WRITTEN QUESTION P-1901/02 by Theodorus Bouwman (Verts/ALE) to the Commission. Progress in implementing Directive 2000/59/EC on port reception facilities.
Date: 2002-06-24
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: EC Directive, EU Member State, harbour installation, national implementing measure, pollution from ships, report, waste disposal, waste management

14.11.2002

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 277 E/251

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(18 July 2002)

Any large, moving structure can produce electromagnetic interference (EMI). This may occur in the case of
wind turbines by reflection of signals from the moving rotor blades so that a nearby receiver picks up both
a direct and reflected signal. EMI is more severe for metallic materials/blades, and least for wooden blades.
Glass reinforced plastic (GRP) which is used in most modern wind turbine blades is practically transparent
to electromagnetic waves and therefore intermediate in its EMI effects.

Experience has shown that careful design and siting of wind energy projects will avoid any disturbance to
telecommunication systems. Nevertheless,
the Commission, via its energy support programmes has
supported in the past research and demonstration projects on innovative materials for wind turbines and
can in principle continue to support such projects through the Sixth Framework Programme for Research,
Technological Development and Demonstration.

(2002/C 277 E/278)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-1901/02

by Theodorus Bouwman (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

(24 June 2002)

Subject: Progress in implementing Directive 2000/59/EC on port reception facilities

On 28 December 2000 Directive 2000/59/EC (1) on port reception facilities came into force. The deadline
for implementation of the directive is 28 December 2002. We have received reports from the Netherlands
that EU Member States are adopting widely differing approaches to financing the costs of implementation.
As I had expected, in my capacity as rapporteur for this subject, only a few Member States have opted for
indirect
financing. Widely differing approaches between ports can lead to waste tourism and may
perpetuate financial incentives to dumping waste at sea. It seems that less and less waste is now being
handed in at the port of Rotterdam. Only 6 % of the ships that call at the port unload waste.

Does the Commission share my view that there are wide variations in methods of implementing the
directive and in the financing systems chosen, and that there is still hardly any sign of plans for a system
of information exchange between ports?

Does the Commission agree that the great differences in financing methods and hence in costs to the
shipping industry limit the effectiveness of the directive and even lead to waste tourism and continued
dumping of waste at sea?

Is the Commission prepared, if the aforementioned differences in implementation justify it, not to wait for
several years before carrying out an assessment, but to take action immediately by encouraging the
Member States to coordinate financing systems more effectively and to launch an information exchange
system in order to ensure that the directive has the desired effect?

(1) OJ L 332, 28.12.2000, p. 81.

C 277 E/252

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

14.11.2002

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(23 July 2002)

The Commission is grateful to the Honourable Member for submitting information about the state of
implementation of Directive 2000/59/EC of the Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2000, on
port reception facilities for ship-generated waste and cargo residues, and in particular its Article 8 on fee
systems for ship-generated waste.

the
The Commission has not yet
implementation of this Directive, the deadline for implementing measures being 28 December 2002. By
this date, the Commission will carefully analyse the implementing legislation of all Member States. The
mechanism adopted to ensure compliance with the principles listed in Article 8 on fee system will
naturally form an important part of this analysis.

received official communication from Member States about

The Commission’s undertaking to make an additional assessment of the fee system within three years, as
provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 8, will not affect the obligation of Member States to comply with the
criteria and principles of Article 8 as from 28 December 2002.

(2002/C 277 E/279)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-1904/02

by Avril Doyle (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(25 June 2002)

Subject: MOX shipment from Japan to UK

Is the Commission satisfied that adequate security measures are in place for the returned MOX shipment
from Japan to the UK port of Barrow-in-Furness due in August/September 2002?

Would the Commission detail what the security measures are and whether all necessary safeguards are in
place to protect European territory and European waters?

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(17 July 2002)

The Commission has neither the responsibility nor the legal powers to evaluate the security arrangements
adopted for the return shipment of the mixed oxide (MOX) fuel to the United Kingdom.

The Office of Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS) in the United Kingdom is responsible for the regulation by
civil nuclear operators for the secure transport of ‘sensitive categories’ of nuclear material. In this context,
the Office is the British designated national authority under the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material, for shipments to and from overseas destinations.

Specifically concerning the return shipment of the MOX fuel from Japan, this falls directly under the
regulatory control of the OCNS. The Office reviewed all the security arrangement, in particular in the
context of the terrorist attack last September 2001 in the United States. These security arrangements were
also reviewed by the United States and Japanese regulatory authorities. All the security authorities are
satisfied that the security arrangements are ‘amply robust to deal with any potential threat’.

According to the information available to the Commission, security measures in place seem adequate.
Nevertheless, the attention of the Honourable Member is drawn to the Convention on Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material and, in particular, the paragraph concerning confidentiality of information concerning
security measures.