WRITTEN QUESTION E-1721/02 by Roberta Angelilli (UEN) to the Commission. Monitoring of nuclear power stations.
Date: 2002-06-13
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Joint Research Centre, competence of the Member States, nuclear safety, public safety, terrorism

C 309 E/156

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

12.12.2002

The 1998 OECD document on the ‘Validation of test methods considered for the adoption as OECD test
guidelines’ (ENV/MC/CHEM (98) 6) acknowledged that ‘… there seems to be a tendency towards being
stricter for ’alternative’ or ’replacement’ tests than for ’conventional’ animal tests, filling gaps of so far
uncovered areas.’ The general problem that double standards may be operating has thus been recognised.

The Commission is not aware of any formal retrospective validation of testing methods currently included
in Annex V of Directive 67/548/EEC. The European Centre for the Validation of Alternative Methods
(ECVAM) of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) has so far concentrated on prospective validation studies.

In the year 2000 three non-animal testing methods validated by ECVAM have been included in Annex V.
These are one method for phototoxicity and two methods for skin corrosion. The methods are since then
available for regulatory purposes in all Member States.

The Commission considers that progress in the development and validation of alternative test methods is
necessary. ECVAM has recently compiled a report, provided for publication in June 2002, on the current
status of alternative tests for human health effects required by Community chemicals legislation. The report
places the emphasis on methods that can replace existing animal tests, either entirely or partially. It makes
recommendations for the further development and validation of alternative tests and strategies.

(1) OJ P 196, 16.8.1967.
(2) OJ L 311, 28.11.2001.

(2002/C 309 E/183)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1721/02

by Roberta Angelilli (UEN) to the Commission

(13 June 2002)

Subject: Monitoring of nuclear power stations

After 11 September and attacks by suicide bombers in Israel and Palestine, the intelligence services in both
Europe and the United States consider that nuclear power stations are potentially high-risk targets and that
therefore nuclear installations and research centres using nuclear material, such as the Ispra research centre
in Varese, are at risk of attack and hence require exceptional surveillance measures.

Can the Commission say:

1. whether steps are being taken at Community level to ensure closer monitoring of nuclear power

stations and thus to ensure the health and safety of the population;

2. what its opinion is on the subject?

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(1 August 2002)

Security measures pertaining to nuclear facilities are the responsibility of the Member States. There is no
Community legislation in this area.

The authorities of the Member States have stepped up existing protective measures for all sites at risk,
particularly nuclear power stations, since 11 September 2001. The measures taken range widely, from
simple verification measures of an administrative nature to military measures. The particular arrangements
are to a great extent confidential and the competent services of the Member States ensure that they are
being properly applied.

12.12.2002

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 309 E/157

As far as Ispra is concerned, it should be noted that most of the activities of this centre concern only the
treatment of nuclear waste and that its security measures have also been reinforced.

(2002/C 309 E/184)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1739/02

by Mario Borghezio (NI) to the Council

(19 June 2002)

Subject: Violation of the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information

In Italy, where the number of telephone calls tapped by the judicial authorities has now reached Orwellian
proportions, there is a huge furore over the ‘eavesdropping’ on ‘Il Giornale’ journalist Marco Chiocci.

Mr Chiocci had in fact been the subject of a three-year campaign ordered by the Rome Public Prosecutors
Office during which all his private and professional calls were tapped.

Other, no less serious, cases have also been reported by representative bodies of the press and of the body
of journalists.

Does the Council consider that this widespread behaviour on the part of Italian magistrates constitutes
serious and repeated violation of the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information, as
specifically provided for in Recommendation No R (2000) 7 of 8 March 2000 of the Council of Europe
Committee of Ministers to member states on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of
information, and in particular Principle 6 thereof, which ‘aims at ensuring that a mere interception order,
surveillance order or search and seizure order does not circumvent the protection of journalists’ sources [of
information] or be applied in a way which lowers this protection’?

Reply

(8 October 2002)

Article 33 of the Treaty on European Union stipulates that the exercise of responsibilities with regard to
the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security is a matter for the Member
States. It is not for the Council to take a position on the measures taken in that context by a Member State
in an individual case.

The recommendation mentioned by the Honourable Member has been adopted in the framework of the
Council of Europe. The Council of the European Union is not in a position to determine whether it has
been violated.

(2002/C 309 E/185)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1744/02

by Camilo Nogueira Román (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

(19 June 2002)

Subject: The intended full application of the FIFG in order to reduce substantially the European Union’s

fishing fleet

How does the Commission intend to solve the extremely serious legal and social problems caused by the
intended use of FIFG structural funding to cut part of the European fleet, as envisaged in the reform of the
common fisheries policy advocated by the Commission, when in actual fact, according to Agenda 2000, in
the period 2000-2006 these funds are earmarked for the modernisation of the fleet?