Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Civil protection - Progress made in implementing the programme for preparedness for possible emergencies
Date: 2002-06-11
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: action programme, civil defence, exchange of information, health control, research programme, terrorism, weapon of mass destruction

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 11.6.2002
COM(2002) 302 final

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Civil protection - Progress made in implementing the programme for preparedness for
possible emergencies

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Civil protection - Progress made in implementing the programme for preparedness for
possible emergencies

1.

INTRODUCTION

In  response  to  the  request  of  the  Heads  of  State  or  Government  to  improve  cooperation
between  the  Member  States  in  preparedness,  detection  and  intervention  to  reduce  the
consequences of Nuclear, Radiological1, Biological and Chemical (NRBC) threats to society,
a  programme  has  been  drawn  up  which 
the  Communication  of
28 November 20012.

is  described 

in 

In  particular,  the  Commission  undertook  to  intensify  its  activities  in  current  actions  and
programmes, work closely with the national authorities and industry to consolidate measures
already  taken,  and  keep  the  Council  and  Parliament  informed  of  progress  made  in
implementing the programme.

The  present  Communication  follows  up  this  commitment  and  sums  up  the  main  progress
made,  in  particular  in  developing  and  implementing  interfaces  between  the  civil  protection
coordination  mechanism,  the  network  for  epidemiological  surveillance  and  control  of
communicable diseases, and activities in key complementary sectors such as research and the
pharmaceutical field.

2.

THE CIVIL PROTECTION FRAMEWORK

The Communication of November 2001 made it clear how the Commission had brought the
various services and networks responsible for civil protection, health protection and research
expertise under one heading in order to have at its disposal a common platform to coordinate
the  European  Union's  optimum  response  to  all  types  of  emergencies.  It  described  how  this
common platform was based on the civil protection coordination mechanism3.

Accordingly, the Commission has given absolute priority to the initiatives  announced in  the
Communication of  November 2001 concerning  civil protection. The initiatives  are  based  on
identifying the threats that are deemed to be the most serious or likely to occur, with the five
following main pillars.

2.1.

Teams of experts for coordinating intervention

The added value of the mechanism largely depends on the  availability of experts capable of
organising and coordinating intervention teams made available by the Member States.

1  Radiological  threats  refers  here,  for  instance,  to  the  theft  of  isotopic  sources  for  criminal  purposes.  Such

sources placed in public areas could insidiously contaminate many people.

2 COM(2001) 707 final, Civil protection - State of preventive alert against possible emergencies.
3 Council  Decision  2001/792/EC,  Euratom  of  23  October  2001  establishing  a  Community  mechanism  to

facilitate reinforced cooperation in civil protection assistance interventions.

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To enable the Commission and the Member States to properly select the experts required and
to ensure that the ability of these experts is recognised by all concerned, it was necessary to
agree on selection criteria developed, approved and used by the Member States in compiling
and supplying lists of experts.

The Commission now has a list of experts available in the Member States with the necessary
qualifications in NRBC fields.

2.2.

Intervention teams and means that can be made available by the Member States

Within the framework of the mechanism, civil protection intervention capacities are provided
by  the  Member  States.  To  ensure  that  optimum  use  can  be  made  of  these  capacities,  a
preliminary inventory had to be compiled in order to discern any requirements not sufficiently
covered within the European Union.

This  stock-taking  exercise,  which  has  been  extended  to  the  candidate  countries  and  to  the
countries of the European Economic Area, has provided an overview of the means currently
available  for  various  types  of  interventions  (including  the  response  to  NRBC  risks).  In
drawing  up  the  inventory  of  specific  means  such  as  serums  and  vaccines,  there  has  been
excellent  cooperation  with  the  pharmaceutical  sector.  Their  activities  are  described  in  more
detail in the section devoted to health protection.

2.3.

Training and exercises for intervention teams

Effective  use  of  the  coordination  mechanism  requires  the  availability  of  highly  qualified
personnel  with  proper  experience  with  this  type  of  exercise  and  of  teams  used  to  working
together in a European context.

All  the  levels  involved,  from  the  head  of  a  national  intervention  team  down  to  the  senior
official responsible for coordinating the action of national teams, should be fully prepared to
be integrated in a Community response to emergencies.

Clearly, such training ought to be an ongoing process; a programme has already been adopted
to this effect. The first training courses will start in the next few weeks. They are designed, in
particular, to ensure compatibility  and  complementarity  between  intervention  teams  that  are
likely to be deployed under the mechanism.

For this purpose, the Commission has issued a call for proposals to the relevant services of the
Member States with a view to holding one or more full-scale simulation exercises in the field
of Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical terrorist attacks.

The idea is to hold one or more exercises in the last quarter of 2002 in order to ascertain the
efficacy of the various components of the new EU civil protection mechanism and particular
contingency plans of the Member States. The response capacity of the Member States will be
tested and response methods will be validated and adapted where necessary.

Moreover, a programme for exchanging NRBC experts will be set up in September 2002 to
disseminate  national  best  practices  more  effectively  and  enable  information  transfer  among
Member States.

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2.4.

Emergency communication and information system

The Commission and the Member States have adopted the technical procedures and security
constraints of  the dedicated  communication  network  that  will  be  established  in  particular  to
enable  urgent  information  to  be  exchanged  among  Member  States  in  response  to  NRBC
threats.

Establishing a communication system that is powerful and reliable even in  emergencies is a
formidable  challenge  which  should  be  met  within  the  framework  of  the  mechanism.  The
solution  adopted  will  specifically  guarantee  the  authenticity,  integrity  and  confidentiality  of
information exchanged among Member States under routine conditions and in emergencies.

Provision  has  of  course  been  made  for  interlinking  this  communication  system  with  other
existing networks, in particular for radiological and health emergencies. The interconnections
will be tested and validated through exercises.

In  order,  more  specifically,  to  validate  and  test  communication  among  operational  centres,
from alert detection to intervention team mobilisation, the Commission has issued a  call for
proposals  to  the  relevant  services  of  the  Member  States  with  a  view  to  holding  a
communication exercise covering NRBC aspects.

This simulation exercise  will  be  followed  by  a special workshop to  take stock of the  action
taken by the Member States and the Commission one year after the attacks of 11 September,
focusing on the level of preparedness and response of the services concerned and highlighting
any additional action required.

2.5.

Monitoring and Information Centre

The Monitoring and Information Centre serves as the nerve centre of the mechanism as it is
here that decisions are taken on the basis of information received from the various networks
and the Member States. This enables the Centre to speed up and facilitate the selection of the
most  appropriate  means  of  intervention  and  to  ensure  ongoing  coordination  while  liaising
with the national authorities.

The Centre's work is based on the round-the-clock network of contacts set up very rapidly by
the Commission to ensure uninterrupted links with the civil protection centres of the Member
States.  Through  this  network  there  is  immediate  access  to  essential  information  on  the
expertise available to control the effects of NRBC attacks.

To  date,  the  fifteen  Member  States,  Norway  and  six  candidate  countries  have  supplied  this
information which will prove to be of crucial importance in the event of an NRBC attack. The
information is constantly kept up to date.

A  precondition  for  ensuring  the  optimum  functioning  of  the  Monitoring  and  Information
Centre  in  times  of  crisis  is  of  course  that  the  teams  working  with  it  are  also  used  to
exchanging  routine  information  with  their  counterparts  in  the  Member  States  and  that  they
develop a relationship of mutual trust.

Moreover,  the  human  resources  available  to  the  Centre  have  been  reinforced,  in  particular
through the support of experts seconded by the Member States. As a result, the personnel on
standby has doubled since 1 April 2002. At the same time, the Commission is trying hard to
substantially  increase  the  staff  that  is  to  be  mobilised  to  implement  the  mechanism  in
particular in emergency situations.

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The  Centre  also  serves  as  an  interface  with  other  networks  likely  to  be  involved  in  dealing
with  an  emergency.  In  this  framework,  appropriate  measures  will  be  taken  to  continue  to
guarantee  optimum  coordination  between  the  civil  protection  network  and  other  networks
such as ECURIE (European Community Urgent Radiological Information Exchange). There
will  of  course  be  cooperation  with  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA)  in
Vienna.

Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  Monitoring  and  Information  Centre  maintains  important
links  with  the  network  for  epidemiological  surveillance  and  control  of  communicable
diseases.

3.

HEALTH PROTECTION 

3.1.

Initiatives already taken in the health field

the  network  for  epidemiological  surveillance  and  control  of
Work  on  extending 
communicable diseases in the Community4 to include pathogenic agents that might be used in
bioterrorist  attacks,  a  key  element  of  the  EU  system  for  responding  to  bioterrorist  threats,
continues with the identification of cases relating to agents that ought to be given priority.

The  programme  for  preparedness  and  response  capacities  in  the  event  of  attacks  involving
biological  and  chemical  agents  (health  security)  compiled  by  the  Commission  on  the
instigation  of  the  health  ministers  of  the  Member  States  has  been  put  in  place.  Substantial
progress has been made on the four main pillars of the programme, whose implementation is
the responsibility of a task force comprising experts from the Member States:

- A network has been set up that is operational day and night to ensure permanent and swift
exchange of information as well as consultation and coordination on health matters potentially
involving chemical or biological agents. As a result, the Commission now has as its disposal a
mutual consultation mechanism to deal with any crisis involving bioterrorist threats.

- Work is in progress to establish a European-level capacity to detect the principal chemical
and biological agents that might be used in an attack and enable rapid detection and diagnosis.
The agents that ought to be  given priority have been identified and  an  inventory  of  existing
resources is currently being drawn up.

- The fundamental aspects of the capacity to produce vaccines and medicines and to stockpile
and supply them have been discussed with the pharmaceuticals sector (see below). Questions
concerning diseases that may affect animals have likewise been discussed in order to increase
stocks of vaccines against foot-and-mouth disease, swine fever and bluetongue in sheep.

- The fourth pillar of the programme consisted of drawing up and publishing rules and advice
on health measures to be taken in response to attacks, coordinating the Union's response and
relations with third countries and international organisations, with work focusing primarily on
cooperation with third countries and international organisations.

4 Decision  2119/98/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of  24  September  1998  setting  up  a

network for the epidemiological surveillance and control of communicable diseases in the Community.

5

                                                
3.2.

Cooperation with third countries and international organisations

Following the meeting of the G7 ministers of health held in Ottawa on 7 November in which
the Commission and Mexico also took part, a network composed of high representatives was
established to deal with crises at international level.

A Global Health Security Action Group has also been set up to  implement  the  plan worked
out  in  Ottawa.  It  has  opened  a  website  with  restricted  access  to  enable  exchange  of
information and rules on health intervention plans, monitoring of diseases, contamination of
water  and  food  chains,  and  guidelines  for  services  providing  care.  The  Group  has  also
initiated  action  relating  to  the  purchase  and  storage  of  medicines,  in  particular  smallpox
vaccines.  Its  work  includes  questions  of  communication  and  risk  management  and  it  has
compiled  a  programme  for  interlinking  P4  laboratories  (laboratories  equipped  to  study  the
most dangerous viruses).

Through the network developed under the European Enter-net programme, all Member States
as well as the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Pan American Health Organisation and
the  European  Commission  are  now  interconnected  and  can  swiftly  exchange  data  from
national  surveillance  systems  and  information  on  particular  types  of  suspect  cases  such  as
contamination of food and water supply chains.

The  countries  participating  in  this  initiative  and  the  Commission  have  decided  to  test  these
procedures and the contingency plans. They will also compile a common seriousness scale for
events  such  as  the  deliberate  discharge  of  biological  and  chemical  agents  and  work  out
strategies for isolation techniques.

The  Commission  is  also  working  with  the  WHO  on  activities  concerning  bioterrorism,  not
only  in  the  context  of  the  initiatives  taken  in  Ottawa  but  also  with  a  view  to  improving
operational aspects of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network and of its integrated
approach towards strengthening epidemiology and laboratory capacity.

The Commission has supported the adoption, and actively participates in the implementation,
of  the  WHO  resolution  on  the  deliberate  use  of  biological  and  chemical  agents  and
radio-nuclear  attacks  which  urges  Member States  to  respond  "by  sharing  expertise,  supplies
and resources in order to rapidly contain the event and mitigate its effects".

The  candidate  countries  have  also  been  informed  of  the  Union's  action  in  the  field  of
bioterrorism.

3.3.

Action in the pharmaceutical field

Action taken in the pharmaceutical field has clearly provided the civil protection mechanism
with strategic resources for the fight against terrorism.

The  Commission  has  first  of  all  set  up  a  joint  Commission  -  pharmaceutical  industry  task
force  which  has  given  priority  to  examining  a  number  of  delicate  questions,  in  particular
drawing  up  an  inventory  of  the  availability  and  capacities  of  production,  stockpiles  and
distribution  of  serums,  vaccines  and  antibiotics  likely  to  be  used  to  counter  any
bacteriological attack.

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The  information  obtained  is  exchanged  on  a  specific  network  created  through  the
Pharmaceutical Committee. At the Commission's request, moreover, the European Agency for
the  Evaluation  of  Medicinal  Products  has  set  up  two  working  parties,  one  responsible  for
compiling a guide on the use of medicines for potential pathogens and the other for drawing
up  more  specific  recommendations  concerning  vaccines  in  general  and  smallpox  vaccine  in
particular. Guidance on how to deal with smallpox will be published by the end of June.

Crucial questions discussed in this connection with the pharmaceutical sector include creating
and  pooling  strategic  stockpiles,  evaluating  production  capacity  for  vaccines,  serums  and
antibiotics,  and  developing  new  medicines  and  vaccines.  The  Commission  continues  to
examine possible options specifically for creating strategic stockpiles at EU level.

4.

RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

The  Research  Council  of  30 October 2001  endorsed  the  Commission's  initiative  to  create  a
group of experts on research and development, composed of representatives appointed by the
ministers for research.

One  of  the  tasks  accomplished  by  this  group  has  been  the  compilation  of  an  inventory  of
research activities in the chemical and biological fields at national and EU level. On the basis
of  this  inventory,  the  group  has  drawn  up  a  number  of  recommendations  which  will  be
submitted to the Research Council of 18 June.

These  recommendations  form  part  of  the  Commission's  strategy  to  establish  a  European
Research  Area  which  through  the  sixth  framework  programme  for  research  (2003-2006)
provides  an  appropriate  structure  and  makes  it  possible  to  make  full  use  of  the  research
potential in Europe, in particular by enabling genuine coordination among Member States.

Against this  background,  the  group  of experts has stressed the Commission's pivotal role in
coordinating  initiatives  taken  in  the  Member  States,  in  particular  in  supporting  surveillance
and  investigative  activities  and  in  such  areas  as  risk  assessment,  physical  protection  and
training.

The group has also presented proposals on research areas that can be covered by the priority
themes  of  the  new  programme  or  under  the  heading  "supporting  policies  and  anticipating
scientific and technological needs". Priority areas include the development of rapid methods
of  detecting  chemical  and  biological  agents  and  the  development  of  new  vaccines  and
therapeutic strategies for use in countering any biological attacks.

These  proposals  back  up  the  work  done  within  the  Health  and  Safety  Committee  and  are
perfectly consistent with the conclusions of the workshop held in Florival in December 2001
which brought together  experts from  the  Member  States  and  the  Commission  mainly  in  the
fields of health, research and civil protection. The key role of research was emphasised at the
workshop, in particular in strengthening  the  scientific basis required  for NRBC surveillance
activities.

The  group  of  experts  has  deemed  it  useful  to  continue  its  work  to  provide  the  Commission
with  an  appropriate  network  and  a  tool  for  guiding  the  research  efforts  required  in  the
European Research Area. The group has stressed that all activities relating to the conclusions
of the Ghent summit ought to continue to be coordinated at Commission level.

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The  Joint  Research  Centre  (JRC)  has  embarked  upon  tow  prospective  studies  on
vulnerabilities  to  bioterrorism  and  the  implication  for  science.  Moreover,  a  bioresponse
working  party  composed  of  experts  from  the  Member  States  has  been  set  up  to  evaluate
whether a terrorist would really be able to introduce deliberately transformed organisms into
the agro-food chain and assess the potential consequences of specific scenarios involving suck
attacks.  The  updating  of  the  database  on  technology  and  equipment  relating  to  the  fight
against  chemical  and  biological  terrorism  ensures  that  the  Member  States  have  is  a  central
source of crucial information at their disposal.

Finally,  in  parallel  with  the  work  of  the  research  and  development  group,  a  pilot  study  has
been  launched  by  the  Commission.  This  study  is  intended  to  observe  and  analyse  the
mechanisms through which scientific advice given in the event of anthrax/bioterrorism can be
conducive  to  interaction  among  the  social  actors  (scientists,  political  decision-makers,  the
media, civic and public society) and influence political action.

5.

CONCLUSION

The important progress made in recent months has made it possible to implement the actions
announced  by  the  Commission  and  thus  meet  the  expectations  of  the  Heads  of  State  and
Government.

Thanks to the sound cooperation among all the Member States and excellent coordination of
work and resources available in the various areas, it has been possible to make considerable
progress  in  sectors  such  as  civil  protection,  health  and  research,  which  are  particularly
sensitive to Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical threats.

A  country  hit  by  a  disaster  can  now  count  not  only  on  EU  resources  in  all  fields  and  in
particular  in  the  field  of  civil  protection,  health  and  research  but  also  on  the  assistance  of
intervention teams that are multinational, complementary and used to working together. These
teams,  which  will  have  the  latest  technical  resources  at  their  disposal,  will  be  coordinated
under the Commission's responsibility by the European experts best qualified to deal with this
type of disaster.

Work on implementing the mechanism will still have to pursue two main lines of action. First,
the  establishment  of  a  genuine  dedicated  communication  network,  reliable  even  in
emergencies,  will  require  a  considerable  amount  of  work  for  development  and  integration.
Second, simulation exercises will have to be held regularly to ensure the smooth functioning
of all components of the civil protection coordination mechanism.

These substantial advances will be further enhanced and will benefit from a phase of practical
tests. The aim of this parallel approach is to contribute to facing the NRBC challenge which
the Commission undertook to meet in its Communication of November 2001.

In the field of health, the Union has already established an efficient mechanism for rapid alert
and  coordinated  management  of  health  aspects  of  crises  precipitated  by  a  biological  or
chemical  attack.  Current  work  on  surveillance  and  laboratory  research  should  in  the  near
future enable rapid detection and treatment of disease and contamination involving biological
and chemical agents following criminal acts.

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In  the  research  field,  the  Commission  will  strive  to  implement  the  recommendations  of  the
research and development group of experts in the context of the sixth framework programme,
continue  to  coordinate  research  activities  and  ensure  exchange  of  information  between
Member States.

In the pharmaceutical field, work on developing new vaccines and stockpiles has already led
to  significant  advances;  this  work  will  continue.  At  the  same  time,  a  system  for  centrally
coordinating  distribution  networks  throughout  the  Union  will  be  developed,  with  possible
amendments  being  made  to  legislation  on  pharmaceuticals  with  a  view  to  facilitating  a
response to bioterrorist threats. The results of the work described above concerning vaccines
and other medicines to counter bioterrorism will be taken into account in drafting proposals
for action at EU level, in particular with regard to reserve stockpiling.

This  Communication  shows  how  the  means  and  tools  for  coordination  and  information
exchange among Member States and between the  Member States and  the Commission  have
been improved in recent months. These advances enhance the efficiency of measures already
taken at national level in countering Nuclear, Radiological, Biological and Chemical (NRBC)
threats.

Work is in progress to further improve this coordination, and a series of additional measures
has been identified and highlighted in this Communication. These additional measures will be
worked out as soon as possible within the framework of existing EU tools.

Finally, it should be noted that all the efforts made to respond specifically to the new threats
in  the  NRBC  field  will,  of  course,  also  enhance  the  capacity  to  respond  and  the  quality  of
such  response  to  any  natural  disaster  or  major  technological  accident  in  and  outside  the
Union.

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