WRITTEN QUESTION P-1610/02 by Samuli Pohjamo (ELDR) to the Commission. Structural Fund payments.
Date: 2002-05-31
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Structural Funds, commitment of expenditure, financial year, implementation of the budget, validation of expenditure

14.8.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 192 E/7

trade (FLEGT) to combat illegal logging and associated illegal trade and to strengthen international co-
operation to address violations of forest law, and forest crime.’

The Commission has been working on this since September 2001, and in particular organised a workshop
in April 2002, to which a wide range of stakeholders and other interested parties were invited (experts
from the Member States, other main wood-producing and importing countries: China, Japan, United States,
Canada, Indonesia, Ghana, …; non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the forest industries). The
workshop produced consensus amongst those present on legality identification and verification of wood
production which could help lead to proposals for inter alia: a legality licence for import
to the
Community; due diligence for banks, Export Credit Agencies and other financing institutions; proper
procurement for public contracts and other matters pertaining to the legal procurement of wood products
into the Community.

Following the workshop, the Commission is now in the process of setting up the FLEGT action plan
covering all relevant aspects. The elaboration of programmes of co-operation with developing wood-
producing countries, with their agreement, will form an essential part of this plan.

The Commission will present the FLEGT action plan before the end of this year.
It should include
proposals for the introduction of new Community legislation which legitimately prohibits the import of
illegally-procured wood and wood products into the Community. The timetable for the introduction of
new legislation will depend on the support of all relevant stakeholders and interested parties; and in
particular the Parliament and the Member States in Council.

(1) OJ L 61, 3.3.1997.
(2) OJ L 250, 19.9.2001.
(3) COM(2002) 82 final.

(2003/C 192 E/007)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-1610/02

by Samuli Pohjamo (ELDR) to the Commission

(31 May 2002)

Subject: Structural Fund payments

The latest budget review figures indicate that the implementation of and payments under Structural Fund
programmes in the current Agenda period have been progressing far too slowly. The slow programme
approval procedure can no longer be held to blame, given that outstanding commitments have risen in
May of this year to the equivalent of last year’s level.

Parliament will be placed in a strange position when it is called upon to give discharge to the Commission
in respect of the Structural Fund policy pursued notwithstanding the fact that the delays have in most
cases been caused by Member States and not by the Commission.

One problem now beginning to arise is that if payments pile up at the end this Agenda period, the annual
payment appropriation frameworks will not be sufficient. A further incipient problem lies in the n+2 rule,
which reduces regional policy funding for many Member States even though local and regional operators
are not to blame for the difficulties inherent in the complicated system.

What is the Commission doing to resolve the situation, which will soon become a political problem?
Could it give a clear and open account to Parliament and the Member States? Could structural policy be
simplified before the end of the current Structural Fund period to enable projects to be set genuinely in
motion?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission

(4 July 2002)

A rapid increase in outstanding commitments (OCs) at the beginning of the year is not an indicator of the
rapidity of implementation of structural action. What happens is that the automatic commitment rule for

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14.8.2003

the annual programme instalments initially creates OCs given that payments are made following actual
execution by recipients and accordingly are spread throughout the year.

Thus during the first five months of 2002 almost all the Structural Fund appropriations were committed
(EUR 30,4 billion in total) whereas payments amounted to EUR 6,2 billion. The difference is the temporary
increase in OCs during the period. In the rest of the year commitments will rise no further whereas
payments will progress normally and so gradually reduce OCs up to the end of the year.

This automatic commitment mechanism, in conjunction with the n+2 automatic decommitment rule, is an
incitement to payment execution and when payment is not made permits reduction of the OCs.

The Commission wishes to point out that in line with the legislation in force it continuously monitors the
financial assistance and regularly reminds Member States of the importance of
state of advance of
implications of failure to do so. It is
maintaining a satisfactory pace of assistance and the financial
preparing a communication on the topic.

simplification has already been met as

The Honourable Member’s wish for
regards programme
complement treatment under the Structural Fund rules in force. In the Committee on Development and
Conversion of Regions the Commission is at present working with the national administrations on
simplifying other aspects of
implementation of the programmes part-financed by the Funds and it
encourages the Member States to take the same approach in national rules. It will not fail to keep
Parliament informed of the results of this work.

(2003/C 192 E/008)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1621/02

by Charles Tannock (PPE-DE) to the Commission

Subject: Interpreting the Growth and Stability Pact

(6 June 2002)

Could the Commission clarify the way in which it interprets the Growth and Stability Pact? In particular,
does the Commission take account of the economic cycle when making its assessment as to whether a
Member State has complied with its provisions? Would the Commission agree that a Member State which
has a budgetary deficit of any size well into an economic upturn is likely to be in a far worse state than a
Member State with an annual budgetary deficit of over 2 % during an economic downturn if that Member
State has demonstrated good financial discipline in the past as well as a capacity to return to surplus
during an upturn, and does the Commission believe that it is necessary for Member States to achieve a
balanced budget over the economic cycle if they are to comply with the terms of the Pact?

Finally, when making its assessment, does the Commission take into account the overall level of debt built-
up by a particular Member State, and, if so, does the Commission believe that full compliance on the part
of countries which have overall levels of debt well in excess of the Maastricht criteria (60 %) can only be
achieved if those countries succeed in permanently reducing their overall level of indebtedness through
such measures as large-scale privatisations?

Answer given by Mr Solbes Mira on behalf of the Commission

(9 July 2002)

In accordance with recital
(14) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97, of 7 July 1997 on the
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic
policies (1) when assessing the compliance of each Member State with the provision of the Stability and
Growth Pact the Commission takes into account the relevant cyclical and structural characteristics of the
economy of each Member State.