Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the "ACP-EU Partnership Agreement"
Date: 2002-04-24
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: ACP countries, agreement (EU), cooperation policy, development policy, dissemination of information, economic cooperation, trade cooperation

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4.5.
The Committee also undertakes to follow the progress
of the programme, so as to inform the socio-occupational
organisations of the Mediterranean countries with which it has
built up close, fruitful cooperation over a period of years, and
encourage them to take part in Tempus MEDA.

4.6.
The Committee also hopes that the activities carried
out under the Tempus programme will be integrated with
those envisaged under other programmes, such as the 6th Fra-
mework Programme on research and development, and will
take account of other initiatives, particularly that on the
European Education Area, which should be extended to include
the Mediterranean countries.

Brussels, 24 April 2002.

The President

of the Economic and Social Committee

Göke FRERICHS

Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘ACP-EU Partnership Agreement’

(2002/C 149/11)

On 28 February and 1 March 2001, in accordance with the third paragraph of Rule 23 of its Rules of
Procedure, the Economic and Social Committee decided to draw up an opinion on the ‘ACP-EU
Partnership Agreement’.

The Section for External Relations, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the
subject, adopted its opinion on 11 April 2002. The rapporteur was Mr Baeza Sanjua´n.

At its 390th plenary session of 24 and 25 April 2002 (meeting of 24 April 2002) the Economic and
Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 101 votes in favour with two abstentions.

1.

Introduction

1.1.
ACP-EU cooperation has its roots in the Treaty of
Rome where the signatories expressed their solidarity with the
overseas colonies and territories and undertook to contribute
to their prosperity. The Yaoundé I and II Agreements (1963-
1969 and 1969-1975 respectively) regulated relations between
the EEC Member States and the ACP countries for the first
it was
time. In 1975 the Lomé I Convention was signed;
revised every five years until the expiry of Lomé IV in 2000.

1.2.
For a long time the Lomé Convention was regarded as
a model for international cooperation agreements because of
its innovative nature. The principle of equality between
partners, the linking of trade and aid (with price stabilisation
mechanisms and protocols on specific products), the gradual
introduction of reciprocal political commitments and the
creation of a joint institutional framework made the Lomé
Convention a yardstick in international relations.

1.3.
However, the political changes which occurred during
the 90s called into question this model of EU/ACP relations.
Some of
the provisions which formed the fundamental
commercial basis of the Lomé Convention were incompatible
with the new rules established by the World Trade Organis-
ation (WTO). The practical implementation of the Convention
turned out to be difficult because of complex procedures
which prevented full use of the resources potentially available.
Despite the Convention’s provisions, the relative share of the
ACP countries in EU trade continued to fall and the outlook
for the development of these countries was, with a few
exceptions, bleak. Poverty increased, exacerbated by a prolifer-
ation of armed conflicts. The increase in emergency humani-
tarian aid bore witness to the shortcomings of long-term
development policies, not to mention the fact that some aid
did not reach its final destination, not infrequently because of
corruption. The end of the bipolar international order favoured
the emergence of two aspects where Lomé was clearly deficient:
a political dimension and its democratisation, through the
effective participation of non-governmental players. Finally,

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many ACP countries felt that the EU was losing interest
in them and turning to the applicant and Mediterranean
countries.

— participation of other actors (private sector, economic
and social players — including trade union organisations,
in addition to central
civil society in all
government, in the ACP-EU partnership;

its forms),

1.4.
Against this background the European Commission
launched a wide-ranging process of consultation and dis-
cussion on future EU-ACP relations, revolving around a green
paper published in 1996 on which the EESC issued an
opinion (1). The negotiations for the conclusion of the new
agreement began formally in September 1998.

— pivotal role of dialogue and mutual commitments;

— differentiation according to characteristics and needs of

each partner (3), and regionalisation.

1.5.
The Partnership Agreement was finally signed in
Cotonou (Benin) in June 2000 by the 15 EU Member States
and 77 ACP countries (2).
It will run for 20 years with
five-yearly reviews and financial protocols. The Agreement
strengthens political dialogue and rests on two fundamental
pillars: trade and aid, matched by two main instruments:
investment facilities and subsidies for promoting long-term
development
indicative programmes —
NIPs and RIPs). To these two pillars a third, equally essential,
pillar must be added, namely the political dimension. The
Agreement will run under the supervision of the ACP-EU joint
institutions.

(national/regional

1.6.
The Committee welcomes the conclusion of the Agree-
ment which avoids the possibility — advocated by some — of
dispensing with a common regulatory framework for ACP-EU
relations. This would have called into question one of the
principal distinguishing features of EU external policy. The
Committee also acknowledges the effort made to come up
with a more readily understandable text than the previous
conventions.

2. Objectives and principles of the Cotonou Agreement

The ultimate objectives of the Agreement are poverty
2.1.
eradication, sustainable development and the gradual
inte-
gration of the ACP countries into the world economy. ACP-
EU cooperation rests on certain fundamental principles:

— equality of the partners and ownership of the develop-
ment strategies, i.e. it is for the ACP countries to define
their own economic and social development strategies in
all sovereignty;

(1) Opinion on the Green Paper on relations between the European
Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century
— challenges and options for a new partnership, rapporteur:
Mr Malosse (OJ C 296, 29.9.1997).

(2) Cuba is the only ACP country which has still not signed the

2.2.
It is particularly appropriate and consistent that the
Agreement should have as a reference framework (as is stated
in the preamble) the international agreements adopted by most
of the Member States and ACP countries, such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the relevant ILO standards, and
the commitments emanating from various UN conferences.

The Committee also welcomes the express recognition
2.3.
of the fact that the Agreement’s objectives can only be attained
by an integrated approach which takes account of the political,
economic, social and environmental aspects.

2.4.
From the text of the Agreement it may be deduced that
one of the partners is basically a donor (EU) and the other a
beneficiary (ACP). It should have spelt out clearly the import-
ance and benefits to the EU of the full integration into the
world economy and the sustainable development of
the
ACP countries. This would have underlined the solidity and
reciprocity of the ACP-EU partnership.

3. The role of the new actors in the ACP-EU partnership

3.1.
Generally speaking, while the Lomé Conventions were
in force the role of non-State actors was limited to the
implementation of small-scale projects financed under the
‘decentralised cooperation’ budget line. Even then, the organis-
ations representing economic and social groups encountered
great difficulties in accessing the Convention’s resources, on
account of both the complexity of the procedures and the
widespread lack of political will to facilitate their participation.

Cotonou Agreement.

(3) The differentiation applies particularly to the LDCs.

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3.2.
The Cotonou Agreement marks a turning point in this
respect. Among the main innovations which it introduces,
its participatory approach should be highlighted. This is
manifested in the desire to broaden the ACP-EU partnership to
embrace a whole range of non-State actors, including local
authorities. The provisions relating to the participation of non-
State actors are contained in more than thirty articles, in a
final declaration and in Annex IV on implementation and
management procedures. The references most representative
of
this new approach are included in the ‘Fundamental
principles’ (Article 2) and in Chapter 2, devoted entirely to ‘the
actors of the partnership’.

3.5.
Nevertheless, the involvement of new actors as envis-
aged in the Agreement also raises a number of serious
questions. Firstly, the definition of the actors — which is
always difficult — is imprecise and has overlaps, and could
therefore lead to arbitrary choices by some governments.
There is no denying the difficulty of establishing traits which
identify clearly and unequivocally the representative non-State
actors of 77 different countries. Even so, it is unacceptable that
it may be inferred from the Agreement (Article 6b and
declaration on the actors of the partnership) that the private
sector does not belong with the economic and social partners
and that the latter, for their part, are not included in civil
society. Such a definition clearly runs counter to current
practice in the EU and is merely likely to sow confusion.

The Agreement provides for the full participation of
3.3.
the new actors in ACP-EU relations, in particular by means of:

— consultation on cooperation policies and strategies, and

on political dialogue;

— provision of financial resources;

— involvement in the implementation of cooperation pro-
jects and programmes in areas that concern them or
where they have a comparative advantage;

3.6. More worrying is the lack of instruments to bind non-
State actors into the ACP-EU partnership. It is true that the
Agreement provides for incentives and it is unrealistic to
expect overnight changes in the political culture of many
governments, traditionally little inclined towards power-shar-
ing with organisations representing civil society. Nevertheless,
the legitimacy of the Agreement would be seriously jeopardised
if one of its central and most innovative planks were infringed
with impunity.

— provision of capacity-building support

to
reinforce their capabilities and establish consultation
mechanisms.

in order

the new actors and of

3.4.
The provisions of the Cotonou Agreement represent a
major step forward on the road towards more democratic
ACP-EU relations in that they envisage the involvement of new
players in the definition of development policies and strategies.
The complementary role of
the
government should be — and indeed is — specially stressed:
they are not competing for the same space but each should
provide their own added value in those areas where they can
show they have a comparative advantage, thus contributing to
the economic development and social well-being of their
respective countries. The positive contribution of non-State
actors to the consolidation of stable and democratic political
systems cannot be underestimated. It should also be stressed
that the full
involvement of non-State actors in framing
national development strategies and sectoral strategies in focal
sectors is a sine qua non for the implementation of effective
anti-poverty policies, the integration of the ACP countries into
the global economy and for sustainable development —
central objectives of the Agreement. For this reason it is hard
to understand why broad consultation is provided for in
national programmes, but is seen as merely a possibility at
regional level. Finally, it is a good thing that new actors are
explicitly not equated exclusively with NGOs.

the Agreement

It should be stressed that

(or its
3.7.
application, through the programming guidelines) expressly
provides for the access of non-State actors to three kinds of
financial resources: strictly Community budget lines, European
Development Fund (EDF) resources earmarked for the focal
sectors identified in the National Cooperation Strategy, and
EDF funds which can be accessed directly by non-State actors,
with a ceiling of 15 % of the total allocated to the National
Indicative Programme. Their primary use will be to finance
information, consultation, dialogue promotion and capacity-
building activities. The possibility for non-State actors to access
directly some of the resources allocated to the NIPs (another
innovation in the Cotonou Agreement), and for these to be
managed directly by the European Commission delegations in
each country, is a highly positive step. Nevertheless, there is
no doubt that uncertainties persist: the choice of actors eligible
for the funding requires the express consent of the national
authorising officer (NAO), the government representative who
traditionally has had a proprietary perception of the funds and
may be tempted not to share them with players who have a
critical or merely differing opinion of his activities.
It is
therefore essential to ensure that all the representative actors
have the chance to access, without discrimination,
the
resources flowing from the Agreement. Nor should the
principle of focusing resources work against the access of new
actors to these resources.

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3.8.
in its
The programming exercise is currently still
infancy. Nevertheless, an initial assessment may be made of
this process on the basis of the information gathered by the
EESC (1). Although there has been an increase in information
and consultation of non-State actors, much remains to be
done: in general terms, information on the Agreement has not
been adequately disseminated or is still difficult to access;
consultation — where it has taken place — has not as a rule
been systematic or regular and in some cases representative
organisations have been excluded. The current programming
should be used to initiate a learning process for all parties,
which will not be easy, and to check whether they are actually
beginning to move in the right direction. For this reason a
specific assessment of the level of consultation and use of
resources by non-State actors should be included in the annual,
mid-term and end-of-term operational reviews. Similarly the
international organisations representing civil society, together
with the European Economic and Social Committee, could
cooperate effectively with the European Commission and
the joint ACP-EU institutions in identifying the difficulties
encountered and highlighting the most fruitful experiences.

4. Political dimension

The Cotonou Agreement, compared with previous
4.1.
conventions, substantially reinforces the political dimension
of ACP-EU relations. Political dialogue, a commitment to
respect all human rights and fundamental freedoms (with a
fundamental social rights, democracy
specific mention of
based on the rule of law and good governance), peace-building
policies and conflict prevention occupy a central place in the
political dimension of the Agreement. This is a new approach,
based on shared values reflected in key elements of the
Agreement.

The Committee welcomes the boost given to the
4.2.
political dimension in the present Agreement and in particular
the unequivocal link established between the afore-mentioned
commitments and sustainable development. This is an explicit
recognition of the fact that development is a concept which
cannot be confined to purely technical considerations. The
reference to the involvement of civil society as an element
contributing to the consolidation of a stable and democratic
political environment, and its role in peace-building, conflict
prevention and resolution, along with its involvement in
the political dialogue, should also be highlighted. In this
connection, the implementation of the Agreement should

(1) The information that the Committee has on the involvement of
civil society organisations — especially economic and social
groups — in the current programming exercise comes from the
European Commission, international socio-occupational organis-
ations and the conclusions of the regional seminars organised by
the ESC itself in various ACP countries.

encourage the effective involvement of non-State actors in the
consultation procedures concerning respect for human rights,
democratic principles, the rule of law and corruption, as
provided for in Articles 96 and 97.

4.3.
The Agreement does not, however, contain instru-
ments for guaranteeing the effective protection of the political
principles enshrined therein; because of their general wording,
different criteria can be applied in different countries. Although
recourse to sanctions should be an exception, more precise
criteria should have been established for the protection of
emergent democracies, with sanctions against gaining power
through violence (especially against democratic regimes),
measures for combating corruption and respect for basic
standards established by the ILO. These are fundamental
principles of the Agreement which deserve greater support;
their practical application should have been guaranteed.

The political dimension of the Cotonou Agreement
4.4.
means putting into practice new working methods, forms of
cooperation, indicators and channels of dialogue. The great
challenge will be to involve all of society in sharing and
implementing the values expressed in the Agreement. To this
end it will be essential to promote dialogue between State and
non-State actors.

5. Development strategies

The development strategies, along with economic and
5.1.
trade cooperation, constitute the cooperation strategies of the
Cotonou Agreement. The principles, objectives and approach
of the development strategies are appropriate. Similarly, the
focus on four selected areas of support (economic develop-
ment, social and human development, regional cooperation
and integration, and cross-cutting issues — gender issues,
environment and institutional development) should be wel-
comed.

5.2.
Generally speaking, however, there is a question-mark
over the degree of coherence between the two pillars which
comprise the development strategies; in particular the links
between economic and social development, especially as
regards training (basic and vocational) and health protection,
should have been highlighted more precisely.

the Agreement as appropriate,

5.3. With regard to economic development, the Committee
regards the important role assigned to the private sector
throughout
including the
measures designed to strengthen that sector. Similarly, the
structural policies mentioned include strengthening labour
market reforms, which, thus formulated, seems excessively
vague and likely to be interpreted in very different, even
contradictory, ways. Again, while agreeing with the objective
of promoting employment, the Committee would have liked
to see the adjective ‘decent’ added in accordance with ILO
recommendations.

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5.4.
It is worrying that the Agreement is less sensitive to
environmental issues than its predecessors. For example, the
Lomé Convention explicitly prohibited all direct and indirect
exports of hazardous or radioactive waste between the EU and
the ACP countries, while the Cotonou Agreement merely ‘takes
into account’ issues relating to the transport and disposal of
hazardous waste. The Agreement should have included an
explicit reference to the relationship between environmental
protection, food safety and poverty reduction, or — more
broadly — studied in depth the concept of sustainable
development. Just as it aspires to coherence and compatibility
with international economic institutions, the Cotonou Agree-
ment should have taken into account the objectives and
instruments of international environmental conventions.

6. Economic and trade cooperation

6.1. While the various Lomé Conventions were in force
(1975-2000), the ACP countries benefited from the most
favourable trade arrangements granted to third countries by
the EU: non-reciprocal trade preferences for most primary,
industrial and processed products (1), commodity protocols
and price stabilisation mechanisms for certain agricultural
products (Stabex) and mining products (Sysmin). Nevertheless,
the general reduction in customs tariffs in the wake of global
trade liberalisation and the preferences granted by the EU
to other developing regions (Mediterranean third countries,
Mercosur, etc.) have meant that the ACP preferences have
become relatively less valuable. It is estimated that after the
Uruguay Round the ACP countries lost a preferential margin
of over 30 %.

6.2.
The record of these 25 years is disappointing: trade
with the ACP countries has fallen from 8 % to 3 % of total EU
trade. With a few exceptions, the ACP countries have not been
able to increase, improve or diversify their products, unlike
some other countries with fewer preferences.
In general
terms ACP trade has four distinctive features: marginalisation,
dependence on raw materials, static specialisation and depen-
dence on the European market. But, especially, Lomé demon-
strated that a few percentage points of tariff preference cannot
offset the shortcomings of other supply-side factors (lack of
investment, inadequate infrastructure, low technological level,
poor training, etc.) which determine the competitiveness of
export products.

6.3.
The Cotonou Agreement attempts to respond to WTO
provisions which, in broad terms, prevent non-reciprocal trade
preferences or preferences limited to a specific group of
countries. This means that the trade arrangements granted to

(1) 92 % of ACP exports enter the European market duty free. 100 %
of industrial products and 80 % of agricultural products are
exempt from duty. If those products covered by protocols are
added, only 1 % of products are subject to tariff protection.

the ACP countries will have to be extended to all developing
countries or be brought into line with free trade agreements.
Strictly speaking, therefore, Cotonou comprises not so much
a trade agreement as a commitment to undertake the nego-
tiation of trade agreements compatible with WTO rules.

6.4.
Thus Cotonou stipulates that between 2002 and 2008
negotiations are to be held to conclude economic partnership
agreements (EPAs) — free trade agreements — between the
EU and the ACP countries. The present trading system will
continue until 2008, thanks to a derogation granted by the
WTO. The characteristic feature of the EPAs will be reciprocity,
integration
with the accent on negotiations with regional
groups. The period 2008 to 2020 will be a transitional period
for the implementation of the agreements.

6.5. With a view to facilitating the conclusion and
implementation of the EPAs, a number of support measures
have been provided for: partial compensation to offset the
fiscal and balance of payments adjustments necessitated by
liberalisation (financed by the EDF and EIB), cooperation on
adjusting national to multilateral rules, and creation of a
joint committee responsible for monitoring the
ministerial
negotiation of the EPAs and cooperation in international fora,
especially in the WTO, which seems an excellent initiative.

6.6.
The Agreement allows LDCs to decide that they are
not in a position to negotiate an EPA. Whatever the case, the
EU wishes to find a formula which, while compatible with
WTO rules, enables products from these countries to have
access to the European market without quantitative or tariff
restrictions, in line with the ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative.
Hence the Cotonou Agreement puts an end to non-discrimi-
nation between ACP countries, providing for different treat-
ment for LDC and non-LDC countries.

6.7.
The approach has changed radically. For 25 years
Lomé placed considerable confidence in trade preferences as
an engine of economic growth. Cotonou seems to transfer the
same confidence to trade liberalisation, linking it to integration
into the world economy, sustainable development and poverty
eradication. The main dynamic effects expected from the EPAs
are: promoting the process of regional integration; enhancing
belief in the ability of the economic and trade policies of the
ACP countries to remain ‘anchored’ to multilateral agreements;
improving internal competitiveness; encouraging modernis-
tax systems; boosting investor confidence; and
ation of
facilitating integration into the global economy. These dynamic
effects could come to act as genuine catalysts for development.

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6.8.
Nevertheless, the EPAs raise not a few concerns, despite
the long time-frames envisaged to negotiate and implement
them, which would seem absolutely appropriate.

the System of Generalised Preferences (SGP). The SGP would
offer reduced access to the European market, but would require
less opening up of their own markets.

6.9.
Firstly, the EU has expressed a wish that the EPAs be
integration blocs. To date,
negotiated with ACP regional
however, these groups have been fragile; frequently their
members do not share clear common interests or are involved
in armed conflicts; furthermore, few of them have an adequate
supranational structure to negotiate free trade agreements on
behalf of their members. Plus the fact that both non-LDCs and
LDCs are involved in regional integration, further complicating
the negotiation of EPAs.

6.10.
Secondly, about 20 % of government revenue in
many ACP countries comes from customs tariffs. The abolition
of duties on European imports (which could reasonably be
expected to increase relative to other countries after the EPAs
are signed) would roughly halve this revenue. Bearing in mind
how difficult it is to diversify fiscal resources, national budgets
could face serious problems (1). Besides, there is no guarantee
that the fall in customs tariffs will be passed on in lower prices
for ACP consumers and importers. For this reason the EPAs
should identify those sectors and social groups potentially
most affected by a possible reduction in public revenue and
adopt appropriate corrective measures. Support should also be
provided for the introduction of adequate tax arrangements
based on a fair distribution of the burden between citizens in
accordance with their income.

6.11.
As far as trade is concerned, the main challenge facing
the ACP countries will be their ability to respond to European
competition. Numerous ACP countries have expressed anxiety
at the difficult situation facing some sectors (especially agri-
culture) which could be at risk on account of their lack of
competitiveness and the production, processing and export
aid enjoyed by European products, even taking into account
that the Agreement (Article 37(7)) allows for the protection of
certain sensitive products.

6.12.
For these reasons there is a risk that not only the
LDCs but also an unspecified number of non-LDCs could avail
themselves of the possibility of not signing an EPA and opt for

At all events, the liberalisation of trade must not be
6.13.
an end in itself. The principal objective of the EPAs must be to
promote forms of sustainable development designed to combat
poverty. To this end, appropriate machinery must be estab-
lished (including capacity building) which enables the represen-
tatives of organised civil society — and in particular the
economic and social groups — to be properly informed and
consulted during the negotiation of the EPAs. Similarly, before
the negotiations start an analysis should be carried out of the
impact of the EPAs in each ACP country, pinpointing those
economic sectors and social groups potentially most at risk.

6.14.
The EPAs must help to attract foreign, especially
European, investment. For this it will be necessary to adopt
simple, transparent and non-discriminatory regulations and to
create broader and more integrated regional markets.

6.15.
In any case it should be pointed out that to guarantee
the success of the EPAs all possible resources will have to be
mobilised to put an end to the armed conflicts besetting
certain African countries. For its part the European Union will
have to pioneer a debt relief
initiative (as it did in the
trade sphere with the ‘Everything But Arms’ initiative), since
repayments preclude any possibility of development for many
ACP countries.

6.16. With regard to the other provisions included in the
Title of the Agreement devoted to trade cooperation, the EESC
also welcomes the inclusion, in connection with trade policy,
of a specific reference to the commitment to core labour
standards — as defined by the ILO — and the decision to
enhance cooperation in this area, especially as regards the
exchange of information on labour regulations, the formu-
lation and strengthening of labour legislation, education and
awareness-raising programmes, and enforcement of adherence
to national labour regulations.

(1) Jadot, Yannick: ‘L’UEMOA et la CEMAC face à l’accord comercial
de Cotonou’, in UE-ACP: A nouvelle convention, nouvelle coopé-
ration? Comment appliquer les accords de Cotonou? Paris,
GEMDEV, 2001. Similar views are expressed in various articles by
Stephan Brune (Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris and Deutsches
U¨ bersee-Institut Hamburg), Bruno Losch, OECD Development
Centre and Cotonou Infokit, and the European Centre for
Development Policy Management.

On the other hand, the Committee regrets that the
6.17.
article on maritime transport refers to cooperation to promote
cost-effective and efficient services, but omits to mention that
they should also be safe and of high quality. Some ACP
countries act as flags of convenience and their registers do not
include conditions ensuring compliance with international
rules, nor do their crews always have the proper certificates.

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7. EESC proposals for the implementation of the Coto-

nou Agreement

7.1.
The Cotonou Agreement provides an appropriate legal
and political framework for developing an effective partnership
between the ACP countries and the European Union.
Its
provisions are a clear advance on Lomé since they build on an
approach which integrates political, economic and social
factors, while at the same time aiming to involve the whole
population of the signatory countries. Nevertheless, the Agree-
ment will only achieve full legitimacy when it is implemented;
when it demonstrates that the principle of the ACP States
determining their own development strategies is more reality
than rhetorical device; when it provides tangible proof that the
whole of organised civil society has the opportunity to
participate actively in the preparation of the strategies for the
development of their country and to access the resources
released by these strategies.

7.2.
The EESC would wish to contribute to the practical
implementation of the Agreement in that area where it can
best add value: proposing specific measures for the full
participation of organised civil society in the furtherance of
ACP-EU relations. First, however, the Committee welcomes
the official recognition which the Cotonou Agreement accords
it by entrusting it with the organisation of consultation
meetings and meetings of ACP-EU economic and social
operators. This recognition has strengthened the EESC’s role
vis-à-vis the Joint Parliamentary Assembly and the ACP-EU
Council of Ministers (1).

Beyond this institutional recognition, the EESC should
7.3.
continue disseminating information on the opportunities
offered by the Cotonou Agreement to the representatives of
civil society and drawing attention to any shortcomings in its
implementation. The regional seminars already held have
shown themselves to be a very useful tool in this respect, but
if the Committee is to develop this role to the full it needs to
take its cooperation with the international socio-occupational
organisations a stage further.

7.4.
As a preliminary comment, the EESC would express its
concern that the implementation of the Agreement could be
complicated unnecessarily and lose its coherence because
responsibility for its implementation is shared between differ-
ent directorates-general
in the European Commission. The
political dialogue is the remit of the External Relations DG,
but the Development, Trade and AIDCO DGs also have major
tasks in the future development of the Agreement. It is essential
that this multiplicity of responsibilities does not impede full
and effective application of the Agreement. The EESC is also
confident that the new management procedures adopted by

the European Commission will help to ensure that greater and
more effective use is made of the resources released by
the Agreement. In particular the Committee hopes that, as
anticipated, those ACP countries which adhere most closely to
all the provisions will benefit from increased resources.

7.5. With a view to ensuring that the provisions of the
Cotonou Agreement are implemented effectively, the EESC
proposes the following:

7.5.1.

with regard to the dissemination of information:

— the EU and the ACP States should ensure that the contents
of the Agreement are widely publicised by all suitable
means (information meetings at different levels, publi-
cations, new technologies, etc.);

— the European Commission should reinforce the del-
egations in the ACP countries, in line with the Agree-
ment’s new political guidelines. In particular, the rep-
resentatives of civil society organisations should be
guaranteed direct access to EU representations so that
they can be fully informed about participation in drawing
up development strategies and access to funding;

— the delegations of the European Commission and the
ACP States should cooperate with the socio-occupational
organisations so that the latter can circulate information
on the Cotonou Agreement among their members.

7.5.2.

with regard to capacity building:

— establish a regulatory framework that helps civil society
organisations to flourish, in particular access to financing
and local resources, and prevent these organisations being
supplanted by non-representative organisations that are
linked to a particular government;

— encourage and support the efforts of civil society organis-
ations to strengthen their structures, build up networks,
improve their representativeness and analytic capabilities;

— promote dialogue between organisations in the ACP
States and between these organisations and their Euro-
pean counterparts, supporting the creation of networks,
with special attention to the processes of regional inte-
gration, respect for labour rights, support for the private
sector, protection of rural areas and of the environment;

(1) Cf. Cotonou Agreement, Protocol 1 on the operating expenditure
of the Joint Institutions, paragraph 4, and Decision 1/2001 of the
ACP/EU Committee of Ambassadors concerning the adoption of
the rules of procedure of the ACP-EU Council of Ministers,
Article 10 (OJ L 43, 14.2.2001).

— simplify the machinery whereby the representatives of
civil society organisations can access the resources
released by the new Agreement ensuring effective access
for the representatives of economic and social interest
groups;

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EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 149/45

— allocate,

in the programming of each country, direct
funding for non-State actors, as provided for in the
programming guidelines, ensuring non-discriminatory
access for the most representative organisations.

— adopt or strengthen a participatory approach, establishing
national and regional structures which promote dialogue
between organisations representing civil society, and
between these organisations and the public authorities;

7.5.3.
tion:

with regard to strengthening the consultative func-

— involve the representatives of civil society organisations
from the outset in the process of applying the Agreement
and in programming, so that they can contribute to
drawing up development strategies in each of
their
countries;

— create or strengthen arrangements which enable the
representatives of civil
to be
involved in the ACP-EU political dialogue and the nego-
tiation of the EPAs;

society organisations

— include a specific assessment of the level of consultation
and use of resources by non-State actors in the annual,
mid-term and end-of-term operational reviews;

— in turn, the ACP-EU Follow-up Committee will draw up
an action plan for assessing the implementation of the
Cotonou Agreement, the adoption of which will be
submitted to the delegates participating in the 23rd meet-
ing of ACP-EU economic and social interest groups, to be
held in Brussels in the second half of 2002.

Brussels, 24 April 2002.

The President

of the Economic and Social Committee

Göke FRERICHS