WRITTEN QUESTION E-1126/02 by Astrid Lulling (PPE-DE) to the Commission. Differences between wholesale prices excluding VAT in the European Union.
Date: 2002-04-18
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: EU Member State, Luxembourg, distributive trades, motor vehicle industry, price disparity, price net of tax, restriction on competition, vertical agreement, wholesale price

C 52 E/38

Official Journal of the European Union

EN

6.3.2003

Answer given by Mr Bolkestein on behalf of the Commission

(17 May 2002)

Article 3 of the Land Vorarlberg law does provide for a 15 % hunting tax for Austrian residents and a 35 %
tax for non-residents.

But an amendment to this law, introducing a standard rate of 20 % for all EU residents, is currently going
through the Land Vorarlberg legislature. Its adoption will soon put an end to the discrimination referred to
by the Honourable Member, which does indeed conflict with Community law.

(2003/C 52 E/048)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1126/02

by Astrid Lulling (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(18 April 2002)

Subject: Differences between wholesale prices excluding VAT in the European Union

The Commission recently presented a draft regulation on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to
categories of agreements and concerted practices in the motor vehicle industry (1). One of the aims is to
align vehicle prices excluding taxes.

Traders in a number of sectors in Luxembourg have complained that their European suppliers (based
outside the Grand Duchy) are charging wholesale prices excluding tax much higher than those asked of
traders in other Member States.

A number of traders are obliged to purchase in particular countries and are unable to buy in other
countries where the same goods are cheaper. It even happens that products are distributed throughout
Europe from only one country and importers fix different prices in different Member States.

What does the Commission plan to do about these accusations, by analogy with the motor vehicle
proposal mentioned above?

Might not these practices be considered contrary to the principles of free movement of goods in the single
market and freedom of competition and to Article 81(1)(a) of the EC Treaty, which bans practices that
‘directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions’?

Is the Commission prepared to take legislative or other action to resolve this problem?

(1) OJ C 67, 16.3.2002, p. 2.

Reply given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission

(28 May 2002)

With regard to competition rules,
the motor vehicle distribution sector is at present governed by
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on the application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements which expires on
30 September 2002 (1).

The proposal
for a new regulation on motor vehicle distribution, adopted by the Commission on
5 February 2002, aims to create the market conditions needed to increase competition in the sales and
after-sales markets.

The general approach of this proposal is based on the Commission’s new policy for the assessment of
vertical restraints, as set out in the recent Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December
1999 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted
practices (2), and the related Guidelines (3).

6.3.2003

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 52 E/39

This general regulation sets out the competition rules applicable to all distribution sectors except motor
vehicles, where the above-mentioned proposal provides for a stricter regime. This general regulation is
based on a more economic approach, and Article 4(d) does not cover the restriction of cross-supplies
between distributors within a selective distribution system, including between distributors operating at
different
trade. Such a system prohibits manufacturers from limiting the supply of retail
distributors from independent importers that have not been assigned to them. By the same token,
manufacturers may not prevent independent importers from selling to the same ‘retail distributors’ if they
so desire.

levels of

However, in the cases in Luxembourg referred to, there is insufficient evidence of the type of distribution
envisaged to be able to ascertain whether or not the behaviour mentioned is likely to constitute an
infringement. If evidence of anti-competitive behaviour were brought to the Commission’s attention, it
would definitely examine it in order to establish whether there were grounds to launch the necessary
infringement procedures to put a stop to such behaviour.

(1) OJ L 145, 29.6.1995.
(2) OJ L 336, 29.12.1999.
(3) Guidelines on vertical restraints, OJ C 291, 13.10.2000.

(2003/C 52 E/049)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1139/02

by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Council

(22 April 2002)

Subject: EU measures to take effective steps against continuing colonisation, destruction and eviction

activities by Israel in the Palestinian territories

1.
If Israel’s policy which has changed under Sharon continues, as does disregard for United Nations
Resolutions Nos 181, 194, 242/338 and 1397, what should the consequences be for the Association
Agreement between the EU and Israel,
in particular Article 2 of this agreement which deals with the
infringement of human rights and the associated sanctions?

2. What consequences should Israel’s altered policy have for the level at which EU Member States’
diplomatic relations with Israel are continued?

3. What consequences should Israel’s altered policy have for the purchase of weapons from the Israeli
defence industry and for the sale of weapons by EU Member States to Israel?

4. What consequences should Israel’s altered policy have for international trials of those responsible for
war crimes in the occupied territories?

5.
How will compensation be made for the improvement projects in the Palestinian area which have
been destroyed on the instructions of the Israeli government and which were financed or co-financed by
contributions from the EU or from individual Member States?

6.
If no other forms of pressure are effective, what should the consequences be for transport links with
Israel, namely El Al’s landing rights at various airports in the EU, flights by various airlines from the EU to
the Israeli airport of Lod (Ben Gurion) for scheduled services and Eilat for holiday charter flights, for the
regular liner services of the Poseidon Lines and Salamis Lines from the Greek port of Piraeus via Rhodes
and Limassol to the Israeli port of Haifa and for access for ships of the Israel shipping line ZIM?