Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on specific stability requirements for ro-ro passenger ships
Date: 2002-03-25
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: International Maritime Organisation, carriage of passengers, maritime safety, maritime transport, safety standard, transport safety

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Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on specific stability
requirements for ro-ro passenger ships

(2003/C 20 E/05)

(Text with EEA relevance)

COM(2002) 158 final — 2002/0074(COD)

(Submitted by the Commission on 25 March 2002)

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

1. Background

The stability following collision damage is an issue of prime importance for the survivability of ro-ro
passenger ships, due to their particular design. It is obvious that in general, the longer the period a ship
remains afloat in case of serious damage, the more efficient the eventual evacuation or search and rescue
operations can be. In that perspective the stability requirements applicable to these ships influence directly
the safety of passengers and crew. These considerations become even more important in view of the
escalating size of ro-ro ships serving Community ports and the increasing number of passengers and crew
they carry.

As both practise and research has demonstrated, the most dangerous problem for a ro-ro ship with an
enclosed ro-ro deck is the one posed by the effect of a build-up of significant amount of water on that
deck. However, with the application of the appropriate technical standards a damaged vessel may stay
afloat even when a certain amount of water made its way to the ro-ro deck (the car deck). Research has
clearly shown that the residual freeboard of the ship and the waves height in a particular sea area had a
significant effect on the amount of water which may accumulate following collision damage.

The stability of ro-ro passenger ships has been addressed at international
level by the International
Maritime Organisation and specific standards have been established in that respect, particularly on the
basis of the SOLAS 90 Convention (1) and Resolution A265. These standards, implicitly include the effect
of water entering the ro-ro deck in a sea state in the order of 1,5 m significant wave height and have a
phasing-in timetable for existing ships ranging from 1 October 1998 to 1 October 2010.

Following the Estonia disaster, eight European countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom) decided in February 1996 to require higher standards of
damage stability for ro-ro passenger ships than those prescribed by SOLAS 90. These new standards
were introduced in the context of the Stockholm Agreement (SA) to which the above eight countries
became parties. The Stockholm Agreement stability requirements are complementary to the SOLAS 90
standard, aimed at increasing the survivability of the ro-ro vessels in sea states between 1,5 m and 4 m
significant wave height. These complementary requirements take specifically into account the probability
of water accumulation in the car deck, up to a height of 0,5 m. The Stockholm Agreement established a
phasing-in period ranging from 1 April 1997 to 1 October 2002.

At the adoption of the Stockholm Agreement, noting its regional application, the Commission announced
its intention to examine the prevailing local conditions, under which ro-ro passenger ferries sail in all
European waters and that this examination would include the extent and effect of the application of the
Agreement in the region covered by it. The statement concluded that in the light of this examination the
Commission would take a decision with regard to the need for further initiatives.

(1) International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea as revised in 1990.

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The Council entered a similar statement into the meeting of the 2074th Council meeting of 17 March
1998 at which Council Directive 98/18/EC on safety rules and standards for passenger ships was
adopted (1). In this statement the need to ensure the same level of safety for all ro-ro passenger ferries
operating in similar conditions was more precisely defined by referring to both international and domestic
voyages. Directive 98/18/EC made mandatory the application of SOLAS 90 stability standards to domestic
EU trades for new class A, B, C and D ships and existing class A and B ships (2).

Following the last serious accident involving a ro-ro passenger ship, the ‘Express Samina’ which occurred
in Greece in September 2000, the European Parliament invited the Commission to examine the effec-
tiveness of the Stockholm Agreement and other measures for improving the stability and safety of
passenger vessels (3).

In this context and following a thorough analysis on the Stockholm Agreement, the Commission included
this item in its work programme for 2001.

2. The SOLAS stability requirements and the Stockholm Agreement

2.1. The question of stability of passenger vessels has been addressed repeatedly by the International
Maritime Organisation (IMO) in the context of the International Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea (SOLAS) and the first damage stability requirements were introduced in 1948 followed by
improvements in 1960 and 1974. However, the major step in the development of stability standards
for ro-ro ships came in 1990 with the introduction of a new section (4) in the SOLAS Convention.
These requirements (known as SOLAS 90 stability standard) are internationally accepted and apply to
passengers vessels involved in international voyages from/to EU ports, as well as to domestic trades
within Member States by means of the Directive 98/18/EC. The SOLAS 90 standard implicitly include
the effect of water entering the ro-ro deck in a sea state in the order of 1.5 m significant wave height.

The SOLAS 90 requirements have a phasing-in period for all existing ro-ro passenger ships with dates
of compliance ranging from 1 October 1998 to 1 October 2010 depending on a combination of
different factors (5).

2.2. In the aftermath of the Estonia disaster, 8 European countries (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom), agreed in February 1996 in Stockholm to
require higher standards of damage stability for ro-ro passenger ships than what had been determined
just a few years earlier by the IMO SOLAS 90 standard. The key idea behind this initiative was that a
ship should be designed to resist capsize even when a certain quantity of water has made its way to
the vehicle (ro-ro) deck.

The Stockholm Agreement (SA) was established in the context of IMO Resolution 14 of the 1995
SOLAS Conference, allowing contracting governments to conclude such an agreement if they consider
that prevailing sea conditions and other local conditions require specific stability requirements in a
designated area. It was notified to the IMO on 1 April 1996 in accordance with operative paragraph
3 of Resolution 14 and entered into force on 1 April 1997 in accordance with its article 10 (6). In
simplified terms, the SA standards are complementary to SOLAS 90 standards with the addition of
technical requirements to satisfy explicitly the ‘water in the car deck’ probability. Compliance with
these requirements is measured whether on basis of numerical calculations defined in the Agreement
or by performing model experiments in accordance with the model testing method of SOLAS 95
Resolution 14.

(1) OJ L 144, 15.5.1998, p. 1.
(2) These classes are defined in line with the type of sea area the ships operate, in accordance with article 4 of Council

Directive 98/18/EC.

(3) EP Resolution B5-0783, 0787 and 0791/2000 of 5 October 2000.
(4) SOLAS Chapter II-1, part B.8 (Stability in damaged condition).
(5) These factors are: the vessel's A/Amax value, the number of persons carried and its age. (The A/Amax calculation
procedure is a simplified version of probabilistic damage stability calculation of ships, adopted by IMO as a means of
trying to compare the survivability of one ship against another in order to achieve a hierarchy for phasing-in
purposes. It is not a survivability standard.)
(6) IMO Circular letter No 1891 of 29 April 1996.

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According to the logic of the Agreement, the residual freeboard of the vessel and the significant wave
height (hs) of the area where a ship operates determine the height of water on the car deck that
would arise following the occurrence of an accidental damage. Consequently, a ship should be
designed to withstand the significant wave heights that prevail in the routes, or areas, where she
operates. Taking into account the above parameters, the result from the application of the SA stability
requirements is that a vessel should resist capsize even with a flooded ro-ro deck up to a level of 0.5
metre. The maps indicating significant wave heights values by area that appear in the Stockholm
Agreement, have been defined by the contracting governments and they are based on all year round
statistics.

The specific stability requirements of the SA are applicable to ro-ro passenger ships regardless of flag,
operating on regular international voyages carrying passengers between designated ports to or from
designated ports in the area covered by the Agreement. As for their enforcement, the Agreement
provided for a phasing-in period ranging from 1 April 1997 for ro-ro passenger ships with the lowest
A/Amax values, to 1 October 2002 for ships already complying with the SOLAS 90 stability standard.

3. The EU position towards the Stockholm Agreement

3.1. At the conclusion of the Conference at which the Agreement was adopted, the Commission services
issued a statement, taking note of the Agreement concluded and expressing the opinion that the same
level of safety should be ensured for all ro-ro passenger ferries operating in similar conditions. Noting
that
the Commission
announced its intention to examine the prevailing local conditions, under which ro-ro passenger
ferries sail in all European waters and that this examination would include the extent and effect of the
application of the Agreement in the region covered by it. The statement concluded that in the light of
this examination the Commission would take a decision with regard to the need for further initiatives.

is not applicable in other parts of

the European Union,

the Agreement

This Commission statement was confirmed at the 1907th meeting of the Council, on 11 March 1996,
at which the outcome of the Stockholm Agreement was discussed by the Ministers of Transport.

The Council agreed to enter a similar statement into the meeting of the 2074th Council meeting of
17 March 1998 at which Council Directive 98/18/EC on safety rules and standards for passenger
ships was adopted. In this statement the need to ensure the same level of safety for all ro-ro passenger
ferries operating in similar conditions was more precisely defined by referring to both international
and domestic voyages. Directive 98/18/EC made mandatory the application of SOLAS 90 stability
standards to domestic EU trades for new class A, B, C and D ships and existing class A and B ships.

3.2. Furthermore, Directive 1999/35/CE on a system of mandatory surveys for the safe operation of
regular ro-ro ferry and high speed passenger crafts, provides in its article 4.1.e that ro-ro ferries
shall fulfil the specific stability requirements adopted at regional level, when operating in the region
covered by such regional rules. This obliges host States to check that ro-ro ferries ‘comply with
specific stability requirements adopted at regional level, and transposed into their national legislation
in accordance with the notification procedure laid down in Directive 98/34/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a procedure for the provision of
information in the field of technical standards and regulations and of rules on information society
services, when operating in that region a service covered by that national legislation, provided those
requirements do not exceed those specified in the Annex of Resolution 14 (Stability Requirements
Pertaining to the Agreement) of the 1995 SOLAS Conference and have been notified to the Secretary-
General of the IMO, in accordance with the procedures specified in point 3 of that resolution’.

3.3. Following its earlier commitment the Commission contracted a study to examine the extent and effect
of the application of the Stockholm Agreement concerning specific stability requirements for ro-ro
passenger ships and the suitability of extending its scope of application to European waters not
covered by it. Furthermore the economic impact of the application of the Stockholm Agreement
has been analysed and found acceptable, as demonstrated in the following chapter.

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3.4. The European Parliament with its Resolution B5-0783, 0787 and 0791/2000 of 5 October 2000,
which followed the ‘Express Samina’ accident, stressed that
‘awaits the evaluation by the
Commission of the effectiveness of the Stockholm Agreement and other measures for improving
the stability and safety of passenger vessels’

it

3.5. Following the evaluation made by the Commission, based on consultation of interested parties and
inputs from various sources including the findings of the above study, it is considered that a legis-
lative initiative in the field covered by the Stockholm Agreement is justified.

JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROPOSED COMMUNITY INITIATIVE

Research following the accidents of Herald of Free Enterprise and Estonia, demonstrated that the worst
stability related danger for a ro-ro ship with an enclosed ro-ro deck is caused by the effect of a build-up of
significant amount of water on that deck.

The current IMO damage stability requirements applicable to ro-ro passenger ships (SOLAS 90), which also
apply to domestic EU trades by means of the Directive 98/18/EC, implicitly include the effect of water
entering the ro-ro deck in a sea state in the order of 1,5 m significant wave height. However, the damage
stability requirements defined by the Stockholm agreement increase the survivability of the vessels in more
severe sea states, since they complement the SOLAS requirements to take into account the effect of water
which could accumulate on the ro-ro deck following damage.

The Commission has declared that it could propose the application of these specific stability requirements
for the entire EU after having studied the local conditions in the South European waters. Although the
expert study of the Commission sustains that other safety critical conditions (as visibility or water
temperatures) may be generally less severe in the South European waters, the significant wave heights
values are comparable or even higher than those in the Baltic sea, whilst waves are known to be steeper in
South European waters.

The analysis shows that the introduction of the SA in the North of Europe took place without particular
trouble for the industry or the contracting governments. Based on a sample of 82 vessels, out of a total of
140 that needed to comply with the Agreement, it appears that 36 % of the vessels in that sample did not
need any upgrade. Furthermore, 69 % of the total 140 vessels were upgraded for less than 1 million EURO.
The estimated total cost of upgrade was around 85 mio Euro. However it is important to note that most of
that cost is related to the accelerated compliance with SOLAS 90 standards (a necessary step before
compliance with the Stockholm Agreement) rather than just to compliance with the Agreement as such.

The economic analysis in the study concludes that, given the common value of significant wave heights in
the Southern EU waters is around 2,5 metres, the modification cost of the South European fleet for
compliance with the provisions of the SA will be approximately the same as the associated cost for
compliance with the requirements of the SOLAS 90 two compartment standard (1). Since full compliance
with SOLAS Regulations is to take place by 2010, on the basis of the IMO timetable (international trades)
and of Directive 98/18/CE (domestic EU trades) the industry should have already planned to invest in the
coming years in the upgrade of the vessels concerned. The study states that 264, operating both in
international and domestic trades, vessels will be affected from the SOLAS upgrade and that the cost of
compliance will be among 106 and 250 million Euro (these figures do not take into account possible
removals from service of aged ro-ro ships). As already mentioned, compliance of these ships with the
specific stability requirements set out
increase their SOLAS
compliance cost in a prohibitive way.

in the Stockholm Agreement will not

It appears therefore that the application of the SA stability requirements to the South European ro-ro
passenger vessels will offer a uniformity of stability requirements and an increased level of survivability of
ro-ro passenger ships throughout the EU, without increasing substantially the economic effort of the
affected part of the industry, which has to comply anyway with the SOLAS 90 standard.

(1) SOLAS 90 two compartment standard establishes that the ship can survive without capsizing with two main

compartments flooded following damage.

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In light of the above, the Commission is of the opinion that the division of north/south as regards stability
requirements for ro-ro vessels in damaged condition (Stockholm Agreement standards in the North and
SOLAS 90 standards in the South) does not seem justified on grounds of the safety parameters or for
techno-economic reasons.

A European Parliament and Council Directive imposing the specific stability standards as defined in the
Stockholm Agreement to all ro-ro passenger ships engaged in international voyages from/to EU ports is
the right way forward. It is to be noted that newly built ferries, both for operation in Northern and in
Southern Europe, generally comply with the aforementioned increased stability standards. The upgrading
of existing ro-ro passenger ships operating in southern Europe will require a transitional period, as it was
the case with the introduction of the Stockholm Agreement standards for the fleet operating in northern
Europe.

Taking into account that operating conditions for ro-ro passenger ships in domestic voyages in the
Member States are often similar to those in international voyages, the Commission proposal amending
Council Directive 98/18/EC contains specific provisions to that respect. In fact it provides for the intro-
duction of the same or equivalent stability standards for ro-ro ships operating in domestic voyages, as
those proposed for ro-ro ships operating in international voyages.

CONTENT OF THE PROPOSED DIRECTIVE

The proposed Directive will introduce the specific stability requirements of the Stockholm Agreement to
the entire EU, covering all ro-ro passenger ships operating from/to EU ports in international voyages.

The specific stability requirements are a complement to the present international IMO standard (SOLAS
90) and are already applicable to 7 northern EU Member States, which are parties to the Stockholm
Agreement established in the context of the IMO Resolution 14 of the 1995 SOLAS Conference. This
Directive will create a uniformity of stability requirements for ro-ro passenger vessels operating under same
conditions and will introduce in the EU framework a regional Agreement agreed under IMO auspices.

The main advantage of the proposed stability requirements is their contribution to an improved surviv-
ability of this type of ships following collision damage and the direct connection of the applicable standard
to the specific service the ships are engaged in. The requirements are indeed established on the basis of the
values of the significant wave heights occurring in the sea areas the ships travel. Taking into account the
operating conditions of the ship, the specific stability requirements guarantee the ship's stability in
damaged condition with up to 0,5 metres of water accumulated in its ro-ro deck.

In view of the structural modifications that the existing ships may have to undergo in order to comply
with the new stability requirements, the Directive introduces a phasing-in period, taking into account the
compliance dates of SOLAS 90.

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS

Article 1

The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a uniform level of specific stability requirements for ro-ro
passenger ships, which will improve the survivability of this type of vessels in case of collision damage and
provide a higher level of safety for the passengers and the crew. In view of the fact that 7 northern EU
Member States already apply these specific stability requirements by means of a regional Agreement, the
proposed Directive will result at the introduction of this regional Agreement in the Community framework
and its extension to the Southern European waters and the Atlantic coast.

Article 2

This article contains the definitions of the key terms used in the Directive and are based on the IMO
SOLAS Convention (International Convention for the safety of life at sea) definitions, as well as existing
Community legislation, particularly Directive 98/18/EC of 17 March 1998 on safety rules and standards
for passenger ships.

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Article 3

Article 3 defines the scope of the Directive. This will apply to all ro-ro passenger ships operating to or
from a port of a Member State on a regular service, regardless of their flag, when engaged on international
voyages.

Article 4

This article specifies that the value of the significant wave heights shall be used for determining the height
of water on car deck when applying the specific stability standard.

Article 5

This Article specifies that in the light of Article 4, Member States have to establish the sea areas under
their jurisdiction as well as the areas between Member State and Member States and third countries, where
ro-ro passenger ships which serve the Community ports undertake voyages.

These areas and the corresponding significant wave heights will be notified to the Commission and be
publicly available by the competent maritime authorities of Member States.

Article 6

This Article establishes the connection to the specific stability requirements set out in the Annex 1 of the
Directive. These requirements will apply in addition to the requirements of SOLAS regulation II-1/8 on
stability in damaged conditions.

The specific stability requirements are therefore complementary to the SOLAS 90 stability standard and
take specifically into account the effect of water which could accumulate on the ro-ro deck following
damage, in order to enable the ship to survive in more severe sea states than 1,5 m significant wave
height.

The specific stability requirements introduced by this Directive are based on a mathematical formula which
calculates the height of water on the ro-ro deck following a collision damage depending on two basic
parameters: the ship's residual free board and the significant wave height in the sea area where the ship
operates.

This article makes also reference to the guidelines to Member States for applying the specific stability
requirements set out in Annex I, which are presented in the Annex II of the Directive. These guidance
notes were presented to the International Maritime Organisation by the governments of Denmark, Finland,
Sweden and the United Kingdom at the 40 session of the IMO sub-Committee on stability and Load Lines
and Fishing vessels safety of 5 July 1996.

Article 7

Article 7 specifies that new ships will comply with the specific stability requirements as from 1 October
2004, while it introduces a phasing-in period for the compliance of existing ships. Such period has been
considered necessary in view of the structural modifications the existing ships will have to undertake, in
addition to the modifications which they will have to undertake on the basis of
the SOLAS 90
requirements. A final deadline for compliance has been set on 1 October 2010. This timetable takes
into account that the large majority of ro-ro passenger ships will have to comply with SOLAS stability
standards by 1 October 2005 and that the final date of compliance under SOLAS is also 1 October 2010.

Article 8

Article 8 refers to the compliance certificate to be issued to all vessels falling under the scope of this
Directive by the flag State Administration. Certificates of compliance issued by a Member State will be
accepted by all Member states. Each Member State acting on its capacity as host state shall accept the
operational certificate issued by a non Member State certifying that a ship complies with the specific
stability requirements established in this Directive

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Article 9

The provisions of that article authorise the specific treatment of ro-ro passenger ships operating only on
seasonal basis in an area where the significant wave height during such season is of a lower value than that
for a year round operation in the same area. In such case, the specific stability requirements introduced by
this Directive will be based on the seasonal values of the significant wave heights to be defined by Member
States. Such seasonal operation may offer certain flexibility to operators wishing to introduce additional
ships on a high season, offering additional possibilities to the travelling public, without lowering at all the
safety standard provided.

Article 10 and 11

Article 10 makes reference to the possible adaptation of the Annexes to the Directive, in the light of the
technical progress, the experience gained or of regulatory developments in the international (IMO) level. As
established in Article 11, in such case the Commission will be assisted by the Committee established
pursuant to Article 12(1) of Directive 93/75/EC (1).

Article 12

Following this article, Member Sates shall
lay down a system of dissuasive measures, penalties for
breaching the national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive. In view of the complex technical
nature of the standards introduced, particular vigilance is requested by the Member States in their
implementation.

Article 13

This article sets up a deadline for the transposition of this Directive in the national legislation of Member
States, which is 1 January 2004.

Article 14

No comments.

Article 15

No comments.

(1) Council Directive 93/75/EEC of 13 September 1993 concerning minimum requirements for vessels bound for or

leaving Community ports and carrying dangerous or polluting goods.

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community, and in particular Article 80(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,

Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social
Committee,

Having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions,

Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article
251 of the Treaty,

Whereas:

(2) The Community wishes to avoid by all appropriate means
shipping accidents involving ro-ro passenger ships and
resulting in loss of life.

(3) The

their

damage

ro-ro ships

survivability of

as determined by

following collision
damage,
stability
standard, is an essential factor for the safety of passengers
and crew and is particularly relevant for search and rescue
operations; the most dangerous problem for the stability
of a ro-ro ship with an enclosed ro-ro deck, following
collision damage,
is the one posed by the effect of a
build up of significant amount of water on that deck.

(1) Within the framework of the common transport policy
further measures must be taken to improve safety in
maritime transport of passengers.

(4) Persons using ro-ro passenger ships and crew employed
on board such vessels throughout the Community, have
the right
to demand the same high level of safety
regardless of the area in which ships operate.

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(5) In view of the internal market dimension of maritime
transport of passengers, action at Community level
is
establishing a common
the most
minimum level of
the
Community.

effective way of

throughout

safety for

ships

(6) Action at Community level is the best way to ensure the
harmonised enforcement of principles agreed on within
thus
International Maritime Organisation (IMO),
the
avoiding
the
between
operators of
ships operating in the
Community.

ro-ro passenger

competition

distortions

of

(7) General stability requirements for ro-ro passenger vessels
in damaged conditions were established at international
level by the 1990 SOLAS Conference and were included
in the chapter II-1, Part B8 of the SOLAS Convention
(SOLAS 90 standard). These requirements are applicable
in the entire Community owing to the direct application
to international voyages of the SOLAS Convention and
the application to domestic voyages of Council Directive
1998/18/EC of 17 March 1998 on safety rules and
standards for passenger ships (1).

(8) The damage stability standard of SOLAS 90 implicitly
include the effect of water entering the ro-ro deck in a
sea state in order of 1,5 m significant wave height.

(9) IMO Resolution 14 of

the 1995 SOLAS Conference,
allowed IMO members to conclude regional agreements
if they consider that prevailing sea conditions and other
local conditions require specific stability requirements in a
designated area.

(10) Eight northern European countries,

including seven
Community Member States, agreed in Stockholm on 28
February 1996 to introduce a higher stability standard for
ro-ro passenger vessels in damaged condition in order to
take into account the effect of water accumulation on the
ro-ro deck and to enable the ship to survive in more
severe states than the SOLAS 90 standard, up to 4 m
significant wave heights.

(11) Under

the

agreement,

known as

Stockholm
this
Agreement,
the specific stability standard is directly
related to the sea area in which the vessel operates and
more particularly to the significant wave height recorded
in the area of operation; the significant wave height of the
area where the ship operates determines the height of
water on the car deck that would arise following the
occurrence of an accidental damage.

(12) At

the conclusion of

the Conference at which the
Stockholm Agreement was adopted,
the Commission
noted that the Agreement was not applicable in other
parts of the Community and announced its intention to
examine the prevailing local conditions under which ro-ro

(1) OJ L 144, 15.5.1998, p. 1.

passenger ships sail in all European waters and to take
appropriate initiatives.

(13) The Council entered a statement in the minutes of the
2074th Council meeting of 17 March 1998 stressing the
need to ensure the same level of safety for all passenger
ferries operating in similar conditions, whether on inter-
national or on domestic voyages.

(14) In the aftermath of the ‘Express Samina’ accident, the
European Parliament adopted on 5 October 2000,
its
resolution B5-0783, 0787 and 0791/2000 where it
it awaited the evaluation by the
expressly stated that
the Stockholm
effectiveness of
Commission of
the
Agreement
improving the
for
stability and safety of passenger ships.

and other measures

(15) Following an expert study by the Commission, the wave
height conditions in South European waters were found
similar to those in the north; while general meteorological
conditions may be generally more favourable in the south,
the stability standard determined in the context of the
Stockholm Agreement is based solely on the significant
wave height parameter and the way this influences the
accumulation of water on the ro-ro deck.

(16) The application of Community safety standards regarding
the stability requirements for ro-ro passenger ships is
essential for the safety of these vessels and has to be
part of the common maritime safety framework.

(17) In the interest of improving safety and avoiding distortion
of competition, the common safety standards regarding
stability should apply to all
ships,
regardless of
they fly, providing regular
services to or from a port in the Member States on inter-
national voyages.

ro-ro passenger

the flag that

(18) The safety of ships is primarily the responsibility of flag
States and therefore each Member State should ensure
compliance with the safety requirements applicable to
the ro-ro passenger ships flying the flag of that Member
State.

(19) Member States should also be addressed in their capacity
as host States;
the responsibilities exercised in that
capacity are based on specific port State responsibilities
that are fully in line with the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

(20) The specific stability requirements introduced by this
Directive should be based on a method which calculates
the height of water on the ro-ro deck following a collision
damage in relation to two basic parameters: the ship's
residual
free board and the significant wave height in
the sea area where the ship operates.

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(21) Member States

for

international

and publicise

should determine

the
significant wave heights in the sea areas under their juris-
diction;
the significant wave
heights should be established in agreement between the
States at both ends of the route. Significant wave heights
for seasonal operation in the same sea areas may also be
determined.

routes

(22) Every ro-ro passenger vessel engaged in voyages within
the scope of
the stability
this Directive, should fulfil
requirements in relation of the significant wave heights
determined for its area of operation;
it should carry a
certificate of compliance issued by the flag Member
State, which should be accepted by all other Member
States.

(23) The SOLAS 90 stability standards provides equivalent
level of safety to the specific stability requirements estab-
lished by this Directive for ships operating in sea areas
where the significant wave height is equal or less than
1,5 m.

(24) In view of the structural modifications that the existing
ships may need to undergo in order to comply with the
specific stability requirements, those requirements should
be introduced over a period of years in order to allow
sufficient time to the affected part of the industry to
comply: to that end, a phasing-in timetable for existing
ships should be provided.

(25) Since the measures necessary for the implementation of
this Directive are measures of general scope within the
meaning of Article 2 of Council Decision 1999/468/EC of
28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise
of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (1),
regulatory
they should be adopted by use of
procedure provided for in Article 5 of that Decision.

the

(26) Since the objectives of the proposed action, namely to
safeguard human life at sea by improving the survivability
of ro-ro vessels in the event of damage, cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
the
therefore, by reason of
the scale and effects of
the
action, be better achieved at Community level,
Community may adopt measures,
in accordance with
the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of
the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of propor-
tionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not
go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those
objectives,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:

Article 1

Purpose

The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a uniform level of
specific stability requirements for ro-ro passenger ships, which
will improve the survivability of this type of vessels in case of

(1) OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 23.

collision damage and provide a higher level of safety for the
passengers and the crew.

Article 2

Definitions

For the purpose of this Directive, the following definitions shall
apply:

(a) ‘ro-ro passenger ship’ means a seagoing passenger vessel
with facilities to enable road or rail vehicles to roll on and
roll off the vessel, and carrying more than 12 passengers;

(b) ‘new ship’ means a ship the keel of which is laid or which
is at a similar stage of construction on or after 1 October
2004: a similar stage of construction means the stage at
which:

(i) construction identifiable with a specific ship begins;

and

(ii) assembly of that ship has commenced comprising at
the estimated mass of

least 50 tonnes or 1 % of
structural material, whichever is less;

(c) ‘an existing ship’ means a ship which is not a new ship;

(d) ‘a passenger’ is every person other than the master and the
members of
the crew or other persons employed or
engaged in any capacity on board a ship on the business
of that ship;

(e) ‘International Conventions’ means the 1974 International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (the 1974 SOLAS
Convention), and the 1966 International Convention on
Load Lines,
together with Protocols and amendments
thereto in force on the date of adoption of this Directive;

(f) ‘regular service’ means a series of ro-ro passenger ship
crossings serving traffic between the same two or more
ports, which is operated either:

(i) according to a published timetable; or

(ii) with crossings

frequent
constitute a recognisable systematic series;

so regular or

that

they

(g) ‘Stockholm Agreement’ means the Agreement concluded at
Stockholm on 27 and 28 February 1996 in pursuance of
SOLAS
‘Regional
Agreements on Specific Stability Requirements for ro-ro
Passenger Ships’, adopted on 29 November 1995;

Conference

Resolution

95

14

(h) ‘administration of flag State’ means the competent auth-
orities of the State whose flag the ro-ro passenger ship is
entitled to fly;

(i) ‘host State’ means a Member State to or from whose ports
a ro-ro passenger ship is engaged on a regular service;

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(j) ‘international voyage’ means a sea voyage from a port of a
Member State to a port outside that Member State, or vice
versa;

(k) ‘specific

stability

requirements’ means

the

stability

requirements set out in Annex I;

(l) ‘significant wave height’ or (‘hs’) is the average height of
the one third highest observed wave heights over a given
period;

(m) ‘residual freeboard’ is the minimum distance between the
damaged ro-ro deck and the waterline at the location of
the damage, without taking into account the additional
effect of
the sea water accumulated on the damaged
ro-ro deck.

Article 3

Scope

1.
This Directive shall apply to all ro-ro passenger ships
operating to or from a port of a Member State on a regular
service, regardless of their flag, when engaged on international
voyages.

Each Member State,

2.
in its capacity as host State, shall
ensure that ro-ro passenger ships, flying the flag of a State
comply fully with the
which is not a Member State,
requirements of this Directive before they may be engaged
on voyages
that Member State in
to ports of
accordance with the provisions of article 4 of Directive
1999/35/EC.

from or

The list

shall be notified to the Commission and
3.
published in a public database available in the internet site of
the competent maritime authority. The location of
such
information as well as any updates
to the list and the
shall also be notified to the
for
reasons
Commission.

such updates

Article 6

Specific stability requirements

regulation
1. Without prejudice to the requirements of
II-1/8 of
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention
relating to watertight subdivision and stability in damaged
condition, all ro-ro passenger ships referred to in Article 3(1)
shall comply with the specific stability requirements set out in
Annex I to this Directive.

For ro-ro passenger ships operating in sea areas where
2.
the significant wave height
to or lower than 1,5
is equal
metres, compliance with the requirements of regulation II-1/8
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention shall be
considered equivalent to compliance with the specific stability
requirements set out in Annex I.

3.
In applying the requirements set out in Annex I, Member
States shall use the guidelines set out in Annex II, in so far this
is practicable and compatible with the design of the ship in
question.

Article 7

Introduction of the specific stability requirements

New ro-ro passenger ships shall comply with the specific

1.
stability requirements as set out in Annex I.

Article 4

Significant wave heights

2.
Existing ro-ro passenger ships shall comply with the
specific stability requirements as set out in Annex I by not
later than 1 October 2010.

The significant wave heights (hs) shall be used for determining
the height of water on the car deck when applying the specific
stability standard contained in Annex 1. The figures of
significant wave heights
those which are not
shall be
exceeded by a probability of more than 10 % on a yearly basis.

Article 5

Sea Areas

Article 8

Certificates

All new and existing ro-ro passenger ships flying the flag
1.
of a Member State
confirming
compliance with the specific stability requirements established
in Article 6 and Annex I.

shall carry a certificate

1. Member States shall establish, not later than six months
before the date mentioned in Article 13, a list of sea areas
under
jurisdiction and the corresponding values of
significant wave heights.

their

This certificate shall be issued by the Administration of the flag
State and will indicate the significant wave height up to which
the ship can satisfy the specific stability requirements as well as
the area for which the certificate has been originally issued.

The sea areas and the applicable values of the significant
2.
in these areas shall be defined by agreement
wave height
between the Member States or between Member States and
third countries at both ends of the route. Where the ship's
route crosses more than one sea area, the ship shall satisfy
the specific stability requirements for the highest value of
significant wave height identified for these areas.

The certificate shall remain valid as long as the vessel operates
in the same area or in another area within which the same
value of significant wave height has been registered.

2.
Each Member State acting in its capacity as host State
shall recognise the certificate issued by another Member State
in pursuance of this Directive.

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Each Member State acting in its capacity as host State
3.
shall accept the certificate issued by a non member country
certifying that a ship complies with the specific stability
requirements established.

Article 9

Seasonal operation

1.
If a shipping company operating a regular scheduled
service on a year round basis wishes to introduce additional
ro-ro passenger ships to operate for a shorter season on that
service, it shall notify the competent authority of the host state
or states not later than three months before the said additional
ships are operated on that service.

round operation,

Where such seasonal operation takes place under conditions of
lower significant wave height than those established for the
same sea area for a year
the seasonal
significant wave height value may be used by the competent
authority for determining the height of water when applying
the specific stability standard contained in Annex I. The
seasonal value of the significant wave height to apply shall
be agreed between the Member States or between Member
States and third countries at both ends of the route.

2.
Following agreement of the competent authority of the
host State or States for a seasonal operation within the
the ro-ro passenger ship which
meaning of paragraph 1,
undertakes such seasonal operations shall have to carry a
certificate of compliance with the provisions of this Directive,
as provided for in Article 8(1).

Article 10

Adaptations

In order to take account of developments at international level
and, in particular, in the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO) or to improve the effectiveness of this Directive in the
light of experience and of e technical progress, the Annexes
may be amended in accordance with the procedure laid down
in Article 11(2).

Article 11

Committee

1.
up pursuant

The Commission shall be assisted by the Committee set
to Article 12(1) of Directive 93/75/EEC (1)

representatives of
composed of
chaired by the representative of the Commission.

the Member States and

2. Where reference is made to this paragraph, the regulatory
procedure laid down in Article 5 of Decision 1999/468/EC
shall apply,
in compliance with Article 7(3) and Article 8
thereof.

The period provided for in Article 5(6) of Decision

3.
1999/468/EC shall be of eight weeks.

Article 12

Penalties

Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable
to infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant
to this Directive and shall take all the measures necessary to
ensure that they are implemented. The penalties provided for
shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.

Article 13

Implementation

Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this
Directive by 1 January 2004 at
the latest. They shall
forthwith inform the Commission thereof.

When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain
a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a
reference on the occasion of
their official publication.
Member States shall determine how such reference is to be
made.

Article 14

Entry into force

This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day
following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the
European Communities.

Article 15

Addressees

This Directive is addressed to the Member States.

(1) OJ L 247, 5.10.1993, p. 19.

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ANNEX I

SPECIFIC STABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR RO-RO PASSENGER SHIPS

(As referred to in Article 6)

In addition to the requirements of regulation II-1/8 of the Safety at Sea (SOLAS) Convention relating to
watertight subdivision and stability in damaged condition, all ro-ro passenger ships referred to in Article 3
(1) shall comply with the requirements of this Annex.

The provisions of regulation II-1/8.2.3 shall be complied with when taking into account the effect of a hypo-
thetical amount of sea water which is assumed to have accumulated on the first deck above the design waterline
of the ro-ro cargo space or the special cargo space as defined in regulation II-2/3 assumed to be damaged
(referred to as ‘the damaged ro-ro deck’ hereinafter). The other requirements of regulation II-1/B/8 need not be
complied with in the application of the stability standard contained in this Annex. The amount of assumed
accumulated sea water shall be calculated on the basis of a water surface having a fixed height above:

(a) the lowest point of the deck edge of the damaged compartment of the ro-ro deck, or

(b) when the deck edge of the damaged compartment is submerged then the calculation is based on a fixed

height above the still water surface at all heel and trim angles;

as follows:

— 0,5 m if the residual freeboard (fr) is 0,3 m or less;

— 0,0 m if the residual freeboard (fr) is 2,0 m or more; and

— intermediate values to be determined by linear interpolation, if the residual freeboard (fr) is 0,3 m or more

but less than 2,0 m;

where the residual freeboard (fr)
is the minimum distance between the damaged ro-ro deck and the final
waterline at the location of the damage in the damage case being considered without taking into account the
effect of the volume of assumed accumulated water on the damaged ro-ro deck;

when a high-efficiency drainage system is installed, the Administration of the flag State may allow a reduction in
the height of the water surface.

For ships in geographically defined restricted areas of operation, the Administration of the flag State may reduce
the height of the water surface prescribed in accordance with paragraph 1.1 by substituting such height of the
water surface by the following:

1.

1.1.

1.2.

1.3.

1.3.1. 0,0 m if the significant wave height (hs) defining the area concerned is 1,5 m or less;

1.3.2.

the value determined in accordance with 1.1 if the significant wave height (hs) defining the area concerned is
4,0 m or above;

1.3.3.

intermediate values to be determined by linear interpolation if the significant wave height (hs) defining the area
concerned is 1,5 m or more but less than 4,0 m;

provided that the following conditions are fulfilled:

1.3.4.

the flag State Administration is satisfied that the defined area is represented by the significant wave height (hs)
which is not exceeded with a probability of more than 10 %; and

1.3.5.

the area of operation and, if applicable, the part of the year for which a certain value of the significant wave
height (hs) has been established are entered into the certificates.

1.4.

as an alternative to the requirements of subparagraphs 1.1 or 1.3, the flag State Administration may exempt
application of the requirements of subparagraphs 1.1 or 1.3 and accept proof, established by model tests carried
out for an individual ship in accordance with the model test method, which appears in Appendix, justifying that
the ship will not capsize with the assumed extent of damage as provided in SOLAS regulation II-1/8.4 in the
worst location being considered under 1.1, in an irregular seaway, and

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1.5.

1.6.

2.

2.1.

2.2.

2.3.

2.4.

2.5.

reference to acceptance of the results of the model test as an equivalence to compliance with paragraphs 1.1 or
1.3 and the value of the significant wave height (hs) used in the model tests shall be entered into the ship's
certificates.

the information supplied to the master in accordance with SOLAS regulations II-1/8.7.1 and II-1/8.7.2, as
ro-ro
developed for compliance with regulations
passenger ships approved according to these requirements.

shall apply unchanged for

II-1/8.2.3 to II-1/8.2.3.4,

For assessing the effect of the volume of the assumed accumulated sea water on the damaged ro-ro deck in
paragraph 1, the following provisions shall prevail:

a transverse or longitudinal bulkhead shall be considered intact if all parts of it lie inboard of vertical surfaces on
both sides of the ship, which are situated at a distance from the shell plating equal to one-fifth of the breadth of
the ship, as defined in regulation II-1/2, and measured at right angles to the centreline at the level of the deepest
subdivision load line.

in cases where the ship's hull is structurally partly widened for compliance with the provisions of this Annex, the
resulting increase of the value of one-fifth of the breadth of it is to be used throughout, but shall not govern the
location of existing bulkhead penetrations, piping systems, etc., which were acceptable prior to the widening.

the tightness of transverse or longitudinal bulkheads which are taken into account as effective to confine the
assumed accumulated sea water in the compartment concerned in the damaged ro-ro deck shall be commen-
surate with the drainage system, and shall withstand hydrostatic pressure in accordance with the results of the
damage calculation. Such bulkheads shall be at least 2,2 m in height. However, in case of a ship with hanging
car decks, the minimum height of the bulkhead shall be not less than the height to the underside of the hanging
deck when in its lowered position.

for special arrangements such as, e.g., full width hanging decks and wide side casings, other bulkhead heights
may be accepted based on detailed model tests.

the effect of the volume of the assumed accumulated sea water need not be taken into account for any
compartment of the damaged ro-ro deck, provided that such a compartment has on each side of the deck
freeing ports evenly distributed along the sides of the compartment complying with the following:

2.5.1. A ‡ 0,3 l

where A is the total area of freeing ports on each side of the deck in m2; and l is the length of the compartment
in m;

2.5.2.

the ship shall maintain a residual freeboard of at least 1,0 m in the worst damage condition without taking into
account the effect of the assumed volume of water on the damaged ro-ro deck; and

2.5.3.

such freeing ports shall be located within the height of 0,6 m above the damaged ro-ro deck, and the lower edge
of the ports shall be within 2 cm above the damaged ro-ro deck; and

2.5.4.

such freeing ports shall be fitted with closing devices or flaps to prevent water entering the ro-ro deck whilst
allowing water which may accumulate on the ro-ro deck to drain.

2.6.

3.

3.1.

when a bulkhead above the ro-ro deck is assumed damaged, both compartments bordering the bulkhead shall be
assumed flooded to the same height of water surface as calculated in paragraphs 1.1 or 1.3 above.

When determining significant wave height, the wave heights given on the maps or list of sea areas established by
Member States in line with Article 5 of this Directive shall be used.

For ships which are to be operated only for a shorter season, the host State Administration shall determine in
agreement with the other country whose port is included in the ships route, the significant wave height to be
used.

4.

Model tests shall be conducted in accordance with Appendix 1.

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Appendix

Model test method

1. Objectives

In the tests provided for in paragraph 1.4 of the stability requirements included in Annex I, the ship should be capable
of withstanding a seaway as defined in paragraph 3 hereunder in the worst damage case scenario.

2. Ship model

2.1.

The model should copy the actual ship for both outer configuration and internal arrangement, in particular all
damaged spaces having an effect on the process of flooding and shipping of water. The damage should
represent the worst damage case defined for compliance with regulation II-1/8.2.3.2 of the Safety at Sea
Convention (SOLAS 90). An additional test is required at a level keel midship damage, if the worst damage
location according to SOLAS 90 is outside the range ± 10 % Lpp from the midship. This additional test is only
required when the ro-ro spaces are assumed to be damaged.

2.2.

The model should comply with the following:

2.2.1.

Length between perpendiculars (Lpp) is to be at least 3 m.

2.2.2.

The hull is to be thin enough in areas where this feature has influence on the results.

2.2.3.

The characteristics of motion should be modelled properly to the actual ship, paying particular attention to
scaling of radii of gyration in roll and pitch motions. Draught, trim, heel and centre of gravity should represent
the worst damage case.

2.2.4. Main design features such as watertight bulkheads, air escapes, etc., above and below the bulkhead deck that
can result in asymmetric flooding should be modelled properly as far as practicable to represent the real
situation.

2.2.5.

The shape of the damage opening shall be as follows:

2.2.5.1.

rectangular side profile with a width according to regulation II-1/8.4.1 of the Safety at Sea Convention and
unlimited vertical extent;

2.2.5.2.

isosceles triangular profile in the horizontal plane with a height equal to B/5 according to regulation II-1/8.4.2
of the Safety at Sea Convention.

3. Procedure for experiments

3.1.

3.1.1.

3.1.2.

3.2.

3.3.

3.4.

The model should be subjected to a long-crested irregular seaway defined by the JONSWAP spectrum with a
significant wave height hs defined in 1.3 of the stability requirements and having peak enhancement factor and
peak period Tp as follows:

p

Tp ¼ 4 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃHs

with γ = 3,3; and

Tp equal to the roll resonant period for the damaged ship without water on deck at the specified loading
condition but not higher than 6 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃHs

and with γ = 1.

p

The model should be free to drift and placed in beam seas (90° heading) with the damage hole facing the
oncoming waves. The model should not be restrained in a manner to resist capsize. If the ship is upright in
flooded condition, 1° of heel towards the damage should be given.

At least 5 experiments for each peak period should be carried out. The test period for each run shall be of
such duration that a stationary state has been reached but should be run for not less than 30 min in full-scale
time. A different wave realisation train should be used for each test.

If none of the experiments result in final inclination towards the damage, the experiments should be repeated
with 5 runs at each of the two specified wave conditions or, alternatively, the model should be given an
additional 1° angle of heel towards the damage and the experiment repeated with 2 runs at each of the two
specified wave conditions. The purpose of these additional experiments is to demonstrate, in the best possible
way, survival capability against capsize in both directions.

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3.5.

The tests are to be carried out for the following damage cases:

3.5.1.

the worst damage case with regard to the area under the GZ curve according to the Safety at Sea Convention;
and

3.5.2.

the worst midship damage case with regard to the residual freeboard in the midship area if required by 2.1.

4. Survival criteria

The ship should be considered as surviving if a stationary state is reached for the successive test runs as required in 3.3,
provided that angles of roll of more than 30° against the vertical axis, occurring more frequently than in 20 % of the
rolling cycles or steady heel greater than 20° should be taken as capsizing events even if a stationary state is reached.

5. Test approval

5.1.

5.2

Proposals for model test programmes should be submitted to the host State Administration to be approved in
advance. It should also be borne in mind that lesser cases of damage may create a worst-case scenario.

The test should be documented by means of a report and a video or other visual record containing all relevant
information on the ship and test results.

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ANNEX II

INDICATIVE GUIDELINES TO NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS

(as referred to in Article 6.(3))

PART I

Application

In line with the provisions of Article 6(3), these guidelines shall be used by the national administrations of Member
States in the application of the specific stability requirements set out in Annex I, in so far this is practicable and
compatible with the design of the ship in question. The paragraph numbers appearing below correspond to those in
Annex I.

Para 1

As a first step all ro-ro passenger ships referred to in Article 3(1) must comply with the ‘SOLAS 90’ standard of residual
stability as it applies to all passenger ships constructed on or after 29 April 1990. It is the application of this
requirement that defines the residual freeboard fr, necessary for the calculations required in paragraph 1.1.

Para 1.1.

1. This paragraph addresses the application of a hypothetical amount of water accumulated on the bulkhead (ro-ro)
deck. The water is assumed to have entered the deck via a damage opening. This paragraph requires that the vessel in
addition to complying with the full requirements of the SOLAS '90 further complies with that part of the SOLAS '90
criteria contained in paragraphs 2.3 to 2.3.4 of regulation 8 of Chapter II-1 Part B of SOLAS with the defined
amount of water on deck. For this calculation no other requirements of Chapter II-1 regulation 8 need be taken into
account. For example the vessel does not, for this calculation, need to comply with the requirements for the angles of
equilibrium or non-submergence of the margin line.

2. The accumulated water is added as a liquid load with one common surface inside all compartments which ate
assumed flooded on the car deck. The height (hw) of water on deck is dependent on the residual freeboard (fr) after
damage, and is measured in way of the damage (see fig 1). The residual freeboard, is the minimum distance between
the damaged ro-ro deck and the final waterline (after equalisation measures if any have been taken) in way of the
assumed damage after examining all possible damage scenarios in determining the compliance with SOLAS '90 as
required in para 1 of Annex I. No account should be taken of the effect of the hypothetical volume of water assumed
to have accumulated on the damaged ro-ro deck when calculating fr.

3. If fr is 2,0 m or more, no water is assumed to accumulate on the ro-ro deck. If fr is 0,3 m or less, then height hw is

assumed to be 0,5 metres. Intermediate heights of water are obtained by linear interpolation (see fig 2).

Para 1.2.

Means for drainage of water can only be considered as effective if these means are of a capacity to prevent large
amounts of water from accumulating on the deck ie many thousand of tonnes per hour which is far beyond the
capacities fitted at the time of the adoption of these regulations. Such high efficiency drainage systems may be
developed and approved in the future (based on guidelines to be developed by the International Maritime Organisation)

Para 1.3.

1. 1. The amount of assumed accumulated water-on — deck may, in addition to any reduction in accordance with
paragraph 1.1, be reduced for operations in geographically defined restricted areas, These areas are designated in
accordance with the significant wave height (hs) defining the area in line with the provisions of Article 5.

2. If the significant wave height (hs), in the area concerned, is 1,5 m or less then no additional water is assumed to
accumulate on the damaged ro-ro deck. If the significant wave height in the area concerned is 4,0 m or more then
the height of the assumed accumulated water shall be the value calculated in accordance with paragraph 1.1.
Intermediate values to be determined by linear interpolation (see fig 3).

3. The height hw is kept constant, therefore the amount of added water is variable as it is dependent upon the heeling
angle and whether at any particular heeling angle the deck edge is immersed or not. (see fig 4). It should be noted
that the assumed permeability of the car deck spaces is to be taken as 90 % (MSC/Circ.649 refers), whereas other
assumed flooded spaces permeabilities are to be those prescribed in SOLAS.

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4. If the calculations to demonstrate compliance with the Directive relate to a significant wave height less than 4,0 m

that restricting significant wave height must be recorded on the vessel's passenger ship safety certificate.

Para 1.4./1.5.

As an alternative to complying with the new stability requirements in paragraphs 1.1 or 1.3 an Administration may
accept proof of compliance via model tests. The model test requirements are detailed in the Appendix to Annex I.
Guidance notes on the model tests are contained in part II of this Annex.

Para 1.6.

Conventionally derived SOLAS '90 limiting operational curve(s) (KG or GM) may not remain applicable in cases where
‘water on deck’ is assumed under the terms of the Directive and it may be necessary to determine revised limiting
curve(s) which take into account the effects of this added water. To this effect sufficient calculations corresponding to an
adequate number of operational draughts and trims must be carried out.

Note: Revised limiting operational KG/GM Curves may be derived by iteration, whereby the minimum excess GM
resulting from damage stability calculations with water on deck is added to the input KG (or deducted from the
GM) used to determine the damaged freeboards (fr), upon which the quantities of water on deck are based, this
process being repeated until the excess GM becomes negligible.

It is anticipated that operators would begin such an iteration with the maximum KG/minimum GM which could
reasonably be sustained in service and would seek to manipulate the resulting deck bulkhead arrangement
to
minimise the excess GM derived from damage stability calculations with water on deck.

Para 2.1.

As for conventional SOLAS damage requirements bulkheads inboard of the B/5 line are considered intact in the event of
side collision damage.

Para 2.2.

If side structural sponsons are fitted to enable compliance with this regulation, and as a consequence there is an increase
in the breadth (B) of the ship and hence the vessel's B/5 distance from the ship's side, such modification shall not cause
the relocation of any existing structural parts or any existing penetrations of the main transverse watertight bulkheads
below the bulkhead deck (see fig 5).

Para 2.3.

1. Transverse or longitudinal bulkheads/barriers which are fitted and taken into account to confine the movement of
assumed accumulated water on the damaged ro-ro deck need not be strictly ‘watertight’. Small amounts of leakage
may be permitted subject to the drainage provisions being capable of preventing an accumulation of water on the
‘other side’ of the bulkhead/barrier. In such cases where scuppers become inoperative as a result of a loss of positive
difference of water levels other means of passive drainage must be provided.

2. The height (Bh) of transverse and longitudinal bulkheads/barriers shall be not less than (8 × Hw) metres, where hw is
the height of the accumulated water as calculated by application of the residual freeboard and significant wave height
(paras 1.1. and 1.3 refers). However in no case is the height of the bulkhead/barrier to be less than the greatest of:

(a) 2,2 metres; or

(b) the height between the bulkhead deck and the lower point of the underside structure of the intermediate or
hanging car decks, when these are in their lowered position. It should be noted that any gaps between the top
edge of the bulkhead and the underside of the plating must be ‘plated-in’
in the transverse or longitudinal
direction as appropriate (see fig 6).

Bulkheads/barriers with a height less than that specified above, may be accepted if model tests are carried out in
accordance with Part II of this Annex to confirm that the alternative design ensures appropriate standard of
survivability. Care needs to be taken when fixing the height of the bulkhead/barrier such that the height shall
also be sufficient to prevent progressive flooding within the required stability range. This range is not to be
prejudiced by model tests.

Note: The range may be reduced to 10 degrees provided the corresponding area under the curve is increased (MSC
64/22 refers)

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Para 2.5.1.

The area ‘A’ relates to permanent openings. It should be noted that the ‘freeing ports’ option is not suitable for ships
which require the buoyancy of the whole or part of the superstructure in order to meet the criteria. The requirement is
that the freeing ports shall be fitted with closing flaps to prevent water entering, but allowing water to drain.

These flaps must not rely on active means. They must be self-operating and it must be shown that they do not restrict
outflow to a significant degree. Any significant efficiency reduction must be compensated by the fitting of additional
openings so that the required area is maintained.

Para 2.5.2.

For the freeing ports to be considered effective the minimum distance from the lower edge of the freeing port to the
damaged waterline shall be at least 1,0 m. The calculation of the minimum distance shall not take into account the
effect of any additional water on deck (see fig 7).

Para 2.5.3.

Freeing ports must be sited as low as possible in the side bulwark or shell plating. The lower edge of the freeing poet
opening must be no higher than 2 cm above the bulkhead deck and the upper edge of the opening no higher than
0,6 m (see fig 8).

Note: Spaces to which paragraph 2.5 applies, ie those spaces fitted with freeing ports or similar openings, shall not be
included as intact spaces in the derivation of the intact and damage stability curves.

Para 2.6.

1. The statutory extent of damage is to be applied along the length of the ship. Depending on the subdivision standard
the damage may not affect any bulkhead or may only affect a bulkhead below the bulkhead deck or only bulkhead
above the bulkhead deck or various combinations.

2. All transverse and longitudinal bulkheads/barriers which constrain the assumed accumulated amount of water must

be in place and secured at all times when the ship is at sea.

3. In those cases where the transverse bulkhead/barrier is damaged the accumulated water-on-deck shall have a

common surface level on both sides of the damaged bulkhead/barrier at the height hw (see fig 9).

PART II

Model testing

The purpose of these guidelines is to ensure uniformity in the methods employed in the construction and verification of
the model as well as in the undertaking and analyses of the model tests, while appreciating that available facilities and
costs will affect in some way this uniformity.

The content of paragraph 1 of the Appendix to Annex I is self explanatory.

Paragraph 2 — Ship model

2.1.

The material of which the model is made is not important in itself, provided that the model both in the intact
and damaged condition is sufficiently rigid to ensure that its hydrostatic properties are the same as those of the
actual ship and also that the flexural response of the hull in waves is negligible.

It is also important to ensure that the damaged compartments are modelled as accurately as practicably
possible to ensure that the correct volume of flood water is represented.

Since ingress of water (even small amounts) into the intact parts of the model will affect its behaviour,
measures must be taken that this ingress does not occur.

2.2.

Model particulars

2.2.1.

In recognising that scale effects play an important role in the behaviour of the model during tests,
it is
important to ensure that these effects are minimised as much as practically possible. The model should be
as large as possible since details of damaged compartments are easier constructed in larger models and the
scale effects are reduced. It is therefore recommended that the model length is not less than that corresponding
to 1:40 scale. However it is required that the model is not less than 3 meters long at the subdivision load line.

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2.2.2.

(a) The model in way of the assumed damages must be as thin as practically possible to ensure that the
amount of flood water and its centre of gravity is adequately represented. It is recognised that it may not be
possible for the model hull and the elements of primary and secondary subdivision in way of the damage
to be constructed with sufficient detail and due to these constructional limitations it may not be possible to
calculate accurately the assumed permeability of the space.

(b) It has been found during tests that the vertical extent of the model can affect the results when tested
dynamically. It is therefore required that the ship is modelled to at least three super structure standard
heights above the bulkhead (freeboard) deck so that the large waves of the wave train do not break over
the model.

(c) It is important that not only the draughts in the intact condition are verified, but also that the draughts of
the damaged model are accurately measured for correlation with those derived from the damaged stability
calculation. After measuring the damaged draughts it may be found necessary to make adjustments to the
permeability of the damaged compartment by either introducing intact volumes or by adding weights.
However it is also important to ensure that the centre of gravity of the flood water is accurately repre-
sented. In this case any adjustments made must err on the side of safety.

(d) If the model is required to be fitted with barriers on deck and the barriers are less than the height required
as per paragraph 2.3 of Annex 1 of this Directive the model is to be fitted with CCTV so that any
‘splashing over’ and any accumulation of water on the undamaged area of the deck can be monitored. In
this case a video recording of the event is to form part of the tests records.

2.2.3.

In order to ensure that the model motion characteristics represent those of the actual ship it is important that
the model is both inclined and rolled in the intact condition so that the intact GM and the mass distribution
are verified.

The transverse radius of gyration of the actual ship is not to be taken as being greater than 0,4 B and the
longitudinal radius of gyration is not to be taken as being more than 0,25 L.

The transverse rolling period of the model is to be obtained by:

2(cid:1) (cid:1) 0,4 B
gGM(cid:2)p
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ

Where

GM: metacentric height of the actual (intact) ship

g:

acceleration due to gravity

λ:

scale of model

B:

breadth of actual ship

Note

While inclining and rolling the model in the damage condition may be accepted as a check for the purpose of
verifying the residual stability curve such tests are not to be accepted in lieu of the intact tests.

Nevertheless the damaged model must be rolled in order to obtain the rolling period required to perform the
tests as per paragraph 3.1.2.

2.2.4.

the damage
The contents of this paragraph are self explanatory.
compartment of the actual ship are adequate for unhindered flooding and movement of the flood water.
However in trying to scale down the ventilating arrangements of the actual ship undesirable scale effects may
be introduced. In order to ensure that these do not occur it is recommended to construct the ventilating
arrangements to a larger scale than that of the model, ensuring that this does not affect the flow of water on
the car deck.

It is assumed that

the ventilators of

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2.2.5.2. The isosceles triangular profile of the prismatic damage shape is that corresponding to the load waterline.

Additionally in cases where side casings of width less than B/5 are fitted and in order to avoid any possible
scale effects, the damage length in way of the side casings must not be less than (2) metres.

Paragraph 3 — Procedure for experiments

3.1. — Wave Spectra

The JONSWAP spectrum it to be used as this describes fetch and duration limited seas which correspond to the majority
of the conditions world-wide. In this respect it is important that not only the peak period of the wave train is verified
but also that the zero crossing period is correct.

3.1.1.

Corresponding to a peak period of 4 ﬃﬃﬃﬃhs
period is not to be greater than:

p

(cid:2)Tp=ð1,20 to 1,28Þ(cid:3) (cid:2) 5 %;

and given that the enhancement factor γ is 3.3, the zero crossing

3.1.2.

The zero crossing period corresponding to a peak period equal to the rolling period of the damaged model and
given that the factor γ is to be 1, is not to be greater than:

(cid:2)Tp=ð1,3 to 1,4Þ(cid:3) (cid:2) 5 %.

noting that if the rolling period of the damaged model is greater than 6 ﬃﬃﬃﬃhs
p
6 ﬃﬃﬃﬃhs
.

p

, the peak period is to be limited to

Note
It has been found that it is not practical to set limits for zero crossing periods of the model wave spectra
according to the nominal values of the mathematical formulae. Therefore an error margin of 5 % is allowed.

It is required that for every test run the wave spectrum is recorded and documented. Measurements for this recording
are to be taken in the immediate vicinity of the model (but not on the leeside) — see figure a below — and also near
the wave-making machine. It is also required that the model is instrumented so that its motions (roll, heave and pitch) as
well as its attitude (heel, sinkage and trim) are monitored and recorded though out the test.

The ‘near the model’ wave measuring probe to be positioned either on arc A or arc B (Figure (a)).

3.2., 3.3., 3.4.

The contents of these paragraphs are considered self explanatory.

3.5. — Simulated damages

Extensive research carried out for the purpose of developing appropriate criteria for new vessels has clearly shown that
in addition to the GM and freeboard being important parameters in the survivability of passenger ships, the area under
the residual stability curve up to the angle of maximum GZ is also an other major factor. Consequently in choosing the
worst SOLAS damage for compliance with the requirement of paragraph 3.5.1 the worst damage is to be taken as that
which gives the least area under the residual stability curve up to the angle of the maximum GZ.

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Paragraph 4 — Survival criteria

The contents of this paragraph are considered self explanatory.

Paragraph 5 — Test approval

The following documents are to be part of the report to the Administration:

(a) damage stability calculations for worst SOLAS and mid-ship damage (if different);

(b) general arrangement drawing of the model together with details of construction and instrumentation;

(c)

inclining experiment and rolling test reports;

(d) calculations of actual ship and model rolling periods; and

(e) nominal and measured wave spectra (near the wave-making machine and near the model respectively)

(f)

representative record of model motions, attitude and drift

(g) relevant video recordings.

Note

All tests must be witnessed by the Administration.

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Figures referred to in Annex 2

(Indicative Guidelines to National Administrations)

Figure 1

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Figure 2

1. If fr ‡ 2,0 metres, height of water on deck (hw) = 0,0 metres

2. If fr £ 0,3 metres, height of water on deck (hw) = 0,5 metres

Figure 3

1. If hs ‡ 4,0 metres, height of water on deck is calculated as per fig 3

2. If hs £ 1,5 metres, height of water on deck (hw) = 0,0 metres

For example

If fr = 1,15 metres and hs = 2,75 metres, Height hw = 0,125 metres

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Figure 4

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Figure 5

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Figure 6

Ship without hanging car decks

Example 1

Height of water on deck = 0,25 metres

Minimum required height of barrier = 2,2 metres

Ship with hanging deck (in way of the barrier)

Example 2

Height of water on deck (hw) = 0,25 metres

Minimum required height of barrier = x

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Figure 7

Figure 8

Minimum required freeboard to freeing port = 1,0 m

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Figure 9

Deck edge not immersed

Deck edge immersed

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THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSAL ON BUSINESS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SMALL AND
MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES (SMEs)

IMPACT ASSESSMENT FORM

Title of proposal

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on specific stability requirements for ro-ro
passenger ships.

Document reference number

COM(2002) 158 — 2002/0074(COD)

The proposal

1. Taking account of the principle of subsidiarity, why is Community legislation necessary in this area and what are its main aims?

The obligations of the Community in this context are the improvement of safety in maritime transport as provided
for in Article 80(2) of the Treaty. The objective of the action proposed is the establishment of harmonised safety
requirements regarding the stability of ro-ro passenger ships operating on international voyages from/to EU ports.

Referring to the principle of subsidiarity, it will be the responsibility of the Community to ensure a framework of
rules providing a harmonised level of safety for passenger ships operating under the same conditions throughout the
EU. The responsibility of the Member States is to adopt within their own national legislation measures which will
ensure the effective application of the Directive.

The impact on business

2. Who will be affected by the proposal?

— which sectors of business

— which sizes of business (what is the concentration of small and medium-sized firms)

— are there particular geographical areas of the Community where these businesses are found.

The business sector which will be affected by this proposal are entities operating ro-ro passenger ships to and from
Community ports. A vast majority of passenger ships sailing in Community waters are operated by medium-sized
and large enterprises. Taking into account that the specific stability requirements introduced by this Directive are
already in place in seven northern EU Member States which apply the Stockholm Agreement, the proposal will have
in practise implications only for the companies operating such type of vessels in the Mediterranean sea. Since the
70 % of the ro-ro passenger ships operating in this area are under the Greek and the Italian flag, it is expected that
there will be economic impact mainly for companies operating vessels under these two flags. Nevertheless, the large
majority of ro-ro passenger ships trading in the south European waters operate in domestic voyages, and thus outside
the scope of this Directive. Their case is addressed by the proposal revising Council Directive 98/18/EC. It has
generally been noted that following the introduction of the Stockholm Agreement, new ro-ro passenger vessels are
built with the aim to satisfy the specific stability requirements even when these are built for trading in the South EU
waters.

3. What will business have to do to comply with the proposal?

Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative procedures so that operators of ro-ro
passenger ships comply with the specific stability requirements. The application of these requirements will oblige the
operators of existing ships (those trading in the areas under the Directive) to proceed with structural modifications
on these ships in order to upgrade them up to the level established by this Directive. A first step for business will be
to subject their ships to the model test of compliance in order to check the need for an upgrade.

4. What economic effects is the proposal likely to have?

— on employment

— on investment and the creation of new businesses

— on the competitiveness of businesses.

No impact is expected on employment following the introduction of the requirements of this Directive. The
phasing-in timetable for existing ships, provided for in the Directive, will give sufficient time to the shipping
companies to upgrade their ships. Taking into account the running SOLAS upgrade time-table, the Directive gives
a sufficient period to comply with the additional stability requirements.

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The analysis conducted by the Commission demonstrates that the introduction of the SA in the North of Europe
took place without particular trouble for the industry or the contracting governments. Based on a sample of 82
vessels, out of a total of 140 that needed to comply with the Agreement, it appears that 36 % of the vessels in that
sample did not need any upgrade. Furthermore, 69 % of the total 140 vessels were upgraded for less than 1 million
Euro. The estimated total cost of upgrade was around 85 mio Euro. However it is important to note that most of
that cost related to the accelerated compliance with SOLAS 90 standards (a necessary step before compliance with
the Stockholm Agreement) rather than just to compliance with the Agreement as such.

Given the common value of significant wave heights in the Southern EU waters is around 2,5 metres, the modi-
fication cost of the South European fleet for compliance with the provisions of the SA will be approximately the
same as the associated cost for compliance with the requirements of the SOLAS 90 two compartment standard (1).
Since full compliance with SOLAS Regulations is to take place by 2010, on the basis of the IMO timetable (inter-
national trades) and of Directive 98/18/CE (domestic EU trades) the industry should have already planned to invest in
the coming years in the upgrade of the vessels concerned. The study states that 264 vessels trading in the South
European waters (international and domestic) will be affected from the SOLAS upgrade and that the cost of
compliance will be among 106 and 250 million Euro (these figures do not take into account possible removals
from service of aged ro-ro ships). As already mentioned, compliance of these ships with the specific stability
requirements set out in the Stockholm Agreement will not increase their SOLAS compliance cost in a prohibitive
way.

It appears therefore that the application of the SA stability requirements to the South European ro-ro passenger
vessels will offer a uniformity of stability requirements and an increased level throughout the EU, without increasing
substantially the economic effort of the affected part of the industry, which has to comply anyway with the SOLAS
90 standard.

The proposal is likely to have a beneficial impact on the competitive position of the business, since it will harmonise
the stability standards applied to ro-ro passenger vessels trading in the EU creating a global market which will make
possible the operation of these ships to all EU trades where the same significant wave height conditions are met. By
establishing a harmonised safety regime for all ro-ro passenger ships serving EU ports, regardless of flag, a level
playing field will be created for all operators involved, minimising the risks for distortion of competition by operators
trying to gain a competitive edge by economising on the safety standard.

5. Does the proposal contain measures to take account of the specific situation of small and medium-sized firms (reduced or different

requirements etc.)?

Fulfilling the requirements of the proposal should not constitute insurmountable financial burdens for the affected
companies. The experience from the introduction of these standards in the Northern European waters demonstrated
that the financial implications for the industry were reasonable.

Consultation

6. List the organisations which have been consulted about the proposal and outline their main views.

The Commission held a consultation meeting on 25 October 2001 with parties interested on this issue, which was
attended by representatives of shipowners (ECSA, ICS, BIMCO), seafarers (ETF), classification societies (IACS), ship-
builders (CESA) and disabled (European Disabilities Forum-EDF).

The proposed action was met with scepticism by the shipowner representatives, particularly in view of the cost
implications this will have for existing ships. These representatives felt that general weather conditions in the South
did not justify the generalisation by EU Law of the regional requirements defined in the Stockholm Agreement.
However, the measure was clearly supported by the seafarers representatives and the users organisation present at the
meeting on the grounds that it will offer additional safety to the travelling public and the crew. These two
organisations found essential that ships operating under similar significant wave height conditions had to comply
with the same safety standard.

(1) The SOLAS 90 two compartment standard establishes that the ship can survive without capsizing with two main compartments

flooded following damage.