Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993 on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports" (COM(2001) 335 final — 2001/0140 (COD))
Date: 2002-03-20
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: air transport, airport, common transport policy, competition, regulation (EU), transport capacity, transport planning

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It

It also provides for exemption of small manufacturers
4.5.
(see point 3.3).
is understandable and proper for the
Commission to concern itself with the effects on SMEs.
However, it is necessary to avoid this exemption being used to
reduce the effectiveness of the standard laid down in the
proposed directive.

The ESC favours this solution, which forms part of the
4.6.
broader approach of support for small and medium European
enterprises, and suggests that for those who produce only
slightly more than 2 000 units per year the public bodies
responsible for type-approval checks could make available the
technical type-approval equipment (dynamometer bench) at a
reasonable cost.

Brussels, 20 March 2002.

5. Conclusions

5.1.
For the reasons set out above, the Committee, while
endorsing the application of this provision to the first sub-
category, would ask the Commission to provide further
justification for the application of the draft directive’s pro-
visions to vehicles in the second and third sub-categories; it
seems more realistic for such vehicles to be excluded from its
scope. It would also seem desirable to extend the deadlines for
new type-approvals as well from 1 July 2003 to 1 October
2005. That would enable the present draft directive to come
into force at the same time as the more restrictive emission
standards known as EURO 4.

The President

of the Economic and Social Committee

Göke FRERICHS

Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/93 of 18 January 1993
on common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports’

(COM(2001) 335 final — 2001/0140 (COD))

(2002/C 125/03)

On 12 July 2001 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under Article 80
(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the above-mentioned proposal.

The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for
preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 26 February 2002. The rapporteur
was Mr Tosh.

At its 389th Plenary Session of 20 and 21 March 2002 (meeting of 20 March) the Committee adopted
the following opinion unanimously.

1.

Introduction

1.2.
It offers clarification to the definition of slot rights,
airports status, new entrant management, coordination, con-
ciliation and ultimately enforcement.

1.1.
This proposal attempts to re-focus upon the manage-
ment of slots and in conjunction with that to reflect ATC,
airports operation and capacity issues alongside current
fair and transparent
environmental objectives,
procedures to protect and encourage the industry and users
alike and arbitrate upon congestion.

to impart

1.3.
It sets out to enhance the prospects of finding and
maintaining the right balance between air carriers and the
development of a competitive network within the EU and with
third countries.

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2. Background

— roles of schedules facilitator and coordinator, and, of the

Coordination Committee;

This proposal amends Council Regulation (EEC) No 95/

2.1.
93 of 18 January 1993.

— definition of slot entitlements at airports;

— recognition of allocation and precedence in slot rights;

2.2.
The Committee should note the context within which
this proposal resides. In 2002 the following proposals are
programmed for implementation:

— operational priorities of airports;

— common rules on noise measurement around airports;

— efficient use of airport capacity;

— standards of noise and emission of air transport;

— environmental impact objectives;

— common requirements and procedures in the field of

aviation security;

— inter-regional air-service provisions;

— specific common requirements for air safety;

— air transport pricing.

— third-country comparability;

— enforcement and review.

2.3. We should also note that a review of the process and
options on a market-based system by which slot-trading will
be managed, is planned. No external award by the Commission
has yet been commissioned!

4. ESC comments

2.4.

Also, in the Transport White Paper it is noted that:

— the EU suffers from over-fragmentation of its air-traffic-

management systems;

— transport is globalised but international rules to facilitate
trade and commerce do not take sufficient account of
environmental protection or security of supply concerns.

The Committee welcomes the proposal, not least in view of
the current situation where poor performance and punctuality
of air transport is causing serious disruption to business and
individuals.

The proposal entails far-reaching impact on the core business
of airports — namely the landing and take-off of the range of
carrier aircraft. It serves to describe and mould procedures and
organisation so as to improve both efficiency and effectiveness.
The Committee would make the following remarks on specific
aspects:

3. Content

It comprehensively revises the following principal aspects and
features:

4.1. New entrants

— new entrant definition and allocations process;

— slots transfer;

— designation and use of airports where demand exceeds

capacity;

4.1.1.
The accommodation now extended to new entrant
applications offers a rolling opportunity for new competition
to assess the attractiveness to compete for both existing route
traffic and new inter-regional routes. The proportion of pool
slots at 50 % appears adequate given that it can be expected
that they will probably be at off-peak times. Article 10(5)
should be reworded to ensure that first preference is given to
new entrants up to 50 % of slots in the pool.

— international terminology;

— principles of transparency, neutrality and non-discrimi-

nation for slot allocation;

4.1.2.
The decree in Article 10 which removes new entrant
status from a carrier who refuses offered slots appears
unreasonable, given the attendant front end commercial risk
level in developing a new route.

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4.2.

Slots transfer

4.5. Coordination

4.2.1. Whereas they might reasonably expect first refusal
on such better timings as became available, the proposal does
not offer such an incentive to new entrants.

4.5.1. G e n e r a l

4.2.2. When an established carrier unilaterally withdraws a
regional service, as did BA from Heathrow to Belfast immedi-
ately post 11 September, slot transfer action must facilitate
return of the service, by whomsoever, and not debar any
carrier. Article 9 should specifically refer to support
for
meeting Public Service Obligations in particular to isolated
and island regions. The ESC is concerned that serious difficult-
ies will arise in the policing of slot mobility as outlined in
Articles 8a and 8b.

The ban on bogus or fake unilateral slot transfers,
4.2.3.
where in essence valuable slots were exchanged for poor
quality slots should help open the competitive environment.

4.3. Airport designation and terminology

Major airports will be clearly coordinated, with slots allocated
by coordinators, others will suffer partial congestion. It should
be understood that when average daily slot allocation exceeds
a designated level, say 40 %, and the ‘analysis’ predicts further
growth, an airport will switch from ‘schedules facilitated’ to
‘coordinated’ status.

4.4.

Principles of slot allocation

4.4.1.
The ESC welcomes the Commission explanation that
slots are considered as ‘rights to use infrastructure’ and not
‘property rights’. This does beg the question of the proposed
examination of slot trading and the inevitable challenge by
flagship carriers that the ‘grandfather right’ embodied in the
proposal is de facto their ‘property’.

4.4.2.
There is concern at the provision (Article 2 (b)) to
debar partners in route sharing from new entrant status; such
route sharing has sound reasons e.g. load factor, environmental
impact, services, to justify it.

On the other hand, the comfort of ‘grandfather’
4.4.3.
rights gives balance to the process of slot mobility, recognition
of historical commercial costs and control of transfers.

The coordinated periods require definition. Some
4.5.1.1.
references suggest six-monthly periods, summer and winter,
elsewhere the emphasis is on year round operational provision.
It is important that these periods be defined and, further, that
to afford the widest opportunity for competition to re-
position slots, the periods should be staggered within national
boundaries to facilitate this. Six-monthly periods would appear
to be the most responsive format.

The appointment of

4.5.1.2.
the coordinator must be
totally independent and apolitical. There is concern that
the coordination exercise could become both costly and
bureaucratic. The ESC would emphasise the importance that
the proposal insist that:

— coordination is established as a totally independent entity;

— Member States adequately ensure their operational

budgets and assure their authority;

— expertise evolves from current status to ensure it has

transparently sustainable, independent capacity;

— management systems develop in concert with airports to
create the data that ensures fast response for solutions
creation.

4.5.2. C o o r d i n a t o r

The reinforcement of neutrality and independence
4.5.2.1.
of the coordinator is an essential ingredient for the success of
this proposal, as is the remit of his/her reach into inter-related
issues such as airport-capacity considerations. The wider
auditorial remit to cross-refer will ensure malpractices are
is unclear in which
identified and addressed,
forum. This should be clarified. Member States must provide
indemnification to coordinators so that they may act in an
unimpaired manner to pursue their brief and respect their
principles. This does not remove any responsibility from the
Coordinator to satisfactorily account for their actions and
decisions.

though it

It is assumed that standardised data will be made
4.5.2.2.
available to the industry at large, within defined response
times, to ensure best competitive knowledge is disseminated.
The ESC insists that coordinators cooperate with relevant
authorities and respect the provisions of Article 81 and 82 of
the EU Treaty to ensure that resulting decisions are favourable
for all air-traffic users.

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4.5.3. C o o r d i n a t i o n c o m m i t t e e ( A r t i c l e 5 )

4.7.

Environment

4.5.3.1.
This forum appears to be an amalgam of the great
and the good from the industry, apparently single airport
focused. With the caveat that matters of commercial confi-
dence are kept off the agenda, it would be more efficient if
regional Coordination Committees governed the policy mat-
ters outlined in Article 8, when it is considered that method-
ology, local guidelines and procedures for example would be
common.

4.5.3.2.
It would appear that the Coordination Committee
has significant influence but no teeth, and definition of its
right of recourse to Member State competent bodies should be
spelt out. The ESC believes that this Committee’s remits should
discourage an infestation of local rules that inadvertently or
otherwise frustrate competitive practice.

4.5.4.

S l o t s a l l o c a t i o n a n d e n t i t l e m e n t

4.5.4.1.
The refinements to the process are justified. Given
the Coordination Committee’s brief to arbitrate it would
appear relevant that the coordinator should report and describe
the totality of all of his/her justifications to this Committee
within each period, so that their deliberations are not predi-
cated upon complaints only.

4.5.4.2.
There is concern that coordinators are not com-
pelled to arbitrate upon ‘alternative’ transfer modes, which is
outside their field of responsibility.

4.6. Airports

4.7.1.
Given the recently adopted ESC Opinion on holisti-
cally minimising the noise and pollutant discharges around
airports (1), it would be appropriate for local/regional govern-
ment to be represented on the Coordination Committee.

4.8.

Inter-regional route development

4.8.1.
The ESC understands the demands for economic
justification, but given the proposal’s emphasis on network
development and the value of this to Community cohesion, it
should clearly establish to what level available slots should be
so reserved and for how long, so as not to consume scarce
airport capacity.

4.8.2.
It is inevitable that major hubs such as London or
Frankfurt will find regional network evolution impossible to
accommodate. Such can be more readily resolved on a regional
air-transport basis, not by a single airport.

4.9. Third countries

4.9.1.
The proposal promotes, in essence, measures against
carriers of a third country which refuses comparable treatment
to Community carriers. Such action is surely misdirected and
raises the need for EU diplomatic efforts to reach comparable
stewardship of slots and cross-reciprocity globally. Airline
alliances tend to be global, so identifying suitable candidates
for action could be tricky and damaging, by association, to EU
partnering carriers.

4.6.1. C a p a c i t y

a n d p r i o r i t i e s

( A r t i c l e s

3

a n d 5 )

4.10.

Enforcement

4.6.1.1.
Intermediate capacity review should only be con-
ceived after significant changes occur to influence airport
capacity, or at three years’ intervals.

4.6.1.2.
Given that airports will make decisions to maximise
returns, it cannot be assumed that an airport will be driven to
invest by the outcome of a dispute referral to the Coordination
Committee. An example could be the desirability of funding
in preference to a no-frills
the ubiquitous shopping mall
this
for low-cost arrivals and departures. So,
terminal
proposal cannot be seen as the means to influence strategic
airport planning, additional measures will be needed.

if

4.10.1.
It seems reasonable that non-performance is penal-
ised by both fines and slot withdrawal. The coordinator must
nevertheless act expeditiously to limit collateral damage to
airports from such actions. Given the recent asymmetric
shocks to the air-traffic industry, coordinators should hold a
degree of autonomy to deal wisely in such occurrences.

(1) Opinion on the Proposal

the European
Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of rules and
procedures with regard to the introduction of noise-related
operating instruction at Community airports.

for a Directive of

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4.10.2.
The ESC would note that in Article 14 the inter-
vention proposed when carriers default could be frustrated by
the slot-trading process.

established then also having more leverage. Recognition of
effective competition should be the driving principle.

5.

Final observations

The ESC believes that EU agreed legislation must be

5.1.
universally upheld.

5.2. Member States must offer indemnification to coordi-
nators so that they may be clear to pursue their brief and
principles unfettered.

avoids

This proposal

5.3.
any comment upon the
maximum level of slots which, in the interests of competition,
any one carrier may hold in a given airport. Present levels
above 60 % are not uncommon.

The measures provided for in this proposal need to be
5.4.
understood by the widest cross-section of the travelling public.
Well-displayed user-friendly records by way of e.g. score
boards showing performance achievements, would be of
interest. Slots’ usage is in the gift of the airport and punctuality
performance must be reported therefore by them, to show
actual and trend reliability.

5.5. Whilst air traffic safety is not under consideration, it is
importance. The Coordination Committee
of paramount
should ensure high levels of safety and security in its operation.

5.6.
There is much emphasis on new entrants developing
new routes. All carriers should be so encouraged, those already

Brussels, 20 March 2002.

5.7.
The inclusion of regional local authority representation
on committees should be considered essential. This influence
could assure that regional capacity, land-side infrastructure
and public service obligations are satisfied, and Article 5
should assert this. However the ESC does recognise that slots
are not infinitely interchangeable given the widely diverging
character of airports.

The allocation of slots will require sensitivity in the
5.8.
policing of
‘use it or lose it’. Coordinators must not be
bureaucratic and restrained by red tape, but should retain
some authority to exercise discretion e.g. when a carrier is
dislodged from a slot by the direct interventions of serious
disruptive actions by terrorists. If airlines can demonstrate
their discomfort to the coordinator’s satisfaction, they should
be accorded the right to retain their slots for the subsequent
coordinated period, to facilitate recovery.

5.9.
The Coordination Committee’s remit should include
clear responsibility to assess the capacity and implementation
of best security practice and ensure that its common adoption
is practised evenly so as to ensure that this slots’ proposal is
implemented in such a secure environment, established jointly
by airports and carriers.

5.10. Whilst the impact of forthcoming reports is awaited,
it is the ESC view that coordinators reflect the latest under-
standing of environmental constraints in their selection pro-
cess.
is anticipated that such findings will clarify the
weighting of their impact upon decisions.

It

The President

of the Economic and Social Committee

Göke FRERICHS