Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Democratic Control over Europol
Date: 2002-02-26
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Europol, parliamentary scrutiny

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 26.2.2002
COM(2002) 95 final

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

Democratic Control over Europol

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.

2.

3.

3.1.

3.2.

Introduction.............................................................................................................. 3

Views of the European Parliament............................................................................ 5

The current functioning of Europol........................................................................... 7

Tasks and powers. .................................................................................................... 7

Existing controls....................................................................................................... 8

3.2.1. Rules on data protection ........................................................................................... 8

3.2.2.

The Management Board ........................................................................................... 9

3.2.3.

Parliamentary control ............................................................................................. 10

4.

5.

The future............................................................................................................... 11

conclusion and Recommendations .......................................................................... 13

2

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL

Democratic Control over Europol

1.

1.1

1.2

INTRODUCTION

Article 29 of the Amsterdam Treaty (TEU) establishes as a new objective for the
Union “...to provide citizens with a high level of safety within an area of freedom,
security and justice by developing common action among the Member States in the
fields of police and judicial co-operation in criminal matters...” It stipulates that this
objective shall be achieved by preventing and combating crime, organised or
otherwise. One of the means mentioned to combat crime is closer co-operation
between police forces, customs authorities and other competent authorities in the
Member States, both directly and through the European Police Office (Europol).1

Article 30 contains the general statement that the Council promotes co-operation
through Europol. In addition it mentions a number of activities which the Council
should realise within a period of five years after the date of entry into force of the
Treaty.2 The conclusions of the special European Council on Justice and Home
Affairs of Tampere of October 1999 contain proposals to develop Europol further.3.

Europol4 became fully operational only in July 1999, after having begun certain
activities as the Europol Drugs Unit in 1993. The role and mandate of Europol in the
European Union's approach to the fight against serious international crime is a
subject of ongoing debate, including at the level of successive intergovernmental
conferences. It has been brought into particularly sharp focus by the events of
11 September in New York and Washington and by the Union’s response to them.
As recently as 6 December 2001, the Council decided, on the basis of a proposal
tabled in the second half of 2000 by Sweden and Belgium, to extend Europol’s
mandate to all forms of crime mentioned in the Annex to the Convention establishing
Europol. The question of how best to implement the provisions of the Amsterdam
Treaty and the Tampere European Council conclusions to extend further Europol’s
role into something more operative is under active discussion. Recently more
fundamental ideas on Europol's future were raised, such as the possibility to give it
real investigative powers.

1 Art. 29 Treaty of the European Union (TEU)
2 Art. 30 (2) TEU
3 Presidency Conclusions of the Tampere European Council on 15-16 October 1999 (Tampere Conclusions)

No. 43 and 45

4 Europol Convention; OJ 1995/ C 316/ 01

3

1.3

Questions have also been raised, particularly in the Committee on Civil Liberties and
Justice and Home Affairs of the European Parliament, about the appropriate means
for democratic control of Europol.

Until recently, however, the subject of the democratic, or rather parliamentary,
control over Europol has never been discussed in detail. This changed with the
presentation by the Swedish Presidency of an overview of the existing legal
provisions concerning democratic control over Europol on 14 May 2001.5 This
initiative was followed by the organisation by the Dutch Parliament of the first inter-
parliamentary European Union conference on Europol on 7-8 June 2001, which
focused on the question of parliamentary control.

The subject of democratic control over Europol requires a careful examination of
what existing control mechanisms exist, whether they are adequate or whether they
should be developed further. That there is need for an adequate level of control over
Europol is beyond doubt. In the discussion on whether parliamentary control over
Europol's activities should be extended, one should have in mind that Europol is a
police organisation which is working in the highly sensitive area of the fight against
organised crime. The challenge is therefore to find the right balance between an
appropriate level of parliamentary control on the one hand and the need for
confidentiality and discretion of a police organisation in order to enable it to fight
this dangerous form of crime effectively on the other. The recent events in the United
States have further highlighted the importance of finding the right balance.

The Scoreboard of the European Commission calls for the examination of the
possible need to revise the Europol Convention to cover the question of democratic
control.6 The Scoreboard mentions the end of 2001 as a deadline for
this
examination. The relevance of the matter has become even clearer with the adoption
by the European Council of Laeken of 14 and 15 December of its "Declaration on the
future of the European Union." The Declaration mentions the need for European
institutions to be less unwieldy and rigid and more efficient and open. It also refers to
the expectations of Europes' citizens for a greater EU role in justice and security and
action against cross-border crime. These issues, which are clearly relevant to the
subject of this Communication, are now on the agenda of the Convention, which has
been tasked with preparing the next Inter-governmental Conference on the future of
the Union.

Two subjects related to democratic control are not dealt with in this Communication:
judicial control and the financing of Europol through the Community budget. The
Commission takes the view that, in view of Europol's current tasks and competences
-which are much more limited than those of the Member States' police services as is
explained below- it would be more appropriate to examine these subjects at a later
point in time in the context of the possible attribution of investigative powers to
Europol.

1.4

1.5

5 See Council document 8677/01 Europol 39
6 COM (2001) 628 final of 30 October 2001; page 43

4

2.

2.1.

2.2.

VIEWS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The European Parliament has raised the subject of democratic control several times.
In April 1999 it adopted a Recommendation to the Council on the extension of the
powers of Europol and the reinforcement of parliamentary control over it.7 In October
2000 it adopted a Report on the Portuguese initiative to extend Europol's competence
to money laundering in general.8 More recently, in October 2001 it adopted a report
on the joint Belgian-Swedish initiative to extend Europol's competence to all forms
of crimes listed in the annex to the Europol Convention.9

In its 1999 Recommendation, which was approved before the entry into force of the
Treaty of Amsterdam,
the Parliament stated that existing parliamentary control
arrangements were too cumbersome and, as a result of the intergovernmental nature
of decision-making procedures in the police co-operation area, ineffective. It does
not regard the way in which information on Europol’s activities is given to the
European Parliament as representing an adequate form of parliamentary control.
However, the Parliament also argued that Europol's new powers, based on its support
role in the co-ordination of police deployment made possible by the Amsterdam
Treaty, did not fundamentally alter the system or imperatives of parliamentary
control.10

In particular the Parliament 11

calls on the Council

to incorporate into the Treaty provisions on full
-
parliamentary and judicial scrutiny of Europol at the level of the European Union and
not
to give any operational powers to Europol without providing for adequate
scrutiny by the European Parliament. The Parliament urges the Council to take
account of the already established rights of the European parliament to be informed
and consulted.

-

proposes to incorporate Europol's budget in the Community budget.

-
suggests that, in the event of Europol's evolving into a police organisation with
cross-border operational powers, the Council should look into setting-up a European
public prosecutor's office or some other judicial body. In this case Europol should be
given a basis in Community law and should be placed under the responsibility of a
member of the Commission.

7 European Parliament recommendation to the Council on Europol: reinforcing parliamentary controls and

extending powers; A4-0064/1999 adopted on 13 April 1999 (Rapporteur: Hartmut Nassauer)

8 Report on the initiative from the Portuguese Republic with a view to the adoption of a Council Act on the
drawing up on the basis of Article 43 (1) of the Europol Convention of a protocol amending Article 2 and the
Annex to the Convention; A5-0312/2000 adopted on 14 November 2000 (Rapporteur: Anna Karamanou)
9 Report on the initiative of the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of Sweden with a view to adopting a
Council decision extending Europol's mandate to deal with the serious forms of international crime listed in
the Annex to the Europol Convention.; A5-0370/2001 Final of 24 october 2001 adopted on 13 November
2001 (Rapporteur: Maurizio Turco)

10 See consideration Q and S of the 1999 Recommendation
11 Recommendations Nr. 1-3, 5, 6 and 16

5

2.3.

2.4

-
calls on the Parliaments of the Member States to take consistent account of
their right and duty to supervise the actions of their national Council member
responsible for Europol and the Member States' representatives appointed to the
Europol Management Board. This should happen in close co-operation with the
European Parliament.

On the occasion of its Report on the Portuguese initiative adopted on 14 November
2000 the Parliament repeats its earlier criticism and proposes additional ideas on how
to enhance the democratic accountability of Europol (e.g. the appearance of the
Europol Director before the competent Parliamentary Committee; the right of the
Parliament to request an exchange of views on the special annual report; making the
European Court of Justice competent to rule on any dispute or conflict between
the Europol
Member States
Convention).12

regarding the interpretation or application of

The suggestions made by the European Parliament on the occasion of the report on
the joint Belgian-Swedish initiative to extend Europol's mandate to all serious forms
of crime listed in the Annex to the Europol Convention adopted on 13 November
2001 also mainly aims at increasing the control of the European Parliament over
Europol. Thus the Parliament requested for example that the Commission should
present by the end of 2001 a proposal to revise the Europol Convention following
best practices and methods of democratic control of police services in the Member
States: "A proposal for the comprehensive reform of the instruments of police and
judicial cooperation, including revision of the Europol Convention to bring it into
line with higher standards and methodes of democratic control of the police forces of
the Member States is to be submitted by the Commission by the end of 2001; that
comprehensive reform should aim gradually to communitise those instruments, to
strengthen judicial control by the Court of Justice and to fund those instruments
through the Community budget."13

At the time the Parliament put forward this request the Council had already made an
inventory of the amendments to the Europol Convention that were considered
necessary to make Europol function more effectively. Member States judged it useful
to postpone a fundamental discussion on the question of democratic control over
Europol until the Commission's Communication on the subject. The Communication
can be considered as an important first step in the process of gradually improving
democratic control over Europol: much of it is devoted to clarifying some basic
questions concerning the exact tasks and functions of Europol as compared with
those of the police services of the Member States as well as the currently existing
types of control over the organisation.

12 Report of the European parliament; A5-0312/2000, p. 6-8
13 Report of the European Parliament; A5-0370/2001 final, p. 6

6

3.

THE CURRENT FUNCTIONING OF EUROPOL.

An examination of the question of whether the existing provisions for democratic control over
Europol are adequate has to begin with an examination of the tasks and powers of Europol
itself.

3.1.

Tasks and powers.

Article 2 (1) of the Europol Convention defines Europol’s objective as “...to improve
the effectiveness and co-operation of the competent law enforcement authorities in
the Member States in preventing and combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking
and other serious forms of international crime where there are factual indications that
an organised criminal structure is involved and two or more Member States are
affected...”

Article 3 (1) stipulates that Europol shall have the following principal tasks to
achieve its objective:

-

-

-

-

-

to facilitate the exchange of information between the Member States;

to obtain, collate and analyse information and intelligence;

to notify the competent authorities of the Member States without delay of
information concerning them and of any connections identified between criminal
offences;

to aid investigations in the Member States by forwarding all relevant information
to the national units;

to maintain a computerised system of collected data.

In performing these tasks Europol could until recently only deal with the following
forms of crime: drug trafficking, trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances,
illegal immigrant smuggling, trade in human beings, motor vehicle crime, terrorism
and money laundering. 14 From 1 January 2002 Europol is able to deal with all the
forms of crime listed in the Annex to the Europol Convention.15

The Europol Convention thus limits Europol’s tasks basically to information
exchange, crime analysis and co-ordination. This means that Europol’s mandate is
limited to a much narrower range of tasks than those which the national police forces
of the Member States traditionally perform, such as assuring public order and
security, the power to effect arrests and the right to use weapons. The only powers
that Europol has on the basis of the Convention is to ask for, to give and to process
information, including on line, on the basis of very stringent legal provisions. A
major difference for example with a national police service is that Europol currently
has no executive and investigative powers and carries no weapons: it has no power to
conduct wire tapping, house searches or arrests or other police activities which affect

14 Art. 2 Europol Convention; Council Decision of 29 April 1999 extending Europol's mandate to forgery of

money and means of payment.

15 Council Decision of 6 December 2001; OJ 2001/C 362/ 01

7

the fundamental rights of citizens (apart from the right to privacy, see 3.2.1 below)
and which therefore – in addition to requiring an adequate legal basis- have to be
under judicial control, e.g. under the control of a public prosecutor or another
democratically accountable authority.

3.2.

Existing controls.

In order to assess whether the provisions for control over Europol are adequate in
relation to its existing powers, it is necessary to examine the Europol Convention.
This document describes in detail what Europol is allowed to do and how it should
operate in performing its functions.

As explained above, Europol's work mainly involves the processing of information,
including (under strictly laid down rules) personal data. It gathers, processes, stores
and disseminates information that it receives from Member States law enforcement
services and its own intelligence work. Recently it signed co-operation agreements
with Interpol, Norway, Iceland, as well as with the candidate countries Poland,
Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia. These agreements include the possibility to
exchange personal data. The co-operation agreement signed with the United Staates
last December does not allow the exchange of such data. It continues to negotiate co-
operation agreements with all other candidate countries. These agreements will
provide additional sources of information.

3.2.1.

Rules on data protection

The main fundamental right of citizens, which is affected by Europol’s current work
therefore, is the right to privacy.16 To address this issue, the Europol Convention
contains a number of articles regarding the processing of personal data and data
protection.17 Article 23 of the Convention stipulates that each Member State shall
designate a national supervisory body (NSB). The NSBs have the task to monitor, in
accordance with their respective national legislation, the permissibility of the input,
retrieval and any communication to Europol of personal data. They must also
examine if this violates the rights of the data subject. In addition, Article 24
stipulates that a Joint Supervisory Body (JSB) shall be established. The task of the
JSB, an independent body, composed of representatives of each of the NSBs, is to
assure that Europol respects the Convention’s provisions on data protection. It also
has to review, in accordance with the Convention, the activities of Europol in order
to ensure that the rights of the individuals are not violated by the storage, processing
and utilisation of the data held by Europol. The JSB shall furthermore monitor the
permissibility of the transmission of data originating from Europol. Europol has an
obligation to assist the JSB in carrying out its tasks successfully, in particular to
allow its members free access to all its premises, to supply requested information, to
give access to all data and to implement its decisions on appeals.18 Every individual
has a right to request the JSB to ensure that the treatment of personal data by Europol
is lawful and accurate.19 In accordance with Article 24 (6) of the Europol Convention

16 See also in this respect the Charter of Fundamental rights of the European Union; Article 8: Protection of

personal data.

17 Title IV, Art. 13 – 25 Europol Convention
18 Art. 24 (2) and Art. 24 (7) Europol Convention
19 Art. 24 (4) Europol Convention

8

the JSB shall draw up reports on its activities at a regular basis to be submitted to the
Council.

In addition to the above provisions on data protection, the Convention itself and
several complementary Council Acts lay down rules on the use of data and the
communication of data to third states and third bodies.20

3.2.2.

The Management Board

As regards the day-to-day work of Europol, the Management Board has the role of
supervising and guiding the organisation. The Convention contains a long list of
tasks, which the Management Board must perform. Some examples are:21

- Adopt the annual report on Europol’s activities during the previous year;

- Adopt a report on Europol’s future activities taking into account Member States’
operational requirements and budgetary and staffing implications for Europol;

- Prepare the implementing rules for data files;

- Approve orders opening data files;

- Take part
Directors;

in the appointment and dismissal of the Director and Deputy

- Take part in the drawing up of the budget;

- Adopt the five-year financing plan;

- Appoint the financial controller and oversee the performance of his duties;

- Take part in any amendment to the Convention;

- Act in disputes between a Member States and Europol or between Member

States on compensation for unauthorized or incorrect processing of data.

The Management Board is composed of one representative of each Member State.
The European Commission has observer status. The Board has to meet at least twice
per year, but in practice meets about six times per year. The performance of the
to monitor Europol's functioning in considerable detail.
above tasks enables it
Through their representatives on the Board, Member States' competent Ministers are
able to remain continuously and well informed about Europol’s functioning.

It may thus be said that in the particular area of data protection and in the supervision
exercised by the Management Board, the controls exercised over Europol are similar
to, if not wider than controls that exist in the Member States for national police

20 e.g. Council Act of 3 November 1998 laying down rules concerning the receipt of information by Europol
from third parties (OJ 1999/ C 26/ 03); Council Act of 12 March 1999 on the rules governing the transmission
of personal data by Europol to third states and third bodies (OJ 1999/ C 88/ 01).

21 Art. 28 Europol Convention

9

services, despite the fact that the latter's powers are much wider than the current ones
of Europol.

3.2.3.

Parliamentary control

a)

Responsibility for the guiding and supervising of Europol rests, therefore, with the
Management Board, which is composed of representatives of the Member States.
The Management Board reports to the Council. The Council members responsible
for Europol, i.e. the Ministers competent for criminal police matters in each Member
State, are subject
to national parliamentary controls in accordance with the
provisions of their respective constitutions. Each of them is responsible for providing
adequate information on the functioning of Europol to his or her national Parliament
where he or she can be held accountable on the Ministry's policy regarding Europol.

The Europol Convention itself also contains specific provisions on the European
Parliament. Article 34 stipulates that the Presidency shall forward each year a special
report on the work of Europol to the Parliament. Since Europol’s becoming fully
operational in July 1999, such reports have been submitted twice: for the years 1999
and 2000. These reports were (only very slightly) edited versions of the general
annual Europol reports submitted to the Council. The question arises, therefore, of
whether there is any compelling reason why the Parliament should not receive
exactly the same report as the one sent to the Council. It could be an improvement to
submit a single report to the European Parliament and the Council.22

The Europol Convention also states that the European Parliament has to be consulted
before any amendment to the Convention.

laid down in
The limited possibilities of control for the European Parliament
Article 34 of the Europol Convention, which came into force in 1998, have now been
indirectly extended by the Amsterdam treaty, where the relevant provision is
the
Article 39 TEU. This lays down an obligation for the Council
Parliament before the adoption of legally binding measures, such as framework
decisions, decisions and conventions. This provision thus also applies to the adoption
of any such instruments involving Europol. Several articles of
the Europol
Convention stipulate that the Council must take decisions in accordance with the
procedures in Title VI of the TEU. This means that the obligation in Article 39 TEU
to consult the Parliament applies. Thus it is assured that the European Parliament is
consulted on important decisions concerning the development of Europol, e.g. any
extension of its mandate, the appointment and dismissal of the Europol Director or
the determination of rules governing the transmission of personal data.23

to consult

Article 39 furthermore stipulates that the Council Presidency and the Commission
shall regularly inform the Parliament of discussions in the area covered by Title VI.
It also states that the European Parliament may ask questions to the Council or make
recommendations to it and that shall hold a debate on the progress made in the
Title VI area.

22 The European Parliament has not delivered any opinion on the Europol reports.
23 The Swedish Presidency together with the Council Secretariat recently presented an overview on the legal
provisions in place concerning democratic control over Europol. See Council Document 8677/01Europol 39

10

b)

c)

These provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty have enhanced the role of the European
Parliament, which nevertheless still falls well short of its role under the Community
Treaty. This situation is not specific to Europol, however. It applies to the whole area
of third pillar co-operation.

As regards other relevant Treaty provisions, Article 41 TEU provides that certain
articles of the EC Treaty shall apply to the areas referred to in Title VI of the TEU.
One of those is article 195 EC, which states that the Ombudsman, who is appointed
by the European Parliament, is also competent for the activities of EU institutions
and bodies in the third pillar area. Consequently he is empowered to receive
complaints concerning possible instances of mal-administration in the activities of
Europol.

Parliamentary control over Europol, be it at national or European level, thus takes a
somewhat indirect form. This is however also true of the control of police in most
is the responsible Minister, and in the final analysis the
Member States. It
Government, which, being politically responsible for the functioning of the police, is
accountable to the Parliament. Parliaments do normally not have a direct influence in
the running of the police.24

However, in addition to being indirect, the control is also “fragmented”, being shared
between 15 national Parliaments and the European Parliament.

A first public step towards examining the adequacy of these control arrangements
was taken with the 1st Inter-parliamentary Conference on Europol in The Hague on
7-8 June 2001, organised by the Dutch Parliament. It brought together members of
national Parliaments and of the European Parliament who are responsible for police
and justice affairs. The conference aimed both to enrich the level of Parliament's
knowledge on Europol matters and to exchange views on democratic control in the
field of police affairs. The Conference concluded that the national parliaments are
individually, a sufficient parliamentary supervision of the
not able to organise,
decisions of the Council in police affairs and of Europol. A network should therefore
be set up consisting of national parliamentarians and members of the European
Parliament responsible for justice and home affairs.25

4.

THE FUTURE

As regards possible future tasks and powers of Europol, a discussion has started last year in
the Union which is becoming increasingly clear and focused. Its relevance has been further
highlighted by the events of 11 September.

The discussion has moved on to more fundamental ways to make Europol more effective in
the fight against serious international crime. One of these has been the possible extension of
Europol's mandate, so that it would be able to deal with many more types of crime than the
seven mentioned in paragraph 3.1 above. This has led to an initiative of Sweden and Belgium

24 One known exception is the situation in Belgium, where since the early 1990’s the ‘Comité P’ is in existence,
which oversees all police activities. It has five members, its chairman being a judge, and an investigation unit
of thirty persons attached to it. The ‘Comité P’ reports directly to a special Committee of the Parliament.

25 Preliminary draft resolution of the inter-parliamentary conference in The Hague on 7-8 June 2001

11

to extend Europol’s competence to all forms of crimes listed in the Annex to the Europol
Convention. On 6 December 2001 the Council of Justice and Home Affairs adopted a
decision to this effect. 26

At the core of the debate are the provisions of Article 30 (2) TEU that makes clear that
Europol should play a more operational role in the future. Within five years after its entry into
force the Council should enable Europol to participate in joint teams and to enable it to ask
Member States to start and co-ordinate investigations. The Tampere European Council of
October 1999 stressed the urgency of realising these measures.

On the basis of an initiative from the Belgian Presidency in 2001, the Council is currently
examining an amendment to the Europol Convention to implement
these provisions. In
addition one of the ideas being discussed is to simplify the existing cumbersome procedure
through which amendments to the Europol Convention have to be realised. The current
procedure stipulates that each amendment has to be ratified by all Member States27.

Such developments would contribute to change gradually the character of Europol from a
purely support police office for Member States dealing mainly with information and
intelligence to a more executive body. Finally, there are ideas on the future tasks and powers
of Europol, which go further still, for example the possibility of Europol developing into an
operative European Police Force with investigative powers.28 These could include the
possibility for Europol to interrogate suspects, to start investigations etc.

Once it becomes clear, at some point in the future, that such operational powers will be
conferred on Europol, it will be necessary to examine very carefully what this implies for the
then existing controls over the organisation and to take measures that go further.

26 Council Decision of 6 December; OJ 2001/C 362/01
27 Council Document 5455/02 Europol 5; It is interesting to compare this procedure with the solution found for

Eurojust, which is to be established through a Council Decision.

28 See in this context the recent report of the Max-Planck-Institute für ausländisches und internationales

Strafrecht “Justizielle Einbindung und Kontrolle von Europol - Kurzvorstellung der Ergebnisse”, p. 26 l

12

5.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The core question throughout this paper has been whether or not there is a need for more
control by parliaments, at EU as well as national level, on the work and functioning of
Europol, particularly in the light of its evolvling role.

The above analysis of the existing controls over Europol indicates that the current system
cannot be regarded as legally insufficient, given the limited nature of the powers attributed to
Europol by comparison with those of national police forces. The existing controls (through
the Parliaments,
the Joint Supervisory Body and the
Management Board) are, however, exercised in an indirect, fragmented and not easily
understood manner. This gives rise to a general feeling - as widely expressed at the 7-8 June
Conference in The Hague - that something clearer and more transparent is needed.

the National Supervisory Bodies,

What is felt to be missing at the moment is first of all an institutionalised and regular
information exchange between those responsible in national parliaments and the European
Parliament. If all the provisions and procedures regarding parliamentary control existing at
national or EU level were made known to all the other parliaments, the situation would
already be improved considerably. In addition, there are no regular formal exchanges foreseen
between the Parliament and Europol and there is also room for improving the information
basis of the European Parliament.

In the Commission's view, such improvements would be achieved through a limited number
together with the establishment of a
of amendments to the Europol Convention itself,
mechanism enabling national Parliaments and the European Parliament
to examine and
coordinate their respective roles.

However, if in the future Europol would be entrusted with investigative powers, farther-
reaching measures would become necessary. In the meantime the Commission offers the
following recommendations for consideration:

(1) Establish a formal mechanism for information exchange and co-ordination between
national Parliaments and the European Parliament. The current fragmented, and
thereby less effective, control, would be gradually transformed into a structured and
unified control at European Union level, based upon an enhanced co-operation
between the Member States’ parliaments and the European Parliament.

To this end a joint committee, consisting of members of both the Member States’ and
European Parliaments committees
responsible for police matters could be
established. This joint committee could meet twice a year to exchange information
and experience and to discuss matters relating to Europol29. It would maintain close
contact with Europol through a special body of about five Members nominated by
the joint committee and reporting to it.

29 An example might be the conference of the Community and European Affairs Committees of the Parliaments
of the European Union (COSAC). COSAC was established in 1989 to reinforce the role of national
parliaments in the Community. The aim of this conference is to intensify the exchange of information
between the various committees in national parliaments specialising in European affairs and to meet twice a
year to discuss issues of common concern.

13

(2) Amend Article 34 of the Europol Convention, so as to come to a single annual report
on Europol's activities for information of both the European Parliament and the
Council.

(3) Amend Article 34 of the Europol Convention, so as to give the European Parliament
the formal right to request an exchange of views on the Europol annual report with
the Presidency.

(4) Amend Article 34 of the Europol Convention, so as to give the European Parliament
the formal right to request the Europol Director to appear before the competent
committee.

(5) Amend Article 24 (6) of the Europol Convention, so as to make it obligatory for the
Joint Supervisory Board to draw up its activity report on an annual basis and to
forward it to the European Parliament. It could be envisaged to include in these
reports information on the controls carried out by the National Supervisory Bodies.

14