WRITTEN QUESTION E-0456/02 by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission. Temporary shutdown of the High Flux Reactor in Petten, the Netherlands, on account of safety problems and damage to the reactor wall.
Date: 2002-02-22
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: International Atomic Energy Agency, Netherlands, application of EU law, cessation of trading, nuclear reactor, nuclear safety

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Supplementary answer
given by Mr Verheugen on behalf of the Commission

(15 May 2002)

Following translation and evaluation of the detailed information and the witness statements presented by
the Honourable Member,
the observations contained in these
documents in the context of its assessment of the development of effective and non-discriminatory law
enforcement in Bulgaria. The Commission will invite Bulgaria to comment specifically on the problems
described by the witnesses. The Honourable Member will be informed of the reply received.

the Commission has taken note of

(2002/C 277 E/051)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0456/02

by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(22 February 2002)

Subject: Temporary shutdown of the High Flux Reactor in Petten, the Netherlands, on account of safety

problems and damage to the reactor wall

1. Was the Commission aware before 4 February 2002 that the following problems existed with the
45 megawatt High Flux Reactor (HFR) of the European Community’s Joint Research Centre near the village
of Petten in the Netherlands, where:

(a) a hairline crack in the reactor wall caused by a welding error in 1984 is continuing to grow;

(b)

the reactor vessel was not designed to withstand strong explosions, yet after an explosion followed by
a pressure wave had occurred in 1987, the reactor was immediately restarted without a thorough
inspection;

(c)

in April 2001, due to an oversight, the irradiation of highly enriched fuel elements for the production
of isotopes was started without any coolant;

(d) written operating rules have been overridden where duty managers have seen fit;

(e) while working at night, staff were forced to sign a ‘declaration of loyalty’, forbidding them to disclose

facts;

(f)

instructions from the Nuclear Energy Service were not carried out;

(g) until 4 February, there was a risk that planned inspections by the Nuclear Energy Service would be

postponed until a planned close-down in the summer of 2002; and

(h)

there are general serious criticisms about attitudes to safety?

2. Why did the Commission only this week decide to endorse the wish of the Netherlands Government
to close down the Petten reactor, although serious problems as referred to in question 1 had already
existed for some time?

3. What is to be investigated while the reactor is closed down? What possible solutions will the
investigations be concerned with? Are the results of the investigations to be published, and will Members
of the European Parliament at least be informed of them?

Answer given by Mr Busquin on behalf of the Commission

(30 April 2002)

1.

(a) The welding anomaly was detected in 1984 during a pre-service inspection. The Dutch licensing
authority (Kernfysische Dienst, (KFD)) agreed to put the vessel in operation on condition that the

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vessel was inspected every three years. During the periodic inspections, which were made before
2001, no changes in the welding anomaly were measured. The last periodic inspection took place in
the summer of 2001. That inspection which was done with different (ultrasonic) techniques gave
different results from the earlier inspections, which might have suggested that the welding anomaly
had grown. It was agreed between KFD and Joint Research Center (JRC) that during the stop of the
reactor that took place on 18 February 2002, a new inspection of the welding anomaly would be
performed. The results of this inspection showed that the welding anomaly had not grown in size
since the summer of 2001. SERCO Assurance, a company specialised in structural assessment,
indicated in its report assessing the inspection results that application of more conventional sizing
methods to inspection data generated throughout plant life showed little or no variation in the
measured size.

(b) No explosion ever occurred in the vessel itself. The question probably refers to a capsule loaded with
Tellurium oxide (used for the fabrication of Iodine-131, an isotope of iodine used in medicine) which
exploded on 28 November 1987 as a result of an unexpected reaction. By construction, the HFR
reactor vessel is immersed in a water pool. The upper surface of the water pool is open to the air,
inside the containment building. In this pool, next to the reactor vessel, is the so-called pool-side
facility, which is used as a supporting device for experiments. The irradiation of this capsule took
place in the pool-side facility and not in the reactor vessel itself. After the explosion in the pool-side
facility the reactor was immediately shut down. An inspection was performed and the only damage
that was observed was on the tellurium oxide capsule and capsule holders in the pool-side facility and
no damage on the reactor itself. The subsequent decision to re-start the reactor was based upon the
fact that all systems to shut down the reactor had worked properly, the origin of the explosion was
clearly the tellurium oxide capsule located in the pool-side facility and not an experiment in the
reactor core. In the two weeks following the incident it was discussed thoroughly by the reactor safety
committee. In 1988 an inspection of the reactor vessel was performed and no problem was detected.
Furthermore, it was decided not to irradiate tellurium oxide in the future and to introduce acceptance
procedures for irradiation of isotopes. As a result, the reporting criteria to KFD were strengthened.

(c)

Isotopes are not produced from Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel elements, but by irradiation of
targets made with HEU and inserted in capsules. On 30 March 2001 during handling, a capsule
loaded with highly enriched uranium pellets for isotope production was inadvertently considered to be
empty (hence, cooled less than normally foreseen for a loaded capsule) and an empty capsule was
inadvertently considered to be loaded (hence, cooled more than normally foreseen for an empty
capsule). During the check procedures before irradiation, this situation was detected and corrected.
Therefore, no irradiation occurred without proper cooling. An analysis was made in order to
investigate what would have happened in case the check had failed. The result of the investigation was
that in the worst case safety systems would have been activated, including if necessary shutdown of
the reactor or isolation of the reactor containment building.

(d) The operating instructions have been followed by the operator of the reactor Nuclear Research and
Consultancy Group (NRG) as confirmed also by a KFD inspection. These operating instructions
provided in some instances the possibility for the operator of the reactor to deviate from them and
this according to well-described procedures. In order to remove any ambiguity, it has been agreed
between KFD and JRC in February 2002 to remove this possibility for the operator of the reactor to
deviate from the operating instructions.

(e) On 25 October 2001 there were reports in the local press that safety rules had been breached by NRG
at the HFR. JRC Petten, as licence holder, immediately contacted the management of the NRG, the
operator of the reactor, to ask for explanations. The management of NRG reacted by presenting a
declaration signed by nine out of the ten Heads and Deputy Heads of the operator’s shifts. This
declaration stated that they had respected the rules and procedures in force and had reported all
deviations and incidents according to those rules and would continue to do so in the future. The Head
and Deputy Head of the evening and night shift on duty signed this declaration during the night of 24
to 25 October 2001. The other Heads and Deputy Heads (except one who was on holidays) signed the
declaration during the morning of 25 October 2001.

The NRG operator claims that the involved staff were not forced to sign this declaration, but the JRC,
together with the KFD, is of the opinion that the fact that some of the operators were asked to sign
the declaration during the night could be considered as putting pressure on them.

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As a result, JRC Petten also immediately contacted the KFD, who performed inspections on these
matters on 31 October 2001, 6 November 2001 and 12 November 2001. The Dutch authorities
came to the conclusion that there were no indications that the NRG operators of the HFR had been
obliged by the NRG management to not mention incidents in the HFR logbook.

Finally, the Commission requested,
(IAEA) to review the safety culture of the operator (see question h).

jointly with the KFD, the International Atomic Energy Agency

JRC as license holder is not aware of any instances where instructions from KFD have been
contravened.

Immediately after the in-service inspection of the summer of 2001 it was agreed between KFD and
JRC that the next in-service inspection of the welding anomaly indication would take place in the
summer of 2002 and not after three years as is done normally. At the beginning of February 2002 it
was agreed between KFD and JRC to advance the in-service inspection to 21 and 22 February 2002.

(f)

(g)

(h) There have indeed been criticisms with respect to the safety culture regarding the operation of the
HFR. The JRC has therefore asked the IAEA to review this very issue, which took place from 3 to
8 March 2002 (a preparatory meeting to the audit took place on 13 and 14 February 2002).

On Friday 8 March 2002, the IAEA presented the principal findings and recommendations to the
licence holder (JRC) and KFD. Several elements of the safety management system were highlighted for
corrective actions. These actions include improved and more frequent training of personnel, improved
communication channels, a tightening of the monitoring and review procedures, and an in depth
review of the licence. These are to be implemented by the operator (NRG), in some cases together
with JRC. A proposal for the implementation of the above recommendations has now been approved
by the KFD. The JRC will monitor closely the progress of implementation by NRG in order to ensure
the continued safe operation of the reactor.

2.
On receipt of a letter from a parent company of the operator NRG, raising some concerns, the
Commission reacted immediately in calling for an inspection of the HFR by the KFD. Subsequently, the
Commission announced its intention to shut down the reactor on 8 February 2002. Following contacts
with the Dutch Authorities, all parties agreed that the shut down would be postponed until 18 February
2002.

The issues mentioned under question 1 were reported to the KFD according to the reporting procedures in
force and the KFD has performed several inspections on them. In the second half of 2001, JRC Petten also
launched two audits on the quality management system of the operator of the reactor and specific safety
culture issues. The Commission nevertheless decided to take advantage of a routine shut down of the
reactor to carry out a safety audit and a re-measurement of the weld anomaly.

3.

During the period of shutdown the following happened:

D a renewed inspection of the welding anomaly (see also question 1.a);

D a review of the safety and the safety culture of the HFR operation by the IAEA;

D an independent assessment of the consequences of the welding anomaly indication on the life time of

the HFR reactor vessel by Serco Assurance.

As discussed in detail under question 1, KFD and JRC have studied carefully the conclusions and
recommendations of the IAEA review regarding the safety culture, and of the Serco Assurance assessment
regarding the life time assessment. All actions required to be done before the start-up were judged to be
satisfactory by KFD. In agreement with KFD, JRC has given its consent to the restart of the HFR on
22 March 2002 in line with the normal schedule. The JRC will monitor closely the progress of
implementation of all necessary actions in order to ensure the continued safe operation of the reactor.
Both Serco Assurance and IAEA reports are available on the web pages of the JRC at the following
addresses: http://www.jrc.org/download/press/releases/Serco_reports.pdf and http://www.jrc.org/download/
press/releases/iaea.pdf.