Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the application of the agreements between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada regarding the application of their competition laws 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2000
Date: 2002-01-29
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Canada, United States, competition law, competition policy, control of restrictive practices, economic cooperation, international agreement, report

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 29.01.2002
COM(2002)45 final

REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

on the application of the agreements
between the European Communities
and the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Canada
regarding the application of their competition laws

1 January 2000 to 31 December 2000

1.

UNITED STATES

1.1.

Introduction

On 23.09.1991 the Commission concluded an Agreement with the Government of the United
States of America regarding the application of
(the “1991
Agreement”),
the aim of which is to promote co-operation between the competition
authorities. By a joint decision of the Council and the Commission on 10.04.19952 the
Agreement was approved and declared applicable.

their competition laws1

On 04.06.1998 another agreement, which strengthens the positive comity provisions of the
1991 Agreement, entered into force3 (the "1998 Agreement"), after having been approved by
a joint decision of the Council and the Commission of 29.05.1998.

On 08.10.1996 the Commission adopted the first report on the application of the 1991
Agreement for the period of 10.04.1995 to 30.06.19964. The second report completes the
1996 calendar year, covering the period of 01.07.1996 to 31.12.19965. The third report covers
the whole calendar year 19976, the fourth the year 19987 and the fifth the year 19998. The
current report concerns the calendar year from the 01.01.2000 to 31.12.2000. This report
should be read in conjunction with the first report which sets out in detail the benefits, but
also the limitations of this kind of co-operation.

In summary, the 1991 Agreement provides for:

- notification of cases being handled by the competition authorities of one Party, to the extent
that these cases concern the important interests of the other Party (Article II), and exchange of
information on general matters relating to the implementation of the competition rules
(Article III);

- co-operation and co-ordination of the actions of both Parties' competition authorities
(Article IV);

- a "traditional comity" procedure by virtue of which each Party undertakes to take into
account the important interests of the other Party when it takes measures to enforce its
competition rules (Article VI);

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the
European Communities regarding the application of their competition laws (OJ L 95, 27.4.1995, pp. 47
and 50)
See OJ L 95, 27.4.1995, pp.45 and 46.
Agreement between the European Communities and the Government of the United States of America
on the application of positive comity principles in the enforcement of their competition laws, OJ L 173,
18.6.1998, pp. 26–31.
Com(96) 479 final, see XXVIth Report on Competition Policy, pp. 299-311.
Com(97) 346 final, see XXVIth Report on Competition Policy, pp. 312-318.
Com(98) 510 final, see XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy, pp. 317-327.
Com(1999) 439 final, see XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy, pp. 313-328.
Com(2000) 618 final, see XXIXth Report on Competition Policy, pp. 319-332.

2

- a "positive comity" procedure by virtue of which either Party can invite the other Party to
take, on the basis of the latter's legislation, appropriate measures regarding anti-competitive
behaviour implemented on its territory and which affects the important
interests of the
requesting Party (Article V).

In addition, the 1991 Agreement makes it clear that none of its provisions may be interpreted
in a manner which is inconsistent with legislation in force in the European Union and the
United States of America (Article IX). In particular, the competition authorities remain bound
by their internal rules regarding the protection of the confidentiality of information gathered
by them during their respective investigations (Article VIII).

The 1998 Agreement clarifies both the mechanics of the positive comity co-operation
instrument, and the circumstances in which it can be availed of. In particular, it describes the
conditions under which the requesting Party should normally suspend its own enforcement
actions and make a referral.

1.2.

EU/US co-operation in individual cases during 2000

Co-operation between the Commission, on the one hand, and the Antitrust Division of the
United States Department of Justice (DoJ) and the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC), on
the other, further intensified during the course of the year 2000. Indeed, contact between
Commission officials and their counterparts at the two US agencies is showing a marked
increase in frequency. These contacts range from detailed case-related discussions to more
general, sometimes theoretical, competition policy-related matters. High-level meetings and
contacts also occur with reasonable frequency. The co-operation continues to be of
considerable mutual benefit to both sides, in terms of enhancing our respective enforcement
activity, avoiding unnecessary conflicts or
inconsistencies between those enforcement
activities, and in terms of better understanding each other's competition policy regimes.

1.2.1. Merger cases

During 2000, an unprecedentedly large number of proposed operations were scrutinised
simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic. With regard to the investigation of these
proposed mergers, staff-level contacts between DG Competition’s Merger Task Force, on the
one hand, and the US DoJ and FTC, on the other, take place virtually on a daily basis. Of
course co-operation is most effective where the parties involved agree to permit the EU and
US authorities to share the information they provide, by means of a waiver of their
confidentiality rights, and this now frequently occurs.

Transatlantic co-operation during 2000 was particularly intensive with regard to the big "new
economy" and multimedia merger cases, notably in the AOL/Time Warner, Time Warner/EMI
and MCI WorldCom/Sprint merger cases. Having obtained waivers from the merging parties,
assessment of much of the substance of the cases was carried out in close co-operation
between the agencies. Representatives from the DoJ (MCI WorldCom/Sprint)and the FTC
(AOL/Time Warner, Time Warner/EMI) attended the oral hearings of the parties intending to
merge, and there were regular telephone calls, e-mails, exchanges of documents, and other
contacts between the case teams.

In the AOL/Time Warner and Time Warner/EMI cases, discussion between staff on both sides
focused most closely on the assessment of the effects that the proposed transactions would be
likely to have on competition in the music markets (e.g. recorded music, music publishing and
on-line distribution through Internet). Ultimately, in the light of the objections advanced by

3

the Commission to the proposed transaction, the Time Warner/EMI deal was terminated and
the parties withdrew their notification; the Commission gave its conditional approval to the
AOL/Time Warner merger, subject to the exit of the German media group Bertelsmann from
joint ventures with AOL.

In MCI WorldCom/Sprint, the Commission quickly reached the conclusion that this proposed
merger between two US telecommunications companies would have worldwide effects. The
Internet is global in nature; Internet access and service providers, Internet content providers,
end-customers, all demand universal connectivity to the worldwide web. The Commission
had found already in 1998, when it investigated the merger between WorldCom and MCI, that
there is a global market for top-level (universal) Internet connectivity and that the impact of
this merger between these two US companies affected not only US consumers but also inter
alia European Union consumers. In MCI WorldCom/Sprint, the Commission again found that
one of
Internet connectivity market. MCI
the top-level
WorldCom/Sprint was the first merger involving a US company to be prohibited by the
Commission.

the relevant markets was

There was also close co-operation between the Commission and FTC in relation to the
Boeing/Hughes merger. In the end, the Commission cleared the merger after an in-depth
investigation and after the parties' offer of undertakings which dismissed its earlier concerns
that the operation might lead to the creation or the strengthening of a dominant position on
GEO satellites and launch services markets.

of

the

treatment

closely with the FTC in

the
The Commission co-operated
AstraZeneca/Novartis merger case, in particular so to a find a common solution to the
problems identified in the markets for cereal fungicides and maize herbicides. Co-operation
proved particularly useful for both authorities because they had been offered the same
commitment in order to solve competition concerns on different regional markets. In this
particular case of world-wide divestitures of both Novartis' strobilurin business and
AstraZenaca's acetochlor products, co-operation between the authorities was needed to ensure
that the final commitments accepted were not contradictory and that the buyer would be
acceptable to both authorities. In fact, in view of the FTC's request to have a "buyer upfront"
for these businesses before approving the deal, the parties had already started to implement
the commitment of looking for a buyer before the commitment could be finally accepted by
the Commission.

In the Alcoa/Reynolds merger case, the case teams on both sides of the Atlantic (Commission
there was also cooperation between the
and DoJ) worked closely together;
Commission and the Canadian and Australian competition authorities. Representatives of the
US and Canadian authorities participated in the oral hearing of the merging parties. The
merger was ultimately cleared by the Commission subject to significant divestitures.

indeed,

1.2.2. Non-merger cases

During the course of the year, there has been an increased level of contact between the
Commission and the US antitrust agencies in non-merger cases generally. Regarding the so-
called B2B market place "Covisint" (a supplier exchange set up by six major manufacturers of
automobile spare parts), for example, the Commission had a number of informal exchanges of
view with the FTC case team investigating the same venture.

4

With regard to cartel investigations, inter-agency contacts are less frequent. This is explained
by the fact that we are not, under our current co-operation arrangements, able to exchange
confidential information in the absence of express waivers from the source of any information
in the agencies' possession. That having been said, co-operation between the EU and US in
cartel matters has improved markedly over the past year; indeed, contacts between the
relevant sections of the Commission and the DoJ have become commonplace.

1.3.

Administrative Arrangements on Attendance (AAA)

The Commission adopted on March 31, 1999 a text setting forth administrative arrangements
between the competition authorities of the European Communities and of the United States
concerning reciprocal attendance at certain stages of the procedures in individual cases
involving the application of their respective competition rules9. These arrangements were
concluded in the framework of the agreements between the European Communities and the
government of the United States concerning enforcement of their competition rules, and in
particular the provisions regarding co-ordination of enforcement activities.

The new administrative arrangements were formally invoked for the first time in December
1999, when representatives of the US FTC attended the Commission's oral hearing in the
BOC/Air Liquide merger case. In 2000, representatives from both the US DoJ and FTC
attended several oral hearings (TimeWarner/EMI, AOL/TimeWarner, WorldCom MCI/Sprint,
Alcoa/Reynolds), whereas a Commission official attended for the first time a "pitch meeting"
between the DoJ and the merging parties during the course of the year (WorldCom
MCI/Sprint).

1.4.

EU/US Mergers Working Group

Following the annual bilateral meeting between the Commission (DG Competition), the FTC
and the DoJ, held in Brussels on October 5 1999, it was agreed that a new EU/US Working
Group on intensified transatlantic antitrust co-operation should be set up.

It was felt that, while EU/US cooperation in merger cases is very successful, there is still
scope for improvement, particularly in view of the current merger wave and the exponential
increase in large-scale cross-border transactions. In the longer term, the Working Group could
be further mandated to study other competition issues of common concern.

To date, the working group has been focusing its energies on the first topic (remedies).
During the course of last year (2000), there were extensive tri-partite (Commission/DoJ/FTC)
discussions, including a meeting and a number of tele/video-conferences. The deliberations
have been mutually beneficial to all three authorities, and were particularly helpful to the
Commission in its preparation of the recently adopted Notice on Commitments in Merger
cases10).

9

10

Bulletin EU 3-1999, Competition (18/43); 1999 Report COM(2000) 618 final, p. 5.
Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 and under
Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98, OJ C 68, 2.3.2001. pp. 3-11.

5

1.5.

Positive Comity

The positive comity instrument provided for in Article V of the 1991 Agreement11 was
invoked, for the first, and so far only, time by the US DoJ in 1997. The DoJ had requested
that the Commission investigate under the EU competition rules possible anticompetitive
conduct by four European carriers (Air France, SAS, Lufthansa and Iberia) that owned or
were affiliated with the Amadeus Computer Reservation System (CRS) in Europe. Sabre, a
CRS at the time owned by American Airlines, had complained to the US DoJ about the
allegedly exclusionary behaviour of these Amadeus owners and affiliates. Following the DoJ
request, the Commission launched an investigation and,
in 1999, issued a statement of
objections against Air France, on the basis of a small number of the original allegations. The
investigation was concluded successfully in July 200012, after Air France agreed to a code of
good behaviour offering SABRE equivalent terms to those offered to its partly owned CRS
Amadeus, as well as to other CRSs. Sabre had also previously reached similar agreements
with SAS and Lufthansa.

Innovative co-operation of this kind heralds the possibility of sensible burden-sharing
between agencies located in different parts of the world. Positive comity, in particular, allows
a possible competition problem to be dealt with by the agency best-placed, notably in terms of
fact-finding or the possible imposition of sanctions, to do so.

1.6.

High-level contacts

There were numerous high-level bilateral contacts between the Commission and the relevant
US authorities during the course of 2000: Commissioner Monti paid a first, extensive official
visit to Washington as Competition Commissioner in June, and used the occasion to meet
inter alia with key members of the Administration and Congress figures;
the annual
Commission/US DoJ/US FTC bilateral meeting was held in Washington in July; meetings
also took place during the course of the year between the Commission and the US Department
of Transportation, the US Federal Communications Commission and the US Federal Maritime
Commission (all of which US authorities have some responsibility for the management of
competition policy issues in their respective sectors).

1.7.

Statistical information

a)

Number of cases notified by the Commission and by the US authorities

There was a total of 104 notifications made by the Commission during the period between
1 January 2000 and 31 December 2000. The cases are divided into merger and non-merger
cases and are listed in Annex 1.

The Commission received a total of 58 notifications from the US authorities during the same
period. 32 were received from the DoJ and 26 from the FTC. A list of these cases is found in
Annex 2, again broken down into merger and non-merger cases.

Merger cases made up the majority of all notifications in both directions. There were 85
merger notifications made by the Commission and 49 by the US authorities.

11

12

The request was made prior to the conclusion of the 1998 EU/US Positive Comity Agreement.
See Commission Press Release IP/00/835, 25.7.2000.

6

The figures given represent the number of cases in which one (or more) notifications took
place and not the total number of individual notifications. Under Article II of the Agreement,
notifications may be made at various stages of the procedure and so more than one
notification may be made concerning the same case.

Table 1 sets out in figures the number of cases notified under the 1991 EC/US Agreement
during the period from 1 January 2000 to 31 December 2000. Table 2 sets out in figures the
number of cases notified since 23 September 1991.

7

Table 1

CASES NOTIFIED

Year

No. of EC
notifications

No. of US notifications

No. of merger
notifications

2000

10413

FTC

26

DoJ

32

Total

58

EC

85

US

49

Year

No. of EC
notifications

Table 2

CASES NOTIFIED

No. of US notifications

No. of merger
notifications

FTC

DoJ

Total

EC

US

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

5

26

44

29

42

48

42

52

70

104

10

20

22

16

14

20

12

22

26

26

2

20

18

19

21

18

24

24

23

32

12

20

40

35

35

38

36

46

49

58

3

11

20

18

31

35

30

43

59

85

9

31

20

20

18

27

20

39

39

49

13

These notifications include a number of cases where the Commission requested information from US
companies.

8

b)

Notifications by the Commission to Member States

The text of the interpretative letter sent by the European Communities to the US as well as the
Statement on Transparency made by the Commission to the Council on 10 April 1995,
provides that the Commission, after notice to the US Competition authorities, will inform the
Member State or Member States, whose interests are affected, of the notifications sent to it by
the US antitrust authorities. Thus, when notifications are received from the US authorities,
they are forwarded immediately to the relevant sections in D-G Competition and at the same
time copies are sent to the Member States, if any, whose interests are affected. Equally, at the
same time that D-G Competition makes notifications to the US authorities, copies are sent to
the Member State(s) whose interests are affected.

In most instances, the US authorities also notify the Member States directly, under the OECD
Recommendation14. During the period under review 45 cases were notified to the United
Kingdom, 30 to Germany, 19 to France, 12 each to the Netherlands and to Sweden, 6 to
Spain, 4 each to Belgium, Finland and Italy, 3 to Ireland, and 2 each to Austria, Denmark and
Luxembourg.

1.8.

Conclusions

2000 witnessed a further intensification of EU/US co-operation in competition matters. In
relation to the treatment of cross-border merger cases in particular, this co-operation has been
very close and fruitful; it has facilitated a growing convergence in the respective EU and US
approaches toward the assessment of the likely anti-competitive effects engendered by such
operations. The authorities on the two sides of the Atlantic are also taking increasingly
convergent approaches to the identification and implementation of remedies, and to post-
merger remedy compliance monitoring.

During the course of the year, the EU and US authorities have moreover further strengthened
their contacts with respect to the investigation of non-merger competition issues, and with
respect to the combatting of global cartels in particular. The Commission, DoJ and FTC also
continue to maintain an ongoing dialogue on general competition policy/enforcement issues
of common concern.

14

Revised recommendation of the OECD Council concerning cooperation between Member countries on
anti-competitive practices affecting international trade, adopted 27/28 July 1995.

9

2.

CANADA

2.1.

Introduction

The EU/Canada Competition Co-operation Agreement is designed to facilitate increased co-
operation between the European Communities and Canada with respect to the enforcement of
their respective competition rules. The agreement was signed at the EU/Canada Summit in
Bonn on 17 June 1999 and entered into force at signature.

In substance, the Agreement provides for: (i) the reciprocal notification of cases under
investigation by either authority, where they may affect the important interests of the other
party; (ii) the possibility of co-ordination by the two authorities of their enforcement
activities, as well as of rendering assistance to each other; (iii) the possibility for one party to
request the other to take enforcement action (positive comity), and for one party to take into
account the important interests of the other party in the course of its enforcement activities
(traditional comity); and (iv) the exchange of information between the parties, while not
affecting either party’s confidentiality obligations with respect
to such information.
Essentially, it is very similar to the one entered into between the EU and US in 1991.

2.2.

Notifications

a)

Number of cases notified by the Commission and by the Canadian authorities

Notifications were made by the Commission in four cases during the period between 17 June
1999 and December 1999, and nine notifications in the year 2000. The Commission received
notifications from the Canadian Competition Bureau (CCB) in three cases in 1999 and in ten
in 2000.

In tendency, notifications by the Commission concerning merger cases are increasing more
rapidly than for other antitrust cases. This reflects the procedure under the Merger Regulation
whereby, on receipt of a notification, the Commission publishes a notice of the fact of the
notification in the Official Journal. Main sectors of co-operation were: airlines, aluminium,
integrated electronics, telecom networks, TV cable and content, transportation.

Many of the cases notified during the period under review are still open, particularly matters
falling under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty and, therefore, it is not possible to discuss
them in detail or to mention them by name, save where they have already been the subject of
a Commission statement or notice.

At the same time, merger cases, which gave rise to notifications and co-operation under the
Agreement, are now mostly closed because of the strict deadlines applied under the Merger
Regulation15 and these can therefore be discussed in this report.

15

Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between
undertakings, OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, p. 1; as corrected in OJ L 257, 21.9.1990, p.13 and as amended by
Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 of 30 June 1997.

10

In addition,
the confidentiality surrounding Canadian procedures, and the obligation of
confidentiality to which the European Communities are subject by virtue of Article X of the
Agreement, has meant
that even where the European Commission has completed its
investigation and closed cases, references to specific cases which are still being pursued by
the Canadian authorities, or are otherwise covered by confidentiality requirements, have had
to be limited.

b)

Notifications by the Commission to Member States and third countries

All notifications received by the Canadian Competition Bureau are copied to the Member
State(s) whose interests might be affected, at the same time as they are forwarded to the
relevant units of DG Competition. Equally, at the same time that DG Competition makes
notifications to the Canadian Competition Bureau, copies are sent to the Member State(s)
whose interests are affected. During the period under review 6 cases were notified to
Germany, 5 to France, 2 each to the United Kingdom and to Denmark and 1 each to the
Netherlands, and to Belgium.

2.3.

Co-operation

Our experience of co-operation with our Canadian counterparts has been very positive. The
nature of co-operation depends on the individual case, and can relate to such matters as simple
enquiries regarding the timing of procedures or to co-ordination of the proposed remedy in a
case.

The day-to-day co-operation between DG Competition and the Canadian Competition Bureau
is rather smooth. The co-operation is similar to the one under the EC-US Co-operation
Agreement, but on a smaller scale. Frequent contacts are established on merger investigations,
the Canadian side has participated in a number of oral hearings. This will be reprociated when
the EC will have an active interest to follow proceedings in Canada. It is noteworthy that
trilateral
(EC/US/ Canada) have taken place in the Dow
Chemical/Union Carbide case and in the Alcoa/Reynolds merger case.

teleconferences/meetings

2.4.

Some Cases

The first notification received from Canada in 2000 concerned the proposed acquisition of
Union Carbide Corporation by Dow Chemical which was already under review in co-
operation with the US authorities. All the other notifications received during 2000 concerned
cartel investigations.

in the Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram case. After a market

From our part, particular attention should be paid to our close co-operation with the Canadian
the
authorities
Commission found out that three markets would be affected by this merger, namely pay-TV,
the emerging pan-European market for portals and the emerging market for on-line-music.
The merger was finally cleared subject to Vivendi's undertaking to divest its stake in British
pay-TV BSkyB and to give rival pay-TV operators access to Universal's films.

investigation,

11

2.5.

Conclusion

The Agreement has lead to a much closer relationship between the Commission and the
Canadian Competition Bureau, as well as to a greater understanding of each other’s
competition policy. An increasing number of cases are being examined by both competition
authorities, and there is consequently a growing recognition of the importance, on the hand, of
avoiding
of
co-ordinating enforcement activities to the extent that this is considered mutually beneficial
by both parties.

conflicting

decisions

other,

and,

the

on

12

ANNEX 1

NOTIFICATIONS BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO THE US AUTHORITIES
01.01.2000 - 31.12.2000

Merger cases:

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

Case n° COMP/M.1786 - General Electric Company/Thomson-CSF

Case n° COMP/M.1782 - American Home Products/Warner-Lambert

Case n° COMP/JV 30 –

BVI Television (Europe) Inc./ SPE Euromovies
Investments Inc./Europe Movieco Partners)

Case n° COMP/M.1794 - Deutsche Post/Air Express International

Case n° COMP/M.1801 - Neusiedler/American Israeli Paper Mills

Case n° COMP/M.1741 - MCI WorldCom/Sprint Corporation

Case n° COMP/JV38 -

KPN/Bellsouth/E-Plus

Case n° COMP/M.1796 - Bayer/Lyondell

Case n° COMP/M.1847 - General Motors/Saab Automobile

Case n° COMP/M.1849 -

Solectron/Ericsson

Case n° COMP/M.1841 - Celestica/IBM

Case n° COMP/M.1854 - Emerson Electric/Ericsson Energy Systems

Case n° COMP/M.1835 - Monsanto/Pharmacia & Upjohn

Case n° COMP/M.1880 -

3M/Quante

Case n° COMP/M.1856 - Citigroup/Schroders

Case n° COMP/M.1745 - Lagardère SCA, DaimlerChrysler AG, the French

State/SEPI/EADS

Case n° COMP/M.1876 - Kohlberg Kravis Roberts/Zumtobel/Wassall

Case n° COMP/M.1871 - Arrow Electronics/Tekelec

Case n° COMP/M.1882 - Pirelli/BICC General

Case n° COMP/M.1892 -

Sara Lee/Courtaulds

Case n° COMP/M.1914 - TXU/Hydro Electrica

Case n° COMP/M.1920 - Nabisco/United Biscuits

Case n° COMP/M.1878 - Pfizer/Warner-Lambert

Case n° COMP/M.1956 - Ford/Autonova

Case n° COMP/M.1891 - BP Amoco/Castrol

Case n° COMP/M.1901 - Cap Gemini/Ernst & Young

Case n° COMP/M.1919 - Alcoa/Cordant

Case n° COMP/JV.46 -

Blackstone/CDPQ - Kabel Nordrhein-Westfalen

Case n° COMP/M.1879 - Boeing/Hughes

13

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

Case n° COMP/M.1946 - Bellsouth/SBC

Case n° COMP/M.1948 - Techpack International/Valois

Case n° COMP/M.1959 - Meritor/Arvin

Case n° COMP/M.1845 - AOL/Time Warner

Case n° COMP/M.1968 -

Solectron/Nortel

Case n° COMP/M.1970 -

Johnson & Johnson/Mercury Asset
Management/Agora Healthcare Services

Case n° COMP/M.1852 - Time Warner/EMI

Case n° COMP/M.1932 - BASF/American Cyanamid

Case n° COMP/M.2004 -

Investcorp/Chase Capital Investments/Gerresheimer
Glass

Case n° COMP/M.1966 - Phillips/Chevron

Case n° COMP/M.2003 - Carlyle/Gruppo Riello

Case n° COMP/M.1998 - Ford/Landrover

Case n° COMP/M.1939- Rexam (PLM)/American National Can

Case n° COMP/M.2026 - Clear Channel Communications/SFX Entertainment

Case n° COMP/M.1949 - Enron/MG

Case n° COMP/M.2026 - Western Power Distribution/Hyder

Case n° COMP/M.1933 - Citigroup/Flender

Case n° COMP/JV.47 -

Lagardère/Canal+/Liberty Media

Case n° COMP/M.1982 - Telia/Oracle/Drutt

Case n° COMP/M.2025 - GE Capital/BTPS/MEPC

Case n° COMP/M.1969 - UTC/Honeywell/i2/MyAircraft.com

Case n° COMP/M.1926 - Telefónica/Tyco

Case n° COMP/M.2053 - Telenor/BellSouth/Sonofon

Case n° COMP/M.2000 - WPP/Young & Rubicam

Case n° COMP/M.2075 - Newhouse/Jupiter/Scudder/M&G

Case n° COMP/M.2077 - Clayton, Dubilier & Rice/Alcatel

Case n° COMP/M.1990 - Unilever/Bestfoods

Case n° COMP/M.2074 - Tyco/Mallinkrodt

Case n° COMP/JV.50 -

Callahan Invest/Kabel Baden-Württemberg

Case n° COMP/M.2128 - ABB Lummus/Engelhard/Equistar/Novolen

Case n° COMP/M.2133 - Hicks/Bear Stearns/Jonhs Manville

Case n° COMP/M.2104 - Messer/Carlyle/Eutectic & Castolin

Case n° COMP/M.2147 - VNU/Hearst/Stratosfera

Case n° COMP/M.2135 -

4Front/NCR

14

64

65

66

67

68

69

70

71

72

73

74

75

76

77

78

79

80

81

82

83

84

85

Case n° COMP/M.2127 - DaimlerChrysler/Detroit Diesel

Case n° COMP/M.2158 - Crédit Suisse Group/Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette

Case n° COMP/M.2137 -

SLDE/NTL/MSCP/NOOS

Case n° COMP/M.2101 - General Mills/Pillsbury/Diageo

Case n° COMP/M.2134 - Avnet/Veba Electronics

Case n° COMP/M.2041 - United Airlines/US Airways

Case n° COMP/M.2111 - Alcoa Inc/British Aluminium Ltd

Case n° COMP/M.2145 - Apollo Group/Shell Resin Business

Case n° COMP/M.2167 - Citigroup/Associates First Capital Group

Case n° COMP/M.2196 - Enron/Bergmann/Hutzler

Case n° COMP/M.2175 - DOW Chemical/Gurit-Essex

Case n° COMP/M.2192 -

SmithKline Beecham/Block Drug

Case n° COMP/M.2230 -

Sanmina/Siemens/Inboard/Leiterplattentechnologie

Case n° COMP/M.2041 - United Airlines/US Air

Case n° COMP/M.2251 - AOL/Banco Santander

Case n° COMP/M.2199 - Quantum/Maxtor

Case n° COMP/M.2213 - DuPont/Sabanci Holdings/JV

Case n° COMP/M.2248 - CVC/Advent/Carlyle/Lafarge

Case n° COMP/M.2238 -

Solectron/Natsteel Electronics

Case n° COMP/M.2252 - Kuoni/TRX/e-TRX/TRX Central Europe/JV

Case n° COMP/M.2259 - Terra Amadeus/1Travel.com

Case n° COMP/M.2265 - Ricoh/Lanier Worldwide

Non-merger cases16:

01

02

03

04

05

06

16

Case n° 37.241 -

Boeing/Airbus

Case n° 36.824 -

Case n° 37.792 -

PO/Microsoft (Windows 2000)

Case n° 37.747 -

Stohaas JV

Request for information

Case n° 37.889 -

FIAT/GENERAL MOTORS Corp

Due to confidentiality requirements or to protect the secrecy of ongoing investigations, this list names
only those investigations or cases which have been made public.

15

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

Case n° 37.866 - DB UK Holding Ltd/UBS AG/Goldman Sachs Vol-Holdings

LLC/Citibank Investments Ltd

Case n° 36.212 - Carbonless paper

Request for information

Case n° 37.949 -

Borealis/DuPont de Nemours

Case n° 37.920 -

3G Patent Platform

Case n° 36.213 - GEAE + P&W

Case n° 36.566 -

Estée Lauder

Request for information

Case n° 36.816-37.055 -Intercontinental Marketing Services Health

Case n° 37.983 - American Airlines/Swissair/Sabena

Case n° 37.774 -

Innogenetics/Chiron-Ortho Diagnostics

Request for information

Case

BUY.com US

16

ANNEX 2

NOTIFICATIONS BY THE US AUTHORITIES TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION -
01.01.2000 - 31.12.2000

Merger cases17

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

17

Carnival Corp/NCL Holding ASA

Chemdal Corp & Chemdal Asia/BASF

Transportacion Maritima Mexicana/Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group (JV)

American Home Products Corp/Warner-Lambert Co

Deere/Metso & Timberjack & Marsta

Dairy Farmers/SODIAAL North America Corp

Valmet Corp & Groupe Laperriere and Verreault Inc/Beloit Corp

Time Warner Inc/EMI Group plc

Alcoa Inc/Reynolds Metals Co

Novartis AG/Astra Zeneca plc

Boeing Co/Hughes Electronics Corp

PE Corp/Third Wave Technologies Inc

Lafarge SA/Blue Circle Industries plc

Carson Inc/L'Oreal

Glaxo Wellcome/SmithKline Beecham

Warner Lambert/Pfizer Inc

Newbridge Networks Corp/Alcatel

Lernout & Hauspie Speech products nv/Dragon Systems Inc

Charter plc/Lincoln Electric Holdings Inc

National Tobacco Co/Swedich Match

Williams plc/Assa Abloy AB

AOL/America on Line Inc

Due to the confidentiality requirements, this list names only those investigations or cases which have
been made public.

17

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

48

Lockheed Martin Corp/BAE Systems plc

Schlumberger Ltd/Baker Hughes Inc

Covisint/General Motors/Ford Motor/Daimler Chrysler/Nissan Motor/Renault/
Oracle/Commerce One (JV)

Wesley Jessen VisionCare Inc/Novartis

CRH plc & Hanson plc/Pioneer Roofing Tile Inc (JV)

BASF/Shell Petroleum NV (JV)

Hannaford Bros Supermarkets Co/Food Lion Inc

Svedala Industri AB/Metso Oyj

Voicestream Wireless Corp/Deutsche Telekom

Renault/ Aktiebolaget Volvo

Delta Air Lines/Air France

Atecs Mannesmann AG/Siemens AG & Robert Bosch GmbH

Mallinckrodt Inc/Tyco International Ltd

BAE Systems plc/Lockheed Martin Corp

Svedala Industri AB/Metso Oyj

British Aviation
Underwriters

Insurance Group Ltd

(BAIG)/Associated Aviation

Pillsbury Co/Diageo plc/General Mills Inc

Svedala Industri AB/Metso Oyj

Lesaffre/Red Star Yeast & Products Division of Universal Foods Corp

ASM Lithography NV/Silicon Valley Group Inc

Egide SA/Industrial Growth Partners/Electronic Protection Products

Quantum Corp/Maxtor Corp

Reed Elsevier Inc/Harcourt General Inc

Electronic foreign exchange (JV)

Krupp Werner & Pfleiderer/Georg Fisher & Westdeutsche Landesbank
Girozentral

Pitt-des-Moines/Chicago Bridge & Iron Co

18

49

Harcourt/Thomson Corp

Non-merger cases18

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

Dywidag-Systems International USA Inc

Smith International/Schlumberger Ltd

Charge Carbone of America Industries Corp

-

International vitamin cartels

-

Sotheby's Holdings Inc

-

-

18

Due to the confidentiality requirements, this list names only those investigations or cases which have
been made public.

19

ANNEX 3

NOTIFICATIONS BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION TO THE CANADIAN
AUTHORITIES 01.01.2000 - 31.12.2000

01

02

03

04

05

06

07

08

09

Case No. COMP/M.1841 - CELESTICA/IBM

Case No. COMP/JV.46 - Callahan Invest/Kabel Nordrhein-Westfalen

Case No. COMP/M.1908 - Alcatel/Newbridge Networks

Case No. COMP/M.1968 - Solectron/Nortel

Case No. COMP/M.2050 - Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram

Case No. COMP/M.2050 - Vivendi/Canal+/Seagram (re-notification)

Case No. COMP/M.2139 - Bombardier/Adtranz

Case No. COMP/M.2217 - CELECTICA/NEC TECHNOLOGIES UK

Case No. COMP/JV.50 -Callahan Invest/Kabel Baden-Württemberg

20

ANNEX 4

NOTIFICATIONS BY THE CANADIAN AUTHORITIES TO THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION - 01.01.2000 - 31.12.2000

Since the 10 notified cases are still ongoing and conducted in private under the
Competition Act, they cannot be specifically mentioned.

21