WRITTEN QUESTION E-0030/02 by Doris Pack (PPE-DE) to the Commission. Air transport: compatibility of alliances with competition.
Date: 2002-01-21
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: air freight rate, air transport, competition law, consumer protection, control of restrictive practices, inter-company agreement, transport company, travel agency

C 301 E/22

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

5.12.2002

(Former question 3 and 4) The question whether the Commission is aware of other cases where local,
regional or national authorities in Member States use confidentiality provisions to protect themselves from
investigations into the misappropriation of Community financial assistance or infringements of European
rules, is difficult to answer. Such information, if any, is not gathered in a systematic way. The Commission
would like to stress Article 10 of the EC Treaty on cooperation by Member States.

(Former questions 5 and 6) From the facts in this case the Commission finds no reason to change its policy
as regards State aid control. As regards this case, the Commission is confident that its decision is based on
full information that is relevant to the case. In general, the Commission expects that its means of control
and its competence to ask for information suffice to prevent it from making wrong decisions due to a lack
of information. The Commission would like to point, e.g., to the provisions in the procedural regulation (4)
by which the Commission can by decision request a Member State to provide certain information. In the
case at hand the Dutch authorities provided the information without such an information injunction.

4.

Not applicable.

5. and 6.
Yes. A duty to inform the Commission stems in the first place from Article 88.3 of the EC
Treaty. The Council has adopted procedural rules for both notified and non-notified aid, but it cannot be
excluded that sometimes an individual aid or an aid scheme is implemented unnoticed by the Commission.
However, competitors of aid beneficiaries and private persons are becoming increasingly active in
informing the Commission of potential non-notified aid.

7.
The Commission is insufficiently informed on the internal procedures of the Province of Friesland
and therefore is not able to answer the Honourable Member’s question. Moreover, the procedures for State
aid concern the relation between the Commission and the Member State. It is the competence of the
Member State to determine which authority within that Member State is responsible.

(1) OJ C 81 E, 4.4.2002, p. 28.
(2) OJ C 144, 22.5.1999.
(3) OJ L 186, 7.7.2001.
(4) Article 10, paragraph 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for

the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty, OJ L 83, 27.3.1999.

(2002/C 301 E/020)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0030/02

by Doris Pack (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(21 January 2002)

Subject: Air transport: compatibility of alliances with competition

1. What is the Commission’s appraisal, in terms of safeguarding competition, of the agreements on
price-fixing and terms and conditions between European and non-European airlines within what are
termed ‘alliances’?

2.

Does such cooperation, in the Commission’s view, hinder or foster competition?

As regards consumers/passengers, what impact does the Commission expect such arrangements to

3.
have on air fares now and in the future?

4. What is the Commission’s appraisal of the agreements entered into by airlines to pay commission to
travel agencies or IATA agents?

Are such agreements on price-fixing and terms and conditions which involve the payment of

5.
commission compatible with EU competition law?

5.12.2002

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 301 E/23

Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission

(8 March 2002)

Alliances between airlines may take different forms and involve different degrees of co-operation and
1.
will have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. In so far as alliances involve co-operation on key elements
where airlines normally compete, such as joint pricing, schedule co-ordination, capacity and revenue
sharing, they may give rise to competition concerns where the alliance partners were prior to the alliance
actual or potential competitors. Such alliances can only be authorised under the Community competition
rules if the alliance partners can demonstrate that the restrictive effects on competition are outweighed by
the benefits achieved by the alliance. Moreover, it should be established that consumers share in these
benefits, that they could not be obtained by less restrictive alternatives and that competition is not
eliminated.

These principles apply both to intra-Community alliances and to alliances between European and non-
framework is however different since Council Regulation (EEC)
European airlines. The procedural
No 3975/87 of 14 December 1997,
laying down the procedure for the application of the rules on
competition to undertakings in the air transport sector (1) only covers air transport between European
Economic Area (EEA) airports. Alliances between European and non European airlines can be examined
under the transitional provision of Article 85 of the EC Treaty, which allow the Commission to propose
appropriate measures to bring infringements to an end and to ‘authorise’ Member States to take the
necessary measures to remedy the situation. Under this provision the Commission is currently examining
some transatlantic alliances as to their compatibility with Community competition law.

2.
From a competition point of view, the Commission is not opposed to the formation of alliances as
such. The Commission acknowledges that alliances can lead to important efficiencies. For that reason, the
Commission has given in the past an approval to such alliances once remedies had been found to address
competition concerns.

The impact of alliances on passenger fares will have to be assessed on a case by case basis and is
3.
difficult to predict.
Increased efficiencies and cost reductions should normally result in lower prices.
However, benefits of alliances for consumers may also be achieved in terms of increased capacity and
frequencies etc.

4. and 5.
Agreements between airlines on the commissions to be paid to travel agents would in principle
amount to a resale price agreement between competitors, prohibited by Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty.
Airlines used to agree on a recommended level of commission to travel agents, in the context of the
International Air Transport Association (IATA). The latter has informed the Commission that all related
resolutions expired in April 2001.

(1) OJ L 374, 31.12.1987.

(2002/C 301 E/021)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0103/02

by Christopher Huhne (ELDR) to the Commission

(28 January 2002)

Subject: Commission staff allocations

1. Will the Commission say how many posts were foreseen at the beginning and end of 2001, and how
many staff were in post at each date?

2. Will it further set out in a table the change in the number of posts allocated to each directorate-
general in 2002 compared with 2001, and in 2001 compared with 2000?

Is the Commission satisfied that its internal flexibility in the allocation of staff to different tasks is

3.
adequate to meet changing needs?