WRITTEN QUESTION P-3631/01 by Elly Plooij-van Gorsel (ELDR) to the Commission. Nuclear Research and Consultancy Group (NRG) in Petten.
Date: 2002-01-08
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: European official, Netherlands, dismissal, nuclear accident, nuclear reactor, nuclear safety, personnel administration

29.8.2002

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 205 E/49

(2002/C 205 E/052)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-3631/01

by Elly Plooij-van Gorsel (ELDR) to the Commission

(8 January 2002)

Subject: Nuclear Research and Consultancy Group (NRG) in Petten

An employee of the Nuclear Research and Consultancy Group (NRG) in Petten in the Netherlands has been
sacked after disclosing that the firm was flouting safety provisions (see report in the NRC Handelsblad of
10 December 2001). The nuclear physics service has since been investigating the high flux reactor
operated by NRG. The firm maintains that the employee caused disquiet among staff by disclosing wrong
information.

Is the Commission aware of the situation?

Is the employee involved an official of the European Commission and, if so, what are the grounds for his
dismissal?

Does the Commission not share my view that shortcomings in the operation of nuclear facilities should be
reported immediately to the department responsible and, if so, what action is an employee justified in
taking where an appropriate response is not forthcoming?

Answer given by Mr Busquin on behalf of the Commission

(14 February 2002)

The Commission is aware of the situation at the High Flux Reactor. The person who has directly contacted
the Kernfysische Dienst (KFD), the Dutch licensing authority, is not an official of the Commission but a
staff member of NRG, the Dutch company which 1 under contract with the Commission 1 is responsible
for the operation of the High Flux Reactor. The Commission is the license holder of the High Flux Reactor.
The Commission has been informed that this employee has been moved by the management of NRG to
another function and considers this to be an internal matter of personnel policy for NRG.

irregularities in the management of nuclear installations should be
The Commission believes that all
reported immediately to the competent authorities. In response to these particular allegations, the Dutch
licensing authority launched an investigation into the safety and the functioning of the High Flux Reactor.
The Commission as a license holder fully co-operated in this investigation. The investigation concluded
that while the High Flux Reactor management had fully respected the license conditions, there had been
inconsistencies between the operating instructions and the technical safety specifications applied by NRG,
leading to different interpretations of how to apply some procedures. The Commission believes that this
finding highlights the need for improvements to the safety culture in the operation of the High Flux
Reactor.

On 1 February 2002 a local newspaper article highlighted the existence of a ‘crack’ (in fact an internal
welding anomaly) in the High Flux Reactor. This has existed since the current reactor vessel was installed
in 1983. It has been fully documented and accepted by the regulatory authorities. The ‘crack’ has been
monitored and measured continually over the years during In Service Inspection. In August 2001 the
results of an inspection and measurement of this internal ‘crack’ led to public concern that the ‘crack’ has
grown. The scientific experts who carried out the tests and NRG claim that the apparent growth is
explained by a change of instrument used in the measurement and that it poses no danger to the public.
After discussion and review of the technical details of the measurements, the KFD allowed the reactor to
continue operation but requested a further inspection in summer 2002.

The Commission is convinced that the safe operation of the High Flux Reactor in Petten, The Netherlands,
is not compromised. Nevertheless,
the Commission has
recommended that the reactor be shut down to permit re-measurement of the ‘crack’ (the internal welding
anomaly). This shutdown should take place as soon as possible. The shutdown period will also be used to

the latest developments,

in the light of

C 205 E/50

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

29.8.2002

accelerate the implementation of training and other measures to enhance the safety culture. A reasonable
date for the shutdown will be on or before the 10 February 2002, subject to the views of Kernfysische
Dienst (KFD), the Dutch licensing authority. On the 4 of February 2002, the acting director of NRG
indicated, in the course of a press conference, that he concurred with the position of the Commission.

(2002/C 205 E/053)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-3642/01

by Geoffrey Van Orden (PPE-DE) to the Council

(8 January 2002)

Subject: Terrorism

With reference to the Council Regulation on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons
and entities with a view to combating international terrorism (1) and the recommendation by the European
Parliament that the Annex listing the actual groups or persons should be drawn up on the basis of a
proposal by the Commission or a Member State, what steps are being taken by the Council to ensure that
the terrorist groups which are actively engaged against EU Member States and candidate countries for EU
membership (such as the IRA, UFF, PKK, DHKP-C, N 17 and ETA, for example) are included on the list of
proscribed organisations?

(1) COM(2001) 569 1 C5-0665/2001 1 2001/0228(CNS).

Reply

(21 May 2002)

1.
Pursuant to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373(2001), the EU legal framework for
imposing sanctions, including the freezing of assets, on persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist
acts is set out in the following instruments that the Council adopted on 27 December 2001:

(a) Council common position on combating terrorism (2001/930/CFSP), which takes up the obligations

contained in the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373(2001);

(b) Council common position on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism (2001/931/
CFSP). In addition to establishing objective criteria for including a given name in the list of persons,
groups and entities which are the subject of police and judicial cooperation and/or the freezing of
assets, this common position includes at annex a ‘first list’ of names;

(c) Council Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain
persons and entities with a view to combating terrorism, which sets out in particular the Community
action needed to implement the CFSP aspects of the common position referred to above under (b);

(d) Council Decision establishing the list provided for

in Article 2(3) of

the Council Regulation

abovementioned under (c) (2001/927/EC).

2.
Among the groups mentioned by the Honourable Member, the Ulster Defence Association/Ulster
Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF), the Revolutionary Organisation 17 November and ETA have already been
included on the ‘first list’ attached to the common position mentioned under point 1(b). The groups in
question are thus the subject of police and judicial cooperation between Member States in criminal
matters.