2004/337/EC: Commission Decision of 20 December 2001 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement — Case COMP/E-1/36.212 — Carbonless paper (notifed under document number C(2001) 4573) (Text with EEA relevance)
Date: 2001-12-20
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: economic concentration, exchange of information, merger control, pulp and paper industry

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II

(Acts whose publication is not obligatory)

COMMISSION

COMMISSION DECISION

of 20 December 2001

relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA
Agreement

Case COMP/E-1/36.212 — Carbonless paper

(notifed under document number C(2001) 4573)

(Only the English, French, German and Spanish texts are authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2004/337/EC)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.

PART I — THE FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1. Summary of the infringement

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2. The carbonless paper industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.1. The product . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.2. The market for carbonless paper

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.2.1. Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.2.2. Demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.2.3. Development of supply and demand in Western Europe, 1990-1996 . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.2.4.

Inter-state trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.3. The producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.3.1. Arjo Wiggins Appleton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.3.2. Binda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.3.3. Carrs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.3.4. Copigraph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.3.5. Divipa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.3.6. Koehler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.3.7. Mougeot

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.3.8. Sappi

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.3.9. Stora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.3.10. Torraspapel

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1.2.3.11. Zanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.3.12. Zicuñaga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.2.4. The Association of European Manufacturers of Carbonless Paper — (AEMCP) . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3. Procedure

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.1. Origin of the case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.2. The investigations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.3. Requests for information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.3.4. General statements given by the producers before receiving the Statement of Objections . . . . .

1.3.5. The administrative procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4. Details of the infringement

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.1.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.2. Basic principles of the cartel

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.2.1. Objectives

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.2.2. Organisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.2.3. Monitoring system and sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.3. The cartel meetings and other collusive contacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.3.1. General cartel meetings

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.3.2. National and regional cartel meetings and collusive contacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.4. Price increase, sales quota and market sharing agreements

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.4.1. Price increase agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.4.2. Allocation of sales quotas and market sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.5. Assessment of the factual evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.5.1. The evidence relating to the cartel as a whole . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.5.2. The evidence on individual participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.4.5.3. Assessment of the parties' factual arguments

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.

PART II — LEGAL ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.1.

Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.2. Application of Article 81 of the Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.2.1. Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.2.2. Agreements and concerted practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.2.3. Single, continuous infringement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.2.4. Restriction of competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.2.5. Effect upon trade between Member States of the Community and between EEA Contracting
Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.2.6. Provisions of competition rules applicable to Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway
and Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.2.7. Duration of the infringement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2.3. Liability for the infringement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.3.1. Arjo Wiggins Appleton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.3.2. Copigraph and Bolloré . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.3.3. Sappi

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.3.4. Stora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.3.5. Torraspapel

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.3.6. Zanders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.3.7. Zicuñaga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.4. Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.4.1. Article 3 of Regulation No 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.4.2. Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.4.2.1. General considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.4.2.2. The amount of the fines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the final report of the Hearing officer in this
case (4),

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community,

Whereas:

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic
Area,

1. PART I — THE FACTS

Having regard to Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February
1962, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of
the Treaty (1) as
last amended by Regulation (EC) No
1216/1999 (2), and in particular Articles 3 and 15 thereof,

1.1. SUMMARY OF THE INFRINGEMENT

Having regard to the Commission decision of 26 July 2000 to
open a proceeding in this case,

(1)

The following undertakings, addressees of the present
Decision, have infringed Article 81 of the Treaty and
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement:

Having given the undertakings concerned the opportunity to
make known their views on the objections raised by the
Commission pursuant to Article 19(1) of Regulation No 17
and Commission Regulation (EC) No 2842/98 of 22 December
1998 on the hearing of parties in certain proceedings under
Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty (3),

— Bolloré SA (Bolloré),

— Carrs Paper Ltd (Carrs),

— Arjo Wiggins Appleton Limited (AWA),

Having consulted the Advisory Committee on Restrictive
Practices and Dominant Positions,

— Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles S.L. (Divipa),

(1) OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204/62.
(2) OJ L 148, 15.6.1999, p. 5.
(3) OJ L 354, 30.12.1998, p. 18.

— Mitsubishi HiTech Paper Bielefeld GmbH (MHTP),

(4) OJ C 96 of 21.4.2004.

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— Papelera Guipuzcoana de Zicuñaga SA (Zicuñaga),

— Papeteries Mougeot SA (Mougeot),

— Papierfabrik August Koehler AG (Koehler),

— Sappi Limited (Sappi),

— Torraspapel SA (Torraspapel),

Sappi Limited

Torraspapel SA

Zanders Feinpapiere AG

from January 1992
until September 1995

from January 1992
until September 1995

from January 1992
until September 1995

1.2. THE CARBONLESS PAPER INDUSTRY

— Zanders Feinpapiere AG (Zanders).

1.2.1. THE PRODUCT

(2)

agreement

infringement

consists of participation of

The
the
members of the Association of European Manufacturers
of Carbonless Paper (AEMCP) and three other European
carbonless paper producers and/or distributors in a
continuing
practice,
contrary to Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article 53(1)
of the EEA Agreement (from January 1994) covering the
whole of the Community and the EEA, by which they
fixed price increases, allocated sales quotas and fixed
market shares and set up machinery to monitor the
implementation of the restrictive agreements.

concerted

and/or

(4)

(5)

(3)

The respective duration of
undertakings was as follows:

the infringement by the

Arjo Wiggins Appleton Limited

Bolloré SA

Carrs Paper Ltd

from January 1992
until September 1995

from January 1992
until September 1995

from January 1993
until September 1995

Distribuidora Vizcaína
de Papeles S.L

from March 1992
until January 1995

Mitsubishi HiTech Paper
Bielefeld GmbH

from January 1992
until September 1995

Papelera Guipuzcoana de
Zicuñaga SA

from October 1993
until January 1995

Papeteries Mougeot SA

Papierfabrik
August Koehler AG

from May 1992 until
September 1995

from January 1992
until September 1995

The product concerned in this case is carbonless paper,
which is also known as self-copying paper. Carbonless
paper
the multiple duplication of
documents and is made from a paper base to which
layers of chemical products are applied (5).

intended for

is

a

by

the

copy

reaction

between

The principle behind carbonless paper
thus involves
two
obtaining
complementary layers under pressure of handwriting or
the impact of a computer printer or typewriter. The first
layer,
is
transmitting coated back (CB)
composed of microcapsules which contain colour
the
The
formers.
formers
microcapsules,
which are then absorbed by the second layer,
the
receiving coated front (CF) layer. This CF layer is made
from a reactive substance (or ‘activated clay') which
reacts with the colour formers to give a sharp image.

or
releasing these

pressure

impact

colour

bursts

layer,

thus

(6)

The following types of carbonless paper exist: (6):

— CB (coated back) is a carbonless paper coated with a
transmitting layer containing microcapsules. This

(5) According to Sappi the paper base is made from a special type of
wood pulp and this pulp is supplied by a limited number of
suppliers (File p. 219).

(6) There are also special types, called ‘self-contained':

— Carbonless paper whose

top side

layer of
microcapsules and another of active clay. It can be used as the
receiving sheet (CF) without it being necessary for the top
sheet to have been coated on the back with microcapsules (for
copying from conventional offset paper).

contains

a

— A self-contained carbonless paper whose top side contains
both the layer of microcapsules and the layer of activated clay;
while the underside contains the layer of microcapsules. It can
be used as the middle sheet without the need for a top sheet
coated with microcapsules.

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sort of carbonless paper is used as the top copy of
is available in different grades:
the bundle.
standard,
for optical character reading, or coated
lightly on the back to provide a better image.

It

(9)

Business forms (7) have always been the single largest
application for carbonless papers, accounting for over
90 % of total consumption (8). Other applications for
carbonless papers include roll converting (9).

— CFB (coated front and back) is a carbonless paper
coated on the front with a reactive substance,
intended to act as a chemical developer, and coated
on the back with microcapsules. This
type of
carbonless paper is used as the middle sheet or one
of several middle sheets. It is the central part of the
bundle, which receives and transmits the copy. It is
the most delicate sheet and is available in standard
grade;
special
applications.

there are also certain grades

for

(10)

Carbonless paper is sold in reels (80 %) and sheets
(20 %) (10). Most carbonless paper producers cater for
sheet demand by cutting reels into sheets, whereas some
sheeted
specialised producers make directly
small
products (11).

on

the

but

front

substance

— CF (coated front) is a carbonless paper used as the
last sheet, which is coated with a receiving layer of
reactive
no
microcapsules on the back capable of bursting
under pressure. This sheet is no different to ordinary
paper, at least as regards its handling, and it is less
delicate than the other sheets that make up the
bundle. This type is available in a standard grade,
reading, a grade
another
receptive on both sides, and certain grades for
special applications.

for optical

character

(11)

for

from reels — both as

‘the market
terms

Carrs implies that the carbonless paper reels and sheets
form separate relevant product markets. Carrs argues
is entirely separate in
that
sheets
commercial
regards
production costs, pricing and distribution channels'.
there are substantial differences
Carrs also says that
between reels and sheets, which in Carrs' case can be
the
the
evidenced
technical
in
differences
by
specification of
sheet product,
its carbonless paper
Signal Plus. For Carrs the distinction between reels and
sheets arise from an understanding of their end-use and
the needs of
these end-users. Ultimately this means
understanding the requirements of printers and the type
of printing equipment they use (12).

(7)

(8)

Each of the three types of carbonless paper is available
in white and other colours, especially blue, pink, yellow
and green. From these families of carbonless paper one
can make up bundles of
all kinds by inserting
carbonless paper of one type or another depending on
requirements.

(12)

Printers use two types of printing press: reel-fed and
sheet-fed. Reel-fed presses pull
the paper through a
press from a continuous reel. Sheet-fed presses push
sheets through the printing press machine. According to
Carrs the sheet-fed press requires paper sheets that are
stiffer and more resistant to stress than reel-fed printers
in order to achieve less wastage and high speeds. Carrs
states that most printers tend to use either reel- or
sheet-fed presses, but not both. According to Carrs it is
not feasible for a printer to react to any changes in the
relationship between the price of sheets and reels by

for

storage

transport,

The composition of carbonless paper alone makes it
necessary to handle carbonless paper carefully and
protect it from pressure. This makes it necessary to take
precautions
printing.
Nevertheless, with existing techniques carbonless papers
folded, combined with other bases
can be glued,
(cardboard, paper, carbon, plastics), made less sensitive
if necessary, marked with pencil, ballpoint pen,
typewriter, computer printer, telex or printing machine,
made into ordinary bundles or self-separating ones, used
for applications requiring optical character reading, etc.

and

(7) Listings

(10 %),

computer bespoke

(37 %), unit

sets

(42 %).

Euroforms January 1991. File pp. 3188-3189.

(8) ‘European and worldwide markets for carbonless paper to 2000
and beyond. Phase I'. A report prepared for AEMCP by Mikulski
Hall Associates (MHA), December 1996, p. 35 (File p. 1115).

(9) 4 %:

telex rolls, office printers,

till

rolls, or automated teller

machines.

(10) MHA report, December 1996, p. 20 (File p. 1100)
(11) Carrs' reply to the Statement of Objections, file pp. 20341-20342.
(12) Carrs' reply to the Statement of Objections, file pp. 20341 and

20351.

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switching from one to the other. It also implies that the
cutting of reels into sheets would not be a viable
alternative for printers using sheet-fed press (13).

figure

that
1 035 000 tonnes (18).

the

total

European capacity

reaches

(13)

The Commission concludes that, since the cartel covers
both the carbonless paper reels and sheets,
for the
purposes of
is not necessary to further
this case it
define the product market.

(16)

At the time of the infringement, the AEMCP members
accounted together for 85-90 % of carbonless paper
sales in the territory that became the EEA in 1994.
Estimated market shares of each of them (except Binda,
not active anymore in the market after 1993) are
presented in Table 1(a).

1.2.2. THE MARKET FOR CARBONLESS PAPER

1.2.2.1. Supply

(14)

Production of
in Europe has
carbonless papers
increasingly become dominated by a relatively small
number of major producers as smaller suppliers have
withdrawn from the market (14). In the EEA all main
producers belong to the Association of European
Manufacturers of Carbonless Paper (hereinafter AEMCP).
At the time of the infringement under consideration
here the following companies were AEMCP members:
Arjo Wiggins Appleton (AWA), Cartiere Sottrici Binda,
Copigraph (15), Papierfabrik August Koehler, Papeteries
Mougeot, Stora Feldmühle (later Stora Carbonless Paper
and today Mitsubishi HiTech Paper Bielefeld) (16),
Zanders Feinpapiere, Sappi (17), and Torraspapel. To a
from integrated
large extent
production of base paper and chemicals.

these producers benefit

(17)

(15) According to the MHA report, prepared for the AEMCP
in 1996, the size of the EU carbonless paper market
was
some ECU 850 million in 1995. The report
estimated that in the same year the west European (EEA
and Switzerland) production capacity of carbonless
paper was 1 010 000 tonnes, of which the AEMCP
members accounted for 890 000 tonnes (i.e. 88 %).
When east European production capacity is added to

(13) Carrs' reply to the Statement of Objections, file pp. 20341-20342.
(14) MHA report, December 1996, p. 42 (File p. 1122).
(15) Bolloré, the parent company of Copigraph, was directly implicated
in the cartel together with its subsidiary (see paragraphs (353) to
(356)); to facilitate the description and analysis of the case, they
are both hereinafter referred to as ‘Copigraph'.

(16) Hereinafter referred to as ‘Stora'.
(17) Several subsidiaries of Sappi Limited have been implicated in the
cartel (see paragraphs (357) to (359)); to facilitate the description
and analysis of the case, all are hereinafter referred to as ‘Sappi'.

TABLE 1(a)

Market shares of AEMCP members in 1995 based on
estimates made by Sappi and AWA (19)

(in %)

AWA

Stora

Koehler

Zanders

Torraspapel

Copigraph

Sappi

Mougeot

30-35

15-18

12-15

10-12

Approximately 8 %

Approximately 5 %

Approximately 4 %

Approximately 3 %

for

own

produce

(‘support')

and chemicals

In addition to the AEMCP members there are a number
including forms
of non-integrated small producers,
printers who
in-house
their
requirements or supply mainly local markets and buy in
base papers
from other
suppliers (20). The principal non-AEMCP companies
include Carrs (UK), Fabriano (Italy), Hauffe (Germany),
Bartsch (Germany), Zicuñaga (Spain) and Divipa (Spain).
This Decision is also addressed to three of these small
producers, namely Carrs, Divipa and Zicuñaga.
In
addition, two East European companies are known to be
producing carbonless papers, namely Aero (Slovenia)
and Krkonosské (Czech Republic) (21).

(18)

Table 1(b) presents the overall size in 2000 of each
addressee of
the present Decision, as well as an
indication of its relative importance on the EEA-wide
carbonless paper market in 1994 and 1995. The figures

(18) MHA report, December 1996, p. 44 (File p. 1124); data collected
by the Commission from the producers suggests that the figure on
the size of the market could be somewhat higher, see table 1.b).
(19) File pp. 217 (Sappi's document), 3262-3265 (AWA's document).
(20) Euroforms, January 1991. (File p. 3188).
(21) MHA report, December 1996, p. 42-43 (File pp. 1122-1123).

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Official Journal of the European Union

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provided are based on the companies' responses to
requests
the
Commission (22).

information

estimates

and

for

of

TABLE 1(b)

The size of the addressees and their relative importance in
the EEA carbonless paper market (23)

Undertaking

Total turnover of
the relevant
companies or
groups of
companies
involved (in EUR)
for 2000

Carbonless
paper turnover
(M.EUR) and
estimated
market shares
in the EEA for
1994

Carbonless
paper turnover
(M.EUR) and
estimated
market shares
in the EEA for
1995

AWA

5 524 138 000 369,9 (32,8 %) 380,4 (31,7 %)

MHTP (STORA)

236 220 000 161,7 (14,3 %) 161,9 (13,5 %)

ZANDERS

579 787 000 135,3 (12,0 %) 147,3 (12,3 %)

KOEHLER

487 775 000

111,4 (9,9 %) 119,6 (10,0 %)

TORRASPAPEL

814 876 000

61,4 (5,4 %)

82,8 (6,9 %)

BOLLORE

4 240 000 000

56,4 (5,0 %)
(Copigraph)

60,0 (5,0 %)
(Copigraph)

SAPPI

5 106 061 000

39,2 (3,5 %)

39,5 (3,3 %)

MOUGEOT

139 589 000

30,2 (2,7 %)

30,9 (2,6 %)

DIVIPA

24 641 000

20,5 (1,8 %)

23,1 (1,9 %)

ZICUNAGA

110 932 000

16,8 (1,5 %)

19,9 (1,7 %)

CARRS

33 128 000

11,6 (1,0 %)

13,8 (1,2 %)

1.2.2.2. Demand

(19)

The principal clients in the self-copying paper sector are
to business
printers, who convert carbonless paper

(22) The sales for years 1994 and 1995 are provided as an example.
The relative importance of each undertaking's annual carbonless
paper sales may have varied from year to year over the period of
the infringement. The market share estimates are derived directly
from the data
for
Copigraph where the market share is based on the information
that in 1995 it had a market share of 5 %) and are provided on a
purely indicative basis. The market share estimates are based on
the assumption that the companies in Table 1(b) together covered
90 % of the EEA market.

submitted by the undertakings

(except

(23) All turnover figures provided in the present Decision are given in
ECU or Euro, as appropriate. Exchange rates used for Euro
calculation are the official yearly (or, as the case may be, monthly)
the
mean exchange rates published by the Commission for
calculation of turnovers.

forms and rolls. Some printers use reels and some
sheets. In 1995 the estimated number of reels printers
in Europe was 2 000, and the number of sheets printers
47 000 (24).

(20)

Reels are sold either directly to reels printers or via
merchants, whereas sheets are mainly distributed via
merchants.

(21) According

considerable
to Sappi, merchants have
market power, which is mainly due to production
over-capacity (25). Merchants demand uniform and
regular deliveries. They also require short delivery times
and adaptation of deliveries to their needs of forms and
in order to reduce their own stocks (26). Carrs
sizes,
explains that, according to its experience, merchants
generally seek price increases in the sheets business
wherever possible and encourage the producer
to
increase its prices (27).

(22) As carbonless paper

is a branded product,

there is
strong relationship between suppliers and merchants.
Suppliers tend to have a long-term relationship with
their merchants. This is at least partly due to the high
cost of switching merchants due to stocks carried by
them and the investments made in promotion of a
brand (28).

(23) According to Sappi, AWA, Stora and Torraspapel

in
particular carry out part or all of
the distribution
function themselves or through their own merchant
companies. Some small producers, mainly supplying
likewise often sell direct to customers.
local markets,
to
The
independent merchants (29).

sell mainly

carbonless

producers

other

(24) In 1993 the estimated number of reels printers was 1 260 and
sheets printers 44 200. (File pp. 3134-3135. See also file p. 340.)

(25) File p. 220.
(26) File p. 339.
(27) Carrs' reply to the Statement of Objections, file p. 20352.
(28) File p. 4628.
(29) Sappi's submission of 22.12.1996 (File p. 220). MHTP states in its
reply to the Statement of Objections (file p. 20404) that it (or
Stora Carbonless Paper before it) sells carbonless paper mainly to
paper wholesalers (all sheets and over 95 % of reels) and that it
does not carry out part or all of the distribution function itself.
MHTP does not specify, however, whether it owns some of the
merchant companies as Sappi claims.

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1.2.2.3. Development of supply and demand in
Western Europe, 1990-1996

(24)

(25)

The Western European carbonless paper market
is
In 1995 the
characterised by structural over-capacity.
capacity utilisation rate was 65 % (30). Capacity has not
increased over the last decade. Demand on the other
hand fell
in the mid-1990s, and this decline was
expected to continue (31).

The demand for carbonless copy paper grew rapidly in
the 1980s as it replaced one-time carbon (OTC) paper.
As the European market has matured, transactions have
increasingly been carried out by electronic means, and
this has hit demand. In 1990 consumption of carbonless
in Western Europe (territory that became EEA in 1994
and Switzerland) reached just over 700 000 tonnes;
thereafter the growth in demand slowed to a standstill,
and in 1995 and 1996 demand started to fall (32).

(26)

In the mid-1990s consumption was highest in Germany,
followed by France and the United Kingdom in joint
second place. Italy was the fourth largest consumer in
Europe, with the Benelux countries following in fifth
place (33).

(28)

(27)

There were
in west
European consumption in the 1990s. The most dramatic

sharp short-term fluctuations

of these occurred in 1994/1995 and in autumn 1996.
According to a study carried out for the AEMCP in
1996 by Mikulski Hall Associates,
‘these fluctuations
were generally accepted to be due largely to changes in
stocks, resulting mainly from changes in price levels'.
However, the study did not point to specific changes in
demand or supply conditions that would explain these
fluctuations. The only development that can be clearly
identified from the study is that growth in carbonless
demand in Western Europe has been constrained for a
number of years. The study draws attention primarily to
the trend towards a reduction in the number of copies
for multi-part sets. The most significant factor limiting
the reduced
demand for carbonless, however, was
the
for multi-part
requirement
growing use of
(EDI),
electronic data
electronic media and bar-coding, combined with the
shift to non-impact printing (laser or ink jet) (34).

forms as a result of

interchange

In Western Europe, total deliveries by AEMCP suppliers
remained rather stable between 1990 and 1996, at just
volumes
600 000
by
tonnes, while
non-AEMCP producers fell
from 112 000 tonnes in
1990 to just over 70 000 tonnes in 1996. Imports from
outside Western
same
period (35).
In 1990 the share of imports was 1.4 %,
whereas in 1996 it had dropped to around 0.7 %. Table
2 summarises changes in deliveries to and consumption
in the European market (36).

supplied

Europe

halved

over

the

(30) Figures calculated on the basis of information provided in the

MHA report, December 1996, p. 40 (File p. 1120).
(31) MHA report, December 1996, p. 4 (File p. 1084).
(32) MHA report, December 1996, p. 3, 18-20 (File p. 1083 and

pp. 1098-1100).

(33) PPI, February 1997, File p. 2787.

(34) MHA report, December 1996, p. 3, 9, 20-21 (File p. 1083, 1089,
1100-1101) and MHA report May 1997, p. 60 (File p. 11670).

(35) MHA report, December 1996, p. 3 (File p. 1083).
(36) MHA report, December 1996, p. 19 (File p. 1099).

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TABLE 2

Delivery and consumption of carbonless paper: Western Europe, 1990-1996

Deliveries to Western Europe
('000 tonnes)

Consumption
('000 tonnes)

AEMCP

Non-AEMCP

Imports

Total consumption

% change on
previous year

590

628

632

618

645

570

610

112

97

85

76

89

82

74

10

10

8

7

6

5

5

712

735

725

701

740

657

689

+ 5,3

+ 3,2

– 1,4

– 3,3

+ 5,5

– 11,2

+ 4,9

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

E. 1996

Source: MHA report, December 1996.

(29)

(30)

1.2.2.4. Inter-state trade

with Iceland and Norway. There is therefore substantial
cross-border trade within the whole EEA territory.

In the EEA the production of carbonless paper
is
concentrated and mills are located in five Community
Member States: Belgium, France, Germany, Spain and
the United Kingdom. Generally speaking, however,
producers sell throughout the EEA, and transport costs
do not seem to hinder trade inside this area (37).

1.2.3. THE PRODUCERS

1.2.3.1. Arjo Wiggins Appleton

following

The Commission has detailed information on sales in
the territory that became the EEA in 1994, by country,
covering most of the reference period of the cartel, for
companies: AWA, Divipa, Koehler,
the
Mougeot,
and
Zicuñaga (38). The data shows that at the time of the
infringement more than 56 % of
these companies'
aggregate sales in the EEA was outside their respective
domestic markets (i.e.
the countries in which their
production sites were located).

Stora, Torraspapel, Zanders

Sappi,

(31)

The reference period of the cartel was also characterised
by significant trade flows between the Community and
different EFTA countries. In 1994, substantial quantities
of carbonless paper were sold to Austria, Finland and
Sweden. From 1994 onwards trade flows also existed

(32) Arjo Wiggins Appleton p.l.c. was transformed on 29
November 2001 into Arjo Wiggins Appleton Limited. It
is the parent company (hereinafter AWA) of the Arjo
Wiggins group, which consists of more than 150
subsidiaries worldwide and is active, among others, in
the manufacture and distribution of carbonless, thermal,
fine, coated and speciality papers.
It has substantial
operations throughout Europe and in North America, as
well as interests in other parts of the world. The group
is the world's largest manufacturer of carbonless paper,
with shares of more than 30 % of the European market
and 50 % of the North American market. Carbonless
papers were organised under the divisional name of
Arjo Wiggins Carbonless Paper Operation (CPO) until in
1998 a Carbonless & Thermal division was created.
AWA has carbonless paper mills in Belgium, France and
the United Kingdom.

1.2.3.2. Binda

(37) According to Sappi, average transport costs for deliveries in

Europe are < 10 % of delivered price. File p. 215.

(38) For year 1992 the Commission has detailed figures

for 6
companies, for 1993 and 1994 for 8 companies and for years
1995-1997 for 9 companies.

(33)

Cartiere Sottrici Binda S.p.A, renamed Binda S.p.A in
May 1996, produced carbonless paper until October
that point Binda ceased production and
1993. At
reached various option agreements with AWA on the

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sale of its trademark ‘Biplura' and several machines used
in the production of carbonless paper. These options
have not been fully exercised and AWA has acquired in
1995 the trademark ‘Biplura' and one machine from
Binda. Binda continued to produce release and cast
coated paper until August 1998, when it was
liquidated (39).

(34)

the factual situation. However,

In this Decision, Binda is mentioned for the purpose of
the description of
in
view of the disappearance of this undertaking and in the
absence of any legal or economic successor,
it is not
possible for the Commission to address this Decision to
any legal or natural person for the behaviour of Binda
until October 1993.

1.2.3.3. Carrs

Carrs Paper Limited (Carrs) has its registered office in
the West Midlands, United Kingdom. The company's
(Birmingham)
immediate parent
Limited, which is incorporated in England and Wales.
Carrs produces and sells carbonless paper
(almost
entirely sheets)
in the United Kingdom, and exports
predominantly to Ireland and Denmark.

company is Carrs

Carrs has been an innovator in the carbonless market
and led the change from blue to black carbonless in
1983. It was the first to launch laser/copier grades in
launched the Signal Plus brand, a
1991.
product
first printer-friendly
carbonless paper.

advertised as

In 1992 it

the

it

1.2.3.5. Divipa

(38) Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles S.L.

is a
Spanish company, which buys large carbonless paper
reels and converts them into sheets and smaller reels for
sale in Spain.

(Divipa)

1.2.3.6. Koehler

(39)

Papierfabrik August Koehler AG, with its registered
office in Oberkirch, Germany, is the parent company of
the privately-owned Koehler group, and owns the entire
capital of Reacto Papier GmbH, Hannover, and Koehler
Kehl GmbH, Kehl. Koehler produces carbonless paper,
fine paper and thermal paper

1.2.3.7. Mougeot

(40)

Papeteries Mougeot SA (Mougeot) is a French company
which is
incorporated in Laval-sur-Vologne, Vosges,
France, and is controlled by the […] (*) family. Mougeot
produces carbonless paper in France and its principal
export markets are the United Kingdom, Germany and
In addition to carbonless paper Mougeot
Austria.
produces sanitary and household papers and diapers
that are sold under the distributors' brands

1.2.3.8. Sappi

(41)

Sappi Limited (Sappi)
is an international company
incorporated in the Republic of South Africa. It is the
parent company of the Sappi group of companies.

1.2.3.4. Copigraph

(42)

Copigraph SA was a wholly owned subsidiary of a
French company, Bolloré SA (formerly known as Bolloré
Technologies SA) until November 1998, when AWA
acquired it. Copigraph SA was part of Bolloré's special
papers division. Bolloré produced base paper in its mill
at Thonon which was coated at Thonon, at Copigraph's
Malesherbes facilities in France and at
the Wülfrath
facilities belonging to Eupaco grafische Papiere GmbH &
Co KG in Germany (Bolloré acquired Eupaco in 1992
and closed its coating facilities in 1995) (40). When
Copigraph sold the finished carbonless paper, its main
markets in the EEA were France and Germany.

Sappi entered the European carbonless market in 1990
with the acquisition of
the Transcript manufacturing
plant from DRG in the United Kingdom. After entering
the market it operated in Europe through its subsidiary
Sappi UK Limited that set up in 1993 with another
Sappi Limited subsidiary (Hannoversche Papierfabriken
Alfeld-Gronau AG) a European sales organisation as a
joint venture, Sappi Europe SA. From May 1995, Sappi
Europe Limited was the European holding company to
Hannoversche
which
Limited
Papierfabriken Alfeld-Gronau AG report (41).
In April
1998,
acquisition of KNP Leykam
(Europe's largest producer of coated woodfree paper),

following

Sappi

and

UK

the

(39) File p. 7793 and pp. 19752-19755.
(40) File pp. 414-415 and 13352.

(*) Information between square brackets marked with an asterisk
replace confidential information which has been deleted from the
text.

(41) File pp. 19-20, 26-28.

(35)

(36)

(37)

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the Sappi group was restructured, and now operates as
two operating divisions, Sappi Fine Paper plc and Sappi
Forest Products. The core businesses of Sappi Fine Paper
are coated and uncoated woodfree paper, mechanical
paper, coated and uncoated speciality paper, and release
paper. Sappi Fine Paper's operations are managed
through three regional subsidiaries, Sappi Fine Paper
Europe, North America and South Africa. Sappi's
carbonless paper mill, the Transcript mill, is owned by
Sappi UK limited, a Sappi Fine Paper plc subsidiary.

1.2.3.9. Stora

an

industrial

international

In 1990 the German paper producer
Feldmühle
Aktiengesellschaft was taken over by Stora Kopparbergs
Bergslags AB,
group
incorporated in Sweden and active in the production
and sale of forest industry products, in particular paper,
board, pulp and sawn timber. Stora Feldmühle was Stora
Kopparbergs Bergslags AB's wholly owned subsidiary.
Until the end of 1992 the carbonless paper operations
of
carried on directly by Stora
Feldmühle AG that was a member of the AEMCP. At the
beginning of 1993 this business was confined to a new
wholly owned subsidiary of Stora Feldmühle, which was
named Stora Carbonless Paper GmbH (SCP). Stora
Carbonless Paper GmbH produces carbonless paper in
Germany and sells it throughout Europe.

the group were

the group is
applications. The parent company of
Torraspapel SA. The group's carbonless paper operations
are handled by a wholly owned subsidiary, Sarriopapel y
Celulosa SA (Sarrió), that has a production site at Leitza,
Spain. The group had no carbonless paper production
until 1991, when Grupo Torras SA (the then parent
company of the Torraspapel group) acquired, through
its
entire
y Celulosa,
Sarriopapel
non-board paper activities of SarrióSA (43).

subsidiary

the

(47)

In 1999 the CVC Group, a private equity provider active
in the provision of fund management and investment
advice services, acquired sole control of Torraspapel
(Case No COMP M.1728). Before the acquisition CVC
did not have any activities in the carbonless paper
market.

(48)

The group is the market leader on the paper markets in
Spain, and has a strong presence in Portugal, France,
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

1.2.3.11. Zanders

(49)

In November 1998 the Commission approved a
concentration between Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB
and a Finnish forest industry group, Enso Oyj. As a
result of the operation, Enso Oyj acquired 100 % of the
share capital of Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB. The
new entity, Stora Enso Oyj
started
operations at the end of 1998 (42).

(Stora Enso),

Feinpapiere AG (Zanders)

Zanders
a German
company incorporated in Bergisch Gladblach, with
production sites in Bergisch Gladblach and Düren, both
in Germany. Zanders produces mainly coated papers
and cartonboard, and carbonless and speciality papers.

is

Immediately after the concentration was finalised Stora
Enso sold a majority holding in its carbonless paper
subsidiary Stora Carbonless Paper to Mitsubishi Paper
Mills Ltd,
and a minority holding to Mitsubishi
Corporation, with effect from 31 December 1998. Stora
Enso still has a minority holding in Stora Carbonless
Paper GmbH, whose name was changed after
the
transaction to Mitsubishi HiTech Paper Bielefeld GmbH.

1.2.3.10. Torraspapel

is primarily
The Torraspapel
engaged in the manufacture and sale of high-quality
and other
paper

for printing, writing

group (Torraspapel)

products

(50) Until

January 2001 Zanders was affiliated to the US
forest and paper products company International Paper,
and was part of its International Division. International
Paper's
Paper
Deutschland
KG owned
Inc. & Co. Holdings
International
approximately 72 % of Zanders' shares.
Paper ranks among the world's largest producers of
high-quality printing and writing papers.

International

subsidiary

German

(51) On 14 November 2000 the Commission received a
notification of a proposed concentration by which
Metsä-Serla Corporation, a Finnish based forest industry
company, was to acquire a sole control of Zanders
Feinpapiere
COMP/M.2245 —
Metsä-Serla/Zanders). The Commission in December
2000 approved the concentration. On 3 January 2001
completed
International
Metsä-Serla
Metsä-Serla's acquisition of the control of Zanders. On 6
April 2001 Metsä-Serla renamed itself M-real.

Paper

(Case

and

AG

No

(43)

(44)

(45)

(46)

(42) See Commission Decision 1999/641/EC of 25 November 1998 in

(43) See Commission Decision of 24.2.1992 in Case No IV/M.166 —

Case IV/M.1225, OJ L 254, 29.9.1999, p. 9.

Torras/Sarrío.

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1.2.3.12. Zicuñaga

1.3.2. THE INVESTIGATIONS

(52)

Papelera Guipuzcoana de Zicuñaga SA (Zicuñaga)
belongs to the Madrid-based Iberpapel group. Iberpapel
Gestión SA, set up in 1997, is the holding and parent
company of
the group, which carries on various
activities in the paper industry. Zicuñaga owns 100 % of
Papeteries de l'Atlantique SA,
located at Hendaye,
France, which has produced carbonless paper since
1992.

(55)

to Sappi's submissions,

Further
the Commission, by
decisions dated 23 January 1997, ordered a number of
carbonless paper producers to submit to investigations
under Article 14(3) of Regulation No 17. These
investigations were carried out on 18 and 19 February
1997 on the premises of the following undertakings:
Arjo Wiggins Belgium SA, Papeteries Mougeot SA,
Torraspapel SA, Sarriopapel y Celulosa SA, Grupo
Torras SA.

1.2.4. THE ASSOCIATION OF EUROPEAN MANUFACTURERS

OF CARBONLESS PAPER — (AEMCP)

(56)

Investigations under Article 14(2) of Regulation 17 were
carried out between July and December 1997 on the
premises of the following producers:

the AEMCP,

Industries (CEPI). After

started to organise a ‘reconstitution' of

this merger
[an AWA employee]

(53) AEMCP was founded in 1981 by nine companies (44). It
operated as an affiliated Product Group of the European
Paper Institute (EPI) until the early 1990s, when the EPI
merged with CEPAC, another paper
industry trade
association, to form the Confederation of the European
the then
Paper
chairman of
from
the
AWA,
association, aimed at formal and legal establishment of
the
association in Belgium. Consequently, on 13
September 1993 the following companies signed the
new articles of association: Arjo Wiggins Appleton plc,
Copigraph SA, Koehler AG, Papeteries Mougeot SA,
Alfred Rose, Sappi Europe Ltd, Stora Feldmühle AG,
Torraspapel SA and Zanders Feinpapiere AG. The
association was approved as an international association
under Belgian law in 1994.

— on 2, 3 and 4 July, Sappi Limited, Sappi Europe

Limited and Sappi (UK) Limited;

— on 21 and 22 October 1997, Arjo Wiggins Appleton
P.L.C., Arjo Wiggins Europe Holdings Ltd., Arjo
Wiggins SA and its subsidiary Guerimand SA;

— on 23 and 24 October 1997, Papeteries Mougeot

SA;

— on 6 and 7 November 1997, Torraspapel SA and

Sarriopapel y Celulosa SA;

— on 20 and 21 November 1997, Unipapel, Sociedade

Comercial de Celulose e Papel Lda;

— on 4 and 5 December 1997, Stora Carbonless Paper

GmbH; and

1.3. PROCEDURE

— on 9 and 10 December 1997, Papierfabrik August

Koehler AG.

1.3.1. ORIGIN OF THE CASE

(57)

By mutual agreement with Sappi, a visit to the Brussels
offices of Sappi's subsidiary, Sappi Europe SA,
took
place on 25 July 1997.

(54)

to

the

information

In autumn 1996 the paper products group Sappi
provided
and
Commission
documents which gave the Commission reason to
suspect that there was or had been a secret price fixing
in which Sappi
cartel
invoked the
was operating as
provisions
the
on
non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases (the
Leniency Notice (45).

a producer. Sappi
the Commission Notice

in the carbonless paper sector,

of

(44) Wiggins Teape, Feldmühle, Koehler, Zanders, Ahlström (ceased
production in 1991), Binda (ceased production in 1993), DRG,
Sarrío and Reed (ceased production in 1986). (File p. 165).

(45) OJ C 207, 18.7.1996, p. 4.

1.3.3. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

(58) On 8 March 1999 the Commission addressed requests
for information under Article 11 of Regulation No 17 to
Arjo Wiggins Appleton plc, Papeteries Mougeot S.A.,
Torraspapel S.A., Cartiere Sottrici Binda S.p.A., Carrs
Paper Ltd, Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles S.L., Ekman
Iberica S.A. and Papelera Guipuzcoana de Zicuñaga S.A.
On 15 March 1999 requests for
information under
Article 11 of Regulation No 17 were also addressed to
Papierfabrik August Koehler AG, Stora Carbonless Paper
GmbH and Zanders Feinpapiere AG, and on 20
December 1999 to Copigraph S.A.

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L 115/13

(59)

Further requests under Article 11 of Regulation No 17
were sent to Carrs Paper Ltd, Stora Carbonless Paper
GmbH and Torraspapel S.A.

(60)

the undertakings were required to
In the requests
provide
increase
information regarding their price
announcements, sales volumes, customers, turnover and
meetings with competitors. The same questions were
put to Sappi.

Mougeot approached the Commission stating that it was
willing to cooperate in the cartel investigation under the
Leniency Notice. Mougeot admitted the existence of a
carbonless paper price
fixing cartel and its own
participation in it between October 1993 and July 1995,
and provided the Commission with information on the
structure of
in particular, on the
individual price fixing meetings its representatives had
attended (49).

the cartel and,

for

request

(61) AWA, Stora and Copigraph admitted in their replies to
information their participation in
the
multilateral cartel meetings held between the producers
of carbonless paper. AWA gave a list of
‘improper'
meetings or groups of meetings between competitors
from 1992 to 1998 where carbonless paper prices were
also discussed, including discussion of historical trends,
but also extending to an exchange of
intentions
regarding announcements of price increases (46). Most
(and the best documented) of these meeting were held
admitted its
during the period 1992-1995. Stora
participation in meetings with competitors at which
‘there was discussion not just of the general economic
situation in the industry but of prices as well', but
claimed that ‘the competitors did not reach agreement
on price increases' (47). These meetings took place in the
period between the end of 1992 and continuing till the
middle of 1995. Copigraph admitted participation in
meetings with competitors where ‘carbonless paper reels
prices were
specifically one
Copigraph executive remembers attending two or three
meetings in 1993 and 1994.

raised' (48)

and more

1.3.4. GENERAL STATEMENTS GIVEN BY THE PRODUCERS

BEFORE RECEIVING THE STATEMENT OF OBJECTIONS

(62) Mougeot and Sappi have admitted participation in
multilateral cartel meetings held between the producers
already described, Sappi
of
provided the Commission with the evidence of
the
cartel's existence. After having received the request for
information under Article 11 of Regulation No 17,

carbonless paper. As

(46) File pp. 7828-7829.
(47) Original

in German:

‘nicht nur die allgemeine wirtschaftliche
Situation der Branche
Preise
gesprochen wurde' … ‘[Z]wischen den Wettbewerbern [wurde]
kein Einvernehmen über Preiserhöhungen erzielt'. (File p. 9044).

sondern auch über

erörtert,

(48) File p. 13353.

1.3.5. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

(63) On 26 July 2000, the Commission initiated proceedings
in the present case and adopted a Statement of
Objections against
the following undertakings: Arjo
Wiggins Appleton p.l.c, Binda S.p.A, Bolloré SA, Carrs
Paper Ltd, Copigraph SA, Distribuidora Vizcaína de
Papeles S.L., Iberpapel Gestión S.A., International Paper,
Mitsubishi HiTech Paper Bielefeld GmbH (MHTP (Stora)),
Mitsubishi Paper Mills Ltd, Papelera Guipuzcoana de
Zicuñaga SA, Papeteries Mougeot SA, Papierfabrik
August Koehler AG, Sappi Limited, Stora Enso Oyj,
Torraspapel SA and Zanders Feinpapiere AG.

(64) All addressees of the Statement of Objections except
Binda S.p.A, International Paper and Mitsubishi Paper
Mills Ltd submitted written observations in response to
the Commission's objections.

(65)

to the Commission's
The undertakings had access
investigation file via a CD-ROM copy of the file, which
was sent to them on 1 August 2000.

(66)

In its reply to the Statement of Objections, Koehler
argued that granting access to the file by sending a
CD-ROM does not
satisfy the Commission's own
principles as laid down in its Notice on access to
file (50) on the basis of case law. Koehler argued that the
undertaking in question is unable to check whether the
CD-ROM actually does contain all
the documents
to the Commission that must be made
available
accessible to it, whether the documents are complete as
such or whether in the scanning documents have been
recorded incompletely. Koehler made accordingly a

(49) File pp. 7647-7658.
(50) Commission Notice on the internal

rules of procedure for
processing requests for access to the file in cases pursuant to
Article 85 and 86 (currently 81 and 82) of the EC Treaty, Article
65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty and Council Regulation (EEC) No
4064/89 (OJ C 23, 23.1.1997, p. 3).

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21.4.2004

request to have access to the file by way of consultation
of the file on the Commission's premises in addition to
the access to file given to it via a CD-ROM (51).

(67) With the CD-ROM the undertakings

received an
enumerative list of all documents in the investigation
file (with a running page numbering), which shows for
each document its degree of accessibility. In addition,
Koehler has been informed that the CD-ROM gives the
parties a full access to all documents obtained by the
Commission during the course of
the investigation,
excluding only business secrets or other confidential
information. Koehler was offered confirmation of that
information by the Hearing Officer but has not made
use of this possibility (52).

(68) An Oral Hearing was held on this case on 8 and 9
March 2001. The following undertakings took part in
the Hearing: Arjo Wiggins Appleton p.l.c, Carrs Paper
Ltd, Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles S.L., Mitsubishi
HiTech Paper Bielefeld GmbH, Papelera Guipuzcoana de
Zicuñaga SA, Papeteries Mougeot SA, Papierfabrik
August Koehler AG, Sappi Limited, Torraspapel SA and
Zanders Feinpapiere AG.

‘there were occasional
that
summer 1995 indicates
meetings between sales managers at national level. […]
[S]ome of its individual national sales managers had not
entirely broken contacts with their counterparts in other
producers. […] However, where it occurred it resulted
from local initiatives by national managers and should
not be viewed as a continuation of
that
summer 1995 (59)'. Mitsubishi HiTech/
existed until
Stora has not contested the infringement over
the
period 1992 to summer/autumn 1995 (60).

the cartel

(71)

replies

Some undertakings that did contest any collusion in
their replies to the requests for information from the
Commission have admitted in their
to the
Statement of Objections their participation in the cartel.
Carrs has admitted that
it participated in the UK
meetings during the period January 1993 to March
1997, the extent of Carrs participation varying over the
period (61). Koehler has not contested some of the facts
for
the period from autumn 1993 to May 1995
inclusive (62). Zanders has not contested the description
of the cartel made by the Commission for the period
1992 to autumn 1995 (63).

1.4. DETAILS OF THE INFRINGEMENT

In their written replies to the Statement of Objections
Torraspapel (53), Divipa (54)
and Zicuñaga (55) have
contested any participation in any collusive agreement.
However, most of the addressees of the Statement of
Objections have admitted existence of the cartel and
their participation in it.

1.4.1. INTRODUCTION

(69)

(70)

The undertakings which had previously admitted their
participation in the cartel have to a large extent not
contested the findings of the Commission described in
the Statement of Objections except for the period after
summer 1995. More precisely Sappi has indicated that
the
its participation ‘ended prior to its approach of
Commission on 19 September 1996' (56). Mougeot has
confirmed its participation to the cartel from September
1993 to summer 1995 (57), as does Copigraph (58).
AWA has not contested the facts
in the
Statement of Objections but regarding the period after

set out

(51) Koehler's

reply

to the

Statement of Objections,

file pp.

20733-20735.

(52) File pp. 20739-20740.
(53) File p. 20439.
(54) File p. 19592.
(55) File p. 18468.
(56) File p. 20603.
(57) File p. 19717.
(58) File p. 19563.

(72) Most of the addressees have admitted participation in
the cartel. However, these undertakings have sometimes
given a different description and different times for the
beginning and for the end of the existence of the cartel.
The undertakings admitting the facts do never contest
the existence of
the cartel during the period from
September 1993 to spring or summer 1995.

(73) As to the beginning of the period, Copigraph, Koehler
and Mougeot deny any participation in the cartel before

(59) File p. 19733.
(60) File p. 20403.
(61) File p. 20358: Carrs indicates that during 1993-1994 it actively
attended UK meeting. From the end of 1994, it generally no longer
attended the meetings but was kept informed of the conclusions of
these meetings by telephone, generally by AWA.

(62) File pp. 20703 and 20721.
(63) File p. 20506.

21.4.2004

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September 1993 and Stora (MHTP) before the end of
1992. However, statements made by Sappi suggest that
there were contacts of a collusive nature between the
European carbonless producers as long ago as the
founding of their trade association, the AEMCP, in 1981,
and in particular from the mid-1980s onward (64). The
evidence provided by Sappi shows that there were cartel
meetings
starting in 1989 and continuing until a
meeting on 2 February 1995 in Frankfurt.

(74)

in the present case limit

The Commission will
its
assessment from January 1992 onward, this date being
the Commission has
the moment
from cartel participants and
converging statements
regular collusive contacts
corroborated evidence of
between carbonless paper producers.

from which

(75) As to the end of

the period, as described in the
Statement of Objections, there is also some suspicion
that at least some elements of the collusive arrangement
put in place at the latest in January 1992 continued
after September 1995. However, all parties except AWA,
their
and Sappi deny any continuation of
Carrs
participation in the collusion after September 1995 —
including parties that admit their participation prior to
that
Stora, Zanders).
date
Moreover,
the statements made by AWA, Carrs and
Sappi are substantially different from each other as to
the nature and the dates of
the alleged collusive
contacts. Finally, the statements are not well enough

(Copigraph, Mougeot,

‘He had first suspected that

(64) Sappi has provided to the Commission a statement made by one
of its employees who has been in sales of carbonless paper since
the 1970s, saying that
there was
collusion in carbonless paper in about the mid 1980[s] because of
comments made by senior management … He would have
believed that the collusion involved Arjo Wiggins, Köhler and
Stora Feldmühle, among others. He had been aware of bilateral
exchanges of information from about the mid/late 1980s' (File p.
4656). Another statement from another Sappi employee suggests
that
and meetings between
competitors during the period from 1991 to 1993 at an EC-wide
level. This Sappi employee ‘believed that
there was collusion
through these contacts and that there were discussions between
suppliers about prices at an EC-wide level'
(File p. 4652-4653.
This employee joined DRG in 1988 and between May 1991 and
the
March 1993 worked for
Transcript mill.).

[a Sappi employee]* based at

there were

collusive

contacts

documented nor corroborated by sufficient evidence to
conclude
in these
issue
behaviour
proceedings continued after September 1995.

that

the

at

(76)

Therefore, the Commission will in the present case limit
its assessment to the period up to September 1995, this
date being the moment until which the Commission has
corroborated evidence of the existence of the cartel.

1.4.2. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE CARTEL

1.4.2.1. Objectives

(77)

The Commission's investigation revealed that the parties
to the cartel agreed on an overall anti-competitive plan
aiming essentially at improving the profitability of the
participants by collectively increasing prices.
In the
framework of this global plan, the principal objective of
the cartel was to agree price increases and also the
the
schedule
increases). This was done by means of cartel meetings
held at various levels (general, national or regional).

(effective dates of

increases

the

for

(78) Documentary evidence on the general cartel meetings
shows that this plan was implemented through meetings
where the participants agreed on several consecutive
price increases expressed in percentage form for each
EEA country. At
the national and regional cartel
meetings the cartel members agreed on percentage price
increases
also monitored the
implementation of the price increases fixed previously.
In the case of
the Spanish and Portuguese markets,
instead of a percentage increase the parties often agreed
on a target price for each type of the product (CB, CFB
and CF). This target price was a minimum price.

and in most

cases

in the following way:

(79) A document found on Sappi's premises explains the
form of the agreed price increases, at least concerning
the Spanish market,
‘On the
agreement taken, reels are discussed in terms of buying
price, but sheets are discussed as selling price and is left
to each supplier the margin he wants their merchants to
obtain.' (65). The terms ‘buying prices' and ‘selling prices'
also appear
found on Sappi's
premises, which summarises the price increases for the

in another document

(65) File p. 2011.

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21.4.2004

from 7 February 1994 until November
UK market
1995 (66). Given that sheets are mainly distributed via
merchants, this means that sheet prices were agreed in
the form of prices to merchants. Reels, on the other
hand, are sold either directly to the end-users or via
merchants, and it seems that reel prices were agreed in
the form of prices to end-users. As this pattern of trade
is common to all EEA countries,
it is likely that the
price increases were agreed in the same way for the
whole area.

(82)

1.4.2.2. Organisation

of

be

can

levels

Two
clearly
cartel meetings
distinguished — the general cartel meetings attended by
chief executives, commercial directors or equivalent in
the carbonless paper business, and the national or
regional cartel meetings attended by national or regional
senior
sales managers, often together with those
managers. Statements from Mougeot and Sappi support
the Commission's conclusions on the structure of the
cartel (72).

the customer, at

(80) As far as prices for reels are concerned, the producers
also agreed to differentiate prices according to the
purchasing power of
least on the
Spanish and Portuguese markets. Three documents
reporting on Spanish market meetings
and one
document reporting on a Portuguese market meeting
show that the reels customers were divided into three
groups — A, B and C — and that the agreed target
prices for each of these groups were different (67). In
addition,
the document on the Portuguese market
meeting, held on 9 February 1994, contains a ‘definition
of a minimum price according to potential of purchases'
and ‘customer classification according to potential of
purchases' (68). During the investigation at Unipapel
(Sappi's agent in the Portuguese market), [an Unipapel
employee]* confirmed that clients were classified in
categories A, B and C according to their purchasing
power (69).

(81)

In order to ensure implementation of the agreed price
increases, in some national cartel meetings sales quotas
were allocated and market shares were fixed for each
participant (70). The agreements on volumes and market
shares show the intention to avoid departures from the
common scheme as well as to refrain from competition
on other commercial aspects. The following statement
by Mougeot illustrates this: ‘[an AWA employee]* added
that this was a problem of prices rather than volumes,
but that on the latter point he would see to it that the
problems were
soon as we were
sorted out
participating in the restoration of profitability' (71).

as

(66) File p. 2245.
(67) File pp. 8, 4476, 1839, 47-51.
(68) File p. 50.
(69) File p. 4520.
(70) See chapter .
(71) Original

in French:

‘[an AWA employee]* a précisé qu'il ne
s'agissait que d'un problème de prix et non de volume mais que
sur ce point il se chargerait de régler ces problèmes dès l'instant
(File p.
où l'on participerait à la restauration de la rentabilité.'
7648).

(a) General cartel meetings

(83)

The EEA-wide planning and co-ordination of the cartel
the general cartel meetings convened
took place at
under the cover of the official meetings of the trade
association, the AEMCP.

(84) At the general cartel meetings the participants decided
in principle on timing and the amount (in percentage
form) of the price increases for each EEA country. They
agreed on several consecutive price increases and for
some months ahead.

(85)

(86)

The AEMCP meetings functioned as cartel meetings at
least from January 1992 until September 1993. From
that date, separate general cartel meetings were held on
the occasion of
the official AEMCP meetings (either
before or after) (see paragraphs 107) to (109)).

The Commission has received copies of the minutes of
the official AEMCP meetings starting from the meeting
of 23 January 1992 (73). Official AEMCP meetings were
held five times a year from 1992 to 1995. Annex I,
Table A lists official AEMCP meetings
from 1992
onward and general cartel meetings for which there is
documentary evidence, beginning with the meeting in
September 1993 where
trade
separation of
association and cartel functions was decided.

the

(72) File pp. 9936, 11596-11598.
(73) See e.g. file pp. 72 and 3973-3976. (Minutes of the meetings can
be found on file pp. 73-197, 3978-4173 and 4732-4750.) The
meetings were first called as the EPI AEMCP Product Group
meetings and from the end of 1993 onward as the AEMCP
General
the
AEMCP meeting held on 1.12.1995 there is a list of chairmen and
secretaries of the association starting from April 1981 (File p.
186). This list shows that a chairman and a secretary of
the
association were appointed every year from one of the member
companies, both coming from the same company at a time.

(Assembly) Meetings. Annexed to the minutes of

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L 115/17

(87)

Koehler,

Mougeot,

The AEMCP meetings were normally well attended, and
at the time of the infringement all the then AEMCP
members participated in those meetings: AWA, Binda,
Copigraph,
Stora,
Torraspapel/Sarrió (74) and Zanders. Attendance was
requested to explain
checked, and members were
reasons for any failure to attend. The minutes of the
AEMCP meeting on 29 February 1996,
for example,
note that Sarriówas absent
the second time in
succession, and that the chairman would contact the
company and ask the reasons for its absence (75).

Sappi,

for

statement also confirms that the participants at these
meetings agreed on steps to be taken to implement in
practice the price increases.

(92) National and regional cartel meetings were usually held
from one to three months prior to implementation of
each price increase agreed at a general cartel meeting.
Sometimes, however, a national cartel meeting too
served to fix several consecutive price increases.

(88)

The attendance of each producer in the official AEMCP
meetings from January 1992 until summer 1995 is
shown in the Annex I, Table B.

(93)

The Commission has evidence that national or regional
cartel meetings were held concerning the following
the United
markets:
Portugal
Kingdom and Ireland (77), Austria, Germany,
Italy,
Benelux and the Nordic countries (paragraphs (129) to
(188)).

and Spain,

France,

(89)

(90)

(b) National and regional cartel meetings

to

The general cartel meetings were followed by a series of
national or regional cartel meetings. The purpose of
ensure market-by-market
these meetings was
implementation of the price increases previously agreed
at the general cartel meetings. It appears that the price
increases, which were decided at
the general cartel
meetings by the senior managers, would not have been
the regional and
successful without participation of
national managers.

for

(i.e.

responsible

Concerning the reasons for holding cartel meetings
market by market
separate national/regional
meetings) Mougeot has stated that ‘AWA felt that unless
the managers
local markets were
involved there was little chance of achieving the results
hoped for, which explained the holding of meetings
market by market'. Mougeot continued by saying that:
‘the local managers were told by their superiors that
they wanted a price rise, and had to decide between
secured in
themselves how the
practice' (76).

should be

rise

(91) At the national and regional cartel meetings the price
increases agreed at European level were confirmed or
revised,
to the price
increases agreed previously was checked. Mougeot's

if necessary, and adherence

(74) Representatives of both Torraspapel SA and Sarriopapel y Celulosa

SA participated in the AEMCP meetings.

(75) File pp. 187-190.
(76) Original

‘il

était

in French:

considéré par AWA que

sans
implication des responsables locaux des marchés, il y avait peu de
chances d'atteindre les résultats escomptés, expliquant par-là même
la tenue des réunions marché par marché' … ‘les responsables
locaux informés par leurs dirigeants d'une volonté de hausse de
prix étaient chargés de définir entre eux les modalités pratiques
pour obtenir cette hausse'. (File p. 11597).

(94) All

cartel meetings,

regional
and
also attended several national

the then AEMCP members attended some or all
some
national or
non-members
cartel
meetings. Of the non-members, in particular, Divipa and
Zicuñaga attended the meetings concerning the Spanish
market, and Carrs attended the meetings concerning the
UK market.

(c) Other contacts between the producers

(95)

Those cartel members who did not participate in a
cartel meeting were informed by other cartel members
of what had been decided, usually by telephone.
Mougeot has explained how it received information on
the concerted price increases if it did not participate in
some cartel meetings:
received
phone calls from one company or another, most often
from AWA, announcing the details of price increases by
market. This continued essentially until mid-1995' (78).

‘Papeteries Mougeot

(96) Occasionally the agreed timetable for implementation of
the increases needed to be revised, but there was neither
time nor any necessity for a new meeting. On these

(77) The documentary evidence, and in particular the information on
the UK and Irish markets were

indicates that

price increases,
considered as one region.

(78) Original

in French:

‘Les Papeteries Mougeot recevait des uns ou
des autres,
le plus souvent d'AWA, des coups de téléphone
annonçant les modalités de hausses de prix par marché. Ceci a été
essentiellement pratiqué jusqu'à mi 1995'. (File p. 11598).

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Official Journal of the European Union

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there are two documents

occasions the competitors kept one another directly
informed of
their intentions regarding the course of
conduct they were going to take. Usually this seems to
have been done by telephone, and no traces were left,
but
showing how AWA
informed Sappi of its decision to revise some increase
dates. The first document is a fax where AWA informs
Sappi that the price increase of June 1993 should be
withdrawn because competitors have failed to put up
their prices (79). The second document, also coming
‘After our call I [a Sappi employee]*
from Sappi, says:
was advised by ARJ/W [Arjo Wiggins] that they have
decided to go one month later in Scandinavia. E.g.
1/5/94' (80).

in the years 1992, 1993 and 1994 and ‘forecast' sales for
1995 and ‘budgeted' sales for 1996 in the Benelux
area (83). Tables of the same kind were also found on
AWA's premises showing the individual producers' sales
in the UK, Spanish and Portuguese markets in 1995
for 1997) (84). The
(and even 1996 and ‘forecasts'
second type of table lists individual producers' shares of
the Dutch, Belgium/Luxembourg and total Benelux
markets in 1993 and 1994, and ‘estimated' shares for
1995 (and ‘forecasted' shares for 1996) (85). Yet another
set of tables shows the percentage growth or decrease in
each producers' sales in the Benelux area in the periods
1993/1994, 1994/1995, 1995/1996 and 1992/1995 (86).
The market share and growth figures are given with an
accuracy of one decimal place. All the tables are dated
December 1995 (87).

1.4.2.3. Monitoring system and sanctions

(97)

(98)

to facilitate

information in order

The carbonless paper producers exchanged individual,
confidential
the
reaching of the agreements on price increases and sales
quotas and to monitor adherence to the agreements.
During the national or regional cartel meetings the
participants
individual
information on their prices and sales volumes (81).
Mougeot has confirmed both the price and volume
information exchange, and emphasised the role of AWA
in this procedure (82).

exchanged

detailed

and

The official co-operation of the AEMCP members within
the association includes the collection and distribution
of statistical information on carbonless paper deliveries.
Since the end of 1994 the statistical service has been
run by Deloitte & Touche, and before that was run by
COPACEL. AEMCP members supply individual data on a
monthly basis to Deloitte & Touche, which collates the
information and produced aggregated statistics for west
European countries and combined statistics for both the
other European countries and the overseas markets.
These aggregated statistics provided for
the AEMCP
members do not identify the sales volumes of individual
producers.

(99) However, on AWA's premises the Commission also
discovered tables containing detailed information on
individual carbonless paper producers' sales. The first
type of table shows annual sales by individual producers

(79) File pp. 10005-10006.
(80) File p. 2482.
(81) See chapter 1.4.4.2.
(82) File pp. 11493 and 11598.

(100) Equally detailed market share figures (accurate to one
decimal place) are shown in hand-written notes taken
by Mougeot's representative at the meeting in Geneva
on 6 December 1994 (88). These notes list shares of the
French market in 1994 and 1995 (1995 shares agreed in
Zanders,
AWA,
the meeting)
Sarrió(Torraspapel), Koehler,
and
Mougeot. Meeting minutes and company statements
show that the cartel members also exchanged individual
sales volume data (89).

Copigraph,

Feldmühle

(Stora)

for

(101) The tables found on AWA's premises and the minutes
and notes of cartel meetings confirm that, in order to
the price-fixing and quota
monitor the operation of
system, at least the AEMCP members exchanged their
individual sales and market share figures outside the

(83) File pp. 940, 942-943, 945, 948, 3378-3380. For year 1992 only

concerning Belgium and Luxembourg.

(84) File pp. 3414, 3641, 3643. For Portugal only concerning year

1996.

(85) File pp. 3381-3383 and 946. Tables of this type were also found
for the UK and Spanish markets in the years from 1995 to 1997
(‘estimate') and for the Portuguese market in the year 1996 (File p.
3415, 3642, 3644; see also file p. 3265, which gives equally
detailed market
in
European level).

share information for main competitors

(86) File pp. 3384-3386 and 947.
(87) The firms are presented in the tables in two groups: AEMCP
members (AWA, Feldmühle (Stora), Koehler, Zanders, Sappi, Sarrío
(Torraspapel), Copigraph and Mougeot) and outsiders (Molineus,
Hauffe, Carrs,
Jujo, Nashua etc.). For the AEMCP members the
tables provide complete information for each year, whereas for the
outsiders only some information is given.

(88) File pp. 7657-7658.
(89) Information on sales volumes was exchanged at

the
following meetings: 30.9.1993 in Barcelona, 1.10.1993 in Paris,
9.2.1994 in Lisbon, spring 1994 in Nogentel and 6.12.1994 in
Geneva. For details see chapter below.

least at

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official arrangements for the collection and distribution
of statistical information operating within the AEMCP.

would leave most people high and dry. He showed quit
clearly what he was capable of by crushing Binda in
Italy' (94).

(102) Standard form letters announcing price increases to
customers were also used to ensure compliance with the
[an
price-fixing agreements. According to Mougeot,
AWA employee]*
the price increases
required that
should be announced by sending standarf form letters to
customers (90). Mougeot has confirmed that AWA and
‘some of the main players on this market' used such
price increase letters (91). The Commission has found
and received from several producers numerous standard
form letters.

(103) Mougeot claims that it received the competitors' price
increase letters found on its premises from customers.
Even if customers sometimes worked as the channel to
transmit the information, it is clear that at least AWA
its price
kept
increase announcements. This is confirmed by a set of
AWA's price increase letters to its customers found at
Sappi's London offices with a signed AWA card ‘with
compliments' from Arjo Wiggins Belgium s.a. (92).

its competitors directly informed of

(104) Mougeot's account of the meeting of 1 October 1993
indicates that there were sanctions for failure to comply
‘[an AWA employee]* said quite
with the agreements:
tolerate any failure to
expressly that he would not
follow this price increase and hat he would “personally
look after” anyone who did not “play the game”' (93).
When asked to describe the control mechanism and the
reasons for the authority of [this AWA employee]* and
‘As far as we know there were
AWA, Mougeot replied:
no contracts, documents or legal circumstances which
gave AWA any sort of authority. But they had a position
of moral and economic leadership on the market. To the
the man who had
old manufacturers
successfully launched self-copying papier in Europe for
AWA, and then secured encouraging results in the
United States. AWA's financial and industrial weight
enabled him to say that if any of these increases were
not passed on AWA would make it its business to push
the market right down by applying a price poliy that

[he]* was

(90) File p. 7649.
(91) File p. 7655. Original

in French:

‘certaines des principaux

intervenants sur ce marché'.

(92) File pp. 2485-2491.
(93) Highlighting added. Original in French:

‘[un employé d'AWA]* a
très explicitement indiqué qu'il ne tolérerait pas que cette hausse
de prix ne soit pas suivie et qu'il “s'occuperait personnellement” de
tous ceux qui ne “joueraient pas le jeu”' (File p. 7648).

(105) AWA was (and still

is) clearly the largest carbonless
paper producer in Europe, with an EEA market share of
approximately 30-35 %. It also had by far the largest
production capacity, twice as much as the second or
third competitor in the EEA. It appears, however, that
AWA would not have been able to ‘crush' the largest of
its competitors, Stora and Zanders.

(106)

(another

smaller producer)

It appears that AWA's threats worked better on the
smaller competitors. Mougeot claims that in view of the
small scale of their production the sanctions and threats
they received were limited to reprimands (‘reproches'),
to which they replied by promising to implement any
indications
future price increases. There are, however,
that stronger measures were taken by AWA against
Torraspapel
to
ensure compliance with the agreements. Indeed, in the
French market meeting held on 6 December 1994 there
was some disagreement between the cartel members on
the accuracy of price increase and volume information
exchanged in the course of the meeting (95). In order to
verify the figures submitted, [an AWA employee]*, who
doubted the figures supplied by Sarrió (Torraspapel),
had asked and received permission to audit
the
information on Sarrió's
sales volumes on Sarrió's
premises (96).

in order

1.4.3. THE CARTEL MEETINGS AND OTHER COLLUSIVE

CONTACTS

1.4.3.1. General cartel meetings

(a) General cartel meetings up to restructuring of

the AEMCP in 1993

(107) Sappi admitted that there was collusion between the
competing manufacturers at regular meetings that took

(94) Original

in French:

‘Il n'y avait pas à notre connaissance de
contrats, documents ou situations juridiques permettant à AWA de
revendiquer une quelconque autorité. En revanche, ces derniers
avaient une position de leader moral et économique sur le marché.
[un employé d'AWA]* était pour les anciens fabricants celui qui
avait lancé avec succès l'autocopiant en Europe pour AWA, puis
obtenu des résultats flatteurs aux Etats-Unis. La présence financière
et industrielle de AWA lui permettait de déclarer que pour le cas
où ces hausses ne seraient pas répercutées, AWA faisait son affaire
de complètement écraser le marché en appliquant une politique de
prix qui
Il fit
d'ailleurs une parfaite démonstration de sa capacité en écrasant
BINDA en Italie'. (File p. 11494)

laisserait le plus grand nombre “sur le carreau”.

(95) Mougeot's statement of 14.4.1999 (File p. 7653).
(96) Mougeot's statement of 29.6.1999 (File pp. 11493-11494).

L 115/20

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Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

that

such meetings

took place as

place at least from the beginning of 1992 onward. A
Sappi employee stated that such meetings were held ‘at
an EC-wide level' from 1991 onward. AWA admitted as
well
from the
beginning of 1992. In addition, the period for which the
Commission has extensive evidence of regular meetings
and contact of a national or regional character begins in
January 1992. The evidence relates in particular
to
meetings
Spanish and Portuguese
the
markets. Other meetings and contacts beginning at the
the
same time concern the markets in France,
Nordic countries and the United Kingdom.

concerning

Italy,

(108) Mougeot, which joined the AEMCP at

statement

the end of
1992 (97), has given a
concerning the
contents of an official AEMCP meeting held in 1993, on
the basis of which the Commission infers that
the
association also involved a
‘reconstitution' of
the
‘Probably on
restructuring of the cartel. Mougeot says:
the occasion of the official AEMCP meeting in Frankfurt
on 14 September 1993, or at the meeting before that,
but certainly when [an AWA employee]*1993, or at the
meeting before that, but certainly when [an AWA
employee]* became head of AWA's self-copying division
[he]*clearly decided to invite the main self-copying
manufactureres on each market
to thies unofficial
meetings, and to change the organisation of the official
AEMCP meetings. [He]* decided that from now on there
would be a lawyer present at all AEMCP meetings in
order to give them an official character and ensure that
the proceedings were not open to criticism. Anything to
do with prices would no longer be discussed at those
“unofficial” meetings, and to
meetings but only at
change the organisation of the official AEMCP meetings.
[He]* decided that
from now on there would be a
lawyer present at all AEMCP meetings in order to give
them an official
the
proceedings were not open to criticism. Anything to do
with prices would no longer be discussed at
those
meetings but only at “unofficial” meetings' (98).

and ensure

character

that

(109) The statement quoted above shows that the election of
[an AWA employee]* as the chairman of the AEMCP on
subsequent
9

1993 (99)

triggered

February

the

(97) Mougeot states that it was introduced to AEMCP as a candidate
member on 25.11.1992, and that the first meeting it attended as a
member was on 9.2.1993. Nevertheless, [a Mougeot employee]*
attended AEMCP meetings as long ago as 26.5 and 10.9.1992. File
pp. 3996 and 4001.

à

des

décidé

clairement

convoquer

les principaux producteurs de

(98) Original in French: ‘Sans doute à l'occasion de la réunion officielle
de l'AEMCP du 14 septembre 1993 à Francfort ou à celle d'avant,
en tout cas lors de l'entrée en fonction de [un employé d'AWA]* à
la tête de la Direction Générale de la branche autocopiant d'AWA.
[Il]*
réunions
de
a
l'autocopiant
“non-officielles”
marché par marché, et de modifier l'organisation des réunions
officielles de l'AEMCP. Désormais,
[il]* a décidé qu'un avocat
assisterait à chaque réunion de l'AEMCP pour donner à celles-ci un
caractère officiel et insusceptible de critique. En revanche il décida
que tout ce qui concernerait les prix n'y serait plus abordé mais
uniquement traité lors de réunions “non-officielles”.' (File p. 7647).
(99) File pp. 74-82. Apparently [an AWA employee]* had become the
head of AWA's carbonless paper sector just before this meeting
took place. The minutes of the meeting expressly mention his
return to Europe and say, ‘[an AWA employee]* … takes the Chair
in place of […]* who has left ARJO WIGGINS'.

the cartel. Also according to this
restructuring of
statement, at the AEMCP meeting of 14 September 1993
(or at the meeting before) (100) [An AWA employee]*.
[An AWA employee]* informed other AEMCP members
of his decision to start to organise carbonless paper
the
producers
cartel meetings outside
It appears that on the basis of AWA's
association.
there was a consensus reached among the
proposal
AEMCP members
trade association
activities from the cartel activitites.

to seprate

those of

the

(110) As the first official AEMCP meeting with a lawyer was
held on 18 November 1993 (101), it appears that at least
from that meeting onward the cartel activities were
effectively moved from ‘official' AEMCP meetings to the
‘non-official' meetings,
i.e. the general cartel meetings
and the national/regional cartel meetings.

(111) Thus Mougeot's statement confirms that, before the
paper
concluded within the
those

reconstitution
price-fixing agreements were
official AEMCP meetings,
agreements were concluded outside those meetings.

the AEMCP,

carbonless

after

that,

and,

of

his

and

then

superiors'

(112) The following recollection of a Sappi employee who
worked in Sappi Europe SA from February 1993
colleagues'
regarding
participation in the cartel meetings confirms that prices
the official AEMCP meetings or at
were agreed at
meetings held on the occasion of
these meetings:
‘However, he admits that he had very strong suspicions,
[two Sappi
close to a degree of knowledge,
employees]* had been to meetings with competitors. He
recollects that one or other of them would come back
from meetings, including AEMCP meetings, with a very
definite view on the price increases that were to be
implemented and that they were relatively unconcerned
by competitor reactions. He knew that they did meet
competitors from time to time but was not aware of the
details or structure. He assumed that
the collusion
related to prices and was EC-wide' (102).

that

(100) The AEMCP meeting preceding the meeting of 14.9.1993 was

held in Zurich on 7.7.1993.

(101) File pp. 106-111.
(102) File p. 5407.

21.4.2004

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/21

(113) The Commission

that,

therefore

concludes

until
restructuring of the association AEMCP and the cartel in
September 1993, general cartel meetings already took
place. The Commission infers
from the Mougeot
statement quoted in paragraph 108 that these meetings
the regular AEMCP
took place in the framework of
meetings. The Commission has information on the dates
and also minutes of the official AEMCP meetings since
the meeting of 23 January 1992. The minutes of these
meetings in the Commission's possession show that
in
between January 1992 and the
September 1993 there were eight AEMCP meetings, all
held in Zurich (see Annex I, Table A).

restructuring

(114) The AEMCP meeting of 14 September 1993 was held in
Frankfurt. Representatives of the following companies
(all the then AEMCP members) attended this meeting
and, therefore, participated in the restructuring of the
cartel: AWA, Copigraph, Koehler, Mougeot, Sappi, Stora,
Torraspapel and Zanders (103).

(b) General cartel meetings after the restructuring

(115) As regards the general cartel meetings held after the
documentary
Commission
restructuring,
evidence and statements which allow identification of
the proceedings, outcome and participants of four such
meetings:

has

the

— meeting on 19 January 1994 in Paris,

— meeting on 21 June 1994 in Frankfurt,

— meeting on 22 September 1994 in Frankfurt,

— meeting on 2 February 1995 in Frankfurt,

(116) All of those general cartel meetings were held on the

occasion of an official AEMCP meeting.

(117) The first general cartel meeting in 1994, aiming at fixing
and controlling the price increases of the first half of

in the EEA, was held on 19 January in
the year
Paris (104). According to the minutes of
the official
AEMCP meeting of 19 January 1994, it opened at 13.55
and ended at 15.30 (105). AWA has confirmed that the
cartel meeting took place before the official AEMCP
meeting and that AWA was represented in the meeting
by […]* (then Chief Executive, AWA Printing and
Writing) (106) and […]*
(then Sales Director, AWA
Carbonless Paper). As for the other participants, AWA
says ‘This meeting is believed to have been attended by
executives from some or all of Koehler, Stora-Feldmühle,
and Zanders.' (107). The Commission also has a travel
expense form which shows that Koehler's representative
in the official AEMCP meeting could have participated
the official
in the general
meeting (108). A copy of
[a Mougeot
employee]* shows that he was also in Paris on 19
January 1994 (109).

cartel meeting before
the diary of

(118) The Commission has found on Sappi's premises a table
dated 21 January 1994 (two days after the meeting)
setting out price increases for most EEA countries from
January 1994 to May 1995 (110). Some of
these
increases correspond to those shown in minutes of
national cartel meetings held before the general cartel
meeting of 19 January. The Commission has also
evidence on implementation of the price increases set
out in that table by those companies and some other
carbonless paper producers. This all provides further
evidence on the general
cartel meeting and the
agreements reached therein (see paragraphs to 189) to
(206)).

(119) On 21 June 1994 an official AEMCP meeting took place
in Frankfurt. According to the minutes the meeting

(104) File p. 121. At the official meeting the following companies were
represented: AWA, Copigraph, Koehler, Mougeot, Sappi, Stora,
Torraspapel and Zanders.

(105) File pp. 121-127.
(106) The Commission also has a copy of the relevant page of the 1994
diary of [an AWA employee]*. This document shows that on 19.1
he was planning to be in Paris at the hotel Sofitel at 08.00, have
lunch at 12.00, and attend a meeting (the official AEMCP
meeting) at 13.00. He had also circled the hours 11 and 16 in his
diary (File p. 927).

(107) AWA reply to the Commission request for information (File p.

7828) and to the Statement of Objections, p. 19749.

(108) A travel expense form for [a Koehler employee]* (File p. 5044),
which shows that he left for Paris on 18 January at 16.00 and
returned to Germany on 19 January at 21.00.

(103) File pp. 91 and 97. The companies were also represented at the

previous AEMCP meeting held on 7.7.1993 in Zurich.

(109) File p. 1147.
(110) File pp. 2484, 10035-10036.

L 115/22

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

opened at 11.00 and closed at 13.00 (111). The official
AEMCP meetings were normally well attended, and at
the meeting of 21 June 1994 all AEMCP member
companies (AWA, Copigraph, Koehler, Mougeot, Sappi,
Stora, Torraspapel and Zanders) were represented.
It
appears that, following the established pattern, a general
cartel meeting was held shortly before or after the
official AEMCP meeting of 21 June. This is confirmed
by a table dated 23 June 1994 (two days after the
AEMCP meeting) setting out price increases for various
from 1 June 1994 to 1 October
EEA countries
1994 (112) and the evidence on implementation of these
price increases by the abovementioned companies (see
paragraphs (207) to (216)).

(120) Another general cartel meeting, aimed at fixing price
increases in the EEA, was held on the occasion of the
official AEMCP meeting of 22 September 1994 in
Frankfurt. The official AEMCP meeting opened at 11.00
hrs and ended at 13.30 hrs (113). The general cartel
meeting was held just before that at Hotel Steinberger
(Frankfurt), in the Jagdzimmer room starting at 08.30
hrs and it was convened by [an AWA employee]* ]*.
the meeting is confirmed by AWA and
Holding of
in the diary of Mougeot's
Mougeot and by notes
representative (114). According to Mougeot,
the
meeting [the AWA employee]* informed the participants
of percentage price increases and the implementation
dates decided country by country, and urged them to
implement the same increases simultaneously (115).

at

(121) On the basis of the statements from AWA and Mougeot
and travel expense forms of Koehler's and Stora's
representatives (116),
that
representatives at least of AWA, Koehler, Mougeot, Stora

the Commission considers

(111) File pp. 144-149.
(112) Documents found in the premises of Sappi and its agent

in

Portugal, Unipapel. File pp. 2358, 4539-4540, 10053-10054.
(113) File pp. 150-155. At the official meeting the following companies
were represented: AWA, Copigraph, Koehler, Mougeot, Sappi,
Stora, Torraspapel and Zanders.

for

(114) AWA reply to the Commission request

information (File
p. 7828) and to the Statement of Objections, p. 19742. See file
p. 1748 and 11597.
(115) File pp. 11597 and 11599.
(116) [a Koehler employee]* travel expense form shows that he left for
Frankfurt on 21 September at 14.00 and that he returned on 22
September at 17.00. [a Stora employee]* travel expense form
shows that he left for Frankfurt at 07.30 and returned at 18.15 on
22 September 1994. A page from [an AWA employee]* diary
shows that had reserved the whole day of 22 September for
‘AEMCP/Frankfurt', and that he had made plans to leave from
Frankfurt for Paris on flight LH 4306 at 17.20. (File pp. 930,
1748, 4787 and 5057). The above documents show that
[a
Koehler
and [an AWA
Stora
employee]* could have participated in a general cartel meeting
before the official AEMCP meeting.

employee]*,

employee]*

[a

and Zanders participated in this general cartel meeting.
found in Sappi, Torraspapel and AWA (117),
Tables
setting out identical price increases, indicate that Sappi
and Torraspapel were also represented at the meeting
(see paragraphs (217) to (221)).

(122) The Commission has in its possession minutes of a
general cartel meeting between the European producers
of carbonless paper held on 2 February 1995 at
Frankfurt airport (118). According to Sappi, the purpose
of this secret meeting was to ‘discuss price increases in
various countries' (119). On the same date there was also
an official meeting of the AEMCP, which was held in a
conference room at the Sheraton Hotel, at Frankfurt
Airport, Terminal 1 and chaired by [a Koehler
employee]*. The official meeting was held between
11.00 and 13.00 hrs and the participants continued
with a lunch (120).

(123) The cartel meeting probably took place after the official
confirmed
Sheraton Hotel had
AEMCP meeting.
Koehler's
reservation of a conference room for 25
persons from 11.00 until 18.00 hrs. Hand-written notes
found on the premises of Koehler, dated 26 January,
show that
two different meetings were planned, of
is the official AEMCP meeting. The
which the first
second meeting seems to be the cartel meeting, planned
for a smaller group after the official meeting. The notes
contain the following remarks on the time and place of
‘Room reservation for eight to ten
the second meeting:
persons, Airport Center, room No 19 [“room No 19” is
written on the margin of the page], 2 February 1995
from 14.00 to 17.00 or 18.00,
in the name of
Koehler' (121).

(124) The minutes of the cartel meeting give the following list

of participants (122):

— [three AWA employees]*

— [a Mougeot employee]*

— [two Zanders employees]*

— [two Stora employees]*

(117) File pp. 2494, 691 and 918.
(118) File p. 7.
(119) File pp. 9938, 9940 and 9973.
(120) File pp. 161-167, 549, 890-892, 905, 4116-4118, 4781, 4783,

4785, 4786, 5216, 5218, 5222-5226, 5230-5232, 5234.

(121) File p. 5219-5220. Original

‘Raumreservierung für
8-10 Pers. Airport Center/Raum Nr 19 2.2.95 ab 1400
(~ 17/1800) auf den Namen Koehler'.

in German:

(122) The attendance list of the official meeting lists all these names

and some others (File p. 164).

21.4.2004

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/23

— [two Koehler employees]*

— [a Sappi employee]*

— [two Torraspapel employees]*.

document, dated 14 February 1995, shows that [two
Koehler employees]* (Koehler, the AEMCP chairman in
1995) and (Koehler, the AEMCP secretary in 1995) had
arranged the reservation of meeting rooms for three
AEMCP meetings (127) and after each of
them for
meetings in a smaller group (128) for 21 April, 28 June
and 29 September 1995.

and

oral

(125) The Commission has pages from diaries,

travel bills,
tickets
the
during
explanations
investigations which prove that the representatives of
AWA, Stora, Koehler and Torraspapel named in the
cartel meeting minutes were in Frankfurt on the date of
the meeting (123).

given

at

hrs

and

and

14.33

statements

time after

(126) Mougeot denies having participated in any cartel
meeting on 2 February 1995, and says it knows nothing
of a general price agreement of that date (124). Mougeot
documents on its
has provided
representatives' use of
the official
their
meeting according to which [a Mougeot employee]* left
Frankfurt
[another Mougeot
employee]* at 15.30 hrs (125). In any event it is clear
from the evidence on Mougeot's participation in the
price increase initiatives agreed in the meeting and the
discussion concerning Mougeot's volume needs recorded
in the meeting minutes that Mougeot did adhere to the
the meeting (see paragraphs
agreements
(237) and (250) to (251)). Therefore, its claim that it did
not participate in the meeting is not relevant to the
assessment of the case. The documentary evidence on
the price increases agreed in the
implementation of
meeting provide
also on other
further
companies' participation (see paragraphs (228) to (240)).

reached at

evidence

(127) A document found on the premises of Koehler indicates
that after the general cartel meeting of 2 February 1995
the parties had agreed to hold at least another three
in 1995 (126). Following the pattern
such meetings
already established, each of these meetings was to be
held on the occasion of an official AEMCP meeting. The

(123) File pp. 264-267, 862, 931, 3675-3676, 3876, 3879, 4246-4247,
4250-4251, 4254, 5001-5002, 5011-5012, 5364-5365, 5382.
The extract from [an AWA employee]* 1995 diary shows that he
was planning to leave Frankfurt for Paris on flight LH 4306 at
17.20, which shows that he would still have been in Frankfurt
some hours after the official meeting.

(124) File pp. 11496-11497.
(125) File pp. 11500-11501, 11601, 11674 ([a Mougeot employee]*'s
parking receipt) and p. 11675 ([a Mougeot employee]*'s boarding
pass).
(126) File p. 5095.

(128) The minutes of

the official AEMCP meeting of 29
September 1995 report a dramatic drop in orders and
deliveries in July, August and September. The minutes
‘the main
continues with the following statement:
problem in June were the increasing costs of
raw
materials and the fact that the paper price could not be
individual
increased as
as necessary
fast
markets' (129). Discussion on the
the
European carbonless market and on price development
continued at the AEMCP meeting of 1 December 1995
and the AEMCP chairman,
[a Koehler employee]*,
emphasised that ‘every member has to make every effort
to return to profitability in the carbonless sector'. [He]*
also went on to speak of the problem of over-capacity
and declining carbonless prices in most countries, which
he said would lead to zero profits and even to
losses (130).

decline of

in the

1.4.3.2. National and regional cartel meetings and

collusive contacts

(a) General

(129)

cartel meetings

the
general
In addition to the
Commission has been able to identify dates and often
also venues of 20 national or regional cartel meetings
between carbonless paper producers concerning the
French, Portuguese, Spanish and United Kingdom
(including Ireland) markets. Table 3 contains a list of
these meetings. The Commission identified also other
meetings for which the date cannot be established so
precisely.

(127) From 11:00 until 13:00, 25 persons, with lunch. The document
the meeting and says either
‘keine

gives the time and the place of
‘Ausschilderung AEMCP'
Ausschilderung' (‘no signposting').

(‘signposted AEMCP')

or

(128) From 14:00 until 18:00, 10 persons. The document gives the time
and place of the meeting and says either ‘keine Ausschilderung'
(‘no
(‘signposted
Koehler').

‘Ausschilderung Koehler'

signposting')

or

(129) File p. 178.
(130) File p. 183.

L 115/24

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Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

TABLE 3

National and regional cartel meetings from February 1992
until spring 1995.

TIME

PLACE

MARKETS
CONCERNED

17 February 1992

Spanish market

5 March 1992

Barcelona

Spanish market

Spring 1992
(probably April)

Paris, Charles de
Gaulle airport

French market

(132)

16 July 1992

Barcelona

Spanish and
Portuguese markets

14 January 1993

London Heathrow
Business Centre

UK and Irish
markets

Spring 1993
(probably in April)

Paris, near Place de
l'Etoile

French market

30 September 1993 Barcelona

Spanish market

1 October 1993

Paris, Charles de
Gaulle airport

French market

19 October 1993

Barcelona

Spanish market

9 November 1993

London, Sheraton
Sky hotel

UK and Irish
markets

20 January 1994

Châtillon, France

French market

meeting in Annex II. This identification of participants
cannot be taken as exhaustive, as it has not been
possible to establish all
for each
meeting with certainty. For example the companies
giving information on the participants have often
there may have been also other
indicated that
participants in addition to those explicitly mentioned.

the participants

In addition to the meetings listed in Table 3,
the
Commission concludes from AWA's and Copigraph's
replies to the Commission request for information and
the period
from Sappi's
1992-1995 improper, anti-competitive
contacts and
meetings took place at least in the following periods
and concerning the following markets (131):

statements

during

that

— between 1992 and 1995 concerning the French,

Italian, Portuguese and Spanish markets;

— between 1992 and 1995 concerning the UK, Irish,
Benelux and the Nordic countries markets (132);

9 February 1994

Lisbon

Portuguese market

and German markets.

— between 1993 and 1994 concerning the Austrian

3 May 1994

Barcelona

Spanish market

May 1994

Nogentel, Nogent-
sur-Marne, France

French market

29 June 1994

Barcelona

Spanish market

23 September 1994

Spanish market

19 October 1994

Barcelona

Spanish market

6 December 1994

Geneva, Mövenpick
hotel

French market

(133) The information provided by AWA, Copigraph and
Sappi, together with the documentation and statements
concerning the meetings for the French, Portuguese,
Spanish and the United Kingdom markets, indicates that
the system of regular national or regional meetings
covered the whole EEA territory.

20 January 1995

Zurich

French market

(134)

Spring 1995

French market

(130) For the meetings listed in Table 3, there is documentary
evidence (including unofficial minutes) and statements
detailing the object, proceedings, outcome and often
also the participants.

(131) Participation of

their representatives if known,

the carbonless paper producers, and
is shown meeting by

is

there

considerable

cartel
In addition to those national and regional
of
a
meetings
documentation on other anti-competitive contacts and
meetings between carbonless paper producers during
the same period. This documentation provides evidence
of collusion in respect of the same markets, namely
France, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, and
also Germany, the Nordic countries and Italy.

amount

(131) File pp. 7828-7829; File p. 13353; File pp. 33-34, 223-224,

4647-4669.

(132) File pp. 7828-7829.

In AWA's sales organization the Benelux
countries come within the responsibility of a regional manager
whose territory also includes the United Kingdom, Ireland and
Overseas (File p. 1931). A document found on AWA's premises
indicates that there were meetings concerning the Benelux area
(File p. 953).

21.4.2004

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/25

(b) France

of Sappi's representative shows that, in addition to price
increases, participants also agreed ‘Q4 1993 quotas to
allow price
be
that
controlled' and that ‘AWA and Sarrio will make press
releases re cost increases etc.' (140).

‘merchants must

increases',

(135)

[…]*

attended by

In its reply to the Commission's request for information,
AWA has stated that
there were meetings between
competitors in Paris, Zurich and Geneva over the period
(Sales
1992-1995 which were
Managers, Tenor brand France, AWA Carbonless papers)
and sometimes by […]* (then Sales Manager,
Idem
brand France, AWA Carbonless Papers), […]* (then Sales
Director, AWA Carbonless Papers) and […]* (then Chief
Executive, AWA Printing and Writing Papers) (133).
According to AWA these meetings were among the
‘improper meetings … at some of these … carbonless
paper prices were also discussed, including discussion of
historical trends, but also extending to an exchange of
price
intentions
increases' (134).

announcements

regarding

of

(136) Sappi and Mougeot have in their statements confirmed
holding of several French market cartel meetings. Based
on the statements and documents from these two
companies, the Commission has been able to identify
dates and venues of eight of the cartel meetings held for
the French market during the period from spring 1992
to spring 1995 (see Annex II for participants and Table
3).

(137) The first two of these meetings were held in Paris, one
in spring 1992 and the other in spring 1993 (135), both
probably in April (136). Sappi states that the purpose of
these meetings was ‘to exchange information, discuss
customers and the prices that were being applied to
those customers' (137).

(138) One French market cartel meeting was held on 1
October 1993 in Paris (138). An ‘attendance note' drawn
up by Sappi's representative at the meeting records the
outcome of the meeting (139). Both Sappi and Mougeot
have admitted that the purpose of this meeting was to
agree a price increase for the French market. The note

(133) File p. 7828.
(134) File p. 7829.
(135) The Commission has travel expenses forms showing that

[a
Koehler employee]* and [a Stora employee]* were both in Paris
on 14.4.1993. File p. 5034 and pp. 4798-4799.

(136) File pp. 34, 223-224 and 9940.
(137) File p. 9940.
(138) File pp. 7648-7649 and File p. 9973.
(139) File p. 6.

(139) Mougeot's statement provides evidence of further five
French market cartel meetings held respectively on 20
January 1994 in Châtillon,
in spring 1994 in
Nogent-sur-Marne, 6 December 1994 in Geneva, 20
January 1995 in Zurich and in spring 1995.

(140) The French market meeting of 20 January 1994 was
held immediately after the general cartel meeting of 19
January 1994 in Paris and it was convened by [an AWA
employee]*. The purpose of the meeting was to follow
up the price increases of December 1993 (agreed in the
meeting of October 1993) and to prepare an increase
on the French market
to take place on 1 April
1994 (141).

[an AWA employee]*

(141) Another French market meeting was held in spring
1994. Mougeot has stated that it was probably held on
31 May at the Hotel Nogentel in Nogent-sur-Marne and
convened this meeting
that
also (142). Mougeot says that the object of this meeting
was
‘monitoring the French market, price increase
probably 1 July 1994' and that [an AWA employee]*
‘urged others to follow the price increase of 6 % which
AWA intended to apply on 1 July 1994' (143).

(142) Regarding the meeting of 6 December 1994 held in the
in Geneva, Mougeot has provided
Mövenpick Hotel
hand-written
representative
its
there (144). The Commission also has a page from the
1994 diary of [a Mougeot employee]*, which against the

taken

notes

by

(140) Ibid.
(141) File p. 7650.
(142) File p. 7651. As to the date of the meeting, the price increase
documents of AWA and Mougeot indicate that the meeting was
held earlier than the date Mougeot recalls. Mougeot's internal
note dated 16.5.1994 speaks of a need to announce the same
week that prices would increase by 6 % on 4.7.1994. AWA for its
part had announced the price increase on 20.5.

(143) Original in French:

‘suivi du marché français, augmentation des
prix vraisemblablement au 1er juillet 1994'; [un employé d'AWA]*
‘a incité à suivre l'augmentation de prix de 6 % qu'AWA entendait
mettre en oeuvre le 1er juillet 1994'.
(144) File pp. 7652-7653 and pp. 7657-7658.

L 115/26

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

date of 6 December refers to Mövenpick, Geneva, and
sets out some details of the meeting (145). The meeting
reviewed the implementation of
the price increases
agreed previously, starting from the December 1993
increase and ending with the October 1994 increase. On
the basis of the meeting notes, Mougeot confirms that
for reels the following increases were decided at the
following meetings:

— 10 % on 1 December 1993 decided at the meeting

of 1 October 1993,

(145) Mougeot has stated that a 6 % increase for reels was
agreed at the French market meeting of 6 December
1994, to be implemented on 1 January 1995 (149). The
general cartel meeting of 22 September 1994 referred to
in paragraph (120), however, had agreed a 10 % increase
for reels and a 5 % increases for sheets, both likewise to
be effective from 1 January 1995 (see Table 6). The
conclusion that these increases were in fact confirmed at
the 6 December meeting is supported by the fact that at
least AWA, Copigraph, Sappi, Stora, Torraspapel and
in
Zanders announced these increases to take effect
January 1995 (Zanders's announcement concerned reels
only).

— 6 % on 1 April 1994 decided at the meeting of 20

January 1994,

— 6 % on 1 July 1994 (146) decided at the meeting of

31 May 1994, and

— 10 % on 1 October 1994 [probably decided at a

meeting on July 1994].

(146) The next French market meeting was held on 20
January 1995 in Zurich. The participants at this meeting
fixed a price increase for 1 April 1995 and reviewed the
implementation of
increases agreed previously. They
also exchanged information on their individual sales
volumes on the French market (150). The next French
market meeting was held in spring 1995; at
this
meeting the participants agreed on price increases for
July 1995 (see paragraphs (231) and (232)) (151).

(143) As these increases were cumulative, the total

increase
was to be 36 %, whereas Mougeot increased its prices
for reels by a total of only 29 %. Mougeot says that
because of this [an AWA employee]* %. Mougeot says
that because of this [an AWA employee] reproached it
in the meeting for
failing to comply with AWA's
instructions (147).

(147) There are also indications that in addition to the cartel
meetings referred to in paragraphs (137),
(138) and
(139), two further French market meetings were held in
1994, one in July and another in October. Mougeot has
‘Although we have no record or precise
stated that
memory,
it is likely that a meeting was held in July
1994 to prepare for a price increase in October the
same year. Another meeting may have been held in
October 1994' (152).

(144) The note of Mougeot's representative on the meeting
also sets out the following plan for the movement of
the carbonless paper price from November 1994 until
January 1996:
‘Nov 118 F, Decem. 132 F, Mi 95
[“mid-1995”] 165 F, Fin 95 [“end 1995”] 170 F' (148).
This
the meeting the participants
agreed on price increases and on their timing for the
end of 1994 and for the year 1995. According to this
scheme, the carbonless paper price was to be increased
by FRF 70 by the end of 1995.

indicates

that at

(145) File p. 1751.
(146) Not in June, as written in Mougeot's representatives hand-written

note.

(147) File pp. 7652-7653; 11493-11495.
(148) These figures represent probably price indexes where the price in
October 1994 is marked by 100 and the increases thereafter are
set in relation to that. This would be consistent with the fact that
the cartel usually set price increases in percentage form (except in
the Spanish market).

in its
that

reply to the Statement of
(148) AWA confirms
Objections (153)
in spring 1992,
spring and October 1993, 6 December 1994 and 20
January 1995 were among the ‘improper' (154) meetings
between competitors referred to in its reply to the
request for information.

the meetings

(149) File pp. 7652-7653.
(150) File pp. 7653-7654.
(151) File p. 7654.
(152) Original

in French:

‘Quoique n'ayant pas retrouvé de trace et
n'ayant pas garde de souvenirs précis, il est vraisemblable qu'il y
ait eu une réunion au mois de juillet 1994 afin de préparer une
hausse de prix pour le mois d'octobre de la même année. Il se
peut également qu'une autre réunion se soit
tenue au mois
d'octobre 1994.' (File p. 7652).

(153) AWA's reply to the Statement of Objections, file p. 19748.
(154) File p. 7829.

21.4.2004

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/27

(149) Those documents and statements from Sappi, Mougeot
and AWA, together with some travel documents and
diary
following
undertakings were represented at
the French market
cartel meetings: AWA, Copigraph, Koehler, Mougeot,
Sappi, Stora, Torraspapel and Zanders. (See Annex II.)

remarks, (155)

show that

the

(c) Germany

(150)

In its reply to the Commission request for information
AWA admits among the ‘improper' meetings four such
in Switzerland and in Ettlingen and
meetings in Basel
Wiesbaden in Germany in 1993 and 1994, which were
attended by […]*, AWA Carbonless Papers'
regional
manager for Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Italy.
According to AWA some or all of Koehler, Stora, Sarrió
(Torraspapel), Hauffe and Eupaco (156) attended these
meetings (157).

(151) Copigraph confirms that during the period 1993-1994
there were meetings between competitors, which were
attended by the ‘joint Geschaftsführer' of Eupaco KG
the
and Copigraph GmbH and executives
companies referred to in paragraph (150),
including
AWA. Copigraph recalls that in these meetings, one of
which was held in Basel,
‘carbonless paper reels prices
were raised' (158).

from all

(152) The note by Sappi's representative in the French market
meeting held in Paris on 1 October 1993 provides
evidence of the planning of a German market meeting,
‘Other
which was scheduled to be held in late 1993:

(155) Meeting in spring 1993:

travel expenses forms show that [a
Koehler employee]* and [a Stora employee]* were both in Paris
on 14.4.1993 (File p. 5034 and pp. 4798-4799). Meeting of
1.10.1993: The presence of [a Koehler employee]* in Paris on
1.10.1993 is confirmed by a travel expenses form, airline ticket
and hotel bill (File pp. 5025-5028 and 5043). Remarks against
the date 1.10 in the 1993 diary of [two Mougeot employees]*
show that both of these persons were in Paris on 1.10.1993. In
the diary of [a Mougeot employee]* from Mougeot there are the
(Paris Roissy)
following words:
14h30. Marché France [French market]. Tel: 39.63.4000'. Against
the same date in [a Mougeot employee]*'s (Mougeot) diary there
are the words ‘France AEMCP' (File p. 1151 and 1755).

‘Salle Saturne [Saturn Room]

(156) Eupaco grafische Papiere GmbH & Co KG (Eupaco KG) was a
sister company of Copigraph SA and also produced carbonless
paper. Their parent company, Bolloré Technologies SA, acquired
Eupaco in 1992, and in 1997 Eupaco was merged with
Copigraph's German subsidiary, Copigraph GmbH.

(157) AWA reply to the Commission request for information (File p.

7828) and to the Statement of Objections, file p. 19748.

(158) File p. 13353.

markets; … German meeting — 26.11.93' (159). Sappi
has confirmed that this meeting took place and that its
representative probably participated in the meeting (160).
The exact number and identity of the participants is not
known to the Commission.

(d) Spain and Portugal

(153) There

a

is

large

companies on the market. Divipa

amount of documentation and
statements providing evidence of collusion on the
Spanish and Portuguese markets. These markets were
characterised by the integration of producers
into
distribution. Copigraph and Sappi had sales offices in
Spain and AWA and Torraspapel had their own
and
merchant
Zicuñaga were both selling direct
to printers. Only
Koehler, Stora and Zanders (and until early 1994 also
Sappi (161)) were not
integrated into distribution in
Spain (Zanders sold through Torraspapel). In addition,
as already described at paragraph (17), two producers,
Divipa
non-integrated
producers of carbonless paper sheets or small reels
purchasing base papers and chemicals or even large
reels (‘jumbo reels') from other producers. The collusive
contacts took place between all the producers (often
qualified
‘distributors')
documentation
including these small producers/processors.

and Zicuñaga were

small

the

as

in

‘improper' meetings

(154) Concerning the Spanish and Portuguese markets, AWA
admits among the
such
meetings in Lisbon and Barcelona between 1992 and
1994, which were attended by […]*
(then AWA
Carbonless Papers' Sales Manager for Portugal) and […]*
(Area Manager for the Iberian Peninsula) and another
three or four meetings in the period 1992 to 1994
attended by […]* (then AWA Carbonless Papers' Sales
Manager for Spain) with […]* (162).

four

(155) Sappi admits its participation in the Spanish market
cartel meetings
starting from February 1992 and
submits documents showing that there was a concerted
price rise of ESP 10/kg at the beginning of February
1992 the application of which was discussed at cartel
meetings on 17 February and 5 March 1992.

(156) The first document, a memo dated 9 March 1992 from
Sappi's agent in Spain to Sappi Europe, speaks about a

(159) File p. 6.
(160) File p. 9939.
(161) From approximately 1991 until early 1994, Sappi sold in Spain
through an agent, Norandum Fibras. In 1994 Sappi established
sales offices in Madrid and Barcelona which were operated by
Sappi Europe (España) SL, and terminated the agency agreement.
File pp. 4635 and 4637-4638.

(162) File p. 7828.

L 115/28

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

It mentions that

price increase of ‘PTAs 10.–' per kg at the beginning of
February set as the target by the distributors (i.e. sellers
of carbonless paper in Spain). The memo describes how
difficult it was to have this price increase applied on the
market.
‘2) The merchants selling
TRANSCRIPT seem to be the only ones, who have raised
prices by PTAs 10.– per kg to all customers',
‘3) “S”
they have raised their prices to
[Sarrió] claims that
everybody',
[Koehler]
‘4) The distributors selling “K”
have only in very few cases raised the prices … Divipa
‘5) WT
has absolutely not
[Wiggins Teape, today Arjo Wiggins Appleton] speaks
loudly about the price increase and how firmly they
stick to it'. Sappi's agent argues in the memo that ‘… It
is obvious that Sappi Europe cannot make the price go
up, unless other suppliers follow', and suggests that
Papelera Zicuñaga should also be integrated into the
concerted price rises on the Spanish market (163).

raised prices' and that

(158) The discussions continued in a meeting held on 5
March 1992. A memo dated 27 February 1992 from [a
Sappi employee]* to his superior [a Sappi employee]*
refers to ‘Carbonless market-Spain' and says that: ‘I have
arranged to attend a meeting next week with other
interested parties in Barcelona to discuss the recent
moves that there have been in the Spanish market. The
is on Thursday 5th March and I will
meeting
accompanied by [a Norandum employee]*' (165). Sappi
has confirmed that this meeting between the European
manufacturers of self-copying paper did take place. It
maintains that the purpose was ‘to discuss recent moves
in the Spanish market' (166). The increase of ESP 10/kg
in February had apparently been applied only by Sappi,
which had lost several customers as a result, and the
situation which had arisen made it necessary to ensure
that increases agreed in future would be applied by all
the manufacturers on the market; this was no doubt
discussed at the March meeting in Spain.

and

Spain

paper
to

representative,

in
Unipapel's

(159) Unipapel, Sappi's agent in Portugal has confirmed that
on 16 July 1992 there was a cartel meeting in Barcelona
this
regarding the marketsin Spain and Portugal. At
meeting it was decided to increase the prices of reels of
Portugal (167).
self-copying
According
Sarrió
(Torraspapel) and Stora were charging very low prices in
Portugal, below the price of the base paper. He says
that, in addition to Unipapel, the meeting was attended
by representatives of Sarrió (Torraspapel), AWA and
Koehler and that the purpose of the meeting was ‘to
discuss price
shares. The
there
agreements are concerned mainly with “reels”;
may be similar agreements regarding “sheets”, but he
cannot confirm this'. This shows that in the meeting an
agreement was reached on price increases and market
shares at least for reels. The Unipapel's representative
indicates that there were more ‘meetings of this kind'
and that in these meetings ‘information is exchanged on
the quantities sold and the prices applied by each
company' (168).

and market

increases

(165) File pp. 4589 (Report from [a Sappi employee]* to [a Sappi

employee]* dated 27 February 1992).

(166) File p. 9938.
(167) File pp. 4501-4503.
(168) File p. 4520 and 4484. Original in Portuguese: ‘discutir aumentos
de preços
incidem
essencialmente sobre “bobinas” mas admite, sem confirmar, a
existência do mesmo tipo de acordos para “folhas”.';
‘trocam-se
informações sobre as quantidades vendidas e os preços praticados
por cada empresa'.

de mercado. Os

acordos

quotas

e

(157) The memo indicates that

the concerted increase of
February 1992 was probably not followed by Koehler
and Sarrió, who attempted to win over Sappi's
customers. This led to the meeting of 17 February 1992.
The gravity of the situation and the importance of the
subject-matter of
the meeting, of which [a Sappi
employee]* informed [another Sappi employee]* by fax
the same day, can be deduced from the haste shown by
[the first one]*, who tried to contact [the latter one]*
over a weekend:
‘I tried to ring you at the weekend
regarding further information from our mutual friend at
Sarrio but there was no reply and I assume you were
out. I have spoken to [a Norandum employee]* today
and the situation remains,
rather
uncertain due to the conduct of Kohler and Sarrio.
There is a meeting of interested parties today and I will
be informed about this first thing tomorrow morning. I
will phone you tomorrow to discuss' (164).

to say at

least,

(163) File pp. 4703-4704 (memo sent to [a Sappi employee]* by Sappi's
agent in Spain, [a Norandum employee]*, on 9 March 1992).
(164) File pp. 4588 (Fax from [a Sappi employee]* to his superior [a
Sappi employee]* dated 17 February 1992). See also file p. 9944.

21.4.2004

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/29

(160) Concerning the years 1993-1995, Sappi has submitted
its
to the Commission evidence supplied by one of
employees on the operation of
in
the cartel and,
particular, on price-fixing meetings between carbonless
paper producers in Spain. Sappi says ‘he [the employee]
had attended six or seven meetings in Barcelona with
other suppliers. These meetings had taken place about
four or five times a year. He believed that he had first
attended such a meeting on 19 October 1993. He last
attended a meeting in 1995' (169).

19 October 1993, 3 May 1994 and 29 June 1994 (173).
The last
two meetings were both convened by [a
Torraspapel employee]* and held in Barcelona whereas
the location of the first meeting is not known. Also
these meetings involved price-fixing. The note on the
meeting of 3 May also shows that Torraspapel opened
the discussion on price increases in the meeting.

(161) As to the purpose and subject matter of the Spanish
market cartel meetings in 1993-1995 Sappi says ‘the
purpose of the meetings was to fix prices in the Spanish
market' and ‘the meetings normally resulted in an
agreed price percentage increase'. Although Sappi claims
that ‘the price agreements that were reached were never
fully implemented or adhered to' it is clear that there
was a concerted attempt
to increase prices in the
Spanish market (170).

(162) The Commission has several notes on Spanish market
cartel meetings during the said period written by Sappi
representatives in the meetings and one written by
Mougeot's representative in a meeting. These notes
record the outcome of
the following meetings: 30
September 1993 in Barcelona, 19 October 1993, 3 May
1994 in Barcelona, 29 June 1994 in Barcelona and 19
October 1994 in Barcelona.

(163) Sappi has provided the Commission with a note written
by its representative at the meeting of 30 September
1993 in Barcelona. The note shows that in the meeting
an agreement was reached on ‘Q4 Quota'
for each
participant for year 1993 and on a price increase for
both reels and sheets. There was also an agreement to
‘re-convene
adhered
to' (171). Sappi has confirmed that the purpose of this
percentage
meeting was
increase' (172).

confirmation that quotas

agree

price

for

on

‘to

a

(164) Three further notes written by Sappi representatives
record the outcome of Spanish market meetings held on

(169) File p. 4657-4662. This employee had begun to work for Sappi in

Spain in September 1993.

(170) File p. 4659.
(171) File pp. 5 and 9972.
(172) File p. 9938.

(165) According to the note on the meeting of 19 October
1993 ‘all distributors … except Copigraph' participated
in the meeting (174). The note on the meeting of 3 May
1994 shows a table with prices for ‘today' (‘hoy', i.e. 3
May 1994) (175) and 16 May 1994 and says that these
prices were a result of ‘agreements between distributors'
(‘acuerdos entre los distribuidores'). The use of the term
‘distributors' in the meeting notes must be understood
in the light of the fact that at the time of these meetings
most of the carbonless paper suppliers selling in Spain
were directly involved in distribution on this market, as
already described in paragraph (153). Consequently, the
Commission holds that the carbonless paper producers
named in the meeting notes both attended the meetings
and participated in the agreements on price increases
reached in the meetings (see Annex II for participants).

(166) According to the notes on the Spanish market meeting
of 29 June 1994, another cartel meeting for this market
was scheduled for 23 September (the day after the
general cartel meeting). It appears that around that date
a Spanish market meeting or other collusive contacts
took place whereby an agreement was reached on a
price increase that was to be implemented on this
market in November 1994. This follows from a Sappi
internal fax, which indicates that the carbonless paper
producers had agreed on a price increase for November
1994. The fax reveals that the Spanish market cartel
leader, Torraspapel, had reduced prices, which the writer
the agreed November price
assumed would render
increase ineffective:
‘Our leader (TP) [Torraspapel] has
announced a price reduction of ESP 10, and everything
suggests that
increases will have no
effect; so far no distributor has announced them' (176).

the November

(173) File pp. 8, 4474, 4476, 9938-9940 and 9977-9980.
(174) File p. 4474 and 9987. Original
distribuidores excepto Copygraf'.

in Spanish:

‘… todos los

(175) AWA's price increase letter dated 3 March 1994 to a Spanish
customer confirms the ‘today' prices in the meeting report and
also that those prices were meant to remain in force until 31
May. File p. 8144.

(176) Original

in Spanish:

(TP [Torraspapel]) ha
‘Nuestro líder
anunciado una disminución en precio de 10 Ptas y todo hace
prever que los aumentos de Noviembre no tomaran efecto, ya que
(File
hasta la fecha ningún distribuidor
p. 4565).

los ha anunciado.'

L 115/30

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

(167) The carbonless paper producers met again in Barcelona
on 19 October 1994 to conclude another agreement on
price increases for the Spanish market. A hand-written
reports on this
note of Mougeot's
representative
the meeting was
meeting. According to Mougeot,
the
convened by Torraspapel and the purpose of
meeting was
the Spanish market'
(‘Organisation du Marché Espagnol'). At the meeting,
prices were fixed for the Spanish market depending on
the size of the client (177).

‘organisation of

(168) Concerning the Portuguese market, there was a cartel
meeting in Lisbon on 9 February 1994, which was
organised by Sarrió (Torraspapel), probably together
with AWA (178). Sappi's agent Unipapel sent two faxes
to Sappi on 31 January 1994 and 1 February 1994
concerning a forthcoming meeting between competitors
and asking Sappi
it would be
represented at the meeting (179). As no one from Sappi
was able to attend the meeting, [a Sappi employee]* told
Unipapel by fax that they had to represent Sappi, and
also gave him instructions to try to increase prices.
Hand-written notes in this fax message shows that the
the agent as representative of Sappi at
presence of
‘secret mill meetings' was
subject of discussion at
Sappi (180).

to confirm whether

(169) Unipapel

sent a report on this

‘Portuguese market
suppliers meeting 09.02.94'
to Sappi Europe by fax
dated 14 February 1994 (181). In the oral explanations
given during the investigation at Unipapel, the company
representative claimed that he did not participate in the
meeting, and that the information in the report was
supplied by […]*,
the then AWA Carbonless Papers
Sales Manager for Portugal (182). Even supposing that
the representative of Unipapel did not attend the
meeting, he was well
informed on the outcome and
communicated it to Sappi as something he had agreed
to on behalf of Sappi.

(170) AWA confirms

in its

reply to the Statement of
the above-identified Spanish and
Objections that all
during
period
the
Portuguese market meetings
1992-1994 were
‘improper' meetings
the
between competitors referred to in its reply to the
request for information (183).

among

(177) File p. 1839, 7652 and 11495.
(178) File p. 9939 and 4483-4484.
(179) File pp. 35-36.
(180) File p. 41.
(181) File p. 47-51.
(182) File p. 4483-4484.
(183) AWA's reply to the Statement of Objections, file p. 19748-19749.
the possible

AWA lists in its reply all these meetings except
meeting of around 23 September 1994.

them give indirect

(171) Most of those documents on Spanish and Portuguese
market meetings contain also a list of the participants
while some of
indication on the
participants. Often these participants are the same as
those that AWA identifies as participants to meetings in
the period 1992-1994 (184). Sappi and Mougeot have
confirmed and completed the participants identified in
or deduced on the basis of
the meeting reports
originating from their companies (185). These documents
and statement together with some travel documents and
diary
following
undertakings were represented in some or all of the
Spanish and Portuguese market cartel meetings: AWA,
Binda, Copigraph, Divipa, Koehler, Mougeot, Sappi,
Stora, Torraspapel, Zanders and Zicuñaga (see also
Annex II).

remarks (186)

show that

the

(172)

In addition to those Spanish and Portuguese market
meetings, Sappi has indicated several other dates for
meetings between competitors concerning specifically
the Spanish market. Sappi says that its employee who
had always attended Spanish market meetings with [a
‘believed … that all the
Sappi employee]* from Sappi
pages in his diary marked with [a Sappi employee]*'s
name
that meetings with
competitors had been held. Relevant pages of his diary
are attached … and these show that meetings appear to
have occurred on 24 January 1994, 18, 19 or 20 April
1994, 29 June 1994 … and 19 December 1994.' (187).

indicated

initials

or

(173) That the price-fixing cartel continued on the Spanish
market in 1995 is confirmed by a Sappi document that
gives some details of attempted price increases on that

(184) AWA reply to the Commission request for information (File p.

7828).
(185) Sappi's

submissions of 4.12.1997 and 18.5.1999 (File p.
submissions of

4657-4659, 15198-15200)
14.4.1999 and 29.6.1999 (File p. 7652 and 11495).

and Mougeot's

(186) The meeting in Barcelona on 30.9.1993: A travel expenses form,
for [a Koehler employee]*
an airline ticket and a hotel bill
confirm that he was
in Barcelona on 30.9.1993 (File pp.
5025-5028 and 5043). The meeting of 3.05.1994: Travel
expenses forms and oral and written explanations received by the
Commission prove that [a Koehler employee]* and [two Stora
employees]* were in Barcelona on the date of the meeting (File
pp.
5052;
5014-5015; 5373). The meeting of 29 June 1994: The
Commission has a travel expense form and oral explanations
received during an investigation which confirm that both [a
Koehler employee]* and […]* from Koehler's agent […]* were
present
in Barcelona on 29.6.1994 (File pp. 5053 and
5373-5374).

5690-5693;

5637-5638;

4788-4790;

5009;

(187) File pp. 4760-4764.

employee]*'s name or
following dates: 25.1.1994, 28.1.1994 and 28.6.1994.

In addition to the above dates [a Sappi
the
initials are also marked against

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L 115/31

until

from February

September/October
market
1995 (188). According to Sappi this document, dated 26
September 1995, is part of an internal survey of price
movements on its main markets (189). Concerning reels,
the document reads:
the increases
‘But, at
agreed were the increases applied (keeping everybody at
the same level except for Zicuñaga, 10 % lower). These
increases
so
everybody coincides in date and amount. Big accounts
always enjoy special prices, but we have not done any
special operation' (190).

agreements,

result of

the end,

secret

the

are

(174) As for the Portuguese market, a report by Sappi's agent,
Unipapel, on a meeting held on 9 February 1994 says
that at this meeting the participants agreed on a set of
cartel meetings to be held concerning the Portuguese
market in the following months in 1994: April, May,
June, September
these
months, except in May, official AEMCP meetings were
also held. The provisional timetable for the Portuguese
market meetings
is consistent with the pattern of
holding general cartel meetings on the occasion of the
official AEMCP meeting and of holding national cartel
meetings following each general cartel meeting.

and November (191).

In all

(175) There is also evidence that the collusion continued in
the Portuguese market in 1995. A fax from Unipapel to
Sappi, describing the movement of reels prices, indicates
that competitors had colluded on attempted price
increases in Portugal from January to September 1995.
The fax refers to ‘an intention to apply 15 % increase
(no one respected)' on 1 January 1995, and says that on
1 April 1995 there was ‘again an intention to increase
prices (no one respected)'. On 1 September 1995 there
was some ‘other intention to rectify prices' (192). During
total market
the

eight months

1995

first

of

(188) File pp. 2010-2011 and 4602-4603. A draft of this fax, dated the

day before, is on file pp. 4580-4581.

(189) File pp. 4579, 4668-4669. See also Sappi's statement in file p.

9969.

(190) Another document received from Sappi confirms that the agreed
reels prices were generally respected by the cartel members,
except Zicuñaga. File p. 4574-4575.

(191) File p. 51.
(192) File pp. 4600-4601. See also Sappi's comment on this document

on file p. 9969.

consumption in Portugal decreased by 4,4 %. Hence, it
seems that the carbonless paper producers tried to offset
their losses in sales volumes by collusive price increases.

(176)

In his reply to oral questions during the investigation a
representative of Unipapel described the Portuguese
market and the reasons for the collusion by stating that
‘Customers were saying that all producers had increased
prices at the same time … There was a feeling that
there was a market logic at the European level between
the producers. Events in the Portuguese market could fit
into this scheme.' (193).

(e) United Kingdom

(177) Sappi has

involvement

acknowledged its

in the
carbonless paper producers' cartel activities in the UK
market from 1989/1990 (194). A memorandum from [a
Sappi employee]* to [a Sappi employee]* dated 24
September 1990 refers to two ‘club agreements' reached
in 1989, based on confidential discussions among ‘the
UK market participants' in Zurich, aiming at increasing
the price of carbonless reels. The document refers to
another ‘pricing committee' meeting held on 15 January
1990 in Zurich and to ‘the March price increase' that
‘went through in the main quite successfully' (195).

(178)

In addition, Sappi has admitted its participation in UK
market cartel meetings on ‘various dates in 1992, 1993,
1994' (196). AWA has also admitted the existence of
‘improper meetings' during the period from 1992 to
1994 attended by […]*, AWA Carbonless Papers'
Regional Manager for the UK and Ireland (197).

(179) Sappi has

submitted to the Commission evidence
supplied by one of its sales employees who participated
in those meetings in the United Kingdom (198). That
such
employee

attended three

confirms

that

‘he

(193) Original

‘Os

in Portuguese:

clientes diziam que

todos os
fabricantes aumentaram os preços ao mesmo tempo … Havia o
“feeling” de que existia uma lógica de mercado, a nível europeu,
entre os produtores. Essa lógica poderia justificar o que estava a
acontecer no mercado português.' File p. 4525.

(194) File p. 9944.
(195) File pp. 10003—10004.
(196) File p. 9940.
(197) File p. 7828.
(198) File pp. 33-34 and p. 223. This employee was at the relevant
times (1990-1995) [high-ranking commercial executive in Sappi's
carbonless paper operation].

L 115/32

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Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

meetings one in each 1992, 1993 and 1994. He also
may have attended one or two (but not more) further
meetings'. He adds,
‘The practice of holding such
meetings was already established by this industry when
he entered carbonless sales'. According to this statement,
the Heathrow
‘two meetings had taken place
airport (199) and one at the Intercontinental Hotel
in
London'.

at

(180) Based on the statements and documents from Sappi and
the Commission has been able to identify
Mougeot,
dates and venues of
the UK market cartel
two of
meetings held during the period from 1992 to 1994: a
meeting on 14 January 1993 and another meeting on 9
November 1993.

(181) The meeting of 14 January 1993 was held at

the
Heathrow Business Centre at Terminal 2 at 10.00 and
Arjo Wiggins ‘led' the meeting. On the subject matter of
the meeting, from Sappi statements it appears that ‘[t]he
meeting was primarily concerned with the exchange of
information as to which supplier was selling to which
customers, markets trends and expectations.' According
to Sappi ‘No agreement was reached' (200).

(182) The meeting of 9 November 1993 was convened and
organised by […]*
then Sales Director of AWA
Carbonless Papers and it was held in the Orlon hall at
the London Sheraton Sky hotel at Heathrow airport.
The object of the meeting was a price increase in the
UK market on 1 February 1994 (201).

(183) AWA confirms

reply to the Statement of
Objections that both of these meetings were among the

in its

‘improper' meetings between competitors referred to in
its reply to the request for information (202).

(184) The statements of Sappi, Mougeot and AWA together
with some travel documents and diary remarks (203)
show that the following undertakings were represented
at the UK market cartel meetings: AWA, Binda, Carrs,
Copigraph, Koehler, Mougeot,
and
Sappi,
Torraspapel (204). (For details see Annex II).

Stora,

evidence

in relation to the

(185) There is also evidence of collusive contacts in the UK
in summer 1993. As a ‘significant piece of
market
documentary
cartel's
activities', Sappi has given the Commission a letter dated
2 August 1993 from [an AWA employee]* to Sappi
the
referring to the UK market, which includes
following: ‘Idem [AWA brand] price increase June 93. It
appears that to remain competitive we must withdraw
our price increase and fall back into line with our
competitors who eventually preferred not to put their
prices up' (205).

(186) Moreover, a document

on

based

between

collusion

found on Sappi's premises
suggests that all price increases in the UK market from
December 1993/January 1994 until September 1995
were
the AEMCP
members (206). This document compares Sappi's price
increases with ‘AEMCP/AEMP' (207) price increases on
this market. Both Sappi's and the AEMCP's price
increases for the years 1994 and 1995 are identical to
price increases agreed either at
the general cartel
meetings on 19 January 1994, 21 June 1994 and 2
February 1995, or at the national cartel meeting held on
9 November 1993. This document indicates that these
meetings were not confined to legitimate practices but
that they resulted in concerted price increases.

(199) This is confirmed by Mougeot in respect of the November 1993

meeting, see paragraph (182) below.

(200) File pp. 34, 223, 4654-4657. Sappi has provided a copy of some
pages of [one of their high-ranking commercial executives in
carbonless paper operation] 1993 diary. On Thursday 14 January
there is the following: ‘T2 Heathrow 10 am Bus. Centre'. File p.
4752.

is said:

(201) In the document concerning the French market meeting in Paris
on 1.10.1993 it
‘Other markets; … U.K. meeting —
6.11.93' (File p. 6) It is more likely that the meeting was held on
9.11.1993 rather than 6.11.1993, because the latter date was a
Saturday. Both Sappi and Mougeot confirm this interpretation.
File p. 9939 and File pp. 7649-7650.

(202) AWA's reply to the Statement of Objections, file p. 19748.
(203) Meeting of 14.1.1993: A travel expense form shows that

[a
Koehler employee]* was in London on 14.1.1993 (File p. 5033).
Meeting of 9.11.1993: Copies of the diaries of [two Mougeot
these persons were in London on
employees]*
9.11.1993 (File pp. 1150 and 1756).

show that

(204) File pp. 33-34, 223 and 9940. File p. 7828.
(205) File pp. 9973 and 10005.
(206) File pp. 2504-2509.
(207) The latter abbreviation clearly also refers to the Association of

European Manufacturers of Carbonless Paper.

21.4.2004

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(187) Carrs

admitted in its

reply to the Statement of
Objections (208) that it participated in the UK meetings
over the whole period (Carrs indicates that from the end
of 1994 it generally no longer attended the meetings
but was kept informed by telephone of the conclusions
of these meetings by AWA).

Carbonless Papers), Koehler, Stora and Zanders; a
meeting in Paris in August 1995 between AWA
([…]*, Carbonless Papers' Regional Manager
for
Scandinavia and […]*, AWA Carbonless Papers' Sales
Director) and Zanders, Koehler and Stora-Feldmühle.

(f) Other EEA countries

1.4.4. PRICE INCREASE, SALES QUOTA AND MARKET

SHARING AGREEMENTS

(188)

In its reply to the Commission request for information,
AWA also refers to some other ‘improper meetings'
between competitors at some of which ‘carbonless paper
prices were also discussed… extending to an exchange
of
price
increases' during the period from the beginning of 1992
to summer 1995 (209).

announcements

intentions

regarding

of

— At least four of these meetings relate to the Italian
market: meeting in Milan in January or February
1992 between AWA, Koehler, Binda, Zanders and
Stora and three or four meetings in Lugano in 1994
and 1995 between AWA, Koehler, Stora
and
Zanders;

— At least three of these meetings relate to the Nordic
countries' markets (Denmark, Finland, Norway and
Sweden): two meetings in spring 1992 and 1993
between AWA ([…]*, Regional Manager
for
Scandinavia and […]*, then Sales Director for AWA

1.4.4.1. Price increase agreements

a) December 1993 to May 1994

(a)(1) Agreements reached

(189) The Commission found a table on Sappi's premises that
sets out price increases for various national markets
from 1 January 1994 to 1 May 1994 (210). Later Sappi
submitted to the Commission a copy of Sappi's price
increase instructions to its sales network, dated 21
January 1994 (two days
cartel
meeting), which has the same table of price increases as
an annex (211). The table found on Sappi's premises is
reproduced as Table 4.

the general

after

(208) File p. 20348
(209) AWA reply to the Commission request for information (File p.
file pp.

7828-7829) and to the Statement of Objections,
19748-19750.

(210) File p. 2484.
(211) Without the hand-written word TRANSCRIP, which appears in
the version of that table found initially. File pp. 10035-10036.

L 115/34

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

TABLE 4

Agreed price increases from January to May 1994

(document found on Sappi's premises)

1.1.1994

1.2.1994 (212)

1.3.1994

1.4.1994

1.5.1994

Sheets

Reels

Sheets

Reels

Sheets

Reels

Sheets

Reels

Sheets

Reels

(in %)

6

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

10

—

—

—

—

10

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

5

10

—

—

5

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

8

—

—

10

5

5

6

5

3

– 3

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

6

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

6

6

—

—

6

—

—

—

5

4

4

4

8

8

6

—

10

6

—

—

—

10

6

6

6

8

8

—

—

—

5

10

—

—

4

4

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

5

—

—

8

4

4

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

FRANCE

GERMANY

ITALY

UK (213)

AUSTRIA

BELGIUM

HOLLAND

FINLAND

SWEDEN

NORWAY

DENMARK

SPAIN

PORTUGAL

GREECE

(190) The Commission considers that Table 4 sets out future price increases agreed at the general cartel
meeting held on 19 January 1994 and some price increases agreed previously and already
announced. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Sappi has included Italy, Finland and
Denmark in the document on price increases, but it did not sell carbonless paper in these countries
in 1994 (214). Sappi has also included a price increase for reels in Portugal on 1 April 1994, despite
the fact that in December 1993 it had decided to concentrate on sheets in Portugal (215). Another
document, annexed to the version of the table found initially, proves that Sappi had no reels
business in Portugal at the time of the above price increases (216). Hence Table 4 cannot have been
purely internal or relating to Sappi's own business alone.

(191)

Furthermore, a comparison of Table 4 with the documentation on national meetings held at the
end of 1993 reveals that the 1 January 1994 price increases for France and Spain were agreed at
meetings between competitors on 30 September 1993 in Barcelona and on 1 October 1993 in
Paris respectively.

(212) See File p. 2737.
(213) Probably includes the Irish market.
(214) This is confirmed by the information Sappi has provided to the Commission on its sales volumes by EEA Member
States. In the tables for the years 1993 and 1994 Sappi does not provide a breakdown of the sales volumes for
sheets and reels. (File p. 9957).

(215) File p. 10029.
(216) File p. 2483.

21.4.2004

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L 115/35

agreed price

(192) The note on the meeting of 30 September 1993 in
Barcelona (217) shows that the participants agreed at this
meeting on a 10 % price increase for reels and sheets to
be implemented on the Spanish market on 1 January
1994. Discussions on this
increase
continued on a meeting held on 19 October 1993 (218).
Apparently the second meeting was being held because
it seemed that on the reels market the agreed 10 %
increase would not be feasible. Reels are sold both direct
to end-users or via merchants, and price increases were
usually fixed in the form of increases in the end-users
the meeting of 19
prices
October 1993 the participants agreed that
the reels
price increase for end-users should be 8 %. They also
agreed to notify ‘the manufacturer'
(either their own
parent company or another supplier) that they would
accept only a 7,5 % increase in the manufacturers'
prices. This would lead to a 0,5 % increase in the
distributor's margin.

(see paragraph (79)). At

effective on 1 February 1994, which it
increase
persuaded the others to follow (222).
follows from
Mougeot's statement that the participants agreed at this
meeting to implement the 10 % price increase for reels
on the UK market on 1 February 1994 as proposed by
AWA (223).

It

(195) The Commission considers

the

that

collusion on
February 1994 price increases in the UK covered both
reels and sheets. This
shown by a document
is
comparing Sappi's price increases with ‘AEMCP/AEMP'
price increases on the UK market (224). The document
indicates that the AEMCP members had agreed increases
for both reels and sheets, but that originally the increase
for reels (10 %) was to be implemented in December
1993 and the increase for sheets (6 %) in January 1994.
Apparently the original decision was revised so that the
increase for sheets became 7,5 % and both increases
were to be implemented in February. This may also
explain why these UK market increases do not appear in
Table 4 drawn in the general cartel meeting of 19
January.

(196)

that

shows

(193) As regards the French market, the note on the meeting
of 1 October 1993 in Paris (219)
the
this meeting on two price
participants agreed at
increases for the French market: a 10 % price increase
for reels effective from 1 December 1993, and a 6 %
price increase for sheets effective from 1 January 1994.
Mougeot has confirmed (220) that [an AWA employee]*
made a presentation at this meeting on the financial
situation of different producers, showing that all of
them were losing money on the carbonless paper
market. He said that AWA would increase its prices by
10 % on the French market starting from 1 Decembe
1993, and asked everybody to do the same; he said he
would not
tolerate any failure to follow this price
increase.
[He]* also requested that producers should
announce these price increases to customers by using
standard form letters. The 6 % increase (both for reels
and sheets) decided during the general cartel meeting of
19 January 1994 for the French market to be effective
from 1 April 1994 was confirmed at the French market
cartel meeting held on 20 January 1994 (221).

is likely that

It
the other increases for January and
February (spring 1994) presented in Table 4 were also
agreed at meetings held during the last quarter of 1993,
or were based on other collusive contacts between
competitors during that period. This conclusion is
supported by the minutes of Koehler's
supervisory
board meeting on 8 December 1993, which state: ‘It is
planned that the prices of the main types of carbonless
paper should be increased in the various countries by
an average of 5 %. In Italy, where a special situation has
arisen owing to the take-over of Binda by Wiggins
Teape, a price increase of 10 % is to be announced on 1
January and again on 1 April.' (225). According to this
increases
document,
depended on the success of an 8 % price increase on the
French market effective from 1 December 1993 (226).
The price increases presented in the Koehler document
are same or close to those set out in Table 4 for January
and February (227).

implementation

the

the

of

(194) Mougeot's statement concerning the UK market meeting
of 9 November 1993 shows that also in this meeting (as
at the French market cartel meeting of 1 October 1993)
AWA took the initiative and proposed a 10 % price

(217) File p. 5.
(218) File pp. 4474 and 9939.
(219) See File p. 6.
(220) File pp. 7648-7649.
(221) File p. 7650: the two graphs found at Stora show immediately
after the 6 % and 10 % price increases, which had been agreed at
the meeting of 1 October 1993, further 6 % increases for both
reels and sheets (File pp. 4944-4945).

(222) Mougeot's submission of 14.4.1999 (File pp. 7649-7650).
(223) As Mougeot was selling only reels, it might be that the increase

referred to by Mougeot related to reels only.

(224) File pp. 2504-2509. The latter abbreviation clearly also refers to

the Association of European Manufacturers of Carbonless Paper.

(225) Original in German:

‘Es ist vorgesehen, für die Hauptsorten im
SD-Bereich eine Preiserhöhung von durchschnittlich 5 % in den
In Italien, wo durch die
verschiedenen Ländern vorzunehmen.
Übernahme von Binda durch Wiggins Teape eine Sondersituation
entstanden ist, soll eine Preiserhöhung zum 1.1. und 1.4. von
jeweils 10 % angekündigt werden.' (File p. 5308-5311).

(226) The date of the increase is the same as agreed in the French
market meeting on 1.10.1993, but the percentage is smaller. The
increase agreed at that meeting was to have been 10 %.

(227) On 1 December 1993 Sappi gave its distribution network
instructions to advise customers of price increases for Belgium,
Holland and the Nordic countries, effective on despatches from
1 February 1994, which were identical to the February price
increases in Table 4. (File p. 2737)

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increase

for price

(197) Table 4 presents also price increases for April and May
1994. Regarding the Portuguese market, it shows that at
the general cartel meeting there was an agreement on
an 8 % price increase from 1 April 1994 for both reels
and sheets. The report
from the Portuguese market
meeting of 9 February 1994, written by Sappi's agent
Unipapel, shows for carbonless paper sheets a table of
‘Actual prices and proposal
to
distributors suggested to be invoiced to the distributors' (228).
This Unipapel table confirms that at the meeting target
prices were agreed for sales of sheets to distributors by
each of the following producers: AWA, Koehler, Sarrió,
Stora and Zanders. These prices were to be effective
from 1 April. The target prices for
three
companies referred to were the same, but the targets for
Stora and Zanders were higher. Given that before the
the producers' actual average prices were
agreement
different,
for AWA,
the percentage price increases
Koehler and Sarrió ranged from around 8 % to more
than 13 %. Hence, while the minimum increase for
sheets was kept at 8 % as agreed at the general meeting,
it was agreed at the national meeting that the increase
would be higher for some producers (229).

the first

classified into these

(198) At the national cartel meeting of 9 February 1994 the
timing of the increase for reels was also changed. Based
on Sarrió's proposals, the participants agreed increased
target prices for reels, to be effective from 1 March. The
prices were set as minimum prices for each product
type and differentiated for customer groups A, B and C.
Customers were
three groups
according to their purchasing power. An annex to the
report lists several customers in groups A and B. In his
oral explanations during the inspection at Unipapel, the
company representative who had written the report on
the meeting confirmed the customer classification, and
also confirmed that the agreed prices were minimum
prices (230).
In addition to the price increase to take
place in March, new, higher minimum prices for reels
were agreed which were to be implemented in June
1994.

(199) Turning to the Spanish market, the note on the meeting
of 3 May 1994 shows that all participants agreed to
increase the sheets price by 5 % from 1 June (Koehler
by 7 %). Concerning reels, the note shows an agreement
on an approximately 10 % price increase in May. The
note also shows that customers for reels were classified
into groups A, B and C, and that different target prices
for reels were agreed for each of these groups (231).

(228) The words ‘proposal for' and ‘to distributors' and the crossing out

of words have been added by hand to the document.

(229) File pp. 47-51.
(230) File pp. 4520.
(231) File pp. 8 and 9977-9978.

(a)(2) Implementation of the agreed price increases (232)

(200) Sappi's

to its

instructions

sales network show its
determination to implement the price increases agreed
‘we
at the general cartel meeting of 19 January 1994:
must now announce our intention to apply further
increases, which will be
applied rigidly in each
market' (233). A letter
to a Sappi distributor in the
Netherlands confirms Sappi's determination and also
the January agreement resulted in an
indicates that
overall price increase:
‘Everywhere in Europe, and in
Holland too, carbonless prices are going up and I do
not see why your customers should not get it.' (234).
Another document suggests that Sappi was determined
to hold on the agreed January price increases for Spain
even if
sheets was only partially
successful (235).

the increase for

(201) AWA's fax to its sales subsidiaries around the EEA
shows similar determination to implement the increases
agreed for April/May:
‘As we continue to be very tight
in capacity, I insist that prices are rigorously increased.
The April/May increase must be enforced with all
determination.' (236).

(232) The Commission requested the carbonless paper producers to
provide information on all price increases of general application
(in percentage form) that each of them had announced since
1.1.1992. Only one company, AWA, gave information on its
percentage price increases for the whole period requested. Sappi,
Stora, Zanders and Copigraph provided information concerning
all but the earlier years. Sappi gave information for the UK for
the years 1994-1999 and for the rest of Europe from 1993 to
1995. Stora and Zanders gave information mainly for the time
from 1995 onwards. Owing to the termination of its industrial
activities and acquisition by AWA, Copigraph has been able to
identify only some price increases since 1994. All others claimed
that, as a rule, price increase negotiations were conducted on a
very individual basis, or that the company no longer had the
relevant documents in its possession for most of the period in
question. Mougeot
indicative
information on price movements (in percentage form) in some
announced to typical
markets, on the basis of
customers. Others
gave
(Koehler,
information only on monthly or annual average prices.

Torraspapel, Zicuñaga)

and Carrs,

however,

increases

gave

(233) File pp. 10035-10036.
(234) File p. 10037.
(235) File p. 10040.
(236) File p. 7866.

21.4.2004

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/37

(202) A document

to a rescheduling of
in general,

found on Sappi's premises shows that
implementation of some price increases set out in the
table from the January meeting were rescheduled,
whereas others were successful (237). It appears that this
the agreed
document
refers
a
and not
increases on the market
rescheduling by Sappi alone. The February increases
were delayed by one month in the case of Austria and
by 15 days in the case of Belgium and the Netherlands.
As for the Spanish market, this document states that the
10 % increase for reels was rearranged for 1 April 1994,
but
least had implemented the 10 %
increase for sheets. The document states that on the
the price increase for sheets was
Portuguese market
postponed until 1 April 1994, which, however,
is the
date indicated in Table 4. As regards the French market,
the document
the increase for sheets
agreed for December 1993 and the increase for reels
agreed for January 1994 were in fact implemented (238).
In the case of the Swedish market, the price increase for
reels took place on 1 February 1994 as agreed.

that Sappi at

indicates that

(203) Regarding the increases agreed for 1 December 1993
(10 % for reels) and 1 January 1994 (6 % for sheets) in
the French market meeting on 1 October 1993, two
graphs found on Stora's premises show exactly the same
increases (239). On 12 October 1993 AWA announced
the same increases to its customers (240). There is also
evidence that Mougeot took measures to implement the
to apply from 1
agreed 10 % increase
reels
it
December 1993,
to
announced
that
and
customers (241). A document
found on Koehler's
premises indicates that Koehler too had decided on an
increase to apply from 1 December 1993, but that this
increase was 8 % instead of 10 %. Other producers have
not provided price increase information for this period.

for

it

relating

to their

comprehensive

(204) Starting from the price increases of January 1994 the
Commission has more
evidence of
sales
producers' price increase instructions
networks, announcements to customers and internal
that
documentation
to
correspond with the price increases agreed at
the
general cartel meeting of 19 January 1994. Concerning
the period from January to March 1994 this information
shows that on some or all of the following markets
AWA, Koehler, Sappi, Stora and Torraspapel announced
price increases identical to those agreed or confirmed at
the general cartel meeting of 19 January 1994 (for
details of the price increases see Annex V, Table A):

increases

price

(237) File p. 2483.
(238) Both agreed at
paragraph (203).

the meeting of 1.10.1993 in Paris, cf. also

(239) File pp. 4944-4945. These graphs show the movement of prices
and sales volumes and percentage price increases for both reels
and sheets in the years 1993-1995 for the French market.

(240) File p. 7838.
(241) File pp. 7681, 7728, 1813-1814.

Belgium and Luxembourg, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (242).

(205) The documentation available also shows that the price
increases agreed in November 1993 were implemented
when both AWA and Sappi announced a 10 % increase
for reels for the UK market (see Annex V, Table A). The
AWA price increase was due to become effective from 1
February, and Sappi's increase from 7 February 1994. In
addition,
the documents show that AWA, Sappi and
Carrs all announced a 7,5 % increase for sheets, likewise
in February 1994 (Carrs was not selling reels).

(206) AWA, Koehler, Mougeot, Sappi, Stora and Torraspapel
also announced price increases for April and May which
the general cartel
were identical
meeting of 19 January on some or all of the following
markets (Annex V, Table B): Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, Norway (243), Sweden (244), the United Kingdom
and Ireland (245).

to those agreed at

(b) June to October 1994

(b)(1) Agreements reached

(207) On the premises of both Sappi and its Portuguese sales
agent Unipapel, the Commission found a table dated 23
June 1994 (again two days after a general cartel
meeting) setting out price increases for various national
markets from 1 June 1994 to 1 October 1994 (246).
Later Sappi submitted to the Commission a copy of the
same table attached to a fax giving instructions for price
increases to its sales network (247). The table submitted
by Sappi is reproduced as Table 5.

It

of

and

types

various

releases

internal

comprises

instructions

(242) The evidence gathered on the price increases of various producers
is not homogeneous.
to sales
subsidiaries or selling agents, standard form letters to customers,
press
company
documentation. For the sake of simplicity, all measures taken by
companies to increase prices, whether announcements or internal
instructions, discussions or decisions, are called ‘price increase
announcements' in the present Decision.
(243) Originally 1.4, but delayed to 1.5. File p. 2482.
(244) Originally 1.4, but delayed to 1.5. File p. 2482.
(245) Also Copigraph announced to customers the increases agreed for
the German market for February (reels and sheets) and May (reels
only), and Carrs announced to customers the February and April
price increases for sheets which had been agreed for the UK and
Irish markets. At
increase
some
announcements are to be explained by the firms' participation in
the cartel activity (see in particular paragraphs (194) to (195)).

these

price

least

of

(246) File p. 2358. File pp. 4539-4540.
(247) File pp. 10053-10054.

L 115/38

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Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

TABLE 5

(210)

Agreed price increases from June to October 1994

(table submitted by Sappi)

REELS in % SHEETS in %

(in %)

EFFECTIVE
DATE

In particular, concerning the 1 July 1994 price increase
for reels on the French market (see paragraph (141)),
there was already in May 1994 cooperation between the
carbonless paper producers. Mougeot has stated that in
a French market cartel meeting held probably in May
1994, [an AWA employee]* ‘urged others to follow the
price increase of 6 % which AWA intended to apply on
1 July 1994' (248). Mougeot's statement shows that AWA
clearly tried to influence the conduct of its competitors
in the French market by disclosing to them exact
information on the price increase that it had decided to
implement. As a result an agreement appears to have
been reached. This is shown by Table 5 drawn up at the
general cartel meeting of 21 June 1994.

UK

IRELAND

GERMANY

AUSTRIA

FINLAND

SWEDEN

NORWAY

DENMARK

HOLLAND

BELGIUM

FRANCE 1

FRANCE 2

ITALY 1

ITALY 2

SPAIN

PORTUGAL 1

PORTUGAL 2

GREECE

(a) To be advised.

12

12

8

12

12

8

8

8

8

10

6

10

10

15

(a)

15

15

10

6

6

6

6

6

—

—

—

6

6

10

15

(a)

5

(a)

10

1.9.1994

1.9.1994

1.9.1994

1.9.1994

1.9.1994

1.9.1994

1.9.1994

1.9.1994

1.9.1994

1.9.1994

1.7.1994

1.10.1994

1.6.1994

1.10.1994

1.9.1994

15.7.1994

1.9.1994

1.9.1994

(211) At the general cartel meeting on 21 June 1994 a price
increase for Spain was also planned, which was to be
effective on 1 September 1994. Instead of giving the
amount of the increase, Table 5 setting out the agreed
price increases says that the Spanish increase is ‘to be
advised' (249). The report
from the Spanish market
meeting of 29 June 1994 shows that an agreement on
the September price increase was
reached in this
meeting. For reels the note shows an agreement on a
10 % increase on 1 September and on target prices
(ESP/kg) for direct sales to printers, which were divided
into three groups (A, B and C), with different target
prices for each group (by product type). On sheets, the
report says that the prices agreed previously have not
been complied with, and that the price has fallen back
to the previous level. At this meeting it was agreed that
the price would be increased in two stages on 1 July
and on 1 September 1994, both times by 5 % (250).

(b)(2) Implementation of the agreed price increases

(208) Once again, as in Table 4 from the meeting on 19
January, Sappi has included Italy, Finland, Denmark and
Portugal in the list of price increases even though it had
no sales in these markets (in the case of Portugal it was
selling sheets but not reels). Like Table 4,
therefore,
Table 5 cannot have been purely internal or relating to
Instead it shows price
Sappi's own business alone.
increases
resulting from collusive contacts between
competitors.

(209) The Commission considers that Table 5 sets out future
price increases agreed between competitors at
the
general cartel meeting held on 21 June 1994 and some
price increases agreed previously and already announced
to customers.

(212) The Commission has in its possession a document
reporting on the implementation of some of the price
increases agreed at the general cartel meeting of 21 June
1994. This document shows that
the price increases
agreed for Germany, France, the United Kingdom and
Italy were implemented for the most part and in some
cases even exceeded. The document,
found on the
premises of Torraspapel, shows that the September price
increases in Germany (for sheets and reels) and the
October price increases in Italy (also for sheets and
reels) were implemented in practice, though there were

(248) Original

in French:

‘a incité à suivre l'augmentation de prix de

6 % qu'AWA entendait mettre en oeuvre le 1er juillet 1994'.

(249) File p. 2358. File pp. 4539-4540.
(250) File p. 4476.

21.4.2004

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/39

some difficulties with the implementation of the price
increase for sheets in Germany. In the United Kingdom
there was an 8 % increase in the price of reels and a
6 % increase in the price of sheets in September 1994.
The increase in the price of sheets is the same as that
the increase for reels is
agreed at
higher. As regards the French market the Torraspapel
document says that in October there was a 10 % price
increase for reels and a 6 % price increase for sheets.
The first of these increases is exactly the same as the
one agreed at the meeting of 21 June 1994 (251).

the meeting, but

(213) On 23 June 1994 Sappi Europe SA sent

its sales
subsidiaries and agents in different European countries a
table summarising the price increase schedule agreed at
the general cartel meeting, and on 28 June and 1 July
the
1994 it gave
increases (252). The
implementation of
Commission also has other documentary evidence of
price
various
competitors to their customers or sales networks and
internal documentation relating to price
increases,
which correspond to the increases agreed at the general
cartel meeting of 21 June 1994.

them instructions
price

each of
the

announcements

increase

sent

for

by

(214) The 6 % reels price increase which it had been agreed
should take place on the French market on 1 July 1994
was announced by AWA, Mougeot and Sappi (253) for 1
or 4 July (see Annex V, Table C). The graph showing
price movements for reels which was found on Stora's
premises shows the same increase for this period (254).

(215)

For September and October 1994 AWA, Sappi, Stora,
Torraspapel and Zanders (255) announced price increases
identical to those agreed at the meeting of 21 June 1994
on some or all of the following markets (see Annex V,
Table D): Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
the
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and
Ireland (256).

(251) File p. 691. According to Torraspapel the document gives specific
market information and was written by [a Torraspapel employee]*
in November 1994.

(252) File pp. 2359-2371 and 10068-10076.
(253) Sappi confirms the 6 % increase in its statement (File p. 9949),
but some instructions to Sappi Paris show a 7 % increase for
1.7.1994.
(254) File p. 4944.
(255) Copigraph also announced the price increases agreed at

this
meeting for the French and German markets, though for reels
only, and Carrs announced to its customers the increase for
sheets agreed for the UK (and Irish) market.

(256) For the United Kingdom and Ireland AWA, Sappi and Torraspapel
announced the same 8 % reels increase. The list of price increases
agreed at the general cartel meeting of 21 June gives a 12 %
increase for reels instead of 8 %. It appears that after the general
the
cartel meeting,
percentage.

cartel members agreed to reduce

the

the first

(216) As regards the implementation of the increases agreed
at for the Spanish market in the meeting of 29 June
1994, a document received from Sappi says that the
increase in the price of reels was ‘applied in full' but
that
increase for sheets was ‘abandoned by
Sarrio due to merchant pressure' (257). The document
confirms that in spite of Sarrió's withdrawal Sappi was
determined to implement the September price increase
for sheets too. Also an AWA's internal price increase
instruction confirms that
there were price increases
both on 1 July and on 1 September (258). Another Sappi
document shows that the Spanish market leader, Sarrió,
had already delayed implementation of the first price
increase for sheets agreed in June, which led Sappi to
conclude that
it had misunderstood the agreement:
‘Would you please note that the price increase of 1
September in Spain on carbonless sheets is in fact the
June increase, which Sarrio (259) have delayed. We
originally understood that the market was moving by
two increases of 5 %, but this is not the case' (260).

(c) December 1994 to February 1995

(c)(1) Agreements reached

the

informed

participants

(217) At the general cartel meeting of 22 September 1994 [an
AWA employee]*
of
percentage price increases and the implementation dates
decided country by country,
and urged them to
implement the same increases simultaneously (261). The
Commission considers
the
that
participants agreed on price increases for the period
from December 1994 to February 1995. These price
increases are set out
found on the
premises of Sappi, reproduced as Table 6 (262).

in a document

this meeting

at

(257) File p. 10062. Sappi announced to customers on 30.6.1994 and
AWA on 8.7.1994 the increases agreed for reels (10 %) and sheets
(5 %) effective from 1.9.1994. File pp. 8150 and 10077.

(258) File p. 7868.
(259) The name Sarrío refers

to Torraspapel, who organised the

meetings in Barcelona. It is also the market leader in Spain.

(260) File p. 4598.
(261) File pp. 11597 and 11599.
(262) File p. 2494.

L 115/40

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Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

TABLE 6

Agreed price increase from December 1994 to February
1995

(document found on Sappi's premises)

Increase

Country

Effective date

Reels

Sheets

(in %)

Germany

Austria

Belgium

Holland

France

Italy

Spain

Finland

Norway

Denmark

Sweden

6

10

6

6

10

15

To be advised

5?

6

6

8

0

5

0

0

5

1.12.1994

1.12.1994

1.12.1994

1.12.1994

1.1.1995

15

1.1.1995

5

5

5

5

1.1.1995

1.12.1994

1.1.1995

1.12.1994

(218) Once again, as in the other two tables found on Sappi's
premises (see Tables 4 and 5), Sappi has included Italy,
Finland, Denmark and Portugal
in the list of price
increases for both reels and sheets even though it was
not selling reels in any of these countries and was not
selling sheets
in Italy, Finland and Denmark. This
confirms that the table cannot have been purely internal
or relating to Sappi's own business alone.

(219) The Commission has in its possession documents found
on the premises of Torraspapel (263) and AWA (264)
the conclusion that Table 6 contains
which support

(263) File p. 691. During the investigation under Article 14(2) of
Regulation No 17 carried out on Torraspapel's premises in
November 1997, the Commission inspectors asked the company
to give its interpretation of the above document, especially of the
reference ‘prochaine augmentation' (‘forthcoming increase') in the
title (File p. 4247). Torraspapel explained that the document gave
specific market
information and had been written by [a
Torraspapel employee]* in November 1994. Torraspapel further
stated that the expression ‘en Europe' (‘in Europe') in the title was
to its European
an expression used by Torraspapel
subsidiaries who were selling direct
the
German, French, British and Italian subsidiary companies. File
p. 4251.
(264) File p. 918.

from the mill,

to refer

i.e.

price increases agreed between competitors. Both these
documents set out price increases that are identical to
the price increases in Table 6. The document found on
Torraspapel's premises sets out ‘forecasts' for December
1994 price increases
in Germany and the United
Kingdom and for January 1995 price increases in France
and Italy that are identical to the increases in Table 6.
The only difference is that Table 6 does not give price
increases
the United Kingdom. Torraspapel's
document ‘forecasts' price increases of 10 % for reels
and 5 % for sheets on the UK market in December. It
appears that
the
general cartel meeting of 22 September 1994.

these increases were also agreed at

for

(220) The document

found on AWA's premises lists ‘price
increase assumptions' for February 1995 in Germany,
France and Italy which are identical to the December
and January price increases set for these countries in the
documents found at Sappi and Torraspapel. In addition,
AWA's
the Benelux
countries is exactly the same as the December 1994
price increases indicated in Table 6 for both Belgium
and the Netherlands. Similarly, AWA's ‘price increase
assumption' for Scandinavia is identical to the December
1994 and January 1995 price increases for Norway and
Denmark indicated in the Sappi document.

‘price increase assumption'

for

(221) Those documents also confirm the participation of
Sappi and Torraspapel in the general cartel meeting of
22 September 1994.

(222) The general cartel meeting on 22 September 1994 did
not agree any price increase for Spain, but Table 6
the agreed price increases contains the
setting out
phrase ‘To be advised'
the Spanish
in the place of
increase. This indicates that the Spanish increase was to
be agreed at a Spanish market meeting after the general
cartel meeting. The hand-written note of Mougeot's
the Spanish market meeting of 19
representative at
October 1994 shows
the
that
participants agreed on price increases (without showing
the size of the increase) and target prices (ESP/kg) that
were to be applied in Spain from 3 January 1995 (265).
Participants agreed different prices for three classes of
customer —A, B and C— and for each product type.
The prices recorded in the note are prices for reels. As

the meeting

at

(265) File p. 1839.

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L 115/41

it was natural that it
Mougeot was selling only reels,
should be interested in those prices only (266). It cannot
be
this meeting price
increases were also agreed for sheets.

excluded, however,

that at

authorised
prices. The

and Mougeot were
agreed
below the

(223) At the Spanish market meeting of 19 October 1994
to sell
Zicuñaga
somewhat
above
mentioned meeting note of Mougeot says ‘Zicuñaga and
Mougeot authorized to sell ESP 5/kg below (what a
gift)' (267). Mougeot confirmed in reply to oral questions
the large producers did
during an investigation that
for
indeed authorise
Mougeot, Sarrio, who was a customer of ours and the
principal operator on the Spanish market, asked us not
to sell more than ESP 5 below the regular market
price' (268). Later Mougeot said ‘we were reminded that
we should not sell under ESP 5 below the announced
minimum prices' (269), indicating that the agreed target
prices were minimum prices.

this. Mougeot also said,

‘As

(224) Concerning the French market,

the price increases
decided at the general cartel meeting were confirmed at
the French cartel meeting of 6 December 1994 (see
paragraph (145)).

(c) (2) Implementation of the agreed price increases

(225) Concerning

1994 —AWA, Koehler,

the period from December 1994 to
February 1995, the Commission has discovered that all
the general cartel meeting of 22
the participants at
September
Stora,
Torraspapel and Zanders— announced price increases
identical to those agreed at the meeting for some or all
of the following markets: France, Germany,
Italy, the
United Kingdom and Ireland (for details of the price
increases see Annex V, Table E) (270).

Sappi,

announced the increases confirmed at the 6 December
1994 meeting to take effect in January 1995, Zanders's
announcement having
(see
paragraph (145)). The graphs of price movements found
on the premises of Stora indicate a 10 % price increase
for reels at the beginning of 1995 (271).

concerned

reels

only

this

increases (10-11 % for

(227) For the United Kingdom and Ireland, AWA, Koehler,
Sappi and Torraspapel all announced or planned almost
identical
reels and 5-6 % for
sheets) for different dates from the end of November
1994 to January 1995. A document
found on the
premises of Sappi confirms that in spite of the different
implementation dates
increase was based on
collusion. AWA and Stora are explicitly mentioned as
participating in the collusion. The document reads: ‘As I
hope you are aware, [an AWA employee]* decided to
withdraw their November/December price increase on
the day of implementation due to “logistical problems”.
They therefore postponed until 3 January and duly
implemented their increase accordingly. We alongside
Feldmuhle [Stora] elected to hold out for our increase,
in the belief
the market place
if we withdrew,
would collapse and we would rapidly get back to a price
war.' The document also confirms that AWA, Sappi and
Stora
Irish market
the UK
increases (272).

implemented

that

and

(d) February to September 1995

(226) Concerning

at
Copigraph, Sappi, Stora, Torraspapel

French market,

the

(d)(1) Agreements reached

least AWA,
and Zanders

(266) In the case of other meetings too Mougeot reports only on price
increases for reels, even though there is evidence that price
increases were also agreed for sheets.

(267) Original

in French:

‘ZICUÑAGA et Mougeot Autorisés à vendre

– 5 Pts/kg (Quel cadeau)', file p. 1839.

(268) Original in French: ‘En ce qui concerne Mougeot, Sarrio qui était
notre client et aussi le principal opérateur du marché espagnol
nous a demandé de ne pas vendre à plus de 5 pts en dessous des
prix réguliers du marché'. File p. 3916.

(269) Original in French: ‘nous nous sommes fait rappeler que nous ne
devions pas vendre moins de PTA 5 en dessous des prix minima
affichés' (File p. 11495).

(270) Copigraph also announced the price increases agreed for the
French market. In addition, Carrs announced for January 1995
the 5 % increase in the price of sheets agreed for the UK (and
Irish) market.

(228) The minutes of the general cartel meeting of 2 February
1995 list
the price increases which were agreed for
various countries, and specify dates when they were to
become effective (273). A document received from AWA
lists exactly the same increases as in the minutes (274).
This document shows that AWA management decided
those increases just before the cartel meeting. Therefore,

(271) File p. 4944-4945. For sheets the increase indicated in these
graphs is only 2 %, which would imply that the agreed increase
for sheets was not fully implemented, at least by Stora.

(272) File p. 2742.
(273) File p. 7.
(274) File pp. 7879-7880.

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21.4.2004

the general cartel meeting of 2
it appears that at
the meeting of 22 September 1994,
February, as at
AWA submitted price increases that
it had planned
beforehand for agreement to the other cartel members.
According to the minutes, the increases agreed for EEA
countries from February to October 1995 were as set
out in Table 7.

TABLE 7

Agreed price increases from February to September 1995

(from the minutes of the general cartel meeting of 2 February
1995)

(in %)

Sheets

0 %

10 %

TBA

5 %

0 %

5 %

0 %

10 %

5 %

5 %

5 %

5 %

15 %

10 %

5 %

0 %

5 %

5 %

Country

Date

1.4.1995

1.5.1995 (275)

Reels

10 %

0 %

1.7.1995 (276)

TBA (277)

France

France

France

Germany

1.4.1995

Austria

Spain

Spain

Spain

1.7.1995

1.2.1995

1.3.1995

1.4.1995

10 %

8 %

10 %

6 %

0 %

Portugal

1.4.1995

10 %

8 %

8 %

8 %

15 %

10 %

8 %

8 %

0 %

0 %

U.K. (278)

U.K.

U.K.

Italy

Italy

Finland

1.3.1995

1.5.1995

1.9.1995

1.4.1995

1.9.1995

1.4.1995

Denmark

1.4.1995

1.6.1995

1.6.1995

Norway

Sweden

Greece

Belgium

Holland

Iceland

1.4.1995

10 %

10 %

1.3.1995

1.6.1995

1.4.1995

6 %

8 %

8 %

6 %

0 %

5 %

(275) In the original document the date reads 96, but this must be a

typing error; the correct year must be 95.

(276) In the original document the date reads 96, but this must be a

typing error; the correct year must be 95.

(277) The abbreviation TBA means that the increase is ‘to be agreed'

later.

(278) Probably includes Ireland.

(229) Like the price increase tables drawn up at the general
cartel meetings held in 1994, Table 7 sets out both
future price increases agreed at the meeting and other
increases agreed previously. In particular, the April price
increase for France had been agreed at
the national
cartel meeting of 20 January 1995.

(230) Mougeot recalls that the participants in the 20 January
1995 French market meeting agreed on a 6 % increase
to be implemented on 1 April 1995 (279). From other
documents, however,
it appears that the agreed price
increase may have been 10 %. A 10 % increase for reels
to take effect on 1 April figures not only in the minutes
of the general cartel meeting of 2 February 1995 but
also in the price development
graph found at
Stora (280). Furthermore, a Mougeot ‘Note de Service'
dated 15 March 1995 confirms that the competitors had
announced an increase of 10 % for reels in France for
the second quarter of 1995, but that the market leaders
would not apply it. Mougeot decide also to adjust its
own increase aiming at 5 to 6 % (281).

(231) The minutes of

the general

cartel meeting show
planning of two further price increases for the French
market: a 10 % price increase for sheets was to be
implemented on the 1 May 1995 and another price
increase on 1 July 1995 was to be agreed later (‘TBA').
in spring 1995 there was a
Mougeot's recalls that
French market cartel meeting the purpose of which was
to decide on an increase in July (282). The producers
appear
to have agreed in that meeting on a 10 %
increase for both reels and sheets for July. These are the
figures marked for mid-1995 in the graphs of French
market price movements found on the premises of
Stora, which indeed reproduce precisely the agreements
reached on price increases until then (283).

(279) File pp. 7653-7654.
(280) File p. 7 and p. 4944.
(281) File p. 1859. File p. 11496.
(282) File p. 7654.
(283) File pp. 4944-4945. The price increases shown in the graphs
start at the end of 1993 and continue until the end of 1995. Up
to autumn 1995 the Commission has been able to confirm that
all these price increases (except the first 2 % sheets price increase)
were agreed between carbonless paper producers (at either the
general or national cartel meetings). These documents also show
that from the end of 1993 onward prices for both reels and
sheets
fluctuated
sharply. The total
the average prices' were the
following: from 1993 to 1994: reels +6 %, sheets +14 %; from
1994 to 1995: reels +15 %, sheets +6 %; from 1993 to 1995: reels
+21 %, sheets +21 %.

increased constantly, while

sales volumes

increases ‘of

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L 115/43

(232)

It follows that at least Mougeot and Stora participated in
the French market cartel meeting held in spring 1995.
As for the other usual participants in the French market
cartel meetings (AWA, Copigraph, Koehler, Torraspapel
and Zanders), the evidence does not allow it to be said
they participated in this
with certainty whether
particular meeting. However, they have all continued to
adhere to the cartel scheme, and therefore they can be
held responsible for the increases agreed at this meeting
too.

(233) At the general cartel meeting of 2 February 1995 the
participants also agreed on a system for launching the
price increases according to which AWA would lead the
price increases and others would follow. As stated in the
following
minutes:
increases per market. To follow, Koehler AG, Zanders,
Stora, Sappi, Torras' (284).

lead announcement of

‘AWA will

(234) Moreover, during

the official meeting

[an AWA
employee]*, while making a presentation on pulp price
increases (which would normally have been done by the
chairman, [a Koehler employee]* on that occasion), said
(according to Mougeot) that ‘anyone who did not adapt
their prices in the light of
this increase would find
themselves in a difficult financial situation' (285). This is
further confirmation of AWA's active role in the cartel.

conclusion that ‘the price increases that appear to have
been agreed between the competitors at the meeting in
Frankfurt correspond to a large degree to the price
increases which
its
customers' (288).

announced

Sappi

later

to

to their

(236) The Commission also has evidence of other producers'
price increase instructions
sales networks,
announcements to customers and other documentation
relating to price increases that correspond with the
price increases agreed at the general cartel meeting of 2
February. This information, together with the data from
AWA and Sappi, shows that for the period from March
to April 1995 AWA, Sappi, Stora, Torraspapel and
the producers who participated in the
Zanders, of
meeting, announced price increases corresponding to
the increases agreed at the general cartel meeting on
some or all of the following markets (see Annex V,
Table F): Denmark, France, (289) the Netherlands, Spain,
the United Kingdom and Ireland (290).

(237) Regarding the UK market increase, a fax from Mougeot
dated 2 February 1995 and sent on 3 February 1995 to
‘The U.K. market
a UK distributor, J & H Paper reads:
increase by 8 % the 6th of March so we propose
will
you our
corroborates
Mougeot's participation in the agreement reached at the
general cartel meeting of 2 February 1995.

best offer.' (291). This

fax

(d) (2) Implementation of the agreed price increases

(235) The Commission is in possession of documents coming
from AWA (286)
and Sappi (287)
show price
increases for most of the EEA countries corresponding
to the increases agreed at the meeting. Sappi itself has
compared the agreed price increases with the ones
which it subsequently announced, and come to the

that

(284) File p. 7.
(285) Original in French: ‘ceux qui ne feraient pas évoluer leurs prix en
tenant compte cette hausse, se trouveraient en situation financière
difficile'. File p. 11496.

(286) File pp. 937, 7879-7880. The last document shows complete
correspondence with the price increases agreed at the general
cartel meeting.

(287) File pp. 2250-2251 and 2492-2493. This document found on
Sappi's premises proves that it told its subsidiaries and merchants
(or agents) to announce price increases that were almost identical
to the increases agreed at the meeting. For the Spanish market
see file pp. 4567-4568 and 4571-4573.

(238) As regards the increases on the Spanish market agreed
for March and April, AWA, Sappi, Stora and Torraspapel
announced the agreed increases, as is shown by Table F
in Annex V. This is confirmed by a document dated 16
from Sappi. The
February, which was
received
document includes the following:
‘the increase of 6 %
[reels] on 1.3.1995 is announced by the markets leaders
Sarrio/Stora/AWA. Therefore if we go for more we are
out of the market' (292). Another document from Sappi

(288) File pp. 9953-9954.
(289) The announced 10 % increase for reels in the French market was
agreed both at the general cartel meeting of 2 February and at
the French market meeting of 20 January. AWA, Copigraph,
Sappi, Stora and Zanders all announced a 10 % increase in the
price of reels to take effect on 1 or 3 April 1995.

(290) Only the increases for the Netherlands are different from the
increases listed in the minutes of the general cartel meeting of 2
February 1995.

(291) File p. 1378.
(292) File p. 3043. The fact

that AWA had announced this price
increase to the customers on 22 February, which is later than the
date of Sappi's fax, supports the conclusion that these increases
were based on collusion.

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in Spain in early 1995 there were some
says that
difficulties in implementing agreed increases in the price
of reels. As for sheets, the document confirms that there
in February and April which
were price increases
the general cartel
corresponded to those agreed at
increased
meeting of 2 February 1995:
effectively by 5 % on February and 10 % on April' (293).

‘The market

(239) Of those who participated in the general cartel meeting,
AWA, Koehler, Sappi, Stora and Zanders announced
identical price increases for the period from May to July
on some or all of the following markets (see Annex V,
Table G): Belgium and Luxembourg, France, Germany,
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Ireland. Of
these increases those for Belgium and Luxembourg,
France and Germany do not appear in the table of price
the general cartel meeting of 2
increases agreed at
February 1995. As regards the French market, there is
evidence that the announced 10 % increase was agreed
at a separate national cartel meeting which was held
later in spring 1995 (see paragraph (231)). The increase
for the Netherlands was announced by AWA, Koehler,
Sappi and Stora for the same date as agreed at the
meeting, but all of them had raised it from 8 % to 10 %.
The percentage agreed at the meeting must have been
revised accordingly.

(240) AWA and Sappi also announced increases in the United
Kingdom and Ireland for September 1995 which are
same as the increases agreed at
the general cartel
meeting of 2 February 1995 (see Annex V, Table
H) (294).

1.4.4.2. Allocation of sales quotas and market sharing

(241) The Commission has found evidence showing that,

in
order to support the implementation of the agreed price
increases, in some national cartel meetings sales quotas
were allocated and market shares were fixed for each
participant.

(293) File pp. 2010-2011.
(294) Copigraph announced to customers on the French market 10 %
increases for reels and sheets for 3.4 and 18.4.1995 respectively,
which correspond to those agreed at the meeting. Carrs also
announced to customers increases for sheets corresponding to
those agreed for March, May and September for the UK (and
Irish) market. At
increase
some
announcements are to be explained by the firms' participation in
the cartel activity (see in particular paragraph (230) on price
increase agreement reached in the French market meeting of 20
January 1995 in which Copigraph participated).

these

price

least

of

(242) Sales quotas were allocated at

in the Spanish
market cartel meeting held on 30 September 1993 in
Barcelona (295) and in the French market cartel meeting
held on 1 October 1993 in Paris (296).

least

(243)

In these meetings
the participants agreed on sales
quotas for the Spanish and French markets respectively
for each of them for the last quarter of 1993, using
confidential
fixing the
information as a device for
quotas. In the Spanish market meeting the information
exchanged was individual average monthly sales for
years 1992 and 1993. In the French market meeting the
participants
the
eight-month period from January to August for years
1992 and 1993 in fixing the quotas.

individual

sales

used

data

for

(244) The Commission requested

the

carbonless paper
producers to provide information on their annual and
monthly sales volumes, but only a few of them gave
monthly information for the years 1992 and 1993. Even
this limited information on real sales figures shows a
close correlation with the quotas agreed and with the
sales volume information exchanged at the meetings of
30 September and 1 October 1993 (see Annex III). This
demonstrates that the carbonless paper producers took
the information exchange and the quota agreement
seriously.

(245) Also the report from the Spanish market meeting of 29
June 1994 indicates that there were sales quotas agreed
for
the producers were selling the
complete amounts allocated to them (297).

reels, and that

(246) Agreements on market shares were concluded at least in
the French market meetings held in spring 1994 in
Nogentel
and on 6 December 1994 in Geneva.
Regarding the meeting in spring 1994, Mougeot states
that AWA described its sales volumes at the meeting
and, that once the other participants had also described
their ‘activities' (i.e. sales volumes), ‘[an AWA employee]*
[an AWA employee] indicated what each one's share of
the French carbonless paper market should be' (298).
Hence, it appears that on the basis of AWA's proposal
there was a consensus reached among the participants
that these market shares would be respected.

(295) File p. 5 and 9972.
(296) File p. 6.
(297) File p. 4476.
(298) File p. 7651. Original in French: ‘[un employé d'AWA]* a indiqué
ce que devait être les parts de marché de chacun sur le marché
français de l'autocopiant.'

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L 115/45

(247) The

notes

taken

hand-written

by Mougeot's
representative from the French market cartel meeting of
6 December 1994 (299) indicates the participants' 1994
and 1995 market shares. Comparison of these market
shares shows that some adjustments were agreed for the
market shares fixed for 1995 as compared with 1994:
AWA's share was reduced, and the shares of Zanders,
Sarrió, Koehler and Stora were increased.

to

the

not

that

exchanged

indications

(248) Mougeot says in its statement that ‘There was some
disagreement expressed at
this meeting between the
leaders on the French carbonless market, as the price
increases were
of
linked
volume.' (300). The notes reporting the meeting also
shows
detailed
participants
information on their 1993 and 1994 sales volumes on
the French market. Comparison of these figures with
information on real sales figures confirms that the sales
the meeting was
volume information exchanged at
accurate (see Annex IV). This shows that the carbonless
paper
information exchange
the
seriously. Mougeot's statement indicates that the volume
information exchanged was used to verify whether there
were important changes in market shares, which might
be due to a failure to comply with the price increase
agreements.

producers

took

(249) Confidential

on

sales

information

carbonless paper prices

volumes was
exchanged also in the Portuguese market meeting of 9
February 1994. The purpose of this meeting was to
increase
in Portugal. The
meeting report (301) shows that in preparing the price
increases participating companies' (AWA, Koehler, Sappi,
Stora and Torraspapel) sales volumes on 1992 and 1993
and prices
in 1993 were collected and compared.
Account was also taken of a comparison of the sales
volumes of Binda, Zanders and Copigraph. Concerning
the source of the individual items of information in the
employee]*
report of
[an Unipapel
confirmed in his oral explanations that
‘the data in
question was drawn up to serve as a basis for the
exchange of
information between the participating
companies and was discussed at these meetings' (302).
Concerning the sales volume information exchanged at
the meeting the report says,
‘All the presents agreed that

the meeting,

(299) File pp. 7652-7653 and pp. 7657-7658.
(300) Original

in French:

‘Cette réunion donna également

lieu à
l'expression de dissensions entre les leaders du marché français de
l'autocopiant car les hausses de prix n'étaient pas liées à des
indications de volume'.

(301) File pp. 47-51.
(302) File p. 4521. Original in Portuguese:

‘os dados aí indicados saõ
estabelecidos com base numa troca de informações entre as
são objecto de discussão nestas
empresas participantes
reuniões'.

e

there was is (303) a decrease on the consumption of 2,8 %
in reels and 9,2 % in sheets from 1992 to 1993' (304). In
spite of the clear decrease in consumption the producers
pressed ahead with price increases.

(250) There are indications that the sales volumes and market
shares were also on the agenda of the general cartel
meetings. The following sentences in the minutes of the
general cartel meeting of 2 February 1995 indicate that
the participants discussed volumes and market shares:
‘Mougeot needs market share. AWA will propose giving
certain tonnage. Separate meeting, Paris TBA [to be
agreed] (305).' An internal Mougeot
‘Note de Service'
dated 15 March 1995 indicates
that Mougeot had
problems with insufficient sales on the French market at
least, which seems
to give meaning to the above
phrases (306).

(251) Mougeot has confirmed that it had a bilateral discussion
with AWA on sales volumes the morning before the
official AEMCP meeting of 2 February, but says that this
was concerned only with AWA's breach of an agreement
to buy certain volumes per year from Mougeot (307).
Although Mougeot claims that it was not present at the
general cartel meeting, it is clear from the minutes that
Mougeot's need for market share was discussed there,
and that it was decided that AWA would be the one to
reduce its sales for Mougeot's benefit. This type of
decision can not be explained if Mougeot was not
participating in the price agreement reached in the
meeting of 2 February 1995.

1.4.5. ASSESSMENT OF THE FACTUAL EVIDENCE

1.4.5.1. The evidence relating to the cartel as a whole

(252) The Commission has been able to establish that the
undertakings concerned had been engaged for years in
an overall anti-competitive plan agreed upon at least in
1992, by means of secret-price fixing arrangements
which they have,
least on some occasions,
complemented with sales quota and market-sharing
information. The
arrangements
Commission relies
following
evidence (this list is not exhaustive):

in particular on the

and exchanges of

at

(303) The word “is” and the crossing out of words have been added by

hand to the document.

(304) File p. 47.
(305) File p. 7.
(306) File p. 1859.
(307) File p. 11496.

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— the setting up of a system of regular general and
national/regional cartel meetings which provided the
structure for continuing collusion;

— the statements of Mougeot and Sappi and the
evidence provided by AWA on ‘improper' meetings in
its reply to the Commission request for information;

— the detailed report of the general cartel meeting on

2 February 1995;

— the detailed reports and statements concerning the
cartel meetings obtained from

national/regional
Mougeot and Sappi;

— the price lists and notes on price increases found on
the premises of or obtained from AWA, Sappi,
Torraspapel and Unipapel (Sappi's agent in Portugal);

evidence relates in particular to meetings concerning the
Spanish and Portuguese markets. Other meetings and
contacts beginning at
the same time concern the
markets in France, Italy, the Nordic countries and the
have
United Kingdom. Moreover,
to the
statements
admitted in their
Commission request for information (as well as in their
replies to the Statement of Objections)
their direct
participation to the regular collusive meetings that took
place at least from the beginning of 1992 onward.

several
and replies

parties

(256) The concurrence of

this factual evidence allows the
beginning of the cartel to be dated no later than January
1992.

(257) Within the period from January 1992 to September
1995, the available evidence shows not only that there
was a framework of collusive contacts and that price
agreements were reached within that framework, but
that
in
particular between January 1994 and September 1995.

these agreements were in fact

implemented,

— the notes, letters/faxes and statements from several
contacts

indicating

collusive

sources

different
between the competitors;

— the pattern of virtually exact correspondence in the
the
timing, amount and announcement dates of
price increases which each producer implemented
on the various national markets, coupled with the
documents indicating collusive contacts.

1.4.5.2. The evidence on individual participation

(a) Introduction

(253) Collusion on prices and the fixing of sales quotas and
market shares were inextricably linked aspects of the
same overall plan. Consequently, the agreements reached
on various occasions,
the meetings
identified in the Decision, cannot be considered as
separate infringements. The uniform announcements of
price increases, of which there is documentary evidence
since January 1994 until September 1995 (these being
the
increases), demonstrate
the
implementation of the overall plan.

effective dates of

in particular at

(258)

,

agreements

the
considers

facts described in chapter
the

the
In view of
Commission
and
that
concerted practices which were found to exist formed
part of systems of regular meetings and other contacts
aimed at price fixing —supported by the fixing of sales
quotas, market share allocation, and the exchange of
sensitive commercial information— and that all of this
behaviour formed part of an overall plan pursuing a
common objective of distorting the movement of prices.

the cartel

(254) At an AEMCP meeting in September 1993 it was
decided that
should be restructured by
separating the general meetings, at which prices could
from the
be fixed for the major European markets,
official AEMCP meetings (see paragraphs (107) to (109)).
This shows that until that time the official meetings had
served the same purpose with regard to the collusive
conduct as the separate meetings did subsequently.

(259) The proper approach in a case such as the present one
is to demonstrate the existence and operation of the
cartel as a whole, and then to link each of
the
participants
showing its participation in the
common scheme and for what period each producer
participated (308).

to it,

(255) The period for which the Commission has extensive
evidence of regular meetings and contacts of a national
in January 1992. The
or

regional character begins

(308) See the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-1/89
Rhône-Poulenc v Commission [1991] ECR II-867, at paragraph
126.

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L 115/47

(260)

In order to find that a given producer participated in
the cartel, it is not necessary to prove its participation
in every manifestation of that cartel. When it has been
found that an undertaking has contributed by its own
conduct to the common objective of the cartel, it can
also be held responsible, throughout the entire period of
its participation in that
for conduct
engaged in by other undertakings in the context of the
same infringement. The Commission must in such cases
show that the undertaking in question was aware of the
into effect by other
actual conduct planned or put
undertakings in pursuit of the same objective, or that it
could reasonably have foreseen it and that
it was
prepared to take the risk (309).

infringement,

(b) AWA, Koehler, Sappi, Stora, Torraspapel and

Zanders

(263) AWA, Koehler, Sappi, Stora, Torraspapel and Zanders
were the largest suppliers in the Community and the
EEA during the entire period for which there is evidence
of continuous cartel activity. All of the six undertakings
the
were selling carbonless paper in all or most of
Member States and also in Norway and Iceland. For all
these companies, except Sappi, there is evidence that
they were clearly playing leading roles in the cartel.

it

indeed a presumption that

(261) According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, as
long as the Commission has been able to establish that
an undertaking has participated in the meetings at
which price initiatives had been decided on, planned
is for that undertaking to adduce
and monitored,
evidence that it had not subscribed to those initiatives.
There must be
the
undertakings participating in concerted arrangements
and remaining active on the market take account of the
information exchanged with their competitors when
determining their conduct on that market. Following the
concerted action decided upon at the meetings of the
producers, an undertaking is bound to take account,
directly or indirectly, of the information obtained during
the course of those meetings in determining the policy
that it intends to follow on the market. Similarly,
its
competitors are bound to take into account, directly or
indirectly, the information disclosed to them by that
undertaking about the course of conduct which it has
itself decided upon or which it contemplates adopting
on the market (310). It follows that the participation of
an undertaking in the collusion may be considered
established at least until the date of the last decision to
be implemented following a meeting in which that
undertaking has participated, unless it has provided
evidence that it dissociated itself from decisions reached
on agreed action. In this respect, any failure to put the
concerted decisions into effect is another matter and
does not suffice to refute such participation.

(262) The available evidence shows the participation of each
of the producers concerned. It also allows the role of
each participant to be identified. In what follows the
principal
indirect) of
participation in the cartel are summarised for each
participant.

items of evidence (direct or

(309) See the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-49/92 P
Commission v Anic Partecipazioni SpA [1999] ECR I-4125, at
paragraphs 82 to 87.

(310) See Case C-49/92 P Commission v Anic, at paragraphs 96, 110,

121.

(264) Starting from at

least

those

January 1992 (311) and until
six
of
September 1993 the participation
companies in the cartel can be established in the first
place by statements from Sappi, Mougeot and AWA as
well as by their membership of the AEMCP and regular
participation in its meetings. These companies had all
been AEMCP members before the year 1992. Until the
separation of
the cartel and the trade association
activities in or after the meeting of 14 September 1993,
the AEMCP members used the association's meetings for
price-fixing purposes (see paragraphs (107) to (113)).

(265) For the same period there is evidence showing that all
six companies also participated in national and/or
regional cartel meetings.

that meeting

(266) Those six companies all participated in the AEMCP
meeting of 14 September 1993 where a decision was
taken to ‘restructure' the cartel, i.e. to separate the cartel
and trade association activities (see paragraph (113)).
After
them continued to
each of
participate regularly in national and/or regional cartel
meetings. The documentary evidence shows that AWA,
Koehler, Stora and Torraspapel participated in all of the
national and regional cartel meetings identified, and that
Sappi and Zanders participated in most of them (see
Annex II).

(267) From the ‘restructuring' of

the cartel onward, all of
them formed part of the cartel at European level, and
thus continued to be full members of it. Indeed, they
also participated in some or all of the general cartel
meetings for which the Commission has found evidence.
In particular, they all participated in the general cartel
meetings of 22 September 1994 (see paragraphs (117),
(121), (124), (125), (189) and (207)).

(311) The

Commission

companies'
evidence
participation in the AEMCP meetings starting from the meeting of
23.1.1992.

of member

has

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(268) The documentary evidence on price increases agreed at
the meetings shows a close relationship between the
increases agreed at the general cartel meetings and those
agreed at the national/regional cartel meetings. This fact,
together with the evidence on participation in the
national/regional cartel meetings, confirms that the six
producers adhered to the general cartel plan and to the
co-ordination of the cartel at the European level.

1992, even if Mougeot itself claims that it joined the
association only at the end of that year. Mougeot also
participated in a French market cartel meeting in spring
1992. That meeting was probably held in April, but as
there is no date specified for
the Commission
considers that Mougeot was a member of the cartel
from at least May 1992.

it

(269) Concerning the end of
suggest

the

the collusion, although some
elements may
continued
cartel
that
afterwards, the Commission limits itself to the period up
to September 1995 for the purposes of
the present
proceedings for the reasons set out in paragraph (75).
Indeed, during the general cartel meeting on 2 February
1995, price increases were decided for a period ending
in September 1995 (price increases in Italy and the
United Kingdom) (312). AWA, Koehler, Sappi, Stora,
Torraspapel and Zanders adhered to the agreements
reached at this general cartel meeting that included the
decision to increase prices in September 1995. Nothing
from the
suggests
decisions taken at the meeting held on 2 February 1995.

they distanced themselves

that

(270) AWA admits participation in the cartel from January
1992 until summer 1995, Stora (MHTP) from the end of
1992 to the middle of 1995 and Zanders from 1992 to
autumn 1995. Koehler does not contest some of the
facts for the period from autumn 1993 to May 1995
(inclusive). Sappi admits participation in the cartel ‘from
January 1992 until a date prior to its approach to the
Commission on 19 September 1996' (313).

(271) On that basis, the Commission concludes that AWA,
Koehler,
and Zanders
participated as full members in the cartel from at least
January 1992 until at least September 1995, i.e. as long
as an element of the overall agreement was applicable.

Torraspapel

Sappi,

Stora,

(c) Other AEMCP members: Mougeot and

Copigraph (Bolloré)

(272) Mougeot has admitted participation in the cartel from
September 1993 until
July 1995. Representatives of
Mougeot first attended an AEMCP meeting on 26 May

(312) See Table 7, paragraph (228).
(313) Sappi's
reply

to the

file pp.
20602-20603. (See also Sappi's statements, File pp. 9936 and
9944-9945.)

Statement of Objections,

(273) Mougeot was an AEMCP member and regularly attended
directly
associations' meetings, which were
the
concerned with price fixing until September 1993.
Moreover, Mougeot attended the AEMCP meeting of 14
September 1993 where the restructuring of the cartel
was agreed. Mougeot has admitted that after that date it
participated in one further general cartel meeting held
on 22 September 1994. Moreover, it is established that
the
Mougeot adhered to the agreements reached at
general cartel meeting held on 2 February 1995.
In
addition, it has admitted regular participation in French
market cartel meetings and in two other national cartel
meetings between October 1993 and summer 1995.
Mougeot has also confirmed that even when it did not
attend a meeting it received information on the price
increases agreed at the meeting from other participants.
Since Mougeot adhered to the agreements reached at the
general cartel meeting held on 2 February 1995 and this
included decision of increasing the prices in the United
Kingdom and Italy in September 1995, the Commission
concludes that Mougeot adhered to the cartel from May
1992 until at least September 1995.

(274) Copigraph (Bolloré) was also a member of the AEMCP
and regularly attended the association's meetings during
the whole period when they were directly concerned
with price fixing,
from at least January 1992 to
September 1993. During the same period it also
participated
least
concerning the French and Spanish markets.

cartel meetings

in national

i.e.

at

is

There

agreed.

evidence

(275) Copigraph (Bolloré) attended the AEMCP meeting of 14
September 1993 where the restructuring of the cartel
was
that Copigraph
participated in a considerable number of national cartel
meetings after September 1993 until
spring 1995.
Copigraph admits in its reply to the Statement of
Objections its participation in the cartel until summer
1995 (314).
are no particular
circumstances showing that Copigraph has distanced
itself from the cartel scheme between spring 1995 and
September 1995.

In addition,

there

(314) Copigraph's reply to the Statement of Objections, file p. 19566.

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Official Journal of the European Union

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(276) On that basis,

it must be concluded that Copigraph
(Bolloré) stood by the other cartel members throughout
infringement and the
the
the whole duration of
Commission
that Copigraph's
therefore
adherence to the common cartel plan continued until
September 1995.

considers

the general cartel meeting of 2 February
decided at
1995. It can be concluded that Carrs was informed of
the decision taken at this general cartel meeting and
adapted its competitive behaviour to that decision. Carrs
has not contested its participation in the cartel up to
the end of the period subject to the present proceedings.

(d) Non-AEMCP members: Carrs, Divipa and

Zicuñaga

(277) The available evidence does not allow it to be said with
certainty when the non-AEMCP companies, Carrs,
Divipa and Zicuñaga, began to take part in the cartel.

(281) Even if Carrs was a small player in the European level, it
was a much more important actor in the UK market.
According to Sappi's estimates, in 1995 Carrs was the
(after AWA,
fifth largest supplier to the UK market
Sappi, Stora and Koehler), with a market share only a
little smaller than that of Koehler (both ± 10 %) (317).
Carrs has also been an innovator in the carbonless
paper market, constantly developing more sophisticated
and advanced products. It was thus in its interest to
keep carbonless paper prices up in the UK market.
Given Carrs' position on the UK market, it is not likely
that the cartel could have functioned in that particular
area without Carrs' participation.

(278)

In its
statements, Sappi has confirmed that Carrs
attended UK market meetings in 1992, but it has not
specified any dates for these meetings. The first meeting
date which has been identified for Carrs is 14 January
1993, and its participation in the cartel is accordingly
regarded as having started then at the latest. After that
least one further meeting,
date it participated in at
which was held on 9 November 1993. The prices fixed
at this meeting were to be applied in February 1994.
Carrs admits in its reply to the Statement of Objections
that it was active in the collusion relating to the UK
(including the Irish market) as from January
market
1993. It recalls that its participation was active during
from the end of 1994,
1993 and 1994 and that
‘although it generally no longer attended meetings,
it
was kept informed of the conclusions of these meetings
by telephone — generally by IDEM [AWA]'. Carrs can
not directly confirm on what dates it attended UK
market cartel meetings, but it confirms that during its
than those
participation there were more meetings
of
in
identified
Objections (315).

Commission

Statement

the

(279) After February 1994 Carrs

regularly announced to
customers the price increases for sheets which had been
agreed at the general cartel meetings for the UK and
Irish markets (316).

(282) On that basis,

the Commission considers that Carrs
from January 1993 until

participated in the cartel
September 1995.

dates

respectively,

from which

(283) The first cartel meetings Divipa and Zicuñaga attended
were held on 5 March 1992 (318) and 19 October
1993 (319)
their
participation in the cartel may be said to have started.
The last meeting for which there is evidence of
participation by Divipa and Zicuñaga was held on 19
October 1994 (320). At
that meeting the participants
including Divipa and Zicuñaga agreed on price increases
and target prices
implemented in January
1995 (321). The Commission concludes that Divipa and
Zicuñaga participated in the cartel at least until January
1995.

to be

(284) Carrs maintains

that

it only participated in cartel
meetings concerning the UK and Irish markets and that
it had no knowledge or realisation that these meetings
that covered the
were one part of an alleged cartel

(280) As described in paragraph (228), an increase for the UK
market to be implemented on 1 September 1995 was

(315) Carrs' reply to the Statement of Objections, file p. 20348.
(316) For the most part Carrs sells sheets only.

(317) File p. 218.
(318) See above paragraphs (155) to (158).
(319) See above paragraphs (165) and Sappi's reply to Commission

request for information, file p. 9939.

(320) Mougeot's reply to the Request for Information, file p. 7652.
(321) See File, p. 1839.

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Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

the EEA.

‘as a producer of
It claims that
whole of
sheets, whose primary market was the UK, a country
with a unique distribution and pricing structure, Carrs
had no interest in any wider arrangements' (322).

different EFTA countries. In 1994, substantial quantities
of carbonless paper were sold to Austria, Finland and
Sweden. From 1994 onwards trade flows also existed
with Iceland and Norway.

in their replies to the
(285) Divipa and Zicuñaga contest
any participation to any
Statement of Objections
collusion neither
in Spain nor on other European
markets or at European level; contacts, if any, were only
two
with
even
companies
knowledge of collusion at European level.

these
any participation in nor

competitors.

Therefore

Spanish

deny

(289) Under

all

these

circumstances, Carrs, Divipa

and
Zicuñaga could not have considered that the national
cartel activities they were involved in were lacking any
they have to be held
wider dimension. Therefore,
responsible for the infringement as a whole, and not
only with respect
to the above-mentioned particular
markets (324).

(286) The Commission considers that, although Carrs, Divipa
and Zicuñaga have been found to have participated only
in national cartel meetings, and only those concerning
the UK market (Carrs) or the Spanish market (Divipa
and Zicuñaga),
the
cartel covered the whole territory that became the EEA
in 1994.

they must have understood that

1.4.5.3. Assessment of the parties' factual arguments

(a) As to the objectives of the cartel

(290) AWA, MHTP (Stora) and Koehler argue that the cartel
sales
concerned mainly price-coordination and that
quotas or market shares were agreed only occasionally.
Koehler submits that there was no agreement on sales
quotas or market shares at general European level (325).

(287) The

two levels of meetings were

indeed closely
intertwined and no participants to the national meetings
could ignore the fact that the purpose of these meetings
was complementary to the general cartel meetings (see
paragraphs (89) to (94), and, for example (197), (211),
(279), (280)). In addition, all the major carbonless paper
producers, who were known to be selling their products
throughout the EEA, participated alongside them in the
cartel activities on the UK and Spanish markets. Certain
of
these companies also played leading roles in the
cartel with respect to these two markets.

following

(288) The Commission has detailed information on sales in
the territory that became the EEA in 1994, by country,
covering most of the reference period of the cartel, for
companies: AWA, Divipa, Koehler,
the
Mougeot,
and
Zicuñaga (323). It may be recalled that at the time of the
infringement more than 56 % of the carbonless paper
companies' aggregate sales in the EEA was outside their
respective domestic markets (see paragraph (30)). The
reference period of the cartel was also characterised by
trade flows between the Community and
significant

Stora, Torraspapel, Zanders

Sappi,

(322) Carrs' reply to the Statement of Objections, file p. 20370.
(323) For year 1992 the Commission has detailed figures

for 6
companies, for 1993 and 1994 for 8 companies and for years
1995-1997 for 9 companies.

(291) MHTP (Stora) and Koehler also argue that there was no
general exchange of individual sales figures. They argue
that
the exchanges referred to by the Commission
clearly constitute isolate incidents. Koehler submits that
no detailed,
information about firms' prices
and sales volumes at general European level was
sales
exchanged.
volumes was
regional
cases' (326).

confined to a few specific

‘exchanges of past

individual

It argues

that

(292) The Commission maintains that, while the principal
the global anti-competitive plan was to
objective of
agree price increases, in certain national cartel meetings
sales quotas were allocated and market shares were
fixed (327). The purpose of these measures was to ensure
implementation of the price increases. In addition, the
the general cartel meeting held on 2
minutes of
February 1995 indicate that
the sales volumes and
market shares were also on the agenda of the general
cartel meetings. The Commission also underlines that

(324) See paragraph (325).
(325) Replies

to the

Statement of Objections: AWA file pp.
19730-19731, Koehler file pp. 20725-20726 and MHTP (Stora)
file pp. 20406-20407.

(326) Replies to the Statement of Objections: MHTP file p. 20405,
Koehler file p. 20727 (Original in German: ‘Darüber hinaus war
das Austausch von Verkaufsmengen vergangener Zeitraüme auf
regionale Einzelfälle beschränkt').
(327) See chapter 1.4.4.3. Allocation of

sales quotas and market

sharing.

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/51

several meeting minutes provide evidence on exchange
of confidential information in relation to the allocation
of sales quotas and fixing of market shares. Finally, its
in most cases when there are
should be noted that
minutes or other reports on the cartel meeting,
the
references to
documents contain direct evidence or
allocation of sales quotas, fixing of market shares and/or
exchange of sensitive information.

(b) As to the evidence on cartel meetings

(b) (1) AEMCP meetings and general cartel meetings

(293) Koehler, Mougeot

the

and

official

contest

Copigraph

the
Commission finding on the anti-competitive nature of
the AEMCP meetings before September 1993. Koehler
argues that the factual description of the cartel does not
give any evidence or details of anti-competitive content
to
of
AEMCP
September/October 1993 (328). Mougeot contests
its
previous statement by claiming that ‘the Statement of
Objections does not prove that the AEMCP meetings
would have
collusive
mechanisms before restructuring of the association in
first
September 1993'. Mougeot also claims that
it
attended an AEMCP meeting as a member of
the
association on 9 February 1993 and that before that it
was only an observer (329).

served as a framework for

meetings

up

(294) Copigraph submits that the whole cartel was launched
when [an AWA employee]* proposed during an AEMCP
meeting held in Frankfurt on 14 September 1993 a
European carbonless paper
cartel mechanism for
producers. Copigraph argues
the
that before that,
companies did not exchange within the AEMcP any
anti-competitive information (330).

fact

(paragraphs

(113)). The

from the collusion that

Moreover, the evidence from Sappi confirm that before
September 1993 collusion took place also in AEMCP
meetings or in meetings held at the occasion of these
meetings
that
(112),
Mougeot was not yet an AEMCP member at the time of
the first association's meetings it attended, does not
excuse it
took place in the
meetings, as there is evidence that Mougeot participated
in collusive contacts during general cartel meetings as
from May 1992. As for Copigraph's argument, it must
be reminded that the documentary evidence obtained by
the cartel was
the Commission clearly shows
operating
at
both
September
before
national/regional and general
level (i.e. European wide
level in the context of the AEMCP meetings).

1993

that

(b)(2) National or regional cartel meetings

(296) With regard to the national or regional cartel meetings
Copigraph, Koehler and Mougeot contest the evidence
received from Sappi and AWA on their participation in
the cartel meetings before September 1993. Copigraph,
Koehler and Zanders also refute the evidence given by
AWA on their participation in the cartel meetings after
spring 1995.

(297) Copigraph argues that AWA's evidence concerning the
period before September 1993 is nullified by the
evidence given by Sappi, because Sappi does not
explicitly mention Copigraph among the participants in
the French market meetings it has identified for the
same period (331).

(295) The Commission considers that Sappi, Mougeot and
AWA statements read together prove that general cartel
least 1992 onwards.
meetings were held from at

(328) Koehler's

reply

to the Statement of Objections,

file pp.

20704-20705.

(329) Original in French: ‘la Communication des griefs ne démontre pas
que les réunions de l'AEMCP ont servi de cadre à des mècanismes
collusoires avant la restructuration de l'association en september
1993'. Mougeot's reply to the Statement of Objections, file pp.
19717-19718.

(330) Copigraph's

reply to the Statement of Objections,

file pp.

19560-19561.

(298) Koehler claims that the statements and documents from
Sappi and AWA are vague, in particular, because they
merely state that Koehler is believed to have attended
the meetings or that the employee giving the statement
is not sure whether Koehler attended. Regarding the
that
content of
AWA's statement means little and proves nothing when
its says that ‘at some of these meetings described above,
including
carbonless paper prices were also discussed,
discussions of historical trends, but also extending to an

the meetings, Koehler argues (332)

(331) Copigraph's

reply to the Statement of Objections,

file pp.

19562-19565.

(332) Koehler's reply to the Statement of Objections, file p. 20708.

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Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

intentions regarding announcements of
exchange of
price increases' (333).
It also claims that none of the
documentary
cartel
meetings before September/October 1993 gives support
to the Commission finding that these meetings involved
collusion (334).

concerning

evidence

national

as full members in the cartel. Their statements and
replies are against their own interests and are wholly
credible in the light of
the documentary evidence
available.

(299) Koehler also claims that

there can not have been a
cartel from January 1992 to around September 1993 in
which Koehler was involved because its prices fell —
with some fluctuations — during the said period.
Koehler argues that ‘this alone shows that there was no
cartel during this period' (335).

arrangements

(300) The Spanish companies, Torraspapel, Zicuñaga and
Divipa contest
in totality the findings made by the
Commission in the Statement of Objections. These
companies pretend that the Commission has failed to
any
evidence of
collusion and/or
provide direct
participation of
and
them to these
misinterpreted the existing documents. In addition, they
argue that the statements made by Sappi, Mougeot and
AWA can not be held as valid proofs of an infringement
and that the statements are even suspect since those are
not vouching their authenticity. According to the
Spanish companies,
the Commission has merely
accepted the statements of Sappi, AWA and Mougeot
without checking them and carrying out the necessary
investigations. Zicuñaga also claims that the documents
given by Sappi do not constitute a proof of the cartel
because Sappi was not vouching for their authenticity.
Furthermore, the Spanish companies claim that Sappi,
AWA and Mougeot have an interest in concentrating the
Commission's attention on the markets of Spain and
Portugal, which are minor compared to those where
Sappi, AWA and Mougeot have more
important
activities (like UK and France) (336).

(301) The Commission does not have any reason to believe
that
have
Sappi, AWA and Mougeot would
misrepresented the truth in the statements, documents
and replies they have provided. This evidence makes it
abundantly clear that they have themselves participated

(333) AWA's statement, file p. 7829.
(334) Koehler's
reply

to the Statement of Objections,

file pp.

20705-20712.

(335) Koehler's reply to the Statement of Objections, file pp. 20712
in

‘Allein dies belegt, dass es ein Kartell

in German:

(original
diesem Zeitraum nicht gegeben hat').

(336) Replies

to the Statement of Objections: Torraspapel,
p. 20439, Zicuñaga, file p. 18477 and Divipa, file p. 19597.

file

to this

that due

(302) The arguments that Mougeot's and Sappi's statements as
well as AWA's reply are ‘vague' or ‘imprecise' and that
they therefore prove nothing must also be dismissed. In
most cases a considerable amount of time had elapsed
between the cartel meetings and the statements or
replies. Therefore it is understandable that the persons
telling about the cartel have used cautious expressions.
The Commission considers
the
information may be incomplete in some areas, but there
is no reason to believe that something in the statements
is incorrect. The Commission believes that the persons
and companies giving the statements would not have
named other companies even as potential participants in
cartel meetings if they were not involved in the cartel
during that period. The uncertainties relate only to the
question whether certain cartel members participated in
an individual meeting, not to their participation in the
overall
is
comparable to the fact that the companies have found it
more easy to identify the period during which meetings
with a view to implement the overall cartel strategy
were held than to identify the venues of
individual
there is abundant direct
cartel meetings. Moreover,
and
in meetings
evidence
the
together with
agreements
statements made by Mougeot and Sappi.

anti-competitive plan. This problematic

concerning participants

reached

that

fits

(303) The Commission must also dismiss Zicuñaga's claim
that the documents provided by Sappi do not constitute
reliable evidence, because Sappi itself has stated that it
can not validate the documents. Only in its initial letter
to the Commission, dated 29 September 1996, did
Sappi express reservations about the authenticity and
validity of the cartel documents provided by its former
employee. Sappi has explained that, as the documents
were given to it
in the context of a compensation
negotiation due to dismissal of the person in question, it
did not know how the documents should be interpreted.
After this initial contact, Sappi
launched an internal
subsequent
investigation in the matter and in its
submissions to the Commission no such reservations
were made on any of the documents and statements
provided to the Commission. This
includes Sappi's
statement of 11 November 1996 and submission of 18
May 1999 compiling and assessing the main elements of
evidence provided to the Commission starting from the
first documents given on 29 September 1996.

(304)

It should also be noted that the participation of Koehler,
Mougeot and Copigraph in the cartel before September

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/53

the Spanish
1993 and the overall participation of
companies is in each case proven by more than one
statement or document.

6. PART II — LEGAL ASSESSMENT

2.1. JURISDICTION

(305) The arrangements between the undertakings concerned

applied to the whole territory of the EEA.

(306) The EEA Agreement, which contains provisions on
competition analogous to the EC Treaty, came into force
on 1 January 1994. The present Decision therefore
includes the application as from that date of the rules
on competition of the EEA Agreement
(in particular
Article 53(1)) to the arrangements to which objection is
taken (337).

(307)

(308)

the Community, Article 81 of

In so far as the arrangements affected competition in
the common market and trade between Member States
of
the Treaty is
applicable.
In so far as the cartel operations had an
effect on trade between Community and EFTA countries
or between EFTA countries which were part of the EEA,
Article 53 of the EEA Agreement is applicable.

If an agreement or practice affects only trade between
Member States of
the Commission
the Community,
retains competence, and applies Article 81 of the Treaty.
On the other hand if an agreement affects trade only
between EFTA States,
then the EFTA Surveillance
Authority (ESA) is alone competent and will apply the
EEA competition rules
the EEA
Agreement (338).

in Article 53 of

(309)

In the present case the Commission is the authority
competent to apply both Article 81(1) of the Treaty and
Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement, on the basis of
Article 56 of the EEA Agreement, since at any rate the
cartel had an appreciable effect on trade between EC
Member States and competition in the common market.

2.2. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 81 OF THE TREATY AND

ARTICLE 53 OF THE EEA AGREEMENT

2.2.1. ARTICLE 81(1) OF THE EC TREATY AND ARTICLE

53(1) OF THE EEA AGREEMENT

undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
or concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect
the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market, and in particular those
which directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices
or any other
limit or control
production and markets, or share markets or sources of
supply.

trading conditions,

(311) Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement (which is modelled
on Article 81(1) of
the Treaty) contains a similar
prohibition. However the reference in Article 81(1) to
trade ‘between Member States' is replaced by a reference
to trade ‘between contracting parties' and the reference
to competition ‘within the common market' is replaced
by a reference to competition ‘within the territory
covered by … (the EEA) agreement'.

2.2.2. AGREEMENTS AND CONCERTED PRACTICES

(312) Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA
of

agreements,

decisions

Agreement
prohibit
associations and concerted practices.

their

individual

(313) An agreement can be said to exist when the parties
adhere to a common plan which limits or is likely to
by
limit
action or
determining the
abstention from action in the market. It does not have
to be made in writing; no formalities are necessary, and
no contractual sanctions or enforcement measures are
required. The fact of agreement may be express or
implicit in the behaviour of the parties.

their mutual

commercial

lines of

conduct

(310) Article 81(1) of the Treaty prohibits as incompatible
with the common market all agreements between

(314)

(337) See Final Act of the Agreement on the European Economic Area,

OJ L 1, 3.1.1994, p. 3.

(338) Pursuant to Article 56(1)(b) of the EEA Agreement, and without
prejudice to the competence of the Commission, where trade
between Member States of the Community is affected, the ESA is
also competent on cases where the turnover of the undertakings
concerned in the territory of the EFTA States equals 33 % or
more of their turnover in the territory of the EEA.

judgement

Vinyl Maatschappij

in Joined Cases T-305/94 etc.
In its
Limburgse
v
Commission (‘PVC II') (339), the Court of First Instance
stated that ‘it is well established in the case law that for
there to be an agreement within the meaning of Article

and Others

(339) Joined Cases T-305/94 etc. Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij N.V.
[1999] ECR II-931, at

and others v Commission (PVC II),
paragraph 715.

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Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

[81(1)] of the Treaty it is sufficient for the undertakings
to have expressed their joint intention to behave on the
market in a certain way' (340).

(315) Article 81 of

the Treaty

(341) draws a distinction
between the concept of ‘concerted practices' and that of
‘agreements between undertakings' or of ‘decisions by
is to bring
associations of undertakings';
within the prohibition of
that Article a form of
co-ordination between undertakings which, without
having reached the stage where an agreement properly
so-called has been concluded, knowingly substitutes
practical co-operation between them for the risks of
competition (342).

the object

(318) Although in terms of Article 81(1) of the Treaty the
concept of a concerted practice requires not only
concertation but also conduct on the market resulting
from the concertation and having a causal connection
it may be presumed, subject to proof to the
with it,
in such a
contrary,
concertation and remaining active in the market will
take
information exchanged with
competitors in determining their own conduct on the
market, all the more so when the concertation occurs
on a regular basis and over a long period. Such a
concerted practice is caught by Article 81(1) even in the
absence of anti-competitive effects on the market (345).

that undertakings

taking part

account of

the

(319)

(316) The criteria of co-ordination and co-operation laid down
by the case law of the Court, far from requiring the
elaboration of an actual plan, must be understood in the
light of the concept inherent in the provisions of the
Treaty relating to competition, according to which each
economic operator must determine independently the
commercial policy which he intends to adopt in the
of
requirement
common market. Although
independence does not deprive undertakings of
the
right to adapt themselves intelligently to the existing or
anticipated conduct of
strictly
precludes any direct or indirect contact between such
to
operators
influence the conduct on the market of an actual or
potential competitor or to disclose to such a competitor
the course of conduct which they themselves have
decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the
market (343).

the objet or effect whereof

their competitors,

is either

that

it

as

an

infringement may

It is not necessary, particularly in the case of a complex
infringement of long duration, for the Commission to
characterise it as exclusively one or other of these forms
of
illegal behaviour. The concepts of agreement and
concerted practice are fluid and may overlap. Indeed, it
may not even be possible realistically to make any such
distinction,
present
simultaneously the characteristics of each form of
prohibited conduct, while considered in isolation some
of its manifestations could accurately be described as
one rather than the other. It would however be artificial
analytically to sub-divide what is clearly a continuing
common enterprise having one and the same overall
objective into several discrete forms of infringement. A
cartel may therefore be an agreement and a concerted
the same time. Article 81 lays down no
practice at
specific category for a complex infringement of
the
present type (346).

(317) Thus conduct may fall under Article 81(1) of the Treaty
and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement as a ‘concerted
practice' even where the parties have not subscribed to
a common plan defining their action in the market but
knowingly adopt or adhere to collusive devices which
facilitate
commercial
behaviour (344).

co-ordination

their

the

of

(340) The case law of

the Court of

Justice and the Court of First
Instance in relation to the interpretation of Article 81 EC applies
equally to Article 53 EEA. See recitals No 4 and 15 as well as
Article 6 of
the EFTA
Surveillance and Court Agreement as well as Case W-1/94 of
16.12.1994, paragraphs 32-35.

the EEA Agreement, Article 3(2) of

(341) The case law of the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance
analysed below in relation to the interpretation of Article 81 EC
expresses principles well established before the signature of the
EEA Agreement. It therefore applies equally to Article 53 EEA.
(342) Case 48/69 Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1972]

ECR 619, paragraph 64.

(343) Joined Cases 40-48/73 etc. Suiker Unie and Others v Commission

[1975] ECR 1663.

(344) See also the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case
T-7/89 Hercules v Commission [1991] ECR II-1711, paragraph
256.

(320)

In its PVC II judgement (347) the Court of First Instance
stated that ‘[i]n the context of a complex infringement
which involves many producers seeking over a number
the
of years to regulate the market between them,
the
to classify
Commission cannot be
infringement precisely, for each undertaking and for any
given moment, as in any event both those forms of
infringement are covered by Article [81] of the Treaty'.

expected

(321) An ‘agreement' for the purposes of Article 81(1) of the
Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement does not
require the same certainty as would be necessary for the
law.
enforcement of a commercial contract at civil

(345) See the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-199/92P Hüls

v Commission, [1999] ECR I-4287, paragraphs 158—166.
(346) Case T-7/89 Hercules v Commission, ibid., paragraph 264.
(347) Cases T-305/94 etc. Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij N.V. v.

Commission, ibid., paragraph 696.

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in the case of a complex cartel of

long
Moreover,
duration, the term ‘agreement' can properly be applied
not only to any overall plan or to the terms expressly
agreed but also to the implementation of what has been
agreed on the basis of the same mechanisms and in
pursuance of the same common purpose.

of the unlawful behaviour of the other participants or
could have reasonably foreseen or been aware of them
and was prepared to take the risk (349).

2.2.3. SINGLE, CONTINUOUS INFRINGEMENT

(322) As the Court of Justice (upholding the judgement of the
Court of First Instance) has confirmed in Case C-49/92
P Commission v Anic, (348) it follows from the express
terms of Article 81(1) of the Treaty that agreement may
consist not only in an isolated act but also in a series of
acts or a course of conduct.

(323) A complex cartel may thus properly be viewed as a
single continuing infringement for the time frame in
which it existed. The agreement may well be varied
its mechanisms adapted or
from time to time, or
strengthened to take account of new developments. The
validity of
is not affected by the
possibility that one or more elements of a series of
actions or of a continuous course of conduct could
individually and in themselves constitute a violation of
Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA
Agreement.

this assessment

there have been collusive

(326) The statements and documentation given by Sappi show
contacts between
that
European carbonless paper producers at least since the
mid-1980s. However, neither documentary evidence nor
statements
are
available to enable the Commission to assess the nature
of this behaviour in terms of Article 81 of the Treaty
during the period from the mid-1980s to 1992.

cartel participants

from the other

to show the

existence of a single

(327) From the beginning of 1992, however, there is ample
evidence
and
continuous collusion inside the territory that became
the EEA in 1994. The agreement
to enter into this
global plan with a view to restrict competition can
therefore be dated back at least to the beginning of
in pursuit of a single
1992. This
anti-competitive economic aim:
increasing carbonless
paper prices in the whole territory that became the EEA
in 1994.

collusion was

(324) Although a cartel is a joint enterprise, each participant
in the agreement may play its own particular role. One
or more may exercise a dominant role as ringleader or
Internal conflicts and rivalries or even
ringleaders.
the
cheating may occur,
arrangement
or
concerted practice for the purposes of Article 81(1) of
the EEA Agreement
the Treaty and Article 53(1) of
where
common and continuing
objective.

but will not prevent
an agreement

from constituting

is a single

there

(328)

(325) The mere fact that each participant in a cartel may play
the role which is appropriate to its own specific
circumstances does not exclude its responsibility for the
infringement as a whole,
including acts committed by
other participants but which share the same unlawful
purpose and the
effect. An
undertaking which takes part in the common unlawful
enterprise by actions which contribute to the realisation
of the shared objective is equally responsible, for the
whole period of its adherence to the common scheme,
for the acts of the other participants pursuant to the
same infringement. This is certainly the case where it is
established that the undertaking in question was aware

same anti-competitive

by

results

through

evidence

collected

from the

It
the
Commission and in particular from Mougeot's statement
and the evidence from Sappi and AWA that there was a
general cartel plan for
the whole EEA aiming at
increasing carbonless paper prices. It is indeed clear that
the undertakings used AEMCP meetings to carry out
this plan up to September 1993 and implemented it
subsequently
The
non-AEMCP meetings.
working out of
the plan via regular meetings and
frequent price increases is not to be seen as a set of
separate agreements but rather as the implementation of
the same overall and illegal scheme under various
different operational
types of
in question can be regarded as constituent
conduct
elements of a single infringement because they formed
part
common
plan
an
of
objective (350).

arrangements. The

pursuing

overall

a

(329) The Commission collected

between competitors during all
beginning of 1992 to September 1995.

evidence

collusion
the period from the

of

(348) See the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-49/92 P
Commission v Anic Partecipazioni SpA, [1999] ECR I-4125, at
paragraph 81.

(349) Ibid., paragraph 83.
(350) See Case T-1/89 Rhône-Poulenc v Commission [1991] ECR II-867
paragraph 126; Joined Cases T-25/95 and al., 15 March 2000,
paragraph 4027.

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(330) This plan, which was subscribed to by all the AEMCP
member companies — AWA, Binda, Copigraph, Koehler,
Sappi, Stora, Torraspapel, Zanders and Mougeot, which
joined the AEMCP in 1992 — and also by the
non-AEMCP companies Carrs, Divipa and Zicuñaga, was
implemented over a period of more than three and a
half
and
the
pursuing the same common purpose of eliminating
competition. The
unlawful
participants
conducts knew, or ought to have known, that it was
that common
part of an overall plan in pursuit of
unlawful object (351).

same mechanisms

employing

these

years

in

— devising and applying a monitoring system to
restrictive
implementation of

the

ensure
the
agreements;

— adapting their individual conduct and pricing in
order to ensure the implementation of the restrictive
agreements;

— participating in regular meetings and other forms of
contact in order to agree those restrictions and to
implement or modify them as required.

(331) Given the common design and common objective of
eliminating
carbonless paper
competition in the
industry, which the producers pursued steadily, in spite
of the suspension period in the cartel, the Commission
considers that
in question constituted a
single continuing infringement of Article 81(1) of the
Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.

the conduct

(335) Those kinds of arrangements have as their object the
restriction of competition within the meaning of Article
81(1) of
the EEA
the Treaty and Article 53(1) of
Agreement. The arrangements are described in detail in
Part I of this Decision. This description is supported by
widespread and clear evidence, systematically referred to
throughout the text.

2.2.4. RESTRICTION OF COMPETITION

(332) The complex of arrangements in the present case had
the object and effect of restricting competition in the
Community and EEA.

(333) Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA
of
expressly mention

Agreement
competition agreements and concerted practices which:

restrictive

as

— directly or indirectly fix prices or any other trading

conditions;

— limit or control production or markets;

— share markets or sources of supply.

(334) The cartel has to be considered as a whole and in the
light of the totality of the circumstances. The principal
aspects of the complex of agreements and arrangements
in this cartel which can be characterised as restrictions
of competition within the meaning of Article 81(1) of
the Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement are:

— agreeing concerted price increases;

— allocating sales quotas and fixing market shares

(mainly in some national cartel meetings);

(351) See Cement Cases (T-25/95 and al.), 15 March 2000, paragraph

2430.

(336) Whilst

of

the

object
is

the
competition-restricting
agreements and concerted practices
to
conclude that Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article
53(1)
the
the
apply,
the arrangements in
competition-restricting effects of
question have nonetheless also been established (see
paragraphs to (382) to (387)).

Agreement

sufficient

EEA

of

2.2.5. EFFECT UPON TRADE BETWEEN MEMBER STATES OF

THE COMMUNITY AND BETWEEN EEA
CONTRACTING PARTIES

(337) The continuing agreement between the producers had
an appreciable effect upon trade between Member States
of the Community and between Contracting Parties of
the EEA Agreement.

(338) Article 81(1) of the Treaty is aimed at agreements which
might harm the attainment of a single market between
the Member States of
the Community, whether by
partitioning national markets or by affecting the
structure of competition within the common market.
is
Similarly, Article 53(1) of
directed at agreements that undermine the realisation of
a homogeneous European Economic Area.

the EEA Agreement

(339) As demonstrated in the section on Inter-state trade
(paragraphs (29) to (31)), the carbonless paper market is
one which is characterised by a substantial volume of
trade between Member States of the Community. There
trade between the
is also a considerable volume of
Community and EFTA countries which are members of
the EEA. All those EFTA countries,
including Austria,
Finland and Sweden prior to their accession to the
requirements of carbonless
Union,
paper.

import all

their

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(340) The application of Article 81(1) of

limited to that part of

the Treaty and
Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement to a cartel is not,
however,
the members' sales
which actually involve the transfer of goods from one
State to another. Nor is it necessary, in order for these
provisions to apply, to show that the individual conduct
of each participant, as opposed to the cartel as a whole,
affected trade between Member States (352).

(341)

the cartel arrangements covered
In the present case,
virtually all trade throughout the Community and EEA.
The existence of price-fixing, allocation of sales quotas
and market shares must have resulted, or was likely to
result, in the automatic diversion of trade patterns from
the course they would otherwise have followed (353).

2.2.6. PROVISIONS OF COMPETITION RULES APPLICABLE
TO AUSTRIA, FINLAND, ICELAND, LIECHTENSTEIN,
NORWAY AND SWEDEN

(342) The EEA Agreement entered into force on 1 January
1994. For the period prior to that date during which
the cartel operated, the only provision applicable to the
present proceedings is Article 81 of the Treaty; in so far
as the cartel arrangements within that period restricted
competition in Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein,
Norway and Sweden (then EFTA Member States), they
were not caught by that provision.

(343)

the
In the period 1 January to 31 December 1994,
provisions of
the EEA agreement applied to the six
EFTA Member States, which had joined the EEA; the
cartel thus constituted a violation of Article 53(1) of the
EEA Agreement as well as of Article 81(1) of the Treaty,
and the Commission is competent
to apply both
provisions. The restriction of competition in these six
EFTA states during this one-year period falls under
Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.

(344) After the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to
the
the Union on 1 January 1995, Article 81(1) of
Treaty became applicable to the cartel
insofar as it
affected competition in those markets. The operation of
Iceland and Liechtenstein
the
remained in violation of Article 53(1) of
the EEA
Agreement.

in Norway,

cartel

(345)

In practice, it follows that insofar as the cartel operated
Iceland and
in Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden,
Liechtenstein it constituted a violation of
the EEA
and/or Community competition rules as from 1 January
1994.

(352) See the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case T-13/89
Imperial Chemical Industries v Commission [1992] ECR II-1021,
at paragraph 304.

(353) See the judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases 209 to
215 and 218/78 Van Landewyck and Others v Commission,
[1980] ECR 3125, at paragraph 170.

2.2.7. DURATION OF THE INFRINGEMENT

(346) Although Sappi's statements indicate that

there were
collusive contacts between carbonless paper producers
from at least the mid-1980s, the Commission will in the
present case limit its assessment under Article 81 of the
Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement and the
application of any fines to the period from January
1992 onward. This is the moment
from which the
Commission has evidence of regular collusive contacts
between carbonless paper producers. It should of course
be noted that in so far as the cartel affected Austria,
Finland, Norway, Sweden, Iceland and Liechtenstein this
does not constitute an infringement of the competition
rules before 1 January 1994, when the EEA Agreement
came into effect.

(347) The participation in the infringement of most of the
addressees of this Decision is established from that date
or a date close to it. Most of the addressees were already
AEMCP members and many of them had been so since
the AEMCP was set up in 1981.

(348) No date at which the cartel itself ceased to exist can be
established but the Commission has a strong body of
documentary evidence up to September 1995. It cannot
that.
be excluded that
However,
the
Commission will proceed on the basis that the cartel
ended in September 1995.

the collusion continued after
the purposes of assessing fines,

for

(349) On that basis and the summary of the factual evidence
concerning the participation of each company in the
the
cartel, presented in paragraphs
duration of
the infringement established for each of
them is as follows:

to (288),

(263)

AWA

Copigraph (Bolloré)

Carrs

Divipa

Stora (MHTP)

Zicuñaga

Mougeot

from January 1992
until September 1995

from January 1992
until September 1995

from January 1993
until September 1995

from March 1992 until
January 1995

from January 1992
until September 1995

from October 1993
until January 1995

from May 1992 until
September 1995

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21.4.2004

Koehler

Sappi

Torraspapel

Zanders

from January 1992
until September 1995

from January 1992
until September 1995

from January 1992
until September 1995

from January 1992
until September 1995

2.3. LIABILITY FOR THE INFRINGEMENT

(350)

that

throughout

is established by the facts

the
It
specified periods Carrs, Divipa, Mougeot and Koehler
participated directly and autonomously in the cartel.
They are not, and were not at any material
time,
subsidiaries of other companies and will consequently
be addressees of the present Decision.

(351) The question of

the appropriate addressees of

this
Decision arises in the remaining cases, where the issue
of the attribution of the liability to the subsidiary or to
its parent company must be discussed or where a
question of succession arises.

2.3.1. ARJO WIGGINS APPLETON

(352) Over

the entire period of

reference Arjo Wiggins
Appleton plc, the parent company of the Arjo Wiggins
group, participated directly and autonomously in the
cartel
through its division Arjo Wiggins Carbonless
Paper Operation. Arjo Wiggins Appleton Limited (new
name of Arjo Wiggins Appleton plc since 29 November
2001) will thus be an addressee of this Decision. The
fact that AWA plc was taken over on 27 July 2000 (the
very day of
the Statement of
adoption of
Objections) by the French undertaking Compagnie
Worms & Cie (itself a subsidiary of the Agnelli Group)
does not modify the choice of
the Commission to
address this Decision to AWA.

the

had

complete

economic

autonomy.
Copigraph
According to Bolloré this autonomy stems from the
following: the management structures of Copigraph and
Bolloré were strictly separate; Copigraph had its own
infrastructure and Copigraph's commercial policy was
its
independent because it acquired almost 35 % of
raw-material
the Bolloré
group, one of the sources being a competitor (355).

from outside

requirement

(354) Copigraph belonged to Bolloré's special papers division
and the then head of division, […]*, was simultaneously
the Managing Director of Copigraph (356). In addition,
the then Commercial Director of Copigraph, […]*, had
also held a sales position at
the Thonon mill since
1994 (357). Consequently, Bolloré SA was necessarily
informed of its subsidiary's participation in the cartel.

(355) There is also evidence implicating the parent company,
Bolloré SA directly in the cartel activities. Bolloré was a
member of the AEMCP, whose official meetings also
served as cartel meetings from January 1992 until
September 1993. Bolloré's representative, the head of its
special papers division […]*, attended these cartel
meetings together with the Commercial Director of
Copigraph. The head of Bolloré's special papers division
also participated in the French market cartel meeting of
In all subsequent cartel meetings
1 October 1993.
where
representatives of Copigraph are
individual
identified the meeting was attended by the Commercial
Director of Copigraph. All these meetings took place in
1994 and, as mentioned, the Commercial Director of
Copigraph also held simultaneously a sales position in
Bolloré.

(356) On that basis, the Commission concludes that Bolloré
should be held responsible not only for its own conduct
but also for the conduct of Copigraph in relation to the
cartel, for the whole of the specified period.

2.3.3. SAPPI

2.3.2. COPIGRAPH AND BOLLORÉ

(353) Copigraph SA was a wholly owned subsidiary of Bolloré
SA (formerly known as Bolloré Technologies SA) during
the time of the infringement and was acquired by AWA
in November 1998. Copigraph ceased activity on 2
from 30 December
February 2000 with
effect
2000 (354). Bolloré claims
it cannot be held
because
behaviour,
responsible

Copigraph's

that

for

(354) Bolloré's reply to the Statement of Objections, file p. 19938.

(357) Sappi's

and

Sappi

carbonless paper business

in Europe was
managed at the time of the infringement by Sappi (UK)
Limited
individuals
Europe
participating in the meetings between competitors and
implementation of
the decisions taken during these
meetings were employed by these two subsidiaries of
(UK) Limited was a subsidiary
Sappi Limited. Sappi

SA. The

(355) Bolloré's

reply

to the Statement of Objections,

file pp.

19939-19946.

(356) […]* was also the Directeur Général

(Managing Director) of

Bolloré's Thonon mill.

(357) File p. 13352-13354. He held his position at Copigraph from

1992 until 1997.

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reporting directly to the parent company of the group
Sappi Limited and, after May 1995, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Sappi Europe Limited,
itself a wholly
owned subsidiary of Sappi Limited. Sappi Europe SA
was a joint venture of Sappi UK Limited and another
Sappi Limited wholly owned subsidiary reporting to the
(42)).
ultimate
Moreover,
the
participation of more than one subsidiary confirms that
the participation in the cartel was a policy effectively
decided by the parent company.

paragraph
circumstances,

company
the

parent

under

said

(see

infringement period. In particular, SCP (now renamed
Mitsubishi HiTech Paper Bielefeld GmbH) was for the
purposes of
the economic
the present proceedings
successor to Stora Feldmühle AG, having taken over its
carbonless paper business within the group at
the
therefore be
beginning of 1993. This Decision will
addressed to Mitsubishi HiTech Paper Bielefeld GmbH.

2.3.5. TORRASPAPEL

(358) The correspondence with the Commission prior to the
Statement of Objections was made on behalf of Sappi
Limited, Sappi Europe Limited and Sappi UK Limited. It
is true that the reply to the Statement of Objections sent
by the Commission to Sappi Limited alone was given on
behalf of Sappi Europe Limited and Sappi (UK) Limited.
The
the Statement had been
addressed to the wrong party without however giving
any reason for this claim.

reply claimed that

(359) The Commission maintains that Sappi Limited should be
held responsible for the infringement and this Decision
will be addressed to it.

2.3.4. STORA

activity

(360) During the time of the infringement the Stora group
through Stora
carried on its
carbonless
Feldmühle AG and Stora Carbonless Paper GmbH. Until
the end of 1992 the carbonless paper operations of the
group were carried on directly by Stora Feldmühle AG.
At the beginning of 1993 this business was confined to
a new subsidiary of Stora Feldmühle AG, which was
named Stora Carbonless Paper GmbH (SCP) (358).

(361) A concentration between Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags
AB and Enso Oyj was cleared by the Commission in
1998 (359). As a result, Stora Enso Oyj became the new
parent company of the group at the end of December
1998. On 31 December 1998, Stora Enso Oyj sold a
majority holding in SCP to Mitsubishi Paper Mills Ltd.
After
the acquisition SCP's name was changed to
Mitsubishi HiTech Paper Bielefeld GmbH.

(362) On that basis,
HiTech
Paper
responsible

the Commission finds that Mitsubishi
held
Bielefeld GmbH should
the
conduct

be
throughout

the

for

(and still

(363) Sarriopapel y Celulosa SA (Sarrió) was at all material
is) a wholly owned subsidiary of
times
Torraspapel SA (Torraspapel). There is also evidence
implicating the parent company directly in the cartel
activities.
In particular, persons from both Sarrióand
Torraspapel participated in cartel meetings such as the
AEMCP meeting on 14 September 1993, where the
decision to separate the cartel and the trade association
functions was
In addition, Torraspapel SA,
addressee of the Statement of Objections, has not denied
responsibility
Sarriopapel.
Consequently, the present Decision will be addressed to
Torraspapel SA.

behaviour

taken.

the

for

of

2.3.6. ZANDERS

(364) Although

International

Paper
had
Feinpapiere,
International Paper knew about

a majority
is no
there
shareholding in Zanders
indication that
the
participation of Zanders to the cartel or was otherwise
involved in it. Under these circumstances, the present
Decision should be addressed to Zanders.

2.3.7. ZICUÑAGA

(365) Papelera Guipuzcoana de Zicuñaga SA became

in its

‘Papeteries

a
Iberpapel Gestión S.A only in 1997.
subsidiary of
reply to the Statement of
Zicuñaga claims,
to have been the carbonless paper
Objections, not
producer, but a processor and distributor client of its
French subsidiary
SA'.
Nevertheless the evidence relating to the Spanish and
Portuguese markets show the participation of ‘Zicuñaga'.
the Oral Hearing, Zicuñaga
In addition, during
confirmed that it is responsible for setting price policies
for all paper products of the group and consequently,
takes all price decisions also concerning Papeteries de
l'Atlantique products. Therefore this Decision will be
addressed to Papelera Guipuzcoana de Zicuñaga SA.

l'Atlantique

de

(366) On the basis of those considerations, this Decision will

be addressed to the following:

(358) MHTP's (Stora) reply to the Statement of Objections,

file p.

— Arjo Wiggins Appleton Limited,

20405.

(359) Commission Decision 1999/641/EC of 25 November 1998, case

IV/M.1225.

— Bolloré SA,

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Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

— Carrs Paper Ltd,

— Distribuidora Vizcaina de Papeles S.L.,

— Mitsubishi HiTech Paper Bielefeld GmbH,

— Papelera Guipuzoana de Zicuñaga SA,

(370)

— Papeteries Mougeot SA,

— Papierfabrik August Koehler AG,

— Sappi Limited,

— Torraspapel SA,

— Zanders Feinpapiere AG.

2.4. REMEDIES

2.4.1. ARTICLE 3 OF REGULATION NO 17

(367) Where the Commission finds there is an infringement of
Article 81(1) of the Treaty or Article 53(1) of the EEA
Agreement, it may require the undertakings concerned
to bring such infringement to an end in accordance
with Article 3 of Regulation No 17 (360).

(368)

survived.

In the present case the participants in the cartel went to
considerable lengths to conceal their unlawful conduct.
Virtually all documentary traces of the activities of the
cartel were suppressed: almost no minutes, records, lists
In these
invitations
of participants or
circumstances it is not possible to declare with absolute
certainty that all the participants have put an end to the
infringement.
the
therefore
Commission to require the undertakings to which this
Decision is addressed to bring the infringement to an
end (if they have not already done so) and henceforth to
refrain from any agreement, concerted practice or
decision of an association which might have the same
or a similar object or effect.

necessary

for

is

It

the undertakings
preceding business year of each of
participating
either
intentionally or negligently, they infringe Article 81(1)
of the Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.

infringement where,

the

in

regard

In fixing the amount of any fine the Commission must
and
have
particularly
the
infringement, which are the two criteria explicitly
referred to in Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17.

circumstances
of
duration

relevant
and

all
gravity

to
the

(371) The role played by each undertaking party to the
infringement will be assessed on an individual basis. In
particular,
in the fine
imposed any aggravating or mitigating circumstances
the Notice on the
and will apply, as appropriate,
non-imposition
cartel
in
cases (361).

the Commission will

reduction

reflect

fines

or

of

2.4.2.2. The amount of the fines

(372) The cartel constituted a deliberate infringement of
Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article 53(1) of the EEA
restrictive
Agreement: with full knowledge of
character of
their
illegality, the leading producers combined to set up a
secret and institutionalised system designed to restrict
competition in a significant industrial sector.

their actions and, moreover, of

the

(373) The

the

amount of

is determined by the
fines
calculation of a basic amount that will be increased to
take into account of aggravating circumstances or
reduced to take account of attenuating circumstances.

(a) The basic amount

(374) The basic amount is determined according to the gravity

and duration of the infringement.

2.4.2. ARTICLE 15(2) OF REGULATION NO 17

2.4.2.1. General considerations

(a)(1) Gravity of the infringement

(369) Under Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17,

the
Commission may by decision impose upon undertakings
fines of from EUR 1 000 to EUR 1 million, or a sum in
excess thereof not exceeding 10 % of the turnover in the

(375)

(360) Under Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2894/94 of
28.11.1994 concerning
the
Agreement on the European Economic Area ‘the Community
rules giving effect to the principles set out in Articles 85 and 86
[now Articles 81 and 82] of the EC Treaty … shall apply mutatis
mutandis' (OJ L 305, 30.11.1994, p. 6).

arrangements of

implementing

(361) OJ C 207, 18.7.1996, p. 4.

its nature,

In its assessment of the gravity of the infringement, the
its actual
Commission takes account of
impact on the market, where this can be measured, and
the size of the relevant geographic market. It will also
take into account the economic capacity of the offender
in
to cause significant damage to other operators,
particular consumers, and the need to set the fine at a
level
it has a sufficiently deterrent
effect.

that ensures that

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L 115/61

( a ) ( 1 ) ( i ) N a t u r e o f t h e i n f r i n g e m e n t

(376)

It follows from the facts described in Part I that the
present infringement consisted of price fixing market
sharing practices, which are by their very nature the
worst kind of violations of Article 81(1) of the Treaty
and Article 53(1) of the EEA Agreement.

(377) The cartel arrangements involved all major operators in
the EEA and were conceived, directed and encouraged at
high levels in each participating company. By its very
nature, the implementation of that type of cartel leads
automatically to an important distortion of competition,
which is of
to the producers
participating in the cartel and is highly detrimental to
customers and, ultimately, to the general public.

exclusive benefit

(378) The Commission therefore considers that the present
infringement constitutes by its nature a very serious
infringement of Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article
53(1) of the EEA Agreement.

price

(379) AWA requests the Commission to take into account in
setting the fines that in the present case the cartel was
very limited in the scope, because there was no clear
institutional structure, the cartel was essentially limited
effective
to
monitoring
producers
continued to compete with each other. According to
AWA, a distinction should be made between the present
case which concerns ‘not a fully institutionalised cartel'
and ‘strong' cartels with clear institutional structures like
for instance the Cement cartel (362).

co-ordination,

there was

carbonless

paper

and

the

no

(380) Sappi also compares the present case to the Cement
cartel case. Sappi argues that in accordance with the
Cement case, the maximum figure for any fines should
be set by reference to the European turnover in the
product concerned. In addition, Sappi pleads that price
serious
sharing are
fixing and market
infringements (363).

the only

(381) The Commission rejects AWA's and Sappi's arguments.
Firstly it is clear that price-fixing and market sharing
cartels by their nature jeopardise the proper functioning
of the single market. Secondly, the structure established
by the cartel participants has indeed sufficed to achieve
the objectives of the overall plan. Moreover, the Court

(362) See OJ L 343, 30.12.1994, p. 1; AWA's reply to the Statement of

Objections, file pp. 19730-19733 and 19751.

of First Instance has rejected in the Cement case (364)
the parties' argument that some particular institutional
structures were required to achieve a cartel agreement:
‘The infringement constitutes a single agreement by
virtue of the identical nature of the objective pursued by
each participant in the […] agreement, not by virtue of
the methods of implementing that agreement'. Methods
of
implementing must only be proportionate to the
objective of the agreement, and this is the case in the
present proceedings. Finally, in the present case there is
the
evidence that
agreements'
implementation and that this was mainly
done by AWA itself (see also paragraphs (418) to (423)).

involved monitoring of

the cartel

( a ) ( 1 ) ( i i ) T h e a c t u a l i m p a c t o f t h e
i n f r i n g e m e n t

(382) The Commission considers

the

that

infringement,
committed by undertakings which during the period
covered by this Decision accounted for about 85-90 %
of the supply of carbonless paper to the EEA, had an
(both
impact on the carbonless paper market
actual
regarding reels and sheets) in the EEA. The Commission
has a large amount of evidence on implementation of
the price agreements. Occasional quota and market
sharing agreements have also occurred and appear to
have been respected to at least a certain extent (see
paragraph (244)), which shows that the cartel inevitably
had an impact on the behaviour of
the market
participants and, thus, on the market.

paper

producers'

carbonless

(383) Concerted price increases formed the corner stone of
cartel. The Commission collected during the
the
investigations
own
documents on price increases. This information was
complemented by a request for the producers to provide
information on all price increases of general application
(in percentage form) that each of them had announced
since 1 January 1992. Even if the information provided
by the companies did not cover the whole period and
in some cases
these
documents together show that the price increases agreed
actually
between producers were
announced to customers (to printers and/or merchants).
In certain cases where no price increase letters were
available,
documents
reporting on internal decisions to implement the price
increases.

the Commission has

in a disparate form,

to large

it was

extent

found

(384)

In particular,
the documentary evidence shows that
most of the price increases agreed at the general and
national/regional cartel meetings for the period from

(363) Sappi's reply to the Statement of Objections, file p. 20623.

(364) Joint Cases T-25/95 and al., 15 March 2000, par. 4126-4127.

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21.4.2004

actually
January 1994 to September 1995 were
announced to customers. The agreed or concerted
increases thus served as a reference point in individual
negotiations on transaction prices with customers.

(385) The members of the cartel accounted for almost the
entire supply of carbonless paper on the EEA carbonless
paper market. As a result of the collusive price increase
initiatives, customers were faced with uniform price
increases announcements, with hardly any possibility of
obtaining supplies from a producer not involved in the
cartel.

(386) There is also evidence that the implementation of agreed
failure to
price increases was monitored and that
implement them would be discussed at the national or
regional cartel meetings (see for instance paragraphs
(97) to (106)). This strengthens the conclusion on actual
impact of the cartel.

(387) The Commission has also found evidence that at least in
the parties agreed on the
some national meetings
allocation of sales quantities and fixing of market shares
as well as exchanged confidential information on their
sales volumes. Comparison of the sales quotas agreed
information exchanged in those
and the volume
information received from the
meetings with the
real sales figures shows a close
producers on their
correlation (see paragraphs to (241)
to (251)). This
demonstrates that
the information exchange and the
quota agreements had an impact on the sales volumes
of the producers.

impact of

the actual

they concentrate on arguing that

(388) AWA, Carrs, MHTP (Stora), Koehler, Sappi and Zanders
claim that
the cartel on the
carbonless paper market in the EEA was very limited or
that the cartel had no negative impact at all. In this
there was
respect,
limited or no impact on prices, because the prices
actually realised on the market were lower than the
agreed or announced increases. According to these
cartel participants,
the agreed price
this shows that
increases were not implemented in practice. They have
put forward many arguments to support this assertion,
which include in particular the following claims: prices
and producers' margins have
fallen substantially;
carbonless paper prices essentially reflect changes in
pulp costs and demand, and during the later phases of
the cartel the capacity constraints; competition between
the producers
and producers had to
negotiate price increases with customers on individual
basis.

continued;

prices for the producers and to the decreasing producer
margins. AWA submits that over the 1990s carbonless
paper prices have fallen substantially. AWA also argues
that its margins have fallen even more than carbonless
prices, which it claims, shows that the cartel was limited
in scope and that carbonless paper consumers have
been able to appropriate much of the benefit of cost
reductions achieved by AWA. Also Sappi argues that
due to rapid discounting of prices and losses in its
business, it is unclear that paper buyers suffered any, or
loss. MHTP (Stora) states that in 1992
any significant,
and 1993 carbonless paper prices fell substantially, but
that prices improved in autumn 1993 and until autumn
1995. A graph in AWA's
reply shows a similar
development. According to MHTP (Stora) this recovery
only returned prices to the 1992 level and the increase
occurred in parallel with pulp prices, which were rising
steeply (365).

(390) AWA has submitted an expert report (366), the main
to demonstrate that although
purpose of which is
concertation did take place during the period from
1992 to mid 1995, it was not effective in raising prices
above levels that would have prevailed in the absence of
any cartel meetings.

— The characteristics of the carbonless paper market
make successful price fixing very difficult. The
report underlines
lack of
sufficient concentration on the supply side, disparity
in size of firms, low barriers to entry and high fixed
costs.

in this

respect

the

— In the period 1994-1997 there is little relationship
between the price increases announced and the
actual prices obtained. To a large degree realised
prices moved in line with the price of pulp.

— Identical price

explained by
economic theory, and do not necessarily signify
concerted behaviour.

increases

can be

— The fluctuations in AWA's market shares in different
concerted

effective

shows

that

no

countries
behaviour took place.

(389) AWA, MHTP (Stora), Koehler and Sappi refer to the
carbonless paper

unfavourable development of

the

(365) Replies to the Statement of Objections: AWA file p. 19738-19739,

MHTP (Stora) file p. 20420, Sappi file p. 20624.

(366) AWA's reply to the Statement of Objections, Annex 1:

‘An
economic assessment of the effectiveness of concertation in the carbonless
paper market', NERA, December 2000, file p. 19766-19806.

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Official Journal of the European Union

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— Excerpts from AWA's business plans for the period
1993-1997, each of which provide commentary on
market outcomes in the previous year, indicate that
competition
producers
continued to be vigorous with customers being won
and lost.

carbonless

between

and increasing demand (368). AWA, which has submitted
an expert report to support its argument on limited
impact of the cartel, claims that the carbonless paper
prices are strictly linked to changes in the cost of pulp.
AWA's expert report argues that during the period from
early 1994 to mid 1995 carbonless paper producers
could increases prices only by the same amount as the
actual change in the cost of pulp (369).

(391) Koehler submits that it felt compelled to counteract the
dramatic losses it had experienced in 1992 and 1993
(due to falling carbonless prices) by joining the cartel.
As Koehler did not manage to keep its carbonless paper
business profitable in spite of participation in the cartel,
it claims that the cartel could not have had any negative
impact on the market. Koehler concludes that the price
agreements had no negative impact on the customers,
because customers were not supplied at
fair market
prices but at prices below-cost (367).

to

due

only

customers'

(392) The Commission must dismiss AWA's, MHTP's (Stora),
Koehler's and Sappi's arguments. Above all, the mere
fact that price announcements were made in amount
and timing following concertation suffices to show an
impact on the market. During the period covered by
this Decision the carbonless paper market was declining;
there was large structural over-capacity and demand was
temporary increases in
decreasing. There were short,
demand
stock-building.
Moreover, several parties to the cartel have reported in
their replies to the Statement of Objections on large and
persistent
losses during the period concerned. Some
confirm that these losses were a reason for them to join
the cartel. Minutes of the official AEMCP meetings even
record that, faced with these difficulties, the parties were
considering the sending of a crisis cartel exemption
application to the Commission. The Commission
accepts that in such a market situation the prices can be
expected to decrease, but considers that this does not
exclude that the cartel managed to control or limit the
price decrease. Consequently,
the cartel may have
impeded the production capacity to adjust naturally to
the demand by maintaining inefficient competitors in
the market longer than they would have stayed under
normal conditions of competition.

(393) MHTP (Stora) submits that carbonless paper prices could
be increased only when that was made possible by
economic circumstances, in particular rising pulp prices

a

as

and,

producers

(394) Both AWA and MHTP (Stora) claim that the competition
result,
continued
between
announced price increases were frequently not passed
on to customers (370). AWA submits that carbonless
producers continued to make competitive aggressive
approaches
offering
other's
particularly favourable prices and also competing on
service
there were
considerable customer switching between suppliers, and
variations of market shares at national
level (while at
European level there were no dramatic variations). AWA
in prices was the result of
also submits that the fall
continued competition.

customers,

and that,

result,

levels

each

to

as

a

(395) MHTP (Stora) argues that the Statement of Objections
provides numerous illustrations of differences of opinion
between the members of the cartel and of failure to
implement agreements. MHTP (Stora) concludes that the
cartel did not have any real
success because of
disagreement within the group of participants. Zanders
refers to four documents annexed to the Statement of
Objections, which it says show that attempted price and
quota agreements were not implemented (371).

(396) The Commission dismisses the arguments of AWA,
MHTP (Stora) and Zanders. Regarding AWA's arguments

(368) MHTP (Stora) reply to the Statement of Objections,

file pp.

20420-20421.

(369) This conclusion is based on comparison of AWA's net realised
prices in local currency in three countries, France, UK and Spain
with the agreed price increases and with the cost of pulp for
AWA. The report assumes that AWA's realised prices provide a
good approximation for overall market prices and that the pulp
prices paid by AWA also represent the general level paid in this
of
industry. The
development of the pulp prices AWA has paid and its carbonless
paper prices in Europe during the period 1992-1998. The report
concludes that there is a strong correlation between changes in
pulp prices and carbonless paper prices. AWA's reply to the
‘An economic assessment of
Statement of Objections, Annex 1:
the effectiveness of concertation in the carbonless paper market',
NERA, December 2000, file pp. 16-26.

comparison

presents

expert

report

a

(370) Replies

to the

Statement of Objections: AWA,

file pp.

19730-19733, MHTP (Stora), file pp. 20421-40424.

(367) Koehler's

reply
pp. 20728-20729.

to

the

Statement

of Objections,

file

(371) Zanders'

reply

to the

Statement of Objections,

file pp.

20506-20507.

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allocation and agreements

to limit
on customer
competition on service levels, these do not appear to be
the overall anti-competitive
constitutive elements of
the participants would have
plan. Therefore, even if
continued to compete on these factors,
it does not
prove as such that the cartel could not have had any
effect or could only have had a limited effect on the
pricing of carbonless paper.

(401)

is generally the printer, not a
where the customer
merchant. Carrs submits that, as reels are mostly sold
directly to final customers, reels prices are not generally
quoted as List Prices and Net Prices and, therefore, any
agreement
to change prices for reels would directly
affect final customer prices (373).

the

fact

‘Cartonboard'

In the light of the Court of First Instance's judgements
case (374),
the
that
in the
undertakings
agreed price
actually announced the
increases and that the prices so announced served as
basis for fixing individual transaction prices suffices in
itself for a finding that the collusion on prices had both
as its object and effect a restriction of competition. As
already concluded, this has been proven in the present
case. Therefore, it is not necessary to analyse whether
the changes in the realised transaction prices followed
those in announced prices in order to show that the
cartel had an actual impact on the EEA carbonless paper
market.

(402) Finally,

it

the

that

concludes

Commission

is
inconceivable that
the parties would have repeatedly
agreed to meet in locations across Europe to fix price
increases, and in some cases also to allocate sales
quotas, over such a long period, having regard inter alia
to the risks involved, if they had perceived the cartel as
having no impact or only a limited impact on the
carbonless paper market in the EEA.

( a ) ( 1 ) ( i i i ) T h e s i z e o f t h e r e l e v a n t

g e o g r a p h i c m a r k e t

(403) The cartel covered the whole of the common market
and, following its creation the whole of the EEA. Every
part of the common market, and later the EEA was
under the influence of the collusion. For the purposes
of assessing the gravity of the infringement as a whole,
the Commission therefore considers the entirety of the
Community and, following its creation, the EEA, to have
been affected by the cartel.

( a ) ( 1 ) ( i v ) C o n c l u s i o n o f t h e C o m m i s s i o n
o n t h e g r a v i t y o f t h e
i n f r i n g e m e n t a s a w h o l e

(404) Taking into account the nature of the behaviour under
scrutiny,
impact on the carbonless paper
market and the fact that it covered the whole of the
common market and, following its creation, the whole

its actual

(373) Carrs' reply to the Statement of Objections, file pp. 20344-20346

and 20356.

(374) See e.g. the judgement of the Court of First Instance in Case
T-354/94 Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB vs. Commission
(‘Cartonboard') [1998] ECR II-2111, paragraph 170.

the

failure

the most part

agreements. The

that
show any complete

(397) As for the examples that MHTP (Stora) and Zanders
have extracted from the Statement of Objections, the
those
for
Commission notes
examples do not
to
implement
evidence on the
meetings and price increases (see Chapters and ) shows
that occasionally the agreed increases were postponed to
increases were
later
implemented (e.g. 6 or 7,5 % instead of 10 %) or further
meetings were arranged to revise the agreement. The
cartel thus had an impact on the pricing policies of the
the implemented increases
cartel members even if
occasionally fell short of the agreed levels or they were
implemented later.

somewhat

smaller

dates,

(398) AWA claims that with respect to prices, the cartel was
necessarily limited in scope and effectiveness because
the producers had to negotiate price increases with
customers on an individual basis. According to AWA,
this made deliberate disregard for agreements with
competitors both easy and frequent. AWA submits that
‘any price increases announced by agreement with
competitors served merely as an opening position for
subsequent negotiations with customers on prices' (372).

(399) Carrs submits that

the meetings and other collusive
contacts in which it participated concerned movements
in so called ‘List Prices', which are prices quoted on the
price lists issued by producers, and that its participation
in discussions on ‘List Prices' for sheets had very limited
market effects. According to Carrs, this is due to the fact
that the sheets are sold through merchants with which
the producer has to negotiate in order to get List Price
increases passed on to printers. In the sheets business
suppliers use heavy discounts and other promotional
schemes to arrive at
the price to printers, which is
called ‘Net Price'.

(400) According to Carrs, the price collusion had considerable
importance to reels manufactures, but
limited or no
significance to sheet manufacturers, because the pricing
of sheets is fundamentally different from the reel market

(372) AWA's reply to the Statement of Objections, file pp. 19730-19731.

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EEA, the Commission considers that the undertakings
concerned by
committed an
this Decision have
infringement of Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article
53(1) of the EEA Agreement, which was very serious.

the effective capacity of

(405) Within the category of very serious infringements, the
proposed scale of likely fines makes it possible to apply
differential treatment to undertakings in order to take
account of
the offenders to
cause significant damage to competition and to set the
fine at a level which ensures it has sufficient deterrent
effect. The Commission notes that this exercise seems
particularly necessary where, as in the present case,
there is considerable disparity in the size of
the
undertakings participating in the infringement.

— Classification of cartel participants

(406)

the fines to take account of

In the circumstances of this case, which involves several
it will be necessary in setting the basic
undertakings,
amount of
the specific
weight and therefore the real
impact of the offending
conduct of each undertaking on competition. For this
purpose the undertakings concerned can in principle be
divided into four categories established according to
their
relative importance in the market concerned,
subject to adjustment where appropriate to take account
of other
factors and especially the need to ensure
effective deterrence.

(407) As

for

the

the

the basis

comparison of

relative
importance of an undertaking in the market concerned,
the Commission considers it appropriate to take in the
turnover. This
present case the EEA-wide product
approach is supported by the fact
this is an
EEA-wide cartel, the principal object of which was inter
alia to agree concerted price increases throughout the
EEA. The comparison is made on the basis of
the
EEA-wide product turnovers in year 1995. Table 1(b) in
paragraph (18) provides the relevant figures.

that

(408) AWA is by far the largest carbonless paper producer in
it will be placed alone in the
the EEA and, therefore,
first category. MHTP, Zanders and Koehler, which are
(or were) the medium-sized operators in the carbonless
second
in EEA, will
paper market
category.
had
and
significantly lower relative market shares in the EEA
level, are placed in the third category. Sappi and
Mougeot, which are significantly smaller in the EEA, are
placed in the fourth category. Divipa, Zicuñaga and
Carrs, which had sales mainly in one or a few EEA
countries, are placed in the fifth category.

constitute
Bolloré, which

Torraspapel

the

(409) On that basis, the Commission sets the amounts of the

fines determined for gravity as follows:

— AWA: EUR 70 million,

— MHTP, Zanders, Koehler: EUR 24,5 million,

— Torraspapel, Bolloré: EUR 10,5 million,

— Sappi, Mougeot: EUR 5,6 million,

— Divipa, Zicuñaga, Carrs: EUR 1,4 million.

— Sufficient deterrence.

In order to ensure that the fine has a sufficient deterrent
effect, the Commission will further determine whether
any adjustment of the starting amount is needed for any
firm.

In the cases of AWA, Sappi and Bolloré the Commission
considers that the appropriate starting amount for a fine
resulting from the criterion of the relative importance in
the market
upward
adjustment
their size and their
overall resources.

to take account of

concerned

requires

further

(410)

(411)

(412) On that basis, the Commission considers that the need
for deterrence requires that the starting amount for the
fines determined under paragraph (409)
should be
increased by 100 % to EUR 140 million as regards
AWA, to EUR 21 million as regards Bolloré and to EUR
11,2 million as regards Sappi.

(a)(2) Duration of the infringement

(413) The Commission has

found that AWA, Copigraph
(Bolloré), Koehler, Sappi, MHTP (Stora), Torraspapel and
Zanders infringed Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article
53(1) of the EEA Agreement from January 1992 until
1995. Mougeot
September
same
infringement
from May 1992 until September 1995,
Carrs from January 1993 until September 1995, Divipa
from March 1992 until
January 1995 and Zicuñaga
from October 1993 until January 1995.

committed

the

(414) The Commission concludes that the infringement was of
every

to five

years)

for

medium duration (one
undertaking involved.

Torraspapel

(415) AWA, Copigraph (Bolloré), Koehler, Sappi, MHTP
an
(Stora),
infringement of
three years and nine months. The
starting amounts of the fines determined for gravity (see
paragraph (409)) are therefore increased for each of
them by 35 % in total.

and Zanders

committed

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Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

(416)

In the case of Mougeot, Carrs, Divipa and Zicuñaga, the
duration of the infringement varied between one year
and four months and three years and five months. The
starting amounts of the fines determined for gravity are
therefore increased by 30 % for Mougeot, by 25 % for
Carrs, by 25 % for Divipa and by 10 % for Zicuñaga.

(a)(3) Conclusion on the basic amount

(417) The Commission accordingly sets the basic amounts of

the fines as follows:

Arjo Wiggins Appleton
Limited

EUR 189 million

Bolloré SA

EUR 28,35 million

Carrs Paper Ltd

EUR 1,75 million

Distribuidora Vizcaína
de Papeles S.L

Mitsubishi HiTech Paper
Bielefeld GmbH

Papelera Guipuzcoana de
Zicuñaga SA

EUR 1,75 million

EUR 33,075 million

EUR 1,54 million

Papeteries Mougeot SA

EUR 7,28 million

Papierfabrik August Koehler AG EUR 33,075 million

Sappi Limited

EUR 15,12 million

Torraspapel SA

EUR 14,175 million

Zanders Feinpapiere AG

EUR 33,075 million

(b) Aggravating circumstances: role of leader in the

infringement

(418) There is no doubt

that AWA, which is the leading
the
producer of carbonless paper
principal leader of the cartel throughout the EEA. The
factual evidence on meetings presented in Part I shows
that
convened and
conducted by representatives of AWA. AWA was also
the instigator of the restructuring of the cartel.

cartel meetings were

in Europe, was

several

least

(419) There are also indications that the price increases agreed
two general cartel meetings and several
by at
national meetings originated from AWA, and that AWA
demanded that the other participants make the same
increases. AWA's position as the cartel leader is further
the general cartel
corroborated by the minutes of
meeting of 2 February 1995, which state explicitly that

the meeting (375).

AWA will lead the announcements of the price increases
agreed at
the documentary
evidence on price increase announcements show that
AWA was often the first to announce the price increases
to the market, and that other competitors ‘followed'
those announcements (376).

Indeed,

(420) AWA claims that there was no principal leader, but that
‘cartel meetings were held as a result of mutual
agreement on the need for a meeting'. According to
AWA cartel meetings ‘were “convened” by any single
company,
companies
involved had to take responsibility for arranging a room
for the meeting'. AWA submits that, in addition to itself
and Torraspapel, at least Koehler, Mougeot and Stora
reserved meeting rooms (377).

although clearly one of

the

(421) AWA argues that the concertation between carbonless
producers took place by mutual consent and did not
require threats or sanctions. AWA refutes Mougeot's
the wordings used by
that
statements and argues
Mougeot reflect its own attitude rather than objective
facts about AWA. AWA also alleges
in
Mougeot's financial
interests today to portray itself as
the victim of coercion. AWA argues that it was smaller
than Stora and International Paper (the then owner of
Zanders) and in the same league as Bolloré (the then
owner of Copigraph) and Sappi.

that

is

it

(422) AWA also disagrees with the Commission finding that at
least some price increases originated from AWA and
that it demanded the others to follow its increases. AWA
accepts that on various occasions it made particular
suggestions as to price announcements that it might
make, but claims that other companies made such
It stresses that carbonless producers
suggestions too.
acted out of a common view of their mutual interests
and that cartel meetings involved a genuine exchange of
views and suggestions from all those present.

(423) The Commission rejects AWA's arguments. A coherent
set of evidence shows
that AWA, which had an
economic leadership in the carbonless paper market and
was in a position to exercise pressure on its competitors
due to the fact that it acquired or distributed (378) large
proportions of some small producers output, had also a

(375) File p. 7.
(376) See for instance file pp. 2510, 2719 and 4607.
(377) AWA's reply to the Statement of Objections, file pp. 19744-9745.
(378) Either itself or through distributors belonging to AWA group.

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/67

key role in monitoring and ensuring the compliance
with the agreements (379). On this point, Mougeot's
a
declarations, which
of
themselves
presentation generally in line with the rest of
the
evidence, fits with these indications on AWA's role in
the cartel. Moreover, it should be noted that AWA does
not contest Mougeot's statement
that AWA audited
Sarrió's sales volume information.

form part

(424) With regard to this aggravating factor, it is appropriate
to increase the basic amount of the fine by 50 % for
AWA.

(c) Attenuating circumstances

(c)(1) An exclusively passive or ‘follow-my-leader' role

(425) Carrs, Copigraph and Torraspapel claim that they played
an exclusively passive role in the infringement and that
they were forced to participate in the cartel due to the
pressure exercised on them by the cartel leader AWA.
Koehler also submits that threats by AWA were a factor
pushing it to take part in the collusion (380).

(426) The Commission rejects those arguments. Firstly,

other

including Carrs

cartel members,

the
Commission notes that in a cartel and for the purpose
of determining the appropriate fine there can be three
categories of cartel members:
leaders, active members
and passive members. In the present case, AWA was the
overall cartel leader. The Commission considers that all
and
the
Copigraph (Bolloré), were active members. Carrs and
Copigraph participated regularly in the cartel meetings
on their national markets. Carrs has even stated that it
participated in a larger number of UK and Irish market
meetings than identified in the Statement of Objections.
Copigraph (Bolloré), which had more sales outside its
home market than Carrs, was also a regular participant
in the general cartel meetings. There is also large
amount evidence on their participation in the price
regularly
showing
increase
announced to the customers the agreed or concerted
price increases.

initiatives

they

that

(427) Secondly, the Commission considers that the threats (in
this
justify
cartel
infringements of the Community and EEA competition
rules. Instead of joining the cartel, the companies should

from the

cannot

leader)

case

(379) See paragraphs (104), (109), (120), (143), (217) and (228).
(380) Replies to the Statement of Objections: Carrs file p. 20371,
Copigraph file p. 19566, Torraspapel file p. 20477, and Koehler
file p. 20728.

have informed the competent authorities, including the
Commission,
their
illegal
competitors in order to put an end to it.

behaviour

the

of

of

(c)(2) Termination of the infringement

(428) MHTP claims that the cartel came to an end by autumn
1995 and thus before the first inspections were carried
out. According to MHTP, this should be regarded as an
attenuating circumstance when setting the fines (381).

(429) However, the Commission has taken into account for
the assessment of
this infringement only the limited
period of time for which it considered to have sufficient
evidence. Since this is an obvious infringement,
the
claim of MHTP to have early termination considered as
an attenuating circumstance must be rejected.

(c)(3) Other attenuating circumstances

(430) AWA argues that the critical situation in the European
carbonless paper sector should be in itself viewed as an
attenuating circumstance. AWA submits that the sector
was
the
in crisis and long-term decline and that
Commission has in recent decisions concerning Alloy
surcharges and Seamless steel tubes cartels (382) taken
such matters (383). Copigraph (Bolloré),
account of
Koehler and Mougeot plead that the Commission should
take into account as a mitigating factor
their
carbonless businesses made losses during the period
decision (384). Copigraph
covered by
to the Court of First
(Bolloré) refer in this respect
Instance's
SpA
Enichem Anic
in the
judgement
case (385).

the present

that

(381) MHTP's (Stora) reply to the Statement of Objections,

file pp.

20424-20425.

(382) Commission Decision 98/247/ECSC of 21 January 1998 in case
IV/35.814 — Alloy surcharge, OJ L 100, 1.4.1998, p. 55, at
paragraphs 83-84 and Commission decision of 8 December 1999
in case IV/E-1/35.860 — Seamless steel tubes, paragraphs 168
and 169, not yet published.

to the

(383) AWA's reply to the Statement of Objections, file pp. 19734.
(384) Replies

Statement of Objections: AWA file pp.
19740-19741, Koehler file pp. 20680-20681 and 20731, Mougeot
file pp. 19724. All competitors pleading on losses, except AWA,
have provided some annual data on the result of their carbonless
paper businesses starting from 1992 until years 1997, 1998 or
1999. The figures, while showing significant variation from year
to year, show that these producers made also profits during the
relevant period.

(385) Replies

to the Statement of Objections: Copigraph file pp.
19570-19571 and Bolloré pp. 19946-19947. See also Case T-6/89
II-1623, at
Enichem Anic Spa v Commission, ECR [1991]
paragraphs 290-291.

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21.4.2004

(431) The Commission does not consider that, in general, the
lack of benefit from a cartel constitutes an attenuating
circumstance in the fixing of the fine, or that there
would be a right of the undertakings to a reduction in
such a case. In addition, the information received in the
replies to the Statement of Objections and the MHA
report commissioned by the AEMCP (386) does not
support the conclusion that the carbonless paper sector
was
in a serious crisis comparable to the sectors
concerned in the previous cartel cases mentioned by the
period
the
undertakings,
1992-1995.

infringement

during

(c)(4) Conclusion on the attenuating circumstances

(432) The Commission concludes that

in the present case

there are no attenuating circumstances.

(d) Conclusion on the amounts of fines prior to any
application of the Commission notice on the
non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel
cases

(433) The Commission accordingly sets the amounts of the
fines prior to any application of the Commission notice
on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel
cases (‘Leniency Notice') as follows:

Arjo Wiggins Appleton
Limited

EUR 283,5 million

Bolloré SA

EUR 28,35 million

Carrs Paper Ltd

EUR 1,75 million

Distribuidora Vizcaína
de Papeles S.L

Mitsubishi HiTech Paper
Bielefeld GmbH

Papelera Guipuzcoana
de Zicuñaga SA

EUR 1,75 million

EUR 33,075 million

EUR 1,54 million

Papeteries Mougeot SA

EUR 7,28 million

Papierfabrik
August Koehler AG

EUR 33,075 million

(434) However, since the final amounts calculated according
to that method may not in any case exceed 10 % of the
world-wide turnover of the addressees (as laid down by
Article 15(2) of Regulation No 17), the fines will be set
as follows:

Arjo Wiggins Appleton
Limited

EUR 283,5 million

Bolloré SA

EUR 28,35 million

Carrs Paper Ltd

EUR 1,75 million

Distribuidora Vizcaína
de Papeles S.L

Mitsubishi HiTech Paper
Bielefeld GmbH

Papelera Guipuzcoana
de Zicuñaga SA

EUR 1,75 million

EUR 23,6 million

EUR 1,54 million

Papeteries Mougeot SA

EUR 7,28 million

Papierfabrik
August Koehler AG

EUR 33,075 million

Sappi Limited

EUR 15,12 million

Torraspapel SA

EUR 14,175 million

Zanders Feinpapiere AG

EUR 33,075 million

(e) Application of the Commission's Leniency

Notice

stages of

(435) Some of the addressees of this Decision have cooperated
with the Commission at different
the
investigation and in relation to different periods of the
infringement covered by this Decision for the purpose
in the
of receiving favourable treatment as set out
Leniency Notice.
the legitimate
In order
expectations of the undertakings concerned as to the
non-imposition or reduction of the fines on the basis of
their cooperation,
it is necessary to examine whether
the parties concerned satisfied the conditions set out in
the Leniency Notice.

to meet

Sappi Limited

EUR 15,12 million

reduction in its amount

(e)(1) Non-imposition of a fine or a very substantial

Torraspapel SA

EUR 14,175 million

Zanders Feinpapiere AG

EUR 33,075 million

(436) Sappi submits that it is entitled to total exemption from
the cartel agreements

any fine levied in respect of
covered by this Decision (387).

(386) Refer to footnote 10.

(387) Sappi's reply to the Statement of Objections, file pp. 20602 and

20620-20622.

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/69

(437) The Commission acknowledges that Sappi submitted to
the Commission information about the cartel covered
by this Decision before the Commission had undertaken
any investigation. The Commission also acknowledges
that when on 11 November 1996 Sappi submitted a
regarding its participation in the
written statement
sufficient
cartel,
information to establish the existence of
the alleged
cartel.

the Commission did not have

its

the cartel's existence. After

(438) Sappi was the first of the cartel members to adduce
evidence of
initial
submission to the Commission, Sappi provided further
information and documents on the cartel
in several
submissions from 1996 to 1999. The evidence provided
by Sappi consists essentially of minutes of cartel
meetings, minutes of AEMCP meetings,
employee
(including
the cartel
statements on functioning of
descriptions of cartel meetings, persons present and
agreements reached), documentation on price increases
and information on the market and the association
AEMCP.

(439) The

to

information provided by Sappi
existence,
establish

enabled the
and
Commission
content
participants of several cartel meetings and existence of
collusive contacts during the period subject
to the
present proceedings. The Commission concludes that
it does not
the evidence provided by Sappi, even if
cover all aspects of the cartel, has given decisive proof
on existence of
the cartel. The Commission also
considers that Sappi has maintained continuous and
complete cooperation throughout the investigation.

(440) Sappi submits that it put a complete end to any cartel
activity from the date at which it disclosed it to the
Commission. It also submits that it even decided not to
participate in the following AEMCP meetings, in order
to avoid even the appearance of any opportunity for
collusive contact with competitors and to underline that
it was not going to be party to any collusive action in
the future (388).

(441) The Commission acknowledges that Sappi had put an
end to its participation into the operation of the cartel
at the date of its first approach to the Commission on
19 September 1996 and of its written submission on 11
November 1996.

(442) Finally, Sappi has not compelled any other enterprise to
in the cartel and it has not acted as an

take part
instigator in the cartel nor has it been the ringleader.

(388) Sappi's

reply

to the

Statement of Objections,

file pp.

20604-20606 and 20615-20616.

(443) The Commission considers that

from section B of

to
this allows Sappi
the Leniency Notice.
benefit
Accordingly,
the Commission grants Sappi a 100 %
reduction of the fine that would have imposed if it had
not cooperated with the Commission.

(e)(2) Substantial reduction in a fine

(444) Mougeot was the second cartel member

to adduce
the cartel. On 14 April 1999, after the
evidence of
Commission had undertaken investigations ordered by
decision and sent a request for information to Mougeot,
Mougeot provided to the Commission a statement and
documents relevant to the case.

(445) The Commission considers

that at

sufficient

the time when
Mougeot started to co-operate with it, Sappi had already
information to establish the
submitted
existence of the cartel. Consequently, the Commission
concludes that Mougeot's co-operation does not meet
the conditions laid down in point (b) of Section B of the
Leniency Notice and that it does not, therefore, qualify
to
for a substantial reduction in the fine pursuant
Section C of the Leniency Notice.

(e)(3) Significant reduction in a fine

( e ) ( 3 ) ( i ) E v i d e n c e p r o v i d e d t o t h e

C o m m i s s i o n b e f o r e t h e S t a t e m e n t
o f O b j e c t i o n s

(446) Before

the Commission adopted its Statement of
and
Objections, Mougeot, AWA, MHTP
Copigraph provided the Commission with information
and/or documents. There are, however, considerable
differences
their
co-operation.

quality

(Stora)

extent

and

the

of

in

(447) Mougeot

detailed

provided

voluntarily
giving

statements
and
documents
information on cartel
meetings (mainly concerning its home market France),
including
the meetings,
participants, contents of the meetings and agreements
reached.

information on dates of

(448) AWA voluntarily

submitted

the Commission
information on cartel meetings detailing the periods
the
during which in various Member States of
such meeting were held and listing
Community

to

L 115/70

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

the
participating companies. On the
meetings AWA stated that ‘at some of these meetings …
carbonless paper prices were discussed … extending to
an exchange of intentions regarding announcements of
price increases' (389).

contents of

(449)

for
In addition to strictly replying to the request
its
information, Copigraph admitted that one of
executives had attended two or three meetings between
competitors in 1993—1994 where price increases were
agreed and listed other participants to these meetings.

(450) MHTP (Stora)'s reply was the most obscure; it admitted
discussions between competitors on prices, but claimed
that no agreement on increases was reached. This vague
and unsubstantiated indication cannot be qualified as
that
information
to
documents
or
contributed
establishing the existence of
the infringement and
therefore does not justify any reduction on fine.

(451)

it

an obligation to

is entitled to a
In addition, Koehler argues that
reduction in the fine because it gave a
significant
detailed reply in response to the Commission's request
that
information. The Commission observes
for
undertakings have
the
supply
information requested by the Commission under Article
11 of Regulation No 17. Regulation No 17 imposes on
undertakings an obligation to cooperate actively, which
implies
to the
Commission all
information relating to the subject
matter of the investigation (390). Cooperation which falls
under such an obligation does not justify any reduction
of fines.

they must make

available

that

(452) Those considerations and the facts set out in paragraph
(70)
the fines by 50 % for
Mougeot, by 35 % for AWA and by 20 % for Bolloré
(Copigraph).

justify a reduction of

( e ) ( 3 ) ( i i ) N o n - c o n t e s t i n g t h e f a c t s a f t e r

r e c e i v i n g t h e S t a t e m e n t o f
O b j e c t i o n s

(453) After

receiving

of
the Commission's
Objections, Carrs, Koehler, MHTP and Zanders pleaded
for a significant reduction in fines for not contesting the
facts.

Statement

(389) File p. 7829.
(390) See Judgement of the Court of 18 October 1989 in Case Orkem v

Commission [1989] ECR 3283, at para. 20 et al.

(454) Carrs admits existence of the cartel and its participation

in it for the whole duration specified in this Decision.

(455) Zanders submits that it does not contest the thrust of
the Commission's
in the Statement of
comments
Objection for the period from 1992 to autumn 1995.

(456) MHTP states that it does not contest the facts on which
the finding of an infringement from 1992 to mid-1995
is based.

(457) Koehler states that it does not contest some of the facts
in the Statement of Objections. However,
set out
Koehler contests substantial parts of the factual evidence
on its participation in the cartel throughout the whole
period.
In particular, Koehler contests the description
made by the Commission of agreements on sales quotas
and market shares and the existence of a monitoring
system (391). The Commission concludes therefore that
there is no effective cooperation on the part of Koehler.

(458) The Commission grants Carrs, MHTP and Zanders a
10 % reduction for not substantially contesting the facts.

(f) Ability to pay

(459) Carrs has presented arguments relating to its ability to
pay in a specific social context. This social context
relates primarily to the company's current level of debt
repayments and its low profitability level.

(460)

the Commission
In order to consider this argument,
requested detailed information on the
company's
financial position (392). After examining the company's
confidential presentation during the Oral Hearing and
the reply of 8 October 2001 as well as the further
submissions made on 10, 13 and 14 December
2001 (393),
is not
the Commission concludes that
appropriate to adjust the amount of the fine in the
present case. To take account of the mere fact of an
undertaking's difficult financial situation due to general
market conditions would be tantamount to conferring
an unjustified competitive advantage on an undertaking.

it

(391) File pp. 20725-20729.
(392) Commission's request for information pursuant to Article 11 of
pp.

Regulation No 17 dated 5 September 2001,
21338-;21340.

File

(393) File pp. 21350-21486, 21512-21540.

21.4.2004

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L 115/71

(g) The final amounts of the fines imposed in the

present proceedings

(461)

the fines to be imposed, pursuant

In conclusion,
to
Article 15(2)(a) of Regulation No 17, should be as
follows:

Distribuidora Vizcaína
de Papeles S.L

from March 1992 until
January 1995

Mitsubishi HiTech Paper
Bielefeld GmbH

from January 1992 until
September 1995

Papelera Guipuzcoana
de Zicuñaga SA

from October 1993 until
January 1995

Arjo Wiggins Appleton
Limited

EUR 184,27 million

Papeteries Mougeot SA

from May 1992 until
September 1995

Bolloré SA

EUR 22,68 million

Carrs Paper Ltd

EUR 1,57 million

Papierfabrik
August Koehler AG

from January 1992 until
September 1995

Distribuidora Vizcaína
de Papeles S.L

Mitsubishi HiTech Paper
Bielefeld GmbH

Papelera Guipuzcoana
de Zicuñaga SA

EUR 1,75 million

Sappi Limited

EUR 21,24 million

Torraspapel SA

EUR 1,54 million

Zanders Feinpapiere AG

from January 1992 until
September 1995

from January 1992 until
September 1995

from January 1992 until
September 1995

Papeteries Mougeot SA

EUR 3,64 million

Papierfabrik
August Koehler AG

EUR 33,07 million

Sappi Limited

EUR 0

Torraspapel SA

EUR 14,17 million

Zanders Feinpapiere AG

EUR 29,76 million

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Arjo Wiggins Appleton Limited, Bolloré SA, Carrs Paper Ltd,
Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles S.L., Mitsubishi HiTech Paper
Bielefeld GmbH, Papelera Guipuzcoana de Zicuñaga SA,
Papeteries Mougeot SA, Papierfabrik August Koehler AG, Sappi
Limited, Torraspapel SA and Zanders Feinpapiere AG have
infringed Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article 53(1) of the
EEA Agreement by participating in a complex of agreements
and concerted practices in the sector of carbonless paper.

The duration of the infringement was as follows :

Arjo Wiggins Appleton
Limited

from January 1992 until
September 1995

Bolloré SA

Carrs Paper Ltd

from January 1992 until
September 1995

from January 1993 until
September 1995

Article 2

The undertakings referred to in Article 1 shall forthwith bring
the infringement referred to therein to an end, if they have not
already done so. They shall refrain from any agreements or
concerted practices in relation to their activities in carbonless
paper which may have the same or a similar object or effect as
the infringement.

Article 3

The following fines are imposed on the undertakings referred
to in Article 1 in respect of
the infringement referred to
therein:

Arjo Wiggins Appleton
Limited

Bolloré SA

Carrs Paper Ltd

Distribuidora Vizcaína
de Papeles S.L

Mitsubishi HiTech Paper
Bielefeld GmbH

Papelera Guipuzcoana
de Zicuñaga SA

EUR 184,27 million

EUR 22,68 million

EUR 1,57 million

EUR 1,75 million

EUR 21,24 million

EUR 1,54 million

Papeteries Mougeot SA

EUR 3,64 million

L 115/72

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

Papierfabrik
August Koehler AG

Sappi Limited

EUR 33,07 million

EUR 0

Torraspapel SA

EUR 14,17 million

Zanders Feinpapiere AG

EUR 29,76 million

The fines shall be paid within three months of the date of the
notification of this Decision into

Bank Account No 642-0029000-95 (Code SWIFT: BBVABEBB
— code IBAN BE76 6420 0290 0095) of
the European
Commission with

Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA) S.A.,

Avenue des Arts, 43,

B-1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

that period,

interest shall automatically be
After expiry of
payable at the interest rate applied by the European Central
Bank to its main refinancing operations on the first day of the
month in which this Decision is adopted, plus 3,5 percentage
points, namely 6,77 %.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to:

Arjo Wiggins Appleton Limited
St Clement House
Alençon Link
Basingstoke
Hampshire RG21 7SB
United Kingdom

Bolloré SA
Tour Bolloré
31-32, quai de Dion-Bouton
92811 Puteaux cedex
France

Carrs Paper Ltd
Cranmore Boulevard
Shirley, Solihull
West Midlands B90 4LJ
United Kingdom

Distribuidora Vizcaína de Papeles S.L
Poligono Industrial Neinver
Barrio Astince n 12-14
48160 Derio, Vizcaya
España

Mitsubishi HiTech Paper Bielefeld GmbH
Niedernholz 23
33699 Bielefeld
Deutschland

Papelera Guipuzoana de Zicuñaga SA
Barrio Zicuñaga
20120 Hernani, Guipúzcoa
España

Papeteries Mougeot SA
34, Rue Maurice Mougeot
88600 Laval sur Vologne
France

Papierfabrik August
Koehler AG
Hauptstraße 2-4
77704 Oberkirch
Deutschland

Sappi Limited
Sappi House
48 Ameshoff Street
2001 Braamfontein
Johannesburg
Republic of South Africa

Torraspapel SA
Gran Via de les Corts Catalanes 678
08010 Barcelona
España

Zanders Feinpapiere AG
An der Gohrsmühle
51465 Bergisch Gladbach
Deutschland

This Decision shall be enforceable pursuant to Article 256 of
the Treaty.

Done at Brussels, 20 December 2001.

For the Commission

Mario MONTI

Member of the Commission

21.4.2004

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/73

ANNEX I

AEMCP MEETINGS AND GENERAL CARTEL MEETINGS

Table A

Official AEMCP meetings since January 1992 and general cartel meetings since September 1993

YEAR

OFFICIAL AEMCP MEETINGS

GENERAL CARTEL MEETINGS

1992

23 January, Zurich

27 March, Zurich

26 May, Zurich

10 September, Zurich

25 November, Zurich

1993

9 February, Zurich

26 April, Zurich

7 July, Zurich

14 September, Frankfurt

14 September, Frankfurt

18 November, Brussels

1994

19 January, Paris

19 January, Paris

21 April, Nice

21 June, Frankfurt

21 June, Frankfurt

22 September, Frankfurt

22 September, Frankfurt

10 November, Frankfurt

1995

2 February, Frankfurt

2 February, Frankfurt

21 April, Frankfurt

28 June, Frankfurt

(foreseen) 28 June, Frankfurt

29 September, Frankfurt

(foreseen) 29 September, Frankfurt

L 115/74

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Official Journal of the European Union

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Table B

Participation in the official AEMCP meetings

Meeting dates

AWA

Binda

Copigraph

Koehler

Mougeot

Sappi

Stora

Torras-
papel

Zanders

X

X

X

X

X

X

23.1.1992, Zurich

27.3.1992, Zurich

26.5.1992, Zurich

10.9.1992, Zurich

25.11.1992, Zurich

9.2.1993, Zurich

26.4.1993, Zurich

7.7.1993, Zurich

14.9.1993, Frankfurt

18.11.1993, Brussels

19.1.1994, Paris

21.4.1994, Nice

21.6.1994, Frankfurt

22.9.1994, Frankfurt

10.11.1994, Frankfurt

2.2.1995, Frankfurt

21.4.1995, Frankfurt

28.6.1995, Frankfurt

29.9.1995, Frankfurt

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

21.4.2004

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/75

I
I

X
E
N
N
A

S
T
E
K
R
A
M
D
N
A
S
T
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EN

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L 115/78

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

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21.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/79

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L 115/80

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

ANNEX III

SALES QUOTAS AGREED/SALES VOLUME INFORMATION EXCHANGED/REAL SALES

Table A

Spanish market (Average monthly sales volumes in tonnes)

1992

1993

Meeting
30.9.1993

Replies to the
request for
information

Meeting 30.9.1993

Replies to the request for information

Sales volumes

Q4 1993 Quotas

Sales volumes (1)

Monthly averages
of Q4 sales

AWA (2)

Binda

Copigraph

Sappi (3)

Divipa

Stora (4)

Koehler (5)

Torraspapel (6)

Zanders (7)

805

192

214

108

216

227

915

1 234

230

(*) = information not available

778

*

*

*

*

227

910

*

233

903

150

265

109

280

168

776

1 139

251

Table B

850

100

265

120

280

200

850

1 200

140

887

*

*

69

*

167

765

1 382

162

556

*

*

*

*

152

*

*

*

French market (Sales volumes in tonnes, for 1992 and 1993 volumes are for 8 months January-August)

1992

1993

Meeting
1.10.1993

Replies to the
request for
information

Meeting 1.10.1993

Replies to the request for information

Sales volumes

Q4 1993 Quotas

Sales volumes

Monthly averages
of Q4 sales

AWA (8)

Koehler

Stora (9)

Zanders

Copigraph

Torraspapel

Mougeot (10)

Sappi

30 112

8 712

7 816

11 015

11 546

8 672

3 166

710

(*) = information not available

19 076

27 702

*

8 028

*

*

*

3 150

*

7 475

6 417

9 497

11 833

8 940

3 958

620

3 187

892

785

TBA

1 289

974

550

100

27 247

*

6 417

*

*

*

3 958

*

3 183

*

833

*

*

*

600

*

(1) For AWA and Stora this column shows monthly average sales over eight months (January-August). For Sappi, Koehler, Torraspapel
and Zanders monthly information was not available. For those companies this column shows the monthly average of total sales in
1993.

(2) File pp. 8222-8223, 8224-8225.
(3) File p. 9956.
(4) File pp. 9268, 9271.
(5) File p. 9831.
(6) File pp. 8997, 9003.
(7) File pp. 8606-8607.
(8) File pp. 8222-8223, 8224-8225.
(9) File pp. 9268, 9271.
(10) File pp. 7773-7774.

21.4.2004

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/81

ANNEX IV

SALES VOLUME INFORMATION EXCHANGED ON 6.12.1994 / VOLUME INFORMATION RECEIVED IN
RESPONSE TO COMMISSION REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

Sales volumes (in tonnes) in the French market

Year 1993 (reels only)

Year 1994

Meeting
6.12.1994

Replies to the
request for
information

Meeting
6.12.1994
REELS

Meeting
6.12.1994
SHEETS

Replies to the
request for
information
REELS

Replies to the
request for
information
SHEETS

30 133

7 323

10 126

8 853

12 020

5 943

454 (8)

31 891

7 410

12 500

9 000

14 150

15 670

5 200

315

13 000

29 628

3 050
(-93)

2 200

2 700

3 050

207

0

480

7 136

13 234

9 029

14 708

5 343

710 (9)

12 571

3 052

2 399

2 637

203

AWA (1)

Stora (2)

Zanders (3)

Koehler (4)

Copigraph

Torraspapel (5)

Mougeot (6)

Sappi (7)

33 233

7 320

10 360

8 930

14 600

12 341

5 980

210

(1) File pp. 8224, 8226, 8227.
(2) File pp. 9272, 9275, 9276.
(3) File pp. 8607, 8608.
(4) File p. 9819.
(5) File pp. 8997, 8998, 9004.
(6) File p. 7772.
(7) File pp. 9956-9957.
(8) Both reels and sheets.
(9) Both reels and sheets.

L 115/82

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

ANNEX V

PRICE INCREASE INITIATIVES FROM JANUARY 1994 TO SEPTEMBER 1995

Key for reading the tables:

a) = date increase effective,

b) = date increase notified to sales network and/or customers or date of other documentation on price increase.

R = reels, S= sheets

Table A

January-March 1994

Belgium and
Luxembourg (1)

AWA
a) 1.2
b) 22.11/25.11
R, S 5 %

Koehler
b) 8.12.1993
5 % for main
CLP grades

Sappi
a) 1.2
b) 1.12.1993
R, S 5 %

Denmark (2)

Germany (3)

Italy (4)

The Nether-
lands (5)

Norway (6)

Sweden (7)

The United
Kingdom and
Ireland (8)

AWA
a) 1.2
b) 22.12.1993
R 3 %

Sappi
a) 1.2
b) 1.12.1993
R 3 %

AWA
a) 1.2
b) 22.11.1993
R, S 5 %

Copigraph
a) 1.2 — R 8 %
b) 16.12.1993
a) 1,3 — S 5 %
b) 10.2

Stora
a) 1.2
b) 13.12.1993
R 3 %

Koehler
b) 8.12.1993
5 % for main
CLP grades

AWA
a) 1.2
b) 16.12.1993
R, S 10 %

Koehler
a) 1.1
b) 8.12.1993
10 %

Sappi
a) 1.2
b) 21.1
R, S 10 %

Sappi
a) 1.2
b) December
1993
R 8 %, S 5 %

Stora
a) 1.2
b) 30.9.1993
R 8 %, S 5 %

Torraspapel
a) February
1994
R 8 %

AWA
a) 1.2
b) 22.11/
3.12.1993
R 5 %

AWA
a) 1.2
b) 7.12.1993
R 3 %

Koehler
b) 8.12.1993
5 % for main
CLP grades

AWA
a) 1.2
b) —
R 10 %,
S 7,5 %

Koehler
b) 8.12
5 % for main
CLP grades

Sappi
a) 1.2
b) 1.12.1993
R 5 %

Stora
a) 1.2
b) 10.12.1993
R 5 %

Sappi
a) 1.2
b) 1.12.1993
R 3 %

Sappi
a) 1.2
b) 1.12.1993
R 5 %

Carrs
a) February
S 7,5 %

Stora
a) 1.2
b) 13.12.1993
R 3 %

Stora
a) 1.2
b) 13.12.1993
R 5 %

Sappi
a) 7.2
b) 21.1
R 10 %,
S 7,5 %

(1) File pp. 7834, 7863, 7928-7931; 5310; 2484, 2737, 9947, 10033, 10035-10036.
(2) File pp. 7836, 7980; 2484, 2737, 9947, 10033, 10035-10036; 9088, 9115, 9116.
(3) File pp. 7863; 13356, 13375-13376; 5310; 2484, 2738, 9947 and 10035-10036; 9050, 9068; 658
(4) File pp. 7846, 8059; 5310; 2484, 9947 and 10035-10036.
(5) File pp. 7848, 7863, 8088-8089; 5310; 2484, 2737, 9947, 10033, 10035-10036; 9128, 9155, 9156.
(6) File pp. 7849, 8109; 2484, 2737, 9947, 10033, 10035-10036; 9088, 9117, 9118.
(7) File pp. 5310; 2484, 2737, 9947, 10033, 10035-10036; 9088, 9120.
(8) File pp. 857; 11477; 2505-2506, 2484, 9947, 10025 and 10035-10036.

21.4.2004

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/83

Denmark (1)

France (2)

Germany (3)

Italy (4)

Norway (5)

Sweden (6)

The United Kingdom
and Ireland (7)

AWA
a) 1.5
b) 16.3
R 6 %

AWA
a) 5.4
b) 21.2
R, S 6 %

Copigraph
a) 1.5
b) 6.4
R 5 %

Koehler
a) April
b) 20.4
10 %

AWA
a) 1.5
b) 14.3, R 6 %
b) 21.2, S 4 %

AWA
a) 1.5
b) 28.2
R 6 %, S 4 %

AWA
a) 13.4
b) —
R, S 6 %

Table B

April-May 1994

Sappi
a) 1.4
b) 21.1
R 6 %, S 4 %

Koehler
a) April
b) 20.4
6 %

Koehler
a) May 1995
b) 20.4
R, S (no % given)

Mougeot
a) 1.4
b) 8.12.1993
10 %

Sappi
a) 1.4
b) 21.1
R 6 %, S 4 %

Sappi
a) 1.4
b) 21.1
R 6 %, S 4 %

Carrs
a) April
S 6 %

Stora
a) 1.5
b) 10.3
R 6 %, S 4 %

Mougeot
a) 5.4
b) 23.2
R 6 %

Sappi
a) 1.5
b) 21.1
R, S 5 %

Sappi
a) 1.5
b) 21.1
R, S 10 %

Stora
a) 1.5
b) 10.3
R 6 %, S 4 %

Stora
a) 1.5
b) 10.3
R 6 %, S 4 %

Sappi
a) 11.4
b) 21.2
R, S 6 %

Sappi
a) 1.4
b) 21.1
R, S 6 %

Stora
a) 1.5
b) 18.3
R 5 %

Torraspapel
a) 18.4
b) 22.3
R, S 6 %

(1) File pp. 7836, 7981; 9948, 10035-10036; 9088, 9114.
(2) File pp. 7838, 7999; 5314; 1894; 9948, 10035-10036.
(3) File pp. 13356, 13377; 5314; 9948, 10035-10036; 9050, 9067.
(4) File pp. 5314; 1894; 9948, 10035-10036.
(5) File pp. 7849, 8110–111; 9948, 10035-10036; 9088, 9112, 9113.
(6) File pp. 7855, 8187; 9948, 10035-10036; 9088, 9111.
(7) File pp. 7857; 11477; 2505-2506, 9946, 10025, 10026; 679, 680.

France (1)

AWA
a) 4.7
b) 20.5
R 6 %

Table C

July 1994

Mougeot
a) 4.7
b) 16.5
R 6 %

Sappi
a) 1.7
b) 23.6
R 6 % / 7 %

(1) File pp. 7838, 8000; 1893; 2358, 2362, 9949, 10054, 10071.

L 115/84

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Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

Table D

September-October 1994

AWA
a) 1.9
b) 15.7
R 8 %

Sappi
a) 1.9
b) 23.6
R 8 %

Stora
a) 1.9
b) 27.6
R 8 %

AWA
a) 1.9
b) —
R 12 %, S 6 %

Sappi
a) 1.9
b) 23.6
R 12 %, S 6 %

Stora
a) 1.9
b) 27.6
R 12 %, S 6 %

Denmark (1)

Finland (2)

France (3)

Germany (4)

The Nether-
lands (5)

Norway (6)

Sweden (7)

AWA
a) 1/3.10
b) 30.6
R 10 %, S 6 %

AWA
a) 1.9
b) 4.7
R 8 %, S 6 %

AWA
a) 1.9
b) 28.6
R 8 %, S 6 %

AWA
a) 1.9
b) 24.6
R 8 %

AWA
a) 1.9
b) 22.6
R 8 %

Copigraph
a) 6.10 —
R 10 %
a) 11.10 —
S 6 %
b) 5.9

Copigraph
a) 1.9
b) 25.7
R 8 %

Sappi
a) 1.10
b) 23/28.6
R 10 %

Stora
a) 1.10
b) 28.7
R 10 %, S 6 %

Torraspapel
a) October
R 10 %, S 6 %

Zanders
a) 1.10
b) 7.9
S 6 % and
a) 3.10
b) 29.8
R 10 %

Stora
a) 1.9
b) 25.7
R 8 %

Torraspapel
a) September
R 8 %, S 6 %

Sappi
a) 1.9
b) 23/28.6
R 8 %, S 6 %

Stora
a) 1.9
b) 6.7
R 8 %, S 6 %

Sappi
a) 1.9
b) 23.6
R 8 %

Sappi
a) 1.9
b) 23/28.6
R 8 %

Carrs
a) September
S 6 %

Stora
a) 1.9
b) 27.6
R 8 %

Stora
a) 1.9
b) 27.6
R 8 %

Sappi
a) 12.9
b) —
R 8 %, S 6 %

Torraspapel
a) 12.9
b) 30.8
R 8 %
a) 3.10
b) 29.9
S 6 %

The United
Kingdom and
Ireland (8)

AWA
a) 1.9/9.9
b) 4.7
R 8 %, S 6 %

(1) File pp. 916, 7836, 7867, 7982; File pp. 2358, 9949, 10053-10054, 9088.
(2) File pp. 916, 7867, 2358, 10053-10054, 9949; 9088, 9108.
(3) File pp. 916, 7838,7867, 8001-8002, 13356, 13365-13366, 2358, 9949, 10053-10054, 10071, 9231, 9243, 691, 8552.
(4) File pp. 916, 7867, 13356, 13378-13379, 9050, 9066, 691.
(5) File pp. 916, 7848, 7867, 8090, 2358, 9949, 10053-10054, 10055, 10069, 9128, 9152, 9153.
(6) File pp. 916, 7849, 7867, 8112, 2358, 9949, 10053-10054, 9088, 9109.
(7) File pp. 916, 7867, 2358, 9949, 10053-10054, 10076, 9088, 9110.
(8) File pp. 916, 7857, 7867, 11478, 2358, 9946, 10053-10054, 392, 676-678, 691.

21.4.2004

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/85

Table E

December 1994-February 1995

Sappi (4)
a) 1.1
b) 7.10.1994
R 10 %
S 5 %

Stora (5)
a) 2.1
b) 22.11.1994
R 10 %
S 5 %

Torraspapel
a) January
R 10 %
S 5 % (6)

Zanders (7)
a) 2.1
b) 1.12.1994
R 10 %

France

Germany

Italy

Spain

AWA (1)
a) 1.1
b) 26.9
R 10 %
S 5 %

AWA (8)
a) 1.12
b) 29.9
R 6 %

Copigraph (2)
a) 1.1
b) 8.12/
15.12
R 10 %,
S 5 %

Koehler (3)
a) 1. Qu.
1995
b) 26.4
R 11 %
S 6 %

Sappi (9)
a) 1.12
b) 7.10
R 6 %

Torraspapel
a) December
R 6 % (10)

AWA (11)
a) 2.1
b) 14.11.1994
R, S 15 %

Sappi (12)
a) 1.1
b) 7.10.1994
R, S 15 %

Torraspapel
a) January
R, S 15 % (13)

AWA (14)
a) 16.1/1.2
b) 27.12.1994
R 10 %
S 5 %

Koehler (15)
a) 1. Qu.
1995
b) 26.4
R 11 %
S 6 %

Sappi (16)
a) 1.2
b) 19.12.1994
R 10 %
S 5 %

The United
Kingdom and
Ireland

AWA (17)
a) 3.1.1995
b) —
R 10 %
S 5 %

Carrs (18)
a) January 95
S 5 %

Koehler (19)
a) 1. Qu.
1995
b) 26.4
R 11 %
S 6 %

Sappi (20)
a) 29.11
R 10 %,
S 5 %

Torraspapel
a) 5.12
b) 28.10
R 10 %
S 5 % (21)

(1) File pp. 918, 7872, 7873. According to the document on p. 918 the increase came in February.
(2) File pp. 13356, 13367-13368.
(3) File pp. 5195, 5320, 5322. Price increase in western Europe in January-March 1995.
(4) File p. 2494.
(5) File pp. 9231, 9242.
(6) File p. 691.
(7) File p. 8551.
(8) File pp. 7841, 7869, 8028.
(9) See footnote 4.
(10) See footnote 6.
(11) File pp. 918 (February 1995), 7846, 7873, 8063-8064.
(12) See footnote 4.
(13) See footnote 6.
(14) File pp. 918, 7853, 7879, 8153-8155. The document on p. 918 shows R 15 % and S 5 % increases for February.
(15) See footnote 3.
(16) File pp. 4572, 10098.
(17) File pp. 918, 7857, 7873. The document on p. 918 shows these increases for February 1995.
(18) File pp. 8247.
(19) See footnote 3.
(20) File pp. 2742, 9946.
(21) File pp. 691, 692.

L 115/86

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Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

Table F

March-April 1995

Denmark

France

The Netherlands

Spain

AWA (1)
a) 1.4
b) 27.2
R 8 %

Sappi (2)
a) 1.4
b) 20.2
R 8 %

AWA (4)
a) 3.4
b) 22.2
R 10 % (certain
qualities 12,5 %)

Copigraph (5)
a) 3.4, R 10 %
a) 18.4, S 10 %
b) 7.3

AWA (9)
a) 1.3
b) 30.1
R, S 6 %

Sappi (10)
a) 15.3
b) 20.2
R, S 6 %

AWA (12)
a) 1.3 — R 6 %
b) 22.2
a) 1.4 — S 10 %

Sappi (13)
a) 1.3 — R 6 %
a) 1.4 — S 10 %
b) 20/16.2

Stora (3)
a) 1.4
b) 8.2
R 8 %

Sappi (6)
a) 1.4
b) 20.2
R 10 %

Stora (11)
a) 1.3
b) 6.2
R, S 6 %

Stora (14)
a) 1.3
b) 16.2
R 6 %

The United
Kingdom and
Ireland (16)

AWA (17)
a) 1.3/3.3
R 8 %, S 5 %

Carrs (18)
a) March
S 5 %

Sappi (19)
a) 6.3
R 8 %, S 5 %

Stora (7)
a) 1.4
b) 16.2
R 10 %

Zanders (8)
a) 3.4
b) 27.2
R 10 %

Torraspapel (15)
a) 1.3 — R 6 %
a) 1.4 — S 10 %
b) 8/9.2

(1) File pp. 937, 7836, 7880, 7984.
(2) File pp. 2250-2251, 2492-2493, 9951.
(3) File pp. 9088, 9106.
(4) File pp. 937, 7838, 7879, 8006.
(5) File pp. 13356, 13369.
(6) File pp. 2250-2251, 2492-2493, 4769, 9951.
(7) File pp. 9231, 9241.
(8) File p. 8551.
(9) File pp. 937, 7880.
(10) File pp. 2250-2251, 2492-2493, 4769.
(11) File pp. 9128, 9149, 9150, 9151.
(12) File pp. 937, 3043, 7853, 7879, 8156-8160. File p. 3043 is a Sappi document dated 16.2.1995, which gives indirect evidence.
(13) File pp. 2250-2251, 2492-2493, 3043, 4567-4568 (‘Existen varios fabricantes que no aplican el aumento hasta 1 de Marz a sus
distribuidores (Feldm. AWA, etc.), como consecuencia de ello, la tarifa Febrero no se aplicará correctamente hasta 1 de Marzo. … Grupo AWA
obligó que la nueva tarifa se aplique 1 de MAYO.' Translation: ‘There are various producers who are applying the agreed price increase to their
distributors (Feldm. AWA etc.) only from 1 March. Consequently the February tariff will be applied correctly from 1 March … the AWA group
requires that the new tariff be implemented on 1 May.'), 4569, 4571-4575, 9950-9951, 10101, 10102.

(14) File p. 3043. Indirect evidence coming from a Sappi document dated 16.2.1995.
(15) File pp. 233, 241, 3043.
(16) File p. 1378. A document found on the premises of Mougeot and dated 2.2.1995 (the date of the general cartel meeting) includes the

following: ‘The UK market will increase by 8 % the 6 March so we propose you our best offer.'

(17) File pp. 937, 7857, 7879.
(18) File pp. 8247.
(19) File pp. 2250-2251, 2492-2493, 9946. See also p. 10125: ‘UK prices will advance 5 % sheets, 8 % reels on the 6 March 1995.'

21.4.2004

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Official Journal of the European Union

L 115/87

Table G

May-July 1995

Koehler (2)
a) 1.6/1.7
b) 25.4
10 %

Sappi (3)
a) 1.6
b) 1.4
R 10 %

Copigraph (5)
a) 7.7
b) 12.6
R 10 %

Koehler (6)
a) 1.6/1.7
b) 25.4
10 %

Sappi (7)
a) June
10 %

Stora (8)
a) 2.5
b) 16.2
S 10 %

Zanders (9)
a) 1.5
b) 14.4
S 10 %
and
a) 1.7
b) 7.6
R, S 10 %

Koehler (11)
a) 1.6/1.7
b) 25.4
10 %

Koehler (15)
a) 1.6/1.7
b) 25.4
10 %

Sappi (12)
a) 1.6
b) 1.4
R 10 %

Sappi (16)
a) 1.6
b) 1.4
R 10 %

Zanders (13)
a) 1.6
b) 19/21.4
R 10 %

Stora (17)
a) 1.6
b) 12.4
R 10 %

Belgium and
Luxembourg

France

Germany

AWA (1)
a) 1.6
b) 30.3 und
3.5
R, S 10 %

AWA (4)
a) 1.5 —
S 10 %
a) 1.7 —
R 10 %
b) 19.5
and
a) 3.7
b) 21.5
R 8.7 %-13 %
and 10 %

AWA (10)
a) 1.6
b) 3.4
R 10 %

The Netherlands AWA (14)

a) 1.6
b) 30.3
R 10 %

The United
Kingdom and
Ireland

AWA (18)
a) 1.5/7.5
b) —
R 8 %, S 5 %

Carrs (19)
a) May
S 5 %

Sappi (20)
a) 9.5
R 8 %, S 5 %

(1) File pp. 7834, 7942-7947.
(2) File pp. 5320, 5322.
(3) File pp. 2739, 9952, 10114, 10115.
(4) File pp. 937, 7839, 7879, 7885-7886, 8007.
(5) File pp. 13356, 13370.
(6) File pp. 5320, 5322.
(7) File p. 4775.
(8) File pp. 9231, 9241.
(9) File pp. 8551.
(10) File pp. 7841, 7886, 8029. File p. 918 shows R 10 %, S 5 % increases for May 95.
(11) See footnote 6.
(12) File pp. 2739, 9952, 10114.
(13) File pp. 8543, 8566, 8567.
(14) File pp. 2486, 7848, 8095-8096.
(15) See footnote 6.
(16) See footnote 12.
(17) File pp. 9128, 9146, 9147, 9148.
(18) File pp. 7857, 7879, 7885-7886.
(19) File p. 8247.
(20) File p. 9946.

L 115/88

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Official Journal of the European Union

21.4.2004

Table H

September 1995

Carrs (2)
a) September
S 5 %

Sappi (3)
a) 11.9
R 8 %, S 5 %

The United Kingdom and
Ireland

AWA (1)
a) 1.9/10.9
b) —
R 8 %, S 5 %

(1) File pp. 7857, 7880, 7885-7886, 7887-7888.
(2) File p. 8248.
(3) See footnote 20, table G.