WRITTEN QUESTION P-3506/01 by Niels Busk (ELDR) to the Commission. Antidumping duty on commercial fertiliser.
Date: 2001-12-12
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Central and Eastern Europe, anti-dumping duty, chemical fertiliser, competition law, originating product

C 229 E/28

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

26.9.2002

The Commission, for its part, has not conducted investigations into the raw materials trade and specifically
on the role of European producers/traders entertaining commercial relations with DRC. At present there
are not compelling reasons to impose sanctions on any of the parties involved in DRC’s resources
exploitation. The United Nations (UN) Security Council decided on 19 December 2001 to postpone a
decision on such an issue for another six months and gave a mandate to the six-member panel of experts
to further deepen investigations. An interim report is expected by March 2002. After that, it is hoped to
have definitive elements on which the international community could base its action.

(2002/C 229 E/028)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-3506/01

by Niels Busk (ELDR) to the Commission

(12 December 2001)

Subject: Antidumping duty on commercial fertiliser

What are the Commission’s reasons for retaining the antidumping duty on commercial fertilisers from
eastern Europe and the proposal to increase it?

By reducing the import duty on grain, the Commission has brought prices down as it desired. Proposing a
higher antidumping duty on commercial fertiliser would therefore unreasonably reduce agriculture’s ability
to compete in the EU and represent a complete reversal of the Commission’s present trade policy.

Does the Commission agree with this assessment?

Answer given by Mr Lamy on behalf of the Commission

(4 February 2002)

The Community has imposed anti-dumping duties on a number of nitrogenous fertilisers from certain
third countries, including from certain countries of Eastern Europe.

The Commission would remind the Honourable Member that Community producers which are suffering
injury as a result of dumped imports are entitled to protection in the form of anti-dumping duties in
accordance with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Anti-Dumping Agreement and Community
legislation. In the fertiliser cases, the Commission has proposed to Council the imposition of anti-dumping
the evidence presented by the complainant Community
duties only after thorough investigation of
industry, the exporters, importers and users concerned.

It is to be noted that anti-dumping duties are only proposed if it is in the interest of the Community as a
whole, taking account of the interests of all the parties concerned by the proceeding. In each of these
fertiliser cases, all parties concerned had the possibility to submit their views. In particular, farmers’
organisations have systematically been invited to contribute to the investigations. Moreover, parties who so
requested were granted an opportunity to be heard by the Commission. The Commission carried out an
analysis of the possible negative effects of anti-dumping measures on users and in particular on farmers.
On the basis of the data received and verified, the Commission reached the conclusion that the potential
increase in farmers’ costs which might result from the imposition of such anti-dumping duties, even under
a worst case scenario, would be very limited (less than 1 %) and, in view of all the circumstances, was not
such as to justify denying the Community fertiliser industry relief from proven unfair trade practices.

The Honourable Member also refers to certain reductions in cereals import duties. These reductions were
made in accordance with the Community’s commitments under the WTO Agreement. The reduction in
customs tariffs on agricultural goods is in no way linked to measures aimed at combating injurious
dumping. The objective of anti-dumping measures is to eliminate the effects of injurious dumping, which
are established despite the existence of any customs tariffs.

26.9.2002

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 229 E/29

For these reasons, the Commission does not share the assessment that the anti-dumping measures on
fertilisers would unreasonably reduce the ability of Community farmers to compete on the EU market. Nor
do these anti-dumping measures represent in any way a departure from the Community’s trade policy.

(2002/C 229 E/029)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3513/01

by Joachim Wuermeling (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(8 January 2002)

Subject: Introduction of the euro and trends in labour costs in the applicant countries

Per capita GDP in terms of purchasing power standards in the applicant countries stands at around 60 % of
the EU average in the case of the Czech Republic, for example. In contrast, the average wage calculated in
terms of currency parity stands at only around 15 % of the European figure. The reason for this disparity is
the comparatively high external value of the euro.

In the light of experience gained in the eurozone and of economic data, will this disparity be reduced by
the introduction of the euro in the applicant countries, and if so, to what extent?

Answer given by Mr Solbes Mira on behalf of the Commission

(8 February 2002)

As pointed out in the question, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in terms of Purchasing Power
Standards (PPS) is much lower in candidate countries than in most Member States. For all 13 candidate
countries it amounted in 2000 to around 35 % of the Community average, varying from nearly 83 % in
Cyprus to around 27 % in Romania. Yet, in current exchange rates (instead of PPS), the differences between
candidate countries and the Member States are even larger: in 2000, average GDP per capita in candidate
countries amounted to 16 %. The difference between these two measures stems from the difference in
domestic prices across countries. The average domestic price levels in candidate countries are considerably
lower than in the Community. Hence a certain amount of nominal income in these countries has a larger
purchasing power than in the Community. Candidate countries’ wages (without Cyprus, Malta and Turkey),
in nominal terms, amounted in 2000 to around 16 % of the Community average. Thus the domestic
purchasing power of these wages is, on average, twice as high as in the Community.

This difference in wages between existing and future Member States is expected to diminish to the extent
candidate countries manage to catch up in their economic performance and, more specifically in their
respective labour productivity. This process has already started, as the average wages of the ten Central and
Eastern European Countries (CEEC) increased from around 12 % of the Community average in 1996 to the
findings on catching-up
mentioned 16 % in 2000. However, given past experiences and analytical
processes, for some candidate countries which are presently lagging far behind the Community average,
this process might take much more than a decade.

It should be noted that accession per se does not lead to the introduction of the euro in the country
concerned. New Member States will become members with a derogation for the adoption of the euro.
Only after the fulfilment of the Treaty conditions, a new Member State can adopt the euro.

The setting of exchange rates upon entry into an exchange rate mechanism (ERM) II B a precondition for
fulfilling the convergence criteria B and, subsequently, the setting of the conversion rate to the euro, is a
multilateral process, involving all participating Member States, the Commission and the European Central
Bank (ECB). These rates should not distort economic equilibria and be close to market rates. Thus, the
introduction of the euro should not affect relative wages. This is also confirmed by past experience with
the introduction of the euro in Member States.