WRITTEN QUESTION E-3396/01 by Stavros Xarchakos (PPE-DE) to the Commission. Definition of the terms minor and major in the European Union.
Date: 2001-12-12
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: EU Member State, age of majority, approximation of laws, children's rights, civil liability, competence of the Member States, criminal liability, criminal responsibility of minors

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a single Member State. Further, when reference is made to social and legal developments in order to justify
a dynamic interpretation of such terms, the Court has said that such developments must be visible in all
the Community. On the basis of this argument, the Court concluded in the Reed case, cited below, that
Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68 could not be interpreted to mean that a companion,
in a stable
relationship, of a worker who is a national of a Member State and is employed in the territory of another
Member State, must in certain circumstances be treated as his ‘spouse’ for the purposes of that provision.

In this context, the Honourable Member refers to Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 on jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgements in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental
responsibility for children of both spouses. This regulation sets out rules on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgements in matters of divorce, legal separation or marriage annulment,
as well as in matters of parental responsibility for the children of both spouses rendered on the occasion of
the matrimonial proceedings.

The regulation is a private international law instrument. As regards the relations between ‘spouses’, its
purpose is to establish rules on jurisdiction and to allow recognition in a Member State of a divorce, a
separation or an annulment of marriage given in another Member State in accordance with the law which
is applicable according to its private international law. Even if it cannot be excluded that the regulation
applies to procedures concerning the divorce of a same sex couple, this does not translate into an
obligation on the courts neither to pronounce or recognise the divorce nor to recognise the marriage.

The regulation also provides for the enforcement in a Member State of an order granted in another
Member State in relation to parental responsibility. Therefore, parental responsibility cannot be granted by
relying on its provisions. Instead, the relations between a same sex partner and the child of his or her
partner are a matter of substantive family law and therefore governed by the applicable national law.

Likewise, the Honourable Member makes reference to the legislation on free movement and in particular
Regulation 1612/68, which by its Article 10 creates a right of family reunion for the ‘spouse’ of a worker
who has exercised his right of free movement in another Member State. In line with the case law
mentioned earlier, the Dutch legislation, while it can have effects on Dutch territory, does not have the
consequence of extending the notion of ‘spouse’ under Article 10 of Regulation 1612/68 or of imposing
on other Member States an extended definition of ‘spouse’.

(1) OJ C 93 E, 18.4.2002, p. 131.
(2) Case 59/85 Netherlands v Reed (1986(ECR 1283, D v Council of the European Union (2001(ECRU I-4319.

(2003/C 28 E/003)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3396/01

by Stavros Xarchakos (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(12 December 2001)

Subject: Definition of the terms ‘minor’ and ‘major’ in the European Union

Commissioner Vitorino, who informed me in writing (on 20 November 2001) that the definition of the
is the sole responsibility of the national authorities and not that of the
terms ‘minor’ and ‘major’
Community, completely avoided answering my question E-2821/01 (1)

This attitude lays the Commission and its Commissioner open to criticism, since the question immediately
arises as to why the European Union and the Commissioners responsible for social policy or internal
affairs are so passionately outspoken in their condemnation of, for example, child labour in third-world
countries, while remaining coldly indifferent and unconcerned with regard to the distinction between
‘minors’ and ‘major’ within the Union itself. It is also significant that the Commission uses these terms in
its own official reports and in the employment figures it publishes with no regard for the confusion thus
created and the resulting unreliability of the relevant statistics.

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In my question I requested details concerning the definition given by each EU Member State regarding the
terms ‘minor’ and ‘major’ and whether the Commission intended to take measures to harmonise the age of
majority throughout the Member States of the Union.

I now repeat my queries in the hope of not being obliged to raise the matter yet again in a question to the
European Parliament meeting in plenary sitting. Does the Commission have information concerning the
definitions of ‘minor’ and ‘major’ in the Member States? What is the age of majority in each Member State?
Why does the Commission not propose that the age of majority be harmonised? Does it consider it
acceptable for different age limits to apply in each Member State and what are the implications of this
regarding the reliability of the facts and figures to which the Commission itself so frequently refers?

(1) OJ C 93 E, 18.4.2002, p. 201.

Answer given by Mr Vitorino on behalf of the Commission

(7 March 2002)

The Commission would confirm that the Community has no powers regarding possible harmonisation of
the legal age of majority in the Union, as its President stated in his answer to Written Question E-2821/01
from the Honourable Member (1).

It is, however, true that some Commission proposals refer to majority as defined in the Member States or
on certain age groups. This is the case with Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum
standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the
consequences thereof (2), which refers to minors under the age of eighteen, with the Commission proposal
on combating the sexual exploitation of children and child pornography (3) and with Council Framework
Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings (4), which
states that specific protection should be given to particularly vulnerable persons, e.g. child victims of
trafficking in human beings, as regards the possible negative effects of giving evidence in open court and
access to specific treatment.

It is important to stress, however, that the terms majority and minority have different accepted meanings
and that, in certain fields, the concept of legal majority is not the most relevant, reference being made
instead to that of civil or criminal liability.

As regards the definition of legal majority, the Commission would point out that Article 24 of the Charter
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union protects the rights of the child. The Article is based on the
New York Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed on 20 November 1989, which has been ratified
by all Member States. The Convention states in Article 1 that ‘for the purposes of the present Convention,
a child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the
child, majority is attained earlier’.

It follows that the parties to the Convention, including the Member States, can lower the age limit for
reaching majority from the above-mentioned eighteen years.

The Honourable Member should note, however, that the New York Convention on the Rights of the Child
does not apply to political rights. The Member States are thus also able to raise the age limit for majority
in this area. This decision is about which age to stipulate as an element of the right to vote usually
incorporated in constitutions.

At present, a large majority of Member States sets the voting age at eighteen, although a higher age may
be imposed for some of the elective functions. On the other hand, the age limit for voting can be lower
than eighteen, e.g. in local elections.

As laws regulating majority fall within the remit of the Member States, which have no obligation to inform
it about domestic rules, the Commission does not possess any detailed information concerning the
definitions of ‘major’ and ‘minor’ in the Member States in general or regarding the right to vote.

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In another area, criminal law, the concept of legal majority is not always the most relevant, and it is
preferable to refer to the age of criminal liability. This varies according to the Member State. In certain
countries it is set at twenty-one. Before that age, depending on the legal system, there may be either no
criminal liability at all (for children under a certain age stipulated by domestic law) or limited liability, with
the actual arrangements again being defined by the laws of the Member States. The age of a young
offender can thus affect the way in which the case is handled (so that, for instance, educational measures
are preferred to enforcement measures) or the procedure applied (e.g. proceedings in camera, specialised
courts, etc.).

Similarly, where a victim is a minor, age may constitute an aggravating circumstance where the offender is
concerned. The Council is currently examining on the basis of a Commission proposal to what extent the
age of a victim can constitute an aggravating factor in crimes committed against children.

Lastly, the Commission stresses that the concepts of ‘major’ and ‘minor’ were originally devised within a
legal context unrelated to considerations of a statistical nature. As regards employment, for instance, the
concepts of ‘major’ and ‘minor’ are not applied. The term ‘active population’ is an economic concept. In
the interest of data comparability, it was agreed at international level that this term would refer to the
15-64 age group. This convention has been applied in particular by all international organisations (ILO,
UN, Eurostat, OECD, etc.) for many years. Commission Regulation (EC) No 1897/2000 of 7 September
2000 implementing Council Regulation No 577/98 on the organisation of a labour force sample survey in
the Community concerning the operational definition of unemployment (5) sets an age limit (fifteen) above
which a person is regarded as being unemployed if he/she is not in employment, is actively seeking
employment and is available for work.

Age limits are chosen according to the ages at which working life may begin in most Member States and is
legally supposed to finish: the age of fifteen is generally the end of compulsory education, while the age of
sixty-four generally corresponds to the end of working life.

Where child labour is concerned, the reference must be to the occupational activity of school-age children.

(1) OJ C 93 E, 18.4.2002, p. 201.
(2) OJ L 212, 7.8.2001.
(3) COM(2000) 854 final/2.
(4) OJ L 82, 22.3.2001.
(5) OJ L 228, 8.9.2000.

(2003/C 28 E/004)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3420/01

by Charles Tannock (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(12 December 2001)

Subject: The arrest and torture of Bubis in Equatorial Guinea

In response to a raid by up to forty members of the Bubi tribe on a military barracks in January 1998,
approximately five hundred people were arrested by the Guinean authorities, of whom, according to
Amnesty International, six died in custody, many were tortured to extract ‘confessions’ and about seventy
people were sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from six to twenty-six years following trials
which fell far short of internationally accepted standards.

Has the European Union raised these matters with the Guinean Government? If so, what pressure has been
brought to bear to ensure that the prisoners are not brutalised and receive proper nourishment and
medical treatment and that a political settlement is found to the problems which led to the storming of the
barracks?