Proposal for a Council Regulation adapting for the seventh time to technical progress Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport
Date: 2001-11-30
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Community certification, European standard, electronic device, road transport, safety device, technological change, transport safety

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II

(Preparatory Acts)

COMMISSION

Proposal for a Council Regulation adapting for the seventh time to technical progress Council
Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport

(2002/C 126 E/01)

(Text with EEA relevance)

COM(2001) 698 final

(Submitted by the Commission on 30 November 2001)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 of 20 December 1985 on recording equipment in
road transport (1), as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2135/98 (2), and in particular Articles 17 and 18
thereof,

Whereas:

(1) The technical specifications of Annex I B to Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 must be adapted to
technical progress paying particular attention to the overall security of the system and to the inter-
operability between the recording equipment and the driver cards.

(2) The adaptation of the equipment also requires an adaptation of Annex II to Regulation (EEC) No

3821/85 which defines the marks and approval certificates.

(3) The Committee set up by Article 18 of Regulation (EC) No 3821/85 did not deliver an opinion on the

measures provided in the proposal.

(4) In accordance with Article 18 paragraph 5 letter b), the Commission shall without delay, submit to the

Council a proposal relating to the measures to be taken,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

The Annex to Regulation (EC) No 2135/98 is replaced by the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 1

Article 2

Annex II to Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 is amended as follows:

1. Chapter I, item 1, first subparagraph is amended as follows:

— The conventional sign for Greece ‘GR’ is replaced by ‘23’;

— The conventional sign for Ireland ‘IRL’ is replaced by ‘24’;

— The conventional sign for ‘12’ is to be added for Austria;

— The conventional sign for ‘17’ is to be added for Finland;

— The conventional sign for ‘5’ is to be added for Sweden.

2. Chapter I, item 1, second subparagraph is amended as follows:

— The wording ‘or of a tachograph card’ is inserted after the words ‘record sheet’.

3. Chapter I, item 2 is amended as follows:

— The wording ‘and on each tachograph card’ is inserted after the words ‘record sheet’.

4. In Chapter II, the following wording is added to the title ‘FOR PRODUCTS COMPLIANT WITH

ANNEX I’

(1) OJ L 370, 31.12.1985, p. 8.
(2) OJ L 274, 9.10.1998, p. 1.

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5. The following Chapter III is added:

‘III. APPROVAL CERTIFICATE FOR PRODUCTS COMPLIANT WITH ANNEX I B

A State, having granted approval, shall issue the applicant with an approval certificate, the model of
which is given below. When informing other Member States of approvals issued or, if the occasion
should arise, withdrawn, a Member State shall use copies of that certificate.

’

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This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official
Journal of the European Communities.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Article 3

ANNEX

‘ANNEX I B

REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSTRUCTION, TESTING, INSTALLATION AND INSPECTION

In this Annex:

(a)

“activation” means:

I. DEFINITIONS

phase where the recording equipment becomes fully operational and implements all functions, including security
functions;

Activating a recording equipment requires the use of a workshop card and the entry of its PIN code;

(b)

“authentication” means:

A function intended to establish and verify a claimed identity;

(c)

“authenticity” means:

The property that an information is coming from a party whose identity can be verified;

(d)

“built-in-test (BIT)” means:

Tests run at request, triggered by the operator or by an external equipment;

(e)

“calendar day” means:

a day ranging from 00.00 hours to 24.00 hours. All calendar days relate to UTC time (Universal Time
Co-ordinated);

(f)

“calibration” means:

updating or confirming vehicle parameters to be held in the data memory. Vehicle parameters include vehicle
identification (VIN, VRN and registering Member State) and vehicle characteristics (w, k, l, tyre size, speed limiting
device setting (if applicable), current UTC time, current odometer value);

Calibrating a recording equipment requires the use of a workshop card;

(g)

“card number” means:

a 16 alpha-numerical characters number that uniquely identifies a tachograph card within a Member State. The
card number includes a consecutive index (if applicable), a replacement index and a renewal index;

A card is therefore uniquely identified by the code of the issuing Member State and the card number;

(h)

“card consecutive index” means:

the 14th alpha-numerical character of a card number that is used to differentiate the different cards issued to a
company or a body entitled to be issued several tachograph cards. The company or the body is uniquely
identified by the 13 first characters of the card number;

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(i)

“card renewal index” means:

the 16th alpha-numerical character of a card number which is incremented each time a tachograph card is
renewed;

(j)

“card replacement index” means:

the 15th alpha-numerical character of a card number which is incremented each time a tachograph card is
replaced;

(k)

“characteristic coefficient of the vehicle” means:

the numerical characteristic giving the value of the output signal emitted by the part of the vehicle linking it with
the recording equipment (gearbox output shaft or axle) while the vehicle travels a distance of one kilometre under
standard test conditions (see Chapter VI.-5.). The characteristic coefficient is expressed in impulses per kilometre
(w = . . . imp/km);

(l)

“company card” means:

a tachograph card issued by the authorities of a Member State to the owner or holder of vehicles fitted with
recording equipment;

The company card identifies the company and allows for displaying, downloading and printing of the data stored in the
recording equipment which has been locked by this company;

(m)

“constant of the recording equipment” means:

the numerical characteristic giving the value of the input signal required to show and record a distance travelled
of one kilometre; this constant shall be expressed in impulses per kilometre (k = . . . imp/km);

(n)

“continuous driving time” is computed within the recording equipment as (1):

the continuous driving time is computed as the current accumulated driving times of a particular driver, since the
end of his last AVAILABILITY or BREAK/REST or UNKNOWN (2) period of 45 minutes or more (this period may
have been split in several periods of 15 minutes or more). The computations involved take into account, as
needed, past activities stored on the driver card. When the driver has not inserted his card, the computations
involved are based on the data memory recordings related to the current period where no card was inserted and
related to the relevant slot;

(o)

“control card” means:

a tachograph card issued by the authorities of a Member State to a national competent control authority;

The control card identifies the control body and possibly the control officer and allows for getting access to the data stored in
the data memory or in the driver cards for reading, printing and/or downloading;

(p)

“cumulative break time” is computed within the recording equipment as (1):

the cumulative break from driving time is computed as the current accumulated AVAILABILITY or BREAK/REST
or UNKNOWN (2) times of 15 minutes or more of a particular driver, since the end of his last AVAILABILITY or
BREAK/REST or UNKNOWN (2) period of 45 minutes or more (this period may have been split in several periods
of 15 minutes or more).

The computations involved take into account, as needed, past activities stored on the driver card. Unknown
periods of negative duration (start of unknown period > end of unknown period) due to time overlaps between
two different recording equipments, are not taken into account for the computation.

When the driver has not inserted his card, the computations involved are based on the data memory recordings
related to the current period where no card was inserted and related to the relevant slot;

(q)

“data memory” means:

an electronic data storage device built into the recording equipment;

(1) This way of computing the continuous driving time and the cumulative break time serves into the Recording Equipment for

computing the continuous driving time warning. It does not prejudge the legal interpretation to be made of these times.

(2) UNKNOWN periods correspond to periods where the driver's card was not inserted in a recording equipment and for which no

manual entry of driver activities was made.

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(r)

“digital signature” means:

data appended to, or a cryptographic transformation of, a block of data that allows the recipient of the block of
data to prove the authenticity and integrity of the block of data;

(s)

“downloading” means:

copying together with digital signature of a part or of a complete set of data stored in the data memory of the
vehicle or in the memory of a tachograph card;

Downloading may not alter or delete any stored data;

(t)

“driver card” means:

a tachograph card issued by the authorities of a Member State to a particular driver;

The driver card identifies the driver and allows for storage of driver activity data;

(u)

“effective circumference of the wheel tyres” means:

the average of the distances travelled by each of the wheels moving the vehicle (driving wheels) in the course of
one complete rotation. The measurement of these distances shall be made under standard test conditions (Chapter
VI-5.) and is expressed in the form “l = . . . mm”. Vehicle manufacturers may replace the measurement of these
distances by a theoretical calculation which takes into account the distribution of the weight on the axles, vehicle
unladen in normal running order (1). The methods for such theoretical calculation will be approved by a
competent Member State authority;

(v)

“event” means:

abnormal operation detected by the recording equipment which may come from a fraud attempt;

(w)

“fault” means:

abnormal operation detected by the recording equipment which may come from an equipment malfunction or
failure;

(x)

“installation” means:

mounting of the recording equipment in a vehicle;

(y)

“motion sensor” means:

part of the recording equipment, providing a signal representative of vehicle speed and/or distance travelled;

(z)

“non valid card” means:

a card detected as faulty, or which initial authentication failed, or which start of validity date is not yet reached, or
which expiry date has passed;

(aa)

“out of scope” means:

when the use of the recording equipment is not required, according to the provisions of Council Regulation (EEC)
No 3820/85;

(bb)

“over speeding” means:

exceeding the authorised speed of the vehicle, defined as any period of more than 60 seconds during which the
vehicle's measured speed exceeds the limit for setting the speed limitation device laid down in Council Directive
92/6/EEC of 10 February 1992 on the installation and use of speed limitation devices for certain categories of
motor vehicles in the Community (2);

(cc)

“periodic inspection” means:

set of operations performed to control that the recording equipment works properly and that its settings
correspond to the vehicle parameters;

(1) Directive 97/27/EC of 22 July 1997 relating to the masses and dimensions of certain categories of motor vehicles and their trailers

and amending Directive 70/156/EEC (OJ L 233, 25.8.1997, p. 1).

(2) OJ L 57, 2.3.1992, p. 27.

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(dd)

“printer” means:

component of the recording equipment which provides printouts of stored data;

(ee)

“recording equipment” means:

the total equipment intended for installation in road vehicles to show, record and store automatically or semi-
automatically details of the movement of such vehicles and of certain work periods of their drivers;

(ff)

“renewal” means:

issue of a new tachograph card when an existing card reaches its expiry date, or is malfunctioning and has been
returned to the issuing authority. Renewal always implies the certainty that two valid cards do not co-exist;

(gg)

“repair” means:

any repair of a motion sensor or of a vehicle unit that requires disconnection of its power supply, or discon-
nection from other recording equipment components, or opening of it;

(hh)

“replacement” means:

issue of a tachograph card in replacement of an existing card, which has been declared lost, stolen or malfunc-
tioning and has not been returned to the issuing authority. Replacement always implies a risk that two valid cards
may co-exist;

(ii)

“security certification” means:

process to certify, by an ITSEC (1) certification body, that the recording equipment (or component) or the
tachograph card under investigation fulfils the security requirements defined in Appendix 10 Generic security
targets;

(jj)

“self test” means:

tests run cyclically and automatically by the recording equipment to detect faults;

(kk)

“tachograph card” means:

smart card intended for use with the recording equipment. Tachograph cards allow for identification by the
recording equipment of the identity (or identity group) of the cardholder and allow for data transfer and storage.
A tachograph card may be of the following types:

— driver card,

— control card,

— workshop card,

— company card;

(ll)

“type approval” means:

process to certify, by a Member State, that the recording equipment (or component) or the tachograph card under
investigation fulfils the requirements of this regulation;

(mm) “tyre size” means:

the designation of the dimensions of the tyres (external driving wheels) in accordance with Directive 92/23/EEC
of 31 march 1992 (2);

(nn)

“vehicle identification” means:

numbers identifying the vehicle: Vehicle Registration Number (VRN) with indication of the registering Member
State and Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) (3);

(1) Council Recommendation 95/144/EC of 7 April 1995 on common information technology security evaluation criteria (OJ L 93,

26.4.1995, p. 27).

(2) OJ L 129, 14.5.1992, p. 95.
(3) Directive 76/114/EEC, 18/12/1975 (OJ L 24, 30.1.1976, p. 1).

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(oo)

“vehicle unit (VU)” means:

the recording equipment excluding the motion sensor and the cables connecting the motion sensor. The vehicle
unit may either be a single unit or be several units distributed in the vehicle, as long as it complies with the
security requirements of this regulation;

(pp)

for computing sake in the recording equipment “week” means:

the period between 00.00 hours UTC on Monday and 24.00 UTC on Sunday;

(qq)

“workshop card” means:

a tachograph card issued by the authorities of a Member State to a recording equipment manufacturer, a fitter, a
vehicle manufacturer or workshop, approved by that Member State.

The workshop card identifies the cardholder and allows for testing, calibration and/or downloading of
equipment;

the recording

II. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE RECORDING EQUIPMENT

000

Any vehicle fitted with the recording equipment complying with the provisions of this Annex, must include a speed
display and an odometer. These functions may be included within the recording equipment.

001

002

003

1. General characteristics

The purpose of the recording equipment is to record, store, display, print, and output data related to driver activities.

The recording equipment includes cables, a motion sensor, and a vehicle unit.

The vehicle unit includes a processing unit, a data memory, a real time clock, two smart card interface devices (driver
and co-driver), a printer, a display, a visual warning, a calibration/downloading connector, and facilities for entry of
user's inputs.

The recording equipment may be connected to other devices through additional connectors.

Any inclusion in or connection to the recording equipment of any function, device, or devices, approved or otherwise,
shall not interfere with, or be capable of interfering with, the proper and secure operation of the recording equipment
and the provisions of the Regulation.

Recording equipment users identify themselves to the equipment via tachograph cards.

004

The recording equipment provides selective access rights to data and functions according to user's type and/or identity.

The recording equipment records and stores data in its data memory and in tachograph cards.

This is done in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (1).

2. Functions

005

The recording equipment shall ensure the following functions:

— monitoring cards insertions and withdrawals,

— speed and distance measurement,

— time measurement,

— monitoring driver activities,

— monitoring driving status,

(1) OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.

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— drivers manual entries:

— entry of places where daily work periods begin and/or end,

— manual entry of driver activities,

— entry of specific conditions,

— company locks management,

— monitoring control activities,

— detection of events and/or faults,

— built-in and self tests,

— reading from data memory,

— recording and storing in data memory,

— reading from tachograph cards,

— recording and storing in tachograph cards,

— displaying,

— printing,

— warning,

— data downloading to external media,

— output data to additional external devices,

— calibration,

— time adjustment.

3. Modes of operation

006

The recording equipment shall possess four modes of operation:

— operational mode,

— control mode,

— calibration mode,

— company mode.

007

The recording equipment shall switch to the following mode of operation according to the valid tachograph cards
inserted into the card interface devices:

Mode of operation

Driver slot

No card

Driver card

Control card

Workshop card

Company card

t
o
l
s

r
e
v
i
r
d
-
o
C

No card

Operational

Operational

Driver card

Operational

Operational

Control

Control

Calibration

Company

Calibration

Company

Control card

Control

Control

Control (*)

Operational

Operational

Workshop card

Calibration

Calibration

Operational

Calibration (1)

Operational

Company card

Company

Company

Operational

Operational

Company (1)

008

(*)

In these situations the recording equipment shall use only the tachograph card inserted in the driver slot.

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009

The recording equipment shall ignore non-valid cards inserted, except displaying, printing or downloading data held on
an expired card which shall be possible.

010

All functions listed in II.2. shall work in any mode of operation with the following exceptions:

— the calibration function is accessible in the calibration mode only,

— the time adjustment function is limited when not in the calibration mode,

— the driver manual entries functions are accessible in operational or calibration modes only,

— the company locks management function is accessible in the company mode only,

— the monitoring of control activities function is operational in the control mode only,

— the downloading function is not accessible in the operational mode (except as provided for in Requirement 150).

011

The recording equipment can output any data to display, printer or external interfaces with the following exceptions:

— in the operational mode, any personal identification (surname and first name(s)) not corresponding to a tachograph
card inserted shall be blanked and any card number not corresponding to a tachograph card inserted shall be
partially blanked (every odd character — from left to right — shall be blanked),

— in the company mode, driver related data (requirements 081, 084 and 087) can be output only for periods not

locked by another company (as identified by the first 13 digits of the company card number),

— when no card is inserted in the recording equipment, driver related data can be output only for the current and 8

previous calendar days.

4. Security

The system security aims at protecting the data memory in such a way as to prevent unauthorised access to and
manipulation of the data and detecting any such attempts, protecting the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged
between the motion sensor and the vehicle unit, protecting the integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the
recording equipment and the tachograph cards, and verifying the integrity and authenticity of data downloaded.

012

In order to achieve the system security, the recording equipment shall meet the security requirements specified in the
motion sensor and vehicle unit generic security targets (Appendix 10).

III. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR RECORDING EQUIPMENT

1. Monitoring cards insertion and withdrawal

The recording equipment shall monitor the card interface devices to detect card insertions and withdrawals.

Upon card insertion the recording equipment shall detect whether the card inserted is a valid tachograph card and in
such a case identify the card type.

The recording equipment shall be so designed that the tachograph cards are locked in position on their proper insertion
into the card interface devices.

The release of tachograph cards may function only when the vehicle is stopped and after the relevant data have been
stored on the cards. The release of the card shall require positive action by the user.

2. Speed and distance measurement

This function shall continuously measure and be able to provide the odometer value corresponding to the total distance
travelled by the vehicle.

013

014

015

016

017

018

This function shall continuously measure and be able to provide the speed of the vehicle.

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019

The speed measurement function shall also provide the information whether the vehicle is moving or stopped. The
vehicle shall be considered as moving as soon as the function detects more than 1 imp/sec for at least 5 seconds from
the motion sensor, otherwise the vehicle shall be considered as stopped.

Devices displaying speed (speedometer) and total distance travelled (odometer) installed in any vehicle fitted with a
recording equipment complying with the provisions of this Regulation, shall comply with the requirements relating to
maximum tolerances laid down in this Annex (Chapters III.2.1 and III.2.2).

2.1. Measurement of distance travelled

020

The distance travelled may be measured either:

— so as to cumulate both forward and reverse movements, or

— so as to include only forward movement.

021

022

The recording equipment shall measure distance from 0 to 9 999 999,9 km.

Distance measured shall be within the following tolerances (distances of at least 1 000 m):

— ± 1 % before installation,

— ± 2 % on installation and periodic inspection,

— ± 4 % in use.

023

Distance measured shall have a resolution better than or equal to 0,1 km.

024

025

2.2. Measurement of speed

The recording equipment shall measure speed from 0 to 220 km/h.

To ensure a maximum tolerance on speed displayed of ± 6 km/h in use, and taking into account:

— a ± 2 km/h tolerance for input variations (tyre variations, . . .),

— a ± 1 km/h tolerance in measurements made during installation or periodic inspections,

the recording equipment shall, for speeds between 20 and 180 km/h, and for characteristic coefficients of the vehicle
between 4 000 and 25 000 imp/km, measure the speed with a tolerance of ± 1 km/h (at constant speed).

Note: The resolution of data storage brings an additional tolerance of ± 0,5 km/h to speed stored by the recording
equipment.

025a

The speed shall be measured correctly within the normal tolerances within 2 seconds of the end of a speed change when
the speed has changed at a rate up to 2 m/s2.

026

Speed measurement shall have a resolution better than or equal to 1 km/h.

027

028

029

030

031

032

3. Time measurement

The time measurement function shall measure permanently and digitally provide UTC date and time.

UTC date and time shall be used for dating throughout the recording equipment (recordings, printouts, data exchange,
display, . . .).

In order to visualise the local time, it shall be possible to change the offset of the time displayed, in half hour steps.

Time drift shall be within ± 2 seconds per day in type approval conditions.

Time measured shall have a resolution better than or equal to 1 second.

Time measurement shall not be affected by an external power supply cut-off of less than 12 months in type approval
conditions.

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033

034

035

036

037

038

039

040

041

042

4. Monitoring driver activities

This function shall permanently and separately monitor the activities of one driver and one co-driver.

Driver activity shall be DRIVING, WORK, AVAILABILITY, or BREAK/REST.

It shall be possible for the driver and/or the co-driver to manually select WORK, AVAILABILITY, or BREAK/REST.

When the vehicle is moving, DRIVING shall be selected automatically for the driver and AVAILABILITY shall be selected
automatically for the co-driver.

When the vehicle stops, WORK shall be selected automatically for the driver.

The first change of activity arising within 120 seconds of the automatic change to WORK due to the vehicle stop shall
be assumed to have happened at the time of vehicle stop (therefore possibly cancelling the change to WORK).

This function shall output activity changes to the recording functions at a resolution of one minute.

Given a calendar minute, if any DRIVING activity has occurred within the minute, the whole minute shall be regarded as
DRIVING.

Given a calendar minute,
immediately succeeding minute, the whole minute shall be regarded as DRIVING.

if any DRIVING activity has occurred within both the immediately preceding and the

Given a calendar minute that is not regarded as DRIVING according to previous requirements, the whole minute shall be
regarded to be of the same type of activity as the longest continuous activity within the minute (or the latest of the
equally longest).

043

This function shall also permanently monitor the continuous driving time and the cumulative break time of the driver.

044

045

046

047

048

049

050

5. Monitoring driving status

This function shall permanently and automatically monitor the driving status.

The driving status CREW shall be selected when two valid driver cards are inserted in the equipment, the driving status
SINGLE shall be selected in any other case.

6. Drivers manual entries

6.1. Entry of places where daily work periods begin and/or end

This function shall allow for the entry of places where the daily work periods begin and/or end for a driver and/or a
co-driver.

Places are defined as the country and, in addition where applicable, the region.

At the time of a driver (or workshop) card withdrawal, the recording equipment shall prompt the (co-)driver to enter a
“place where the daily work period ends”.

The recording equipment shall allow this request to be disregarded.

It shall be possible to input places where daily work periods begin and/or end without card or at times other than card
insertion or withdrawal.

6.2. Manual entry of driver activities

050a

Upon driver (or workshop) card insertion, and only at this time, the recording equipment shall:

— remind the cardholder the date and time of his last card withdrawal, and

— ask the cardholder to identify if the current insertion of the card represents a continuation of the current daily work

period.

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The recording equipment shall allow the cardholder to disregard the question without answering, or to answer
positively, or to answer negatively:

— In the case where the cardholder disregards the question, the recording equipment shall prompt the cardholder for a
“place where the daily work period begins”. The recording equipment shall allow this request to be disregarded. If a
location is entered, then it shall be recorded, in the data memory and in the tachograph card, and related to the card
insertion time.

— In the case of a negative or positive answer, the recording equipment shall invite the cardholder to enter activities
manually, with their dates and times of beginning and end, among WORK, AVAILABILITY, or BREAK/REST only,
strictly included within the period last card withdrawal — current insertion only, and without allowing such
activities to overlap mutually. This shall be done in accordance with the following procedures:

— In the case where the cardholder answers positively to the question, the recording equipment shall invite the
cardholder to enter activities manually, in chronological order, for the period last card withdrawal — current
insertion. The process shall end when the end time of a manually entered activity equals the card insertion time.

— In the case where the cardholder answers negatively to the question, the recording equipment shall:

— Invite the card holder to enter manually activities in chronological order from the card withdrawal time up
to the time of end of the related daily work period (or of the activities related to that vehicle in the case
where the daily work period continues on a record sheet). The recording equipment shall therefore, before
allowing the cardholder to enter manually each activity, invite the cardholder to identify if the time of end
of the last recorded activity represents the end of a previous work period (see note below),

Note: In the case where the cardholder fails to declare when the previous work period ended, and manually
enters an activity which end time equals the card insertion time, the recording equipment shall:

— Assume that the daily work period ended at the start of the first REST (or remaining UNKNOWN)
period after card withdrawal or at the time of card withdrawal if no rest period has been entered (and if
no period remains UNKNOWN),

— Assume that the start time (see below) equals the card insertion time,

— Proceed through the steps below.

— Then, if the time of end of the related work period is different from the time of card withdrawal, or if no
place of end of daily work period had been entered at that time, prompt the cardholder to “confirm or enter
the place where the daily work period ended” (the recording equipment shall allow this request to be
disregarded). If a location is entered, it shall be recorded in the tachograph card only and only if different
from the one entered at card withdrawal (if one was entered), and related to the time of end of the work
period,

— Then invite the cardholder to “enter a start time” of the current daily work period (or of the activities related
to the current vehicle in the case where the card holder previously used a record sheet during this period),
and prompt the cardholder for a “place where the daily work period begins” (the recording equipment shall
allow this request to be disregarded). If a location is entered, it shall be recorded in the tachograph card and
related to this start time. If this start time is equal to the card insertion time, the location shall also be
recorded in the data memory,

— Then, if this start time is different from the card insertion time, invite the cardholder to enter manually
activities in chronological order from this start time up to the time of card insertion. The process shall end
when the end time of a manually entered activity equals the card insertion time.

— The recording equipment shall then allow the card holder to modify any activity manually entered, until

validation by selection of a specific command, and thereafter forbid any such modification.

— Such answers to the initial question followed by no activity entries, shall be interpreted by the recording

equipment as if the cardholder had disregarded the question.

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During this whole process, the recording equipment shall wait for entries no longer than the following time-outs:

— if no interaction with the equipment's human machine interface is happening during 1 minute (with a visual, and

possibly audible, warning after 30 seconds) or,

— if the card is withdrawn or another driver (or workshop) card is inserted or,

— as soon as the vehicle is moving,

in this case the recording equipment shall validate any entries already made.

6.3. Entry of specific conditions

050b

The recording equipment shall allow the driver to enter, in real time, the following two specific conditions:

— “OUT OF SCOPE” (begin, end)

— “FERRY/TRAIN CROSSING”

A “FERRY/TRAIN CROSSING” may not occur if an “OUT OF SCOPE” condition is opened.

An opened “OUT OF SCOPE” condition must be automatically closed, by the recording equipment, if a driver card is
inserted or withdrawn.

7. Company locks management

This function shall allow the management of the locks placed by a company to restrict data access in company mode to
itself.

Company locks consist in a start date/time (lock-in) and an end date/time (lock-out) associated with the identification of
the company as denoted by the company card number (at lock-in).

051

052

053

Locks may be turned “in” or “out” in real time only.

054

Locking-out shall only be possible for the company whose lock is “in” (as identified by the first 13 digits of the company
card number), or,

055

locking-out shall be automatic if another company locks in.

055a

In the case where a company locks in and where the previous lock was for the same company, then it will be assumed
that the previous lock has not been turned “out” and is still “in”.

056

057

8. Monitoring control activities

This function shall monitor DISPLAYING, PRINTING, VU and card DOWNLOADING activities carried while in control
mode.

This function shall also monitor OVER SPEEDING CONTROL activities while in control mode. An over speeding control
is deemed to have happened when, in control mode, the “over speeding” printout has been sent to the printer or to the
display, or when “events and faults” data have been downloaded from the VU data memory.

9. Detection of events and/or faults

058

This function shall detect the following events and/or faults:

9.1. “Insertion of a non-valid card” event

059

This event shall be triggered at the insertion of any non-valid card and/or when an inserted valid card expires.

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9.2. “Card conflict” event

060

This event shall be triggered when any of the valid cards combination noted X in the following table arise:

No card

Driver card

Control card

Workshop card

Company card

Driver slot

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Card conflict

No card

Driver card

Control card

Workshop card

Company card

t
o
l
s

r
e
v
i
r
d
-
o
C

9.3. “Time overlap” event

061

This event shall be triggered when the date/time of last withdrawal of a driver card, as read from the card, is later than
the current date/time of the recording equipment in which the card is inserted.

9.4. “Driving without an appropriate card” event

062

This event shall be triggered for any tachograph cards combination noted X in the following table, when driver activity
changes to DRIVING, or when there is a change of the mode of operation while driver activity is DRIVING:

Driving without an
appropriate card

No (or non-
valid) card

t
o
l
s

r
e
v
i
r
d
-
o
C

No (or non-
valid) card

Driver card

Control card

Workshop card

Company card

X

X

X

X

X

9.5. “Card insertion while driving” event

Driver slot

Driver card

Control card

Workshop card

Company card

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

063

This event shall be triggered when a tachograph card is inserted in any slot, while driver activity is DRIVING.

9.6. “Last card session not correctly closed” event

064

This event shall be triggered when at card insertion the recording equipment detects that, despite the provisions laid
down in paragraph III.1., the previous card session has not been correctly closed (the card has been withdrawn before all
relevant data have been stored on the card). This event shall be triggered by driver and workshop cards only.

9.7. “Over speeding” event

065

This event shall be triggered for each over speeding.

9.8. “Power supply interruption” event

066

This event shall be triggered, while not in calibration mode, in case of any interruption exceeding 200 milliseconds of
the power supply of the motion sensor and/or of the vehicle unit. The interruption threshold shall be defined by the
manufacturer. The drop in power supply due to the starting of the engine of the vehicle shall not trigger this event.

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9.9. “Motion data error” event

067

This event shall be triggered in case of interruption of the normal data flow between the motion sensor and the vehicle
unit and/or in case of data integrity or data authentication error during data exchange between the motion sensor and
the vehicle unit.

9.10. “Security breach attempt” event

068

This event shall be triggered for any other event affecting the security of the motion sensor and/or of the vehicle unit as
specified within the generic security targets of these components, while not in calibration mode.

9.11. “Card” fault

069

This fault shall be triggered when a tachograph card failure occurs during operation.

9.12. “Recording equipment” fault

070

This fault shall be triggered for any of these failures, while not in calibration mode:

— VU internal fault

— Printer fault

— Display fault

— Downloading fault

— Sensor fault

10. Built-in and self tests

071

The recording equipment shall self-detect faults through self tests and built-in-tests, according to the following table:

Sub-assembly to test

Self test

Built-in-test

Software

Data memory

Card interface devices

Keyboard

Printer

Display

Downloading
downloading)

Sensor

Access

Access

(up to manufacturer)

Integrity

Access, data integrity

Access

Manual check

Printout

Visual check

(performed

only

during

Proper operation

Proper operation

Proper operation

11. Reading from data memory

072

The recording equipment shall be able to read any data stored in its data memory.

12. Recording and storing in the data memory

For the purpose of this paragraph,

— “365 days” is defined as 365 calendar days of average drivers activity in a vehicle. The average activity per day in a
vehicle is defined as at least 6 drivers or co-drivers, 6 card insertion withdrawal cycles, and 256 activity changes.
“365 days” therefore include at least 2 190 (co-)drivers, 2 190 card insertion withdrawal cycles, and 93 440 activity
changes,

— times are recorded with a resolution of one minute, unless otherwise specified,

— odometer values are recorded with a resolution of one kilometre,

— speeds are recorded with a resolution of 1 km/h.

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073

Data stored into the data memory shall not be affected by an external power supply cut-off of less than twelve months
in type approval conditions.

074

The recording equipment shall be able to record and store implicitly or explicitly in its data memory the following:

12.1. Equipment identification data

12.1.1. Vehicle unit identification data

075

The recording equipment shall be able to store in its data memory the following vehicle unit identification data:

— name of the manufacturer,

— address of the manufacturer,

— part number,

— serial number,

— software version number,

— software version installation date,

— year of equipment manufacture,

— approval number.

076

Vehicle unit identification data are recorded and stored once and for all by the vehicle unit manufacturer, except the
software-related data and the approval number which may be changed in case of software upgrade.

12.1.2. Motion sensor identification data

077

The motion sensor shall be able to store in its memory the following identification data:

— name of the manufacturer,

— part number,

— serial number,

— approval number,

— embedded security component identifier (e.g. internal chip/processor part number),

— operating system identifier (e.g. software version number).

078

079

Motion sensor identification data are recorded and stored once and for all in the motion sensor, by the motion sensor
manufacturer.

The vehicle unit shall be able to record and store in its data memory the following currently paired motion sensor
identification data:

— serial number,

— approval number,

— first pairing date.

12.2. Security elements

080

The recording equipment shall be able to store the following security elements:

— European public key,

— Member State certificate,

— equipment certificate,

— equipment private key.

Recording equipment security elements are inserted in the equipment by the vehicle unit manufacturer.

12.3. Driver card insertion and withdrawal data

081

For each insertion and withdrawal cycle of a driver or workshop card in the equipment, the recording equipment shall
record and store in its data memory:

— the card holder's surname and first name(s) as stored in the card,

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— the card's number, issuing Member State and expiry date as stored in the card,

— the insertion date and time,

— the vehicle odometer value at card insertion,

— the slot in which the card is inserted,

— the withdrawal date and time,

— the vehicle odometer value at card withdrawal,

082

083

084

085

086

087

— the following information about the previous vehicle used by the driver, as stored in the card:

— VRN and registering Member State,

— card withdrawal date and time,

— a flag indicating whether, at card insertion, the card holder has manually entered activities or not.

The data memory shall be able to hold these data for at least 365 days.

When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace oldest data.

12.4. Driver activity data

The recording equipment shall record and store in its data memory whenever there is a change of activity for the driver
and/or the co-driver, and/or whenever there is a change of driving status, and/or whenever there is an insertion or
withdrawal of a driver or workshop card:

— the driving status (CREW, SINGLE)

— the slot (DRIVER, CO-DRIVER),

— the card status in the relevant slot (INSERTED, NOT INSERTED) (See Note),

— the activity (DRIVING, AVAILABILITY, WORK, BREAK/REST),

— the date and time of the change,

Note: INSERTED means that a valid driver or workshop card is inserted in the slot. NOT INSERTED means the opposite,
i.e. no valid driver or workshop card is inserted in the slot (e.g. a company card is inserted or no card is inserted).

Note: Activity data manually entered by a driver are not recorded in the data memory.

The data memory shall be able to hold driver activity data for at least 365 days.

When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace oldest data.

12.5. Places where daily work periods start and/or end

The recording equipment shall record and store in its data memory whenever a (co-)driver enters the place where a daily
work period begins and/or ends:

— if applicable, the (co-)driver card number and card issuing Member State,

— the date and time of the entry (or the date/time related to the entry when the entry is made during the manual entry

procedure),

— the type of entry (begin or end, condition of entry),

— the country and region entered,

— the vehicle odometer value.

088

The data memory shall be able to hold daily work periods start and/or end data for at least 365 days (with the
assumption that one driver enters two records per day).

089

When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace oldest data.

12.6. Odometer data

090

The recording equipment shall record in its data memory the vehicle odometer value and the corresponding date at
midnight every calendar day.

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091

The data memory shall be able to store midnight odometer values for at least 365 calendar days.

092

When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace oldest data.

12.7. Detailed speed data

093

The recording equipment shall record and store in its data memory the instantaneous speed of the vehicle and the
corresponding date and time at every second of at least the last 24 hours that the vehicle has been moving.

12.8. Events data

For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be recorded with a resolution of 1 second.

094

The recording equipment shall record and store in its data memory the following data for each event detected according
to the following storage rules:

Event

Storage rules

Data to be recorded per event

Card conflict

— the 10 most recent events.

— date and time of beginning of event,

— date and time of end of event,

— cards'

type,

number
Member
of
creating the conflict.

State

the

and

two

issuing
cards

Driving without an appropriate card — the longest event for each of
the 10 last days of occurrence,

— date and time of beginning of event,

— date and time of end of event,

— the 5 longest events over the

last 365 days.

Card insertion while driving

— the last event for each of the
10 last days of occurrence.

— cards'

type,

issuing
number
Member State of any card inserted at
beginning and/or end of the event,

and

— number of similar events that day.

— date and time of the event,

— card's

type,
Member State,

number

and

issuing

— number of similar events that day.

card session not

correctly

— the 10 most recent events.

— date and time of card insertion,

Last
closed

Over speeding (1)

— the most serious event for each
last
of
days
the one with

of
occurrence (i.e.
the highest average speed),

the

10

— the 5 most serious events over

the last 365 days.

— the first event having occurred

after the last calibration

— card's

type,
Member State,

number

and

issuing

— last session data as read from the card:

— date and time of card insertion,

— VRN and Member State of regis-

tration.

— date and time of beginning of event,

— date and time of end of event,

— maximum speed measured during the

event,

— arithmetic

average

speed measured

during the event,

— card's

type,

Member
applicable),

State

number
of

the

and

issuing
(if

driver

— number of similar events that day.

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Event

Storage rules

Data to be recorded per event

Power supply interruption (2)

— the longest event for each of
the 10 last days of occurrence,

— the 5 longest events over the

last 365 days.

Motion data error

— the longest event for each of
the 10 last days of occurrence,

— the 5 longest events over the

last 365 days.

— date and time of beginning of event,

— date and time of end of event,

— cards'

type,

issuing
number
Member State of any card inserted at
beginning and/or end of the event,

and

— number of similar events that day.

— date and time of beginning of event,

— date and time of end of event,

— cards'

type,

issuing
number
Member State of any card inserted at
beginning and/or end of the event,

and

Security breach attempt

— the 10 most recent events per

— date and time of beginning of event,

type of event.

— date and time of end of event

(if

relevant),

— number of similar events that day.

— cards'

type,

issuing
number
Member State of any card inserted at
beginning and/or end of the event,

and

095

(1)

The recording equipment shall also record and store in its data memory:
— the date and time of the last OVER SPEEDING CONTROL,
— the date and time of the first over speeding following this OVER SPEEDING CONTROL,
— the number of over speeding events since the last OVER SPEEDING CONTROL.

(2) These data may be recorded at power supply reconnection only, times may be known with an accuracy to the minute.

— type of event.

12.9. Faults data

For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be recorded with a resolution of 1 second.

096

The recording equipment shall attempt to record and store in its data memory the following data for each fault detected
according to the following storage rules:

Fault

Storage rules

Data to be recorded per fault

Card fault

— the 10 most recent driver card

— date and time of beginning of fault,

faults.

— date and time of end of fault,

— card's type number and issuing Member

State.

Recording equipment faults

— the 10 most recent faults for

— date and time of beginning of fault,

each type of fault,

— date and time of end of fault,

— the first fault after the last cali-

bration.

— type of fault,

— cards'

type,

issuing
number
Member State of any card inserted at
beginning and/or end of the fault.

and

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12.10. Calibration data

097

The recording equipment shall record and store in its data memory data relevant to:

— known calibration parameters at the moment of activation,

— its very first calibration following its activation,

— its first calibration in the current vehicle (as identified by its VIN),

— the 5 most recent calibrations (If several calibrations happen within one calendar day, only the last one of the day

shall be stored).

098

The following data shall be recorded for each of these calibrations:

— purpose of calibration (activation, first installation, installation, periodic inspection),

— workshop name and address,

— workshop card number, card issuing Member State and card expiry date,

— vehicle identification,

— parameters updated or confirmed: w, k, l, tyre size, speed limiting device setting, odometer (old and new values),

date and time (old and new values).

099

The motion sensor shall record and store in its memory the following motion sensor installation data:

— first pairing with a VU (date, time, VU approval number, VU serial number),

— last pairing with a VU (date, time, VU approval number, VU serial number).

12.11. Time adjustment data

100

The recording equipment shall record and store in its data memory data relevant to:

— the most recent time adjustment,

— the 5 largest time adjustments, since last calibration,

performed in calibration mode outside the frame of a regular calibration (def. (f)).

101

The following data shall be recorded for each of these time adjustments:

— date and time, old value,

— date and time, new value,

— workshop name and address,

— workshop card number, card issuing Member State and card expiry date.

12.12. Control activity data

102

The recording equipment shall record and store in its data memory the following data relevant to the 20 most recent
control activities:

— date and time of the control,

— control card number and card issuing Member State,

— type of the control (displaying and/or printing and/or VU downloading and/or card downloading).

103

In case of downloading, the dates of the oldest and of the most recent days downloaded shall also be recorded.

12.13. Company locks data

104

The recording equipment shall record and store in its data memory the following data relevant to the 20 most recent
company locks:

— lock-in date and time,

— lock-out date and time,

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— company card number and card issuing Member State,

— company name and address.

12.14. Download activity data

105

The recording equipment shall record and store in its data memory the following data relevant to the last data memory
downloading to external media while in company or in calibration mode:

— date and time of downloading,

— company or workshop card number and card issuing Member State,

— company or workshop name.

12.15. Specific conditions data

105a

The recording equipment shall record in its data memory the following data relevant to specific conditions:

— date and time of the entry,

— type of specific condition.

105b

The data memory shall be able to hold specific conditions data for at least 365 days (with the assumption that on
average, 1 condition is opened and closed per day). When storage capacity is exhausted, new data shall replace oldest
data.

13. Reading from tachograph cards

106

The recording equipment shall be able to read from tachograph cards, where applicable, the necessary data:

— to identify the card type, the card holder, the previously used vehicle, the date and time of the last card withdrawal

and the activity selected at that time,

— to check that last card session was correctly closed,

— to compute the driver's continuous driving time, cumulative break time and cumulated driving times for the

previous and the current week,

— to print requested printouts related to data recorded on a driver card,

— to download a driver card to external media.

107

108

109

109a

110

111

In case of a reading error, the recording equipment shall try again, three times maximum, the same read command, and
then if still unsuccessful, declare the card faulty and non valid.

14. Recording and storing on tachograph cards

The recording equipment shall set the “card session data” in the driver or workshop card right after the card insertion.

The recording equipment shall update data stored on valid driver, workshop and/or control cards with all necessary data
relevant to the period while the card is inserted and relevant to the card holder. Data stored on these cards are specified
in Chapter IV.

The recording equipment shall update driver activity and location data (as specified in Chapter IV paragraphs 5.2.5 and
5.2.6), stored on valid driver and/or workshop cards, with activity and location data manually entered by the cardholder.

Tachograph cards data update shall be such that, when needed and taking into account card actual storage capacity,
most recent data replace oldest data.

In the case of a writing error, the recording equipment shall try again, three times maximum, the same write command,
and then if still unsuccessful, declare the card faulty and non valid.

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112

Before releasing a driver card, and after all relevant data have been stored on the card, the recording equipment shall
reset the card session data.

113

114

114a

115

116

117

118

119

120

15. Displaying

The display shall include at least 20 characters.

The minimum character size shall be 5 mm high and 3,5 mm wide.

The display shall support the Latin 1 and Greek character sets defined by ISO 8859 parts 1 and 7, as specified in
Appendix 1 Chapter 4 “Character sets”. The display may use simplified glyphs (e.g. accented characters may be displayed
without accent, or lower case letters may be shown as upper case letters).

The display shall be provided with adequate non-dazzling lighting.

Indications shall be visible from outside the recording equipment.

The recording equipment shall be able to display:

— default data,

— data related to warnings,

— data related to menu access,

— other data requested by a user.

Additional information may be displayed by the recording equipment, provided that it is clearly distinguishable from
information required above.

The display of the recording equipment shall use the pictograms or pictograms combinations listed in Appendix 3.
Additional pictograms or pictograms combinations may also be provided by the display, if clearly distinguishable from
the aforementioned pictograms or pictograms combinations.

The display shall always be ON when the vehicle is moving.

The recording equipment may include a manual or automatic feature to turn the display OFF when the vehicle is not
moving.

Displaying format is specified in Appendix 5.

15.1. Default display

121

When no other information needs to be displayed, the recording equipment shall display, by default, the following:

— the local time (as a result of UTC time + offset as set by the driver),

— the mode of operation,

— the current activity of the driver and the current activity of the co-driver,

— information related to the driver:

— if his current activity is DRIVING, his current continuous driving time and his current cumulative break time,

— if his current activity is not DRIVING, the current duration of this activity (since it was selected) and his current

cumulative break time,

— information related to the co-driver:

— the current duration of his activity (since it was selected).

122

Display of data related to each driver shall be clear, plain and unambiguous. In the case where the information related to
the driver and the co-driver cannot be displayed at the same time, the recording equipment shall display by default the
information related to the driver and shall allow the user to display the information related to the co-driver.

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123

In the case where the display width does not allow to display by default the mode of operation, the recording equipment
shall briefly display the new mode of operation when it changes.

124

The recording equipment shall briefly display the card holder name at card insertion.

124a

When an “OUT OF SCOPE” condition is opened, then the default display must show using the relevant pictogram that
the condition is opened (It is acceptable that the driver's current activity may not be shown at the same time).

15.2. Warning display

125

The recording equipment shall display warning information using primarily the pictograms of Appendix 3, completed
where needed by an additional numerically coded information. A literal description of the warning may also be added in
the driver's preferred language.

15.3. Menu access

126

The recording equipment shall provide necessary commands through an appropriate menu structure.

15.4. Other displays

127

It shall be possible to display selectively on request:

— the UTC date and time,

— the mode of operation (if not provided by default),

— the continuous driving time and cumulative break time of the driver,

— the continuous driving time and cumulative break time of the co-driver,

— the cumulated driving time of the driver for the previous and the current week,

— the cumulated driving time of the co-driver for the previous and the current week,

— the content of any of the six printouts under the same formats as the printouts themselves.

128

Printout content display shall be sequential, line by line. If the display width is less than 24 characters the user shall be
provided with the complete information through an appropriate mean (several
. . .). Printout lines
devoted to hand-written information may be omitted for display.

lines, scrolling,

16. Printing

129

The recording equipment shall be able to print information from its data memory and/or from tachograph cards in
accordance with the six following printouts:

— driver activities from card daily printout,

— driver activities from Vehicle Unit daily printout,

— events and faults from card printout,

— events and faults from Vehicle Unit printout,

— technical data printout,

— over speeding printout.

The detailed format and content of these printouts are specified in Appendix 4.

Additional data may be provided at the end of the printouts

Additional printouts may also be provided by the recording equipment, if clearly distinguishable from the six afore-
mentioned printouts.

130

The “driver activities from card daily printout” and “events and faults from card printout” shall be available only when a
driver card or a workshop card is inserted in the recording equipment. The recording equipment shall update data
stored on the relevant card before starting printing.

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131

In order to produce the “driver activities from card daily printout” or the “events and faults from card printout”, the
recording equipment shall:

— either automatically select the driver card or the workshop card if one only of these cards is inserted,

— or provide a command to select the source card or select the card in the driver slot if two of these cards are inserted

in the recording equipment.

132

The printer shall be able to print 24 characters per line.

133

The minimum character size shall be 2.1 mm high and 1.5 mm wide.

133a

134

The printer shall support the Latin1 and Greek character sets defined by ISO 8859 parts 1 and 7, as specified in
Appendix 1 Chapter 4 “Character sets”.

Printers shall be so designed as to produce these printouts with a degree of definition likely to avoid any ambiguity
when they are read.

135

Printouts shall retain their dimensions and recordings under normal conditions of humidity (10-90 %) and temperature.

136

The paper for use by the recording equipment shall bear the relevant type approval mark and the indication of the
type(s) of recording equipment with which it may be used. Printouts shall remain clearly legible and identifiable under
normal conditions of storage, in terms of light intensity, humidity and temperature, for at least one year.

137

It shall also be possible to add hand-written notes, such as the driver's signature, to these documents.

138

The recording equipment shall manage “paper out” events while printing by, once paper has been re-loaded, restarting
printing from printout beginning or by continuing printing and providing an unambiguous reference to previously
printed part.

17. Warnings

139

The recording equipment shall warn the driver when detecting any event and/or fault.

140

Warning of a power supply interruption event may be delayed until the power supply is reconnected.

141

The recording equipment shall warn the driver 15 minutes before and at the time of exceeding 4 h. 30 min.
continuous driving time.

142

Warnings shall be visual. Audible warnings may also be provided in addition to visual warnings.

143

Visual warnings shall be clearly recognisable by the user, shall be situated in the driver's field of vision and shall be
clearly legible both by day and by night.

144

Visual warnings may be built into the recording equipment and/or remote from the recording equipment.

145

In the latter case it shall bear a “T” symbol and shall be amber or orange.

146

147

Warnings shall have a duration of at least 30 seconds, unless acknowledged by the user by hitting any key of the
recording equipment. This first acknowledgement shall not erase warning cause display referred to in next paragraph.

Warning cause shall be displayed on the recording equipment and remain visible until acknowledged by the user using a
specific key or command of the recording equipment.

148

Additional warnings may be provided, as long as they do not confuse drivers in relation to previously defined ones.

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149

150

18. Data downloading to external media

The recording equipment shall be able to download on request data from its data memory or from a driver card to
external storage media via the calibration/downloading connector. The recording equipment shall update data stored on
the relevant card before starting downloading.

In addition and as an optional feature, the recording equipment may, in any mode of operation, download data through
another connector to a company authenticated through this channel. In such a case, company mode data access rights
shall apply to this download.

151

Downloading shall not alter or delete any stored data.

The calibration/downloading connector electrical interface is specified in Appendix 6.

Downloading protocols are specified in Appendix 7.

19. Output data to additional external devices

152

153

When the recording equipment does not include speed and/or odometer display functions, the recording equipment
shall provide output signal(s) to allow for displaying the speed of the vehicle (speedometer) and/or the total distance
travelled by the vehicle (odometer).

The vehicle unit shall also be able to output the following data using an appropriate dedicated serial link independent
from an optional CAN bus connection (ISO 11898 Road vehicles — Interchange of digital information — Controller
Area Network (CAN) for high speed communication), to allow their processing by other electronic units installed in the
vehicle:

— current UTC date and time,

— speed of the vehicle,

— total distance travelled by the vehicle (odometer),

— currently selected driver and co-driver activity,

— information if any tachograph card is currently inserted in the driver slot and in the co-driver slot and (if applicable)

information about the corresponding cards identification (card number and issuing Member State).

Other data may also be output in addition to this minimum list.

When the ignition of the vehicle is ON, these data shall be permanently broadcasted. When the ignition of the vehicle is
OFF, at least any change of driver or co-driver activity and/or any insertion or withdrawal of a tachograph card shall
generate a corresponding data output. In the event that data output has been withheld whilst the ignition of the vehicle
is OFF, that data shall be made available once the ignition of the vehicle is ON again.

20. Calibration

154

The calibration function shall allow:

— to automatically pair the motion sensor with the VU,

— to digitally adapt the constant of the recording equipment (k) to the characteristic coefficient of the vehicle (w)
(vehicles with two or more axle ratios shall be fitted with a switch device whereby these various ratios will
automatically be brought into line with the ratio for which the equipment has been adapted to the vehicle),

— to adjust (without limitation) the current time,

— to adjust the current odometer value,

— to update motion sensor identification data stored in the data memory,

— to update or confirm other parameters known to the recording equipment: vehicle identification, w, l, tyre size and

speed limiting device setting if applicable.

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155

Pairing the motion sensor to the VU shall consist, at least, in:

— updating motion sensor installation data held by the motion sensor (as needed),

— copying from the motion sensor to the VU data memory necessary motion sensor identification data.

156

The calibration function shall be able to input necessary data through the calibration/downloading connector in
accordance with the calibration protocol defined in Appendix 8. The calibration function may also input necessary
data through other connectors.

21. Time adjustment

157

The time adjustment function shall allow for adjusting the current time in amounts of 1 minute maximum at intervals
of not less than 7 days.

158

The time adjustment function shall allow for adjusting the current time without limitation, in calibration mode.

22. Performance characteristics

159

The Vehicle Unit shall be fully operational in the temperature range – 20 °C to 70 °C, and the motion sensor in the
temperature range – 40 °C to 135 °C. Data memory content shall be preserved at temperatures down to – 40 °C.

160

The recording equipment shall be fully operational in the humidity range 10 % to 90 %.

161

162

The recording equipment shall be protected against over-voltage,
circuits.

inversion of its power supply polarity, and short

The recording equipment shall conform to Commission Directive 95/54/EC of 31 October 1995 (1) adapting to
technical progress Council Directive 72/245/EEC, related to electromagnetic compatibility, and shall be protected
against electrostatic discharges and transients.

23. Materials

163

All the constituent parts of the recording equipment shall be made of materials of sufficient stability and mechanical
strength and with stable electrical and magnetic characteristics.

164

For normal conditions of use, all the internal parts of the equipment shall be protected against damp and dust.

165

The Vehicle Unit shall meet the protection grade IP 40 and the motion sensor shall meet the protection grade IP 64, as
per standard IEC 529.

166

The recording equipment shall conform to applicable technical specifications related to ergonomic design.

167

The recording equipment shall be protected against accidental damage.

24. Markings

168

If the recording equipment displays the vehicle odometer value and speed, the following details shall appear on its
display:

— near the figure indicating the distance, the unit of measurement of distance, indicated by the abbreviation “km”,

(1) OJ L 266, 8.11.1995, p. 1.

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— near the figure showing the speed, the entry “km/h”.

The recording equipment may also be switched to display the speed in miles per hour, in which case the unit of
measurement of speed shall be shown by the abbreviation “mph”.

169

A descriptive plaque shall be affixed to each separate component of the recording equipment and shall show the
following details:

— name and address of the manufacturer of the equipment,

— manufacturer's part number and year of manufacture of the equipment,

— equipment serial number,

— approval mark for the equipment type.

170

When physical space is not sufficient to show all abovementioned details, the descriptive plaque shall show at least: the
manufacturer's name or logo, and the equipment's part number.

IV. CONSTRUCTION AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR TACHOGRAPH CARDS

1. Visible data

The front page will contain:

171

the words “Driver card” or “Control card” or “Workshop card” or “Company card” printed in large type in the official
language or languages of the Member State issuing the card, according to the type of the card.

172

the same words in the other official languages of the Community, printed to form the background of the card:

ES

DK

DE

EL

EN

FR

TARJETA DEL
CONDUCTOR

TARJETA DE CONTROL

TARJETA DEL CENTRO
DE ENSAYO

TARJETA DE LA
EMPRESA

FØRERKORT

KONTROLKORT

VÆRKSTEDSKORT

VIRKSOMHEDSKORT

FAHRERKARTE

KONTROLLKARTE

WERKSTATTKARTE

UNTERNEHMENSKARTE

ΚΑΡΤΑ Ο∆ΗΟΥ

ΚΑΡΤΑ ΕΛΕΓΧΟΥ

ΚΑΡΤΑ ΚΕΝΤΡΟΥ
∆ΟΚΙΜΩΝ

ΚΑΡΤΑ ΕΠΙΧΕΙΡΗΣΗΣ

DRIVER CARD

CONTROL CARD

WORKSHOP CARD

COMPANY CARD

CARTE DE
CONDUCTEUR

CARTE DE
CONTROLEUR

CARTE D'ATELIER

CARTE D'ENTREPRISE

GA

CÁRTA TIOMÁNAÍ

CÁRTA STIÚRTHA

CÁRTA CEARDLAINNE

CÁRTA COMHLACHTA

IT

CARTA DEL
CONDUCENTE

CARTA DI CONTROLLO CARTA DEL CENTRO DI

CARTA DELL'AZIENDA

PROVA

NL

BESTUURDERS KAART

CONTROLEKAART

CONTROLESTATION
KAART

BEDRIJFSKAART

PT

FIN

CARTÃO DE
CONDUTOR

KULJETTAJA
KORTTILLA

CARTÃO DE
CONTROLO

CARTÃO DO CENTRO
DE ENSAIO

CARTÃO DE EMPRESA

VALVONTA KORTILLA

TESTAUSASEMA
KORTILLA

YRITYSKORTILLA

SV

FÖRARKORT

KONTROLLKORT

VERKSTADSKORT

FÖRETAGSKORT

173

the name of the Member State issuing the card (optional);

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174

the distinguishing sign of the Member State issuing the card, printed in negative in a blue rectangle and encircled by 12
yellow stars. The distinguishing signs shall be as follows:

B

Belgium

DK

Denmark

D

Germany

GR

Greece

E

F

Spain

France

IRL

Ireland

I

L

Italy

Luxembourg

NL

The Netherlands

A

P

Austria

Portugal

FIN

Finland

S

Sweden

UK

The United Kingdom

175

information specific to the card issued, numbered as follows:

Driver card

Control card

Company or workshop card

surname of the driver

control body name

Company or workshop card

first name(s) of the driver

surname of the controller
(if applicable)

surname of card holder
(if applicable)

birth date of the driver

first name(s) of the controller
(if applicable)

first name(s) of card holder
(if applicable)

card start of validity date

card expiry date (if any)

the name of the issuing authority (may be printed on page 2)

a different number from the one under heading 5, for administrative purposes (optional)

1.

2.

3.

4.(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

5.(a)

Driving licence number
(at the date of issue of the driver card)

—

Photograph of the driver

Card number

photograph of the controller
(optional)

—

—

Signature of the driver

Signature of the holder (optional)

Normal place of residence, or postal
address of the holder (optional)

postal address of control body

postal address of company or
workshop

5.(b)

6.

7.

8.

176

dates shall be written using a “dd/mm/yyyy” or “dd.mm.yyyy” format (day, month, year).

177

178

The reverse page will contain:

an explanation of the numbered items which appear on the front page of the card;

with the specific written agreement of the holder, information which is not related to the administration of the card may
also be added, such addition will not alter in any way the use of the model as a tachograph card.

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179

Tachograph cards shall be printed with the following background predominant colours:

— driver card: white,

— control card: blue,

— workshop card: red,

— company card: yellow.

180

Tachograph cards shall bear at least the following features for protection of the card body against counterfeiting and
tampering:

— a security design background with fine guilloche patterns and rainbow printing,

— in the area of the photograph, the security design background and the photograph shall overlap,

— at least one two-coloured microprint line.

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181

After consulting the Commission, Member States may add colours or markings, such as national symbols and security
features, without prejudice to the other provisions of this Annex.

2. Security

The system security aims at protecting integrity and authenticity of data exchanged between the cards and the recording
equipment, protecting the integrity and authenticity of data downloaded from the cards, allowing certain write
operations onto the cards to recording equipment only, ruling out any possibility of falsification of data stored in
the cards, preventing tampering and detecting any attempt of that kind.

182

In order to achieve the system security, the tachograph cards shall meet the security requirements defined in the
tachograph cards generic security target (Appendix 10).

183

Tachograph cards shall be readable by other equipment such as personal computers.

3. Standards

184

The tachograph cards shall comply with the following standards:

— ISO/IEC 7810 Identification cards — Physical characteristics,

— ISO/IEC 7816 Identification cards — Integrated circuits with contacts:

— Part 1: Physical characteristics,

— Part 2: Dimensions and location of the contacts,

— Part 3: Electronic signals and transmission protocols,

— Part 4: Inter-industry commands for interchange,

— Part 8: Security related inter-industry commands,

— ISO/IEC 10373 Identification cards — Test methods.

4. Environmental and electrical specifications

185

186

187

188

The tachograph cards shall be capable of operating correctly in all the climatic conditions normally encountered in
Community territory and at least in the temperature range – 25 °C to + 70 °C with occasional peaks of up to + 85 °C,
“occasional” meaning not more than 4 hours each time and not over 100 times during the life time of the card.

The tachograph cards shall be capable of operating correctly in the humidity range 10 % to 90 %.

The tachograph cards shall be capable of operating correctly for a five-year period if used within the environmental and
electrical specifications.

During operation, the tachograph cards shall conform to Commission Directive 95/54/EC of 31 October 1995 (1),
related to electromagnetic compatibility, and shall be protected against electrostatic discharges.

5. Data storage

For the purpose of this paragraph,

— times are recorded with a resolution of one minute, unless otherwise specified,

— odometer values are recorded with a resolution of one kilometre,

— speeds are recorded with a resolution of 1 km/h.

The tachograph cards functions, commands and logical structures, fulfilling data storage requirements are specified in
Appendix 2.

(1) JO L 266, 8.11.1995, p. 1.

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189

This paragraph specifies minimum storage capacity for the various application data files. The tachograph cards shall be
able to indicate to the recording equipment the actual storage capacity of these data files.

Any additional data that may be stored on tachograph cards, related to other applications eventually borne by the card,
shall be stored in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (1).

5.1. Card identification and security data

5.1.1. Application identification

190

The tachograph cards shall be able to store the following application identification data:

— tachograph application identification,

— type of tachograph card identification.

5.1.2. Chip identification

191

The tachograph cards shall be able to store the following integrated circuit (IC) identification data:

— IC serial number,

— IC manufacturing references.

5.1.3. IC card identification

192

The tachograph cards shall be able to store the following smart card identification data:

— card serial number (including manufacturing references),

— card type approval number,

— card personaliser identification (ID),

— embedder ID,

— IC identifier.

5.1.4. Security elements

193

The tachograph cards shall be able to store the following security elements data:

— European public key,

— Member State certificate,

— card certificate,

— card private key.

5.2. Driver card

5.2.1. Card identification

194

The driver card shall be able to store the following card identification data:

— card number,

— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue date,

— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date.

5.2.2. Card holder identification

195

The driver card shall be able to store the following card holder identification data:

— surname of the holder,

— first name(s) of the holder,

(1) OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31.

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— date of birth,

— preferred language.

5.2.3. Driving licence information

196

The driver card shall be able to store the following driving licence data:

— issuing Member State, issuing authority name,

— driving licence number (at the date of the issue of the card).

5.2.4. Vehicles used data

197

The driver card shall be able to store, for each calendar day where the card has been used, and for each period of use of
a given vehicle that day (a period of use includes all consecutive insertion/withdrawal cycle of the card in the vehicle, as
seen from the card point of view), the following data:

— date and time of first use of the vehicle (i.e. first card insertion for this period of use of the vehicle, or 00h00 if the

period of use is on-going at that time),

— vehicle odometer value at that time,

— date and time of last use of the vehicle, (i.e. last card withdrawal for this period of use of the vehicle, or 23h59 if

the period of use is on-going at that time),

— vehicle odometer value at that time,

— VRN and registering Member State of the vehicle.

198

The driver card shall be able to store at least 84 such records.

5.2.5. Driver activity data

199

The driver card shall be able to store, for each calendar day where the card has been used or for which the driver has
entered activities manually, the following data:

— the date,

— a daily presence counter (increased by one for each of these calendar days),

— the total distance travelled by the driver during this day,

— a driver status at 00:00,

— whenever the driver has changed of activity, and/or has changed of driving status, and/or has inserted or withdrawn

his card:

— the driving status (CREW, SINGLE),

— the slot (DRIVER, CO-DRIVER),

— the card status (INSERTED, NOT INSERTED),

— the activity (DRIVING, AVAILABILITY, WORK, BREAK/REST),

— the time of the change.

200

201

202

The driver card memory shall be able to hold driver activity data for at least 28 days (the average activity of a driver is
defined as 93 activity changes per day).

The data listed under requirements 197 and 199 shall be stored in a way allowing the retrieval of activities in the order
of their occurrence, even in case of a time overlap situation.

5.2.6. Places where daily work periods start and/or end

The driver card shall be able to store the following data related to places where daily work periods begin and/or end,
entered by the driver:

— the date and time of the entry (or the date/time related to the entry if the entry is made during the manual entry

procedure),

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— the type of entry (begin or end, condition of entry),

— the country and region entered,

— the vehicle odometer value.

203

The driver card memory shall be able to hold at least 42 pairs of such records.

5.2.7. Events data

For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be stored with a resolution of 1 second.

204

The driver card shall be able to store data related to the following events detected by the recording equipment while the
card was inserted:

— Time overlap (where this card is the cause of the event),

— Card insertion while driving (where this card is the subject of the event),

— Last card session not correctly closed (where this card is the subject of the event),

— Power supply interruption,

— Motion data error,

— Security breach attempts.

205

The driver card shall be able to store the following data for these events:

— Event code,

— Date and time of beginning of the event (or of card insertion if the event was on-going at that time),

— Date and time of end of the event (or of card withdrawal if the event was on-going at that time),

— VRN and registering Member State of vehicle in which the event happened.

Note: For the “Time overlap” event:

— Date and time of beginning of the event shall correspond to the date and time of the card withdrawal from the

previous vehicle,

— Date and time of end of the event shall correspond to the date and time of card insertion in current vehicle,

— Vehicle data shall correspond to the current vehicle raising the event.

Note: For the “Last card session not correctly closed” event:

— date and time of beginning of event shall correspond to the card insertion date and time of the session not correctly

closed,

— date and time of end of event shall correspond to the card insertion date and time of the session during which the

event was detected (current session),

— Vehicle data shall correspond to the vehicle in which the session was not correctly closed.

206

The driver card shall be able to store data for the six most recent events of each type (i.e. 36 events).

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5.2.8. Faults data

For the purpose of this subparagraph, time shall be recorded with a resolution of 1 second.

207

The driver card shall be able to store data related to the following faults detected by the recording equipment while the
card was inserted:

— card fault (where this card is the subject of the event),

— recording equipment fault.

208

The driver card shall be able to store the following data for these faults:

— fault code,

— date and time of beginning of the fault (or of card insertion if the fault was on-going at that time),

— date and time of end of the fault (or of card withdrawal if the fault was on-going at that time),

— VRN and registering Member State of vehicle in which the fault happened.

209

The driver card shall be able to store data for the twelve most recent faults of each type (i.e. 24 faults).

5.2.9. Control activity data

210

The driver card shall be able to store the following data related to control activities:

— date and time of the control,

— control card number and card issuing Member State,

— type of the control (displaying and/or printing and/or VU downloading and/or card downloading (see note)),

— period downloaded, in case of downloading,

— VRN and registering Member State of the vehicle in which the control happened.

Note: security requirements imply that card downloading will only be recorded if performed through a recording
equipment.

211

The driver card shall be able to hold one such record.

5.2.10. Card session data

212

The driver card shall be able to store data related to the vehicle which opened its current session:

— date and time the session was opened (i.e. card insertion) with a resolution of one second,

— VRN and registering Member State.

5.2.11. Specific conditions data

212a

The driver card shall be able to store the following data related to specific conditions entered while the card was inserted
(whatever the slot):

— Date and time of the entry,

— Type of specific condition.

212b

The driver card shall be able to hold 56 such records.

5.3. Workshop card

5.3.1. Security elements

213

214

The workshop card shall be able to store a personal identification number (PIN code).

The workshop card shall be able to store the cryptographic keys needed for pairing motion sensors to vehicle units.

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5.3.2. Card identification

215

The workshop card shall be able to store the following card identification data:

— card number,

— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue date,

— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date.

5.3.3. Card holder identification

216

The workshop card shall be able to store the following card holder identification data:

— workshop name,

— workshop address,

— surname of the holder,

— first name(s) of the holder,

— preferred language.

5.3.4. Vehicles used data

217

218

219

220

221

The workshop card shall be able to store vehicles used data records in the same manner as a driver card.

The workshop card shall be able to store at least 4 such records.

5.3.5. Driver activity data

The workshop card shall be able to store driver activity data in the same manner as a driver card.

The workshop card shall be able to hold driver activity data for at least 1 day of average driver activity.

5.3.6. Daily work periods start and/or end data

The workshop card shall be able to store daily works period start and/or end data records in the same manner as a
driver card.

222

The workshop card shall be able to hold at least 3 pairs of such records.

5.3.7. Events and faults data

223

224

The workshop card shall be able to store events and faults data records in the same manner as a driver card.

The workshop card shall be able to store data for the three most recent events of each type (i.e. 18 events) and the six
most recent faults of each type (i.e. 12 faults).

5.3.8. Control activity data

225

The workshop card shall be able to store a control activity data record in the same manner as a driver card.

5.3.9 Calibration and time adjustment data

226

The workshop card shall be able to hold records of calibrations and/or time adjustments performed while the card is
inserted in a recording equipment.

227

Each calibration record shall be able to hold the following data:

— purpose of calibration (first installation, installation, periodic inspection),

— vehicle identification,

— parameters updated or confirmed (w, k, l, tyre size, speed limiting device setting, odometer (new and old values),

date and time (new and old values),

— recording equipment identification (VU part number, VU serial number, motion sensor serial number).

228

229

The workshop card shall be able to store at least 88 such records.

The workshop card shall hold a counter indicating the total number of calibrations performed with the card.

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230

The workshop card shall hold a counter indicating the number of calibrations performed since its last download.

5.3.10. Specific conditions data

230a

The workshop card shall be able to store data relevant to specific conditions in the same manner as the driver card. The
workshop card shall be able to store 2 such records.

5.4. Control card

5.4.1. Card identification

231

The control card shall be able to store the following card identification data:

— card number,

— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue date,

— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date (if any).

5.4.2. Card holder identification

232

The control card shall be able to store the following card holder identification data:

— control body name,

— control body address,

— surname of the holder,

— first name(s) of the holder,

— preferred language.

5.4.3. Control activity data

233

The control card shall be able to store the following control activity data:

— date and time of the control,

— type of the control (displaying and/or printing and/or VU downloading and/or card downloading)

— period downloaded (if any),

— VRN and Member State registering authority of the controlled vehicle,

— card number and card issuing Member State of the driver card controlled.

234

The control card shall be able to hold at least 230 such records.

5.5. Company card

5.5.1. Card identification

235

The company card shall be able to store the following card identification data:

— card number,

— issuing Member State, issuing authority name, issue date,

— card beginning of validity date, card expiry date (if any).

5.5.2. Card holder identification

236

The company card shall be able to store the following card holder identification data:

— company name,

— company address.

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5.5.3. Company activity data

237

The company card shall be able to store the following company activity data:

— date and time of the activity,

— type of the activity (VU locking in and/or out, and/or VU downloading and/or card downloading),

— period downloaded (if any),

— VRN and Member State registering authority of vehicle,

— card number and card issuing Member State (in case of card downloading).

238

The company card shall be able to hold at least 230 such records.

1. Installation

V. INSTALLATION OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT

239

240

241

242

243

244

245

246

247

248

New recording equipment shall be delivered non-activated to fitters or vehicle manufacturers, with all calibration
parameters, as listed in Chapter III.20, set to appropriate and valid default values. Where no particular value is
appropriate, literal parameters shall be set to strings of “?” and numeric parameters shall be set to “0”.

Before its activation, the recording equipment shall give access to the calibration function even if not in calibration
mode.

Before its activation, the recording equipment shall neither record nor store data referred by points III.12.3. to III.12.9.
and III.12.12 to III.12.14. inclusive.

During installation, vehicle manufacturers shall pre-set all known parameters.

Vehicle manufacturers or fitters shall activate the installed recording equipment before the vehicle leaves the premises
where the installation took place.

The activation of the recording equipment shall be triggered automatically by the first insertion of a workshop card in
either of its card interface devices.

Specific pairing operations required between the motion sensor and the vehicle unit, if any, shall take place auto-
matically before or during activation.

After its activation, the recording equipment shall fully enforce functions and data access rights.

The recording and storing functions of the recording equipment shall be fully operational after its activation.

Installation shall be followed by a calibration. The first calibration will include entry of VRN and will take place within 2
weeks of this installation or of VRN allocation whichever comes last.

248a

The recording equipment must be positioned in the vehicle in such a way as to allow the driver to access the necessary
functions from his seat.

2. Installation plaque

249

After the recording equipment has been checked on installation, an installation plaque which is clearly visible and easily
accessible shall be affixed on, in or beside the recording equipment. After every inspection by an approved fitter or
workshop, a new plaque shall be affixed in place of the previous one.

250

The plaque shall bear at least the following details:

— name, address or trade name of the approved fitter or workshop,

— characteristic coefficient of the vehicle, in the form “w = . . . imp/km”,

— constant of the recording equipment, in the form “k = . . . imp/km”,

— effective circumference of the wheel tyres in the form “l = . . . mm”,

— tyre size,

— the date on which the characteristic coefficient of the vehicle was determined and the effective circumference of the

wheel tyres measured,

— the vehicle identification number.

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3. Sealing

251

The following part shall be sealed:

— any connection which, if disconnected, would cause undetectable alterations to be made or undetectable data loss,

— the installation plaque, unless it is attached in such a way that it cannot be removed without the markings thereon

being destroyed.

252

The seals mentioned above may be removed:

— in case of emergency,

— to install, to adjust or to repair a speed limitation device or any other device contributing to road safety, provided
that the recording equipment continues to function reliably and correctly and is resealed by an approved fitter or
workshop (in accordance with Chapter VI) immediately after fitting the speed limitation device or any other device
contributing to road safety or within seven days in other cases.

253

On each occasion that these seals are broken a written statement giving the reasons for such action shall be prepared
and made available to the competent authority.

VI. CHECKS, INSPECTIONS AND REPAIRS

Requirements on the circumstances in which seals may be removed, as referred to in Article 12.5 of Regulation (EEC)
No 3821/85 as last amended by Regulation (EC) No 2135/98, are defined in Chapter V,3 of this annex.

1. Approval of fitters or workshops

The Member States will approve, regularly control and certify the bodies to carry out:

— installations,

— checks,

— inspections,

— repairs.

In the framework of Article 12-1 of this Regulation, workshop cards will be issued only to fitters and/or workshops
approved for the activation and/or the calibration of recording equipment in conformity with this annex and, unless
duly justified:

— who are not eligible for a company card,

— and whose other professional activities do not present a potential compromise of the overall security of the system

as defined in Appendix 10.

2. Check of new or repaired instruments

254

255

256

Every individual device, whether new or repaired, shall be checked in respect of its proper operation and the accuracy of
its reading and recordings, within the limits laid down in Chapter III.2.1. and III.2.2 by means of sealing in accordance
with Chapter V.3. and calibration.

3. Installation inspection

When being fitted to a vehicle, the whole installation (including the recording equipment) shall comply with the
provisions relating to maximum tolerances laid down in Chapter III.2.1 and III.2.2.

4. Periodic inspections

Periodic inspections of the equipment fitted to the vehicles shall take place after any repair of the equipment, or after
any alteration of the characteristic coefficient of the vehicle or of the effective circumference of the tyres, or after
equipment UTC time is wrong by more than 20 minutes, or when the VRN has changed, and at least once within two
years (24 months) of the last inspection.

257

These inspections shall include the following checks:

— that the recording equipment is working properly, including the data storage in tachograph cards function,

— that compliance with the provisions of Chapter III.2.1 and III.2.2 on the maximum tolerances on installation is

ensured,

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— that the recording equipment carries the type approval mark,

— that the installation plaque is affixed,

— that the seals on the equipment and on the other parts of the installation are intact,

— the tyre size and the actual circumference of the wheel tyres.

258

These inspections shall include a calibration.

5. Measurement of errors

259

The measurement of errors on installation and during use shall be carried out under the following conditions, which are
to be regarded as constituting standard test conditions:

— vehicle unladen, in normal running order,

— tyre pressures in accordance with the manufacturer's instructions,

— tyre wear, within the limits allowed by national law,

— vehicle movement:

— the vehicle shall advance under its own engine power in a straight line on level ground and at a speed of

50 ± 5 km/h. The measuring distance shall be at least 1 000 m,

— provided that it is of comparable accuracy, alternative methods, such as a suitable test bench, may also be used for

the test.

6. Repairs

260

261

262

263

264

265

266

267

268

Workshops shall be able to download data from the recording equipment to give the data back to the appropriate
transport company.

Approved workshops shall issue to transport companies a certificate of data un-downloadability where the malfunction
of the recording equipment prevents previously recorded data to be downloaded, even after repair by this workshop.
The workshops will keep a copy of each issued certificate for at least one year.

The card issuing processes set-up by the Member States shall conform to the following:

VII. CARD ISSUING

The card number of the first issue of a tachograph card to an applicant shall have a consecutive index (if applicable) and
a replacement index and a renewal index set to “0”.

The card numbers of all non-personal tachograph cards issued to a single control body or a single workshop or a single
transport company shall have the same first 13 digits, and shall all have a different consecutive index.

A tachograph card issued in replacement of an existing tachograph card shall have the same card number than the
replaced one except the replacement index which shall be raised by “1” (in the order 0, . . ., 9, A, . . ., Z).

A tachograph card issued in replacement of an existing tachograph card shall have the same card expiry date as the
replaced one.

A tachograph card issued in renewal of an existing tachograph card shall have the same card number as the renewed
one except the replacement index which shall be reset to “0” and the renewal index which shall be raised by “1” (in the
order 0, . . ., 9, A, . . ., Z).

The exchange of an existing tachograph card, in order to modify administrative data, shall follow the rules of the
renewal if within the same Member State, or the rules of a first issue if performed by another Member State.

The “card holder surname” for non-personal workshop or control cards shall be filled with workshop or control body
name.

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VIII. TYPE APPROVAL OF RECORDING EQUIPMENT AND TACHOGRAPH CARDS

1. General points

For the purpose of this chapter, the words “recording equipment” mean “recording equipment or its components”. No
type approval is required for the cable(s) linking the motion sensor to the VU. The paper, for use by the recording
equipment, shall be considered as a component of the recording equipment.

Recording equipment shall be submitted for approval complete with any integrated additional devices.

Type approval of recording equipment and of tachograph cards shall include security related tests, functional tests and
interoperability tests. Positive results to each of these tests are stated by an appropriate certificate.

Member States type approval authorities will not grant a type approval certificate in accordance with Article 5 of this
Regulation, as long as they do not hold:

— a security certificate,

— a functional certificate,

— and an interoperability certificate,

for the recording equipment or the tachograph card, subject of the request for type approval.

Any modification in software or hardware of the equipment or in the nature of materials used for its manufacture shall,
before being used, be notified to the authority which granted type-approval for the equipment. This authority shall
confirm to the manufacturer the extension of the type approval, or may require an update or a confirmation of the
relevant functional, security and/or interoperability certificates.

Procedures to upgrade in-situ recording equipment software shall be approved by the authority which granted type
approval for the recording equipment. Software upgrade must not alter nor delete any driver activity data stored in the
recording equipment. Software may be upgraded only under the responsibility of the equipment manufacturer.

269

270

271

272

273

2. Security certificate

274

The security certificate is delivered in accordance with the provisions of Appendix 10 of this Annex.

3. Functional certificate

275

276

277

278

279

Each candidate for type approval shall provide the Member State's type approval authority with all the material and
documentation that the authority deems necessary.

A functional certificate shall be delivered to the manufacturer only after all functional tests specified in Appendix 9, at
least, have been successfully passed.

The type approval authority delivers the functional certificate. This certificate shall indicate, in addition to the name of
its beneficiary and the identification of the model, a detailed list of the tests performed and the results obtained.

4. Interoperability certificate

Interoperability tests are carried out by a single laboratory under the authority and responsibility of the European
Commission.

The laboratory shall register interoperability test requests introduced by manufacturers in the chronological order of
their arrival.

280

Requests will be officially registered only when the laboratory is in possession of:

— the entire set of material and documents necessary for such interoperability tests,

— the corresponding security certificate,

— the corresponding functional certificate,

The date of the registration of the request shall be notified to the manufacturer.

281

282

No interoperability tests shall be carried out by the laboratory, for a recording equipment or a tachograph card that
have not been granted a security certificate and a functional certificate.

Any manufacturer requesting interoperability tests shall commit to leave to the laboratory in charge of these tests the
entire set of material and documents which he provided to carry out the tests.

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283

The interoperability tests shall be carried out, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Appendix 9 of this
Annex, with respectively all the types of recording equipment or tachograph cards:

284

285

286

287

288

289

290

291

292

293

294

295

— for which type approval is still valid, or

— for which type approval is pending and that have a valid interoperability certificate.

The interoperability certificate shall be delivered by the laboratory to the manufacturer only after all required inter-
operability tests have been successfully passed.

If the interoperability tests are not successful with one or more of the recording equipment or tachograph card(s), as
requested by requirement 283, the interoperability certificate shall not be delivered, until the requesting manufacturer
has realised the necessary modifications and has succeeded the interoperability tests. The laboratory shall identify the
cause of the problem with the help of the manufacturers concerned by this interoperability fault and shall attempt to
help the requesting manufacturer in finding a technical solution. In the case where the manufacturer has modified its
product, it is the manufacturer's responsibility to ascertain from the relevant authorities that the security certificate and
the functional certificates are still valid.

The interoperability certificate is valid for six months. It is revoked at the end of this period if the manufacturer has not
received a corresponding type approval certificate. It is forwarded by the manufacturer to the type approval authority of
the Member State who has delivered the functional certificate.

Any element that could be at the origin of an interoperability fault shall not be used for profit or to lead to a dominant
position.

5. Type approval certificate

The type approval authority of the Member State may deliver the type approval certificate as soon as it holds the three
required certificates.

The type approval certificate shall be copied by the type approval authority to the laboratory in charge of the inter-
operability tests at the time of deliverance to the manufacturer.

The laboratory competent for interoperability tests shall run a public web site on which will be updated the list of
recording equipment or tachograph cards models:

— for which a request for interoperability tests have been registered,

— having received an interoperability certificate (even provisional),

— having received a type approval certificate.

6. Exceptional procedure: first interoperability certificates

Until four months after a first couple of recording equipment and tachograph cards (driver, workshop, control and
company cards) have been certified to be interoperable, any interoperability certificate delivered (including this very first
one), regarding requests registered during this period, shall be considered provisional.

If at the end of this period, all products concerned are mutually interoperable, all corresponding interoperability
certificates shall become definitive.

If during this period, interoperability faults are found, the laboratory in charge of interoperability tests shall identify the
causes of the problems with the help of all manufacturers involved and shall invite them to realise the necessary
modifications.

If at the end of this period, interoperability problems still remain, the laboratory in charge of interoperability tests, with
the collaboration of the manufacturers concerned and with the type approval authorities who delivered the corre-
sponding functional certificates shall find out the causes of the interoperability faults and establish which modifications
should be made by each of the manufacturers concerned. The search for technical solutions shall last for a maximum of
two months, after which, if no common solution is found, the Commission, after having consulted the laboratory in
charge of interoperability tests, shall decide which equipment(s) and cards get a definitive interoperability certificate and
state the reasons why.

Any request for interoperability tests, registered by the laboratory between the end of the four-month period after the
first provisional interoperability certificate has been delivered and the date of the decision by the Commission referred to
in requirement 294, shall be postponed until the initial interoperability problems have been solved. Those requests are
then processed in the chronological order of their registration.

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Appendix 1

DATA DICTIONARY

1. INTRODUCTION

This appendix specifies data formats, data elements, and data structures for use within the recording equipment and
tachograph cards.

1.1. Approach for definitions of data types

This appendix uses Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) to define data types. This enables simple and structured data
to be defined without implying any specific transfer syntax (encoding rules) which will be application and environment
dependent.

ASN.1 type naming conventions are done in accordance with ISO/IEC 8824-1. This implies that:

— where possible, the meaning of the data type is implied through the names being selected,

— where a data type is a composition of other data types, the data type name is still a single sequence of alphabetical
characters commencing with a capital letter, however capitals are used within the name to impart the corresponding
meaning,

— in general, the data types names are related to the name of the data types from which they are constructed, the

equipment in which data is stored and the function related to the data.

If an ASN.1 type is already defined as part of another standard and if it is relevant for usage in the recording equipment,
then this ASN.1 type will be defined in this appendix.

To enable several types of encoding rules, some ASN.1 types in this appendix are constrained by value range identifiers.
The value range identifiers are defined in paragraph 3.

1.2. References

The following references are used in this Appendix:

ISO 639

Code for the representation of names of languages. First Edition: 1988.

EN 726-3

Identification cards systems — Telecommunications integrated circuit(s) cards and terminals — Part
3: Application independent card requirements. December 1994.

ISO 3779

Road vehicles — Vehicle identification number (VIN) — Content and structure. Edition 3: 1983.

ISO/IEC 7816-5

Information technology — Identification cards — Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 5:
Numbering system and registration procedure for application identifiers. First edition: 1994 +
Amendment 1: 1996.

ISO/IEC 8824-1

Information technology — Abstract Syntax Notation 1 (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation.
Edition 2: 1998.

ISO/IEC 8825-2

Information technology — ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Packed Encoding Rules (PER).
Edition 2: 1998.

ISO/IEC 8859-1

Information technology — 8 bit single-byte coded graphic character sets — Part 1: Latin alphabet No
1. First edition: 1998.

ISO/IEC 8859-7

Information technology — 8 bit single-byte coded graphic character sets — Part 7: Latin/Greek
alphabet. First edition: 1987.

ISO 16844-3

Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Motion Sensor Interface. WD 3-20/05/99.

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2. DATA TYPE DEFINITIONS

For any of the following data types, the default value for an “unknown” or a “not applicable” content will consist in
filling the data element with 'FF'-Bytes.

2.1. ActivityChangeInfo

This data type enables to code, within a two bytes word, a slot status at 00.00 and/or a driver status at 00.00 and/or
changes of activity and/or changes of driving status and/or changes of card status for a driver or a co-driver. This data
type is related to requirements 084, 109a, 199 and 219.

ActivityChangeInfo ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(2))

Value assignment — Octet Aligned: 'scpaattttttttttt'B (16 bits)

For Data Memory recordings (or slot status):

's'B

Slot:

'0'B: DRIVER,

'1'B: CO-DRIVER,

'c'B

Driving status:

'0'B: SINGLE,

'1'B: CREW,

'p'B

Driver (or workshop) card status in the relevant slot:

'0'B: INSERTED, a card is inserted,

'1'B: NOT INSERTED, no card is inserted (or a card is withdrawn),

'aa'B

Activity:

'00'B: BREAK/REST,

'01'B: AVAILABILITY,

'10'B: WORK,

'11'B: DRIVING,

'ttttttttttt'B Time of the change: Number of minutes since 00h00 on the given day.

For Driver (or Workshop) card recordings (and driver status):

's'B

Slot (not relevant when 'p' = 1 except note below):

'0'B: DRIVER,

'1'B: 2. CO-DRIVER,

'c'B

Driving status (case 'p' = 0) or

Following activity status (case 'p' = 1):

'0'B: SINGLE,

'0'B: UNKNOWN

'1'B: CREW,

'1'B: KNOWN (= manually entered)

'p'B

Card status:

'0'B: INSERTED, the card is inserted in a recording equipment,

'1'B: NOT INSERTED, the card is not inserted (or the card is withdrawn),

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'aa'B

Activity (not relevant when 'p' = 1 and 'c' = 0 except note below):

'00'B: BREAK/REST,

'01'B: AVAILABILITY,

'10'B: WORK,

'11'B: DRIVING,

'ttttttttttt'B Time of the change: Number of minutes since 00h00 on the given day.

Note for the case “card withdrawal”:

When the card is withdrawn:

— 's' is relevant and indicates the slot from which the card is withdrawn,

— 'c' must be set to 0,

— 'p' must be set to 1,

— 'aa' must code the current activity selected at that time,

As a result of a manual entry, the bits 'c' and 'aa' of the word (stored in a card) may be overwritten later to reflect the
entry.

2.2. Address

An address.

address ::= SEQUENCE {

codePage

address

}

INTEGER (0..255),

OCTET STRING (SIZE(35))

codePage specifies the part of the ISO/IEC 8859 used to code the address,

address is an address coded in accordance with ISO/IEC 8859-codePage.

2.3. BCDString

BCDString is applied for Binary Code Decimal (BCD) representation. This data type is used to represent one decimal
digit in one semi octet (4 bits). BCDString is based on the ISO/IEC 8824-1 'CharacterStringType'.

BCDString ::= CHARACTER STRING (WITH COMPONENTS {

identification ( WITH COMPONENTS {

fixed PRESENT }) })

BCDString uses an “hstring” notation. The leftmost hexadecimal digit shall be the most significant semi octet of the first
octet. To produce a multiple of octets, zero trailing semi octets shall be inserted, as needed, from the leftmost semi octet
position in the first octet.

Permitted digits are: 0, 1, . . . 9.

2.4. CalibrationPurpose

Code explaining why a set of calibration parameters was recorded. This data type is related to requirements 097 and
098.

CalibrationPurpose ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1))

Value assignment:

'00'H reserved value,

'01'H activation: recording of calibration parameters known, at the moment of the VU activation,

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'02'H first installation: first calibration of the VU after its activation,

'03'H installation: first calibration of the VU in the current vehicle,

'04'H periodic inspection.

2.5. CardActivityDailyRecord

Information, stored in a card, related to the driver activities for a particular calendar day. This data type is related to
requirements 199 and 219.

CardActivityDailyRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

activityPreviousRecordLength
activityRecordLength
activityRecordDate
activityDailyPresenceCounter
activityDayDistance
activityChangeInfo

}

INTEGER(0..CardActivityLengthRange),
INTEGER(0..CardActivityLengthRange),
TimeReal,
DailyPresenceCounter,
Distance,
SET SIZE(1..1440) OF ActivityChangeInfo

activityPreviousRecordLength is the total length in bytes of the previous daily record. The maximum value is given
by the length of the OCTET STRING containing these records (see CardActivityLengthRange paragraph 3). When this
record is the oldest daily record, the value of activityPreviousRecordLength must be set to 0.

activityRecordLength is the total length in bytes of this record. The maximum value is given by the length of the
OCTET STRING containing these records.

activityRecordDate is the date of the record.

activityDailyPresenceCounter is the daily presence counter for the card this day.

activityDayDistance is the total distance travelled this day.

activityChangeInfo is the set of ActivityChangeInfo data for the driver this day. It may contain at maximum 1 440
values (one activity change per minute). This set always includes the activityChangeInfo coding the driver status at
00.00.

2.6. CardActivityLengthRange

Number of bytes in a driver or a workshop card, available to store driver activity records.

CardActivityLengthRange ::= INTEGER(0..216-1)

Value assignment: see paragraph 3.

2.7. CardApprovalNumber

Type approval number of the card.

CardApprovalNumber ::= IA5String(SIZE(8))

Value assignment: Unspecified.

2.8. CardCertificate

Certificate of the public key of a card.

CardCertificate ::= Certificate

2.9. CardChipIdentification

Information, stored in a card, related to the identification of the card's Integrated Circuit (IC) (requirement 191).

CardChipIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {

icSerialNumber
icManufacturingReferences

OCTET STRING (SIZE(4)),
OCTET STRING (SIZE(4))

}

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icSerialNumber is the IC serial number as defined in EN 726-3.

icManufacturingReferences is the IC manufacturer identifier and fabrication elements as defined in EN 726-3.

2.10. CardConsecutiveIndex

A card consecutive index (definition h)).

CardConsecutiveIndex ::= IA5String(SIZE(1))

Value assignment: (see this Annex Chapter VII)

Order for increase: '0 , . . ., 9, A , . . . , Z , a , . . . , z'

2.11. CardControlActivityDataRecord

Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the last control the driver has been subject to (requirements
210 and 225).

CardControlActivityDataRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

controlType

controlTime

controlCardNumber

controlType,

TimeReal,

FullCardNumber,

controlVehicleRegistration

VehicleRegistrationIdentification,

controlDownloadPeriodBegin

controlDownloadPeriodEnd

TimeReal,

TimeReal,

}

controlType is the type of the control.

controlTime is the date and time of the control.

controlCardNumber is the FullCardNumber of the control officer having performed the control.

controlVehicleRegistration is the VRN and registering Member State of the vehicle in which the control happened.

controlDownloadPeriodBegin and controlDownloadPeriodEnd is the period downloaded, in case of downloading.

2.12. CardCurrentUse

Information about the actual usage of the card (requirement 212).

CardCurrentUse ::= SEQUENCE {

sessionOpenTime

sessionOpenVehicle

}

TimeReal,

VehicleRegistrationIdentification

sessionOpenTime is the time when the card is inserted for the current usage. This element is set to zero at card
removal.

sessionOpenVehicle is the identification of the currently used vehicle, set at card insertion. This element is set to zero
at card removal.

2.13. CardDriverActivity

Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, related to the activities of the driver (requirements 199 and 219).

CardDriverActivity ::= SEQUENCE {

activityPointerOldestDayRecord

INTEGER(0..CardActivityLengthRange-1),

activityPointerNewestRecord

INTEGER(0..CardActivityLengthRange-1),

activityDailyRecords

}

OCTET STRING
(SIZE(CardActivityLengthRange))

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activityPointerOldestDayRecord is the specification of the begin of the storage place (number of bytes from the
beginning of the string) of the oldest complete day record in the activityDailyRecords string. The maximum value is
given by the length of the string.

activityPointerNewestRecord is the specification of the begin of the storage place (number of bytes from the
beginning of the string) of the most recent day record in the activityDailyRecords string. The maximum value is
given by the length of the string.

activityDailyRecords is the space available to store the driver activity data (data structure: CardActivityDailyRecord) for
each calendar day where the card has been used.

Value assignment: this octet string is cyclically filled with records of CardActivityDailyRecord. At the first use storing is
started at the first byte of the string. All new records are appended at the end of the previous one. When the string is
full, storing continues at the first byte of the string independently of a break being inside a data element. Before placing
new activity data in the string (enlarging current activityDailyRecord, or placing a new activityDailyRecord) that replaces
older activity data, activityPointerOldestDayRecord must be updated to reflect the new location of the oldest complete
day record, and activityPreviousRecordLength of this (new) oldest complete day record must be reset to 0.

2.14. CardDrivingLicenceInformation

Information, stored in a driver card, related to the card holder driver licence data (requirement 196).

CardDrivingLicenceInformation ::= SEQUENCE {

drivingLicenceIssuingAuthority

Name,

drivingLicenceIssuingNation

NationNumeric,

drivingLicenceNumber

IA5String(SIZE(16))

}

drivingLicenceIssuingAuthority is the authority responsible for issuing the driving licence.

drivingLicenceIssuingNation is the nationality of the authority that issued the driving licence.

drivingLicenceNumber is the number of the driving licence.

2.15. CardEventData

Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the events associated with the card holder (requirements
204 and 223).

CardEventData ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(6) OF {

cardEventRecords

}

SET SIZE(NoOfEventsPerType) OF
CardEventRecord

CardEventData is a sequence, ordered by ascending value of EventFaultType, of cardEventRecords (except security
breach attempts related records which are gathered in the last set of the sequence).

CardEventRecords is a set of event records of a given event type (or category for security breach attempts events).

2.16. CardEventRecord

Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, related to an event associated to the card holder (requirements 205
and 223).

CardEventRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

eventType

eventBeginTime

eventEndTime

EventFaultType,

TimeReal,

TimeReal,

eventVehicleRegistration

VehicleRegistrationIdentification

}

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eventType is the type of the event.

eventBeginTime is the date and time of beginning of event.

eventEndTime is the date and time of end of event.

eventVehicleRegistration is the VRN and registering Member State of vehicle in which the event happened.

2.17. CardFaultData

Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, related to the faults associated to the card holder (requirements 207
and 223).

CardFaultData ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(2) OF {

cardFaultRecords

}

SET SIZE(NoOfFaultsPerType) OF
CardFaultRecord

CardFaultData is a sequence of Recording Equipment faults set of records followed by card faults set of records.

cardFaultRecords is a set of fault records of a given fault category (Recording Equipment or card).

2.18. CardFaultRecord

Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, related to a fault associated to the card holder (requirement 208 and
223).

CardFaultRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

faultType

faultBeginTime

faultEndTime

EventFaultType,

TimeReal,

TimeReal,

faultVehicleRegistration

VehicleRegistrationIdentification

}

faultType is the type of the fault.

faultBeginTime is the date and time of beginning of fault.

faultEndTime is the date and time of end of fault.

faultVehicleRegistration is the VRN and registering Member State of vehicle in which the fault happened.

2.19. CardIccIdentification

Information, stored in a card, related to the identification of the integrated circuit (IC) card (requirement 192).

CardIccIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {

clockStop

OCTET STRING (SIZE(1)),

cardExtendedSerialNumber

ExtendedSerialNumber,

cardApprovalNumber

cardPersonaliserID

embedderIcAssemblerId

icIdentifier

}

CardApprovalNumber

OCTET STRING (SIZE(1)),

OCTET STRING (SIZE(5)),

OCTET STRING (SIZE(2))

clockStop is the Clockstop mode as defined in EN 726-3.

cardExtendedSerialNumber is the IC card serial number and IC card manufacturing reference as defined in EN 726-3
and as further specified by the ExtendedSerialNumber data type.

cardApprovalNumber is the type approval number of the card.

cardPersonaliserID is the card personaliser ID as defined in EN 726-3.

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embedderIcAssemblerId is the embedder/IC assembler identifier as defined in EN 726-3.

icIdentifier is the Identifier of the IC on the card and its IC manufacturer as defined in EN 726-3.

2.20. CardIdentification

Information, stored in a card, related to the identification of the card (requirements 194, 215, 231, 235).

CardIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {

cardIssuingMemberState

cardNumber

cardIssuingAuthorityName

cardIssueDate

cardValidityBegin

cardExpiryDate

}

NationNumeric,

CardNumber,

Name,

TimeReal,

TimeReal,

TimeReal

cardIssuingMemberState is the code of the Member State issuing the card.

cardNumber is the card number of the card.

cardIssuingAuthorityName is the name of the authority having issued the Card.

cardIssueDate is the issue date of the Card to the current holder.

cardValidityBegin is the first date of validity of the card.

cardExpiryDate is the date when the validity of the card ends.

2.21. CardNumber

A card number as defined by definition g).

CardNumber ::= CHOICE {

SEQUENCE {

driverIdentification

cardReplacementIndex

cardRenewalIndex

}

SEQUENCE {

ownerIdentification

cardConsecutiveIndex

cardReplacementIndex

cardRenewalIndex

}

}

IA5String(SIZE(14)),

CardReplacementIndex,

CardRenewalIndex

IA5String(SIZE(13)),

CardConsecutiveIndex,

CardReplacementIndex,

CardRenewalIndex

driverIdentification is the unique identification of a driver in a Member State.

ownerIdentification is the unique identification of a company or a workshop or a control body within a Member
State.

cardConsecutiveIndex is the card consecutive index.

cardReplacementIndex is the card replacement index.

cardRenewalIndex is the card renewal index.

The first sequence of the choice is suitable to code a driver card number, the second sequence of the choice is suitable to
code workshop, control, and company card numbers.

2.22. CardPlaceDailyWorkPeriod

Information, stored in a driver or a workshop card, related to the places where daily work periods begin and/or end
(requirements 202 and 221).

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CardPlaceDailyWorkPeriod ::= SEQUENCE {

placePointerNewestRecord

INTEGER(0..NoOfCardPlaceRecords-1),

placeRecords

SET SIZE(NoOfCardPlaceRecords) OF PlaceRecord

}

placePointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated place record.

Value assignment: Number corresponding to the numerator of the place record, beginning with “0” for the first
occurrence of the place records in the structure.

placeRecords is the set of records containing the information related to the places entered.

2.23. CardPrivateKey

The private key of a card.

CardPrivateKey ::= RSAKeyPrivateExponent

2.24. CardPublicKey

The public key of a card.

CardPublicKey ::= PublicKey

2.25. CardRenewalIndex

A card renewal index (definition i)).

CardRenewalIndex ::= IA5String(SIZE(1))

Value assignment:

(see this Annex Chapter VII).

'0' First issue.

Order for increase:

'0, . . ., 9, A, . . ., Z'

2.26. CardReplacementIndex

A card replacement index (definition j)).

CardReplacementIndex ::= IA5String(SIZE(1))

Value assignment: (see this Annex Chapter VII).

'0' Original card.

Order for increase:

'0, . . ., 9, A, . . ., Z'

2.27. CardSlotNumber

Code to distinguish between the two slots of a vehicle unit.

CardSlotNumber ::= INTEGER {

driverSlot

co-driverSlot

}

Value assignment: not further specified.

2.28. CardSlotsStatus

(0),

(1)

Code indicating the type of cards inserted in the two slots of the vehicle unit.

CardSlotsStatus ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1))

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Value assignment — Octet Aligned:'ccccdddd'B:

'cccc'B Identification of the type of card inserted in the co-driver slot,

'dddd'B Identification of the type of card inserted in the driver slot,

with the following identification codes:

'0000'B no card is inserted,

'0001'B a driver card is inserted,

'0010'B a workshop card is inserted,

'0011'B a control card is inserted,

'0100'B a company card is inserted.

2.29. CardStructureVersion

Code indicating the version of the implemented structure in a tachograph card.

CardStructureVersion ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(2))

Value assignment: 'aabb'H:

'aa'H

Index for changes of the structure,

'bb'H

Index for changes concerning the use of the data elements defined for the structure given by the high byte.

2.30. CardVehicleRecord

Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to a period of use of a vehicle during a calendar day
(requirements 197 and 217).

CardVehicleRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

vehicleOdometerBegin

vehicleOdometerEnd

vehicleFirstUse

vehicleLastUse

vehicleRegistration

vuDataBlockCounter

}

OdometerShort,

OdometerShort,

TimeReal,

TimeReal,

VehicleRegistrationIdentification,

VuDataBlockCounter

vehicleOdometerBegin is the vehicle odometer value at the beginning of the period of use of the vehicle.

vehicleOdometerEnd is the vehicle odometer value at the end of the period of use of the vehicle.

vehicleFirstUse is the date and time of the beginning of the period of use of the vehicle.

vehicleLastUse is the date and time of the end of the period of use of the vehicle.

vehicleRegistration is the VRN and the registering Member State of the vehicle.

vuDataBlockCounter is the value of the VuDataBlockCounter at last extraction of the period of use of the vehicle.

2.31. CardVehiclesUsed

Information, stored in a driver or workshop card, related to the vehicles used by the card holder (requirements 197 and
217).

CardVehiclesUsed := SEQUENCE {

vehiclePointerNewestRecord

INTEGER(0..NoOfCardVehicleRecords-1),

cardVehicleRecords

}

SET SIZE(NoOfCardVehicleRecords) OF
CardVehicleRecord

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vehiclePointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated vehicle record.

Value assignment: Number corresponding to the numerator of the vehicle record, beginning with '0' for the first
occurrence of the vehicle records in the structure.

cardVehicleRecords is the set of records containing information on vehicles used.

2.32. Certificate

The certificate of a public key issued by a Certification Authority.

Certificate ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(194))

Value assignment: digital signature with partial recovery of a CertificateContent according to Appendix 11 “common
security mechanisms”: Signature (128 bytes) || Public Key remainder (58 Byte) || Certification Authority Reference (8
bytes).

2.33. CertificateContent

The (clear) content of the certificate of a public key according to Appendix 11 common security mechanisms.

CertificateContent ::= SEQUENCE {

certificateProfileIdentifier

INTEGER(0..255),

certificationAuthorityReference

KeyIdentifier,

certificateHolderAuthorisation

CertificateHolderAuthorisation,

certificateEndOfValidity

TimeReal,

certificateHolderReference

KeyIdentifier,

publicKey

}

PublicKey

certificateProfileIdentifier is the version of the corresponding certificate.

Value assignment:: '01h' for this version.

certificationAuthorityReference identifies the Certification Authority issuing the certificate. It also references the
Public Key of this Certification Authority.

certificateHolderAuthorisation identifies the rights of the certificate holder.

certificateEndOfValidity is the date when the certificate expires administratively.

certificateHolderReference identifies the certificate holder. It also references his Public Key.

publicKey is the public key that is certified by this certificate.

2.34. CertificateHolderAuthorisation

Identification of the rights of a certificate holder.

CertificateHolderAuthorisation ::= SEQUENCE {

tachographApplicationID

OCTET STRING(SIZE(6))

equipmentType

EquipmentType

}

tachographApplicationID is the application identifier for the tachograph application.

Value assignment: 'FFh'
accordance with ISO/IEC 7816-5.

'54h'

'41h'

'43h'

'48h'

'4Fh'. This AID is a proprietary non-registered application identifier in

equipmentType is the identification of the type of equipment to which the certificate is intended.

Value assignment: in accordance with EquipmentType data type. 0 if certificate is the one of a Member State.

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2.35. CertificateRequestID

Unique identification of a certificate request. It can also be used as a Vehicle Unit Public Key Identifier if the serial
number of the vehicle Unit to which the key is intended is not known at certificate generation time.

CertificateRequestID ::= SEQUENCE {

requestSerialNumber

requestMonthYear

crIdentifier

manufacturerCode

}

INTEGER(0..232-1)

BCDString(SIZE(2))

OCTET STRING(SIZE(1))

ManufacturerCode

requestSerialNumber is a serial number for the certificate request, unique for the manufacturer and the month below.

requestMonthYear is the identification of the month and the year of the certificate request.

Value assignment: BCD coding of month (two digits) and year (two last digits).

crIdentifier: is an identifier to distinguish a certificate request from an extended serial number.

Value assignment: 'FFh'.

manufacturerCode: is the numerical code of the manufacturer requesting the certificate.

2.36. CertificationAuthorityKID

Identifier of the Public Key of a Certification Authority (a Member State or the European Certification Authority).

CertificationAuthorityKID ::= SEQUENCE {

nationNumeric

nationAlpha

keySerialNumber

additionalInfo

caIdentifier

}

NationNumeric

NationAlpha

INTEGER(0..255)

OCTET STRING(SIZE(2))

OCTET STRING(SIZE(1))

nationNumeric is the numerical nation code of the Certification Authority.

nationAlpha is the alphanumerical nation code of the Certification Authority.

keySerialNumber is a serial number to distinguish the different keys of the Certification Authority in the case keys are
changed.

additionalInfo is a two byte field for additional coding (Certification Authority specific).

caIdentifier is an identifier to distinguish a Certification Authority Key Identifier from other Key Identifiers.

Value assignment: '01h'.

2.37. CompanyActivityData

Information, stored in a company card, related to activities performed with the card (requirement 237).

CompanyActivityData ::= SEQUENCE {

companyPointerNewestRecord

INTEGER(0..NoOfCompanyActivi tyRecords-1),

companyActivityRecords

SET SIZE(NoOfCompanyActivityRecords) OF

companyActivityRecord

SEQUENCE {

companyActivityType

companyActivityTime

CompanyActivityType,

TimeReal,

cardNumberInformation

FullCardNumber,

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vehicleRegistrationInformation

VehicleRegistrationIdentification,

downloadPeriodBegin

downloadPeriodEnd

TimeReal,

TimeReal

}

}

companyPointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated companyActivityRecord.

Value assignment: Number corresponding to the numerator of the company activity record, beginning with '0' for the
first occurrence of the company activity record in the structure.

companyActivityRecords is the set of all company activity records.

companyActivityRecord is the sequence of information related to one company activity.

companyActivityType is the type of the company activity.

companyActivityTime is the date and time of the company activity.

cardNumberInformation is the card number and the card issuing Member State of the card downloaded, if any.

vehicleRegistrationInformation is the VRN and registering Member State of the vehicle downloaded or locked in or
out.

downloadPeriodBegin and downloadPeriodEnd is the period downloaded from the VU, if any.

2.38. CompanyActivityType

Code indicating an activity carried out by a company using its company card.

CompanyActivityType ::= INTEGER {

card downloading

VU downloading

VU lock-in

VU lock-out

}

(1),

(2),

(3),

(4)

2.39. CompanyCardApplicationIdentification

Information, stored in a company card related to the identification of the application of the card (requirement 190).

CompanyCardApplicationIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {

typeOfTachographCardId

cardStructureVersion

EquipmentType,

CardStructureVersion,

noOfCompanyActivityRecords

NoOfCompanyActivityRecords

}

typeOfTachographCardId is specifying the implemented type of card.

cardStructureVersion is specifying the version of the structure that is implemented in the card.

noOfCompanyActivityRecords is the number of company activity records the card can store.

2.40. CompanyCardHolderIdentification

Information, stored in a company card, related to the cardholder identification (requirement 236).

CompanyCardHolderIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {

companyName

companyAddress

cardHolderPreferredLanguage

}

Name,

Address,

Language

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companyName is the name of the holder company.

companyAddress is the address of the holder company.

cardHolderPreferredLanguage is the preferred language of the card holder.

2.41. ControlCardApplicationIdentification

Information, stored in a control card related to the identification of the application of the card (requirement 190).

ControlCardApplicationIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {

typeOfTachographCardId

cardStructureVersion

EquipmentType,

CardStructureVersion,

noOfControlActivityRecords

NoOfControlActivityRecords

}

typeOfTachographCardId is specifying the implemented type of card.

cardStructureVersion is specifying the version of the structure that is implemented in the card.

noOfControlActivityRecords is the number of control activity records the card can store.

2.42. ControlCardControlActivityData

Information, stored in a control card, related to control activity performed with the card (requirement 233).

ControlCardControlActivityData ::= SEQUENCE {

controlPointerNewestRecord

INTEGER(0..NoOfControlActivityRecords-1),

controlActivityRecords

SET SIZE(NoOfControlActivityRecords) OF

controlActivityRecord

SEQUENCE {

controlType

controlTime

ControlType,

TimeReal,

controlledCardNumber

FullCardNumber,

controlledVehicleRegistration

VehicleRegistrationIdentification,

controlDownloadPeriodBegin

TimeReal,

controlDownloadPeriodEnd

TimeReal

}

}

controlPointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated control activity record.

Value assignment: Number corresponding to the numerator of the control activity record, beginning with '0' for the
first occurrence of the control activity record in the structure.

controlActivityRecords is the set of all control activity records.

controlActivityRecord is the sequence of information related to one control.

controlType is the type of the control.

controlTime is the date and time of the control.

controlledCardNumber is the card number and the card issuing Member State of the card controlled.

controlledVehicleRegistration is the VRN and registering Member State of the vehicle in which the control happened.

controlDownloadPeriodBegin and controlDownloadPeriodEnd is the period eventually downloaded.

2.43. ControlCardHolderIdentification

Information, stored in a control card, related to the identification of the cardholder (requirement 232).

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ControlCardHolderIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {

controlBodyName

controlBodyAddress

cardHolderName

cardHolderPreferredLanguage

}

Name,

Address,

HolderName,

Language

controlBodyName is the name of the control body of the card holder.

controlBodyAddress is the address of the control body of the card holder.

cardHolderName is the name and first name(s) of the holder of the Control Card.

cardHolderPreferredLanguage is the preferred language of the card holder.

2.44. ControlType

Code indicating the activities carried out during a control. This data type is related to requirements 102, 210 and 225.

ControlType ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1))

Value assignment — Octet aligned: 'cvpdxxxx'B (8 bits)

'c'B

card downloading:

'0'B: card not downloaded during this control activity,

'1'B: card downloaded during this control activity

'v'B

VU downloading:

'0'B: VU not downloaded during this control activity,

'1'B: VU downloaded during this control activity

'p'B

printing:

'0'B: no printing done during this control activity,

'1'B: printing done during this control activity

'd'B

display:

'0'B: no display used during this control activity,

'1'B: display used during this control activity

'xxxx'B

Not used.

2.45. CurrentDateTime

The current date and time of the recording equipment.

CurrentDateTime ::= TimeReal

Value assignment: not further specified.

2.46. DailyPresenceCounter

Counter, stored in a driver or workshop card, increased by one for each calendar day the card has been inserted in a VU.
This data type is related to requirements 199 and 219.

DailyPresenceCounter ::= BCDString(SIZE(2))

Value assignment: Consecutive number with maximum value = 9 999, starting again with 0. At the time of first issuing
of the card the number is set to 0.

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2.47. Datef

Date expressed in a readily printable numeric format.

Datef ::= SEQUENCE {

year

month

day

BCDString(SIZE(2)),

BCDString(SIZE(1)),

BCDString(SIZE(1))

}

Value assignment:

yyyy

mm

dd

Year

Month

Day

'00000000'H

denotes explicitly no date.

2.48. Distance

A distance travelled (result of the calculation of the difference between two vehicle's odometer value in kilometres).

Distance ::= INTEGER(0..216-1)

Value assignment: Unsigned binary. Value in km in the operational range 0 to 9 999 km.

2.49. DriverCardApplicationIdentification

Information, stored in a driver card related to the identification of the application of the card (requirement 190).

DriverCardApplicationIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {

typeOfTachographCardId

cardStructureVersion

noOfEventsPerType

noOfFaultsPerType

activityStructureLength

noOfCardVehicleRecords

noOfCardPlaceRecords

}

EquipmentType,

CardStructureVersion,

NoOfEventsPerType,

NoOfFaultsPerType,

CardActivityLengthRange,

NoOfCardVehicleRecords,

NoOfCardPlaceRecords

typeOfTachographCardId is specifying the implemented type of card.

cardStructureVersion is specifying the version of the structure that is implemented in the card.

noOfEventsPerType is the number of events per type of event the card can record.

noOfFaultsPerType is the number of faults per type of fault the card can record.

activityStructureLength indicates the number of bytes available for storing activity records.

noOfCardVehicleRecords is the number of vehicle records the card can contain.

noOfCardPlaceRecords is the number of places the card can record.

2.50. DriverCardHolderIdentification

Information, stored in a driver card, related to the identification of the cardholder (requirement 195).

DriverCardHolderIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {

cardHolderName

cardHolderBirthDate

cardHolderPreferredLanguage

HolderName,

Datef,

Language

}

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cardHolderName is the name and first name(s) of the holder of the Driver Card.

cardHolderBirthDate is the date of birth of the holder of the Driver Card.

cardHolderPreferredLanguage is the preferred language of the card holder.

2.51. EntryTypeDailyWorkPeriod

Code to distinguish between begin and end for an entry of a daily work period place and condition of the entry.

EntryTypeDailyWorkPeriod ::= INTEGER

related time = card withdrawal time or time of entry

Begin, related time = card insertion time or time of entry
End,
Begin, related time manually entered (start time)
End,
Begin, related time assumed by VU
related time assumed by VU
End,

related time manually entered (end of work period)

(0),
(1),
(2),
(3),
(4),
(5)

}

Value assignment: according to ISO/IEC8824-1.

2.52. EquipmentType

Code to distinguish different types of equipment for the tachograph application.

EquipmentType ::= INTEGER(0..255)
- - Reserved
- - Driver Card
- - Workshop Card
- - Control Card
- - Company Card
- - Manufacturing Card
- - Vehicle Unit
- - Motion Sensor
- - RFU

Value assignment: According to ISO/IEC8824-1.

(0),
(1),
(2),
(3),
(4),
(5),
(6),
(7),
(8..255)

Value 0 is reserved for the purpose of designating a Member State or Europe in the CHA field of certificates.

2.53. EuropeanPublicKey

The European public key.

EuropeanPublicKey ::= PublicKey

2.54. EventFaultType

Code qualifying an event or a fault.

EventFaultType ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1))

Value assignment:

'0x'H
'00'H
'01'H
'02'H
'03'H
'04'H
'05'H
'06'H
'07'H

General events,
No further details,
Insertion of a non-valid card,
Card conflict,
Time overlap,
Driving without an appropriate card,
Card insertion while driving,
Last card session not correctly closed,
Over speeding,

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'08'H

'09'H

Power supply interruption,

Motion data error,

'0A'H to '0F'H

RFU,

'1x'H

'10'H

'11'H

'12'H

'13'H

'14'H

'15'H

'16'H

'17'H

'18'H

Vehicle unit related security breach attempt events,

No further details,

Motion sensor authentication failure,

Tachograph card authentication failure,

Unauthorised change of motion sensor,

Card data input integrity error

Stored user data integrity error,

Internal data transfer error,

Unauthorised case opening,

Hardware sabotage,

'19'H to '1F'H

RFU,

'2x'H

'20'H

'21'H

'22'H

'23'H

'24'H

'25'H

Sensor related security breach attempt events,

No further details,

Authentication failure,

Stored data integrity error,

Internal data transfer error,

Unauthorised case opening,

Hardware sabotage,

'26'H to '2F'H

RFU,

'3x'H

'30'H

'31'H

'32'H

'33'H

'34'H

'35'H

Recording equipment faults,

No further details,

VU internal fault,

Printer fault,

Display fault,

Downloading fault,

Sensor fault,

'36'H to '3F'H

RFU

'4x'H

'40'H

Card faults,

No further details,

'41'H to '4F'H

RFU

'50'H to '7F'H

RFU,

'80'H to 'FF'H Manufacturer specific.

2.55. EventFaultRecordPurpose

Code explaining why an event or a fault has been recorded.

EventFaultRecordPurpose ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1))

Value assignment:

'00'H

'01'H

'02'H

'03'H

'04'H

'05'H

'06'H

'07'H

one of the 10 most recent (or last) events or faults

the longest event for one of the last 10 days of occurrence

one of the 5 longest events over the last 365 days

the last event for one of the last 10 days of occurrence

the most serious event for one of the last 10 days of occurrence

one of the 5 most serious events over the last 365 days

the first event or fault having occurred after the last calibration

an active/on-going event or fault

'08'H to '7F'H
'80'H to 'FF'H manufacturer specific

RFU

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2.56. ExtendedSerialNumber

Unique identification of an equipment. It can also be used as an equipment Public Key Identifier.

ExtendedSerialNumber ::= SEQUENCE {

serialNumber

monthYear

type

manufacturerCode

}

INTEGER(0..232-1)

BCDString(SIZE(2))

OCTET STRING(SIZE(1))

ManufacturerCode

serialNumber is a serial number for the equipment, unique for the manufacturer, the equipment's type and the month
below.

monthYear is the identification of the month and the year of manufacturing (or of serial number assignment).

Value assignment: BCD coding of Month (two digits) and Year (two last digits).

type is an identifier of the type of equipment.

Value assignment: manufacturer specific, with FFh' reserved value.

manufacturerCode: is the numerical code of the manufacturer of the equipment.

2.57. FullCardNumber

Code fully identifying a tachograph card.

FullCardNumber ::= SEQUENCE {

cardType

cardIssuingMemberState

cardNumber

}

cardType is the type of the tachograph card.

EquipmentType,

NationNumeric,

CardNumber

cardIssuingMemberState is the code of the Member State having issued the card.

cardNumber is the card number.

2.58. HighResOdometer

Odometer value of the vehicle: Accumulated distance travelled by the vehicle during its operation.

HighResOdometer ::= INTEGER(0..232-1)

Value assignment: Unsigned binary. Value in 1/200 km in the operating range 0 to 21 055 406 km.

2.59. HighResTripDistance

A distance travelled during all or part of a journey.

HighResTripDistance ::= INTEGER(0..232-1)

Value assignment: Unsigned binary. Value in 1/200 km in the operating range 0 to 21 055 406 km.

2.60. HolderName

The surname and first name(s) of a card holder.

HolderName ::= SEQUENCE {

holderSurname

holderFirstNames

}

Name,

Name

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holderSurname is the surname (family name) of the holder. This surname does not include titles.

Value assignment: When a card is not personal, holderSurname contains the same information as companyName or
workshopName or controlBodyName.

holderFirstNames is the first name(s) and initials of the holder.

2.61. K-ConstantOfRecordingEquipment

Constant of the recording equipment (definition m)).

K-ConstantOfRecordingEquipment ::= INTEGER(0..216-1)

Value assignment: Pulses per kilometre in the operating range 0 to 64 255 pulses/km.

2.62. KeyIdentifier

A unique identifier of a Public Key used to reference and select the key. It also identifies the holder of the key.

KeyIdentifier ::= CHOICE {

extendedSerialNumber

certificateRequestID

ExtendedSerialNumber,

CertificateRequestID,

certificationAuthorityKID

CertificationAuthorityKID

}

The first choice is suitable to reference the public key of a Vehicle Unit or of a tachograph card.

The second choice is suitable to reference the public key of a Vehicle Unit (in the case the serial number of the Vehicle
Unit cannot be known at certificate generation time).

The third choice is suitable to reference the public key of a Member State.

2.63. L-TyreCircumference

Effective circumference of the wheel tyres (definition u)).

L-TyreCircumference ::= INTEGER(0..216-1)

Value assignment: Unsigned binary, value in 1/8 mm in the operating range 0 to 8 031 mm.

2.64. Language

Code identifying a language.

Language ::= IA5String(SIZE(2))

Value assignment: Two-letter lower-case coding according to ISO 639.

2.65. LastCardDownload

Date and time, stored on a driver card, of last card download (for other purposes than control). This date is updateable
by a VU or any card reader.

LastCardDownload ::= TimeReal

Value assignment: not further specified.

2.66. ManualInputFlag

Code identifying whether a cardholder has manually entered driver activities at card insertion or not (requirement 081).

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(0)

(1)

ManualInputFlag ::= INTEGER {

noEntry

manualEntries

}

Value assignment: not further specified.

2.67. ManufacturerCode

Code identifying a manufacturer.

ManufacturerCode ::= INTEGER(0..255)

Value assignment:

'00'H

'01'H

No information available

Reserved value

'02'H .. '0F'H

Reserved for Future Use

'10'H

ACTIA

'11'H .. '17'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'A'

'18'H .. '1F'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'B'

'20'H .. '27'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'C'

'28'H .. '2F'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'D'

'30'H .. '37'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'E'

'38'H .. '3F'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'F'

'40'H

'41'H

Giesecke & Devrient GmbH

GEM plus

'42'H .. '47'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'G'

'48'H .. '4F'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'H'

'50'H .. '57'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'I'

'58'H .. '5F'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'J'

'60'H .. '67'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'K'

'68'H .. '6F'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'L'

'70'H .. '77'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'M'

'78'H .. '7F'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'N'

'80'H

OSCARD

'81'H .. '87'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'O'

'88'H .. '8F'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'P'

'90'H .. '97'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'Q'

'98'H .. '9F'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'R'

'A0'H

'A1'H

'A2'H

SETEC

SIEMENS VDO

STONERIDGE

'A3'H .. 'A7'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'S'

'AA'H

TACHOCONTROL

'AB'H .. 'AF'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'T'

'B0'H .. 'B7'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'U'

'B8'H .. 'BF'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'V'

'C0'H .. 'C7'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with W'

'C8'H .. 'CF'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'X'

'D0'H .. 'D7'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'Y'

'D8'H .. 'DF'H

Reserved for manufacturers which name begins with 'Z'

2.68. MemberStateCertificate

The certificate of the public key of a Member State issued by the European certification authority.

MemberStateCertificate ::= Certificate

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2.69. MemberStatePublicKey

The public key of a Member State.

MemberStatePublicKey ::= PublicKey

2.70. Name

A name.

Name ::= SEQUENCE {

codePage
name

}

INTEGER (0..255),
OCTET STRING (SIZE(35))

codePage specifies the part of the ISO/IEC 8859 used to code the name,

name is a name coded in accordance with ISO/IEC 8859-codePage.

2.71. NationAlpha

Alphabetic reference to a country, in accordance with the conventional coding of countries on car bumper stickers,
and/or as used on internationally harmonised vehicle insurance papers (green card).

NationAlpha ::= IA5String(SIZE(3))

Value assignment:

'
'
'A '
'AL '
'AND'
'ARM'
'AZ '
'B '
'BG '
'BIH'
'BY '
'CH '
'CY '
'CZ '
'D '
'DK '
'E '
'EST'
'F '
'FIN'
'FL '
'FR '
'UK '
'GE '
'GR '
'H '
'HR '
'I '
'IRL'
'IS '
'KZ '
'L '
'LT '
'LV '
'M '
'MC '

No information available
Austria
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belgium
Bulgaria
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Belarus
Switzerland
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Germany
Denmark
Spain
Estonia
France
Finland
Liechtenstein
Faeroe Islands
United Kingdom, Alderney, Guernsey, Jersey, Isle of Man, Gibraltar
Georgia
Greece
Hungary
Croatia
Italy
Ireland
Iceland
Kazakhstan
Luxembourg
Lithuania
Latvia
Malta
Monaco

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'MD '
'MK '
'N '
'NL '
'P '
'PL '
'RO '
'RSM'
'RUS'
'S '
'SK '
'SLO'
'TM '
'TR '
'UA '
'V '
'YU '
'UNK'
'EC '
'EUR'
'WLD'

Republic of Moldova
Macedonia
Norway
The Netherlands
Portugal
Poland
Romania
San Marino
Russian Federation
Sweden
Slovakia
Slovenia
Turkmenistan
Turkey
Ukraine
Vatican City
Yugoslavia
Unknown
European Community
Rest of Europe
Rest of the world.

2.72. NationNumeric

Numerical reference to a country.

NationNumeric ::= INTEGER(0..255)

Value assignment:

- - No information available
- - Austria
- - Albania
- - Andorra
- - Armenia
- - Azerbaijan
Belgium
- -
Bulgaria
- -
Bosnia and Herzegovina
- -
Belarus
- -
- -
Switzerland
- - Cyprus
- - Czech Republic
- - Germany
- - Denmark
Spain
- -
Estonia
- -
France
- -
Finland
- -
Liechtenstein
- -
- -
Faeroe Islands
- - United Kingdom
- - Georgia
- - Greece
- - Hungary
- - Croatia
Italy
- -
- -
Ireland
Iceland
- -
- - Kazakhstan
- -
- -
- -

Luxembourg
Lithuania
Latvia

(00)H,
(01)H,
(02)H,
(03)H,
(04)H,
(05)H,
(06)H,
(07)H,
(08)H,
(09)H,
(0A)H,
(0B)H,
(0C)H,
(0D)H,
(0E)H,
(0F)H,
(10)H,
(11)H,
(12)H,
(13)H,
(14)H,
(15)H,
(16)H,
(17)H,
(18)H,
(19)H,
(1A)H,
(1B)H,
(1C)H,
(1D)H,
(1E)H,
(1F)H,
(20)H,

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- - Malta
- - Monaco
- - Republic of Moldova
- - Macedonia
- - Norway
- - Netherlands
Portugal
- -
- -
Poland
- - Romania
- -
San Marino
- - Russian Federation
Sweden
- -
Slovakia
- -
Slovenia
- -
Turkmenistan
- -
- -
Turkey
- - Ukraine
- - Vatican City
- -
- - RFU
- -
- - Rest of Europe
- - Rest of the world

Yugoslavia

European Community

(21)H,
(22)H,
(23)H,
(24)H,
(25)H,
(26)H,
(27)H,
(28)H,
(29)H,
(2A)H,
(2B)H,
(2C)H,
(2D)H,
(2E)H,
(2F)H,
(30)H,
(31)H,
(32)H,
(33)H,
(34..FC)H,
(FD)H,
(FE)H,
(FF)H

2.73. NoOfCalibrationRecords

Number of calibration records, a workshop card can store.

NoOfCalibrationRecords ::= INTEGER(0..255)

Value assignment: see paragraph 3.

2.74. NoOfCalibrationsSinceDownload

Counter indicating the number of calibrations performed with a workshop card since its last download (requirement
230).

NoOfCalibrationsSinceDownload ::= INTEGER(0..216-1),

Value assignment: Not specified further.

2.75. NoOfCardPlaceRecords

Number of place records a driver or workshop card can store.

NoOfCardPlaceRecords ::= INTEGER(0..255)

Value assignment: see paragraph 3.

2.76. NoOfCardVehicleRecords

Number of vehicles used records a driver or workshop card can store.

NoOfCardVehicleRecords ::= INTEGER(0..216-1)

Value assignment: see paragraph 3.

2.77. NoOfCompanyActivityRecords

Number of company activity records, a company card can store.

NoOfCompanyActivityRecords ::= INTEGER(0..216-1)

Value assignment: see paragraph 3.

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2.78. NoOfControlActivityRecords

Number of control activity records, a control card can store.

NoOfControlActivityRecords ::= INTEGER(0..216-1)

Value assignment: see paragraph 3.

2.79. NoOfEventsPerType

Number of events per type of event a card can store.

NoOfEventsPerType ::= INTEGER(0..255)

Value assignment: see paragraph 3.

2.80. NoOfFaultsPerType

Number of faults per type of fault a card can store.

NoOfFaultsPerType ::= INTEGER(0..255)

Value assignment: see paragraph 3.

2.81. OdometerValueMidnight

The vehicle's odometer value at midnight on a given day (requirement 090).

OdometerValueMidnight ::= OdometerShort

Value assignment: not further specified.

2.82. OdometerShort

Odometer value of the vehicle in a short form.

OdometerShort ::= INTEGER(0..224-1)

Value assignment: Unsigned binary. Value in km in the operating range 0 to 9 999 999 km.

2.83. OverspeedNumber

Number of over speeding events since the last over speeding control.

OverspeedNumber ::= INTEGER(0..255)

Value assignment: 0 means that no over speeding event has occurred since the last over speeding control, 1 means that
one over speeding event has occurred since the last over speeding control . . . 255 means that 255 or more over
speeding events have occurred since the last over speeding control.

2.84. PlaceRecord

Information related to a place where a daily work period begins or ends (requirements 087, 202, 221).

TimeReal,
EntryTypeDailyWorkPeriod,
NationNumeric,
RegionNumeric,
OdometerShort

PlaceRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

entryTime
entryTypeDailyWorkPeriod
dailyWorkPeriodCountry
dailyWorkPeriodRegion
vehicleOdometerValue

}

entryTime is a date and time related to the entry.

entryTypeDailyWorkPeriod is the type of entry.

dailyWorkPeriodCountry is the country entered.

dailyWorkPeriodRegion is the region entered.

vehicleOdometerValue is the odometer value at the time of place entry.

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2.85. PreviousVehicleInfo

Information related to the vehicle previously used by a driver when inserting his card in a vehicle unit (requirement
081).

PreviousVehicleInfo ::= SEQUENCE {

vehicleRegistrationIdentification

VehicleRegistrationIdentification,

cardWithdrawalTime

TimeReal

}

vehicleRegistrationIdentification is the VRN and the registering Member State of the vehicle.

cardWithdrawalTime is the card withdrawal date and time.

2.86. PublicKey

A public RSA key.

PublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {

rsaKeyModulus

rsaKeyPublicExponent

}

RSAKeyModulus,

RSAKeyPublicExponent

rsaKeyModulus is the Modulus of the key pair.

rsaKeyPublicExponent is the public exponent of the key pair.

2.87. RegionAlpha

Alphabetic reference to a region within a specified country.

RegionAlpha ::= IA5STRING(SIZE(3))

Value assignment:

'

'

Spain:

'AN '

'AR '

'AST '

'C

'

'CAT '

'CL '

'CM '

'CV '

'EXT '

'G

'

'IB '

'IC '

'LR '

'M

'

'MU '

'NA '

'PV '

No information available

Andalucía

Aragón

Asturias

Cantabria

Cataluña

Castilla-León

Castilla-La-Mancha

Valencia

Extremadura

Galicia

Baleares

Canarias

La Rioja

Madrid

Murcia

Navarra

País Vasco

2.88. RegionNumeric

Numerical reference to a region within a specified country.

RegionNumeric ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1))

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Value assignment:
'00'H

No information available

Spain:

'01'H

'02'H

'03'H

'04'H

'05'H

'06'H

'07'H

'08'H

'09'H

'0A'H

'0B'H

'0C'H

'0D'H

'0E'H

'0F'H

'10'H

'11'H

Andalucía

Aragón

Asturias

Cantabria

Cataluña

Castilla-León

Castilla-La-Mancha

Valencia

Extremadura

Galicia

Baleares

Canarias

La Rioja

Madrid

Murcia

Navarra

País Vasco

2.89. RSAKeyModulus

The modulus of a RSA key pair.

RSAKeyModulus ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(128))

Value assignment: Unspecified.

2.90. RSAKeyPrivateExponent

The private exponent of a RSA key pair.

RSAKeyPrivateExponent ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(128))

Value assignment: Unspecified.

2.91. RSAKeyPublicExponent

The public exponent of a RSA key pair.

RSAKeyPublicExponent ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8))

Value assignment: Unspecified.

2.92. SensorApprovalNumber

Type approval number of the sensor.

SensorApprovalNumber ::= IA5String(SIZE(8))

Value assignment: Unspecified.

2.93. SensorIdentification

Information, stored in a motion sensor, related to the identification of the motion sensor (requirement 077).

SensorIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {

sensorSerialNumber
sensorApprovalNumber
sensorSCIdentifier
sensorOSIdentifier

}

SensorSerialNumber,
SensorApprovalNumber,
SensorSCIdentifier,
SensorOSIdentifier

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sensorSerialNumber is the extended serial number of the motion sensor (includes part number and manufacturer
code).

sensorApprovalNumber is the approval number of the motion sensor.

sensorSCIdentifier is the identifier of the security component of the motion sensor.

sensorOSIdentifier is the identifier of the operating system of the motion sensor.

2.94. SensorInstallation

Information, stored in a motion sensor, related to the installation of the motion sensor (requirement 099).

SensorInstallation ::= SEQUENCE {

sensorPairingDateFirst

firstVuApprovalNumber

firstVuSerialNumber

sensorPairingDateCurrent

currentVuApprovalNumber

currentVUSerialNumber

}

SensorPairingDate,

VuApprovalNumber,

VuSerialNumber,

SensorPairingDate,

VuApprovalNumber,

VuSerialNumber

sensorPairingDateFirst is the date of the first pairing of the motion sensor with a vehicle unit.

firstVuApprovalNumber is the approval number of the first vehicle unit paired with the motion sensor.

firstVuSerialNumber is the serial number of the first vehicle unit paired with the motion sensor.

sensorPairingDateCurrent is the date of the current pairing of the motion sensor with the vehicle unit.

currentVuApprovalNumber is the approval number of the vehicle unit currently paired with the motion sensor.

currentVUSerialNumber is the serial number of the vehicle unit currently paired with the motion sensor.

2.95. SensorInstallationSecData

Information, stored in a workshop card, related to the security data needed for pairing motion sensors to vehicle units
(requirement 214).

SensorInstallationSecData ::= TDesSessionKey

Value assignment: in accordance with ISO 16844-3.

2.96. SensorOSIdentifier

Identifier of the operating system of the motion sensor.

SensorOSIdentifier ::= IA5String(SIZE(2))

Value assignment: manufacturer specific.

2.97. SensorPaired

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the identification of the motion sensor paired with the vehicle unit
(requirement 079).

SensorPaired ::= SEQUENCE {

sensorSerialNumber

sensorApprovalNumber

SensorSerialNumber,

SensorApprovalNumber,

sensorPairingDateFirst

SensorPairingDate

}

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sensorSerialNumber is the serial number of the motion sensor currently paired with the vehicle unit.

sensorApprovalNumber is the approval number of the motion sensor currently paired with the vehicle unit.

sensorPairingDateFirst is the date of the first pairing with a vehicle unit of the motion sensor currently paired with the
vehicle unit.

2.98. SensorPairingDate

Date of a pairing of the motion sensor with a vehicle unit.

SensorPairingDate ::= TimeReal

Value assignment: Unspecified.

2.99. SensorSerialNumber

Serial number of the motion sensor.

SensorSerialNumber ::= ExtendedSerialNumber

2.100. SensorSCIdentifier

Identifier of the security component of the motion sensor.

SensorSCIdentifier ::= IA5String(SIZE(8))

Value assignment: component manufacturer specific.

2.101. Signature

A digital signature.

Signature ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(128))

Value assignment: in accordance with Appendix 11, “Common security mechanisms”.

2.102. SimilarEventsNumber

The number of similar events for one given day (requirement 094).

SimilarEventsNumber ::= INTEGER(0..255)

Value assignment: 0 is not used, 1 means that only one event of that type have occurred and have been stored on that
day, 2 means that 2 events of that type have occurred on that day (one only has been stored), . . . 255 means that 255
or more events of that type have occurred on that day.

2.103. SpecificConditionType

Code identifying a specific condition (requirements 050b, 105a, 212a and 230a).

SpecificConditionType ::= INTEGER(0..255)

Value assignment:

'00'H

'01'H

'02'H

'03'H

RFU

Out of scope — Begin

Out of scope — End

Ferry/Train crossing

'04'H .. 'FF'H

RFU

2.104. SpecificConditionRecord

Information, stored in a driver card, a workshop card or a vehicle unit, related to a specific condition (requirements
105a, 212a and 230a).

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SpecificConditionRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

entryTime

TimeReal,

specificConditionType

SpecificConditionType

}

entryTime is the date and time of the entry.

specificConditionType is the code identifying the specific condition.

2.105. Speed

Speed of the vehicle (km/h).

Speed ::= INTEGER(0..255)

Value assignment: kilometre per hour in the operational range 0 to 220 km/h.

2.106. SpeedAuthorised

Maximum authorised Speed of the vehicle (definition bb)).

SpeedAuthorised ::= Speed

2.107. SpeedAverage

Average speed in a previously defined duration (km/h).

SpeedAverage ::= Speed

2.108. SpeedMax

Maximum speed measured in a previously defined duration.

SpeedMax ::= Speed

2.109. TDesSessionKey

A triple DES session key.

TDesSessionKey ::= SEQUENCE {

tDesKeyA

tDesKeyB

}

Value assignment: not further specified.

2.110. TimeReal

OCTET STRING (SIZE(8))

OCTET STRING (SIZE(8))

Code for a combined date and time field, where the date and time are expressed as seconds past 00h.00m.00s. on
1 January 1970 GMT.

TimeReal{INTEGER:TimeRealRange} ::= INTEGER(0..TimeRealRange)

Value assignment — Octet Aligned: Number of seconds since midnight 1 January 1970 GMT.

The max. possible date/time is in the year 2106.

2.111. TyreSize

Designation of tyre dimensions.

TyreSize ::= IA5String(SIZE(15))

Value assignment: in accordance with Directive 92/23 (EEC) 31.3.1992, OJ L 129, p. 95.

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2.112. VehicleIdentificationNumber

Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) referring to the vehicle as a whole, normally chassis serial number or frame
number.

VehicleIdentificationNumber ::= IA5String(SIZE(17))

Value assignment: As defined in ISO 3779.

2.113. VehicleRegistrationIdentification

Identification of a vehicle, unique for Europe (VRN and Member State).

VehicleRegistrationIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {

vehicleRegistrationNation
vehicleRegistrationNumber

NationNumeric,
VehicleRegistrationNumber

}

vehicleRegistrationNation is the nation where the vehicle is registered.

vehicleRegistrationNumber is the registration number of the vehicle (VRN).

2.114. VehicleRegistrationNumber

Registration number of the vehicle (VRN). The registration number is assigned by the vehicle licensing authority.

VehicleRegistrationNumber ::= SEQUENCE {

codePage
vehicleRegNumber

}

INTEGER (0..255),
OCTET STRING (SIZE(13))

codePage specifies the part of the ISO/IEC 8859 used to code the vehicleRegNumber,

vehicleRegNumber is a VRN coded in accordance with ISO/IEC 8859-codePage.

Value assignment: Country specific.

2.115. VuActivityDailyData

Information, stored in a VU, related to changes of activity and/or changes of driving status and/or changes of card status
for a given calendar day (requirement 084) and to slots status at 00.00 that day.

VuActivityDailyData ::= SEQUENCE {

noOfActivityChanges
activityChangeInfos

}

INTEGER SIZE(0..1440),
SET SIZE(noOfActivityChanges) OF
ActivityChangeInfo

noOfActivityChanges is the number of ActivityChangeInfo words in the activityChangeInfos set.

activityChangeInfos is the set of ActivityChangeInfo words stored in the VU for the day. It always includes two
ActivityChangeInfo words giving the status of the two slots at 00.00 that day.

2.116. VuApprovalNumber

Type approval number of the vehicle unit.

VuApprovalNumber ::= IA5String(SIZE(8))

Value assignment: Unspecified.

2.117. VuCalibrationData

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the calibrations of the recording equipment (requirement 098).

VuCalibrationData ::= SEQUENCE {

noOfVuCalibrationRecords
vuCalibrationRecords

}

INTEGER(0..255),
SET SIZE(noOfVuCalibrationRecords) OF
VuCalibrationRecord

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noOfVuCalibrationRecords is the number of records contained in the vuCalibrationRecords set.

vuCalibrationRecords is the set of calibration records.

2.118. VuCalibrationRecord

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related a calibration of the recording equipment (requirement 098).

VuCalibrationRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

calibrationPurpose
workshopName
workshopAddress
workshopCardNumber
workshopCardExpiryDate
vehicleIdentificationNumber
vehicleRegistrationIdentification
wVehicleCharacteristicConstant
kConstantOfRecordingEquipment
lTyreCircumference
tyreSize
authorisedSpeed
oldOdometerValue
newOdometerValue
oldTimeValue
newTimeValue
nextCalibrationDate

}

calibrationPurpose is the purpose of the calibration.

CalibrationPurpose,
Name,
Address,
FullCardNumber,
TimeReal,
VehicleIdentificationNumber,
VehicleRegistrationIdentification,
W-VehicleCharacteristicConstant,
K-ConstantOfRecordingEquipment,
L-TyreCircumference,
TyreSize,
SpeedAuthorised,
OdometerShort,
OdometerShort,
TimeReal,
TimeReal,
TimeReal

workshopName, workshopAddress are the workshop name and address.

workshopCardNumber identifies the workshop card used during the calibration.

workshopCardExpiryDate is the card expiry date.

vehicleIdentificationNumber is the VIN.

vehicleRegistrationIdentification contains the VRN and registering Member State.

wVehicleCharacteristicConstant is the characteristic coefficient of the vehicle.

kConstantOfRecordingEquipment is the constant of the recording equipment.

lTyreCircumference is the effective circumference of the wheel tyres.

tyreSize is the designation of the dimension of the tyres mounted on the vehicle.

authorisedSpeed is the authorised speed of the vehicle.

oldOdometerValue, newOdometerValue are the old and new values of the odometer.

oldTimeValue, newTimeValue are the old and new values of date and time.

nextCalibrationDate is the date of the next calibration of the type specified in CalibrationPurpose to be carried out by
the authorised inspection authority.

2.119. VuCardIWData

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to insertion and withdrawal cycles of driver cards or of workshop cards in
the vehicle unit (requirement 081).

VuCardIWData ::= SEQUENCE {

noOfIWRecords
vuCardIWRecords

}

INTEGER(0..216-1),
SET SIZE(noOfIWRecords) OF
VuCardIWRecord

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noOfIWRecords is the number of records in the set vuCardIWRecords.

vuCardIWRecords is a set of records related to card insertion withdrawal cycles.

2.120. VuCardIWRecord

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to an insertion and withdrawal cycle of a driver card or of a workshop card
in the vehicle unit (requirement 081).

VuCardIWRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

cardHolderName

fullCardNumber

cardExpiryDate

cardInsertionTime

HolderName,

FullCardNumber,

TimeReal,

TimeReal,

vehicleOdometerValueAtInsertion

OdometerShort,

cardSlotNumber

cardWithdrawalTime

CardSlotNumber,

TimeReal,

vehicleOdometerValueAtWithdrawal

OdometerShort,

previousVehicleInfo

manualInputFlag

}

PreviousVehicleInfo

ManualInputFlag

cardHolderName is the driver or workshop card holder's surname and first names as stored in the card.

fullCardNumber is the type of card, its issuing Member State and its card number as stored in the card.

cardExpiryDate is the card's expiry date as stored in the card.

cardInsertionTime is the insertion date and time.

vehicleOdometerValueAtInsertion is the vehicle odometer value at card insertion.

cardSlotNumber is the slot in which the card is inserted.

cardWithdrawalTime is the withdrawal date and time.

vehicleOdometerValueAtWithdrawal is the vehicle odometer value at card withdrawal.

previousVehicleInfo contains information about the previous vehicle used by the driver, as stored in the card.

manualInputFlag is a flag identifying if the cardholder has manually entered driver activities at card insertion.

2.121. VuCertificate

Certificate of the public key of a vehicle unit.

VuCertificate ::= Certificate

2.122. VuCompanyLocksData

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to company locks (requirement 104).

VuCompanyLocksData ::= SEQUENCE {

noOfLocks

vuCompanyLocksRecords

}

INTEGER(0..20),

SET SIZE(noOfLocks) OF
VuCompanyLocksRecord

noOfLocks is the number of locks listed in vuCompanyLocksRecords.

vuCompanyLocksRecords is the set of company locks records.

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2.123. VuCompanyLocksRecord

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to one company lock (requirement 104).

VuCompanyLocksRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

lockInTime
lockOutTime
companyName
companyAddress
companyCardNumber

}

TimeReal,
TimeReal,
Name,
Address,
FullCardNumber

lockInTime, lockOutTime are the date and time of lock-in and lock-out.

companyName, companyAddress are the company name and address related with the lock-in.

companyCardNumber identifies the card used at lock-in.

2.124. VuControlActivityData

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to controls performed using this VU (requirement 102).

VuControlActivityData ::= SEQUENCE {

noOfControls
vuControlActivityRecords

}

INTEGER(0..20),
SET SIZE(noOfControls) OF
VuControlActivityRecord

noOfControls is the number of controls listed in vuControlActivityRecords.

vuControlActivityRecords is the set of control activity records.

2.125. VuControlActivityRecord

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to a control performed using this VU (requirement 102).

VuControlActivityRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

controlType
controlTime
controlCardNumber
downloadPeriodBeginTime
downloadPeriodEndTime

}

controlType is the type of the control.

controlTime is the date and time of the control.

ControlType,
TimeReal,
FullCardNumber,
TimeReal,
TimeReal

ControlCardNumber identifies the control card used for the control.

downloadPeriodBeginTime is the begin time of the downloaded period, in case of downloading.

downloadPeriodEndTime is the end time of the downloaded period, in case of downloading.

2.126. VuDataBlockCounter

Counter, stored in a card, identifying sequentially the insertion withdrawal cycles of the card in vehicle units.

VuDataBlockCounter ::= BCDString(SIZE(2))

Value assignment: Consecutive Number with max, value 9 999, starting again with 0.

2.127. VuDetailedSpeedBlock

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the vehicle's detailed speed for a minute during which the vehicle has
been moving (requirement 093).

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VuDetailedSpeedBlock ::= SEQUENCE {

speedBlockBeginDate

speedsPerSecond

}

TimeReal,

SEQUENCE SIZE(60) OF Speed

speedBlockBeginDate is the date and time of the first speed value within the block.

speedsPerSecond is the chronological sequence of measured speeds every seconds for the minute starting at speed-
BlockBeginDate (included).

2.128. VuDetailedSpeedData

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the detailed speed of the vehicle.

VuDetailedSpeedData ::= SEQUENCE {

noOfSpeedBlocks

vuDetailedSpeedBlocks

}

INTEGER(0.216-1),
SET SIZE(noOfSpeedBlocks) OF
VuDetailedSpeedBlock

noOfSpeedBlocks is the number of speed blocks in the vuDetailedSpeedBlocks set.

vuDetailedSpeedBlocks is the set of detailed speed blocks.

2.129. VuDownloadablePeriod

Oldest and latest dates for which a vehicle unit holds data related to drivers activities (requirements 081, 084 or 087).

VuDownloadablePeriod ::= SEQUENCE {

minDownloadableTime

maxDownloadableTime

}

TimeReal

TimeReal

minDownloadableTime is the oldest card insertion or activity change or place entry date and time stored in the VU.

maxDownloadableTime is the latest card withdrawal or activity change or place entry date and time stored in the VU.

2.130. VuDownloadActivityData

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to its last download (requirement 105).

VuDownloadActivityData ::= SEQUENCE {

downloadingTime

fullCardNumber

TimeReal,

FullCardNumber,

companyOrWorkshopName

Name

}

downloadingTime is the date and time of downloading.

fullCardNumber identifies the card used to authorise the download.

companyOrWorkshopName is the company or workshop name.

2.131. VuEventData

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to events (requirement 094 except over speeding event).

VuEventData ::= SEQUENCE {

noOfVuEvents

vuEventRecords

}

INTEGER(0..255),

SET SIZE(noOfVuEvents) OF VuEventRecord

noOfVuEvents is the number of events listed in the vuEventRecords set.

vuEventRecords is a set of events records.

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2.132. VuEventRecord

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to an event (requirement 094 except over speeding event).

VuEventRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

eventType

eventRecordPurpose

eventBeginTime

eventEndTime

cardNumberDriverSlotBegin

cardNumberCodriverSlotBegin

cardNumberDriverSlotEnd

cardNumberCodriverSlotEnd

EventFaultType,

EventFaultRecordPurpose,

TimeReal,

TimeReal,

FullCardNumber,

FullCardNumber,

FullCardNumber,

FullCardNumber,

similarEventsNumber

SimilarEventsNumber

}

eventType is the type of the event.

eventRecordPurpose is the purpose for which this event has been recorded.

eventBeginTime is the date and time of beginning of event.

eventEndTime is the date and time of end of event.

cardNumberDriverSlotBegin identifies the card inserted in the driver slot at the beginning of the event.

cardNumberCodriverSlotBegin identifies the card inserted in the co-driver slot at the beginning of the event.

cardNumberDriverSlotEnd identifies the card inserted in the driver slot at the end of the event.

cardNumberCodriverSlotEnd identifies the card inserted in the co-driver slot at the end of the event.

similarEventsNumber is the number of similar events that day.

This sequence can be used for all events other than over speeding events.

2.133. VuFaultData

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to faults (requirement 096).

VuFaultData ::= SEQUENCE {

noOfVuFaults

vuFaultRecords

}

INTEGER(0..255),

SET SIZE(noOfVuFaults) OF VuFaultRecord

noOfVuFaults is the number of faults listed in the vuFaultRecords set.

vuFaultRecords is a set of faults records.

2.134. VuFaultRecord

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to a fault (requirement 096).

VuFaultRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

faultType

faultRecordPurpose

faultBeginTime

faultEndTime

cardNumberDriverSlotBegin

cardNumberCodriverSlotBegin

cardNumberDriverSlotEnd

cardNumberCodriverSlotEnd

}

EventFaultType,

EventFaultRecordPurpose,

TimeReal,

TimeReal,

FullCardNumber,

FullCardNumber,

FullCardNumber,

FullCardNumber

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faultType is the type of recording equipment fault.

faultRecordPurpose is the purpose for which this fault has been recorded.

faultBeginTime is the date and time of beginning of fault.

faultEndTime is the date and time of end of fault.

cardNumberDriverSlotBegin identifies the card inserted in the driver slot at the beginning of the fault.

cardNumberCodriverSlotBegin identifies the card inserted in the co-driver slot at the beginning of the fault.

cardNumberDriverSlotEnd identifies the card inserted in the driver slot at the end of the fault.

cardNumberCodriverSlotEnd identifies the card inserted in the co-driver slot at the end of the fault.

2.135. VuIdentification

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the identification of the vehicle unit (requirement 075).

VuIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {

vuManufacturerName

vuManufacturerAddress

vuPartNumber

vuSerialNumber

VuManufacturerName,

VuManufacturerAddress,

VuPartNumber,

VuSerialNumber,

vuSoftwareIdentification

VuSoftwareIdentification,

vuManufacturingDate

vuApprovalNumber

}

VuManufacturingDate,

VuApprovalNumber

vuManufacturerName is the name of the manufacturer of the vehicle unit.

vuManufacturerAddress is the address of the manufacturer of the vehicle unit.

vuPartNumber is the part number of the vehicle unit.

vuSerialNumber is the serial number of the vehicle unit.

vuSoftwareIdentification identifies the software implemented in the vehicle unit.

vuManufacturingDate is the manufacturing date of the vehicle unit.

vuApprovalNumber is the type approval number of the vehicle unit.

2.136. VuManufacturerAddress

Address of the manufacturer of the vehicle unit.

VuManufacturerAddress ::= Address

Value assignment: Unspecified.

2.137. VuManufacturerName

Name of the manufacturer of the vehicle unit.

VuManufacturerName ::= Name

Value assignment: Unspecified.

2.138. VuManufacturingDate

Date of manufacture of the vehicle unit.

VuManufacturingDate ::= TimeReal

Value assignment: Unspecified.

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2.139. VuOverSpeedingControlData

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to over speeding events since the last over speeding control (requirement
095).

VuOverSpeedingControlData ::= SEQUENCE {

lastOverspeedControlTime
firstOverspeedSince
numberOfOverspeedSince

}

TimeReal,
TimeReal,
OverspeedNumber

lastOverspeedControlTime is the date and time of the last over speeding control.

firstOverspeedSince is the date and time of the first over speeding following this over speeding control.

numberOfOverspeedSince is the number of over speeding events since the last over speeding control.

2.140. VuOverSpeedingEventData

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to over speeding events (requirement 094).

VuOverSpeedingEventData ::= SEQUENCE {

noOfVuOverSpeedingEvents
vuOverSpeedingEventRecords

}

INTEGER(0..255),
SET SIZE(noOfVuOverSpeedingEvents) OF
VuOverSpeedingEventRecord

noOfVuOverSpeedingEvents is the number of events listed in the vuOverSpeedingEventRecords set.

vuOverSpeedingEventRecords is a set of over speeding events records.

2.141. VuOverSpeedingEventRecord

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to over speeding events (requirement 094).

VuOverSpeedingEventRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

eventType
eventRecordPurpose
eventBeginTime
eventEndTime
maxSpeedValue
averageSpeedValue
cardNumberDriverSlotBegin
similarEventsNumber

}

eventType is the type of the event.

EventFaultType,
EventFaultRecordPurpose,
TimeReal,
TimeReal,
SpeedMax,
SpeedAverage,
FullCardNumber,
SimilarEventsNumber

eventRecordPurpose is the purpose for which this event has been recorded.

eventBeginTime is the date and time of beginning of event.

eventEndTime is the date and time of end of event.

maxSpeedValue is the maximum speed measured during the event.

averageSpeedValue is the arithmetic average speed measured during the event.

cardNumberDriverSlotBegin identifies the card inserted in the driver slot at the beginning of the event.

similarEventsNumber is the number of similar events that day.

2.142. VuPartNumber

Part number of the vehicle unit.

VuPartNumber ::= IA5String(SIZE(16))

Value assignment: VU manufacturer specific.

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2.143. VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodData

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to places where drivers begin or end a daily work periods (requirement
087).

VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodData ::= SEQUENCE {

noOfPlaceRecords
vuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecords

INTEGER(0..255),
SET SIZE(noOfPlaceRecords) OF
VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecord

}

noOfPlaceRecords is the number of records listed in the vuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecords set.

vuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecords is a set of place related records.

2.144. VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecord

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to a place where a driver begins or ends a daily work period (requirement
087).

VuPlaceDailyWorkPeriodRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

fullCardNumber
placeRecord

}

FullCardNumber,
PlaceRecord

fullCardNumber is the driver's card type, card issuing Member State and card number.

placeRecord contains the information related to the place entered.

2.145. VuPrivateKey

The private key of a vehicle unit.

VuPrivateKey ::= RSAKeyPrivateExponent

2.146. VuPublicKey

The public key of a vehicle unit.

VuPublicKey ::= PublicKey

2.147. VuSerialNumber

Serial number of the vehicle unit (requirement 075).

VuSerialNumber ::= ExtendedSerialNumber

2.148. VuSoftInstallationDate

Date of installation of the vehicle unit software version.

VuSoftInstallationDate ::= TimeReal

Value assignment: Unspecified.

2.149. VuSoftwareIdentification

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to the software installed.

VuSoftwareIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {

vuSoftwareVersion
vuSoftInstallationDate

VuSoftwareVersion,
VuSoftInstallationDate

}

vuSoftwareVersion is the software version number of the Vehicle Unit.

vuSoftInstallationDate is the software version installation date.

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2.150. VuSoftwareVersion

Software version number of the vehicle unit.

VuSoftwareVersion ::= IA5String(SIZE(4))

Value assignment: Unspecified.

2.151. VuSpecificConditionData

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to specific conditions.

VuSpecificConditionData ::= SEQUENCE {

noOfSpecificConditionRecords

INTEGER(0..216-1)

specificConditionRecords

SET SIZE (noOfSpecificConditionRecords)
OF SpecificConditionRecord

}

noOfSpecificConditionRecords is the number of records listed in the specificConditionRecords set.

specificConditionRecords is a set of specific conditions related records.

2.152. VuTimeAdjustmentData

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to time adjustments performed outside the frame of a regular calibration
(requirement 101).

VuTimeAdjustmentData ::= SEQUENCE {

noOfVuTimeAdjRecords

vuTimeAdjustmentRecords

}

INTEGER(0..6),

SET SIZE(noOfVuTimeAdjRecords) OF
VuTimeAdjustmentRecords

noOfVuTimeAdjRecords is the number of records in vuTimeAdjustmentRecords.

vuTimeAdjustmentRecords is a set of time adjustment records.

2.153. VuTimeAdjustmentRecord

Information, stored in a vehicle unit, related to a time adjustment performed outside the frame of a regular calibration
(requirement 101).

VuTimeAdjustmentRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

oldTimeValue

newTimeValue

workshopName

workshopAddress

workshopCardNumber

}

TimeReal,

TimeReal,

Name,

Address,

FullCardNumber

oldTimeValue, newTimeValue are the old and new values of date and time.

workshopName, workshopAddress are the workshop name and address.

workshopCardNumber identifies the workshop card used to perform the time adjustment.

2.154. W-VehicleCharacteristicConstant

Characteristic coefficient of the vehicle (definition k)).

W-VehicleCharacteristicConstant ::= INTEGER(0..216-1))

Value assignment: Impulses per kilometre in the operating range 0 to 64 255 pulses/km.

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2.155. WorkshopCardApplicationIdentification

Information, stored in a workshop card related to the identification of the application of the card (requirement 190).

WorkshopCardApplicationIdentificatio n ::= SEQUENCE {

typeOfTachographCardId

cardStructureVersion

noOfEventsPerType

noOfFaultsPerType

activityStructureLength

noOfCardVehicleRecords

noOfCardPlaceRecords

noOfCalibrationRecords

}

EquipmentType,

CardStructureVersion,

NoOfEventsPerType,

NoOfFaultsPerType,

CardActivityLengthRange,

NoOfCardVehicleRecords,

NoOfCardPlaceRecords,

NoOfCalibrationRecords

typeOfTachographCardId is specifying the implemented type of card.

cardStructureVersion is specifying the the version of the structure that is implemented in the card.

noOfEventsPerType is the number of events per type of event the card can record.

noOfFaultsPerType is the number of faults per type of fault the card can record.

activityStructureLength indicates the number of bytes available for storing activity records.

noOfCardVehicleRecords is the number of vehicle records the card can contain.

noOfCardPlaceRecords is the number of places the card can record.

noOfCalibrationRecords is the number of calibration records the card can store.

2.156. WorkshopCardCalibrationData

Information, stored in a workshop card, related to workshop activity performed with the card (requirements 227 and
229).

WorkshopCardCalibrationData ::= SEQUENCE {

calibrationTotalNumber

calibrationPointerNewestRecord

calibrationRecords

INTEGER(0..216-1),
INTEGER(0..NoOfCalibrationRecords-1),

SET SIZE(NoOfCalibrationRecords) OF
WorkshopCardCalibrationRecord

}

calibrationTotalNumber is the total number of calibrations performed with the card.

calibrationPointerNewestRecord is the index of the last updated calibration record.

Value assignment: Number corresponding to the numerator of the calibration record, beginning with “0” for the first
occurrence of the calibration records in the structure.

calibrationRecords is the set of records containing calibration and/or time adjustment information.

2.157. WorkshopCardCalibrationRecord

Information, stored in a workshop card, related to a calibration performed with the card (requirement 227).

WorkshopCardCalibrationRecord ::= SEQUENCE {

calibrationPurpose

CalibrationPurpose,

vehicleIdentificationNumber

VehicleIdentificationNumber,

vehicleRegistration

VehicleRegistrationIdentification,

wVehicleCharacteristicConstant

W-VehicleCharacteristicConstant,

kConstantOfRecordingEquipment

K-ConstantOfRecordingEquipment,

lTyreCircumference

tyreSize

L-TyreCircumference,

TyreSize,

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authorisedSpeed

oldOdometerValue

newOdometerValue

oldTimeValue

newTimeValue

nextCalibrationDate

vuPartNumber

vuSerialNumber

sensorSerialNumber

}

SpeedAuthorised,

OdometerShort,

OdometerShort,

TimeReal,

TimeReal,

TimeReal,

VuPartNumber,

VuSerialNumber,

SensorSerialNumber

calibrationPurpose is the purpose of the calibration.

vehicleIdentificationNumber is the VIN.

vehicleRegistration contains the VRN and registering Member State.

wVehicleCharacteristicConstant is the characteristic coefficient of the vehicle.

kConstantOfRecordingEquipment is the constant of the recording equipment.

lTyreCircumference is the effective circumference of the wheel tyres.

tyreSize is the designation of the dimensions of the tyres mounted on the vehicle.

authorisedSpeed is the maximum authorised speed of the vehicle.

oldOdometerValue, newOdometerValue are the old and new values of the odometer.

oldTimeValue, newTimeValue are the old and new values of date and time.

nextCalibrationDate is the date of the next calibration of the type specified in CalibrationPurpose to be carried out by
the authorised inspection authority.

vuPartNumber, vuSerialNumber and sensorSerialNumber are the data elements for recording equipment identifi-
cation.

2.158. WorkshopCardHolderIdentification

Information, stored in a workshop card, related to the identification of the cardholder (requirement 216).

WorkshopCardHolderIdentification ::= SEQUENCE {

workshopName

workshopAddress

cardHolderName

cardHolderPreferredLanguage

}

Name,

Address,

HolderName,

Language

workshopName is name of the workshop of the card holder.

workshopAddress is the address of the workshop of the card holder.

cardHolderName is the name and first name(s) of the holder (e.g. the name of the mechanic).

cardHolderPreferredLanguage is the preferred language of the card holder.

2.159. mWorkshopCardPIN

Personal identification number of the Workshop Card (requirement 213).

WorkshopCardPIN ::= IA5String(SIZE(8))

Value assignment: The PIN known to the cardholder, right padded with “FF” bytes up to 8 bytes.

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3. VALUE AND SIZE RANGE DEFINITIONS

Definition of variable values used for definitions in paragraph 2.

TimeRealRange ::= 232-1

3.1. Definitions for the Driver Card:

Name of the variable value

Min

Max

CardActivityLengthRange

NoOfCardPlaceRecords

NoOfCardVehicleRecords

NoOfEventsPerType

NoOfFaultsPerType

3.2. Definitions for the Workshop Card:

Name of the variable value

CardActivityLengthRange

NoOfCardPlaceRecords

NoOfCardVehicleRecords

NoOfEventsPerType

NoOfFaultsPerType

NoOfCalibrationRecords

3.3. Definitions for the Control Card:

Name of the variable value

NoOfControlActivityRecords

3.4. Definitions for the Company Card:

Name of the variable value

NoOfCompanyActivityRecords

4. CHARACTER SETS

5 544 bytes
(28 days
93 activity changes
per day)

13 776 bytes
(28 days
240 activity changes
per day)

84

84

6

12

Min

112

200

12

24

Max.

198 bytes
(1 day
93 activity changes)

492 bytes
(1 day
240 activity changes)

6

4

3

6

88

Min

230

Min

230

8

8

3

6

255

Max

520

Max

520

IA5Strings use the ASCII characters as defined by ISO/IEC 8824-1. For readability and for easy referencing the value
assignment is given below. The ISO/IEC 8824-1 supersedes this informative note in case of discrepancy.

! " # $ % & ' ( ) * + , - . / 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 : ; < = > ?

@ A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z [ \ ] ^ _

` a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z { | } ~

Other character strings (Address, Name, VehicleRegistrationNumber) use, in addition, the characters defined by the codes
192 to 255 of ISO/IEC 8859-1 (Latin1 character set) or ISO/IEC 8859-7 (Greek character set):

5. ENCODING

When encoded with ASN.1 encoding rules, all data types defined shall be encoded according to ISO/IEC 8825-2, aligned
variant.

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Appendix 2

TACHOGRAPH CARDS SPECIFICATION

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Abbreviations

For the purpose of this appendix, the following abbreviations apply.

AC

AID

ALW

APDU

ATR

AUT

Access conditions

Application Identifier

Always

Application Protocol Data Unit (structure of a command)

Answer To Reset

Authenticated

C6, C7

Contacts No 6 and 7 of the card as described in ISO/IEC 7816-2

cc

CHV

CLA

DF

EF

ENC

etu

IC

ICC

ID

IFD

IFS

IFSC

IFSD

INS

Lc

Le

MF

P1-P2

NAD

NEV

PIN

clock cycles

Card holder Verification Information

Class byte of an APDU command

Dedicated File. A DF can contain other files (EF or DF)

Elementary File

Encrypted: Access is possible only by encoding data

elementary time unit

Integrated Circuit

Integrated Circuit Card

Identifier

Interface Device

Information Field Size

Information Field Size for the card

Information Field Size Device (for the Terminal)

Instruction byte of an APDU command

Length of the input data for a APDU command

Length of the expected data (output data for a command)

Master File (root DF)

Parameter bytes

Node Address used in T=1 protocol

Never

Personal Identification Number

PRO SM

Protected with secure messaging

PTS

RFU

Protocol Transmission Selection

Reserved for Future Use

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RST

SM

Reset (of the card)

Secure Messaging

SW1-SW2

Status bytes

TS

VPP

Initial ATR character

Programming Voltage

XXh

Value XX in hexadecimal notation

||

Concatenation symbol 03||04=0304

1.2. References

The following references are used in this Appendix:

EN 726-3

Identification cards systems — Telecommunications integrated circuit(s) cards and terminals — Part 3:
Application independent card requirements. December 1994.

ISO/IEC 7816-2 Information technology — Identification cards — Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 2:

Dimensions and location of the contacts. First edition: 1999.

ISO/IEC 7816-3 Information technology — Identification cards — Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 3:

Electronic signals and transmission protocol. Edition 2: 1997.

ISO/IEC 7816-4 Information technology — Identification cards — Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 4:

Interindustry commands for interexchange. First edition: 1995 + Amendment 1: 1997.

ISO/IEC 7816-6 Information technology — Identification cards — Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 6:

Interindustry data elements. First Edition: 1996 + Cor 1: 1998.

ISO/IEC 7816-8 Information technology — Identification cards — Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 8:

Security related interindustry commands. First Edition: 1999.

ISO/IEC 9797

Information technology — Security techniques — Data integrity mechanism using a cryptographic
check function employing a block cipher algorithm. Edition 2: 1994.

2. ELECTRICAL AND PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS

TCS_200 All electronic signals shall be in accordance with ISO/IEC 7816-3 unless specified otherwise.

TCS_201

The location and dimensions of the card contacts shall comply with the ISO/IEC 7816-2.

2.1. Supply Voltage and Current Consumption

TCS_202

The card shall work according to specifications within the consumption limits specified in ISO/IEC 7816-3.

TCS_203

The card shall work with Vcc = 3 V (+/– 0,3 V) or with Vcc = 5 V (+/– 0,5 V).

Voltage selection shall be performed according to ISO/IEC 7816-3.

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2.2. Programming Voltage Vpp

TCS_204

The card shall not require a programming voltage at pin C6. It is expected that pin C6 is not connected in an IFD.
Contact C6 may be connected to Vcc in the card but shall not be connected to ground. This voltage should not be
interpreted in any case.

2.3. Clock generation and Frequency

TCS_205

The card shall operate within a frequency range of 1 to 5 MHz. Within one card session the clock frequency may vary
± 2 %. The clock frequency is generated by the Vehicle Unit and not the card itself. The duty cycle may vary between
40 and 60 %.

TCS_206 Under conditions contained into the card file EFICC, the external clock can be stopped. The first byte of the EFICC file

body codes the Clockstop mode conditions (see EN 726-3 for further details):

Low

Bit 3

0

0

1

0

0

1

High

Bit 2

0

1

0

0

1

0

Bits 4 to 8 are not used.

2.4. I/O Contact

Bit 1

1

1

1

0

0

0

Clockstop allowed, no preferred level

Clockstop allowed, high level preferred

Clockstop allowed, low level preferred

Clockstop not allowed

Clockstop only allowed on high level

Clockstop only allowed on low level

TCS_207

The I/O contact C7 is used to receive data from and to transmit data to the IFD. During operation only either the card
or the IFD shall be in transmit mode. Should both units be in transmit mode no damage shall occur to the card. Unless
transmitting, the card shall enter the reception mode.

2.5. States of the Card

TCS_208

The card works in two states while the supply voltage is applied:

— Operation state while executing commands or interfacing with Digital Unit,

— Idle state at all other times; in this state all data shall be retained by the card.

3. HARDWARE AND COMMUNICATION

3.1. Introduction

This paragraph describes the minimum functionality required by Tachograph cards and VUs to ensure correct operation
and interoperability.

Tachograph cards are as compliant as possible with the available ISO/IEC applicable norms (especially ISO/IEC 7816).
However, commands and protocols are fully described in order to specify some restricted usage or some differences if
they exist. The commands specified are fully compliant with the referred norms except where indicated.

3.2. Transmission Protocol

TCS_300

The Transmission protocol shall be compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-3. In particular, the VU shall recognise waiting time
extensions sent by the card.

3.2.1. Protocols

TCS_301

The card shall provide both protocol T=0 and protocol T=1.

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TCS_302

T=0 is the default protocol, a PTS command is therefore necessary to change the protocol to T=1.

TCS_303 Devices shall support direct convention in both protocols: the direct convention is hence mandatory for the card.

TCS_304

The Information Field Size Card byte shall be presented at the ATR in character TA3. This value shall be at least 'F0h'
(= 240 bytes).

The following restrictions apply to the protocols:

TCS_305

T=0

— The interface device shall support an answer on I/O after the rising edge of the signal on RST from 400 cc.

— The interface device shall be able to read characters separated with 12 etu.

— The interface device shall read an erroneous character and its repetition if separated with 13 etu. If an erroneous
character is detected, the Error signal on I/O can occur between 1 etu and 2 etu. The device shall support a 1 etu
delay.

— The interface device shall accept a 33 bytes ATR (TS+32)

— If TC1 is present in the ATR, the Extra Guard Time shall be present for characters sent by the interface device
although characters sent by the card can still be separated with 12 etu. This is also true for the ACK character sent
by the card after a P3 character emitted by the interface device.

— The interface device shall take into account a NUL character emitted by the card.

— The interface device shall accept the complementary mode for ACK.

— The get-response command cannot be used in chaining mode to get a data which length could exceed 255 bytes.

TCS_306

T=1

— NAD byte: not used (NAD shall be set to '00').

— S-block ABORT: not used.

— S-block VPP state error: not used.

— The total chaining length for a data field will not exceed 255 bytes (to be ensured by the IFD).

— The Information Field Size Device (IFSD) shall be indicated by the IFD immediately after the ATR: the IFD shall
transmit the S-Block IFS request after the ATR and the card shall send back S-Block IFS. The recommended value for
IFSD is 254 bytes.

— The card will not ask for an IFS readjustment.

3.2.2. ATR

TCS_307

The device checks ATR bytes, according to ISO/IEC 7816-3. No verification shall be done on ATR Historical Characters.

Example of Basic Biprotocol ATR according to ISO/IEC 7816-3

Character

Value

Remarks

TS

T0

TD1

TD2

TA3

'3Bh'

'85h'

'80h'

'11h'

Indicates direct convention

TD1 present; 5 historical bytes are presents

TD2 present; T=0 to be used

TA3 present; T=1 to be used

'XXh' (mind. 'F0h')

Information Field Size Card (IFSC)

TH1 bis TH5

TCK

'XXh'

'XXh'

Historical characters

Check Character (exclusive OR)

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TCS_308 After the Answer To Reset (ATR), the Master File (MF) is implicitly selected and becomes the Current Directory.

3.2.3. PTS

TCS_309

The default Protocol is T=0. To set the T=1 protocol, a PTS (also known as PPS) must be sent to the card by the device.

TCS_310 As both T=0 and T=1 protocols are mandatory for the card, the basic PTS for protocol switching is mandatory for the

card.

The PTS can be used, as indicated in ISO/IEC 7816-3, to switch to higher baud rates than the default one proposed by
the card in the ATR if any (TA(1) byte).

Higher baud rates are optional for the card.

TCS_311

If no other baud rate than the default one are supported (or if the selected baud rate is not supported), the card shall
respond to the PTS correctly according to ISO/IEC 7816-3 by omitting the PPS1 byte.

Examples of basic PTS for protocol selection are the following:

Character

Value

Remarks

'FFh'

The Initiate Character

'00h' or '01h'

PPS1 to PPS3 are not present; '00h' to select T0, '01h' to select T1

'XXh'

Check Character: 'XXh' = 'FFh' if PPS0 = '00h'
'XXh' = 'FEh' if PPS0 = '01h'

PPSS

PPS0

PK

3.3. Access Conditions (AC)

Access Conditions (AC) for the UPDATE_BINARY and READ_BINARY commands are defined for each Elementary File.

TCS_312

The AC of the current file must be met before accessing the file via these commands.

The definitions of the available access conditions are the following:

— ALW: The action is always possible and can be executed without any restriction.

— NEV: The action is never possible.

— AUT: The right

corresponding a successful external authentication must be opened up (done by the

EXTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE command).

— PRO SM: Command must be transmitted with a cryptographic checksum using secure messaging (See Appendix

11).

— AUT and PRO SM (combined)

On the processing commands (UPDATE_BINARY and READ_BINARY), the following access conditions can be set in the
card:

ALW

NEV

AUT

PRO SM

AUT and PRO SM

UPDATE_ BINARY

READ_ BINARY

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

The PRO SM access condition is not available for the READ_BINARY command. It means that the presence of a
cryptographic checksum for a READ command is never mandatory. However, using the value 'OC' for the class, it is
possible to use the READ_BINARY command with secure messaging, as described in paragraph 3.6.2.

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3.4. Data encryption

When confidentiality of data to be read from a file needs to be protected, the file is marked as “Encrypted”. Encryption is
performed using secure messaging (See Appendix 11).

3.5. Commands and error codes overview

Commands and file organisation are deduced from and complies with ISO/IEC 7816-4.

TCS_313

This section describes the following APDU command-response pairs:

Command

SELECT FILE

READ BINARY

UPDATE BINARY

GET CHALLENGE

VERIFY

GET RESPONSE

PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION:

VERIFY CERTIFICATE
COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE
VERIFY DIGITAL SIGNATURE
HASH

INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE

EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE

MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT:

SETTING A KEY

PERFORM HASH OF FILE

INS

A4

B0

D6

84

20

C0

2A

88

82

22

2A

TCS_314

The status word SW1 SW2 are returned in any response message and denote the processing state of the command.

SW1

SW2

Meaning

90

61

62

63

64

65

65

66

67

69

69

69

69

69

69

69

6A

6A

6A

6B

00

XX

81

CX

00

00

81

88

00

00

82

83

85

86

87

88

82

86

88

00

Normal processing

Normal processing. XX = number of response bytes available

Warning processing. Part of returned data may be corrupted

Wrong CHV (PIN). Remaining attempts counter provided by 'X'

Execution error — State of non-volatile memory unchanged. Integrity error

Execution error — State of non-volatile memory changed

Execution error — State of non-volatile memory changed — Memory failure

Security error: wrong Cryptographic checksum (during Secure Messaging) or

wrong certificate (during certificate verification) or
wrong cryptogram (during external authentication) or
wrong signature (during signature verification)

Wrong length (wrong Lc or Le)

Forbidden command (no response available in T=0)

Security status not satisfied

Authentication method blocked

Conditions of use not satisfied

Command not allowed (no current EF)

Expected Secure Messaging Data Objects missing

Incorrect Secure Messaging Data Objects

File not found

Wrong parameters P1-P2

Referenced data not found

Wrong parameters (offset outside the EF)

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SW1

SW2

Meaning

6C

6D

6E

6F

XX

00

00

00

Wrong length, SW2 indicates the exact length. No data field is returned

Instruction code not supported or invalid

Class not supported

Other checking errors

3.6. Commands description

The mandatory commands for the Tachograph cards are described in this chapter.

Additional relevant details, related to cryptographic operations involved, are given in Appendix 11 Common security
mechanisms.

All commands are described independently of the used protocol (T=0 or T=1). The APDU bytes CLA, INS, P1, P2, Lc
and Le are always indicated. If Lc or Le is not needed for the described command, the associated length, value and
description are empty.

TCS_315

If both length bytes (Lc and Le) are requested, the described command has to be split in two parts if the IFD is using
protocol T=0: the IFD sends the command as described with P3=Lc + data and then sends a GET_RESPONSE (see §
3.6.6) command with P3=Le.

TCS_316

If both length bytes are requested, and Le=0 (secure messaging):

— When using protocol T=1, the card shall answer to Le=0 by sending all available output data.

— When using protocol T=0, the IFD shall send the first command with P3=Lc + data, the card shall answer (to this
implicit Le=0) by the Status bytes '61La', where La is the number of response bytes available. The IFD shall then
generate a GET RESPONSE command with P3=La to read the data.

3.6.1. Select File

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted usage compared to the command defined in the
norm.

The SELECT FILE command is used:

— to select an application DF (selection by name must be used)

— to select an elementary file corresponding to the submitted file ID

3.6.1.1. Selection by name (AID)

This command allows to select an application DF in the card.

TCS_317

This command can be performed from anywhere in the file structure (after the ATR or at anytime).

TCS_318

The selection of an application resets the current security environment. After performing the application selection, no
current public key is selected anymore and the former session key is no longer available for secure messaging. The AUT
access condition is also lost.

TCS_319

Command Message

Byte

CLA
INS
P1
P2
Lc

Length

1
1
1
1
1

Value

'00h'
'A4h'
'04h'
'0Ch'
'NNh'

#6-#(5+NN)

NN

'XX..XXh'

Description

Selection by name (AID)
No response expected
Number of bytes sent to the card (length of the AID):
Tachograph application
AID: 'FF 54 41 43 48 4F' for the Tachograph application

'06h' for the

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No response to the SELECT FILE command is needed (Le absent in T=1, or no response asked in T=0).

TCS_320

Response Message (no response asked)

Byte

SW

Length

Value

Description

2

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If the command is successful, the card returns '9000'.

— If the application corresponding with the AID is not found, the processing state returned is '6A82'.

— In T=1, if the byte Le is present, the state returned is '6700'.

— In T=0, if a response is asked after the SELECT FILE command, the state returned is '6900'.

— If the selected application is considered corrupted (integrity error is detected within the file attributes),

the

processing state returned is '6400' or '6581'.

3.6.1.2. Selection of an Elementary File using its File Identifier

TCS_321

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Lc

#6-#7

Length

1

1

1

1

1

2

Value

'00h'

'A4h'

'02h'

'0Ch'

'02h'

Description

Selection of an EF under the current DF

No response expected

Number of bytes sent to the card

'XXXXh'

File Identifier

No response to the SELECT FILE command is needed (Le absent in T=1, or no response asked in T=0).

TCS_322

Response Message (no response asked)

Byte

SW

Length

Value

Description

2

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If the command is successful, the card returns '9000'.

— If the file corresponding with the file identifier is not found, the processing state returned is '6A82'.

— In T=1, if the byte Le is present, the state returned is '6700'.

— In T=0, if a response is asked after the SELECT FILE command, the state returned is '6900'.

— If the selected file is considered corrupted (integrity error is detected within the file attributes), the processing state

returned is '6400' or '6581'.

3.6.2. Read Binary

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted usage compared to the command defined in the
norm.

The Read Binary command is used to read data from a transparent file.

The response of the card consists of returning the data read, optionally encapsulated in a secure messaging structure.

TCS_323

The command can be performed only if the security status satisfies the security attributes defined for the EF for the
READ function.

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3.6.2.1. Command without secure messaging

This command enables the IFD to read data from the EF currently selected, without secure messaging.

TCS_324

Reading data from a file marked as “Encrypted” shall not be possible through this command.

TCS_325

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Le

Length

1

1

1

1

1

Value

'00h'

'B0h'

'XXh'

'XXh'

'XXh'

No Secure Messaging asked

Description

Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file: Most Significant Byte

Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file: Least Significant Byte

Length of data expected. Number of Bytes to be read

Note: bit 8 of P1 must be set to 0.

TCS_326

Response Message

Byte

#1-#X

SW

Length

Value

Description

X

2

'XX..XXh'

Data read

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If the command is successful, the card returns '9000'.

— If no EF is selected, the processing state returned is '6986'.

— If the Access Control of the selected file are not satisfied, the command is interrupted with '6982'.

— If the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF (Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is '6B00'.

— If the size of the data to be read is not compatible with the size of the EF (Offset + Le > EF size) the processing state

returned is '6700' or '6Cxx', where 'xx' indicates the exact length.

— If an integrity error is detected within the file attributes, the card shall consider the file as corrupted and unre-

coverable, the processing state returned is '6400' or '6581'.

— If an integrity error is detected within the stored data, the card shall return the demanded data, and the processing

state returned is '6281'.

3.6.2.2. Command with secure messaging

This command enables the IDF to read data from the EF currently selected with secure messaging, in order to verify the
integrity of the data received and to protect the confidentiality of the data in the case the EF is marked as “Encrypted”.

TCS_327

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Lc

#6

#7

#8

Length

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Value

'0Ch'

'B0h'

'XXh'

'XXh'

'09h'

'97h'

'01h'

'NNh'

Description

Secure Messaging asked

INS

P1 (offset in bytes from the beginning of the file): Most Significant Byte

P2 (offset in bytes from the beginning of the file): Least Significant Byte

Length of input data for secure messaging

TLE: Tag for expected length specification
LLE: Length of expected length
Expected length specification (original Le): Number of Bytes to be read

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Byte

#9

#10

#11-#14

Le

Length

1

1

4

1

Value

'8Eh'

'04h'

'XX..XXh'

Description

TCC: Tag for cryptographic checksum
LCC: Length of following cryptographic checksum
Cryptographic checksum (4 most significant bytes)

'00h'

As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4

TCS_328

Response Message if EF is not marked as “Encrypted” and if Secure Messaging input format is correct:

Byte

#1

#2

#(2+L)-#(1+L+NN)

#(2+L+NN)

#(3+L+NN)

#(4+L+NN)-#(7+L+NN)

SW

Length

1

L

NN

1

1

4

2

Value

'81h'

'NNh' or
'81 NNh'

'XX..XXh'

'8Eh'

'04h'

'XX..XXh'

Description

TPV: Tag for plain value data
LPV: length of returned data (= original Le)
L is 2 bytes if LPV >127 bytes
Plain Data value

TCC: Tag for cryptographic checksum
LCC: Length of following cryptographic checksum
Cryptographic checksum (4 most significant bytes)

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

TCS_329

Response Message if EF is marked as “Encrypted” and if Secure Messaging input format is correct:

Byte

#1

#2

Length

1

L

Value

'87h'

Description

TPI CG: Tag for encrypted data (cryptogram)

'MMh' or '81
MMh'

length of returned encrypted data (different of

LPI CG:
original Le of the command due to padding)
L is 2 byte if LPI CG > 127 bytes

#(2+L)-#(1+L+MM)

MM

'01XX..XXh'

Encrypted Data: Padding Indicator and cryptogram

#(2+L+MM)

#(3+L+MM)

#(4+L+MM)-#(7+L+MM)

SW

1

1

4

2

'8Eh'

'04h'

TCC: Tag for cryptographic checksum

LCC: Length of following cryptographic checksum

'XX..XXh'

Cryptographic checksum (4 most significant bytes)

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

The encrypted data returned contain a first byte indicating the used padding mode. For the tachograph application, the
padding indicator always takes the value '01h', indicating that the used padding mode is the one specified in ISO/IEC
7816-4 (one byte with value '80h' followed by some null bytes: ISO/IEC 9797 method 2).

The “regular” processing states, described for the READ BINARY command with no secure messaging (see § 3.6.2.1), can
be returned using the response message structures described above, under a '99h' Tag (as described in TCS 335).

Additionally, some errors specifically related to secure messaging can happen. In that case, the processing state is simply
returned, with no secure messaging structure involved:

TCS_330

Response Message if incorrect Secure Messaging input format

Byte

SW

Length

Value

Description

2

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If no current session key is available, the processing state '6A88' is returned. It happens either if the session key has
not already been generated or if the session key validity has expired (in this case the IFD must re-run a mutual
authentication process to set a new session key).

— If some expected data objects (as specified above) are missing in the secure messaging format, the processing state
'6987' is returned: this error happens if an expected tag is missing or if the command body is not properly
constructed.

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— If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state returned is '6988': this error happens if all the required tags

are present but some lengths are different from the ones expected.

— If the verification of the cryptographic checksum fails, the processing state returned is '6688'.

3.6.3. Update Binary

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted usage compared to the command defined in the
norm.

The UPDATE BINARY command message initiates the update (erase + write) of the bits already present in an EF binary
with the bits given in the command APDU.

TCS_331

The command can be performed only if the security status satisfies the security attributes defined for the EF for the
UPDATE function (If the Access Control of the UPDATE function includes PRO SM, a Secure Messaging must be added
in the command).

3.6.3.1. Command without secure messaging

This command enables the IFD to write data into the EF currently selected, without the card verifying the integrity of
data received. This plain mode is allowed only if the related file is not marked as “Encrypted”.

TCS_332

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Lc

Length

1

1

1

1

1

Value

'00h'

'D6h'

'XXh'

'XXh'

'NNh'

No Secure Messaging asked

Description

Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file: Most Significant Byte

Offset in bytes from the beginning of the file: Least Significant Byte

Lc Length of data to Update. Number of bytes to be written

#6-#(5+NN)

NN

'XX..XXh'

Data to be written

Note: bit 8 of P1 must be set to 0.

TCS_333

Response Message

Byte

SW

Length

Value

Description

2

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If the command is successful, the card returns '9000'.

— If no EF is selected, the processing state returned is '6986'.

— If the Access Control of the selected file are not satisfied, the command is interrupted with '6982'.

— If the Offset is not compatible with the size of the EF (Offset > EF size), the processing state returned is '6B00'.

— If the size of the data to be written is not compatible with the size of the EF (Offset + Le > EF size) the processing

state returned is '6700'.

— If an integrity error is detected within the file attributes, the card shall consider the file as corrupted and unre-

coverable, the processing state returned is '6400' or '6500'.

— If writing is unsuccessful, the processing state returned is '6581'.

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3.6.3.2. Command with secure messaging

This command enables the IFD to write data into the EF currently selected, with the card verifying the integrity of data
received. As no confidentiality is required, the data are not encrypted.

TCS_334

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Lc

#6

#7

Length

1

1

1

1

1

1

L

#(7+L)-#(6+L+NN)

NN

#(7+L+NN)

#(8+L+NN)

#(9+L+NN)-#(12+L+NN)

Le

1

1

4

1

Value

'0Ch'

'D6h'

'XXh'

'XXh'

'XXh'

'81h'

'NNh' or
'81 NNh'

'XX..XXh'

'8Eh'

'04h'

'XX..XXh'

Description

Secure Messaging. Asked

INS

in bytes from the beginning of

Offset
Significant Byte

the file: Most

in bytes from the beginning of

Offset
Significant Byte

the file: Least

Length of the secured data field

TPV: Tag for plain value data
LPV: length of transmitted data
L is 2 bytes if LPV > 127 bytes
Plain Data value (Data to be written)

TCC: Tag for cryptographic checksum
LCC: Length of following cryptographic checksum
Cryptographic checksum (4 most significant bytes)

'00h'

As specified in ISO/IEC 7816-4

TCS_335

Response message if correct Secure Messaging input format

Byte

#1

#2

#3-#4

#5

#6

#7-#10

SW

Length

1

1

2

1

1

4

2

Value

'99h'

'02h'

'XXXXh'

'8Eh'

'04h'

'XX..XXh'

Description

TSW: Tag for Status Words (to be protected by CC)
LSW: length of returned Status Words
Status Words (SW1, SW2)

TCC: Tag for cryptographic checksum
LCC: Length of following cryptographic checksum
Cryptographic checksum (4 most significant bytes)

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

The “regular” processing states, described for the UPDATE BINARY command with no secure messaging (see §3.6.3.1),
can be returned using the response message structure described above.

Additionally, some errors specifically related to secure messaging can happen. In that case, the processing state is simply
returned, with no secure messaging structure involved:

TCS_336

Response Message if error in secure messaging

Byte

SW

Length

Value

Description

2

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If no current session key is available, the processing state '6A88' is returned.

— If some expected data objects (as specified above) are missing in the secure messaging format, the processing state
'6987' is returned: this error happens if an expected tag is missing or if the command body is not properly
constructed.

— If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state returned is '6988': this error happens if all the required tags

are present but some lengths are different from the ones expected.

— If the verification of the cryptographic checksum fails, the processing state returned is '6688'.

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3.6.4. Get Challenge

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted usage compared to the command defined in the
norm.

The GET CHALLENGE command asks the card to issue a challenge in order to use it in a security related procedure in
which a cryptogram or some ciphered data are sent to the card.

TCS_337

The Challenge issued by the card is only valid for the next command, which uses a challenge, sent to the card.

TCS_338

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Le

Length

1

1

1

1

1

Value

'00h'

'84h'

'00h'

'00h'

'08h'

Description

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Le (Length of Challenge expected)

TCS_339

Response Message

Byte

#1-#8

SW

Length

Value

Description

8

2

'XX..XXh'

Challenge

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If the command is successful, the card returns '9000'.

— If Le is different from '08h', the processing state is '6700'.

— If parameters P1-P2 are incorrect, the processing state is '6A86'.

3.6.5. Verify

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4, but has a restricted usage compared to the command defined in the
norm.

The Verify command initiates the comparison in the card of the CHV (PIN) data sent from the command with the
reference CHV stored in the card.

Note: The PIN entered by the user must be right padded with FFh' bytes up to a length of 8 bytes by the IFD.

TCS_340

If the command is successful, the rights corresponding to CHV presentation are opened and the remaining CHV attempt
counter is reinitialised.

TCS_341 An unsuccessful comparison is recorded in the card in order to limit the number of further attempts of the use of the

reference CHV.

TCS_342

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Lc

#6-#13

Length

1

1

1

1

1

8

Value

'00h'

'20h'

'00h'

'00h'

'08h'

Description

CLA

INS

P1

P2 (the verified CHV is implicitly known)

Length of CHV code transmitted

'XX..XXh'

CHV

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TCS_343

Response Message

Byte

SW

Length

Value

Description

2

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If the command is successful, the card returns '9000'.

— If the reference CHV is not found, the processing state returned is '6A88'.

— If the CHV is blocked, (the remaining attempt counter of the CHV is null), the processing state returned is '6983'.

Once in that state, the CHV can never be successfully presented anymore.

— If the comparison is unsuccessful, the remaining attempt Counter is decreased and the status '63CX' is returned
(X > 0, and X equals the remaining CHV attempts counter. X = 'F', the CHV attempts counter is greater than 'F').

— If the reference CHV is considered corrupted, the processing state returned is '6400' or '6581'.

3.6.6. Get Response

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4.

This command (only necessary and available for T=0 Protocol) is used to transmit prepared data from the card to the
interface device (case where a command had included both Lc and Le).

The GET_RESPONSE command has to be issued immediately after the command preparing the data, otherwise, the data
are lost. After the execution of the GET_RESPONSE command (except if the error '61xx' or '6Cxx' occur, see below), the
previously prepared data are no longer available.

TCS_344

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Le

Length

1

1

1

1

1

Value

'00h'

'C0h'

'00h'

'00h'

'XXh'

TCS_345

Response Message

Description

Number of bytes expected

Byte

Length

Value

Description

#1-#X

SW

X

2

'XX..XXh'

Data

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If the command is successful, the card returns '9000'.

— If no data have been prepared by the card, the processing state returned is '6900' or '6F00'.

— If Le exceeds the number of available bytes or if Le is null, the processing state returned is '6Cxx', where 'xx' denotes
the prepared data are still available for a subsequent

In that case,

the exact number of available bytes.
GET_RESPONSE command.

— If Le is not null and is smaller than the number of available bytes, the required data are sent normally by the card,
indicates a number of extra bytes still available by a

and the processing state returned is '61xx', where 'xx'
subsequent GET_RESPONSE command.

— If the command is not supported (protocol T=1), the card returns '6D00'.

3.6.7. PSO: Verify Certificate

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8, but has a restricted usage compared to the command defined in the
norm.

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The VERIFY CERTIFICATE command is used by the card to obtain a Public Key from the outside and to check its
validity.

TCS_346 When a VERIFY CERTIFICATE command is successful, the Public Key is stored for a future use in the Security
environment. This key shall be explicitly set for the use in security related commands (INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE,
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE or VERIFY CERTIFICATE) by the MSE command (see § 3.6.10) using its key identifier.

TCS_347

In any case, the VERIFY CERTIFICATE command uses the public key previously selected by the MSE command to open
the certificate. This public key must be the one of a Member State or of Europe.

TCS_348

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Lc

Length

1

1

1

1

1

Value

'00h'

'2Ah'

'00h'

'AEh'

'CEh'

Description

CLA

Perform Security Operation

P1

P2: non BER-TLV coded data (concatenation of Data Elements)

Lc: Length of the certificate, 194 Bytes

#6-#199

194

'XX..XXh'

Certificate: concatenation of data Elements (as described in Appendix 11)

TCS_349

Response Message

Byte

SW

Length

Value

Description

2

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If the command is successful, the card returns '9000'.

— If the certificate verification fails, the processing state returned is '6688'. The verification and unwrapping process of

the certificate is described in Appendix 11.

— If no Public Key is present in the Security Environment, '6A88' is returned.

— If the selected public key (used to unwrap the certificate) is considered corrupted, the processing state returned is

'6400' or '6581'.

— If the selected public key (used to unwrap the certificate) has a CHA.LSB (CertificateHolderAuthori-
is not the one of a Member State or of Europe), the
(i.e.

sation.equipmentType) different from '00'
processing state returned is '6985'.

3.6.8. Internal Authenticate

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4.

Using the INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command, the IFD can authenticate the card.

The authentication process is described in Appendix 11. It includes the following statements:

TCS_350

The INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command uses the card Private Key (implicitly selected) to sign authentication data
including K1 (first element for session key agreement) and RND1, and uses the Public Key currently selected (through
the last MSE command) to encrypt the signature and form the authentication token (more details in Appendix 11).

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TCS_351

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Lc

#6-#13

#14-#21

Le

Length

1

1

1

1

1

8

8

1

Value

'00h'

'88h'

'00h'

'00h'

'10h'

Description

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Length of data sent to the card

'XX..XXh'

Challenge used to authenticate the card

'XX..XXh'

VU.CHR (see Appendix 11)

'80h'

Length of the data expected from the card

TCS_352

Response Message

Byte

Length

Value

Description

#1-#128

SW

128

2

'XX..XXh'

Card authentication token (see Appendix 11)

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If the command is successful, the card returns '9000'.

— If no Public Key is present in the Security Environment, the processing state returned is '6A88'.

— If no Private Key is present in the Security Environment, the processing state returned is '6A88'.

— If VU.CHR does not match the current public key identifier, the processing state returned is '6A88'.

— If the selected private key is considered corrupted, the processing state returned is '6400' or '6581'.

TCS_353

If the INTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE command is successful, the current session key, if existing, is erased and no longer
available. In order to have a new session key available, the EXTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE command must be successfully
performed.

3.6.9. External Authenticate

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4.

Using the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command, the card can authenticate the IFD.

The authentication process is described in Appendix 11. It includes the following statements:

TCS_354 A GET CHALLENGE command must precede the EXTERNAL_AUTHENTICATE command immediately. The card issues

a challenge to the outside (RND3).

TCS_355

The verification of the cryptogram uses RND3 (challenge issued by the card), the card private key (implicitly selected)
and the public key previously selected by the MSE command.

TCS_356

The card verifies the cryptogram, and if it is correct, the AUT access condition is opened.

TCS_357

The input cryptogram is carries the second element for session key agreement K2.

TCS_358

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Lc

Length

1

1

1

1

1

Value

'00h'

'82h'

'00h'

'00h'

Description

CLA

INS

P1

P2 (the public Key to be used is implicitly known, and has been
previously set by the MSE command)

'80h'

Lc (Length of the data sent to the card)

#6-#133

128

'XX..XXh'

Cryptogram (see Appendix 11)

28.5.2002

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C 126 E/101

TCS_359

Response Message

Byte

SW

Length

Value

Description

2

'XXXXh'

Status Words (Status Words (SW1, SW2))

— If the command is successful, the card returns '9000'.

— If no Public Key is present in the Security Environment, '6A88' is returned.

— If the CHA of the currently set public key is not the concatenation of the Tachograph application AID and of a VU

equipment Type, the processing state returned is '6F00' (see Appendix 11).

— If no Private Key is present in the Security Environment, the processing state returned is '6A88'.

— If the verification of the cryptogram is wrong, the processing state returned is '6688'.

— If the command is not immediately preceded with a GET CHALLENGE command, the processing state returned is

'6985'.

— If the selected private key is considered corrupted, the processing state returned is '6400' or '6581'.

TCS_360

If the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command is successful, and if the first part of the session key is available from a
successful INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE recently performed, the session key is set for future commands using secure
messaging.

TCS_361

If the first session key part is not available from a previous INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command, the second part of
the session key, sent by the IFD, is not stored in the card. This mechanism ensures that the mutual authentication
process is done in the order specified in Appendix 11.

3.6.10. Manage Security Environment

This command is used to set a public key for authentication purpose.

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. The use of this command is restricted regarding the related standard.

TCS_362

The key referenced in the MSE data field is valid for every file of the Tachograph DF.

TCS_363

The key referenced in the MSE data field remains the current public key until the next correct MSE command.

TCS_364

If the key referenced is not (already) present into the card, the security environment remains unchanged.

TCS_365

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Lc

#6

#7

Length

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Value

'00h'

'22h'

'C1h'

'B6h'

'0Ah'

'83h'

'08h'

Description

CLA

INS

P1: referenced key valid for all cryptographic operations

P2 (referenced data concerning Digital Signature)

Lc: length of subsequent data field

Tag for referencing a public key in asymmetric cases

Length of the key reference (key identifier)

#8-#15

08h

'XX..XXh'

Key identifier as specified in Appendix 11

C 126 E/102

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TCS_366

Response Message

Byte

SW

Length

Value

Description

2

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If the command is successful, the card returns '9000'.

— If the referenced key is not present into the card, the processing state returned is '6A88'.

— If some expected data objects are missing in the secure messaging format, the processing state '6987' is returned.

This can happen if the tag '83h' is missing.

— If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state returned is '6988'. This can happen if the length of the key

identifier is not '08h'.

— If the selected key is considered corrupted, the processing state returned is '6400' or '6581'.

3.6.11. PSO: Hash

This command is used to transfer to the card the result of a hash calculation on some data. This command is used for
the verification of digital signatures. The hash value is stored in EEPROM for the subsequent command verify digital
signature.

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. The use of this command is restricted regarding the related standard.

TCS_367

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Lc

#6

#7

Length

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

Value

'00h'

'2Ah'

'90h'

'A0h'

'16h'

'90h'

'14h'

Description

CLA

Perform Security Operation

Return Hash code

Tag: data field contains DOs relevant for hashing

Length Lc of the subsequent data field

Tag for the hash code

Length of the hash code

#8-#27

20

'XX..XXh'

Hash code

TCS_368

Response Message

Byte

SW

Length

Value

Description

2

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If the command is successful, the card returns '9000'.

— If some expected data objects (as specified above) are missing, the processing state '6987' is returned. This can

happen if one of the tag '90h' is missing.

— If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state returned is '6988'. This error happens if the required tag is

present but with a length different from '14h'.

3.6.12. Perform Hash of File

This command is not compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. Thus the CLA byte of this command indicates that there is a
proprietary use of the PERFORM SECURITY OPERATION/HASH.

TCS_369

The perform hash file command is used to hash the data area of the currently selected transparent EF.

28.5.2002

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C 126 E/103

TCS_370

The result of the hash operation is stored in the card. It can then be used to get a digital signature of the file, using the
PSO-COMPUTE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE command. This
the COMPUTE DIGITAL
remains available
SIGNATURE command until the next successful PERFORM HASH of FILE command.

result

for

TCS_371

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Length

1

1

1

1

Value

'80h'

'2Ah'

'90h'

'00h'

Description

CLA

Perform Security Operation

Tag: Hash

P2: Hash the data of the currently selected transparent file

TCS_372

Response Message

Byte

SW

Length

Value

Description

2

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If the command is successful, the card returns '9000'.

— If no application is selected, the processing state '6985' is returned

— If the selected EF is considered corrupted (file attributes or stored data integrity errors), the processing state returned

is '6400' or '6581'.

— If the selected file is not a transparent file, the processing state returned is '6986'.

3.6.13. PSO: Compute Digital Signature

This command is used to compute the digital signature of previously computed hash code (see PERFORM HASH of FILE,
§ 3.6.12).

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. The use of this command is restricted regarding the related standard.

TCS_373

The card private key is used to compute the digital signature and is implicitly known by the card.

TCS_374

The card performs a digital signature using a padding method compliant with PKCS1 (see Appendix 11 for details).

TCS_375

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Le

Length

1

1

1

1

1

TCS_376

Response Message

Value

'00h'

'2Ah'

'9Eh'

'9Ah'

Description

CLA

Perform Security Operation

Digital signature to be returned

Tag: data field contains data to be signed. As no data field is included,
the data are supposed to be already present in the card (hash of file)

'80h'

Length of the expected signature

Byte

Length

Value

Description

#1-#128

SW

128

2

'XX..XXh'

Signature of the previously computed hash

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If the command is successful, the card returns '9000'.

— If the implicitly selected private key is considered as corrupted, the processing state returned is '6400' or '6581'.

C 126 E/104

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28.5.2002

3.6.14. PSO: Verify Digital Signature

This command is used to verify the digital signature, provided as an input, in accordance with PKCS1 of a message,
whose hash is known to the card. The signature algorithm is implicitly known by the card.

This command is compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-8. The use of this command is restricted regarding the related standard.

TCS_377

The Verify Digital Signature command always uses the public key selected by the previous Manage Security Environment
command, and the previous hash code entered by a PSO: Hash command.

TCS_378

Command Message

Byte

CLA

INS

P1

P2

Lc

#28

#29-#30

Length

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

Value

'00h'

'2Ah'

'00h'

'A8h'

'83h'

'9Eh'

Description

CLA

Perform Security Operation

Tag: data field contains DOs relevant for verification

Length Lc of the subsequent data field

Tag for Digital Signature

'8180h'

Length of digital signature (128 bytes, coded in accordance with ISO/IEC
7816-6)

#31-#158

128

'XX..XXh'

Digital signature content

TCS_379

Response Message

Byte

SW

Length

Value

Description

2

'XXXXh'

Status Words (SW1, SW2)

— If the command is successful, the card returns '9000'.

— If the verification of the signature fails, the processing state returned is '6688'. The verification process is described

in Appendix 11.

— If no public key is selected, the processing state returned is '6A88'.

— If some expected data objects (as specified above) are missing, the processing state '6987' is returned. This can

happen if one of the required tag is missing.

— If no hash code is available to process the command (as a result of a previous PSO: Hash command), the processing

state returned is '6985'.

— If some data objects are incorrect, the processing state returned is '6988'. This can happen if one of the required

data objects length is incorrect.

— If the selected public key is considered corrupted, the processing state returned is '6400' or '6581'.

4. TACHOGRAPH CARDS STRUCTURE

This paragraph specifies the file structures of the Tachograph cards for storage of accessible data.

It does not specify card manufacturer dependant internal structures, such as e.g. file headers, nor storage and handling of
data elements needed for internal use only such as EuropeanPublicKey, CardPrivateKey, TDesSes-
sionKey or WorkshopCardPin.

The useful storage capacity of Tachograph cards shall be of 11 Kbytes minimum. Greater capacities may be used. In
such case, the structure of the card remains the same, but the number of records of some elements of the structure is
increased. This paragraph specifies minimum and maximum values of these record numbers.

28.5.2002

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 126 E/105

4.1. Driver card structure

TCS_400 After its personalisation, the driver card shall have the following permanent file structure and file access conditions:

File

File ID

Read

Update

Encrypted

Access conditions

MF
’!EF ICC
’!EF IC
%!DF Tachograph

’!EF Application_Identification
’!EF Card_Certificate
’!EF CA_Certificate
’!EF Identification
’!EF Card_Download
’!EF Driving_Licence_Info
’!EF Events_Data
’!EF Faults_Data
’!EF Driver_Activity_Data
’!EF Vehicles_Used
’!EF Places
’!EF Current_Usage
’!EF Control_Activity_Data
%!EF Specific_Conditions

3F00
0002
0005
0500
0501
C100
C108
0520
050E
0521
0502
0503
0504
0505
0506
0507
0508
0522

ALW
ALW

ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW

NEV
NEV

NEV
NEV
NEV
NEV
ALW
NEV
PRO SM / AUT
PRO SM / AUT
PRO SM / AUT
PRO SM / AUT
PRO SM / AUT
PRO SM / AUT
PRO SM / AUT
PRO SM / AUT

No
No

No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

TCS_401 All EFs structures shall be transparent.

TCS_402

Read with secure messaging shall be possible for all files under the DF Tachograph.

TCS_403

The driver card shall have the following data structure:

File/Data element

No of Records

’!clockStop
’!cardExtendedSerialNumber
’!cardApprovalNumber
’!cardPersonaliserID
’!embedderIcAssemblerId
%!icIdentifier

MF
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF ICC
(cid:6) %!CardIccIdentification
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF IC
(cid:6) %!CardChipIdentification
’!icSerialNumber
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
%!icManufacturingReferences
Æ(cid:5)DF Tachograph

’!typeOfTachographCardId
’!cardStructureVersion
’!noOfEventsPerType
’!noOfFaultsPerType
’!activityStructureLength
’!noOfCardVehicleRecords
%!noOfCardPlaceRecords

(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Application_Identification
(cid:6) %!DriverCardApplicationIdentification
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Card_Certificate
(cid:6) %!CardCertificate
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF CA_Certificate
(cid:6) %!MemberStateCertificate
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Identification
(cid:6) ’!CardIdentification
(cid:6) " ’!cardIssuingMemberState
(cid:6) " ’!cardNumber
(cid:6) " ’!cardIssuingAuthorityName
(cid:6) " ’!cardIssueDate
(cid:6) " ’!cardValidityBegin
(cid:6) " %!cardExpiryDate
(cid:6) %!DriverCardHolderIdentification
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)

’!cardHolderName
" ’!holderSurname
" %!holderFirstNames
’!cardHolderBirthDate
%!cardHolderPreferredLanguage

Size (bytes)

Min
11411
25
25
1
8
8
1
5
2
8
8
4
4
11378
10
10
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
194
194
194
194
143
65
1
16
36
4
4
4
78
72
36
36
4
2

Max
24959
25
25
1
8
8
1
5
2
8
8
4
4
24926
10
10
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
194
194
194
194
143
65
1
16
36
4
4
4
78
72
36
36
4
2

Default Values

{00}
{00..00}
{20..20}
{00}
{00..00}
{00 00}

{00..00}
{00..00}

{00}
{00 00}
{00}
{00}
{00 00}
{00 00}
{00}

{00..00}

{00..00}

{00}
{20..20}
{20..20}
{00..00}
{00..00}
{00..00}

{00, 20..20}
{00, 20..20}
{00..00}
{20 20}

C 126 E/106

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28.5.2002

’!vehicleRegistrationNation
%!vehicleRegistrationNumber

’!vehicleRegistrationNation
%!vehicleRegistrationNumber

’!activityPointerOldestDayRecord
’!activityPointerNewestRecord
%!activityDailyRecords

’!drivingLicenceIssuingAuthority
’!drivingLicenceIssuingNation
%!drivingLicenceNumber

%!cardFaultRecords

%!cardEventRecords

%!CardVehicleRecord

’!vehiclePointerNewestRecord
%!cardVehicleRecords

%!CardFaultRecord
’!faultType
’!faultBeginTime
’!faultEndTime
%!faultVehicleRegistration

%!CardEventRecord
’!eventType
’!eventBeginTime
’!eventEndTime
%!eventVehicleRegistration

(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Card_Download
(cid:6) %!LastCardDownload
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Driving_Licence_Info
(cid:6) %!CardDrivingLicenceInformation
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Events_Data
(cid:6) %!CardEventData
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Faults_Data
(cid:6) %!CardFaultData
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Driver_Activity_Data
(cid:6) %!CardDriverActivity
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Vehicles_Used
(cid:6) %!CardVehiclesUsed
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Places
(cid:6) %!CardPlaceDailyWorkPeriod
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Current_Usage
(cid:6) %!CardCurrentUse
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Control_Activity_Data
(cid:6) %!CardControlActivityDataRecord
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
Æ(cid:5)EF Specific_Conditions

’!controlType
’!controlTime
’!controlCardNumber
" ’!cardType
" ’!cardIssuingMemberState
" %!cardNumber
’!controlVehicleRegistration
" ’!vehicleRegistrationNation
" %!vehicleRegistrationNumber
’!controlDownloadPeriodBegin
%!controlDownloadPeriodEnd

%!PlaceRecord
’!entryTime
’!entryTypeDailyWorkPeriod
’!dailyWorkPeriodCountry
’!dailyWorkPeriodRegion
%!vehicleOdometerValue

’!vehicleRegistrationNation
%!vehicleRegistrationNumber

’!placePointerNewestRecord
%!placeRecords

’!sessionOpenTime
%!sessionOpenVehicle

’!vehicleOdometerBegin
’!vehicleOdometerEnd
’!vehicleFirstUse
’!vehicleLastUse
’!vehicleRegistration
" ’!vehicleRegistrationNation
" %!vehicleRegistrationNumber
%!vuDataBlockCounter

%!SpecificConditionRecord

’!entryTime
%!SpecificConditionType

4
4
53
53
36
1
16
864
864
144
24
1
4
4

1
14
576
576
288
24
1
4
4

1
14
5548
5548
2
2
5544
2606
2606
2
2604
31
3
3
4
4

1
14
2
841
841
1
840
10
4
1
1
1
3
19
19
4

1
14
46
46
1
4

1
1
16

1
14
4
4
280
5
4
1

4
4
53
53
36
1
16
1728
1728
288
24
1
4
4

1
14
1152
1152
576
24
1
4
4

1
14
13780
13780
2
2
13776
6202
6202
2
6200
31
3
3
4
4

1
14
2
1121
1121
1
1120
10
4
1
1
1
3
19
19
4

1
14
46
46
1
4

1
1
16

1
14
4
4
280
5
4
1

{00, 20..20}
{00}
{20..20}

{00}
{00..00}
{00..00}

{00}
{00, 20..20}

{00}
{00..00}
{00..00}

{00}
{00, 20..20}

{00 00}
{00 00}
{00..00}

{00 00}

{00..00}
{00..00}
{00..00}
{00..00}

{00}
{00, 20..20}
{00 00}

{00}

{00..00}
{00}
{00}
{00}
{00..00}

{00..00}

{00}
{00, 20..20}

{00}
{00..00}

{00}
{00}
{20..20}

{00}
{00, 20..20}
{00..00}
{00..00}

{00..00}
{00}

6
n1

2
n2

n6

n3

n4

56

28.5.2002

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 126 E/107

TCS_404

The following values, used to provide sizes in the table above, are the minimum and maximum record number values
the driver card data structure must use:

n1
n2
n3
n4
n6

NoOfEventsPerType

NoOfFaultsPerType

NoOfCardVehicleRecords

NoOfCardPlaceRecords

CardActivityLengthRange

4.2. Workshop card structure

Min

6

12

84

84

Max

12

24

200

112

5 544 bytes
(28 days * 93
activity changes)

13 776 bytes
(28 days * 240
activity changes)

TCS_405 After its personalisation, the workshop card shall have the following permanent file structure and file access conditions:

File

File ID

Read

Update

Encrypted

Access conditions

MF
’!EF ICC
’!EF IC
%!DF Tachograph

’!EF Application_Identification
’!EF Card_Certificate
’!EF CA_Certificate
’!EF Identification
’!EF Card_Download
’!EF Calibration
’!EF Sensor_Installation_Data
’!EF Events_Data
’!EF Faults_Data
’!EF Driver_Activity_Data
’!EF Vehicles_Used
’!EF Places
’!EF Current_Usage
’!EF Control_Activity_Data
%!EF Specific_Conditions

3F00
0002
0005
0500
0501
C100
C108
0520
0509
050A
050B
0502
0503
0504
0505
0506
0507
0508
0522

ALW
ALW

ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW
ALW

NEV
NEV

NEV
NEV
NEV
NEV
ALW
PRO SM / AUT
NEV
PRO SM / AUT
PRO SM / AUT
PRO SM / AUT
PRO SM / AUT
PRO SM / AUT
PRO SM / AUT
PRO SM / AUT
PRO SM / AUT

No
No

No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No

TCS_406 All EFs structures shall be transparent.

TCS_407

Read with secure messaging shall be possible for all files under the DF Tachograph.

TCS_408

The workshop card shall have the following data structure:

File/Data element

No of Records

’!clockStop
’!cardExtendedSerialNumber
’!cardApprovalNumber
’!cardPersonaliserID
’!embedderIcAssemblerId
%!icIdentifier

MF
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF ICC
(cid:6) %!CardIccIdentification
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF IC
(cid:6) %!CardChipIdentification
’!icSerialNumber
(cid:6)
%!icManufacturingReferences
(cid:6)
Æ(cid:5)DF Tachograph

(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Application_Identification
(cid:6) %!WorkshopCardApplicationIdentification
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)

’!typeOfTachographCardId
’!cardStructureVersion
’!noOfEventsPerType
’!noOfFaultsPerType
’!activityStructureLength
’!noOfCardVehicleRecords
’!noOfCardPlaceRecords
%!noOfCalibrationRecords

Size (Bytes)

Min
11088
25
25
1
8
8
1
5
2
8
8
4
4
11055
11
11
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
1

Max
29061
25
25
1
8
8
1
5
2
8
8
4
4
29028
11
11
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
1

Default Values

{00}
{00..00}
{20..20}
{00}
{00..00}
{00 00}

{00..00}
{00..00}

{00}
{00 00}
{00}
{00}
{00 00}
{00 00}
{00}
{00}

C 126 E/108

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

28.5.2002

%!WorkshopCardCalibrationRecord

’!workshopName
’!workshopAddress
’!cardHolderName
" ’!holderSurname
" %!holderFirstNames
%!cardHolderPreferredLanguage

(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Card_Certificate
(cid:6) %!CardCertificate
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF CA_Certificate
(cid:6) %!MemberStateCertificate
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Identification
(cid:6) ’!CardIdentification
(cid:6) " ’!cardIssuingMemberState
(cid:6) " ’!cardNumber
(cid:6) " ’!cardIssuingAuthorityName
(cid:6) " ’!cardIssueDate
(cid:6) " ’!cardValidityBegin
(cid:6) " %!cardExpiryDate
(cid:6) %!WorkshopCardHolderIdentification
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Card_Download
(cid:6) %!NoOfCalibrationsSinceDownload
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Calibration
(cid:6) %!WorkshopCardCalibrationData
’!calibrationTotalNumber
(cid:6)
’!calibrationPointerNewestRecord
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
%!calibrationRecords
(cid:6)
’!calibrationPurpose
(cid:6)
’!vehicleIdentificationNumber
(cid:6)
’!vehicleRegistration
(cid:6)
" ’!vehicleRegistrationNation
(cid:6)
" %!vehicleRegistrationNumber
(cid:6)
’!wVehicleCharacteristicConstant
(cid:6)
’!kConstantOfRecordingEquipment
(cid:6)
’!lTyreCircumference
(cid:6)
’!tyreSize
(cid:6)
’!authorisedSpeed
(cid:6)
’!oldOdometerValue
(cid:6)
’!newOdometerValue
(cid:6)
’!oldTimeValue
(cid:6)
’!newTimeValue
(cid:6)
’!nextCalibrationDate
(cid:6)
’!vuPartNumber
(cid:6)
’!vuSerialNumber
(cid:6)
%!sensorSerialNumber
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Sensor_Installation_Data
(cid:6) %!SensorInstallationSecData
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Events_Data
(cid:6) %!CardEventData
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Faults_Data
(cid:6) %!CardFaultData
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Driver_Activity_Data
(cid:6) %!CardDriverActivity
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Vehicles_Used
(cid:6) %!CardVehiclesUsed
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)

%!CardFaultRecord
’!faultType
’!faultBeginTime
’!faultEndTime
%!faultVehicleRegistration

%!CardEventRecord
’!eventType
’!eventBeginTime
’!eventEndTime
%!eventVehicleRegistration

’!activityPointerOldestDayRecord
’!activityPointerNewestRecord
%!activityDailyRecords

’!vehiclePointerNewestRecord
%!cardVehicleRecords

’!vehicleRegistrationNation
%!vehicleRegistrationNumber

’!vehicleRegistrationNation
%!vehicleRegistrationNumber

’!CardVehicleRecord
’!vehicleOdometerBegin

%!cardEventRecords

%!cardFaultRecords

194
194
194
194
211
65
1
16
36
4
4
4
146
36
36

36
36
2
2
2
9243
9243
2
1
9240
105
1
17

1
14
2
2
2
15
1
3
3
4
4
4
16
8
8
16
16
432
432
72
24
1
4
4

1
14
288
288
144
24
1
4
4

1
14
202
202
2
2
198
126
126
2
124
31
3

194
194
194
194
211
65
1
16
36
4
4
4
146
36
36

36
36
2
2
2
26778
26778
2
1
26775
105
1
17

1
14
2
2
2
15
1
3
3
4
4
4
16
8
8
16
16
432
432
72
24
1
4
4

1
14
288
288
144
24
1
4
4

1
14
496
496
2
2
492
250
250
2
248
31
3

{00..00}

{00..00}

{00}
{20..20}
{00, 20..20}
{00..00}
{00..00}
{00..00}

{00, 20..20}
{00, 20..20}

{00, 20..20}
{00, 20..20}
{20 20}

{00 00}

{00 00}
{00}

{00}
{20..20}

{00}
{00, 20..20}
{00 00}
{00 00}
{00 00}
{20..20}
{00}
{00..00}
{00..00}
{00..00}
{00..00}
{00..00}
{20..20}
{00..00}
{00..00}

{00..00}

{00}
{00..00}
{00..00}

{00}
{00, 20..20}

{00}
{00..00}
{00..00}

{00}
{00, 20..20}

{00 00}
{00 00}
{00..00}

{00 00}

{00..00}

n5

6
n1

2
n2

n6

n3

28.5.2002

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 126 E/109

’!placePointerNewestRecord
%!placeRecords

’!vehicleOdometerEnd
’!vehicleFirstUse
’!vehicleLastUse
’!vehicleRegistration
" ’!vehicleRegistrationNation
" %!vehicleRegistrationNumber
%!vuDataBlockCounter

%!PlaceRecord
’!entryTime
’!entryTypeDailyWorkPeriod
’!dailyWorkPeriodCountry
’!dailyWorkPeriodRegion
%!vehicleOdometerValue

(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Places
(cid:6) %!CardPlaceDailyWorkPeriod
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Current_Usage
(cid:6) %!CardCurrentUse
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Control_Activity_Data
(cid:6) %!CardControlActivityDataRecord
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
Æ(cid:5)EF Specific_Conditions

’!controlType
’!controlTime
’!controlCardNumber
" ’!cardType
" ’!cardIssuingMemberState
" %!cardNumber
’!controlVehicleRegistration
" ’!vehicleRegistrationNation
" %!vehicleRegistrationNumber
’!controlDownloadPeriodBegin
%!controlDownloadPeriodEnd

’!vehicleRegistrationNation
%!vehicleRegistrationNumber

’!sessionOpenTime
%!sessionOpenVehicle

%!SpecificConditionRecord

’!entryTime
%!SpecificConditionType

3
4
4

1
14
2
61
61
1
60
10
4
1
1
1
3
19
19
4

1
14
46
46
1
4

1
1
16

1
14
4
4
10
5
4
1

3
4
4

1
14
2
81
81
1
80
10
4
1
1
1
3
19
19
4

1
14
46
46
1
4

1
1
16

1
14
4
4
10
5
4
1

{00..00}
{00..00}
{00..00}

{00}
{00, 20..20}
{00 00}

{00}

{00..00}
{00}
{00}
{00}
{00..00}

{00..00}

{00}
{00, 20..20}

{00}
{00..00}

{00}
{00}
{20..20}

{00}
{00, 20..20}
{00..00}
{00..00}

{00..00}
{00}

n4

2

TCS_409

The following values, used to provide sizes in the table above, are the minimum and maximum record number values
the workshop card data structure must use:

n1
n2
n3
n4
n5
n6

NoOfEventsPerType

NoOfFaultsPerType

NoOfCardVehicleRecords

NoOfCardPlaceRecords

NoOfCalibrationRecords

CardActivityLengthRange

4.3. Control card structure

Min

3

6

4

6

88

Max

3

6

8

8

255

198 bytes
(1 day * 93 activity
changes)

492 bytes
(1 day * 240
activity changes)

TCS_410 After its personalisation, the control card shall have the following permanent file structure and file access conditions:

File

File ID

Read

Update

Encrypted

Access conditions

MF
’!EF ICC
’!EF IC
%!DF Tachograph

’!EF Application_Identification
’!EF Card_Certificate
’!EF CA_Certificate
’!EF Identification
%!EF Controller_Activity_Data

3F00
0002
0005
0500
0501
C100
C108
0520
050C

ALW
ALW

ALW
ALW
ALW
AUT
ALW

NEV
NEV

NEV
NEV
NEV
NEV
PRO SM / AUT

No
No

No
No
No
No
No

C 126 E/110

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

28.5.2002

TCS_411 All EFs structures shall be transparent.

TCS_412

Read with secure messaging shall be possible for files under the DF Tachograph.

TCS_413

The control card shall have the following data structure:

File/Data element

No of Records

’!clockStop
’!cardExtendedSerialNumber
’!cardApprovalNumber
’!cardPersonaliserID
’!embedderIcAssemblerId
%!icIdentifier

MF
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF ICC
(cid:6) %!CardIccIdentification
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF IC
(cid:6) %!CardChipIdentification
’!icSerialNumber
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
%!icManufacturingReferences
Æ(cid:5)DF Tachograph

’!typeOfTachographCardId
’!cardStructureVersion
%!noOfControlActivityRecords

(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Application_Identification
(cid:6) %!ControlCardApplicationIdentification
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Card_Certificate
(cid:6) %!CardCertificate
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF CA_Certificate
(cid:6) %!MemberStateCertificate
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Identification
(cid:6) ’!CardIdentification
(cid:6) " ’!cardIssuingMemberState
(cid:6) " ’!cardNumber
(cid:6) " ’!cardIssuingAuthorityName
(cid:6) " ’!cardIssueDate
(cid:6) " ’!cardValidityBegin
(cid:6) " %!cardExpiryDate
(cid:6) %!ControlCardHolderIdentification
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
Æ(cid:5)EF Controller_Activity_Data

’!controlBodyName
’!controlBodyAddress
’!cardHolderName
" ’!holderSurname
" %!holderFirstNames
%!cardHolderPreferredLanguage

%!ControlCardControlActivityData
’!controlPointerNewestRecord
%!controlActivityRecords

%!controlActivityRecord

’!controlType
’!controlTime
’!controlledCardNumber
" ’!cardType
" ’!cardIssuingMemberState
" %!cardNumber
’!controlledVehicleRegistration
" ’!vehicleRegistrationNation
" %!vehicleRegistrationNumber
’!controlDownloadPeriodBegin
%!controlDownloadPeriodEnd

n7

Size (Bytes)

Min
11219
25
25
1
8
8
1
5
2
8
8
4
4
11186
5
5
1
2
2
194
194
194
194
211
65
1
16
36
4
4
4
146
36
36

36
36
2
10582
10582
2
10580
46
1
4

1
1
16

1
14
4
4

Max
24559
25
25
1
8
8
1
5
2
8
8
4
4
24526
5
5
1
2
2
194
194
194
194
211
65
1
16
36
4
4
4
146
36
36

36
36
2
23922
23922
2
23920
46
1
4

1
1
16

1
14
4
4

Default Values

{00}
{00..00}
{20..20}
{00}
{00..00}
{00 00}

{00..00}
{00..00}

{00}
{00 00}
{00 00}

{00..00}

{00..00}

{00}
{20..20}
{00, 20..20}
{00..00}
{00..00}
{00..00}

{00, 20..20}
{00, 20..20}

{00, 20..20}
{00, 20..20}
{20 20}

{00 00}

{00}
{00..00}

{00}
{00}
{20..20}

{00}
{00, 20..20}
{00..00}
{00..00}

TCS_414

The following values, used to provide sizes in the table above, are the minimum and maximum record number values
the control card data structure must use:

n7

NoOfControlActivityRecords

Min

230

Max

520

28.5.2002

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 126 E/111

4.4. Company card structure

TCS_415 After its personalisation, the company card shall have the following permanent file structure and file access conditions:

File

File ID

Read

Update

Encrypted

Access conditions

MF
’!EF ICC
’!EF IC
%!DF Tachograph

’!EF Application_Identification
’!EF Card_Certificate
’!EF CA_Certificate
’!EF Identification
%!EF Company_Activity_Data

3F00
0002
0005
0500
0501
C100
C108
0520
050D

ALW
ALW

ALW
ALW
ALW
AUT
ALW

NEV
NEV

NEV
NEV
NEV
NEV
PRO SM / AUT

No
No

No
No
No
No
No

TCS_416 All EFs structures shall be transparent.

TCS_417

Read with secure messaging shall be possible for all files under the DF Tachograph.

TCS_418

The company card shall have the following data structure:

File/Data element

No of Records

’!clockStop
’!cardExtendedSerialNumber
’!cardApprovalNumber
’!cardPersonaliserID
’!embedderIcAssemblerId
%!icIdentifier

MF
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF ICC
(cid:6) %!CardIccIdentification
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF IC
(cid:6) %!CardChipIdentification
’!icSerialNumber
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
%!icManufacturingReferences
Æ(cid:5)DF Tachograph

’!typeOfTachographCardId
’!cardStructureVersion
%!noOfCompanyActivityRecords

(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Application_Identification
(cid:6) %!CompanyCardApplicationIdentification
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Card_Certificate
(cid:6) %!CardCertificate
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF CA_Certificate
(cid:6) %!MemberStateCertificate
(cid:4)(cid:5)EF Identification
(cid:6) ’!CardIdentification
(cid:6) " ’!cardIssuingMemberState
(cid:6) " ’!cardNumber
(cid:6) " ’!cardIssuingAuthorityName
(cid:6) " ’!cardIssueDate
(cid:6) " ’!cardValidityBegin
(cid:6) " %!cardExpiryDate
(cid:6) %!CompanyCardHolderIdentification
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
(cid:6)
Æ(cid:5)EF Company_Activity_Data
%!CompanyActivityData

’!companyName
’!companyAddress
%!cardHolderPreferredLanguage

’!companyPointerNewestRecord
%!companyActivityRecords

%!companyActivityRecord
’!companyActivityType
’!companyActivityTime
’!cardNumberInformation
" ’!cardType
" ’!cardIssuingMemberState
" %!cardNumber
’!vehicleRegistrationInformation
" ’!vehicleRegistrationNation
" %!vehicleRegistrationNumber

n8

Size (bytes)

Min
11147
25
25
1
8
8
1
5
2
8
8
4
4
11114
5
5
1
2
2
194
194
194
194
139
65
1
16
36
4
4
4
74
36
36
2
10582
10582
2
10580
46
1
4

1
1
16

1
14

Max
24487
25
25
1
8
8
1
5
2
8
8
4
4
24454
5
5
1
2
2
194
194
194
194
139
65
1
16
36
4
4
4
74
36
36
2
23922
23922
2
23920
46
1
4

1
1
16

1
14

Default Values

{00}
{00..00}
{20..20}
{00}
{00..00}
{00 00}

{00..00}
{00..00}

{00}
{00 00}
{00 00}

{00..00}

{00..00}

{00}
{20..20}
{00, 20..20}
{00..00}
{00..00}
{00..00}

{00, 20..20}
{00, 20..20}
{20 20}

{00 00}

{00}
{00..00}

{00}
{00}
{20..20}

{00}
{00, 20..20}

C 126 E/112

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

28.5.2002

’!cardNumberInformation
" ’!cardType
" ’!cardIssuingMemberState
" %!cardNumber
’!downloadPeriodBegin
%!downloadPeriodEnd

1
1
16
4
4

1
1
16
4
4

{00}
{00}
{20..20}
{00..00}
{00..00}

TCS_419

The following values, used to provide sizes in the table above, are the minimum and maximum record number values
the company card data structure must use:

n8

NoOfCompanyActivityRecords

Min

230

Max

520

28.5.2002

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 126 E/113

PIC_001

The recording equipment may use the following pictograms and pictograms combinations:

Appendix 3

PICTOGRAMS

1. BASIC PICTOGRAMS

People

Company
Controller
Driver
Workshop/test station
Manufacturer

Actions

Control
Driver
Inspection/calibration

Modes of operation

Company mode
Control mode
Operational mode
Calibration mode

Duration

Current availability period
Continuous driving time
Current rest period
Current work period
Cumulative break time

Functions

Displaying
Downloading

Printing

Activities

Available
Driving
Rest
Work
Break
Unknown

Equipment

Driver slot
Co-driver slot
Card
Clock
Display
External storage
Power supply
Printer/printout
Sensor
Tyre size
Vehicle/vehicle unit

Specific conditions

Out of scope
Ferry/train crossing

Miscellaneous

Events
Faults
Start of daily work period
End of daily work period
Location
Manual entry of driver activities
Security
Speed
Time
Total/summary

C 126 E/114

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

28.5.2002

Qualifiers

Daily
Weekly
Two weeks
From or to

2. PICTOGRAM COMBINATIONS

Miscellaneous

Control place
Location start of daily work period
Location end of daily work period
From time
To time
From vehicle
Out of scope begin
Out of scope end

Cards

Driver card
Company card
Control card
Workshop card
No card

– – –

Driving

Crew driving
Driving time for one week
Driving time for two weeks

Printouts

Driver activities from card daily printout
Driver activities from VU daily printout
Events and faults from card printout
Events and faults from VU printout
Technical data printout
Over speeding printout

Events

Insertion of a non valid card
Card conflict
Time overlap
Driving without an appropriate card
Card insertion while driving
Last card session not correctly closed
Over speeding
Power supply interruption
Motion data error
Security breach
Time adjustment (by workshop)
Over speeding control

28.5.2002

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 126 E/115

Faults

Card fault (driver slot)
Card fault (co-driver slot)
Display fault
Downloading fault
Printer fault
Sensor fault
VU internal fault

Manual entries procedure

Still same daily work period?
End of previous work period?
Confirm or enter location of end of work period
Enter start time
Enter location of start of work period.

Note: Additional pictogram combinations to form printout block or record identifiers are defined in Appendix 4.

C 126 E/116

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

28.5.2002

Appendix 4

PRINTOUTS

1. GENERALITIES

Each printout is built up by chaining various data blocks, possibly identified with a block identifier.

A data block contains one or more records, possibly identified with a record identifier.

PRT_001 When a block identifier immediately precedes a record identifier, the record identifier is not printed.

PRT_002

In the case where a data item is unknown, or must not be printed for data access rights reasons, spaces are printed
instead.

PRT_003

If the content of a complete line is unknown, or need not to be printed, then the complete line is omitted.

PRT_004 Numerical data fields are printed right aligned, with a space separator for thousands and millions, and without leading

zeros.

PRT_005

String data fields are printed left aligned and filled up with spaces to data item length, or truncated to data item length
when needed (names and addresses).

2. DATA BLOCKS SPECIFICATION

In this chapter the following format notation conventions have been used:

— Characters printed in bold denote plain text to be printed (printing remains in normal characters),

— Normal characters denote variables (pictograms or data) to be replaced by their values for printing,

— Variable names have been padded with underscores to show the data item length available for the variable,

— Dates are specified with a “dd/mm/yyyy” (day, month, year) format. A “dd.mm.yyyy” format may also be used,

— The term “card identification” denotes the composition of: the type of card through a card pictograms combination,
the card issuing Member State code, a forward slash character and the card number with the replacement index and
the renewal index separated with a space:

PRT_006

Printouts shall use the following data blocks and/or data records,
formats:

in accordance with the following meanings and

Block or record number
Meaning

1

Date and time at which the document is printed

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2

Type of printout
Block identifier
Printout pictogram combination (see App. 3), Speed limiting
device setting (Over speeding printout only)

3

Card holder identification

Block identifier. P = people pictogram
Card holder surname
Card holder first name(s) (if any)
Card identification
Card expiry date (if any)
In the case where the card is a non-personal card, and holds
the company or workshop or
no card holder surname,
control body name shall be printed instead.

4

Vehicle identification

Block identifier
(VIN)
Registering Member State and VRN

5

VU identification

Block identifier
VU manufacturer's name
VU part number

6

Last calibration of the recording equipment

Block identifier
Workshop name
Workshop card identification
Date of the calibration

7

Last control (by a control officer)

Block identifier
Controller's card identification
Control date, time and type
Type of the control: Up to four pictograms. The type of
control can be (a combination) of:

: Card downloading,

: VU downloading,

: printing,

:

Displaying

8

Driver activities stored on a card in order of occurrence

Block identifier
Enquiry date (calendar day subject of the printout) + Daily
card presence counter

8.1

Period during which the card was not inserted

Record identifier (start of period)

8.1a
8.1b Unknown period. Start and end time, duration
8.1c Activity manually entered

Activity pictogram, start and end time (included), duration,
rest periods of at least one hour are tagged with a star.

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8.2

Card insertion in slot S

Record identifier; S = Slot pictogram
Vehicle registering Member State and VRN
Vehicle odometer at card insertion

8.3

Activity (while card was inserted)

Activity pictogram, start and end time (included), duration,
crew status (crew pictogram if CREW, blanks if SINGLE),
rest periods of at least one hour are tagged with a star.

8.3a

Specific condition. Time of entry, specific condition pictogram
(or pictogram combination).

8.4

Card withdrawal

Vehicle odometer and distance travelled since last insertion
for which odometer is known

9

Driver activities stored in a VU
per slot in chronological order

Block identifier
Enquiry date (calendar day subject of the printout)
Vehicle odometer at 00:00 and 24:00

10

Activities carried in slot S

Block identifier

10.1

Period where no card is inserted in slot S

Record identifier
No Card inserted
Vehicle odometer at beginning of period

10.2

Card insertion

Card insertion Record identifier
Driver's name
Driver's first name
Driver's Card identification
Driver's card expiry date
Registering MS and VRN of previous vehicle used

Date and time of card withdrawal from previous vehicle
Blank line
Vehicle odometer at card insertion, Manual entry of driver
activities flag (M if yes, Blank if No)

10.3 Activity

Activity pictogram, start and end time (included), duration,
crew Status (crew pictogram if CREW, blanks if SINGLE),
rests of at least one hour are tagged with a star.

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10.3a Specific condition. Time of entry, specific condition pictogram

(or pictogram combination).

10.4

Card withdrawal or End of “No Card” period

Vehicle odometer at card withdrawal or at end of “no card”
period and distance travelled since insertion, or
since
beginning of the “No Card” period.

11

Daily summary

Block identifier

11.1 VU summary of periods without card in driver slot

Block identifier

11.2 VU summary of periods without card in co-driver slot

Block identifier

11.3 VU daily summary per driver

Record identifier
Driver's surname
Driver's first name(s)
Driver's card identification

11.4

Entry of place where a daily work period begins and/or ends

pi = location begin/end pictogram, time, country, region,
Odometer

11.5 Activity totals (from a card)

Total driving duration, distance travelled
Total working and availability duration
Total resting and unknown duration
Total duration of crew activities

11.6 Activity totals (periods without card driver slot)

Total driving duration, distance travelled
Total working and availability duration
Total resting duration

11.7 Activity totals (periods without card co-driver slot)

Total working and availability duration
Total resting duration

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11.8 Activity totals (per driver both slots included)

Total driving duration, distance travelled
Total driving duration, distance travelled
Total resting duration
Total duration of crew activities
When a daily printout is required for the current day, daily
summary information is computed with available data at the
time of the printout.

12

Events and/or faults stored on a card

12.1

Block identifier last 5 “Events and Faults” from a card

12.2

Block identifier all recorded “Events” on a card

12.3

Block identifier all recorded “Faults” on a card

12.4

Event and/or Fault record

Record identifier
Event/fault pictogram, record purpose, date time of start,

Additional event/fault code (if any), duration

Registering Member State & VRN of vehicle in which the
event or fault occurred

13

Events and/or faults stored or on-going in a VU

13.1

Block identifier last 5 “Events and Faults” from VU

13.2

Block identifier all recorded or on-going “Events” in a VU

13.3

Block identifier all recorded or on-going “Faults” in a VU

13.4

Event and/or fault record

Record identifier
Event/fault pictogram, record purpose, date time of start,
Additional event/fault code (if any), No of similar events this
day, duration
Identification of the cards inserted at start or end of the
event or fault (up to 4 lines without repeating twice the
same card numbers)

Case where no card was inserted
The record purpose (p) is a numerical code explaining why
the event or fault was recorded, coded in accordance with
the data element EventFaultRecordPurpose.

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14

VU Identification

Block identifier
VU manufacturer name
VU manufacturer address
VU part number
VU approval number
VU serial number
VU year of manufacture
VU software version and installation date

15

Sensor identification

Block identifier
Sensor serial number
Sensor approval number
Sensor first installation date

16

Calibration data

Block identifier

16.1

Calibration record

Record identifier
Workshop having performed the calibration
Workshop address
Workshop card identification
Workshop card expiry date
Blank line
Calibration date + calibration purpose
VIN
Registering Member State & VRN
Characteristic coefficient of vehicle
Constant of the recording equipment
Effective circumference of wheel tyres
Size of tyres mounted
Speed limiting device setting
Old and new odometer values
The calibration purpose (p) is a numerical code explaining
why these calibration parameters were recorded, coded in
element Calibration-
accordance with the data
Purpose.

17

Time adjustment

Block identifier

17.1

Time adjustment record

Record identifier
Old date and time
New date and time
Workshop having performed the time adjustment
Workshop address
Workshop card identification
Workshop card expiry date

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18

Most recent event and Fault recorded in the VU

Block identifier
Most recent event date time
Most recent fault date time

19

Over speeding control information

Block identifier
Date and time of last OVER SPEEDING CONTROL
Date/time of
speeding events since

first over

speeding and number of over

20

Over speeding record

20.1

Block identifier “First over speeding after the last calibration”

20.2

Block identifier “The 5 most serious over the last 365 days”

20.3

Block identifier “The most serious for each of the last 10
days of occurrence”

20.4 Record identifier

Date time and duration
Max and average speeds, No of similar events this day

Driver's surname
Driver's first name(s)
Driver card identification

20.5

If no over speeding record exists in a block

21

Hand-written information

Block identifier
Control Place
21.1
Controller's signature
21.2
From time
21.3
21.4
To time
21.5 Driver's signature

“Hand-written information” Insert enough blank lines above
a hand-written item, to be able to actually write the required
information or to put a signature.

3. PRINTOUT SPECIFICATIONS

In this chapter the following notation conventions have been used:

Print block or record number N

Print block or record number N repeated as many times as necessary

Print blocks or records X and/or Y as needed, and repeating as many times as
necessary.

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3.1 Driver Activities from Card Daily Printout

PRT_007

The driver activities from card daily printout shall be in accordance with the following format:

Date and time at which the document is printed

Type of printout

Controller identification (if a control card is inserted in the VU)

Driver identification (from card subject of the printout)

Vehicle identification (vehicle from which printout is taken)

VU identification (VU from which printout is taken)

Last calibration of this VU

Last control the inspected driver has been subject to

Driver activities delimiter

Activities of the driver in order of occurrence

Daily summary delimiter

Places entered in chronological order

Activity totals

Events or faults from card delimiter

Event/Fault records
(Last 5 events or faults stored in the card)

Events or faults from VU delimiter

Event/Fault records
(Last 5 events or faults stored or on-going in the VU)

Control place

Controller's signature

Driver's signature

3.2 Driver Activities from VU Daily Printout

PRT_008

The driver activities from VU daily printout shall be in accordance with the following format:

Date and time at which the document is printed

Type of printout

Card holder identification (for all cards inserted in VU)

Vehicle identification (vehicle from which printout is taken)

VU identification (VU from which printout is taken)

Last calibration of this VU

Last control on this recording equipment

Driver activities delimiter

Driver slot delimiter (slot 1)

Activities in chronological order (driver slot)

Co-driver slot delimiter (slot 2)

Activities in chronological order (co-driver slot)

Daily summary delimiter

Summary of periods without card in driver slot

Places entered in chronological order

Activity totals

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Summary of periods without card in co-driver slot

Places entered in chronological order

Activity totals

Summary of activities for a driver both slots included

Places entered by this driver in chronological order

Activity totals for this driver

Events faults delimiter

Event/Fault records (Last 5 events or faults stored or on-going in the VU)

Control place

Controller's signature

From time

To time

(space available for a driver without a card to indicate which periods
are relevant to himself)

Driver's signature

3.3 Events and Faults from Card Printout

PRT_009

The events and faults from card printout shall be in accordance with the following format:

Date and time at which the document is printed

Type of printout

Controller identification (if a control card is inserted in the VU)

Driver identification (from card subject of the printout)

Vehicle identification (vehicle from which printout is taken)

Events delimiter

Event records (all events stored on the card)

Faults delimiter

Fault records (all faults stored on the card)

Control place

Controller's signature

Driver's signature

3.4 Events and Faults from VU Printout

PRT_010

The events and faults from VU printout shall be in accordance with the following format:

Date and time at which the document is printed

Type of printout

Card holder identification (for all cards inserted in VU)

Vehicle identification (vehicle from which printout is taken)

Events delimiter

Event records
(All Events stored or on-going in the VU)

Faults delimiter

Fault records
(All Faults stored or on-going in the VU)

Control place

Controller's signature

Driver's signature

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3.5 Technical data Printout

PRT_011

The technical data printout shall be in accordance with the following format:

Date and time at which the document is printed

Type of printout

Card holder identification (for all cards inserted in VU)

Vehicle identification (vehicle from which printout is taken)

VU identification

Sensor identification

Calibration data delimiter

Calibration records (all records available in chronological order)

Time adjustment delimiter

Time adjustment records (all records available from time adjustment and from
calibration data records)

Most recent event and Fault recorded in the VU

3.6 Over speeding Printout

PRT_012

The over speeding printout shall be in accordance with the following format:

Date and time at which the document is printed

Type of printout

Card holder identification (for all cards inserted in VU)

Vehicle identification (vehicle from which printout is taken)

Over speeding control information

Over speeding data identifier

First over speeding after the last calibration

Over speeding data identifier

The 5 most serious over speeding events over the last 365 days

Over speeding data identifier

The most serious over speeding for each of the last 10 days of occurrence

Control place

Controller's signature

Driver's signature

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Appendix 5

DISPLAY

In this appendix the following format notation conventions have been used:

— characters printed in bold denote plain text to be displayed (display remains in normal character),

— normal characters denote variables (pictograms or data) to be replaced by their values for displaying:

dd mm yyyy: day, month, year,

hh:

mm:

D:

EF:

O:

hours,

minutes,

duration pictogram,

event or fault pictograms combination,

mode of operation pictogram.

DIS_001

The recording equipment shall display data using the following formats:

Data

Default display

Local time

Mode of operation

Format

hh:mm

O

Information related to the driver

Dhhhmm

hhhmm

Information related to the co-driver

Dhhhmm

Out of scope condition opened

Warning display

Exceeding continuous driving time

hhhmm

hhhmm

Event or fault

Other displays

UTC date

time

Driver's continuous driving time and cumulative break
time

EF

UTC dd/mm/yyyy
or
UTC dd.mm.yyyy

hh:mm

hhhmm

hhhmm

Co-driver's continuous driving time and cumulative break
time

hhhmm

hhhmm

Driver's cumulated driving time for the previous and the
current week

Co-driver's cumulated driving time for the previous and
the current week

hhhhmm

hhhhmm

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Appendix 6

EXTERNAL INTERFACES

1. HARDWARE

1.1. Connector

INT_001

The downloading/calibration connector shall be a 6 pin connector, accessible on the front panel without the need to
disconnect any part of the recording equipment, and shall comply with the following drawing (all dimensions in
millimetres):

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The following diagram shows a typical 6 pin mating plug:

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1.2. Contact allocation

INT_002

Contacts shall be allocated in accordance with the following table:

Pin

1

2

3

4

5

6

Description

Remark

Battery minus

Data communication

RxD — Downloading

Input/output signal

Permanent power output

Connected to the battery minus of the vehicle

K-line (ISO 14230-1)

Data input to recording equipment

Calibration

The voltage range is specified to be that of the
vehicle power minus 3V to allow for the voltage
drop across the protective circuitry
Output 40 mA

TxD — Downloading

Data output from recording equipment

1.3. Block diagram

INT_003

The block diagram shall comply with the following:

2. DOWNLOADING INTERFACE

INT_004

The downloading interface shall comply to RS232 specifications.

INT_005

The downloading interface shall use one start bit, 8 data bits LSB first, one even parity bit and 1 stop bit.

Data byte organisation

Start bit:

Data bits:

Parity bit:

Stop bit:

one bit with logic level 0

transmitted with LSB first

even parity

one bit with logic level 1

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When numerical data composed by more than one byte are transmitted, the most significant byte is transmitted first and
the least significant byte last.

INT_006

Transmission baud rates shall be adjustable from 9 600 bps to 115 200 bps. Transmission shall be achieved at the
highest possible transmission speed, the initial baud rate after a start of communication being set at 9 600 bps.

3. CALIBRATION INTERFACE

INT_007

The data communication shall comply to ISO 14230-1 Road vehicles — Diagnostic systems — Keyword protocol 2000
— Part 1: Physical layer, First edition: 1999.

INT_008

The input/output signal shall comply with the following electrical specification:

Parameter

Minimum

Typical

Maximum

Remark

Ulow (in)

Uhigh (in)

Frequency

Ulow (in)

Uhigh (out)

4 V

4 V

1,0 V

4 kHz

1,0 V

I = 750 µA

I = 200 µA

I = 1 mA

I = 1 mA

INT_009

The input/output signal shall comply with the following timing diagrams:

Sensor signal (out)

Test signal (in)

UTC clock signal (out)

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Appendix 7

DATA DOWNLOADING PROTOCOLS

1. INTRODUCTION

This appendix specifies the procedures to follow in order to perform the different types of data download to an External
Storage Medium, together with the protocols that must be implemented to assure the correct data transfer and the full
compatibility of the downloaded data format to allow any controller to inspect these data and be able to control their
authenticity and their integrity before analysing them.

1.1 Scope

Data may be downloaded to an ESM:

— from a Vehicle Unit by an Intelligent Dedicated Equipment (IDE) connected to the VU,

— from a tachograph card by an IDE fitted with a card interface device (IFD),

— from a tachograph card via a vehicle unit by an IDE connected to the VU.

To give the possibility to verify the authenticity and integrity of downloaded data stored on an ESM, data is downloaded
with a signature appended in accordance with Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms. The source equipment (VU
or card) identification and its security certificates (Member State and equipment) are also downloaded. The verifier of the
data must possess independently a trusted European public key.

DDP_001 Data downloaded during one download session must be stored in the ESM within one file.

1.2 Acronyms and notations

The following acronyms are used in this appendix:

AID

ATR

CS

DF

DS_

EF

ESM

FID

FMT

ICC

IDE

IFD

KWP

LEN

PPS

PSO

SID

SRC

TGT

TLV

TREP

TRTP

VU

Application Identifier

Answer To Reset

Checksum byte

Dedicated File

Diagnostic Session

Elementary File

External Storage Medium

File Identifier (File ID)

Format Byte (first byte of message header)

Integrated Circuit Card

Intelligent Dedicated Equipment: The equipment used to perform data downloading to the ESM (e.g. Personal
Computer)

Interface Device

Keyword Protocol 2000

Length Byte (last byte of message header)

Protocol Parameter Selection

Perform Security Operation

Service Identifier

Source byte

Target Byte

Tag Length Value

Transfer Response Parameter

Transfer Request Parameter

Vehicle Unit

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2. VU DATA DOWNLOADING

2.1. Download procedure

In order to carry on a VU data download, the operator must perform the following operations:

— Insert his tachograph card inside a card slot of the VU (1);

— Connect the IDE to the VU download connector;

— Establish the connection between the IDE and the VU;

— Select on the IDE the data to download and send the request to the VU;

— Close the download session.

2.2. Data download protocol

The protocol is structured on a master-slave basis, with the IDE playing the master role and the VU playing the slave
role.

The message structure, types and flow are principally based on the Keyword Protocol 2000 (KWP) (ISO 14230-2 Road
vehicles — Diagnostic systems — Keyword protocol 2000 — Part 2: Data link layer).

The application layer is principally based on the current draft to date of ISO 14229-1 (Road vehicles — Diagnostic
systems — Part 1: Diagnostic services, version 6 of 22 February 2001).

2.2.1. Message structure

DDP_002 All the messages exchanged between the IDE and the VU are formatted with a structure consisting of three parts:

— Header composed by a Format byte (FMT), a Target byte (TGT), a Source byte (SRC) and possibly a Length byte

(LEN),

— Data field composed by a Service Identifier byte (SID) and a variable number of data bytes, which can include an

optional diagnostic session byte (DS_) or an optional transfer parameter byte (TRTP or TREP).

— Checksum composed by a Checksum byte (CS).

Header

Data field

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

SID

DATA

. . .

. . .

. . .

4 bytes

Max 225 bytes

Checksum

CS

1 byte

The TGT and SRC byte represent the physical address of the recipient and originator of the message. Values are F0 Hex
for the IDE and EE Hex for the VU.

The LEN byte is the length of the Data field part.

The Checksum byte is the 8 bit sum series modulo 256 of all the bytes of the message excluding the CS itself.

FMT, SID, DS_, TRTP and TREP bytes are defined later in this document.

(1) The card inserted will trigger the appropriate access rights to the downloading function and to the data.

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DDP_003

In the case where the data to be carried by the message is longer than the space available in the data field part, the
message is actually sent in several sub messages. Each sub message bears a header, the same SID, TREP and a 2-byte sub
message counter indicating the sub message number within the total message. To enable error checking and abort the
IDE acknowledges every sub message. The IDE can accept the sub message, ask for it to be re-transmitted, request the
VU to start again or abort the transmission.

DDP_004

If the last sub message contains exactly 255 bytes in the data field, a final sub message with an empty (except SID TREP
and sub message counter) data field must be appended to show the end of the message.

Example:

Header

4 Bytes

SID

TREP

Message

Longer than 255 Bytes

Will be transmitted as:

Header

4 Bytes

Header

4 Bytes

. . .

Header

4 Bytes

or as:

Header

4 Bytes

Header

4 Bytes

. . .

Header

4 Bytes

SID

TREP

00

255 Bytes

SID

TREP

00

255 Bytes

01

01

Sub message 1

Sub message 2

SID

TREP

xx

yy

Sub message n

CS

Less than 255 Bytes

SID

TREP

00

255 Bytes

SID

TREP

00

255 Bytes

01

02

Sub message 1

Sub message 2

SID

TREP

xx

yy

Sub message n

255 Bytes

Header

4 Bytes

SID

4 bytes

TREP

xx

yy+1

CS

CS

CS

CS

CS

CS

CS

2.2.2. Message types

The communication protocol for data download between the VU and the IDE requires the exchange of 8 different
message types.

The following table summarises these messages.

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Message Structure

Max 4 Bytes
Header

Max 255 Bytes
Data

1 Byte
CheckSum

IDE ->

<- VU

FMT TGT SRC LEN SID DS_ / TRTP

DATA

Start Communication Request

Positive Response Start Communication

Start Diagnostic Session Request

Positive Response Start Diagnostic

Link Control Service

Verify Baud Rate (stage 1)

9 600 Bd

19 200 Bd

38 400 Bd

57 600 Bd

115 200 Bd

Positive Response Verify Baud Rate

Transition Baud Rate (stage 2)

Request Upload

81

80

80

80

80

80

80

80

80

80

80

80

EE

F0

EE

F0

EE

EE

EE

EE

EE

F0

EE

EE

F0

EE

F0

EE

F0

F0

F0

F0

F0

EE

F0

F0

81

03 C1

02

02

10

50

04

04

04

04

04

87

87

87

87

87

02 C7

03

87

0A 35

Positive Response Request Upload

80

F0

EE

03

75

8F,EA

81

81

01,01,01

01,01,02

01,01,03

01,01,04

01,01,05

01

02,03

00,00,00,00,
00,FF,FF,
FF,FF

00,FF

Date

F0

F0

F0

F0

F0

F0

EE

F0

EE

F0

EE

Transfer Data Request

Overview

Activities

Events & Faults

Detailed Speed

Technical Data

Card download

Request Transfer Exit

Positive Response Transfer Data

Positive Response Request Transfer Exit

Stop Communication Request

Positive Response Stop Communication

Acknowledge sub message

Negative responses

General reject

Service not supported

Sub function not supported

80

80

80

80

80

80

80

80

80

80

80

80

80

80

80

EE

EE

EE

EE

EE

EE

F0

EE

F0

EE

F0

EE

F0

F0

F0

Incorrect Message Length

80 F0

Conditions not correct or Request sequence error

Request out of range

Upload not accepted

Response pending

Data not available

80

80

80

80

80

F0

F0

F0

F0

F0

02

06

02

02

02

02

36

36

36

36

36

36

01

02

03

04

05

06

Len 76

TREP

Data

01

01

01

37

77

82

01 C2

F0 Len 83

Data

EE

EE

EE

EE

EE

EE

EE

EE

EE

03

03

03

03

03

03

03

03

03

7F

7F

7F

7F

7F

7F

7F

7F

7F

Sid Req

Sid Req

Sid Req

Sid Req

Sid Req

Sid Req

Sid Req

Sid Req

Sid Req

10

11

12

13

22

31

50

78

FA

CS

E0

9B

F1

31

EC

ED

ED

EF

F0

28

ED

99

D5

97

CS

99

9A

9B

9C

CS

96

D6

E1

21

CS

CS

CS

CS

CS

CS

CS

CS

CS

CS

Notes:
— Sid Req = the Sid of the corresponding request.
— TREP = the TRTP of the corresponding request.
— Dark cells denotes that nothing is transmitted.
— The term upload (as seen from the IDE) is used for compatibility with ISO 14229. It means the same as download (as seen from the VU).
— Potential 2-byte sub message counters are not shown in this table.

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2.2.2.1. Start Communication Request (SID 81)

DDP_005 This message is issued by the IDE to establish the communication link with the VU. Initial communications are always
performed at 9 600 baud (until baud rate is eventually changed using the appropriate Link control services).

2.2.2.2. Positive Response Start Communication (SID C1)

DDP_006 This message is issued by the VU to answer positively to a start communication request. It includes the 2 key bytes '8F'
'EA' indicating that the unit supports protocol with header including target source and length information.

2.2.2.3. Start Diagnostic Session Request (SID 10)

DDP_007 The Start Diagnostic Session request message is issued by the IDE in order to request a new diagnostic session with the

VU. The sub function 'default session' (81 Hex) indicates a standard diagnostic session is to be opened.

2.2.2.4. Positive Response Start Diagnostic (SID 50)

DDP_008 The Positive Response Start Diagnostic message is sent by the VU to answer positively to Diagnostic Session Request.

2.2.2.5. Link Control Service (SID 87)

DDP_052 The Link Control Service is used by the IDE to initiate a change in baud rate. This takes place in two steps. In step one
the IDE proposes the baud rate change, indicating the new rate. On receipt of a positive message from the VU the IDE
sends out confirmation of the baud rate change to the VU (step two). The IDE then changes to the new baud rate. After
receipt of the confirmation the VU changes to the new baud rate

2.2.2.6. Link Control Positive Response (SID C7)

DDP_053 The Link Control Positive response is issued by the VU to answer positively to Link Control Service request (step one).

Note that no response is given to the confirmation request (step two).

2.2.2.7. Request Upload (SID 35)

DDP_009 The Request Upload message is issued by the IDE to specify to the VU that a download operation is requested. To meet
the requirements of ISO14229 data is included covering address, the size and format details for the data requested. As
these are not known to the IDE prior to a download, the memory address is set to 0, format is unencrypted and
uncompressed and the memory size is set to the maximum.

2.2.2.8. Positive Response Request Upload (SID 75)

DDP_010 The Positive Response Request Upload message is sent by the VU to indicate to the IDE that the VU is ready to
download data. To meet the requirements of ISO 14229 data is included in this positive response message, indicating to
the IDE that further Positive Response Transfer Data messages will include 00FF hex bytes maximum.

2.2.2.9. Transfer Data Request (SID 36)

DDP_011 The Transfer Data Request is sent by the IDE to specify to the VU the type of data that are to be downloaded. A one

byte Transfer Request Parameter (TRTP) indicates the type of transfer.

There are six types of data transfer:

— Overview (TRTP 01),

— Activities of a specified date (TRTP 02),

— Events and faults (TRTP 03),

— Detailed speed (TRTP 04),

— Technical data (TRTP 05),

— Card download (TRTP 06).

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DDP_054

It is mandatory for the IDE to request the overview data transfer (TRTP 01) during a download session as this only will
ensure that the VU certificates are recorded within the downloaded file (and allow for verification of digital signature).

In the second case (TRTP 02) the Transfer Data Request message includes the indication of the calendar day TimeReal
format) to be downloaded.

2.2.2.10. Positive Response Transfer Data (SID 76)

DDP_012 The Positive Response Transfer Data is sent by the VU in response to the Transfer Data Request. The message contains
the requested data, with a Transfer Response Parameter (TREP) corresponding to the TRTP of the request.

DDP_055

In the first case (TREP 01), the VU will send data helping the IDE operator to choose the data he wants to download
further. The information contained within this message is:

— Security certificates,

— Vehicle identification,

— VU current date and time,

— Min and Max downloadable date (VU data),

— Indication of cards presence in the VU,

— Previous download to a company,

— Company locks,

— Previous controls.

2.2.2.11. Request Transfer Exit (SID 37)

DDP_013 The Request Transfer Exit message is sent by the IDE to inform the VU that the download session is terminated.

2.2.2.12. Positive Response Request Transfer Exit (SID 77)

DDP_014 The Positive Response Request Transfer Exit message is sent by the VU to acknowledge the Request Transfer Exit.

2.2.2.13. Stop Communication Request (SID 82)

DDP_015 The Stop Communication Request message is sent by the IDE to disconnect the communication link with the VU.

2.2.2.14. Positive Response Stop Communication (SID C2)

DDP_016 The Positive Response Stop Communication message is sent by the VU to acknowledge the Stop Communication

Request.

2.2.2.15. Acknowledge Sub Message (SID 83)

DDP_017 The Acknowledge Sub Message is sent by the IDE to confirm receipt of each part of a message that is being transmitted
as several sub messages. The data field contains the SID received from the VU and a 2-byte code as follows:

— MsgC +1 Acknowledges correct receipt of sub message number MsgC.

Request from the IDE to the VU to send next sub message

— MsgC indicates a problem with the receipt of sub message number MsgC.

Request from the IDE to the VU to send the sub message again.

— FFFF requests termination of the message.

This can be used by the IDE to end the transmission of the VU message for any reason.

The last sub message of a message (LEN byte < 255) may be acknowledged using any of these codes or not
acknowledged.

The VU responses that will consist of several sub messages are:

— Positive Response Transfer Data (SID 76)

2.2.2.16. Negative Response (SID 7F)

DDP_018 The Negative Response message is sent by the VU in response to the above request messages when the VU cannot
satisfy the request. The data fields of the message contains the SID of the response (7F), the SID of the request, and a
code specifying the reason of the negative response. The following codes are available:

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— 10 general reject

The action cannot be performed for a reason not covered below.

— 11 service not supported

The SID of the request is not understood.

— 12 sub function not supported

The DS_ or TRTP of the request is not understood, or there are no further sub messages to be transmitted.

— 13 incorrect message length

The length of the received message is wrong.

— 22 conditions not correct or request sequence error

The required service is not active or the sequence of request messages is not correct.

— 31 Request out of range

The request parameter record (data field) is not valid.

— 50 upload not accepted

The request cannot be performed (VU in a non appropriate mode of operation or internal fault of the VU).

— 78 response pending

The action requested cannot be completed in time and the VU is not ready to accept another request.

— FA data not available

The data object of a data transfer request are not available in the VU (e.g. no card is inserted, . . .).

2.2.3. Message flow

A typical message flow during a normal data download procedure is the following:

IDE

Start Communication Request

Start Diagnostic Service Request

Request Upload

Transfer Data Request Overview

Data Request #2

Acknowledge Sub Message #1

Acknowledge Sub Message #2

Acknowledge Sub Message #m

Acknowledge Sub Message (optional)

Transfer Data Request #n

Request Transfer Exit

Stop Communication Request

FE

Positive Response

Positive Response

Positive Response

Positive Response Transfer

Positive Response #1

Positive Response #2

Positive Response #m

Positive Response (Data Field < 255 Bytes)

Positive Response

Positive Response

Positive Response

æ
æ

æ
æ

æ
æ

æ
æ

æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ
æ

. . .

æ
æ

æ
æ

æ
æ

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2.2.4. Timing

DDP_019 During normal operation the timing parameters shown in the following figure are relevant:

Figure 1

Message flow, timing

Where:

P1 = Inter byte time for VU response.

P2 = Time between end of IDE request and start of VU response, or between end of IDE acknowledge and start of next

VU response.

P3 = Time between end of VU response and start of new IDE request, or between end of VU response and start of IDE

acknowledge, or between end of IDE request and start of new IDE request if VU fails to respond.

P4 = Inter byte time for IDE request.

P5 = Extended value of P3 for card downloading.

The allowed values for the timing parameters are showed in the following table (KWP extended timing parameters set,
used in case of physical addressing for faster communication).

Timing
Parameter

P1

P2

P3

P4

P5

Lower limit
Value (ms)

0

20

10

5

10

Upper limit value (ms)

20

1 000 (*)

5 000

20

20 minutes

(*) If the VU responds with a Negative Response containing a code meaning “request correctly received, response pending”, this value is

extended to the same upper limit value of P3.

2.2.5. Error handling

If an error occurs during the message exchange, the message flow scheme is modified depending on which equipment
has detected the error and on the message generating the error.

In figure 2 and figure 3 the error handling procedures for the VU and the IDE are respectively shown.

2.2.5.1. Start Communication phase

DDP_020

If the IDE detects an error during the Start Communication phase, either by timing or by the bit stream, then it will wait
for a period P3min before issuing again the request.

DDP_021

If the VU detects an error in the sequence coming from the IDE, it shall send no response and wait for another Start
Communication Request message within a period P3 max.

2.2.5.2. Communication phase

Two different error handling areas can be defined:

1. The VU detects an IDE transmission error.

DDP_022

For every received message the VU shall detect timing errors, byte format errors (e.g. start and stop bit violations) and
frame errors (wrong number of bytes received, wrong checksum byte).

DDP_023

If the VU detects one of the above errors, then it sends no response and ignores the message received.

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DDP_024 The VU may detect other errors in the format or content of the received message (e.g. message not supported) even if
the message satisfies the length and checksum requirements; in such a case, the VU shall respond to the IDE with a
Negative Response message specifying the nature of the error.

Figure 2

VU error handling

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2. The IDE detects a VU transmission error.

DDP_025

For every received message the IDE shall detect timing errors, byte format errors (e.g. start and stop bit violations) and
frame errors (wrong number of bytes received, wrong checksum byte).

DDP_026 The IDE shall detect sequence errors, e.g. incorrect sub message counter increments in successive received messages.

DDP_027

If the IDE detects an error or there was no response from the VU within a P2max period, the request message will be
sent again for a maximum of three transmissions in total. For the purposes of this error detection a sub message
acknowledge will be considered as a request to the VU.

DDP_028 The IDE shall wait at least for a period of P3min before beginning each transmission; the wait period shall be measured

from the last calculated occurrence of a stop bit after the error was detected.

Figure 3

IDE error handling

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2.2.6. Response Message content

This paragraph specifies the content of the data fields of the various positive response messages.

Data elements are defined in Appendix 1 data dictionary.

2.2.6.1. Positive Response Transfer Data Overview

DDP_029 The data field of the “Positive Response Transfer Data Overview” message shall provide the following data in the

following order under the SID 76 Hex, the TREP 01 Hex and appropriate sub message splitting and counting:

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2.2.6.2. Positive Response Transfer Data Activities

DDP_030 The data field of the “Positive Response Transfer Data Activities” message shall provide the following data in the

following order under the SID 76 Hex, the TREP 02 Hex and appropriate sub message splitting and counting:

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2.2.6.3. Positive Response Transfer Data Events and Faults

DDP_031 The data field of the “Positive Response Transfer Data Events and Faults” message shall provide the following data in the

following order under the SID 76 Hex, the TREP 03 Hex and appropriate sub message splitting and counting:

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2.2.6.4. Positive Response Transfer Data Detailed Speed

DDP_032 The data field of the “Positive Response Transfer Data Detailed Speed” message shall provide the following data in the

following order under the SID 76 Hex, the TREP 04 Hex and appropriate sub message splitting and countering:

2.2.6.5. Positive Response Transfer Data Technical Data

DDP_033 The data field of the “Positive Response Transfer Data Technical Data” message shall provide the following data in the
following order under the SID 76 Hex, the TREP 05 Hex and appropriate sub message splitting and counting:

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2.3. ESM File storage

DDP_034 When a download session has included a VU data transfer, the IDE shall store within one physical file all data received
from the VU during the download session within Positive Response Transfer Data messages. Data stored excludes
message headers, sub-message counters, empty sub-messages and checksums but include the SID and TREP (of the
first sub-message only if several sub-messages).

3. TACHOGRAPH CARDS DOWNLOADING PROTOCOL

3.1. Scope

This paragraph describes the direct card data downloading of a tachograph card to an IDE. The IDE is not part of the
secure environment; therefore no authentication between the card and the IDE is performed.

3.2. Definitions

Download session:

Each time a download of the ICC data is performed. The session covers the complete procedure from the reset of the
ICC by an IFD until the deactivation of the ICC (withdraw of the card or next reset).

Signed Data File:

A file from the ICC. The file is transferred to the IFD in plain text. On the ICC the file is hashed and signed and the
signature is transferred to the IFD.

3.3. Card Downloading

DDP_035 The download of a tachograph card includes the following steps:

— Download the common information of the card in the EFs ICC and IC. This information is optional and is not

secured with a digital signature.

— Download the EFs Card_Certificate and CA_Certificate. This information is not secured with a

digital signature.

It is mandatory to download these files for each download session.

— Download the other application data EFs (within Tachograph DF) except EF Card_Download. This

information is secured with a digital signature.

— It is mandatory to download at least the EFs Application_Identification and ID for each download

session.

— When downloading a driver card it is also mandatory to download the following EFs:

— Events_Data,

— Faults_Data,

— Driver_Activity_Data,

— Vehicles_Used,

— Places,

— Control_Activity_Data,

— Specific_Conditions.

— When downloading a driver card, update the LastCardDownload date in EF Card_Download,

— When downloading a workshop card, reset the calibration counter in EF Card_Download.

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3.3.1. Initialisation sequence

DDP_036 The IDE shall initiate the sequence as follows:

Card

Direction

IDE / IFD

Meaning / Remarks

ATR

æ

æ

Hardware reset

It is optional to use PPS to switch to a higher baudrate as long as the ICC supports it.

3.3.2. Sequence for un-signed data files

DDP_037 The sequence to download the ICC, IC, Card_Certificate and CA_Certificate is as follows:

Card

OK

File Data
OK

Direction

IDE / IFD

Meaning / Remarks

æ

æ

æ

æ

Select File

Select File Select by File identifiers

Read Binary

If the file contains more data than the buffer
size of the reader or the card the command
has to be repeated until the complete file is
read.

Store data to ESM

according to 3.4, Data storage format

Note: Before selecting the Card_Certificate EF, the Tachograph Application must be selected (selection by AID).

3.3.3. Sequence for Signed data files

DDP_038 The following sequence shall be used for each of the following files that has to be downloaded with their signature:

Card

OK

Calculate Hash of File and
store Hash value temporarily

OK

File Data
OK

Perform Security Operation
“Compute Digital Signature”
using the temporarily stored
Hash value

Signature
OK

Direction

IDE / IFD

Meaning / Remarks

æ

æ

æ

æ

æ

æ

æ

æ

Select File

Perform Hash of File

Read Binary

Calculates the hash value over the data content
of the selected file using the prescribed hash
algorithm in accordance with Appendix 11.
This command is not an ISO-Command.

the reader or

If the file contains more data than the buffer
the
of
command has
the
complete file is read.

the card can hold,
repeated until

to be

Store received data to ESM according to 3.4, Data storage format

PSO: Compute Digital
Signature

Append data to the previous
stored data on the ESM

according to 3.4, Data storage format

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3.3.4. Sequence for resetting the calibration counter

DDP_039 The sequence to reset the NoOfCalibrationsSinceDownload counter in the EF Card_Download in a

workshop card is the following:

Direction

IDE / IFD

Meaning / Remarks

Select File EF Card_Download

Select by File identifiers

Update Binary
NoOfCalibrationsSinceDownloa d =
'00 00'

æ
æ

æ

æ

Card

OK

resets card download
number

OK

3.4. Introduction

3.4.1. Introduction

DDP_040 The downloaded data has to be stored according to the following conditions:

— The data shall be stored transparent. This means that the order of the bytes as well as the order of the bits inside the

byte that are transferred from the card has to be preserved during storage.

— All files of the card downloaded within a download session are stored in one file on the ESM.

3.4.2. File format

DDP_041 The file format is a concatenation of several TLV objects.

DDP_042 The tag for an EF shall be the FID plus the appendix “00”.

DDP_043 The tag of an EF's signature shall be the FID of the file plus the appendix “01”.

DDP_044 The length is a two byte value. The value defines the number of bytes in the value field. The value “FF FF” in the length

field is reserved for future use.

DDP_045 When a file is not downloaded nothing related to the file shall be stored (no tag and no zero length).

DDP_046 A signature shall be stored as the next TLV object directly after the TLV object that contains the data of the file.

Definition

Meaning

Length

FID (2 Bytes) || “00”

Tag for EF (FID)

3 Bytes

FID (2 Bytes) || “01”

for

Tag
EF(FID)

Signature

of

3 Bytes

xx xx

Length of Value field

2 Bytes

Example of data in a download file on an ESM:

Tag

Length

Value

00 02 00

C1 00 00

05 05 00

05 05 01

00 11

00 C2

0A 2E

00 80

Data of EF ICC

Data of EF Card_Certificate

. . .

Data of EF Vehicles_Used

Signature of EF Vehicles_Used

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4. DOWNLOADING A TACHOGRAPH CARD VIA A VEHICLE UNIT

DDP_047 The VU must allow for downloading the content of a driver card inserted to a connected IDE.

DDP_048 The IDE shall send a “Transfer Data Request Card Download” message to the VU to initiate this mode (see 2.2.2.9).

DDP_049 The VU shall then download the whole card, file by file, in accordance with the card downloading protocol defined in
paragraph 3, and forward all data received from the card to the IDE within the appropriate TLV file format (see 3.4.2)
and encapsulated within a “Positive Response Transfer Data” message.

DDP_050 The IDE shall retrieve card data from the “Positive Response Transfer Data” message (stripping all headers, SIDs, TREPs,

sub message counters, and checksums) and store them within one physical file as described in paragraph 2.3.

DDP_051 The VU shall then, as applicable, update the Control_Activity_Data or the Card_Download file of the driver

card.

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Appendix 8

CALIBRATION PROTOCOL

1. INTRODUCTION

This appendix describes how data is exchanged between a vehicle unit and a tester via the K-line which forms part of
the calibration interface described in Appendix 6. It also describes control of the input/output signal
line on the
calibration connector.

Establishing K-line communications is described in Section 4 “Communication Services”.

This appendix uses the idea of diagnostic “sessions” to determine the scope of K-line control under different conditions.
The default session is the “StandardDiagnosticSession” where all data can be read from a vehicle unit but no data can be
written to a vehicle unit.

Selection of the diagnostic session is described in Section 5 “Management Services”.

CPR_001

The “ECUProgrammingSession” allows data entry into the vehicle unit.
(requirements 097 and 098), the vehicle unit must, in addition be in the CALIBRATION mode of operation.

In the case of entry of calibration data

Data transfer via K-line is described in Section 6 “Data Transmission Services”. Formats of data transferred are detailed in
Section 8 “dataRecords formats”.

CPR_002

The “ECUAdjustmentSession” allows the selection of the I/O mode of the calibration I/O signal
line via the K-line
interface. Control of the calibration I/O signal line is described in section 7 “Control of Test Pulses — Input/Output
Control functional unit”.

CPR_003

Throughout this document the address of the tester is referred to as 'tt'. Although there may be preferred addresses for
testers, the VU shall respond correctly to any tester address. The physical address of the VU is 0xEE.

2. TERMS, DEFINITIONS AND REFERENCES

The protocols, messages and error codes are principally based on the current draft to date of ISO 14229-1 (Road
vehicles — Diagnostic systems — Part 1: Diagnostic services, version 6 of 22 February 2001).

Byte encoding and hexadecimal values are used for the service identifiers, the service requests and responses, and the
standard parameters.

The term “tester” refers to the equipment used to enter programming/calibration data into the VU.

The terms “client” and “server” refer to the tester and the VU respectively.

The term ECU means “Electronic Control Unit” and refers to the VU.

References:

ISO 14230-2: Road Vehicles — Diagnostic Systems — Keyword Protocol 2000- Part 2: Data Link Layer. First edition:

1999. Vehicles — Diagnostic Systems.

3. OVERVIEW OF SERVICES

3.1. Services available

The following table provides an overview of the services that will be available in the recording equipment and are
defined in this document.

CPR_004

The table indicates the services that are available in an enabled diagnostic session.

— The 1st column lists the services that are available.

— The 2nd column includes the section number in this appendix where of service is further defined.

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— The 3rd column assigns the assigns the service identifier values for request messages.

— The 4th column specifies the services of the “StandardDiagnosticSession” (SD) which must be implemented in each

VU.

— The 5th column specifies the services of the “ECUAdjustmentSession” (ECUAS) which must be implemented to allow

control of the I/O signal line in the front panel calibration connector of the VU.

— The 6th column specifies the services of the “ECUProgrammingSession” (ECUPS) which must be implemented to

allow for programming of parameters in the VU.

Table 1

Service Identifier value summary table

SD
&

&

&

&

&

&

Diagnostic Sessions

ECUAS
&

ECUPS
&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

&

Diagnostic Service Name

Section No

SId Req.Value

StartCommunication

StopCommunication

TesterPresent

StartDiagnosticSession

SecurityAccess

ReadDataByIdentifier

WriteDataByIdentifier

InputOutputControlByIdentifier

4.1

4.2

4.3

5.1

5.2

6.1

6.2

7.1

81

82

3E

10

27

22

2E

2F

& This symbol indicates that the service is mandatory in this diagnostic session.
No symbol indicates that this service is not allowed in this diagnostic session.

3.2. Response codes

Response codes are defined for each service.

4. COMMUNICATION SERVICES

Some services are necessary to establish and maintain communication. They do not appear on the application layer. The
services available are detailed in the following table:

Table 2

Communication Services

Service name

Description

StartCommunication

The client requests to start a communication session with a server(s)

StopCommunication

The client requests to stop the current communication session

TesterPresent

The client indicates to the server that it is still present

CPR_005

The StartCommunication Service is used for starting a communication. In order to perform any service, communication
must be initialised and the communication parameters need to be appropriate for the desired mode.

4.1. StartCommunication Service

CPR_006 Upon receiving a StartCommunication indication primitive, the VU shall check if the requested communication link can
be initialised under the present conditions. Valid conditions for the initialisation of a communication link are described
in document ISO 14230-2.

CPR_007

Then the VU shall perform all actions necessary to initialise the communication link and send a StartCommunication
response primitive with the Positive Response parameters selected.

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CPR_008

If a VU that is already initialised (and has entered any diagnostic session) receives a new StartCommunication Request
(e.g. due to error recovery in the tester) the request shall be accepted and the VU shall be reinitialised.

CPR_009

If the communication link cannot be initialised for any reason, the VU shall continue operating as it was immediately
prior to the attempt to initialise the communication link.

CPR_010

The StartCommunication Request message must be physically addressed.

CPR_011

Initialising the VU for services is performed through a “fast initialisation” method,

— There is a bus-idle time prior to any activity.

— The tester then sends an initialisation pattern.

— All information which is necessary to establish communication is contained in the response of the VU.

CPR_012 After completion of the initialisation,

— All communication parameters are set to values defined in Table 4 according to the key bytes.

— The VU is waiting for the first request of the tester.

— The VU is in the default diagnostic mode, i.e. StandardDiagnosticSession.

— The calibration I/O signal line is in the default state, i.e. disabled state.

CPR_014

The data rate on the K-line shall be 10 400 Baud.

CPR_016

The fast initialisation is started by the tester transmitting a Wake up pattern (Wup) on the K-line. The pattern begins
after the idle time on K-line with a low time of Tinil. The tester transmits the first bit of the StartCommunication Service
after a time of Twup following the first falling edge.

CPR_017

The timing values for the fast initialisation and communications in general are detailed in the tables below. There are
different possibilities for the idle time:

— First transmission after power on, Tidle = 300 ms.

— After completion of a StopCommunication Service, Tidle = P3 min.

— After stopping communication by time-out P3 max, Tidle = O.

Table 3

Timing values for fast initialisation

Tinil

Twup

Parameter

25 ± 1 ms

50 ± 1 ms

min value

24 ms

49 ms

max value

26 ms

51 ms

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Table 4

Communication timing values

Timing
Parameter

P1

P2

P3

P4

Parameter Description

lower limit values
(ms)

upper limit values
(ms)

Inter byte time for VU response

Time between tester request and VU response or two VU
responses

Time between end of VU responses and start of new tester
request

Inter byte time for tester request

min.

0

25

55

5

max.

20

250

5 000

20

CPR_018

The message format for fast initialisation is detailed in the following tables:

Table 5

StartCommunication Request Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

StartCommunication Request Service Id

Checksum

81

EE

tt

81

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

SCR

CS

Table 6

StartCommunication Positive Response Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

#8

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

StartCommunication Positive Response Service Id

Key byte 1

Key byte 2

Checksum

80

tt

EE

03

C1

EA

8F

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

SCRPR

KB1

KB2

CS

CPR_019

There is no negative response to the StartCommunication Request message, if there is no positive response message to
be transmitted then the VU is not initialised, nothing is transmitted and it remains in its normal operation.

4.2. StopCommunication Service

4.2.1. Message description

The purpose of this communication layer service is to terminate a communication session.

CPR_020 Upon receiving a StopCommunication indication primitive, the VU shall check if the current conditions allow to
terminate this communication. In this case the VU shall perform all actions necessary to terminate this communication.

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CPR_021

If it is possible to terminate the communication, the VU shall issue a StopCommunication response primitive with the
Positive Response parameters selected, before the communication is terminated.

CPR_022

If the communication cannot be terminated by any reason, the VU shall issue a StopCommunication response primitive
with the Negative Response parameter selected.

CPR_023

If time-out of P3max is detected by the VU, the communication shall be terminated without any response primitive
being issued.

4.2.2. Message format

CPR_024

The message formats for the StopCommunication primitives are detailed in the following tables:

Table 7

StopCommunication Request Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

StopCommunication Request Service Id

Checksum

80

EE

tt

01

82

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

SPR

CS

Table 8

StopCommunication Positive Response Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

StopCommunication Positive Response Service Id

Checksum

80

tt

EE

01

C2

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

SPRPR

CS

Table 9

StopCommunication Negative Response Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

#8

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

negative Response Service Id

StopCommunication Request Service Identification

responseCode = generalReject

Checksum

80

tt

EE

03

7F

82

10

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

NR

SPR

RC_GR

CS

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4.2.3. Parameter Definition

This service does not require any parameter definition.

4.3. TesterPresent Service

4.3.1. Message description

The TesterPresent service is used by the tester to indicate to the server that it is still present, in order to prevent the
server from automatically returning to normal operation and possibly stopping the communication. This service, sent
periodically, keeps the diagnostic session/communication active by resetting the P3 timer each time a request for this
service is received.

4.3.2. Message format

CPR_079

The message formats for the TesterPresent primitives are detailed in the following tables.

Table 10

TesterPresent Request Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

TesterPresent Request Service Id

Sub Function = responseRequired = [yes

no]

80

EE

tt

02

3E

01

02

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

TP

RESPREQ_Y

RESPREQ_NO

#7

Checksum

00-FF

CS

CPR_080

If the responseRequired parameter is set to “yes”, then the server shall respond with the following positive response
message. If set to “no”, then no response is sent by the server.

Table 11

TesterPresent Positive Response Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

TesterPresent Positive Response Service Id

Checksum

80

tt

EE

01

7E

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

TPPR

CS

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CPR_081

The service shall support the following negative responses codes:

Table 12

TesterPresent Negative Response Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

negative Response Service Id

TesterPresent Request Service Identification

responseCode = [SubFunctionNotSupported-InvalidFormat

incorrectMessageLength]

#8

Checksum

80

tt

EE

03

7F

3E

12

13

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

NR

TP

RC_SFNS_IF

RC_IML

CS

5. MANAGEMENT SERVICES

The services available are detailed in the following table:

Table 13

Management Services

Service name

Description

StartDiagnosticSession

The client requests to start a diagnostic session with a VU

SecurityAccess

The client requests access to functions restricted to authorised users

5.1. StartDiagnosticSession service

5.1.1. Message description

CPR_025

The service StartDiagnosticSession is used to enable different diagnostic sessions in the server. A diagnostic session
enables a specific set of services according to Table 17. A session can enable vehicle manufacturer specific services
which are not part of this document. Implementation rules shall conform to the following requirements:

— There shall be always exactly one diagnostic session active in the VU.

— The VU shall always start the StandardDiagnosticSession when powered up. If no other diagnostic session is started,

then the StandardDiagnosticSession shall be running as long as the VU is powered.

— If a diagnostic session which is already running has been requested by the tester, then the VU shall send a positive

response message.

— Whenever the tester requests a new diagnostic session, the VU shall first send a StartDiagnosticSession positive
response message before the new session becomes active in the VU. If the VU is not able to start the requested new
diagnostic session, then it shall respond with a StartDiagnosticSession negative response message, and the current
session shall continue.

CPR_026

diagnostic session shall only be started if communication has been established between the client and the VU.

CPR_027

The timing parameters defined in Table 4 shall be active after a successful StartDiagnosticSession with the diagnos-
ticSession parameter set to “StandardDiagnosticSession” in the request message if another diagnostic session was
previously active.

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5.1.2. Message format

CPR_028

The message formats for the StartDiagnosticSession primitives are detailed in the following tables:

Table 14

StartDiagnosticSession Request Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

StartDiagnosticSession Request Service Id

diagnosticSession = [one value from Table 17]

Checksum

80

EE

tt

02

10

xx

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

STDS

DS_. . .

CS

Table 15

StartDiagnosticSession Positive Response Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

StartDiagnosticSession Positive Response Service Id

DiagnosticSession = [same value as in byte #6 Table 14]

Checksum

80

tt

EE

02

50

xx

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

STDSPR

DS_. . .

CS

Table 16

StartDiagnosticSession Negative Response Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

Negative Response Service Id

StartDiagnosticSession Request Service Id

ResponseCode = [subFunctionNotSupported (a)

incorrectMessageLength (b)

conditionsNotCorrect (c)]

#8

Checksum

80

tt

EE

03

7F

10

12

13

22

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

NR

STDS

RC_SFNS

RC_IML

RC_CNC

CS

(a) The value inserted in byte #6 of the request message is not supported, i.e. not in Table 17.
(b) The length of the message is wrong.
(c) The criteria for the request StartDiagnosticSession are not met.

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5.1.3. Parameter definition

CPR_029

The parameter diagnosticSession (DS_) is used by the StartDiagnosticSession service to select the specific behaviour of the
server(s). The following diagnostic sessions are specified in this document:

Table 17

Definition of diagnosticSession Values

Description

StandardDiagnosticSession
This diagnostic session enables all services specified in Table 1 column 4 “SD”. These
services allow reading of data from a server (VU). This diagnostic Session is active after
the initialisation has been successfully completed between client (tester) and server (VU).
This diagnostic session may be overwritten by other diagnostic sessions specified in this
section.

ECUProgrammingSession
This diagnostic session enables all services specified in Table 1 column 6 “ECUPS”.
These services support the memory programming of a server (VU) This diagnostic
session may be overwritten by other diagnostic sessions specified in this section.

ECUAdjustmentSession
This diagnostic session enables all services specified in Table 1 column 5 “ECUAS”.
These services support the input/output control of a server (VU). This diagnostic session
may be overwritten by other diagnostic sessions specified in this section.

Hex

81

85

87

Mnemonic

SD

ECUPS

ECUAS

5.2. SecurityAccess service

Writing of calibration data or access to the calibration input/output line is not possible unless the VU is in CALI-
BRATION mode. In addition to insertion of a valid workshop card into the VU, it is necessary to enter the appropriate
PIN into the VU before access to the CALIBRATION mode is granted.

The SecurityAccess service provides a means to enter the PIN and to indicate to the tester whether or not the VU is in
CALIBRATION mode.

It is acceptable that the PIN may be entered through alternative methods.

5.2.1. Message Description

The SecurityAccess service consists of a SecurityAccess “requestSeed” message, eventually followed by a SecurityAccess
“sendKey” message. The SecurityAccess service must be carried out after the StartDiagnosticSession service.

CPR_033

The tester shall use the SecurityAccess "requestSeed" message to check if the vehicle unit is ready to accept a PIN.

CPR_034

If the vehicle unit is already in CALIBRATION mode, it shall answer the request by sending a “seed” of 0x0000 using
the service SecurityAccess Positive Response.

CPR_035

If the vehicle unit is ready to accept a PIN for verification by a workshop card, it shall answer the request by sending a
“seed” greater than 0x0000 using the service SecurityAccess Positive Response.

CPR_036

If the vehicle unit is not ready to accept a PIN from the tester, either because the workshop card inserted is not valid, or
because no workshop card has been inserted, or because the vehicle unit expects the PIN from another method, it shall
answer the request with a Negative Response with a response code set to conditionsNotCorrectOrRequestSequenceError.

CPR_037

The tester shall then, eventually, use the SecurityAccess “sendKey” message to forward a PIN to the Vehicle Unit. To
allow time for the card authentication process to take place, the VU shall use the negative response code request-
CorrectlyReceived-ResponsePending to extend the time to respond. However, the maximum time to respond shall not
exceed 5 minutes. As soon as the requested service has been completed, the VU shall send a positive response message
or negative response message with a response code different from this one. The negative response code requestCor-
rectlyReceived-ResponsePending may be repeated by the VU until the requested service is completed and the final
response message is sent.

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28.5.2002

CPR_038

The vehicle unit shall answer to this request using the service SecurityAccess Positive Response only when in CALI-
BRATION mode.

CPR_039

In the following cases, the vehicle unit shall answer to this request with a Negative Response with a response code set
to:

— subFunctionNot supported: Invalid format for the subfunction parameter (accessType),

— conditionsNotCorrectOrRequestSequenceError: Vehicle unit not ready to accept a PIN entry,

— invalidKey: PIN not valid and number of PIN checks attempts not exceeded,

— exceededNumberOfAttempts: PIN not valid and number of PIN checks attempts exceeded,

— generalReject: Correct PIN but mutual authentication with workshop card failed.

5.2.2. Message format — SecurityAccess — requestSeed

CPR_040

The message formats for the SecurityAccess “requestSeed” primitives are detailed in the following tables:

Table 18

SecurityAccess Request — requestSeed Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

SecurityAccess Request Service Id

accessType — requestSeed

Checksum

80

EE

tt

02

27

7D

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

SA

AT_RSD

CS

Table 19

SecurityAccess — requestSeed Positive Response Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

#8

#9

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

SecurityAccess Positive Response Service Id

accessType — requestSeed

Seed High

Seed Low

Checksum

80

tt

EE

04

67

7D

00-FF

00-FF

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

SAPR

AT_RSD

SEEDH

SEEDL

CS

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Table 20

SecurityAccess Negative Response Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

negativeResponse Service Id

SecurityAccess Request Service Id

responseCode = [conditionsNotCorrectOrRequestSequenceError

incorrectMessageLength]

#8

Checksum

80

tt

EE

03

7F

27

22

13

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

NR

SA

RC_CNC

RC_IML

CS

5.2.3. Message format — SecurityAccess — sendKey

CPR_041

The message formats for the SecurityAccess “sendKey” primitives are detailed in the following tables:

Table 21

SecurityAccess Request — sendKey Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

SecurityAccess Request Service Id

accessType — sendKey

#7 to #m+6 Key #1 (High)

. . .

Key #m (low, m must be a minimum of 4, and a maximum of
8)

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

SA

AT_SK

KEY

80

EE

tt

m+2

27

7E

xx

. . .

xx

#m+7

Checksum

00-FF

CS

Table 22

SecurityAccess — sendKey Positive Response Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

SecurityAccess Positive Response Service Id

accessType — sendKey

Checksum

80

tt

EE

02

67

7E

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

SAPR

AT_SK

CS

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28.5.2002

Table 23

SecurityAccess Negative Response Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

NegativeResponse Service Id

SecurityAccess Request Service Id

ResponseCode = [generalReject

subFunctionNotSupported

incorrectMessageLength

conditionsNotCorrectOrRequestSequenceError

invalidKey

exceededNumberOfAttempts

requestCorrectlyReceived-ResponsePending]

80

tt

EE

03

7F

27

10

12

13

22

35

36

78

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

NR

SA

RC_GR

RC_SFNS

RC_IML

RC_CNC

RC_IK

RC_ENA

RC_RCR_RP

#8

Checksum

00-FF

CS

6. DATA TRANSMISSION SERVICES

The services available are detailed in the following table:

Service name

ReadDataByIdentifier

Table 24

Data Transmission Services

Description

The client requests the transmission of the current value of a record with access by
recordDataIdentifier

WriteDataByIdentifier

The client requests to write a record accessed by recordDataIdentifier

6.1. ReadDataByIdentifier service

6.1.1. Message description

CPR_050

The ReadDataByIdentifier service is used by the client to request data record values from a server. The data are identified
by a recordDataIdentifier. It is the VU manufacturer's responsibility that the server conditions are met when performing
this service.

6.1.2. Message format

CPR_051

The message formats for the ReadDataByIdentifier primitives are detailed in the following tables:

Table 25

ReadDataByIdentifier Request Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

ReadDataByIdentifier Request Service Id

#6 and #7

recordDataIdentifier = [a value fromTable 28]

#8

Checksum

80

EE

tt

03

22

xxxx

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

RDBI

RDI_. . .

CS

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Table 26

ReadDataByIdentifier Positive Response Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

ReadDataByIdentifier Positive Response Service Id

#6 and #7

recordDataIdentifier = [the same value as bytes #6 and #7 Table

#8 to #m+7 dataRecord[] = [data#1

25]

:

data#m]

80

tt

EE

m+3

62

xxxx

xx

:

xx

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

RDBIPR

RDI_. . .

DREC_DATA1

:

DREC_DATAm

#m+8

Checksum

00-FF

CS

Table 27

ReadDataByIdentifier Negative Response Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

NegativeResponse Service Id

ReadDataByIdentifier Request Service Id

ResponseCode = [requestOutOfRange

incorrectMessageLength

conditionsNotCorrect]

#8

Checksum

6.1.3. Parameter Definition

80

tt

EE

03

7F

22

31

13

22

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

NR

RDBI

RC_ROOR

RC_IML

RC_CNC

CS

CPR_052

The parameter recordDataIdentifier (RDI_) in the ReadDataByIdentifier request message identifies a data record.

CPR_053

recordDataIdentifier values defined by this document are shown in the table below.

The recordDataIdentifier table consists of four columns and multiple lines.

— The 1st column (Hex) includes the “Hex Value” assigned to the recordDataIdentifier specified in the 3rd column.

— The 2nd column (Data element) specifies the data element of Appendix 1 on which the recordDataIdentifier is based

(transcoding is sometimes necessary).

— The 3rd column (Description) specifies the corresponding recordDataIdentifier name.

— The 4th column (Mnemonic) specifies the mnemonic of this recordDataIdentifier.

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28.5.2002

Table 28

Definition of recordDataIdentifier values

Hex

Data element

F90B CurrentDateTime

F912 HighResOdometer

recordDataIdentifier Name
(see format in Section 8.2)

TimeDate

Mnemonic

RDI_TD

HighResolutionTotalVehicleDistance

RDI_HRTVD

F918 K-ConstantOfRecordingEquipme nt

Kfactor

F91C L-TyreCircumference

LfactorTyreCircumference

RDI_KF

RDI_LF

F91D W-VehicleCharacteristicConst ant

WvehicleCharacteristicFactor

RDI_WVCF

F921 TyreSize

F922 nextCalibrationDate

F92C SpeedAuthorised

F97D vehicleRegistrationNation

F97E VehicleRegistrationNumber

TyreSize

NextCalibrationDate

SpeedAuthorised

RegisteringMemberState

VehicleRegistrationNumber

F190 VehicleIdentificationNumber

VIN

RDI_TS

RDI_NCD

RDI_SA

RDI_RMS

RDI_VRN

RDI_VIN

CPR_054

The parameter dataRecord (DREC_) is used by the ReadDataByIdentifier positive response message to provide the data
record value identified by the recordDataIdentifier to the client (tester). Data formats are specified in section 8.
Additional user optional dataRecords including VU specific input, internal and output data may be implemented, but
are not defined in this document.

6.2. WriteDataByIdentifier service

6.2.1. Message description

CPR_056

The WriteDataByIdentifier service is used by the client to write data record values to a server. The data are identified by
a recordDataIdentifier. It is the VU manufacturer's responsibility that the server conditions are met when performing this
service. To update the parameters listed in Table 28 the VU must be in CALIBRATION mode.

6.2.2. Message format

CPR_057

The message formats for the WriteDataByIdentifier primitives are detailed in the following tables:

Table 29

WriteDataByIdentifier Request Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

WriteDataByIdentifier Request Service Id

#6 and #7

recordDataIdentifier = [a value from Table 28]

#8 to #m+7 dataRecord[] = [data#1

:

data#m]

80

EE

tt

m+3

2E

xxxx

xx

:

xx

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

WDBI

RDI_. . .

DREC_DATA1

:

DREC_DATAm

#m+8

Checksum

00-FF

CS

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C 126 E/163

Table 30

WriteDataByIdentifier Positive Response Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

WriteDataByIdentifier Positive Response Service Id

80

tt

EE

03

6E

#6 and #7

recordDataIdentifier = [the same value as bytes #6 and #7 Table

xxxx

29]

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

WDBIPR

RDI_. . .

#8

Checksum

00-FF

CS

Table 31

WriteDataByIdentifier Negative Response Message

Byte #

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

NegativeResponse Service Id

WriteDataByIdentifier Request Service Id

ResponseCode = [requestOutOfRange

incorrectMessageLength

conditionsNotCorrect]

#8

Checksum

6.2.3. Parameter definition

The parameter recordDataIdentifier (RDI_) is defined in Table 28.

80

tt

EE

03

7F

2E

31

13

22

00-FF

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

NR

WBDI

RC_ROOR

RC_IML

RC_CNC

CS

The parameter dataRecord (DREC_) is used by the WriteDataByIdentifier request message to provide the data record
values identified by the recordDataIdentifier to the server (VU). Data formats are specified in section 8.

7. CONTROL OF TEST PULSES — INPUT/OUTPUT CONTROL FUNCTIONAL UNIT

The services available are detailed in the following table:

Table 32

Input/Output Control functional unit

Service name

Description

InputOutputControlByIdentifier

The client requests the control of an input/output specific to the server

7.1. InputOutputControlByIdentifier service

7.1.1. Message description

There is a connection via the front connector which allows test pulses to be controlled or monitored using a suitable
tester.

C 126 E/164

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CPR_058

This calibration I/O signal line can be configured by K-line command using the InputOutputControlByIdentifier service
to select the required input or output function for the line. The available states of the line are:

— disabled,

— speedSignalInput, where the calibration I/O signal line is used to input a speed signal (test signal) replacing the

motion sensor speed signal,

— realTimeSpeedSignalOutputSensor, where the calibration I/O signal line is used to output the speed signal of the

motion sensor,

— RTCOutput, where the calibration I/O signal line is used to output the UTC clock signal.

CPR_059

The vehicle unit must have entered an adjustment session and must be in CALIBRATION mode to configure the state of
the line. On exit of the adjustment session or of the CALIBRATION mode the vehicle unit must ensure the calibration
I/O signal line is returned to the “disabled” (default) state.

CPR_060

If speed pulses are received at the real time speed signal input line of the VU while the calibration I/O signal line is set
to input then the calibration I/O signal line shall be set to output or returned to the disabled state.

CPR_061

The sequence shall be:

— Establish communications by StartCommunication Service

— Enter an adjustment session by StartDiagnosticSession Service and be in CALIBRATION mode of operation (the

order of these two operation is not important).

— Change the state of the output by InputOutputControlByIdentifier Service.

7.1.2. Message format

CPR_062

The message formats for the InputOutputControlByIdentifier primitives are detailed in the following tables:

Table 33

InputOutputControlByIdentifier Request Message

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

InputOutputControlByIdentifier
Request Sid

80

EE

tt

xx

2F

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

IOCBI

Byte

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6 and #7

InputOutputIdentifier = [CalibrationInputOutput]

F960

IOI_CIO

#8 or
#8 to #9

ControlOptionRecord = [

inputOutputControlParameter — one
value from Table 36

controlState — one value from Table
37 (see note below)]

xx

xx

COR_. . .

IOCP_. . .

CS_. . .

#9 or #10

Checksum

00-FF

CS

Note: The controlState parameter is present only in some cases (see 7.1.3).

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C 126 E/165

Table 34

InputOutputControlByIdentifier Positive Response Message

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

inputOutputControlByIdentifier Positive Response SId

80

tt

EE

xx

6F

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

IOCBIPR

Byte

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6 and #7

inputOutputIdentifier = [CalibrationInputOutput]

F960

IOI_CIO

#8 or
#8 to #9

controlStatusRecord = [

inputOutputControlParameter (same value
as byte #8 Table 33)

controlState (same value as byte #9 Table
33)]
(if applicable)

xx

xx

CSR_

IOCP_. . .

CS_. . .

#9 or #10

Checksum

00-FF

CS

Byte

#1

#2

#3

#4

#5

#6

#7

Table 35

InputOutputControlByIdentifier Negative Response Message

Parameter Name

Hex Value

Mnemonic

Format byte — physical addressing

Target address byte

Source address byte

Additional length byte

negativeResponse Service Id

inputOutputControlByIdentifier Request SId

responseCode = [

incorrectMessageLength

conditionsNotCorrect

requestOutOfRange

deviceControlLimitsExceeded]

80

tt

EE

03

7F

2F

13

22

31

7A

FMT

TGT

SRC

LEN

NR

IOCBI

RC_IML

RC_CNC

RC_ROOR

RC_DCLE

#8

Checksum

00-FF

CS

7.1.3. Parameter definition

CPR_064

The parameter inputOutputControlParameter (IOCP_) is defined in the following table:

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Table 36

Definition of inputOutputControlParameter values

Description

ReturnControlToECU
This value shall indicate to the server (VU) that the tester does no longer have
control about the calibration I/O signal line.

ResetToDefault
This value shall
calibration I/O signal line to its default state.

indicate to the server (VU) that it is requested to reset the

ShortTermAdjustment
This value shall indicate to the server (VU) that it is requested to adjust the
calibration I/O signal line to the value included in the controlState parameter.

Mnemonic

RCTECU

RTD

STA

Hex

00

01

03

CPR_065

The parameter controlState is present only when the inputOutputControlParameter is set to ShortTermAdjustment and
is defined in the following table:

Table 37

Definition of controlState values

Mode

Disable

Enable

Enable

Enable

Hex Value

Description

00

01

02

03

I/O line is disabled (default state)

Enable calibration I/O line as speedSignalInput

Enable calibration I/O line as realTimeSpeedSignalOutputSensor

Enable calibration I/O line as RTCOutput

8. DATARECORDS FORMATS

This section details:

— general rules that shall be applied to ranges of parameters transmitted by the vehicle unit to the tester,

— formats that shall be used for data transferred via the Data Transmission Services described in section 6.

CPR_067 All parameters identified shall be supported by the VU.

CPR_068 Data transmitted by the VU to the tester in response to a request message shall be of the measured type (i.e. current

value of the requested parameter as measured or observed by the VU).

8.1. Transmitted parameter ranges

CPR_069

Table 38 defines the ranges used to determine the validity of a transmitted parameter.

CPR_070

The values in the range “error indicator” provide a means for the vehicle unit to immediately indicate that valid
parametric data is not currently available due to some type of error in the recording equipment.

CPR_071

The values in the range “not available” provide a means for the vehicle unit to transmit a message which contains a
parameter that is not available or not supported in that module. The values in the range “not requested” provide a
means for a device to transmit a command message and identify those parameters where no response is expected from
the receiving device.

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CPR_072

If a component failure prevents the transmission of valid data for a parameter, the error indicator as described in Table
38 should be used in place of that parameter's data. However, if the measured or calculated data has yielded a value that
is valid yet exceeds the defined parameter range, the error indicator should not be used. The data should be transmitted
using the appropriate minimum or maximum parameter value.

Table 38

dataRecords ranges

Range Name

1 byte
(Hex value)

2 bytes
(Hex value)

4 bytes
(Hex value)

ASCII

Valid signal

00 to FA

0000 to FAFF

00000000 to FAFFFFFF

1 to 254

Parameter specific indicator

FB

FB00 to FBFF

FB000000 to FBFFFFFF

Reserved range for future
indicator bits

Error indicator

Not available or not
requested

FC to FD

FC00 to FDFF

FC000000 to FDFFFFFF

FE

FF

FE00 to FEFF

FE000000 to FEFFFFFF

FF00 to FFFF

FF000000 to FFFFFFFF

none

none

0

FF

CPR_073

For parameters coded in ASCII, the ASCII character “*” is reserved as a delimiter.

8.2. dataRecords formats

Table 39 to Table 42 below detail the formats that shall be used via the ReadDataByIdentifier and WriteDataByIdentifier
Services.

CPR_074

Table 39 provides the length, resolution and operating range for each parameter identified by its recordDataIdentifier:

Table 39

Format of dataRecords

Parameter Name

Data length
(bytes)

Resolution

Operating range

TimeDate

HighResolutionTotalVehicleDistance

Kfactor

LfactorTyreCircumference

WvehicleCharacteristicFactor

TyreSize

NextCalibrationDate

SpeedAuthorised

RegisteringMemberState

VehicleRegistrationNumber

VIN

8

4

2

2

2

15

3

2

3

14

17

See details in Table 40

5 m/bit gain,
0 m offset

0,001 pulse/m/bit gain,
offset 0

0,125 10-3/bit gain
0 offset

0,001 pulse/m/bit gain,
0 offset

0 to + 21 055 406 km

0 to 64,255 pulse/m

0 to 8 031 m

0 to 64,255 pulse/m

ASCII

ASCII

See details in Table 41

1/256 km/h/bit gain,
0 offset

0 to 250 996 km/h

ASCII

ASCII

See details in Table 42

ASCII

ASCII

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CPR_075

Table 40 details the formats of the different bytes of the TimeDate parameter:

Table 40

Detailed format of TimeDate (recordDataIdentifier value # F00B)

Byte

Parameter definition

Resolution

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Seconds

Minutes

Hours

Month

Day

Year

Local Minute Offset

Local Hour Offset

1

2

3

Month

Day

Year

0,25 s/bit gain,
0 s offset

1 min/bit gain,
0 min offset

Operating range

0 to 59,75 s

0 to 59 min

1 h/bit gain, 0 h offset

0 to 23 h

1 month/bit gain,
0 month offset

1 to 12 month

0,25 day/bit gain,
0 day offset (see Note below Table 41)

0,25 to 31,75 day

1 year/bit gain,
+1985 year offset (see
Note below Table 41)

1 min/bit gain,
– 125 min offset

1 h/bit gain,
– 125 offset

1985 to 2235 year

– 59 to 59 min

– 23 to + 23 h

1 month/bit gain,
0 month offset

Operating range

1 to 12 month

0,25 day/bit gain,
0 day offset (see Note below)

0,25 to 31,75 day

1 Year/bit gain,
+1985 year offset (see
Note below)

1985 to 2235 year

CPR_076

Table 41 details the formats of the different bytes of the NextCalibrationDate parameter:

Detailed format of NextCalibrationDate (recordDataIdentifier value # F022)

Table 41

Byte

Parameter definition

Resolution

Note conerning the use of the “Day” parameter:
1. A value of 0 for the date is null. The values 1, 2, 3, and 4 are used to identify the first day of the month; 5, 6, 7, and 8 identify the second

day of the month; etc.

2. This parameter does not influence or change the hours parameter above.

Note concerning the use of byte “Year” parameter:
A value of 0 for the year identifies the year 1985; a value of 1 identifies 1986; etc.

CPR_078

Table 42 details the formats of the different bytes of the VehicleRegistrationNumber parameter:

Table 42

Detailed format of VehicleRegistrationNumber (recordDataIdentifier value # F07E)

Parameter definition

Resolution

Operating range

Byte

1

Code Page (as defined in Appendix
1)

2 to 14 Vehicle Registration Number

(as

defined in Appendix 1)

ASCII

ASCII

01 to 0A

ASCII

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Appendix 9

TYPE APPROVAL — LIST OF MINIMUM REQUIRED TESTS

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Type approval

The EEC type approval for a recording equipment (or component) or a tachograph card is based on:

— a security certification, performed by an ITSEC authority, against a security target fully compliant with Appendix 10

to this Annex,

— a functional certification performed by a Member State authority certifying that

the item tested fulfils the
requirements of this Annex in terms of functions performed, measurement accuracy and environmental charac-
teristics,

— an interoperability certification performed by the competent body certifying that the recording equipment (or
tachograph card) is fully interoperable with the necessary tachograph card (or recording equipment) models (see
Chapter VIII of this Annex).

This Appendix specifies which tests, as a minimum, must be performed by a Member State authority during the
functional tests, and which tests, as a minimum, must be performed by the competent body during the interoperability
tests. Procedures to follow to carry out the tests or the type of tests are not specified further.

The security certification aspects are not covered by this Appendix. If some tests requested for type approval are
performed during the security evaluation and certification process, then these tests do not need to be performed
again.
In this case, only the results of these security tests may be inspected. For information, the requirements
expected to be tested (or closely related to tests expected to be performed) during the security certification, are
marked with a “*” in this Appendix.

This Appendix considers separately the type approval of the motion sensor and of the vehicle unit, as components of
the recording equipment. Interoperability between every model of motion sensor and every model of vehicle unit is not
required, therefore the type approval for a motion sensor can be granted only in combination with the type approval of
a vehicle unit and vice versa.

1.2. References

The following references are used in this Appendix:

IEC 68-2-1

Environmental testing — Part 2: Tests — Tests A: Cold. 1990 + Amendment 2: 1994.

IEC 68-2-2

Environmental testing — Part 2: Tests — Tests B: Dry heat. 1974 + Amendment 2: 1994.

IEC 68-2-6

Basic environmental testing procedures — Test methods — Test Fc and guidance: Vibration (sinu-
soidal). 6th edition: 1985.

IEC 68-2-14

Basic environmental testing procedures — Test methods — Test N: Change of temperature. Modi-
fication 1: 1986.

IEC 68-2-27

Basic environmental testing procedures — Test methods — Test Ea and guidance: Shock. Edition 3:
1987.

IEC 68-2-30

Basic environmental testing procedures — Test methods — Test Db and guidance: Damp heat,
cyclic (12 + 12 — hour cycle). Modification 1: 1985.

IEC 68-2-35

Basic environmental testing procedure — Test methods — Test Fda: Random vibration wide band
— Reproductibility High. Modification 1: 1983.

IEC 529

Degrees of protection provided by enclosures (IP code). Edition 2: 1989.

IEC 61000-4-2

Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) — Testing and measurement
discharge immunity test: 1995/Amendment 1: 1998

techniques — Electrostatic

ISO 7637-1

Road vehicles — Electrical disturbance by conduction and coupling — Part 1: Passenger cars and
light commercial vehicles with nominal 12 V supply voltage — Electrical transient conduction along
supply lines only. Edition 2: 1990.

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ISO 7637-2

Road vehicles — Electrical disturbance by conduction and coupling — Part 1: Passenger cars and
light commercial vehicles with nominal 12 V supply voltage — Electrical transient conduction along
supply lines only. Edition 2: 1990.

ISO 7637-3

Road vehicles — Electrical disturbance by conduction and coupling — Part 3: Vehicles with 12 V or
24 V supply voltage — Electrical transient transmission by capacitive and inductive coupling via
lines other than supply lines. First Edition: 1995 + Cor 1: 1995.

ISO/IEC 7816-1

Identification cards — Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 1: Physical characteristics.
First edition: 1998.

ISO/IEC 7816-2

Information technology — Identification cards — Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 2:
Dimensions and location of the contacts. First edition: 1999.

ISO/IEC 7816-3

Information technology — Identification cards — Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts — Part 3:
Electronic signals and transmission protocol. Edition 2: 1997.

ISO/IEC 10373

Identification cards — Test methods. First edition: 1993.

2. VEHICLE UNIT FUNCTIONAL TESTS

No

Test

Description

Related
requirements

Administrative examination

Documentation

Correctness of documentation

Manufacturer test
results

Results of manufacturer test performed during integration.
Paper demonstrations

070, 071, 073

Visual inspection

Compliance with documentation

Identification/markings

Materials

Sealing

External interfaces

Functional tests

Functions provided

Modes of operation

Functions and data access rights

Monitoring cards insertion and withdrawal

Speed and distance measurement

Time measurement (test performed at 20 °C)

168, 169

163 to 167

251

002, 004, 244

006*, 007*,
008*, 009*, 106,
107

010*, 011*, 240,
246, 247

013, 014, 015*,
016*, 106

017 to 026

027 to 032

1.

1.1.

1.2.

2.

2.1.

2.2.

2.3.

2.4.

2.5.

3.

3.1.

3.2.

3.3.

3.4.

3.5.

3.6.

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No

Test

Description

3.7.

3.8.

3.9.

3.10.

3.11.

3.12.

3.13.

3.14.

3.15.

3.16.

3.17.

3.18.

3.19.

3.20.

3.21.

3.22.

3.23.

3.24.

3.25.

3.26.

3.27.

Monitoring driver activities

Monitoring driving status

Manual entries

Company locks management

Monitoring control activities

Detection of events and/or faults

Equipment identification data

Driver card insertion and withdrawal data

Driver activity data

Places data

Odometer data

Detailed speed data

Events data

Faults data

Calibration data

Time adjustment data

Control activity data

Company locks data

Download activity data

Specific conditions data

Recording and storing on tachographs cards

3.28.

Displaying

3.29.

Printing

3.30.

Warning

3.31.

Data downloading to external media

3.32.

3.33.

3.34.

3.35.

Output data to additional external devices

Calibration

Time adjustment

Non-interference of additional functions

Related
requirements

033 to 043, 106

044, 045, 106

046 to 050b

051 to 055

056, 057

059 to 069, 106

075*, 076*, 079

081* to 083*

084* to 086*

087* to 089*

090* to 092*

093*

094*, 095

096*

097*, 098*

100*, 101*

102*, 103*

104*

105*

105a*, 105b*

108, 109*,
109a*, 110*,
111, 112

072, 106, 113 to
128, PIC_001,
DIS_001

072, 106, 129 to
138, PIC_001,
PRT_001 to
PRT_012

106, 139 to 148,
PIC_001

072, 106, 149 to
151

152, 153

154*, 155*,
156*, 245

157*, 158*

003, 269

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No

Test

Description

Related
requirements

4.

Environmental tests

4.1.

Temperature

Verify functionality through:

159

— IEC 68-2-1, test Ad, with a test duration of 72 hours at
temperature (– 20 °C), 1 hour operating,

the lower
1 hour non operating,

— IEC 68-2-2, test Bd, with a test duration of 72 hours at
the higher temperature (+ 70 °C), 1 hour operating,
1 hour non operating

the vehicle unit

cycles: verify that

Temperature
can
withstand rapid changes in the environment temperature
through IEC 68-2-14 test Na, 20 cycles, each with
temperature varying from the lower temperature (– 20 °C)
to the higher temperature (+ 70 °C) and a 2 hours stay at
both the lower and the higher temperature

4.2.

Humidity

A reduced set of tests (among those defined in section 3 of
this table) can be carried out at the lower temperature, the
higher temperature and during the temperature cycles

Verify that the vehicle unit can withstand a cyclic damp
test) through IEC 68-2-30, test Db, six 24 hours
(heat
cycles, each temperature varying from + 25 °C to + 55 °C
and a relative humidity of 97 % at + 25 °C and equal to
93 % at + 55 °C

4.3.

Vibration

1. Sinusoidal vibrations:

160

163

verify that
vibrations with the following characteristics:

the vehicle unit can withstand sinusoidal

constant displacement between 5 and 11 Hz: 10 mm
peak

constant acceleration between 11 and 300 Hz: 5 g

This requirement is verified through IEC 68-2-6, test Fc,
with a minimum test duration of 3 × 12 hours (12
hours per axis)

2. Random vibrations:

verify that
vibrations with the following characteristics:

the vehicle unit can withstand random

frequency 5-150 Hz, level 0,02 g2/Hz

This requirement is verified through IEC 68-2-35, test
Ffda, with a minimum test duration of 3 × 12 hours (12
hours per axis), 1 hour operating, 1 hour non operating

The two tests described above are performed on two
different samples of the equipment type being tested

4.4.

Protection against water
and foreign bodies

Verify that the vehicle unit protection index according to
IEC 529 is at least IP 40, when mounted in operating
conditions in a vehicle

164, 165

4.5.

Over-voltage protection

Verify that the vehicle unit can withstand a power supply
of:

161

24V versions: 34 V at + 40 °C 1 hour

12V versions: 17 V at + 40 °C 1 hour

4.6.

Reverse polarity
protection

Verify that the vehicle unit can withstand an inversion of its
power supply

161

4.7.

Short-circuit protection

Verify that input output signals are protected against short
circuits to power supply and ground

161

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No

Test

Description

Related
requirements

5.

EMC tests

5.1.

5.2.

5.3.

Radiated emissions and
susceptibility

Compliance with Directive 95/54/EEC

162

Electrostatic
discharge

Conducted transient
susceptibility
on power supply

Compliance with IEC 61000-4-2, ± 2 kV (level 1)

162

For 24V versions: compliance with ISO 7637-2:

162

pulse 1a: Vs = – 100 V, Ri = 10 ohms

pulse 2: Vs = + 100 V, Ri = 10 ohms

pulse 3a: Vs = – 100 V, Ri = 50 ohms

pulse 3b: Vs = + 100 V, Ri = 50 ohms

pulse 4: Vs = – 16 V Va = – 12 V, t6=100 ms

pulse 5: Vs = + 120 V, Ri = 2,2 ohms, td = 250 ms

For 12V versions: compliance with ISO 7637-1:

pulse 1: Vs = – 100 V, Ri = 10 ohms

pulse 2: Vs = + 100 V, Ri = 10 ohms

pulse 3a: Vs = – 100 V, Ri = 50 ohms

pulse 3b: Vs = + 100 V, Ri = 50 ohms

pulse 4: Vs = – 6 V, Va = – 5 V, t6 = 15 ms

pulse 5: Vs = + 65 V, Ri = 3 ohms, td = 100 ms

Pulse 5 shall be tested only for vehicle units designed to be
installed in vehicles
for which no external common
protection against load dump is implemented

3. MOTION SENSOR FUNCTIONAL TESTS

No

Test

Description

Related
requirements

1.

1.1.

2.

2.1.

2.2.

2.3.

2.4.

3.

3.1.

3.2.

3.3.

Administrative examination

Documentation

Correctness of documentation

Visual inspection

Compliance with documentation

Identification/markings

Materials

Sealing

Functional tests

Sensor identification data

Motion sensor — vehicle unit pairing

Motion detection

Motion measurement accuracy

169, 170

163 to 167

251

077*

099*, 155

022 to 026

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No

Test

Description

Related
requirements

4.

4.1.

Environmental tests

Operating temperature

4.2.

Temperature cycles

4.3.

Humidity cycles

4.4.

Vibration

4.5.

Mechanical shock

Verify functionality (as defined in test No 3.3)
temperature range [– 40 °C; + 135 °C] through:

in

159

— IEC 68-2-1 test Ad, with a test duration of 96 hours at

the lowest temperature Tomin

— IEC 68-2-2 test Bd, with a test duration of 96 hours at

the highest temperature Tomax

Verify functionality (as defined in test No 3.3) through IEC
68-2-14 test Na, 20 cycles, each with temperature varying
from the
to the higher
temperature (+135 °C) and a 2 hours stay at both the
lower and the higher temperature

temperature

(– 40 °C)

lower

159

A reduced set of tests (among those defined in test 3.3) can
be carried out at
the higher
temperature,
temperature and during the temperature cycles

the lower

Verify functionality (as defined in test No 3.3) through IEC
68-2-30, test Db, six 24 hours cycles, each temperature
varying from + 25 °C to + 55 °C and a relative humidity
of 97 % at + 25 °C and equal to 93 % at + 55 °C

160

Verify functionality (as defined in test No 3.3) through IEC
68-2-6,
test Fc, with a test duration of 100 frequency
cycles:

163

constant displacement between 10 and 57 Hz: 1,5 mm
peak constant accelaration between 57 and 500 Hz: 20 g

Verify functionality (as defined in test No 3.3) through IEC
68-2-27, test Ea, 3 shocks in both directions of the 3
perpendicular axes

4.6.

4.7.

4.8.

5.

5.1.

5.2.

5.3.

Protection against water
and foreign bodies

Verify that the motion sensor protection index according to
IEC 529 is at least IP 64, when mounted in operating
conditions in a vehicle

Reverse polarity
protection

Verify that the motion sensor can withstand an inversion of
its power supply

Short circuit protection

Verify that input output signals are protected against short
circuits to power supply and ground

EMC

Radiated emissions and
susceptibility

Electrostatic
discharge

Conducted transient
susceptibility on data
lines)

Verify compliance with Directive 95/54/EEC

Compliance with IEC 61000-4-2, ± 2 kV (level 1)

Compliance with ISO7637-3 (level III)

163

165

161

161

162

162

162

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4. TACHOGRAPH CARDS FUNCTIONAL TESTS

No

Test

Description

Related
requirements

Administrative examination

Documentation

Correctness of documentation

Visual inspection

Make sure that all features for protection and visible data
are correctly printed on the card and compliant

171 to 181

Check dimension of the card and location of the contacts 184

1.

1.1.

2.

2.1.

3.

3.1.

4.

4.1.

Physical tests

Protocol tests

ATR

Check that the ATR is compliant

4.2.

T=0

Check that T=0 protocol is compliant

ISO/IEC 7816-1
ISO/IEC 7816-2

ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 304, 307,
308

ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 302, 303,
305

PTS

T=1

Card structure

4.3.

4.4.

5.

5.1.

Check that the PTS command is compliant by setting T=1
from T=0

ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 309 to 311

Check that T=1 protocol is compliant

Test that the file structure of the card is compliant by
checking the presence of the mandatory files in the card
and their access conditions

ISO/IEC 7816-3
TCS 303, / 306

TCS 312
TCS 400*, 401,
402, 403*, 404,
405*, 406, 407,
408*, 409, 410*,
411, 412, 413*,
414, 415*, 416,
417, 418*, 419

6.

6.1.

Functional tests

Normal processing

6.2.

Error messages

Environmental tests

7.

7.1.

Test at least once each allowed usage of each command (ex:
test the UPDATE BINARY command with CLA = '00', CLA
= '0C' and with different P1, P2 and Lc parameters)

TCS 313 to TCS
379

Check that the operations have actually been performed in
the card (ex: by reading the file the command has been
performed on)

Test at
Appendix 2) for each command

least once each error message (as specified in

Test at
least once every generic error
integrity errors checked during security certification)

(except

'6400'

Make sure that the cards work within the limit conditions
defined in accordance with ISO/IEC 10373

185 to 188
ISO/IEC 7816-1

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5. INTEROPERABILITY TESTS

1.

2.

No

Test

Description

Mutual authentication

Check that
tachograph card runs normally

the mutual authentication between the vehicle unit and the

Write/read tests

Execute a typical activity scenario on the vehicle unit. The scenario shall be
adapted to the type of card being tested and involve writings in as many EFs as
possible in the card

Verify through a card downloading that all corresponding recordings have
been properly made

Verify through a card daily printout that all corresponding recordings can be
properly read

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Appendix 10

GENERIC SECURITY TARGETS

This appendix specifies the minimum required content of motion sensor, vehicle unit and tachograph card security
targets.

In order to form the security targets against which they may seek security certification, manufacturers shall refine and
complete the documents as necessary, without amending nor deleting existing threats, objectives, procedural means and
security enforcing functions specifications.

MOTION SENSOR GENERIC SECURITY TARGET

1. Introduction

This document contains a description of the motion sensor, of the threats it must be able to counteract and of the
security objectives it must achieve. It specifies the required security enforcing functions. It states the claimed minimum
strength of security mechanisms and the required level of assurance for the development and the evaluation.

Requirements referred to in the document, are those of the body of Annex I B. For clarity of reading, duplication
sometimes arises between Annex I B body requirements and security target requirements. In case of ambiguity between
a security target requirement and the Annex I B body requirement referred by this security target requirement, the
Annex I B body requirement shall prevail.

Annex I B body requirements not referred by security targets are not the subject of security enforcing functions.

Unique labels have been assigned to threats, objectives, procedural means and SEF specifications for the purpose of
traceability to development and evaluation documentation.

2. Abbreviations, definitions and references

2.1. Abbreviations

ROM Read Only Memory

SEF

Security Enforcing Function

TBD

To Be Defined

TOE

Target Of Evaluation

VU

Vehicle Unit

2.2. Definitions

Digital Tachograph

Recording Equipment

Entity

A device connected to the motion sensor

Motion data

The data exchanged with the VU, representative of speed and distance travelled

Physically separated parts

Physical components of the motion sensor that are distributed in the vehicle as
opposed to physical components gathered into the motion sensor casing

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Security data

The specific data needed to support security enforcing functions (e.g. crypto keys)

System

Equipment, people or organisations,
equipment

involved in any way with the recording

User

A human user of the motion sensor (when not used in the expression “user data”)

User data

Any data, other than motion or security data, recorded or stored by the motion
sensor

2.3. References

ITSEC

ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria 1991

3. Product rationale

3.1. Motion sensor description and method of use

The motion sensor is intended to be installed in road transport vehicles. Its purpose is to provide a VU with secured
motion data representative of vehicle's speed and distance travelled.

The motion sensor is mechanically interfaced to a moving part of the vehicle, which movement can be representative of
vehicle's speed or distance travelled. It may be located in the vehicle's gear box or in any other part of the vehicle.

In its operational mode, the motion sensor is connected to a VU.

It may also be connected to specific equipment for management purposes (TBD by manufacturer)

The typical motion sensor is described in the following figure:

Figure 1

Typical motion sensor

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3.2. Motion sensor life cycle

The typical life cycle of the motion sensor is described in the following figure:

Figure 2

Motion sensor typical life cycle

3.3. Threats

This paragraph describes the threats the motion sensor may face.

3.3.1. Threats to access control policies

T.Access

Users could try to access functions not allowed to them

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3.3.2. Design related threats

T.Faults

T.Tests

T.Design

3.3.3. Operation oriented threats

T.Environment

Faults in hardware, software, communication procedures could place the motion
sensor in unforeseen conditions compromising its security

The use of non invalidated test modes or of existing back doors could compromise the
motion sensor security

Users could try to gain illicit knowledge of design either from manufacturer's material
(through theft, bribery, . . .) or from reverse engineering

Users could compromise the motion sensor security through environmental attacks
(thermal, electromagnetic, optical, chemical, mechanical, . . .)

T.Hardware

Users could try to modify motion sensor hardware

T.Mechanical_Origin

Users could try to manipulate the motion sensor input (e.g. unscrewing from gearbox,
. . .)

T.Motion_Data

T.Power_Supply

T.Security_Data

Users could try to modify the vehicle's motion data (addition, modification, deletion,
replay of signal)

Users could try to defeat the motion sensor security objectives by modifying (cutting,
reducing, increasing) its power supply

Users could try to gain illicit knowledge of security data during security data
generation or transport or storage in the equipment

T.Software

Users could try to modify motion sensor software

T.Stored_Data

Users could try to modify stored data (security or user data)

3.4. Security objectives

The main security objective of the digital tachograph system is the following:

O.Main

The data to be checked by control authorities must be available and reflect fully and
accurately the activities of controlled drivers and vehicles in terms of driving, work,
availability and rest periods and in terms of vehicle speed

Therefore the security objective of the motion sensor, contributing to the global security objective, is:

O.Sensor_Main

The data transmitted by the motion sensor must be available to the VU so as to allow
the VU to determine fully and accurately the movement of the vehicle in terms of
speed and distance travelled

3.5. Information Technology Security Objectives

The specific IT security objectives of the motion sensor contributing to its main security objective, are the following:

O.Access

O.Audit

The motion sensor must control connected entities' access to functions and data

The motion sensor must audit attempts to undermine its security and should trace
them to associated entities

O.Authentication

The motion sensor must authenticate connected entities

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O.Processing

The motion sensor must ensure that processing of input to derive motion data is
accurate

O.Reliability

The motion sensor must provide a reliable service

O.Secured_Data_Exchange

The motion sensor must secure data exchanges with the VU

3.6. Physical, personnel or procedural means

This paragraph describes physical, personnel or procedural requirements that contribute to the security of the motion
sensor.

3.6.1. Equipment design

M.Development

M.Manufacturing

3.6.2. Equipment delivery

M.Delivery

Motion sensor developers must ensure that the assignment of responsibilities during
development is done in a manner which maintains IT security

Motion sensor manufacturers must ensure that
the assignment of responsibilities
during manufacturing is done in a manner which maintains IT security, and that
during the manufacturing process the motion sensor is protected from physical
attacks which might compromise IT security

Motion sensor manufacturers, vehicle manufacturers and fitters or workshops must
ensure that handling of the motion sensor is done in a manner which maintains IT
security

3.6.3. Security data generation and delivery

M.Sec_Data_Generation

Security data generation algorithms must be accessible to authorised and trusted
persons only

M.Sec_Data_Transport

Security data must be generated, transported, and inserted into the motion sensor, in
such a way to preserve its appropriate confidentiality and integrity

3.6.4. Recording equipment installation, calibration, and inspection

M.Approved_Workshops

Installation, calibration and repair of recording equipment must be carried by trusted
and approved fitters or workshops

M.Mechanical_Interface

Means of detecting physical tampering with the mechanical interface must be provided
(e.g. seals)

M.Regular_Inpections

Recording equipment must be periodically inspected and calibrated

3.6.5. Law enforcement control

M.Controls

3.6.6. Software upgrades

M.Software_Upgrade

Law enforcement controls must be performed regularly and randomly, and must
include security audits

Software revisions must be granted security certification before they can be imple-
mented in a motion sensor

4. Security enforcing functions

4.1. Identification and authentication

UIA_101

The motion sensor shall be able to establish, for every interaction, the identity of any entity it is connected to.

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UIA_102

The identity of a connected entity shall consist of:

— an entity group:

— VU,

— Management device,

— Other,

— an entity ID (VU only).

UIA_103

The entity ID of a connected VU shall consist of the VU approval number and the VU serial number.

UIA_104

The motion sensor shall be able to authenticate any VU or management device it is connected to:

— at entity connection,

— at power supply recovery

UIA_105

The motion sensor shall be able to periodically re-authenticate the VU it is connected to.

UIA_106

The motion sensor shall detect and prevent use of authentication data that has been copied and replayed.

UIA_107 After (TBD by manufacturer and not more than 20) consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts have been

detected, the SEF shall:

— generate an audit record of the event,

— warn the entity,

— continue to export motion data in a non secured mode.

4.2. Access control

Access controls ensure that information is read from, created in, or modified into the TOE only by those authorised to
do so.

4.2.1. Access control policy

ACC_101 The motion sensor shall control access rights to function and data.

4.2.2. Data access rights

ACC_102 The motion sensor shall ensure that motion sensor identification data can be written once only (requirement 078).

ACC_103 The motion sensor shall accept and/or store user data from authenticated entities only.

ACC_104 The motion sensor shall enforce appropriate read and write access rights to security data.

4.2.3. File structure and access conditions

ACC_105 Application and data files structure and access conditions shall be created during the manufacturing process, and then

locked from any future modification or deletion.

4.3. Accountability

ACT_101 The motion sensor shall hold in its memory motion sensor identification data (requirement 077).

ACT_102 The motion sensor shall store in its memory installation data (requirement 099).

ACT_103 The motion sensor shall have a capability to output accountability data to authenticated entities at their request.

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4.4. Audit

AUD_101 The motion sensor shall, for events impairing its security, generate audit records of the events.

AUD_102 The events affecting the security of the motion sensor are the following:

— security breach attempts:

— authentication failure,

— stored data integrity error,

— internal data transfer error,

— unauthorised case opening,

— hardware sabotage.

— Sensor fault,

AUD_103 Audit records shall include the following data:

— date and time of the event,

— type of event,

— connected entity identity.

when required data is not available, an appropriate default indication shall be given (TBD by manufacturer).

AUD_104 The motion sensor shall send the generated audit records to the VU at the moment of their generation, and may also

store them in its memory.

AUD_105 In the case where the motion sensor stores audit records, it shall ensure that 20 audit records will be maintained
independent of audit storage exhaustion, and shall have a capability to output stored audit records to authenticated
entities at their request.

4.5. Accuracy

4.5.1. Information flow control policy

ACR_101 The motion sensor shall ensure that motion data may only been processed and derived from sensor mechanical input.

4.5.2. Internal data transfers

The requirements of this paragraph apply only if the motion sensor makes use of physically separated parts.

ACR_102

If data are transferred between physically separated parts of the motion sensor, the data shall be protected from
modification.

ACR_103 Upon detection of a data transfer error during an internal transfer, transmission shall be repeated and the SEF shall

generate an audit record of the event.

4.5.3. Stored data integrity

ACR_104 The motion sensor shall check user data stored in its memory for integrity errors.

ACR_105 Upon detection of a stored user data integrity error, the SEF shall generate an audit record.

4.6. Reliability of service

4.6.1. Tests

RLB_101 All commands, actions, or test points, specific to the testing needs of the manufacturing phase shall be disabled or
removed before the end of the manufacturing phase. It shall not be possible to restore them for later use.

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RLB_102

The motion sensor shall run self-tests, during initial start-up, and during normal operation to verify its correct operation.
The motion sensor self-tests shall include a verification of the integrity of security data and a verification of the integrity
of stored executable code (if not in ROM).

RLB_103 Upon detection of an internal fault during self-test, the SEF shall generate an audit record (sensor fault).

4.6.2. Software

RLB_104

There shall be no way to analyse or debug the motion sensor software in the field.

RLB_105

Inputs from external sources shall not be accepted as executable code.

4.6.3. Physical protection

RLB_106

If the motion sensor is designed so that it can be opened, the motion sensor shall detect any case opening, even without
external power supply for a minimum of 6 months. In such a case, the SEF shall generate an audit record of the event
(It is acceptable that the audit record is generated and stored after power supply reconnection).

If the motion sensor is designed so that it cannot be opened, it shall be designed such that physical tampering attempts
can be easily detected (e.g. through visual inspection).

RLB_107

The motion sensor shall detect specified (TBD by manufacturer) hardware sabotage.

RLB_108

In the case described above, the SEF shall generate an audit record and the motion sensor shall: (TBD by manufacturer).

4.6.4. Power supply interruptions

RLB_109

The motion sensor shall preserve a secure state during power supply cut-off or variations.

4.6.5. Reset conditions

RLB_110

In case of a power supply interruption, or if a transaction is stopped before completion, or on any other reset
conditions, the motion sensor shall be reset cleanly.

4.6.6. Data availability

RLB_111

The motion sensor shall ensure that access to resources is obtained when required and that resources are not requested
nor retained unnecessarily.

4.6.7. Multiple applications

RLB_112

If the motion sensor provides applications other than the tachograph application, all applications shall be physically
and/or logically separated from each other. These applications shall not share security data. Only one task shall be active
at a time.

4.7. Data exchange

DEX_101 The motion sensor shall export motion data to the VU with associated security attributes, such that the VU will be able

to verify its integrity and authenticity.

4.8. Cryptographic support

The requirements of this paragraph are applicable only where needed, depending upon security mechanisms used and
upon the manufacturer's solutions.

CSP_101 Any cryptographic operation performed by the motion sensor shall be in accordance with a specified algorithm and a

specified key size.

CSP_102

If the motion sensor generates cryptographic keys, it shall be in accordance with specified cryptographic key generation
algorithms and specified cryptographic key sizes.

CSP_103

If the motion sensor distributes cryptographic keys, it shall be in accordance with specified key distribution methods.

CSP_104

If the motion sensor accesses cryptographic keys, it shall be in accordance with specified cryptographic keys access
methods.

CSP_105

If the motion sensor destroys cryptographic keys, it shall be in accordance with specified cryptographic keys destruction
methods.

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5. Definition of security mechanisms

The security mechanisms, fulfilling the motion sensor security enforcing functions, are defined by the motion sensor
manufacturers.

6. Minimum strength of security mechanisms

The minimum strength of the motion sensor security mechanisms is High, as defined in [ITSEC].

7. Level of assurance

The target level of assurance for the motion sensor is ITSEC level E3, as defined in [ITSEC].

8. Rationale

The following matrixes give a rationale for the SEFs by showing:

— which SEFs or means counteract which threats,

— which SEFs fulfil which IT security objectives.

Threats

IT Objectives

n
i
g
i
r

O
_
l
a
c
i
n
a
h
c
e
M

t
n
e
m
n
o
r
i
v
n
E

e
r
a
w
d
r
a
H

a
t
a
D
_
n
o
i
t
o
M

y
l

p
p
u
S
_
r
e
w
o
P

a
t
a
D
_
y
t
i
r
u
c
e
S

a
t
a
D
_
d
e
r
o
t
S

e
r
a
w

t
f
o
S

s
s
e
c
c
A

t
i
d
u
A

n
o
i
t
a
c
i
t
n
e
h
t
u
A

g
n
i
s
s
e
c
o
r
P

y
t
i
l
i

b
a
i
l
e
R

e
g
n
a
h
c
x
E
_
a
t
a
D
_
d
e
r
u
c
e
S

s
s
e
c
c
A

s
t
l
u
a
F

s
t
s
e
T

n
g
i
s
e
D

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Physical Personnel Procedural means

Development

Manufacturing

Delivery

Security Data Generation

Security Data Transport

Approved Workshops

Mechanical interface

Regular Inspection

Law enforcement controls

Software Upgrades

Security Enforcing Functions

Identification and authentication

UIA_101 Entities identification

UIA_102 Entities identity

UIA_103 VU identity

UIA_104 Entities authentication

UIA_105 re-authentication

UIA_106 Unforgeable authentication

UIA_107 Authentication failure

Access control

ACC_101 Access control policy

ACC_102 Motion sensor ID

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Threats

IT Objectives

n
i
g
i
r

O
_
l
a
c
i
n
a
h
c
e
M

a
t
a
D
_
n
o
i
t
o
M

y
l
p
p
u
S
_
r
e
w
o
P

t
n
e
m
n
o
r
i
v
n
E

e
r
a
w
d
r
a
H

s
s
e
c
c
A

s
t
l
u
a
F

s
t
s
e
T

n
g
i
s
e
D

ACC_103 User data

ACC_104 Security Data

ACC_105 File structure and access conditions

x

e
g
n
a
h
c
x
E
_
a
t
a
D
_
d
e
r
u
c
e
S

n
o
i
t
a
c
i
t
n
e
h
t
u
A

g
n
i
s
s
e
c
o
r
P

y
t
i
l
i

b
a
i
l
e
R

a
t
a
D
_
y
t
i
r
u
c
e
S

x

x

e
r
a
w

t
f
o
S

a
t
a
D
_
d
e
r
o
t
S

x

x

x

s
s
e
c
c
A

t
i
d
u
A

x

x

x

Accountability

ACT_101 Motion sensor ID data

ACT_102 Pairing data

ACT_103 Accountability data

Audit

AUD_101 Audit records

AUD_102 Audit events list

AUD_103 Audit data

AUD_104 Audit tools

AUD_105 Audit records storage

Accuracy

ACR_101 Information flow control policy

ACR_102 Internal transfers

ACR_103 Internal transfers

ACR_104 Stored data integrity

ACR_105 Stored data integrity

Reliability

x

x

x

RLB_101 Manufacturing tests

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

RLB_102 Self tests

RLB_103 Self tests

RLB_104 Software analysis

RLB_105 Software input

RLB_106 Case opening

RLB_107 Hardware sabotage

RLB_108 Hardware sabotage

RLB_109 Power supply interruptions

RLB_110 Reset

RLB_111 Data Availability

RLB_112 Multiple Applications

Data exchange

DEX_101 Secured motion data export

Cryptographic support

CSP_101 Algorithms

CSP_102 key generation

CSP_103 key distribution

CSP_104 key access

CSP_105 key destruction

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

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1. Introduction

VEHICLE UNIT GENERIC SECURITY TARGET

This document contains a description of the vehicle unit, of the threats it must be able to counteract and of the security
objectives it must achieve. It specifies the required security enforcing functions. It states the claimed minimum strength
of security mechanisms and the required level of assurance for the development and the evaluation.

Requirements referred to in the document, are those of the body of Annex I B. For clarity of reading, duplication
sometimes arises between Annex I B body requirements and security target requirements. In case of ambiguity between
a security target requirement and the Annex I B body requirement referred by this security target requirement, the
Annex I B body requirement shall prevail.

Annex I B body requirements not referred by security targets are not the subject of security enforcing functions.

Unique labels have been assigned to threats, objectives, procedural means and SEF specifications for the purpose of
traceability to development and evaluation documentation.

2. Abbreviations, definitions and references

2.1. Abbreviations

PIN

Personal Identification Number

ROM Read Only Memory

SEF

Security Enforcing Function

TBD

To Be Defined

TOE

Target Of Evaluation

VU

Vehicle Unit

2.2. Definitions

Digital tachograph

Recording equipment

Motion data

The data exchanged with the motion sensor, representative of speed and distance
travelled

Physically separated parts.

Physical components of the VU that are distributed in the vehicle as opposed to
physical components gathered into the VU casing

Security data

The specific data needed to support security enforcing functions (e.g. crypto keys)

System

User

User data

2.3. References

Equipment, people or organisations,
equipment

involved in any way with the recording

Users are to be understood as human user of the equipment. Normal users of the
VU comprise drivers, controllers, workshops and companies

Any data, other than security data, recorded or stored by the VU, required by
Chapter III.12

ITSEC

ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria 1991

3. Product rationale

3.1. Vehicle Unit description and method of use

The VU is intended to be installed in road transport vehicles. Its purpose is to record, store, display, print and output
data related to driver activities.

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It is connected to a motion sensor with which it exchanges vehicle's motion data.

Users identify themselves to the VU using tachograph cards.

The VU records and stores user activities data in its data memory, it also records user activities data in tachograph cards.

The VU outputs data to display, printer and external devices.

The vehicle unit's operational environment while installed in a vehicle is described in the following figure:

Figure 1

VU operational environment

The VU general characteristics, functions and mode of operations are described in Chapter II of Annex I B.

The VU functional requirements are specified in Chapter III of Annex I B.

The typical VU is described in the following figure:

Figure 2

Typical VU (. . .) optional

It must be noted that although the printer mechanism is part of the TOE, the paper document once produced is not.

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3.2. Vehicle Unit life cycle

The typical life cycle of the VU is described in the following figure:

Figure 3

VU typical life cycle

3.3. Threats

This paragraph describes the threats the VU may face.

3.3.1. Threats to identification and access control policies

T.Access

Users could try to access functions not allowed to them (e.g. drivers gaining access to
calibration function)

T.Identification

Users could try to use several identifications or no identification

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3.3.2. Design related threats

T.Faults

T.Tests

T.Design

3.3.3. Operation oriented threats

T.Calibration_Parameters

Faults in hardware, software, communication procedures could place the VU in
unforeseen conditions compromising its security

The use of non invalidated test modes or of existing back doors could compromise the
VU security

Users could try to gain illicit knowledge of design either from manufacturer's material
(through theft, bribery, . . .) or from reverse engineering

Users could try to use mis-calibrated equipment (through calibration data modification,
or through organisational weaknesses)

T.Card_Data_Exchange

Users could try to modify data while exchanged between VU and tachograph cards
(addition, modification, deletion, replay of signal)

T.Clock

Users could try to modify internal clock

T.Environment

Users could compromise the VU security through environmental attacks (thermal,
electromagnetic, optical, chemical, mechanical, . . .)

T.Fake_Devices

Users could try to connect fake devices (motion sensor, smart cards) to the VU

T.Hardware

Users could try to modify VU hardware

T.Motion_Data

Users could try to modify the vehicle's motion data (addition, modification, deletion,
replay of signal)

T.Non_Activated

Users could use non activated equipment

T.Output_Data

Users could try to modify data output (print, display or download)

T.Power_Supply

Users could try to defeat the VU security objectives by modifying (cutting, reducing,
increasing) its power supply

T.Security_Data

Users could try to gain illicit knowledge of security data during security data
generation or transport or storage in the equipment

T.Software

Users could try to modify VU software

T.Stored_Data

Users could try to modify stored data (security or user data)

3.4. Security objectives

The main security objective of the digital tachograph system is the following:

O.Main

The data to be checked by control authorities must be available and reflect fully and
accurately the activities of controlled drivers and vehicles in terms of driving, work,
availability and rest periods and in terms of vehicle speed

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Therefore the security objectives of the VU, contributing to the global security objective, are the following:

O.VU_Main

The data to be measured and recorded and then to be checked by control authorities
must be available and reflect accurately the activities of controlled drivers and vehicles
in terms of driving, work, availability and rest periods and in terms of vehicle speed

O.VU_Export

The VU must be able to export data to external storage media in such a way as to
allow for verification of their integrity and authenticity

3.5. Information Technology Security Objectives

The specific IT security objectives of the VU contributing to its main security objectives, are the following:

O.Access

The VU must control user access to functions and data

O.Accountability

The VU must collect accurate accountability data

O.Audit

The VU must audit attempts to undermine system security and should trace them to
associated users

O.Authentication

The VU should authenticate users and connected entities (when a trusted path needs to
be established between entities)

O.Integrity

O.Output

The VU must maintain stored data integrity

The VU must ensure that data output reflects accurately data measured or stored

O.Processing

The VU must ensure that processing of inputs to derive user data is accurate

O.Reliability

The VU must provide a reliable service

O.Secured_Data_Exchange

The VU must secure data exchanges with the motion sensor and with tachograph cards

3.6. Physical, personnel or procedural means

This paragraph describes physical, personnel or procedural requirements that contribute to the security of the VU.

3.6.1. Equipment design

M.Development

M.Manufacturing

VU developers must ensure that the assignment of responsibilities during development
is done in a manner which maintains IT security

VU manufacturers must ensure that the assignment of responsibilities during manu-
facturing is done in a manner which maintains IT security, and that during the manu-
facturing process the VU is protected from physical attacks which might compromise
IT security

3.6.2. Equipment delivery and activation

M.Delivery

M.Activation

VU manufacturers, vehicle manufacturers and fitters or workshops must ensure that
handling of non activated VUs is done in a manner which maintains VU security

Vehicle manufacturers and fitters or workshops must activate the VU after its instal-
lation before the vehicle leaves the premises where installation took place

3.6.3. Security data generation and delivery

M.Sec_Data_Generation

Security data generation algorithms must be accessible to authorised and trusted
persons only

M.Sec_Data_Transport

Security data must be generated, transported, and inserted into the VU, in such a way
to preserve its appropriate confidentiality and integrity

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3.6.4. Cards delivery

M.Card_Availability

Tachograph cards must be available and delivered to authorised persons only

M.Driver_Card_Uniqueness

Drivers must possess, at one time, one valid driver card only

M.Card_Traceability

Card delivery must be traceable (white lists, black lists), and black lists must be used
during security audits

3.6.5. Recording equipment installation, calibration, and inspection

M.Approved_Workshops

Installation, calibration and repair of recording equipment must be carried by trusted
and approved fitters or workshops

M.Regular_Inpections

Recording equipment must be periodically inspected and calibrated

M.Faithful_Calibration

Approved fitters and workshops must enter proper vehicle parameters in recording
equipment during calibration

3.6.6. Equipment operation

M.Faithful_Drivers

3.6.7. Law enforcement control

M.Controls

3.6.8. Software upgrades

M.Software_Upgrade

Drivers must play by the rules and act responsibly (e.g. use their driver cards, properly
select their activity for those that are manually selected, . . .)

Law enforcement controls must be performed regularly and randomly, and must
include security audits

Software revisions must be granted security certification before they can be imple-
mented in a VU

4. Security enforcing functions

4.1. Identification and authentication

4.1.1. Motion sensor identification and authentication

UIA_201

The VU shall be able to establish, for every interaction, the identity of the motion sensor it is connected to.

UIA_202

The identity of the motion sensor shall consist of the sensor approval number and the sensor serial number.

UIA_203

The VU shall authenticate the motion sensor it is connected to:

— at motion sensor connection,

— at each calibration of the recording equipment,

— at power supply recovery.

Authentication shall be mutual and triggered by the VU.

UIA_204

The VU shall periodically (period TBD by manufacturer and more frequently than once per hour) re-identify and
re-authenticate the motion sensor it is connected to, and ensure that the motion sensor identified during the last
calibration of the recording equipment has not been changed.

UIA_205

The VU shall detect and prevent use of authentication data that has been copied and replayed.

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UIA_206 After (TBD by manufacturer and not more than 20) consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts have been
detected, and/or after detecting that the identity of the motion sensor has changed while not authorised (i.e. while
not during a calibration of the recording equipment), the SEF shall:

— generate an audit record of the event,

— warn the user,

— continue to accept and use non secured motion data sent by the motion sensor.

4.1.2. User identification and authentication

UIA_207

The VU shall permanently and selectively track the identity of two users, by monitoring the tachograph cards inserted in
respectively the driver slot and the co-driver slot of the equipment.

UIA_208

The user identity shall consist of:

— a user group:

— DRIVER (driver card),

— CONTROLLER (control card),

— WORKSHOP (workshop card),

— COMPANY (company card),

— UNKNOWN (no card inserted),

— a user ID, composed of:

— the card issuing Member State code and of the card number,

— UNKNOWN if user group is UNKNOWN.

UNKNOWN identities may be implicitly or explicitly known.

UIA_209

The VU shall authenticate its users at card insertion.

UIA_210

The VU shall re-authenticate its users:

— at power supply recovery,

— periodically or after occurrence of specific events (TBD by manufacturers and more frequently than once per day).

UIA_211 Authentication shall be performed by means of proving that the card inserted is a valid tachograph card, possessing
security data that only the system could distribute. Authentication shall be mutual and triggered by the VU.

UIA_212

In addition to the above, workshops shall be required to be successfully authenticated through a PIN check. PINs shall be
at least 4 characters long.

Note: In the case the PIN is transferred to the VU from an outside equipment located in the vicinity of the VU, PIN
confidentiality need not be protected during the transfer.

UIA_213

The VU shall detect and prevent use of authentication data that has been copied and replayed.

UIA_214 After 5 consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts have been detected, the SEF shall:

— generate an audit record of the event,

— warn the user,

— assume the user as UNKNOWN, and the card as non valid (definition z) and requirement 007).

C 126 E/194

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Official Journal of the European Communities

28.5.2002

4.1.3. Remotely connected company identification and authentication

Company remote connection capability is optional. This paragraph therefore applies only if this feature is implemented.

UIA_215

For every interaction with a remotely connected company, the VU shall be able to establish the company's identity.

UIA_216

The remotely connected company's identity shall consist of its company card issuing Member State code and of its
company card number.

UIA_217

The VU shall successfully authenticate the remotely connected company before allowing any data export to it.

UIA_218 Authentication shall be performed by means of proving that the company owns a valid company card, possessing

security data that only the system could distribute.

UIA_219

The VU shall detect and prevent use of authentication data that has been copied and replayed.

UIA_220 After 5 consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts have been detected, the VU shall:

— warn the remotely connected company.

4.1.4. Management device identification and authentication

VU manufacturers may foresee dedicated devices for additional VU management functions (e.g. Software upgrading,
security data reloading, . . .). This paragraph therefore applies only if this feature is implemented.

UIA_221

For every interaction with a management device, the VU shall be able to establish the device identity.

UIA_222

Before allowing any further interaction, the VU shall successfully authenticate the management device.

UIA_223

The VU shall detect and prevent use of authentication data that has been copied and replayed.

4.2. Access control

Access controls ensure that information is read from, created in, or modified into the TOE only by those authorised to
do so.

It must be noted that the user data recorded by the VU, although presenting privacy or commercial sensitivity aspects,
are not of a confidential nature. Therefore, the functional requirement related to data read access rights (requirement
011) is not the subject of a security enforcing function.

4.2.1. Access control policy

ACC_201 The VU shall manage and check access control rights to functions and to data.

4.2.2. Access rights to functions

ACC_202 The VU shall enforce the mode of operation selection rules (requirements 006 to 009).

ACC_203 The VU shall use the mode of operation to enforce the functions access control rules (requirement 010).

4.2.3. Access rights to data

ACC_204 The VU shall enforce the VU identification data write access rules (requirement 076)

ACC_205 The VU shall enforce the paired motion sensor identification data write access rules (requirements 079 and 155)

ACC_206 After the VU activation, the VU shall ensure that only in calibration mode, may calibration data be input into the VU

and stored into its data memory (requirements 154 and 156).

ACC_207 After the VU activation, the VU shall enforce calibration data write and delete access rules (requirement 097).

28.5.2002

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ACC_208 After the VU activation, the VU shall ensure that only in calibration mode, may time adjustment data be input into the
VU and stored into its data memory (This requirement does not apply to small time adjustments allowed by
requirements 157 and 158).

ACC_209 After the VU activation, the VU shall enforce time adjustment data write and delete access rules (requirement 100).

ACC_210 The VU shall enforce appropriate read and write access rights to security data (requirement 080).

4.2.4. File structure and access conditions

ACC_211 Application and data files structure and access conditions shall be created during the manufacturing process, and then

locked from any future modification or deletion.

4.3. Accountability

ACT_201 The VU shall ensure that drivers are accountable for their activities (requirements 081, 084, 087, 105a, 105b, 109 and

109a).

ACT_202 The VU shall hold permanent identification data (requirement 075).

ACT_203 The VU shall ensure that workshops are accountable for their activities (requirements 098, 101 and 109).

ACT_204 The VU shall ensure that controllers are accountable for their activities (requirements 102, 103 and 109).

ACT_205 The VU shall record odometer data (requirement 090) and detailed speed data (requirement 093).

ACT_206 The VU shall ensure that user data related to requirements 081 to 093 and 102 to 105b inclusive are not modified once

recorded, except when becoming oldest stored data to be replaced by new data.

ACT_207 The VU shall ensure that it does not modify data already stored in a tachograph card (requirements 109 and 109a)
except for replacing oldest data by new data (requirement 110) or in the case described in Appendix 1 Paragraph 2.1
Note.

4.4. Audit

Audit capabilities are required only for events that may indicate a manipulation or a security breach attempt. It is not
required for the normal exercising of rights even if relevant to security.

AUD_201 The VU shall, for events impairing the security of the VU, record those events with associated data (requirements 094,

096 and 109).

AUD_202 The events affecting the security of the VU are the following:

— Security breach attempts:

— motion sensor authentication failure,

— tachograph card authentication failure,

— unauthorised change of motion sensor,

— card data input integrity error,

— stored user data integrity error,

— internal data transfer error,

— unauthorised case opening,

— hardware sabotage,

C 126 E/196

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Official Journal of the European Communities

28.5.2002

— Last card session not correctly closed,

— Motion data error event,

— Power supply interruption event,

— VU internal fault,

AUD_203 The VU shall enforce audit records storage rules (requirement 094 and 096).

AUD_204 The VU shall store audit records generated by the motion sensor in its data memory.

AUD_205 It shall be possible to print, display and download audit records.

4.5. Object reuse

REU_201 The VU shall ensure that temporary storage objects can be reused without this involving inadmissible information flow.

4.6. Accuracy

4.6.1. Information flow control policy

ACR_201 The VU shall ensure that user data related to requirements 081, 084, 087, 090, 093, 102, 104, 105, 105a and 109 may

only be processed from the right input sources:

— vehicle motion data,

— VU's real time clock,

— recording equipment calibration parameters,

— tachograph cards,

— user's inputs.

ACR_201a The VU shall ensure that user data related to requirement 109a may only be entered for the period last card withdrawal

— current insertion (requirement 050a).

4.6.2. Internal data transfers

The requirements of this paragraph apply only if the VU makes use of physically separated parts.

ACR_202

If data are transferred between physically separated parts of the VU, the data shall be protected from modification.

ACR_203 Upon detection of a data transfer error during an internal transfer, transmission shall be repeated and the SEF shall

generate an audit record of the event.

4.6.3. Stored data integrity

ACR_204 The VU shall check user data stored in the data memory for integrity errors.

ACR_205 Upon detection of a stored user data integrity error, the SEF shall generate an audit record.

4.7. Reliability of service

4.7.1. Tests

RLB_201 All commands, actions or test points, specific to the testing needs of the manufacturing phase of the VU shall be

disabled or removed before the VU activation. It shall not be possible to restore them for later use.

RLB_202

The VU shall run self tests, during initial start-up, and during normal operation to verify its correct operation. The VU
self tests shall
include a verification of the integrity of security data and a verification of the integrity of stored
executable code (if not in ROM).

RLB_203 Upon detection of an internal fault during self test, the SEF shall:

— generate an audit record (except in calibration mode) (VU internal fault),

— Preserve the stored data integrity.

28.5.2002

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 126 E/197

4.7.2. Software

RLB_204

There shall be no way to analyse or debug software in the field after the VU activation.

RLB_205

Inputs from external sources shall not be accepted as executable code.

4.7.3. Physical protection

RLB_206

If the VU is designed so that it can be opened, the VU shall detect any case opening, except in calibration mode, even
without external power supply for a minimum of 6 months. In such a case, the SEF shall generate an audit record (It is
acceptable that the audit record is generated and stored after power supply reconnection).

If the VU is designed so that it cannot be opened, it shall be designed such that physical tampering attempts can be
easily detected (e.g. through visual inspection).

RLB_207 After its activation, the VU shall detect specified (TBD by manufacturer) hardware sabotage.

RLB_208

In the case described above, the SEF shall generate an audit record and the VU shall: (TBD by manufacturer).

4.7.4. Power supply interruptions

RLB_209

The VU shall detect deviations from the specified values of the power supply, including cut-off.

RLB_210

In the case described above, the SEF shall:

— generate an audit record (except in calibration mode),

— preserve the secure state of the VU,

— maintain the security functions, related to components or processes still operational,

— preserve the stored data integrity.

4.7.5. Reset conditions

RLB_211

In case of a power supply interruption, or if a transaction is stopped before completion, or on any other reset
conditions, the VU shall be reset cleanly.

4.7.6. Data availability

RLB_212

The VU shall ensure that access to resources is obtained when required and that resources are not requested nor retained
unnecessarily.

RLB_213

The VU must ensure that cards cannot be released before relevant data have been stored to them (requirements 015 and
016)

RLB_214

In the case described above, the SEF shall generate an audit record of the event.

4.7.7. Multiple applications

RLB_215

If the VU provides applications other than the tachograph application, all applications shall be physically and/or
logically separated from each other. These applications shall not share security data. Only one task shall be active at
a time.

4.8. Data exchange

This paragraph addresses data exchange between the VU and connected devices.

4.8.1. Data exchange with motion sensor

DEX_201 The VU shall verify the integrity and authenticity of motion data imported from the motion sensor

C 126 E/198

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28.5.2002

DEX_202 Upon detection of a motion data integrity or authenticity error, the SEF shall:

— generate an audit record,

— continue to use imported data.

4.8.2. Data exchange with tachograph cards

DEX_203 The VU shall verify the integrity and authenticity of data imported from tachograph cards.

DEX_204 Upon detection of card data integrity or authenticity error, the VU shall:

— generate an audit record,

— not use the data.

DEX_205 The VU shall export data to tachograph smart cards with associated security attributes such that the card will be able to

verify its integrity and authenticity.

4.8.3. Data exchange with external storage media (downloading function)

DEX_206 The VU shall generate an evidence of origin for data downloaded to external media.

DEX_207 The VU shall provide a capability to verify the evidence of origin of downloaded data to the recipient.

DEX_208 The VU shall download data to external storage media with associated security attributes such that downloaded data

integrity and authenticity can be verified.

4.9. Cryptographic support

The requirements of this paragraph are applicable only where needed, depending upon security mechanisms used and
upon the manufacturer's solutions.

CSP_201 Any cryptographic operation performed by the VU shall be in accordance with a specified algorithm and a specified key

size.

CSP_202

If the VU generates cryptographic keys, it shall be in accordance with specified cryptographic key generation algorithms
and specified cryptographic key sizes.

CSP_203

If the VU distributes cryptographic keys, it shall be in accordance with specified key distribution methods.

CSP_204

If the VU accesses cryptographic keys, it shall be in accordance with specified cryptographic keys access methods.

CSP_205

If the VU destroys cryptographic keys, it shall be in accordance with specified cryptographic keys destruction methods.

5. Definition of security mechanisms

Required security mechanisms are specified in Appendix 11.

All other security mechanisms are to be defined by manufacturers.

6. Minimum strength of security mechanisms

The minimum strength of the Vehicle Unit security mechanisms is High, as defined in [ITSEC].

7. Level of assurance

The target level of assurance for the Vehicle Unit is ITSEC level E3, as defined in [ITSEC].

28.5.2002

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 126 E/199

8. Rationale

The following matrixes give a rationale for the SEFs by showing:

— which SEFs or means counteract which threats,

— which SEFs fulfil which IT security objectives.

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x x x

x x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x x

x

x

Threats

IT Objectives

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x

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x x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

Physical Personnel Procedural Means

Development

Manufacturing

Delivery

Activation

Security Data Generation

Security Data Transport

Card Availability

One Driver Card

Card Traceability

Approved Workshops

Regular Inspection Calibration

Faithful workshops

Faithful drivers

Law enforcement controls

Software Upgrade

Security Enforcing Functions

Identification and Authentication

UIA_201 Sensor identification

UIA_202 Sensor identity

UIA_203 Sensor authentication

UIA_204 Sensor re-identification and
re-authentication

UIA_205 Unforgeable authentication

UIA_206 Authentication failure

UIA_207 Users identification

UIA_208 User identity

UIA_209 User authentication

UIA_210 User re-authentication

UIA_211 Authentication means

UIA_212 PIN checks

UIA_213 Unforgeable authentication

x x

x x

x x

x x

x x

x x

x x

C 126 E/200

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28.5.2002

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Threats

IT Objectives

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x

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x

x

x

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x

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x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x x

x

x

x x

x x

x x

x x

x x

x x

x x

x x

x

x

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x

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x x

x x

x x

x x

x x

x x

UIA_214 Authentication failure

UIA_215 Remote user identification

UIA_216 Remote user identity

UIA_217 Remote user authentication

UIA_218 Authentication means

UIA_219 Unforgeable authentication

UIA_220 Authentication failure

UIA_221 Management device Identifi-

cation

UIA_222 Management device Auth-

x x

entication

UIA_223 Unforgeable authentication

x x

Access Control

ACC_201 Access control policy

ACC_202 Access rights to functions

ACC_203 Access rights to functions

ACC_204 VU ID

ACC_205 Connected sensor ID

ACC_206 Calibration data

ACC_207 Calibration data

ACC_208 Time adjustment data

ACC_209 Time adjustment data

ACC_210 Security Data

x

x

x

x

ACC_211 File structure and access

x

conditions

Accountability

ACT_201 Drivers accountability

ACT_202 VU ID data

ACT_203 Workshops accountability

ACT_204 Controllers accountability

ACT_205 Vehicle movement

accountability

ACT_206 Accountability data modifi-

cation

ACT_207 Accountability data modifi-

cation

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C 126 E/201

Threats

IT Objectives

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Audit

AUD_201 Audit records

AUD_202 Audit events list

x

x

x x

x x

x

AUD_203 Audit records storage rules

AUD_204 Sensor audit records

AUD_205 Audit tools

Reuse

REU_201 Reuse

Accuracy

ACR_201 Information flow control

x

x

x

policy

ACR_202 Internal transfers

ACR_203 Internal transfers

ACR_204 Stored data integrity

ACR_205 Stored data integrity

Reliability

RLB_201 Manufacturing tests

RLB_202 Self tests

RLB_203 Self tests

RLB_204 Software analysis

RLB_205 Software input

RLB_206 Case opening

RLB_207 Hardware sabotage

RLB_208 Hardware sabotage

RLB_209 Power supply interruptions

RLB_210 Power supply interruptions

RLB_211 Reset

RLB_212 Data Availability

RLB_213 Card release

RLB_214 card session not correctly

closed

RLB_215 Multiple Applications

Data exchange

DEX_201 Secured motion data import

DEX_202 Secured motion data import

x x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

DEX_203 Secured card data import

x

x

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x

C 126 E/202

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28.5.2002

Threats

IT Objectives

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DEX_204 Secured card data import

DEX_205 Secured data export to cards

DEX_206 Evidence of origin

DEX_207 Evidence of origin

DEX_208 Secured export to external

media

Cryptographic support

CSP_201 Algorithms

CSP_202 key generation

CSP_203 key distribution

CSP_204 key access

CSP_205 key destruction

28.5.2002

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C 126 E/203

1. Introduction

TACHOGRAPH CARD GENERIC SECURITY TARGET

This document contains a description of the tachograph card, of the threats it must be able to counteract and of the
security objectives it must achieve. It specifies the required security enforcing functions. It states the claimed minimum
strength of security mechanisms, and the required level of assurance for the development and the evaluation.

Requirements referred to in the document, are those of the body of Annex I B. For clarity of reading, duplication
sometimes arises between Annex I B body requirements and security target requirements. In case of ambiguity between
a security target requirement and the Annex I B requirement referred by this security target requirement, the Annex I B
body requirement shall prevail.

Annex I B body requirements not referred by security targets are not the subject of security enforcing functions.

A tachograph card is a standard smart card carrying a dedicated tachograph application, and shall comply to up-to-date
functional and assurance security requirements applicable to smart cards. This security target therefore incorporates only
the extra security requirements needed by the tachograph application.

Unique labels have been assigned to threats, objectives, procedural means and SEF specifications for the purpose of
traceability to development and evaluation documentation.

2. Abbreviations, definitions and references

2.1. Abbreviations

IC

Integrated Circuit (Electronic component designed to perform processing and/or memory functions)

OS

Operating system

PIN

Personal Identification Number

ROM Read Only Memory

SFP

Security Functions Policy

TBD

To Be Defined

TOE

Target of Evaluation

TSF

TOE Security Function

VU

Vehicle Unit

2.2. Definitions

Digital tachograph

Recording equipment

Sensitive data

Data stored by the tachograph card that need to be protected for integrity, unauth-
orised modification and confidentiality (where applicable for
security data).
Sensitive data includes security data and user data

Security data

The specific data needed to support security enforcing functions (e.g. crypto keys)

System

User

Equipment, people or organisations involved in any way with the recording
equipment

Any entity (human user or external IT entity) outside the TOE that interacts with
the TOE (when not used in the expression “user data”)

C 126 E/204

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User data

Sensitive data stored in the tachograph card, other than security data. User data
include identification data and activity data

Identification data

Identification data include card identification data and cardholder identification data

Card identification data

User data related to card identification as defined by requirements 190, 191, 192,
194, 215, 231 and 235

Cardholder identification data

User data related to cardholder identification as defined by requirements 195, 196,
216, 232 and 236

Activity data

Activity data include cardholder activities data, events and faults data and control
activity data

Cardholder activities data

User data related to the activities carried by the cardholder as defined by
requirements 197, 199, 202, 212, 212a, 217, 219, 221, 226, 227, 229, 230a,
233 and 237

Events and faults data

User data related to events or faults as defined by requirements 204, 205, 207, 208
and 223

Control activity data

User data related to law enforcement controls as defined by requirements 210 and
225

2.3. References

ITSEC

ITSEC Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria 1991

IC PP

Smartcard Integrated Circuit Protection Profile — version 2.0 — issue September 1998. Registered at French
certification body under the number PP/9806

ES PP

Smart Card Integrated Circuit With Embedded Software Protection Profile — version 2.0 — issue June 99.
Registered at French certification body under the number PP/9911

3. Product Rationale

3.1. Tachograph card description and method of use

A tachograph card is a smart card, as described in [IC PP] and [ES PP], carrying an application intended for its use with
the recording equipment.

The basic functions of the tachograph card are:

— to store card identification and card holder identification data. These data are used by the vehicle unit to identify the
cardholder, provide accordingly functions and data access rights, and ensure cardholder accountability for his
activities,

— to store cardholder activities data, events and faults data and control activities data, related to the cardholder.

A tachograph card is therefore intended to be used by a card interface device of a vehicle unit. It may also be used by
any card reader (e.g. of a personal computer) which shall have full read access right on any user data.

During the end-usage phase of a tachograph card life-cycle (phase 7 of life-cycle as described in [ES PP]), vehicle units
only may write user data to the card.

The functional requirements for a tachograph card are specified in Annex I B body text and Appendix 2.

3.2. Tachograph card life-cycle

The tachograph card life-cycle conforms to smart card life cycle described in [ES PP].

28.5.2002

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C 126 E/205

3.3. Threats

In addition to the smart card general threats listed in [ES PP] and [IC PP], the tachograph card may face the following
threats:

3.3.1. Final aims

The final aim of attackers will be to modify user data stored within the TOE.

T.Ident_Data

A successful modification of identification data held by the TOE (e.g. the type of card,
or the card expiry date or the cardholder identification data) would allow a fraudulent
use of the TOE and would be a major threat to the global security objective of the
system.

T.Activity_Data

A successful modification of activity data stored in the TOE would be a threat to the
security of the TOE.

T.Data_Exchange

A successful modification of activity data (addition, deletion, modification) during
import or export would be a threat to the security of the TOE.

3.3.2. Attack paths

TOE's assets may be attacked by:

— trying to gain illicit knowledge of TOE's hardware and software design and especially of its security functions or
security data. Illicit knowledge may be gained though attacks to designer or manufacturer material (theft, bribery,
. . .) or through direct examination of the TOE (physical probing, inference analysis, . . .).

— taking advantage of weaknesses in TOE design or realisation (exploit errors in hardware, errors in software, trans-
mission faults, errors induced in TOE by environmental stress, exploit weaknesses of security functions such as
authentication procedures, data access control, cryptographic operations, . . .).

— modifying the TOE or its security functions through physical, electrical or logical attacks or combination of these.

3.4. Security Objectives

The main security objective of the entire digital tachograph system is the following:

O.Main

The data to be checked by control authorities must be available and reflect fully and
accurately the activity of controlled drivers and vehicles in terms of driving, work,
availability and rest period and in terms of vehicle speed.

Therefore the main security objectives of the TOE, contributing to this global security objective are the following:

O.Card_Identification_Data

The TOE must preserve card identification data and cardholder identification data
stored during card personalisation process.

O.Card_Activity_Storage

The TOE must preserve user data stored in the card by vehicle units.

3.5. Information Technology security objectives

In addition to the smart card general security objectives listed in [ES PP] and [IC PP], the specific IT security objectives of
the TOE that contributes to its main security objectives during its end-usage life-cycle phase are the following:

O.Data_Access

The TOE must limit user data write access rights to authenticated vehicle units.

O.Secure_Communications

The TOE must be able to support secure communication protocols and procedures
between the card and the card interface device when required by the application.

3.6. Physical, personnel or procedural means

The physical, personnel or procedural requirements that contribute to the security of the TOE are listed in [ES PP] and
[IC PP] (chapters security objectives for the environment).

C 126 E/206

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4. Security enforcing functions

This paragraph refines some of the permitted operations such as assignment or selection of [ES PP] and provides
additional SEF functional requirements.

4.1. Compliance to protection profiles

CPP_301

The TOE shall comply with [IC PP].

CPP_302

The TOE shall comply with [ES PP] as refined further.

4.2. User Identification and authentication

The card must identify the entity in which it is inserted and know whether it is an authenticated vehicle unit or not. The
card may export any user data whatever the entity it is connected to, except the control card which may export card
holder identification data to authenticated vehicle units only (such that a controller is ensured that the vehicle unit is not
a fake one by seeing his name on display or printouts).

4.2.1. User identification

Assignment (FIA_UID.1.1) List of TSF mediated actions: none.

Assignment (FIA_ATD.1.1) List of security attributes:

USER_GROUP:

VEHICLE_UNIT, NON_VEHICLE_UNIT,

USER_ID:

Vehicle Registration Number (VRN) and registering Member State Code (USER_ID is known for
USER_GROUP = VEHICLE_UNIT only).

4.2.2. User authentication

Assignment (FIA_UAU.1.1) List of TSF mediated actions:

— Driver and Workshop cards: Export user data with security attributes (card data download function),

— Control card: Export user data without security attributes except cardholder identification data.

UIA_301 Authentication of a vehicle unit shall be performed by means of proving that it possesses security data that only the

system could distribute.

Selection (FIA_UAU.3.1 and FIA_UAU.3.2): prevent.

Assignment (FIA_UAU.4.1) Identified authentication mechanism(s): any authentication mechanism.

UIA_302

The Workshop card shall provide an additional authentication mechanism by checking a PIN code (This mechanism is
intended for the Vehicle Unit to ensure the identity of the card holder, it is not intended to protect Workshop card
content).

4.2.3. Authentication failures

The following assignments describe the card reaction for each single user authentication failure.

Assignment (FIA_AFL.1.1) Number: 1, list of authentication events: authentication of a card interface device.

Assignment (FIA_AFL.1.2) List of actions:

— warn the entity connected,

— assume the user as NON_VEHICLE_UNIT.

The following assignments describe the card reaction in the case of failure of the additional authentication mechanism
required in UIA_302.

Assignment (FIA_AFL.1.1) Number: 5, list of authentication events: PIN checks (workshop card).

28.5.2002

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C 126 E/207

Assignment (FIA_AFL.1.2) List of actions:

— warn the entity connected,

— block the PIN check procedure such that any subsequent PIN check attempt will fail,

— be able to indicate to subsequent users the reason of the blocking.

4.3. Access control

4.3.1. Access control policy

During end-usage phase of its life-cycle, the tachograph card is the subject of one single access control Security Function
Policy (SFP) named AC_SFP.

Assignment (FDP_ACC.2.1) Access control SFP: AC_SFP.

4.3.2. Access control functions

Assignment (FDP_ACF.1.1) Access control SFP: AC_SFP.

Assignment (FDP_ACF.1.1) Named group of security attributes: USER_GROUP.

Assignment (FDP_ACF.1.2) Rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations
on controlled objects:

GENERAL_READ:

User data may be read from the TOE by any user, except cardholder identification data which
may be read from control cards by VEHICLE_UNIT only.

IDENTIF_WRITE:

Identification data may only be written once and before the end of phase 6 of card's life-cycle. No
user may write or modify identification data during end-usage phase of card's life-cycle.

ACTIVITY_WRITE:

Activity data may be written to the TOE by VEHICLE_UNIT only.

SOFT_UPGRADE:

No user may upgrade TOE's software.

FILE_STRUCTURE:

Files structure and access conditions shall be created before end of phase 6 of TOE's life-cycle and
then locked from any future modification or deletion by any user.

4.4. Accountability

ACT_301 The TOE shall hold permanent identification data.

ACT_302 There shall be an indication of the time and date of the TOE's personalisation. This indication shall remain unalterable.

4.5. Audit

The TOE must monitor events that indicate a potential violation of its security.

Assignment (FAU_SAA.1.2) Subset of defined auditable events:

— cardholder authentication failure (5 consecutive unsuccessful PIN checks),

— self test error,

— stored data integrity error,

— activity data input integrity error.

4.6. Accuracy

4.6.1. Stored Data Integrity

Assignment (FDP_SDI.2.2) Actions to be taken: warn the entity connected,

4.6.2. Basic data authentication

Assignment (FDP_DAU.1.1) List of objects or information types: Activity data.

Assignment (FDP_DAU.1.2) List of subjects: Any.

C 126 E/208

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4.7. Reliability of service

4.7.1. Tests

Selection (FPT_TST.1.1): during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation.

Note: during initial start-up means before code is executed (and not necessarily during Answer To Reset procedure).

RLB_301

The TOE's self tests shall include the verification of the integrity of any software code not stored in ROM.

RLB_302 Upon detection of a self test error the TSF shall warn the entity connected.

RLB_303 After OS testing is completed, all testing-specific commands and actions shall be disabled or removed. It shall not be
possible to override these controls and restore them for use. Command associated exclusively with one life cycle state
shall never be accessed during another state.

4.7.2. Software

RLB_304

There shall be no way to analyse, debug or modify TOE's software in the field.

RLB_305

Inputs from external sources shall not be accepted as executable code.

4.7.3. Power supply

RLB_306

The TOE shall preserve a secure state during power supply cut-off or variations.

4.7.4. Reset conditions

RLB_307

If power is cut (or if power variations occur) from the TOE, or if a transaction is stopped before completion, or on any
other reset conditions, the TOE shall be reset cleanly.

4.8. Data exchange

4.8.1. Data exchange with a vehicle unit

DEX_301 The TOE shall verify the integrity and authenticity of data imported from a vehicle unit.

DEX_302 Upon detection of an imported data integrity error, the TOE shall:

— Warn the entity sending the data,

— not use the data.

DEX_303 The TOE shall export user data to the vehicle unit with associated security attributes, such that the vehicle unit will be

able to verify the integrity and authenticity of data received.

4.8.2. Export of data to a non-vehicle unit (download function)

DEX_304 The TOE shall be able to generate an evidence of origin for data downloaded to external media.

DEX_305 The TOE shall be able to provide a capability to verify the evidence of origin of downloaded data to the recipient.

DEX_306 The TOE shall be able to download data to external storage media with associated security attributes such that down-

loaded data integrity can be verified.

4.9. Cryptographic Support

CSP_301

If the TSF generates cryptographic keys, it shall be in accordance with specified cryptographic key generation algorithms
and specified cryptographic key sizes. Generated cryptographic session keys shall have a limited (TBD by manufacturer
and not more than 240) number of possible use.

CSP_302

If the TSF distributes cryptographic keys, it shall be in accordance with specified cryptographic key distribution methods.

5. Definition of Security Mechanisms

Required security mechanisms are specified in Appendix 11.

All other security mechanisms are to be defined by the TOE manufacturer.

28.5.2002

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C 126 E/209

6. Claimed Minimum Strength of Mechanisms

The minimum strength of mechanisms for the Tachograph Card is High as defined in [ITSEC].

7. Level of Assurance

The target level of assurance for the Tachograph Card is ITSEC level E3, as defined in [ITSEC].

8. Rationale

The following matrixes give a rationale for the additional SEFs by showing:

— which SEFs counteract which threats,

— which SEFs fulfil which IT security objectives.

Threats

IT Objectives

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UIA_301 Authentication means

UIA_302 PIN checks

ACT_301 Identification data

ACT_302 Personalisation date

RLB_301 Software integrity

RLB_302 Self tests

RLB_303 Manufacturing tests

RLB_304 Software analysis

RLB_305 Software input

RLB_306 Power supply

RLB_307 Reset

DEX_301 Secured data import

DEX_302 Secured data import

DEX_303 Secured data export to VU

DEX_304 Evidence of origin

DEX_305 Evidence of origin

DEX_306 Secured export to external

media

CSP_301 key generation

CSP_302 key distribution

C 126 E/210

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Appendix 11

COMMON SECURITY MECHANISMS

1. GENERALITIES

This appendix specifies the security mechanisms ensuring:

— The mutual authentication between VUs and tachograph cards, including session key agreement,

— The confidentiality, integrity and authentication of data transferred between VUs and tachograph cards,

— The integrity and authentication of data downloaded from VUs to external storage media,

— The integrity and authentication of data downloaded from tachograph cards to external storage media.

1.1. References

The following references are used in this Appendix:

SHA-1

PKCS1

TDES

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). FIPS Publication 180-1:
Secure Hash Standard. April 1995

RSA Laboratories. PKCS # 1: RSA Encryption Standard. Version 2.0. October 1998

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). FIPS Publication 46-3: Data
Encryption Standard. Draft 1999

TDES-OP

ANSI X9.52, Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation. 1998

ISO/IEC 7816-4

Information Technology — Identification cards — Integrated circuit(s) cards with
contacts — Part 4: Interindustry commands for interexchange. First edition: 1995 +
Amendment 1: 1997

ISO/IEC 7816-6

Information Technology — Identification cards — Integrated circuit(s) cards with
contacts — Part 6: Interindustry data elements. First edition: 1996 + Cor 1: 1998

ISO/IEC 7816-8

Information Technology — Identification cards — Integrated circuit(s) cards with
contacts — Part 8: Security related interindustry commands. First edition 1999

ISO/IEC 9796-2

Information Technology — Security techniques — Digital signature schemes giving
message recovery — Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash function. First edition: 1997

ISO/IEC 9798-3

Information Technology — Security techniques — Entity authentication mech-
anisms — Part 3: Entity authentication using a public key algorithm. Second
edition 1998

ISO 16844-3

Road vehicles — Tachograph systems — Part 3: Motion sensor interface

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1.2. Notations and abbreviated terms

The following notations and abbreviated terms are used in this Appendix:

(Ka, Kb, Kc)

a key bundle for use by the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm

CA

CAR

CC

CG

CH

CHA

CHR

D()

DE

DO

d

e

E()

EQT

Hash()

Hash

KID

Km

KmVU

KmWC

m

n

PB

PI

PV

s

SSC

SM

TCBC

TDEA

TLV

VU

X.C

X.CA

Certification Authority

Certification Authority Reference

Cryptographic Checksum

Cryptogram

Command Header

Certificate Holder Authorisation

Certificate Holder Reference

Decryption with DES

Data Element

Data Object

RSA private key, private exponent

RSA public key, public exponent

Encryption with DES

Equipment

hash value, an output of Hash

hash function

Key Identifier

TDES key. Master Key defined in ISO 16844-3

TDES key inserted in vehicle units

TDES key inserted in workshop cards

message representative an integer between 0 and n–1

RSA keys, modulus

Padding Bytes

Padding Indicator byte (for use in Cryptogram for confidentiality DO)

Plain Value

signature representative, an integer between 0 and n-1

Send Sequence Counter

Secure Messaging

TDEA Cipher Block Chaining Mode of Operation

Triple Data Encryption Algorithm

Tag Length Value

Vehicle Unit

the certificate of user X issued by a certification authority

a certification authority of user X

X.CA.PKoX.C

the operation of unwrapping a certificate to extract a public key. It is an infix operator,
whose left operand is the public key of a certification authority, and whose right
operand is the certificate issued by that certification authority. The outcome is the
public key of the user X whose certificate is the right operand,

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X.PK

X.PK[I]

X.SK

X.SK[I]

'xx'

||

public key of a user X

RSA encipherment of some information I, using the public key of user X

RSA private key of a user X

RSA encipherment of some information I, using the private key of user X

a Hexadecimal value

concatenation operator

2. CRYPTOGRAPHIC SYSTEMS AND ALGORITHMS

2.1. Cryptographic systems

CSM_001 Vehicle units and tachograph cards shall use a classical RSA public-key cryptographic system to provide the following

security mechanisms:

— authentication between vehicle units and cards,

— transport of Triple-DES session keys between vehicle units and tachograph cards,

— digital signature of data downloaded from vehicle units or tachograph cards to external media.

CSM_002 Vehicle units and tachograph cards shall use a Triple DES symmetric cryptographic system to provide a mechanism for
data integrity during user data exchange between vehicle units and tachograph cards, and to provide, where applicable,
confidentiality of data exchange between vehicle units and tachograph cards.

2.2. Cryptographic algorithms

2.2.1. RSA algorithm

CSM_003 The RSA algorithm is fully defined by the following relations:

A more comprehensive description of the RSA function can be found in reference [PKCS1].

2.2.2. Hash algorithm

CSM_004 The digital signature mechanisms shall use the SHA-1 hash algorithm as defined in reference [SHA-1].

2.2.3. Data Encryption Algorithm

CSM_005 DES based algorithms shall be used in Cipher Block Chaining mode of operation.

3. KEYS AND CERTIFICATES

3.1. Keys generation and distribution

3.1.1. RSA Keys generation and distribution

CSM_006 RSA keys shall be generated through three functional hierarchical levels:

— European level,

— Member State level,

— Equipment level.

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CSM_007 At European level, a single European key pair (EUR.SK and EUR.PK) shall be generated. The European private key shall
be used to certify the Member States public keys. Records of all certified keys shall be kept. These tasks shall be handled
by a European Certification Authority, under the authority and responsibility of the European Commission.

CSM_008 At Member State level, a Member State key pair (MS.SK and MS.PK) shall be generated. Member States public keys shall
be certified by the European Certification Authority. The Member State private key shall be used to certify public keys to
be inserted in equipment (vehicle unit or tachograph card). Records of all certified public keys shall be kept with the
identification of the equipment to which it is intended. These tasks shall be handled by a Member State Certification
Authority. A Member State may regularly change its key pair.

CSM_009 At equipment level, one single key pair (EQT.SK and EQT.PK) shall be generated and inserted in each equipment.
Equipment public keys shall be certified by a Member State Certification Authority. These tasks may be handled by
equipment manufacturers, equipment personalisers or Member State authorities. This key pair is used for authentication,
digital signature and encipherement services

CSM_010

Private keys confidentiality shall be maintained during generation, transport (if any) and storage.

The following picture summarises the data flow of this process:

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3.1.2. RSA Test keys

CSM_011

For the purpose of equipment testing (including interoperability tests) the European Certification Authority shall
generate a different single European test key pair and at least two Member State test key pairs, the public keys of
which shall be certified with the European private test key. Manufacturers shall insert, in equipment undergoing type
approval tests, test keys certified by one of these Member State test keys.

3.1.3. Motion sensor keys

The confidentiality of the three TDES keys described below shall be appropriately maintained during generation,
transport (if any) and storage.

In order to support recording equipment compliant with ISO 16844, the European Certification Authority and the
Member State Certification Authorities shall, in addition, ensure the following:

CSM_036 The European Certification authority shall generate KmVU and KmWC, two independent and unique Triple DES keys, and

generate Km as:

The European Certification Authority shall forward these keys, under appropriately secured procedures, to Member
States Certification Authorities at their request.

CSM_037 Member States Certification Authorities shall:

— use Km to encrypt motion sensor data requested by motion sensor manufacturers (data to be encrypted with Km is

defined in ISO 16844-3),

— forward KmVU to vehicle unit manufacturers, under appropriately secured procedures, for insertion in vehicle units,

— ensure

that KmWC will be

inserted in all workshop cards

(SensorInstallationSecData in

Sensor_Installation_Data elementary file) during card personalisation.

3.1.4. T-DES session keys generation and distribution

CSM_012 Vehicle units and tachograph cards shall, as a part of the mutual authentication process, generate and exchange
necessary data to elaborate a common Triple DES session key. This exchange of data shall be protected for confi-
dentiality through an RSA crypt-mechanism.

CSM_013 This key shall be used for all subsequent cryptographic operations using secure messaging. Its validity shall expire at the
end of the session (withdrawal of the card or reset of the card) and/or after 240 use (one use of the key = one command
using secure messaging sent to the card and associated response).

3.2. Keys

CSM_014 RSA keys shall have (whatever the level) the following lengths: modulus n 1024 bits, public exponent e 64 bits

maximum, private exponent d 1024 bits.

CSM_015 Triple DES keys shall have the form (Ka, Kb, Ka) where Ka and Kb are independent 64 bits long keys. No parity error

detecting bits shall be set.

3.3. Certificates

CSM_016 RSA Public key certificates shall be “non self-descriptive” “Card Verifiable” certificates (Ref.: ISO/IEC 7816-8)

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3.3.1. Certificates content

CSM_017 RSA Public key certificates are built with the following data in the following order:

Data

Format

Bytes

Obs

INTEGER

OCTET STRING

OCTET STRING

TimeReal

OCTET STRING

1

8

7

4

8

Certificate Profile Identifier ('01' for this version)

Certification Authority Reference

Certificate Holder Authorisation

Certificate end of validity. Optional, 'FF' padded if not used

Certificate Holder Reference

OCTET STRING

128

Public key (modulus)

OCTET STRING

8

164

Public key (public exponent)

CPI

CAR

CHA

EOV

CHR

n

e

Notes:

1. The “Certificate Profile Identifier” (CPI) delineates the exact structure of an authentication certificate. It can be used as
an equipment internal identifier of a relevant headerlist which describes the concatenation of Data Elements within
the certificate.

The headerlist associated with this certificate content is as follows:

2. The “Certification Authority Reference” (CAR) has the purpose of identifying the certificate issuing CA, in such a way
that the Data Element can be used at the same time as an Authority Key Identifier to reference the Public Key of the
Certification Authority (for coding, see Key Identifier below).

3. The “Certificate Holder Authorisation” ((CHA) is used to identify the rights of the certificate holder. It consists of the
Tachograph Application ID and of the type of equipment to which the certificate is intended (according to Equip-
mentType data element, “00” for a Member State).

4. “Certificate Holder Reference” (CHR) has the purpose of identifying uniquely the certificate holder, in such a way that
the Data Element can be used at the same time as a Subject Key Identifier to reference the Public Key of the
certificate holder.

5. Key Identifiers uniquely identify certificate holder or certification authorities. They are coded as follows:

5.1. Equipment (VU or Card):

Data

Equipment serial
number

Date

Length

4 Bytes

2 Bytes

Type

1 Byte

Manufacturer

1 Byte

Value

Integer

mm jj BCD coding

Manufacturer specific Manufacturer code

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In the case of a VU, the manufacturer, when requesting certificates, may or may not know the identification of the
equipment in which the keys will be inserted.

In the first case, the manufacturer will send the equipment identification with the public key to its Member State
authority for certification. The certificate will then contain the equipment identification, and the manufacturer must
ensure that keys and certificate are inserted in the intended equipment. The Key identifier has the form shown above.

In the later case, the manufacturer must uniquely identify each certificate request and send this identification with the
public key to its Member State authority for certification. The certificate will contain the request identification. The
manufacturer must feed back its Member State authority with the assignment of key to equipment (i.e. certificate
request identification, equipment identification) after key installation in the equipment. The key identifier has the
following form:

Data

Certificate request
serial number

Date

Length

4 Bytes

2 Bytes

Type

1 Byte

Manufacturer

1 Byte

Value

BCD coding

mm jj BCD coding

'FF'

Manufacturer code

5.2. Certification Authority:

Data

Authority
cation

Identifi-

Key serial number

Additional info

Identifier

Length

4 Bytes

1 Byte

2 Bytes

Value

1
Byte
numerical code

nation

Integer

3 Bytes nation alpha-
numerical code

additional coding
(CA specific)

'FF FF' if not used

1 Byte

'01'

The key serial number is used to distinguish the different keys of a Member State, in the case the key is changed.

6. Certificate verifiers shall implicitly know that the public key certified is an RSA key relevant to authentication, digital
signature verification and encipherement for confidentiality services (the certificate contains no Object Identifier to
specify it).

3.3.2. Certificates issued

CSM_018 The certificate issued is a digital signature with partial recovery of the certificate content in accordance with ISO/IEC

9796-2, with the “Certification Authority Reference” appended.

With certificate content

Notes:

1. This certificate is 194 bytes long.

2. CAR, being hidden by the signature, is also appended to the signature, such that the Public Key of the Certification

Authority may be selected for the verification of the certificate.

3. The certificate verifier shall implicitly know the algorithm used by the Certification Authority to sign the certificate.

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4. The headerlist associated with this issued certificate is as follows:

3.3.3. Certificate verification and unwrapping

Certificate verification and unwrapping consists in verifying the signature in accordance with ISO/IEC 9796-2, retrieving
the certificate content and the public key contained: X.PK = X.CA.PKoX.C, and verifying the validity of the certificate.

CSM_019

It involves the following steps:

Verify signature and retrieve content:

— from X.C retrieve Sign, Cn' and CAR':

— from CAR' select appropriate Certification Authority Public Key (if not done before through other means)

— open Sign with CA Public Key: Sr' = X.CA.PK [Sign],

— check Sr' starts with '6A' and ends with 'BC'

— compute Cr' and H' from:

— Recover certificate content C' = Cr' || Cn',

— check Hash(C') = H'

If the checks are OK the certificate is a genuine one, its content is C'.

Verify validity. From C':

— if applicable, check End of validity date,

Retrieve and store public key, Key Identifier, Certificate Holder Authorisation and Certificate End of Validity from C':

— X.PK = n || e

— X.KID = CHR

— X.CHA = CHA

— X.EOV = EOV

4. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM

Mutual authentication between cards and VUs is based on the following principle:

Each party shall demonstrate to the other that it owns a valid key pair, the public key of which has been certified by a
Member State certification authority, itself being certified by the European certification authority.

Demonstration is made by signing with the private key a random number sent by the other party, who must recover the
random number sent when verifying this signature.

The mechanism is triggered at card insertion by the VU. It starts with the exchange of certificates and unwrapping of
public keys, and ends with the setting of a session key.

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CSM_020 The following protocol shall be used (arrows indicate commands and data exchanged (see Appendix 2)):

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5. VU-CARDS DATA TRANSFER CONFIDENTIALITY, INTEGRITY AND AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS

5.1 Secure Messaging

CSM_021 VU-Cards data transfers integrity shall be protected through Secure Messaging in accordance with references [ISO/IEC

7816-4] and [ISO/IEC 7816-8].

CSM_022 When data need to be protected during transfer, a Cryptographic Checksum Data Object shall be appended to the Data
Objects sent within the command or the response. The Cryptographic Checksum shall be verified by the receiver.

CSM_023 The cryptographic checksum of data sent within a command shall integrate the command header, and all data objects

sent (= > CLA = '0C', and all data objects shall be encapsulated with tags in which b1 = 1).

CSM_024 The response status-information bytes shall be protected by a cryptographic checksum when the response contains no

data field.

CSM_025 Cryptographic checksums shall be 4 Bytes long.

The structure of commands and responses when using secure messaging is therefore the following:

The DOs used are a partial set of the Secure Messaging DOs described in ISO/IEC 7816-4:

Tag

'81'

'97'

'99'

'8E'

'87'

Mnemonic

Meaning

TPV

TLE

TSW

TCC

TPI CG

Plain Value not BER-TLV coded data (to be protected by CC)

Value of Le in the unsecured command (to be protected by CC)

Status-Info (to be protected by CC)

Cryptographic Checksum

Padding Indicator Byte || Cryptogram (Plain Value not coded in BER-TLV)

Given an unsecured command response pair:

Command header

Command body

CLA INS

P1

P2

[Lc-field]

[Data field]

[Le-field]

four bytes

L bytes, denoted as B1 to BL

Response body

Response trailer

[Data field]

Lr data bytes

SW1

SW2

two bytes

The corresponding secured command response pair is:

Secured command:

Command header (CH)

CLA INS

P1

P2

[New Lc field]

'OC'

Length of New
Data field

Command body

[New Data field]

[New Le field]

TPV

LPV

PV

TLE

LLE

'81'

Lc Data
field

'97'

'01'

Le

Le

TCC

LCC

CC

'00'

'8E'

'04'

CC

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Data to be integrated in checksum = CH || PB || TPV || LPV || PV || TLE || LLE || Le || PB

PB = Padding Bytes (80 .. 00) in accordance with ISO-IEC 7816-4 and ISO 9797 method 1.

DOs PV and LE are present only when there is some corresponding data in the unsecured command.

Secured response:

1. Case where response data field is not empty and needs not to be protected for confidentiality:

Response body

[New Data field]

Response trailer

new SW1 SW2

TPV

'81'

LPV

Lr

PV

TCC

Datafield

'8E'

LCC

'04'

CC

CC

Data to be integrated in checksum = TPV || LPV || PV || PB

2. Case where response data field is not empty and needs to be protected for confidentiality:

Response body

[New Data field]

Response trailer

new SW1 SW2

TPI CG

LPI CG

PI CG

'87'

PI || CG

TCC

'8E'

LCC

'04'

CC

CC

Data to be carried by CG: non BER-TLV coded data and padding bytes.

Data to be integrated in checksum = TPI CG || LPI CG || PI CG || PB

3. Case where response data field is empty:

Response body

[New Data field]

Response trailer

new SW1 SW2

TSW

'99'

LSW

'02'

SW

New SW1 SW2

TCC

'8E'

LCC

'04'

CC

CC

Data to be integrated in checksum = TSW || LSW || SW || PB

5.2. Treatment of Secure Messaging errors

CSM_026 When the tachograph card recognises an SM error while interpreting a command, then the status bytes must be
returned without SM. In accordance with ISO/IEC 7816-4, the following status bytes are defined to indicate SM errors:

'66 88': Verification of Cryptographic Checksum failed,

'69 87': Expected SM Data Objects missing,

'69 88': SM Data Objects incorrect.

CSM_027 When the tachograph card returns status bytes without SM DOs or with an erroneous SM DO, the session must be

aborted by the VU.

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5.3. Algorithm to compute Cryptographic Checksums

CSM_028 Cryptographic checksums are built using a retail MACs in accordance with ANSI X9.19 with DES:

— Initial stage: The initial check block y0 is E(Ka, SSC).

— Sequential stage: The check blocks y1, . . ., yn are calculated using Ka.

— Final stage: The cryptographic checksum is calculated from the last check block yn as follows: E(Ka, D(Kb, yn)).

where E() means encryption with DES, and D() means decryption with DES.

The four most significant bytes of the cryptographic checksum are transferred

CSM_029 The Send Sequence Counter (SSC) shall be initiated during key agreement procedure to:

Initial SSC: Rnd3 (4 least significant bytes) || Rnd1 (4 least significant bytes).

CSM_030 The Send Sequence Counter shall be increased by 1 each time before a MAC is calculated (i.e. the SSC for the first

command is Initial SSC + 1, the SSC for the first response is Initial SSC + 2).

The following figure shows the calculation of the retail MAC:

5.4. Algorithm to compute cryptograms for confidentiality DOs

CSM_031 Cryptograms are computed using TDEA in TCBC mode of operation in accordance with references [TDES] and

[TDES-OP] and with the Null vector as Initial Value block.

The following figure shows the application of keys in TDES:

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6. DATA DOWNLOAD DIGITAL SIGNATURE MECHANISMS

CSM_032 The Intelligent Dedicated Equipment (IDE) stores data received from an equipment (VU or card) during one download
session within one physical data file. This file must contain the certificates MSi.C and EQT.C. The file contains digital
signatures of data blocks as specified in Appendix 7 Data Downloading Protocols.

CSM_033 Digital signatures of downloaded data shall use a digital signature scheme with appendix such, that downloaded data

may be read without any decipherment if desired.

6.1. Signature generation

CSM_034 Data signature generation by the equipment shall follow the signature scheme with appendix defined in reference

[PKCS1] with the SHA-1 hash function:

Signature = EQT.SK['00' || '01' || PS || '00' || DER(SHA-1(Data))]

PS = Padding string of octets with value 'FF' such that length is 128.

DER(SHA-1(M)) is the encoding of the algorithm ID for the hash function and the hash value into an ASN.1 value of
type DigestInfo (distinguished encoding rules):

'30'||'21'||'30'||'09'||'06'||'05'||'2B'||'0E'||'03'||'02'||'1A'||'05'||'00'||'04'||'14'||Hash Value.

6.2. Signature verification

CSM_035 Data signature verification on downloaded data shall follow the signature scheme with appendix defined in reference

[PKCS1] with the SHA-1 hash function.

The European public key EUR.PK needs to be known independently (and trusted) by the verifier.

The following table illustrates the protocol an IDE carrying a Control card can follow to verify the integrity of data
downloaded and stored on the ESM (External Storage media). The control card is used to perform the decipherement of
digital signatures. This function may in this case not be implemented in the IDE.

The equipment that has downloaded and signed the data to be analysed is denoted EQT.

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