Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Financing of civilian crisis management operations
Date: 2001-11-29
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: EU action, EU financing, civil defence, common foreign and security policy, international conflict, peacekeeping, settlement of disputes

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, xxx
COM(2001) yyy final

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

FINANCING OF CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

FINANCING OF CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

1.

SUMMARY

The EU needs more effective and reliable procedures for the rapid financing of civilian crisis
interventions, including CFSP actions.

Financing of such actions through the regular budget has been too cumbersome in the past.
Yet the EC budget still offers the best basis upon which to build, not least because it is best
context in which to ensure principles of good governance and transparency, and in which to
ensure coherence of EU action (both CFSP and Community). If the regular budget is to be
used, however, it will be necessary to overcome both resource constraints and procedural
obstacles.

• As concerns resources: Recourse could be made to a new flexibility instrument for civil
crisis interventions, including CFSP action as well as to the current emergency reserve
within the budget. The creation of a new flexibility instrument would permit the release of
additional credits for external action in unforeseen and exceptional crisis situations, while
remaining within the overall financial perspectives agreed at Berlin. Similar recourse to the
emergency reserve in cases of particular urgency, while respecting the priority given to
flexibility and resources in EU crisis
humanitarian action, would provide further
management.

• As concerns procedures: current financing mechanisms within the budget need to be
reviewed and improved. This is true equally for CFSP financing procedures and for regular
Community instruments. For
the new flexibility instrument a
transparent and fast procedure has to be sought.

the management of

Continued use of the EC budget for most crisis management actions would not preclude the
option of Member State contributions in exceptional cases, in accordance with Article 28 (3)
of the EU Treaty.

2.

INTRODUCTION

Since its inception the European Community has been involved through its external policy in
conflict prevention and crisis management. The Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam
introduced new instruments for political/diplomatic and security/military action under the
CFSP/ESDP. In parallel with these developments,
international experience with crisis
management over the last decade has shown a change in the nature and scale of crises to
which the European Union must respond. The combination of these two developments poses a
double challenge to the Commission:

• of improving Community instruments and procedures to make them more flexible and

adapted to the needs of crisis response; and

2

• of ensuring co-ordinated and cohesive development between Community instruments and

the new instruments available under CFSP/ESDP.

The existing pillar structure of the European Union may not be the optimal architecture for a
fully integrated approach, and the next Intergovernmental Conference may have to address
this issue. But that is for the future. Our task now is to develop effective and integrated
mechanisms on the basis of the Treaty we have. There are many examples in the past few
years of coherent and co-ordinated interaction of European Union instruments within the
existing structures, most recently in fYROM.

The Commission is playing its full part in the European Union’s efforts to develop an
effective overall crisis management and conflict prevention capability. In a crisis, the Union
must be able to act quickly. There must be no confusion over the distribution of tasks.

With a view to improving its capacity to respond fast and effectively to crises the
Commission has developed tools in order to mobilise Community instruments more quickly.
The recently adopted Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)1 is an example. It allows fast access
to necessary budgetary financial means by operating through a separate budget line in the
regular budget. The Commission is also seeking to ensure that programmes under the
Community instruments are designed in such a way as to permit flexible and rapid response in
case of crises.2

Military aspects of crisis operations cannot be covered from the regular budget of the
European Communities. It is for this reason that new structures3 have been developed within
the Council Secretariat and that ad-hoc arrangements are being put in place for the funding of
operations with military implications.

Article 28 of the EU Treaty foresees that, as a general rule, expenditure generated by CFSP
action in situations of crisis should be charged to the regular budget. This helps to ensure the
consistency and continuity of the European Union’s external activities. The Treaty, however,
also leaves open the possibility of a derogation from this rule.

3.

CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT UNDER CFSP AND COMMUNITY INSTRUMENTS

In two recent reports, one on CFSP and one on the European Agency for Reconstruction in
Kosovo, the European Court of Auditors comes to very different assessments: While the
Agency is praised for its diligence and effectiveness, the management of CFSP is seen as
being cumbersome and often much too slow. In the case of the CFSP both, an insufficient
involvement of the Commission in the preparatory phase of actions as well as coordination
problems
cited. Among other
recommendations, including the request for a more transparent management of CFSP, the
Court of Auditors calls for a more timely decision-making in Council where existing actions
are to be prolonged and for using the potential for faster management by the Commission.

and other difficulties within the Commission are

The Community has considerable experience in conflict prevention, crisis management and
crisis resolution. For example, in South Africa, the Community gave active support to front-

1

2

3

Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism, OJ L 57, 27.2.2001, p. 5.
As advocated in the Commission’s Communication on Conflict Prevention COM(2001) 211 final.
See Presidency Conclusions of the Nice European Council Meeting, 7,8 and 9 December 2000, Annex
VI.

3

line states and NGOs during the apartheid era. Since 1994 it has intervened to support the
the
transition, and helped with electoral and institution-building efforts. In Guatemala,
Community has helped to implement the peace agreement and contributed to institution-
building in key sectors such as rule of law and police. In East Timor the Commission is
supporting the UNTAET administration. And in the Balkans the Community is leading one of
the UN pillars in Kosovo, engaged in reconstruction efforts as well as support to local
administration and civil society.

The European Council in Feira identified four priority areas for civilian crisis management
intervention: police, rule of law, civil protection and civilian administration. These priority
areas fall within a much broader set of civilian crisis management interventions, for which the
Community has clear competence,
trade, economic incentives,
humanitarian interventions, rehabilitation and institution building. For many actions which
might be contemplated within the four priority areas identified at Feira the Community has
competence as well as valuable expertise.

including, for example,

It is the aim and content of an envisaged operation that determines the related legal basis4 and
consequently the source of financing under the budget – whether Community or CFSP. The
extent of Community competence for European Union civilian crisis management is not
always clearly understood. Annex I clarifies some of the boundaries between First and Second
Pillar.

In budgetary terms, there are three possible categories of crisis management operations:

a)

b)

c)

operations under a Community instrument5, which are financed under the appropriate
Community budget line;

CFSP operations not having military or defence implications6, which are financed
under the CFSP budget line;

ESDP operations having military or defence implications, which fall outside the
Community budget.

As regards a) – operations under Community instruments – it is worth noting that these may
include actions which might at first sight be thought of as ‘CFSP’. For example, demining,
civilian emergency assistance, Civil Protection assistance intervention, human rights,
institution building, election monitoring, consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, food
aid,
reconstruction,
infrastructure development as well as economic aid fall under Community instruments.

securing the livelihoods and safety of

rehabilitation,

refugees,

4

5

6

See established case law of the European Court of Justice, recently confirmed by Case C-376/98
Germany v European Parliament and Council [2000] ECR I-8419.
See non-exhaustive overview of range of possible crisis management operations under the Community
(1stpillar) in Annex I.
CFSP operations not having military or defence implications are for example structural and long-term
issues such as non-proliferation, disarmament, security monitoring, security support for peace processes
and stabilisation efforts, projects to combat terrorism, political facilitation and tasks undertaken by
Special Representatives of the European Union as well as related preparatory fact-finding missions.
Further progress of ESDP under CFSP will allow the European Union eventually to perform military
actions, thus contributing to an overall crisis management capability. But the military dimension of
crisis management is only one part of overall CFSP action in conflict and crisis situations.

4

As regards b) – CFSP operations without military or defence implications – Community
budgetary law applies in full when such operations are charged to the budget (which is the
general rule under Article 28 – though there is also an exceptional procedure to charge
expenditure to Member States). The Council decides a Joint Action and the budgetary
resources to put into it, and the Commission commits, contracts and disburses the budget
allocated to the action. Such expenditure is subject to external controls by the Court of
Auditors, the legal control of budgetary implementation by the European Court of Justice and
the discharge procedure at
the European Parliament. A transparent and democratically
accountable procedure is thus assured for the financing of CFSP operations – though that
procedure is admittedly too cumbersome at present.

As regards c) – ESDP operations having military or defence implications – the permanent
political and military structures which have been set up in the past two years are designed to
ensure synergy between the civilian and military aspects. Once again, it is the aim and content
of an envisaged operation, not the nature of the implementing body, that determines the
related legal basis and the source of financing for an action. In a future deployment of the
Rapid Reaction Force or other military actions, the situation is clear: financing from within
the Community budget, under any title, will be precluded. But even a military body may
perform CFSP crisis management tasks without rendering the action automatically ‘military’7.
This may be the case, for example, for certain monitoring or police missions.

4.

PROCEDURAL AND BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CFSP
OPERATIONS

It is clear that the present procedures related to CFSP operations within the budget are too
cumbersome for crisis situations. Furthermore, there would not be sufficient resources in the
present CFSP budget if the European Union ever decided, say, to extend the EU Monitoring
Mission in the Balkans, or to undertake a major police operation. Both procedural and
budgetary constraints, in other words, threaten to reduce the potential and credibility of the
European Union’s new global role.

4.1.

Overcoming procedural constraints

If CFSP is to continue to be financed within the budget, it is essential to develop new
procedures adapted to the particular needs of crisis management, notably to increase speed
and flexibility of disbursement. The practice of CFSP implementation does not yet match the
political expectations. The budgetary rules contain no urgency mechanism for the rapid
implementation of CFSP operations. This contrasts with the situation in other areas. It is
therefore important that the provisions for CFSP and crisis management foreseen in the
proposal8 for a recast Financial Regulation (as adopted on 30 October by the Commission) are
accepted by the Budgetary Authority.

7

8

Note that for example in line with the principle that the aim and content of an envisaged operation
determines the legal basis, Article 3 of Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid, OJ L
163, 2.7.1996, p. 1. This Community instrument allows for the financing of outside staff, including
military personnel, for the storage, transport, logistics and distribution of humanitarian aid. Said
Community instrument is also one of the possible financial sources for civil protection assistance.
Of specific interest among the proposed provisions are:
(i) the derogation to the principle that subsidies to third parties should be pre-programmed;
(ii) a possible derogation from the mandatory ex-post publishing of allocated subsidies for reason of
confidentiality and security (Article 109 of the recast);

5

the

decision-making

The Commission is streamlining the management of financial operations in other ways. It is
financial management
shortening
responsibilities to external Delegations which will enable them to react more quickly when
they are asked to take responsibility for the implementation of a CFSP action. It is also worth
noting that in the reform of external assistance the Commission has brought together the
project cycle for external assistance projects in one implementing unit. This will have benefits
for CFSP also.

process9.

devolving

is

It

4.2.

Providing budgetary flexibility

As a rule, expenditure for civilian actions under CFSP crisis management is charged to the
budget dedicated to the CFSP10. In exceptional cases, the Council acting unanimously may
decide to charge the expenditure to Member States11. Expenditure with military or defence
implications is always charged to Member States. The possibility of charging operational
expenditure to the Member States is, however, limited to CFSP actions. It is not legally
possible, nor would it be financially sound, to charge expenses of Community instruments to
the Member States.

The budgetary constraint might be eased either through systematic recourse to the possibility
offered in Article 28 of the EU Treaty to draw on contributions from Member States or by
creating greater flexibility within the regular budget. The first option is currently being
discussed in the Council, in the context of a possible new ad-hoc fund.12 The second option,
which would keep CFSP crisis expenditure within the established budget structures, might
involve either making better use of budgetary reserves, or perhaps greater recourse to the new
flexibility instrument. The Commission believes that this second option deserves serious
consideration.

Financing civilian CFSP operations in crises through a new ad-hoc fund may seem an
attractive solution. But it would raise many questions:

• the EU Treaty is silent on the management and the control of such a fund. Unless
management were to be given to the Commission, as in the case of the European
Development Fund, Member States would have to create a body parallel to the existing
budgetary machinery, running counter to a recent recommendation of the Court of
Auditors which insisted on greater transparency in financing of CFSP operations13.

• it would widen divisions between the first and the second pillar and so threaten to

undermine the consistency of the European Union’s external activities.

9

10

11

12

13

(iii) a derogation from the principle of non-retroactivity for subsidies targeting situations for crisis
management or humanitarian aid (Article 111 of the recast);
(iv) simplified procedures regarding public procurement.
An empowerment of a Member of Commission is envisaged in accordance with Article 13 of the rules
of procedure of the Commission C(2000) 3614, OJ L 308, 8.12.2000, p. 26.
Article 28(3) first subparagraph of the Treaty on European Union.
See Annex II on applicable budgetary rules.
See Council Document on financing operations of crisis management 10716/01 dated 09.07.2001,
Council Document on financing CFSP/ESDP 11910/01 dated 17.09.2001 and Council Document as
option paper on the financing of operations having military or defence implications 13043/01 dated
19.10.2001.
See recommendation n° 2 (point 69) of Special Report No. 13/2001 on the management of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), published on the website of
the Court of Auditors
(http://www.eca.eu.int/EN/reports_opinions.htm).

6

• any new management body would have to be responsible for all aspects of the budgetary
cycle from the preparatory phase through implementation, accounting and financial control
to possible discharge procedures. Given the small volume of funding to be handled relative
to the overall EU budget,
to achieve cost-effectiveness in the
administrative structures required to cope with these tasks.

it would be difficult

• the lack of Parliamentary control for such a fund would raise serious concerns about
accountability and about the division of responsibilities between the two branches of the
Budgetary Authority. With two parallel sources of financing for crisis actions, it would be
hard to conduct a political dialogue on priorities.

• an ad hoc outside the regular budget fund might be seen as a way to circumvent normal
than seeking to improve the effectiveness of existing

budgetary procedure rather
mechanisms for crisis intervention, including CFSP action.

In sum, a separate ad-hoc fund would be likely to generate inconsistency, politically and
financially, rather than closer cohesion.

By contrast, revising or introducing new budget mechanisms for CFSP financing of crisis
operations could be done without any major amendments in existing budget management
structures while respecting the provisions on CFSP in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Such
expenditure would remain within the regular EC budget, respecting the principles of
governance and transparency emphasised by the Court of Auditors. CFSP financing
mechanisms within the budget could be streamlined and the possibility would remain to resort
to Member State contributions in exceptional cases in accordance with Article 28 (3) of the
EU Treaty.

5.

THE CREATION OF A NEW BUDGETARY MECHANISM FOR CRISIS INTERVENTIONS

Both Community and CFSP appropriations are subject to the current financial perspective,
which runs until 2006. Hence, the current resources available for crisis management do not
match the very ambitious targets developed since 1999 and would certainly not be sufficient
to cover crisis actions such as a substitution of local police forces in non-member countries.
Although situations of this kind are not likely to arise very often, we need to reflect on how to
mobilise the resources that would be necessary to face them.

The most logical solution would be to establish a reserve for crisis management14 outside the
heading for external actions (Heading 4). This would match the recent step change in both the
ambition and capability of EU, Community and CFSP, to address crisis situations. But it
could involve a revision of the financial perspective ceiling.

Given the sensitivity of such a step it might be prudent, rather, to reach the same objective
both by creating a new flexibility instrument for civil crisis interventions, including CFSP

14

Similar to the existing reserves (Article 23 (c) of the Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999
between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and
improvement of the budgetary procedure). Heading 6 of the financial perspective currently foresees the
monetary reserve, the reserve for guaranteeing loans to non-member countries and the emergency aid
reserve.

7

action, and by extending the use of the current emergency reserve15 to CFSP crisis
it would be possible to address
interventions. Through the new flexibility instrument,
unforeseen and exceptional circumstances while maintaining the ceiling in Heading 4 within
the overall financial perspective agreed at Berlin. Such a new instrument must be set up by a
new Inter Institutional Agreement between Council, Parliament and Commission, by which
the procedures for its mobilisation have to be determined. As for the emergency reserve, it is
the Commission's view that, while maintaining priority for humanitarian action16,
the
provisions governing this reserve already allow for such extended use. In 2000, for example,
the reserve was used to fund the special assistance granted to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in order to consolidate the new democratic government
in the civil crisis
following the ousting of Milosevic.

In management terms:

• Given past experience, it will be necessary to examine how to ensure a more rapid
decision-making procedure for the new flexibility instrument, for example by accelerating
the adoption of a Supplementary and Amending Budget (SAB). Equally, an assessment
should be made of how other implementation procedures could be simplified and
accelerated, including flexibility provisions in the respective regulations, the conclusion of
framework agreements, etc.

• The mobilisation of the funds from the emergency reserve would follow present rules,

involving a transfer proposal to be adopted by the Budgetary Authority.

This approach, drawing on the existing budgetary framework and procedures, has three
advantages: First, the necessary resources are called in from Member States only when the
reserve is implemented. Second, no new funding key is required. And third, by relying on the
to a
established budgetary management structures administrative overheads are kept
minimum.

CONCLUSION

The European Union must grow into its new role as a global player in crises and equip itself
with the necessary means. This can be achieved within the existing budgetary structures.

Community instruments and CFSP instruments are complementary. They cannot substitute
each other. The bulk of civilian crisis management can be undertaken using Community
instruments.

The idea of a parallel budget process outside existing structures is superficially attractive, but
it could lead to duplication; reduced management efficiency; lack of budgetary transparency;
and incoherence in overall financial management in the EU.

15

16

Article 23 (c) of the Inter-institutional Agreement of 6 May 1999 between the European Parliament, the
Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budgetary procedure
reads explicitly: “[T]he purpose of the emergency aid reserve is to provide a rapid response to the
specific aid requirements of non-member countries following events which could not be foreseen when
the budget was established, first and foremost for humanitarian operations.”
last sentence, of
The terms of the Inter-institutional Agreement are reiterated in Article 16(1),
Regulation (EC) No 2040/2000 on budgetary discipline, OJ L 244, 29. 9.2000, p. 27, which speaks of "a
rapid response to specific emergency aid requirements in non member countries resulting from
unforeseeable events, with priority being given to humanitarian operations".

8

By working instead within the existing structures to maximise the funding available for crisis
management under both Community instruments and the CFSP, and by improving the
operational efficiency of these mechanisms, the European Union would be better equipped to
develop its role in conflict prevention and crisis management. This approach would also
reflect the close links, emphasised repeatedly by the European Council, between short-term
crisis management interventions and long term conflict prevention.

9

Community instruments for Civilian Crisis Management

ANNEX I

1.

The Community instruments range from trade, economic incentives, humanitarian
interventions to institution building. Building upon the existing Community
instruments the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) established by Regulation (EC)
No 381/2001, OJ L 57, 27.2.2001, p. 5, provides the necessary speed and flexibility
(with the exception of humanitarian
to mobilise any Community instrument
instruments which have specific emergency procedures) to be deployed in a crisis. In
fact, in case of urgency, the RRM authorises the Commission to undertake any crisis
management operation foreseen under the instruments listed in the RRM’s annex
irrespective of the geographical applicability of the underlying regulation (See recital
(4) and Articles 4 and 9 of the mentioned Regulation (EC) No 381/2001). For its
implementation, the RRM envisages the development of Framework agreements
with the Member states (to agree i.a. procedures for the deployment of MS civilian
personnel in crisis management operations); the launch of Calls for tender for private
and public sector organisations to complement the existing experts databases within
the Commission; and the preparation of Framework agreements with other
international organisations.

2.

Some specific areas of Community competence are highlighted hereafter:

• Civil protection

The definition of a concrete target
in the field of civil protection for crisis
management, as defined in the Feira/Göteborg conclusions, has given rise to some
ambiguity concerning the procedures and scope for such interventions. However, it
should be remembered that the Community competence in civil protection is well
established, both within and outside the EU:

–

–

within the EU this competence derives from the Community mechanism to
facilitate reinforced co-operation in Civil Protection assistance intervention,
which provides for co-ordination of Member States resources and the financing
of assessment missions;

outside the EU the competence derives from two sources: the Civil Protection
Mechanism (which applies equally to intra- and extra-EU operations), and the
Humanitarian Aid Regulation (Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 1257/96
concerning humanitarian aid, OJ L 163, 2.7.1996, p. 1).

• Police operations

In the area of police, the Community has established competence and expertise in
training, assistance of local forces, and local capacity building. Police missions may
cover a large number of functions. Whenever the overall objective is reform and
restructuring, the Community has a clear competence as the examples of Guatemala,
South Africa, Algeria and more recently fYROM have shown. It is also for this
reason that the Commission has set aside significant sums under the Regulation (EC)
No 2666/2000 (CARDS-Regulation), OJ L 206, 7.12.2000, p. 1 for Justice and Home
affairs components in the Balkans.

10

• Fact Finding Missions

Fact-finding missions will in many cases cover a combination of different kinds of
experts from the Member States, for example engineers or
forensic experts.
fact-finding missions will need to be deployed within very short
Moreover,
timeframes.

These characteristics of fact-finding missions require special arrangements:
the
Commission can mobilise the RRM for the deployment of fact-finding missions. The
Commission is setting up such a provision under the RRM and will
identify
procedures within the framework agreements to be concluded with the Member
States on provision of experts.

• Civilian Monitoring Missions

The Commission has regularly deployed election and human rights monitors in full
co-operation with the Member States and other international organisations.

Civilian monitoring missions can be paid for under a variety of instruments,
including notably the geographic instruments, the human rights and democratisation
regulations (Regulation (EC) No 975/1999, OJ L 120, 08.05.1999, p. 1 and
Regulation (EC) No 976/1999, OJ L 120, 08.05.1999, p. 8) and the RRM. The best
mechanism for funding for civilian monitoring missions will be identified on a case
by case basis.

• Training

In order to assist Member States in meeting the Feira targets, the Commission is
setting up with the Member States a first phase of a training pilot programme for
civilian crisis management personnel.

It is hoped that this programme in a second phase will lead to agreement with the
Member States on actual training modules to be implemented by Member States
institutions. For 2001-2002 the project will be funded under the budget dedicated to
the human right and democratisation regulations. In a second phase, funding of
training programmes would require dedicated budgetary resources from 2003
onwards.

3.

For further examples of activities covered by Community instruments, please consult
the annex of
the RRM enlisting "Geographical" Regulations/Decisions and
"Sectoral" Regulations and Decisions (food aid, reconstruction, NGOs, etc)

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ANNEX II

FINANCING OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT OPERATIONS

TYPE OF ACTION

Crisis
Management
Operations17

Civilian Operations:

Civilian Petersberg tasks, which are not covered
by Community Competence18:

Military Operations:

E.g. as humanitarian aid, food aid, securing the
livelihoods and safety of refugees, civilian
emergency assistance, rehabilitation,
reconstruction, infrastructure development,
demining, economic aid, consolidation of
democracy and the rule of law , institution
building, human rights
(cid:1)

E.g. non-proliferation, disarmament, security
monitoring, certain executive police missions,
including assignments to substitute for local
police, and fact-finding missions preceding an
envisaged operation related thereto
(cid:1)

military Petersberg tasks i.e. peacekeeping tasks
and tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
including peacemaking
(cid:1)

Legal Base

pillar: Treaty establishing

1St
Community (TEC)

the European

2nd pillar: Title V (CFSP) of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU)

2nd pillar: Title V (ESDP within CFSP) of the Treaty
on European Union (TEU)

See relevant Regulations such as Regulation No
2666/2000
(ECHO); Regulation No
1257/96
(CARDS); Regulation No 1080/2000 (UNMIK and
OHR), Regulation No 381/2001 creating the RRM,
in particular
its annex enlisting "Geographical"
Regulations/Decisions and "Sectoral" Regulations
and Decisions (food aid, reconstruction, NGOs, etc).

Depending on relevant Regulation,
if based on
Article 179 (ex-Article 130w) TEC qualified
majority; if based on Article 308 (ex-Article 235)
TEC unanimity; implementation usually conferred
on the Commission in accordance with so-called
“comitology”-procedures as set up by Decision
1999/468/EC.

Decision

Making
Procedure

Specific joint action adopted under Article 14 TEU
coupled with corresponding financing decision of
the Commission.

Specific joint action adopted under Article 14 TEU
on basis of Article 17 TEU.

Depending on Joint Action, generally unanimity
following Article 23 (1) TEU, unless taken on basis
then qualified majority
of a common strategy,
indent TEU;
following Article 23 (2)
implementing
qualified
by
majority following Article 23 (2) first indent TEU.

first
adopted

decision

Joint Action and implementing decision always
adopted by unanimity following Article 23 (1) and
(2).

17

18

P.M.: Title VI TEU (JAI) not applicable as only related to police, rule of law etc. action inside Union, no external crisis management , even if executed by Member State police forces.
According to Articles 3 and 47 TEU the financing of civilian crisis management operations through the Community and through CFSP financing are complementary, but they are not substituting each other nor are they
interchangeable.

12

1st Pillar actions
(Community framework)
(cid:1)

2nd Pillar Actions
(CFSP)(cid:1)

2nd Pillar Actions
(ESDP)(cid:1)

Applicable
Budget

Budget of European Communities.

of

Budget
or,
exceptionally, operational expenditure may be
charged Member States.

Communities,

European

Administra-
tive
Expenditure

Part A of the Commission’s section of the budget or
specific BA-lines under the relevant budget lines
attributed to applicable legal base (regulation or
decision).

If expenditure entailed for European Institutions:
either charged to the Council’s section of the budget
(e.g.. EU special representatives) or, as concerns
Commission administrative expenditure, to Part A
of the Commission, both following Article 28(2)
TEU.

and

expenditure

of European Communities:
Outside Budget
Operational
administrative
expenditure, which is not attributable to the
European Institutions is charged to the Member
States
(Article 28 (2) TEU). Administrative
expenditure stemming from military operations but
attributable to European Institutions to be charged to
(The
the Council’s
Commission is not involved in military operations).

section

budget

the

of

budget, when

If expenditure entailed for European Institutions
(e.g. operating costs – logistics, facilities,
travel,
meetings – of military or ESDP related staff at
Council): charged only to the Council’s section of
the
proper
administrative functioning of Council
following
Article 28(2) TEU. If not attributable to proper
functioning
administrative
expenditure linked to military or defence operations
fall outside the budget in analogy to Art 28 (3) TEU
charged to Member States.

Council,

related

the

all

of

to

Operational
Expenditure

section of

Operational expenditure is charged to Part B of the
Commission’s
the budget, mainly
Budget-Subsection B7, according to relevant budget
title or budget line corresponding to applicable legal
base (regulation or decision) , e.g. notably B7-210
(ECHO) and B7-671 (RRM).

As a general
rule: Operational expenditure are
charged to Budget-Subsection B8 following Article
28(3) first subparagraph TEU.

As an exception: Unanimous Council decision to do
otherwise following Article 28(3) first subparagraph
TEU. Normally charged to Member States on GNP
scale basis except if unanimously Council decision
to do otherwise (e.g. fund) following Article 28(3)
second subparagraph TEU.

Following Article 28(3) first subparagraph TEU
always charged to Member States on GNP scale
basis except if unanimously Council decision to do
otherwise (e.g. fund) following Article 28(3) second
subparagraph TEU.

Responsible
Managing
Authority

Commission according to Article 274 (ex-Article
205) TEC.

For
the budget: Commission for operational
expenditure, Council for administrative expenditure.

TEU foresees no provisions on managing authority.

For exceptionally charging expenditure to the
Member States: TEU foresees no provisions on
managing authority.

13

1st Pillar actions
(Community framework)
(cid:1)

2nd Pillar Actions
(CFSP)(cid:1)

2nd Pillar Actions
(ESDP)(cid:1)

Applicable
budgetary
rules

Application of financial provisions of Articles 268
to 280 (ex-Articles 199 to 209a) and corresponding
secondary Community law such as Financial
Regulation of 21.12.1977 applicable to the general
budget of the European Communities.

Control
Court
Auditors

by
of

Based on Article 238 (ex-Article 188c) TEC.

Jurisdiction of
the European
Court
of
Justice

Following Article 220 (ex-Article 164) TEC,
jurisdiction on the substance of the applicable legal
base (regulation or decision) and the related
financing, notably on claims based on Articles 230
and 232 (ex-Articles 173 and 175) TEC.

TEU foresees no provisions on budgetary rules,
which still need to be devised.

Not foreseen.

Not foreseen.

For
to
the budget: Article 28(4) TEU refers
application of financial provisions of TEC, among
which Articles 268 to 280 (ex-Articles 199 to 209a)
and corresponding secondary Community law such
as Financial Regulation of 21.12.1977 applicable to
the general budget of the European Communities,
regardless whether the Commission or the Council
is the responsible managing authority. This includes
the Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999 on
budgetary discipline and improvement of
the
budgetary procedure with the possibility to draw on
the emergency reserve and to have recourse to a
new flexibility instrument.
For exceptionally charging expenditure to the
Member States: TEU foresees no provisions on
budgetary rules, which still need to be devised.
For the budget: Based on Article 238 (ex-Article
188c) TEC, regardless whether the Commission or
the Council is the responsible managing authority.
For exceptionally charging expenditure to the
Member States: Not foreseen.
Due to Article 46 TEU, no jurisdiction on substance,
except on verifying that measures which fall within
the scope of the CFSP do not encroach the powers
conferred by the TEC on the Community.
For the budget: Additional jurisdiction on financial
decision, regardless whether the Commission or the
Council is the responsible managing authority, by
reference of Article 28(4) TEU to financial
provisions of TEC, comprising related jurisdiction
notably on claims based on Articles 230 and 232
(ex-Articles 173 and 175) TEC.
For exceptionally charging expenditure to the
Member States: Not foreseen.

14