WRITTEN QUESTION E-2988/01 by Daniela Raschhofer (NI) to the Commission. Protection of vulnerable installations against terrorist threats.
Date: 2001-10-29
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: EU Member State, civil defence, cooperation policy, industrial building, nuclear power station, public safety, terrorism

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 134 E/165

(cid:1) the absence of an appropriate assessment of the project’s repercussions on special protection areas for

birds will affect Directive 79/409/EEC (2);

(cid:1) the canalisation of this stretch of the river will also run counter to the environmental objectives laid

down Directive 2000/60/EC (3) on surface water.

What steps can the Commission take to ensure, in this particular case, correct application of Community
environmental legislation, in particular the above-mentioned directives?

(1) OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7.
(2) OJ L 103, 25.4.1979, p. 1.
(3) OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1.

Answer given by Ms Wallström on behalf of the Commission

(23 November 2001)

As far Council Directives 79/409/EEC of 2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds (1) and 92/43/EEC
of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and wild flora and fauna (2) are involved, the
Commission notes that there are no specially protected areas for birds nor sites of Community interest in
the town of Alcoy, where the canalisation project is to be implemented. Moreover, the impact of this
canalisation project on sites of Community interest near Alcoy cannot be said to be significant, as it
concerns a small urban section of river. The Commission therefore takes the view that these directives are
not applicable in this case.

As regards Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000
establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy (3), the Commission does not
consider that it is applicable in this case, given that the deadline for the Spanish authorities to transpose it
into national law is 22 December 2003. It should also be noted that the aim of this Directive is to prevent
deterioration of the quality of waters and of the aquatic environment. The nature of the work in question
and its limited range do not suggest that this aim will be undermined.

(1) OJ L 103, 25.4.1979.
(2) OJ L 206, 22.7.1992.
(3) OJ L 327, 22.12.2000.

(2002/C 134 E/167)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2988/01

by Daniela Raschhofer (NI) to the Commission

(29 October 2001)

Subject: Protection of vulnerable installations against terrorist threats

The extraordinary meeting of the European Council, held on 21 September 2001 in Brussels, and the
Parliament resolution of 4 October 2001 dealt in detail with the implications of the terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001. It has now become clear that a new threat has emerged to public security.

First and foremost, the measures taken to protect vulnerable installations must be reviewed. The head of
the Reactor Safety Commission in the Federal Republic of Germany, Hahn, has stated in public that
nuclear power stations can now only be protected by means of military measures. Steps of this kind are
already being discussed in specialist bodies and ministries in the Member States.

In view of the terrorist threat which has now emerged, could the Commission answer the following
questions:

1. What is the current position regarding the measures taken to protect vulnerable installations in the
Member States (industrial plants dealing with dangerous products, nuclear power stations, reprocessing
plants)?

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2. What measures are being planned in the Member States in order to guarantee the protection of such

vulnerable installations against the background of the new terrorist threat?

3. What is the Commission’s standpoint on this new situation? Is it planning any measures of its own?

Answer given by Mrs Wallström on behalf of the Commission

(7 January 2002)

Quickly after the 11 September events, the Commission, with full backing from Member States
1.
moved to anticipate entry into force of a new Civil Protection Mechanism (foreseen for 1 January)
co-ordinated by the Commission, which reinforces the EU civil protection capabilities.

In light of the events, the co-operation was extended to include:

(cid:1) The pooling of expertise in the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical fields (NBC experts), available

24 hours a day to assist any country that requests help;

(cid:1) Enhanced co-operation on information-sharing concerning antidotes, vaccines, antibiotics, and access

to hospital treatment for any victims of such attacks;

(cid:1) Creation of a system of immediate and systematic exchange of information relating to accidents or

threats of terrorist attack;

(cid:1) Creation of a Civil Protection monitoring and information centre in the Commission.

2.
The extraordinary meeting in Knokke (Belgium) on 11 and 12 October 2001 focused on the
response expected from Civil Protection authorities in case of major terrorist attacks inside or outside the
Union. The Directors General of Civil Protection from the Member States, from the European Economic
Area and from the candidate countries recalled that the response to be given in the wake of a terrorist
attack remains the responsibility of the Member States.

They informed the Commission that the national emergency plans were currently being reviewed to take
into account the new challenges which have arisen, in particular since the terrorist attacks on New York
and Washington. They also underlined that
their
responsibilities, thus enabling citizens to react purposefully in any situation.

the information to the public is a vital part of

In response to the Ghent European Council conclusions,

the Commission has presented a
3.
Communication (1) on ‘Civil Protection (cid:1) State of preventive alert against possible emergencies’. This
Communication presents the basis for co-ordinating an optimal response by the Community to all types of
emergencies. It sets out the main lines of action desirable for improved co-operation across the European
Union. It is a contribution to the joint response from the Commission and the Council to the challenges
laid down by the Heads of State.

Moreover, in the same line, it has been decided to organise a dedicated workshop in December under the
Belgian Presidency; the latter will be entrusted with setting up a short, medium and long term working
programme in this field.

Specifically with regard to nuclear installations, the authorities of the Member States and candidate
countries have, since 11 September 2001, strengthened physical protection measures already in force for
installations at risk, especially for nuclear installations. These measures come under the national powers of
the police. The Member States and the candidate countries have furthermore prohibited overflying of
nuclear installations (if it was not already the case). In this regard, it should be underlined that the nuclear
industry, because of non-proliferation and radioprotection concerns, is one of the sectors of industrial
activity where safety and security standards are extremely strict.

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Reprocessing plants, such as those at Sellafield and La Hague, require particular attention because of the
high concentration of radioactive materials held in large quantities, notably uranium or plutonium left over
from spent fuels. Therefore the vulnerability of these installations must be considered in the context of the
actual radioprotection consequences of a terrorist act.

(1) COM(2001) 707 final.

(2002/C 134 E/168)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2989/01

by Paul Rübig (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(29 October 2001)

Subject: Funding for the Sixth R & D Framework Programme

The most important sources of European prosperity are those industrial sectors which export large
volumes of goods, since they generate competition and growth. In the Commission proposal for a decision
on the Framework Programme for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration for the
period 2002-2006 the funding allocated to some sectoral budgets fails to reflect the significance of the
European Union’s balance of trade.

Given its key role in generating economic growth, the focusing of support on the sphere of Information
Society Technologies (IST)
increase
competitiveness in fields where the Union is lagging behind, and those benefits will also spill over into
other areas.

is justified, since increased investment in these technologies will

However, by comparison with the IST sector, which, when calculated on the basis of EU export volumes,
receives seven times more support, the funding for the Materials/Machines/Vehicles sector under the
thematic programme Nanotechnologies,
Intelligent Materials and New Production Processes seems
inadequate.

What explanation can the Commission give for the funding of the individual sub-programmes in the light
of the criterion outlined above, having regard to the issue of Europe’s competitiveness and the contribution
to the safeguarding of jobs and prosperity which export successes can make?

Answer given by Mr Busquin on behalf of the Commission

(7 January 2002)

for a new research Framework Programme 2002-2006 (1)

In the proposal
(the Sixth Framework
Programme), the choice of the priority areas on which to concentrate Community efforts and of the
budget to be attributed to themes based on the principle of greater value-added at the European level, in
particular on the need to:

(cid:1) concentrate resources on the scientific and technological challenges and opportunities Europe will be

confronted with,

(cid:1) mobilise resources to achieve critical mass,

(cid:1) achieve greater complementarity with national (cid:1) public and private (cid:1) research investments in the

relevant areas.

The actions to be carried out under priority 1.1.3 ‘Nanotechnologies,
intelligent materials, and new
production processes’ are intended to help Europe develop the knowledge and the technologies on the
advanced materials, products, services and manufacturing processes which are important for industrial
competitiveness. As compared with the Fifth Framework Programme, nanotechnologies is an entirely new
priority. The proposal for the Sixth Framework Programme would result in a tripling of the budget
compared to current levels of support. In its Resolution on the Caudron Report, Parliament has not voted
to change the budget proposed by the Commission for this priority.

(1) OJ C 240 E, 28.8.2001.