WRITTEN QUESTION E-2926/01 by Hiltrud Breyer (Verts/ALE) to the Commission. Answer to Question No. E-1568/01 Application and amendment of Directives 96/82/EC and 96/61/EC.
Date: 2001-10-24
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: accident prevention, dangerous substance, environmental protection, explosive, industrial hazard, public health, storage

C 134 E/152

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

6.6.2002

(2002/C 134 E/152)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2926/01

by Hiltrud Breyer (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

(24 October 2001)

Subject: Answer to Question No. E-1568/01 ‘Application and amendment of Directives 96/82/EC and

96/61/EC’

It is not possible to share the Commission’s view that the Directive concerning integrated pollution
prevention and control (IPPC) is not the appropriate instrument for improving safety at installations for the
production and/or storage of fireworks materials for the following reasons.

The argument that the reports on best available techniques focus mainly on emission control is not, in my
view, convincing. The obligations of operators of installations covered by the IPPC Directive include taking
the necessary measures to prevent accidents and limit their consequences (Article 3(e)). In determining best
available techniques, the need to prevent accidents and to minimise the consequences for the environment
must also be taken into account (Annex VI, point 10).

In principle, therefore, the reports on best available techniques should also set out the necessary measures
to prevent accidents and the measures to be taken should an accident nevertheless occur.

How does the Commission intend to correct its guidelines for drawing up these reports so that the

1.
requirements already set out in the Directive are satisfied in practice?

The investigation into the Enschede explosion established that

the authorities responsible for
2.
licensing and inspection had no specific knowledge about the dangers of fireworks materials or the
necessary safety measures to be taken at production or storage facilities; advice from experts was also
inadequate. What measures will the Commission take to ensure that the instruments provided under the
IPPC Directive 8 such as comprehensive applications for permits, conversion of existing installations to
meet the standard of the best available techniques 8 are applied?

3. When does the Commission propose to make the necessary amendments to the IPPC Directive so
that it also applies to installations for the production and/or storage of fireworks materials?

Answer given by Mrs Wallström on behalf of the Commission

(12 December 2001)

1.
Indeed in its Annex IV, Council Directive 96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated
pollution prevention and control (1) requires that in determining ‘best available techniques’ the need to
prevent accidents is taken into account. The Commission considers that the requirements of the Directive
are adequately reflected in the current guidelines (2) for the exchange of information between Member
States and the industries concerned. Members of working groups that exchange information are asked to
consider if the use of a certain technique may involve a risk of accidents. Thus, working groups do not just
in reference
consider chronic emissions but also the risk of accidental pollution where relevant, e.g.
documents covering the chemical
industry and in the reference document on emissions from storage.
However,
the information provided so far more often addresses chronic emissions than accidental
pollution.

2.
The Enschede explosion happened on a site that was outside the scope of Directive 96/61/EC.
Therefore, as regards the application of the provisions of the Directive at fireworks production and storage
sites, the only measure that the Commission could take at this stage is to make a proposal for an
amendment of the Directive.

3.
The Commission is currently carrying out a comparative study of the scope of environmental
licensing systems in the Member States. The purpose is to assess for which activities harmonisation is
justified. The first statutory evaluation report on the implementation and effectiveness of Directive
96/61/EC will be published in the Official Journal at the latest in April 2004.

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However, before proposing to expand the scope to certain installations for the production and/or storage
of fireworks materials, it is necessary to analyse whether the same objectives cannot be reached through
the implementation of the Seveso II Directive (3), which should be revised as previously mentioned in the
answer to the Honourable Member’s Written Question E-1568/01 (4).

The March 2001 workshop on pyrotechnic and explosive substances, referred to in the above-mentioned
answer, concluded that fireworks pose a challenge in terms of the application of appropriate safety
provisions to storage installations. In particular, concern over the increased hazard that may result when
in heavy confinement, or are stored together with highly explosive
pyrotechnics are stored in bulk,
materials is relatively recent. Some competent authorities may not be aware of these concerns and there
does not yet exist enough knowledge of how and when these hazards are created to form a consensus on
appropriate remedies. It might be useful for Member States to exchange information on best practices for
fireworks storage to support the efforts of licensing authorities to impose appropriate safety requirements
on fireworks installations.

(1) OJ L 257, 10.10.1996.
(2) Available from http://eippcb. jrc. es/pages/FActivities. htm.
(3) Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous

substances, OJ L 10, 14.1.1997.

(4) OJ C 364 E, 20.12.2001, p. 148.

(2002/C 134 E/153)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2931/01

by Hiltrud Breyer (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

(24 October 2001)

Subject: Motorway project A 143 endangering semi-natural countryside

1. What view does the Commission take of the plans to build federal motorway ‘A 143 8 Halle West
bypass’, Section AS Bennstedt (B80) 8 AD Wallwitz (A 14) in the light of the complaint of 4 May 2000
submitted by the German Nature Conservation Society (complaint number 2000/415, SG(2000) A/6157)
and the Federal Republic of Germany’s failure fully to transpose the fauna, flora and habitats (FFH)
Directive (see the latest judgment of the Court of Justice of 11 September 2001 in case C-71/99)?

2. What view does the Commission take in particular of:

(a)

the significant effects on FFH sites of the planned motorway, and the FRG’s failure to take account of
such effects in concluding its route determination procedure?

(b)

the threat to priority species and habitats in the FFH sites concerned?

(c)

the failure so far to involve the public in the assessment of implications for the FFH sites (Article 6(3),
last clause of the FFH Directive)?

(d)

the accusation of an infringement of Article 6(4), first sentence, of the FFH Directive through lack of
assessment or inadequate consideration of alternative solutions?

(e) What views has the Federal Government expressed so far on the complaint by the Nature

Conservation Society?

(f) Does the Commission intend to initiate proceedings against the Federal Republic of Germany for

infringement of the Treaty through its plans to build the A 143 and, if so, when?