WRITTEN QUESTION P-2919/01 by Heide Rühle (Verts/ALE) to the Council. Appointment of a Member of the Court of Auditors.
Date: 2001-10-19
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: European Court of Auditors, appointment of staff, member of the Court of Auditors (EU), professional experience

6.6.2002

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 134 E/149

The Commission is currently looking with great attention into the links and coherence between the
National Hydrological Plan and the Water Framework Directive (1). On issues linked to water pricing and
the Water Framework Directive effectively includes specific provisions on water charging,
charging,
incentive pricing and cost-recovery.
‘Member States shall account of the
Its Article 9 specifies that:
principle of recovery of the costs of water services, including environmental and resource costs, having
regards to the economic analysis conducted according to Annex III, and in accordance in particular with
the polluter pays principle’.

The same article also put obligations on Member States to ensure by 2010 that water-pricing policies
provide adequate incentives to efficient water use and ensure a fair contribution of water uses
(disaggregated into at least industry, households and agriculture) to the recovery of the costs of water
services. In deciding levels of cost recovery, social, economic and environmental effects of the recovery as
well as the geographic and climatic conditions of the region affected may be considered.

With respect to timing, it is too early to assess on the basis of the National Hydrological Plan only whether
Spain comply with Article 9 and its incentive pricing and cost recovery requirements. Deadline for
compliance with these requirements is 2010. And Spain has up to December 2003 to transpose the Water
Framework Directive into national legislation.

It will be possible then to make a first assessment on whether water services pricing, including services
provided in the context of the National Hydrological Plan, and main water uses as defined above, will
eventually comply with the requirements of the Water Framework Directive, and do not present a case of
unfair competition vis-à-vis the other regions of Europe. The economic analysis of water uses required
under Article 5 and Annex III of the Water Framework Directive will provide some basic information for
this assessment.

(1) Directive 2000/60/EC of the Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for

Community action in the field of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000.

(2002/C 134 E/149)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-2919/01

by Heide Rühle (Verts/ALE) to the Council

(19 October 2001)

Subject: Appointment of a Member of the Court of Auditors

By letter of 28 June 2001, the Council consulted Parliament on the appointment of Mr Lars Tobisson.

Pursuant to Article 247 of the EC Treaty, ‘Members of the Court of Auditors shall be chosen from among
persons who belong or have belonged in their respective countries to external audit bodies or who are
especially qualified for this office’. According to his curriculum vitae and what he said when he was heard,
Mr Tobisson has no relevant experience in the external audit field. Why does the Council consider
Mr Tobisson to be especially qualified for this office?

Pursuant to Article 247 of the EC Treaty, Members of the Court of Auditors are to be appointed for a term
of six years by the Council, acting unanimously after consulting the European Parliament. The six-year
term is intended to ensure the continuity of the Court’s work and the independence of its Members.

When heard by the Committee on Budgetary Control on 9 October 2001, Mr Tobisson said he intended to
take up office for only four years, referring to agreements whereby he would serve only for the remainder
of the current ECA President’s term of office, after the latter announced that he was to step down.

Does the Council consider such agreements to be compatible with the EC Treaty,
requirement for Members of the Court of Auditors to be independent?

in particular the

Will it proceed with Mr Tobisson’s appointment, even though he has made it known from the outset that
he does not intend to serve for the term of office laid down in the EC Treaty?

C 134 E/150

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

6.6.2002

Reply

(12 February 2002)

Pursuant to Article 247(3) of the EC Treaty, in June 2001 the Council consulted the European Parliament
on the appointment of nine Members of the Court of Auditors. Seven of the Members concerned are to be
appointed in the context of a part replacement, in accordance with Article 247(3) of the EC Treaty, whilst
two others ? including Mr Tobisson ? are to replace Members who have resigned,
in pursuance of
Article 247(6) of the Treaty.

In a secret ballot the European Parliament delivered its Opinions, after the nine candidates had been heard
by its Committee on Budgetary Control, at the meeting on 23 October 2001. The European Parliament’s
Opinions on each individual candidate were all positive by a very large majority.

The EC Treaty stipulates that the term of office is to be six years in the context of a part replacement
(Article 247(3) of the EC Treaty). However, in the event of a replacement following a resignation ? as is
Mr Tobisson case ? the replacement runs, as stipulated in Article 247(6) of the EC Treaty,
‘for the
remainder of the Member’s term of office’. In the instance referred to by the Honourable Member that term
of office, which runs from 1 January 2002, expires on 28 February 2006.

The nine Members of
unanimously after consulting the European Parliament, on 8 November 2001 (1).

the Court of Auditors were accordingly appointed by the Council, acting

(1) Decision of 12 November 2001.

(2002/C 134 E/150)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-2921/01

by Phillip Whitehead (PSE) to the Commission

(17 October 2001)

Subject: Plant Protection Products ? Directive 91/414/EEC and Regulation 451/2000

Does the Commission accept that a failure to notify an active substance under the second and third stages
of the work programme (Commission Regulation 451/2000 (1)) may be due to the inability of small and
medium-sized enterprises to meet the considerable costs involved in the notification and evaluation of the
active substance, and not to their lack of interest or knowledge?

Does the Commission not agree that this may lead to a perverse situation where safer and more effective
pesticides are compulsorily taken off the market while less safe and less effective pesticides are allowed to
remain on the market, simply because they are supported by larger firms who can afford the very large
sums which are charged for evaluation and notification?

the ongoing review of

In light of
the work programme as required by Article 8(2) of Directive
91/414/EEC (2), will the Commission consider allowing derogations on active substances that have not
been notified by the date set out in Regulation 451/2000, where it can be proved that the lack of
notification was due to the inability of reputable small firms, which are supposed to be at the heart of the
EU’s strategy for economic growth, to meet the substantial costs of notification and evaluation which may
exceed their actual annual turnover?

(1) OJ L 55, 29.2.2000, p. 25.
(2) OJ L 230, 19.8.1991, p. 1.

Answer given by Mr Byrne on behalf of the Commission

(20 November 2001)

The Commission is aware that pesticide manufacturers took many factors into consideration when
reaching decisions on whether to notify individual substances under the second and third stages of the