Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on "The preparation of the 4th WTO Ministerial Conference in Qatar: ESC position"
Date: 2001-10-17
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: World Trade Organisation, international conference

8.2.2002

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Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on ‘The preparation of the 4th WTO Ministerial
Conference in Qatar: ESC position’

(2002/C 36/18)

On 26 April 2001, the Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 23(3) of its Rules of Procedure,
‘The preparation of the 4th WTO Ministerial Conference: ESC
decided to draw up an opinion on:
position’.

The Section for External Relations which was instructed to prepare the Committee’s work on the subject,
adopted its opinion on 4 October 2001. The rapporteur was Mr Vever and the co-rapporteur Mrs Sa´nchez.

At its 385th plenary session on 17 and 18 October 2001 (meeting of 17 October), the Economic and
Social Committee adopted the following opinion by 116 votes with one abstention.

1. Summary

misunderstandings on the shape of a new agenda and the lack
of a properly prepared dialogue with civil society and NGOs.

Nearly two years after the failure in Seattle, the WTO
1.1.
is still seeking to define its future role. Despite consolidation
of its dispute settlement system, it is struggling to cope with
the new challenges facing international trade: the hetero-
geneous mix of states, the fact that many developing countries
are falling behind, practices which jeopardise the concept of a
‘single undertaking’, and the need for new rules to regulate
international trade issues which go beyond the strictly com-
mercial (cf. competition, environment, health, social). Another
failure at Doha in November 2001 would threaten the primacy
of multilateralism and create, mainly for the developing
countries, new risks of exclusion from the market, at the same
time paralysing the WTO’s ability to tackle the new challenges
of globalisation and the increase in trade disputes. On the
other hand, success in Doha would set international trade on
a course towards better regulation and a lasting consolidation
of the bases of global economic growth, which would in
particular benefit the developing countries. Against the back-
cloth of the terrorist attacks on 11 September in the United
States and the sudden increase in friction thus triggered
throughout the world, such a success would bear witness to
the international community’s determination to speed up,
through dialogue, its organised response to globalisation and
the new challenges of the future.

1.2.
In order to avoid a repetition of the Seattle failure,
lessons have to be learnt. This failure must not be attributed to
an overly ambitious agenda, but rather to the Conference’s
inability to prepare properly beforehand, in particular because
of the expectations and problems of the developing countries
being underestimated, the fact that many of these countries
felt excluded from the negotiation procedures, a failure to
listen to each other and a lack of flexibility in the debates,

1.3.
In the run-up to the Doha Conference, the challenges
are as complex as ever, although some recent convergence of
positions does — despite major uncertainties in the wake of
11 September — give rise to a glimmer of hope. On the
positive side, many countries are still
interested in a new
round, the main trading partners are drawing closer together
on this point, and the developing countries are more favour-
ably disposed, bolstered by recent EU initiatives. However
there is still little room for manœuvre. High expectations of a
broad agenda voiced by civil society and NGOs still clash —
particularly on environmental and social issues — with the
reticence of several developing countries whose key demands
lie elsewhere: implementation, development, access to markets.
Everyone is weighing up the complexity of obtaining unani-
mous agreement among 142 states on a satisfactory outcome,
which implies an ability to compromise.

All these facts lead the Committee to put forward the

1.4.
following recommendations for Doha:

1.4.1.
Firstly, certain preconditions have to be met, i.e. the
negotiations have to be entered into in a spirit of openness, of
listening to each other, and of transparency; opening an
agenda must not be confused with anticipating the final
outcome; the support of the developing countries is essential;
an interactive dialogue with organised civil society must be
established; bridges must be built between the various issues;
the Doha agenda must be placed in a wider context requiring
an input from other international bodies besides the WTO.

The fact of agreeing on a coherent, ambitious agenda
1.4.2.
would mean that there was a minimum degree of common
to succeed. The Committee
vision and considerable will

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therefore suggests gearing the new WTO round to a ‘global
and sustainable development objective’. Such an objective
would in fact make it possible to highlight:

— the economic development at the core of the round, first

and foremost in developing countries;

— the development of new qualitative requirements: health,

safety, environment, social issues;

— further development of cooperation with other inter-

national bodies;

— the firm determination of the international community
to respond to the post-11 September challenges by
stepping up global and sustainable cooperation, focusing
extra attention on underdevelopment problems and
maintaining the WTO’s vigilance in ensuring that the
trade repercussions of the upheavals triggered by this
new situation are kept under control.

1.4.3. While stressing the necessarily global, interdependent
and interactive nature of the new round, the Committee notes
that more time may be required in order to outline some
delicate issues more clearly in the negotiations. That being the
case, one approach might be to base the round on a three-
pronged approach. None of the three elements comprising this
approach should be dissociated from the implementation of
the whole:

— tackling questions of implementation in the developing
countries without further ado; the Committee is pleased
to observe that these are the focus of proactive proposals;

— facilitating negotiations on market access and the built-in

agenda — agriculture and services;

— opening the way for discussions on more comprehensive
investment, consumer protection,
issues (competition,
the environment and social issues in conjunction with
the ILO).

The Committee’s comments on the various goals are based on
the hearings it has organised and on the discussion groups set
up by Commissioner Lamy with socio-occupational interest
groups and NGOs.

1.4.4.
Effective dialogue with civil society organisations is
an integral prerequisite for success. To this end, the Committee
recommends that a code of conduct be adopted between the
WTO and representatives of organised civil society (socio-

occupational
interest groups, NGOs). Without calling into
question the exclusive right of member countries to conduct
the negotiations, such a code would give the socio-occu-
pational groups and NGOs additional responsibilities in the
preparation, evaluation, monitoring and implementation of
WTO commitments. While creating a framework for dialogue,
it would also provide an operational instrument for cooper-
ation between the WTO and civil society organisations to the
benefit of ‘global and sustainable development’, which the
Committee strongly supports.

2. The challenges for the conference

2.1.
The success of GATT for a long time stemmed from its
pragmatic approach. In contrast to UNCTAD, which became
bogged down in ideological debates without ever achieving
any concrete results, the GATT always avoided politicising its
discussions and managed, as a consequence, to carry through
its ambitious negotiation programmes for the liberalisation of
international trade. However, since the successful conclusion
of the Uruguay Round in Marrakesh, the new World Trade
Organisation set up to replace GATT has been seeking to
define its future role.

2.2. With the passing of time, everyone has now realised
that the results achieved in Marrakech at the end of the Uruguay
Round were considerable, whatever the value judgments made
in this connection. The achievements were:

to turn GATT from a simple provisional agreement
2.2.1.
with non-permanent status into a United Nations-type inter-
national institution — the WTO — with permanent authority
to issue legislation on international trade; and

2.2.2.
to convert an agreement bringing together a medley
of states — or rather of groups of states — hitherto subject to
types of obligation depending on their level of
different
development, into a ‘single undertaking’, making it possible
ultimately to envisage a uni-polar world based on one body of
rules, which, if not identical, would at least be comparable.

2.3.
Nevertheless, the WTO’s success was also the source of
its problems. Indeed, as soon as the dispute settlement system
was introduced, there were concerns in many quarters about
its influence as well as fears that this was disproportionate to
its original legitimacy. Moreover, disputes have arisen as to
whether WTO rules take precedence over other rules (social,
environmental, etc.). Another point to be acknowledged is
that since the 1996 Singapore Ministerial conference, many
developing countries have fallen behind as they lack insti-
tutions capable of applying the WTO rules in full. Although

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the Singapore Conference initially provided some reassurance,
the WTO was seriously destabilised during the 3rd Conference
in Seattle by the harsh attacks which came internally from the
developing countries and externally from representatives of
civil society.

The developing countries were unable to agree in
2.4.
Seattle to the launch of a new MTN (multilateral
trade
negotiations) round: what these countries were in fact looking
for was a re-assessment of some of the rules to which they had
agreed in Marrakesh. As a consequence, even the very concept
of a ‘single undertaking’ is likely to be seriously undermined.
Some have argued in favour of henceforth taking into account
a series of other concerns (sustainable development, human
the workplace, more harmonious regulation of
rights at
international trade and investment etc.) in parallel to, and on
the same level as, developments in world trade.

The recent awareness of this situation within the WTO

2.5.
has had the following consequence:

2.5.1.
the split between its members (or groups of mem-
bers) has been aggravated, affecting more than trade issues per
se. In addition to these traditional differences, there have been
clashes of views on matters such as the environment and
labour relations, both among the industrialised countries and
between them and the developing countries;

2.5.2.
an increasing number of parameters (trade, tariff,
non-tariff, competition, environmental, societal and social
issues) necessitate a suitable comprehensive solution being
found in time for the next WTO ministerial meetings. This is
proving to be an extraordinarily difficult task.

2.6.
These developments also reflect markedly different
political and strategic visions of the future of international
trade and its operational procedures:

2.6.1.
should priority be given to a multilateral agreement
within the WTO framework, or to bilateral, regional and even
unilateral approaches?

is it possible to maintain uniformity in trade rules at
2.6.2.
the global level, or should maximum consideration be given
to the degree of development of WTO members (including
the development gaps between the developing countries
themselves — from emerging economies which are already
competitive in many aspects, such as Brazil and India, to the
least developed countries — the LDCs)?

2.6.3.
should WTO activities be restricted to trade alone or,
given that the dispute settlement mechanism is already affect-
ing other factors, even though it was designed for purely trade
issues, should the organisation be encouraged to take related
issues into account, such as sustainable development in its
broadest sense (in other words social, societal, ethical and
environmental considerations)? If so, should the WTO or other
organisations take the lead, and whatever the case, how should
their activities be coordinated?

should the WTO change the way it operates with a
2.6.4.
view to ensuring both greater transparency and more effective
participation of its governing bodies, thereby enhancing the
role of parliamentary democracy and economic and social
democracy and, more generally, taking account of the expec-
tations and concerns of civil society as a whole?

2.7.
For all the above reasons, the preparation and various
stages of the Doha ministerial conference will prove to be
fraught with risks and dangers. Yet another failure would
inevitably have an impact on the very future of the Geneva
organisation and on the framework conditions for inter-
national trade, even if some believe, more or less rightly, that
such a failure would still not be irrevocable.

Failure at Doha would strengthen the hand of those
2.8.
who have advocated bilateral or bi-regional solutions. Past
experience has demonstrated the damaging impact of such
solutions which have caused not only the European Union but
also many developing countries to be excluded from markets;
the latter group includes countries of a relatively modest size
as well as countries which, like India, remain opposed to going
down this path. Furthermore, failure would undermine the
stability of the dispute settlement system.

2.9.
The potential negative repercussions of such a failure
could well include paralysis of the WTO’s activities at the very
moment that:

2.9.1.
new, urgent issues are constantly cropping up in
world trade: new technologies, e-commerce, the environment,
consumer protection, food safety, the precautionary principle,
the need for basic medicines, the growing demands relating to
ethics and responsible social behaviour, together with many
other expectations held by civil society;

2.9.2.
trade disputes are a constant source of tension; the
very existence of the new dispute settlement mechanism
somehow seems to fan the flames of these disputes;

dominant operators

2.9.3.
are
increasingly drawn towards regionalisation, and therefore the
compartmentalisation, of international trade to the detriment
of their weaker partners;

(FTAA, EU-Mercosur)

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2.9.4.
the fact of China joining the WTO in the near future,
although a key event because of the clear advantages of
bringing such a significant partner into the institution, cannot
fail to have some repercussions on such tricky items on the
negotiators’ agenda as the environment or social matters,
unless these negotiations are launched beforehand.

2.10.
From this perspective, for the WTO to grind to a halt
or even be temporarily immobilised would be tantamount to
taking a step backwards. There would then be a considerable
risk that the WTO’s dispute settlement body might monopolise
all the WTO’s activities, applying rules which will increasingly
prove to be outstripped by the ongoing developments in world
trade.

2.11.
However, should Doha turn out to be a success, i.e.
with the launch of a new round of rational, balanced trade
negotiations, hope would spring up again on all sides:

2.11.1.
such a success would provide genuine proof of the
priority accorded to multilateralism over other solutions
(regional, bilateral, etc.); and would consolidate economic
growth in all participating countries, particularly the
developing ones, which would thus be in a better position to
close the development gap. This positive impact would be
particularly apparent in the currently fragile state of both the
following the
world economy and international stability,
repercussions across the board of the terrorist attacks in the
United States on 11 September;

2.11.2.
success could only flow from a compromise accept-
able to all members (industrialised countries, developing
countries,
least developed countries (LDCs), economies in
transition and newly industrialised countries (NICs), as well as
to the key parties involved in such a compromise (parliamen-
tary groupings, civil society, occupational and trade union
organisations, business, economic operators, etc.); this would
allow international trade to grow in a more balanced way,
incorporating factors other than purely trade-oriented ones,
which would make this process more acceptable to each party
and easier for everyone to predict;

thus, launching this cycle would demonstrate that
2.11.3.
the debate on globalisation had moved beyond being a mere
bone of contention among countries and between countries
and NGOs, and that the way was now cleared for seeking
negotiated solutions together.

The radical

2.12.
international upheavals following the
events of 11 September have generated major uncertainties,
yet this objective remains within the reach of the negotiators
in Geneva if the lessons from Seattle are fully taken on board.
To this end there are two things to avoid: a)
inadequate
preparations for the round and an elitist approach to these
preparations, and b) wording the text in such a way that it
goes beyond the objectives by focusing from the outset on
resources.

2.13.
more carefully to identify:

Further, the different procedures need to be structured

— which sectors are to be reserved for the WTO;

— which additional sectors should be the subject of bilateral

or bi-regional agreements.

2.14.
from the starting point of a new round, i.e. to:

In brief, steps must be taken to build up a consensus

2.14.1.
revive the spirit which was still prevailing in Punta
del Este and even the spirit of the failed Havana Conference
which aimed to re-shape world trade and flee the pernicious
effects of Seattle (premature disagreements on the ultimate
target);

2.14.2.
bear in mind the need not to think solely in terms
of an EU/United States agreement, which is of course absolutely
necessary but nonetheless now not enough: indeed, support
from the QUAD, OECD member countries and the developing
countries is now vital for launching the brand new round, as
much in terms of the principles underlying the round as its
agenda;

2.14.3.
react to the sharp exacerbation of functions in the
wake of 11 September in the shape of a common drive by the
international community to bear witness to its determination
to speed up, through dialogue,
its organised response to
globalisation and the new challenges of the future.

3. The ESC’s recommendations

3.1.
In order to prepare its analysis and recommendations,
the ESC has contacted a large number of parties, including the
European Commission’s Trade DG, the European Parliament
rapporteur, Konrad Schwaiger, the WTO secretariat and rep-
resentatives of civil society: this has entailed involvement in
the discussion groups set up by Commissioner Pascal Lamy
with NGO participation in 2000-2001; a hearing on 6 June of
members of the NGO Contact Group at the Commission’s
Trade DG; a hearing on 5 July of European socio-occupational
representatives; participation in the public conference organ-
ised by the WTO in Geneva on 6 and 7 July with socio-
occupational interest groups and the NGOs; and participation
in the week of dialogue with civil society on the potential
implications of the WTO conference, organised by the Com-
mission’s Trade DG from 24 to 28 September.

The ESC firstly confirms its support for several prin-

3.2.
ciples of international trade, namely:

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3.2.1.
priority given to multilateralism, without however
ruling out the possibility of going further with certain states or
regional groupings, but with the express condition that these
bilateral and bi-regional agreements respect the letter and spirit
of the WTO (pride of place must be given to the WTO, non-
discrimination, national treatment, etc.);

3.3.3.
efforts to strike a global balance within the WTO and
between the WTO and other international organisations (in
particular the ILO where social issues are concerned);

3.3.4.
looking beyond the immediate future;

greater attention to medium- and long-term interests,

3.2.2.
the system of ‘single undertakings’, which enables all
WTO members to subscribe to the same rules, even if it entails
granting:

3.3.5.
pating the final outcome of the negotiations;

not confusing the opening of an agenda with antici-

3.2.2.1.

technical and financial assistance;

transition periods for application by the developing
3.2.2.2.
and least developed countries of certain rules which require a
multilateral approach, as suggested by Commissioner Lamy,
so as to allow these countries, as is currently the case for the
public procurement agreement, to choose at the end of the
negotiations whether or not to sign up to the investment and
competition agreements;

3.3.6.
the option referred to above, allowing the developing
countries ultimately to refrain from underwriting certain items
which exceed their administrative capacities;

3.3.7.

the need to build bridges between different subjects;

3.3.8.
certain conditions on different speeds of implementation;

the need for more flexible rules, e.g. agreement under

3.2.2.3.
country.

censure of unilateral breaches of WTO rules by any

3.3.9.
take effect as of now; and

the need to improve transparency in procedures, to

The Committee stresses the need to take into account
3.3.
the lessons learned in Seattle and to turn on-going develop-
ments to best account in order to avoid a repeat of the
circumstances which led to the breakdown of talks. This entails
in particular:

better support

3.3.1.
for the developing countries by
placing greater emphasis in the negotiations on the objective
of development:

3.3.1.1.
(transparent negotiations and more flexible procedures),

by involving them more closely in procedures

3.3.1.2.
by agreeing to negotiate on a number of points
about which they feel very strongly, such as escalating tariff
levels, mobility for key personnel in service companies and
anti-dumping,

3.3.1.3.
implementation of the Marrakesh rules, and

by agreeing to review some matters concerning the

3.3.1.4.
by granting them special and specific treatment
wherever possible without excluding a graduation scheme for
those with the best performance;

3.3.10.
WTO more closely to the needs of the moment.

encouragement of prospects for reform to tailor the

The Committee also stresses the need to opt for a
3.4.
timetable for the new round of WTO trade negotiations which
allows enough time to meet the expectations of all parties
concerned, making it easier to reach a compromise. The fact
of agreeing on an ambitious agenda would mean that there
was a minimum degree of common vision and considerable
will to succeed. It would therefore seem vital to set a major
objective for this round, capable of attracting enough support
and of bringing the various parties together so as to ensure
that it was backed by members and also supported by a good
number of the NGOs. The Committee thus suggests gearing
the new WTO round to a ‘global and sustainable development
objective’. Such an objective would in fact make it possible to
underline:

3.4.1.
first and foremost in developing countries;

the economic development at the core of the round,

3.4.2.
further development of new qualitative requirements:
on health, safety, consumer protection, the environment, the
precautionary principle and social issues;

3.3.2. more effective dialogue with civil society representa-
tives even though the negotiations themselves are ultimately
the responsibility of Member States alone;

3.4.3.
further development of formal institutional cooper-
ation with activities under the aegis of the United Nations and
other international bodies such as the ILO, IMF, World Bank,
WIPO, UNCTAD, WCO, OECD, etc.;

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3.4.4.
the firm determination of the international com-
munity to respond to the challenges following the events
of 11 September by consolidating global and sustainable
cooperation: in addition to focusing extra attention on under-
development problems, that will mean in particular vigilance
on the part of the WTO in exercising control over possible
distortions of trade flows and terms of competition resulting
from various measures, be they already announced or foresee-
able, concerning:

3.4.4.1.
to networks for funding terrorism or laundering money),

tighter financial rules (e.g. the drive to put an end

3.4.4.2. more stringent state control over trade in sensitive
products (e.g. nuclear, chemicals, dual use products, potentially
dangerous substances and weapons),

3.4.4.3.
aeronautics, transport, tourism, insurance/reinsurance).

state aids for hard-hit and struggling sectors (e.g.

3.5.
So as to launch a broad agenda which takes account of
the expectations of all parties concerned, the solutions advo-
cated must be flexible and to the point. While stressing the
necessarily global, interdependent and interactive nature of the
new round, the Committee notes more time may be required
to outline some delicate issues more clearly in the negotiations.
That being the case, one approach might be to base the round
on a three-pronged approach. None of the three elements
comprising this approach should be dissociated from the
implementation of the whole:

without

3.5.1.
further ado, dealing with questions of
implementation benefiting the developing countries, possibly
with an ‘early harvest’ to their benefit, similar to the Montreal
‘mid-term review’ under the Uruguay Round; the Committee
is happy to note that this vital matter is now the subject of
initial priority negotiation;

3.5.2.
facilitating negotiations on market access in the
broadest sense of the term, i.e. products, including the drive to
facilitate customs procedures, pre-investment and aspects
relating to market barriers created by competition rules or the
absence thereof, also including matters coming under the
built-in agenda — agriculture, services;

3.5.4.
all the while maintaining links between the various
areas of negotiation, none of which should be formally
concluded before an overall agreement is reached, in line with
the principle that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’.

3.6.
As regards the different topics of a new agenda, the
Committee would advance a necessarily brief, non-exhaustive
series of comments (set out below) in the light, inter alia, of the
work of the various discussion groups set up by Commissioner
Lamy with the participation of the socio-occupational interest
groups and NGOs, as well as the additional hearings organised
in preparation for this opinion.

3.6.1.
The Committee’s comments are confined to the
prospects and issues at stake in the different subject areas and
avoid anticipating the content of the negotiations as such.
Indeed, as the Committee previously pointed out,
these
negotiations themselves come under various other stages
which are distinct from that affecting the Doha Conference
which must focus on determining the agenda of a new round
without anticipating its results.

3.6.2.
These observations must not be viewed in isolation:
a constant effort must be made to link up the different subject
areas because they interact on many levels and there is a
need ultimately to achieve an overall coherent and balanced
outcome to the various negotiations.

3.6.3.
The Committee also stresses that the various nego-
tiation topics will have to be bound together by a constant
concern to take into account the essential requirements of
development when launching the new round. Indeed, although
trade constitutes one condition of development, development
must also be encouraged by striking a minimum balance in
the mutual concessions made and by means of effective
national adjustment and implementation strategies which play
a key role here. Doing this will entail amongst other things
discussing as a priority how to implement commitments made
by the WTO, including the Marrakesh commitments, which
might mean giving developing countries support to boost their
institutional capacity. Debt relief initiatives could also be
appropriate for the most highly indebted developing countries.

opening the way for negotiations on more compre-
3.5.3.
investment, the environment,
hensive issues (competition,
consumer protection and social issues in conjunction with the
ILO);

3.6.4.
As far as market access objectives are concerned, the
Committee stresses the need to adopt new schedules for
reducing customs duties (in particular peak tariffs) and non-
tariff barriers (including public procurement), which would
help boost world economic growth. Special attention should
be given here to improving market access for the developing

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countries by bringing down the barriers in the developed
countries; multilateral negotiations in the various technical,
agricultural and environmental sectors would make this easier.
Provisions should be made in the implementation phase for
the developing countries to benefit from exemptions from
certain liberalisation commitments stipulated by the WTO,
subject to compliance with given objective, verifiable require-
ments.

should be encouraged to adopt a more pro-active approach
and to define priorities between different professions as well
as sectoral priorities for organising the opening up of their
markets.

As regards the objective of

3.6.5.
facilitating customs
procedures, the Committee stresses the need to cut back
administrative bureaucracy and to modernise customs import
and export procedures, which could warrant technical support
for the developing countries (including support for these
countries’ use of the trade-related dispute settlement mech-
anism).

3.6.8.
As regards investment-related objectives, the Com-
mittee would underscore the need to focus negotiations on a
positive listing of priority sectors which seem to merit steps to
facilitate new investment, particularly in the interests of
the developing countries themselves. Codes of conduct for
multinational companies also ought to be encouraged, such as
those being developed on the basis of the guidelines launched
by the OECD. Special attention should be paid to freedom
of transfer and protection against expropriation and other
nationalisation.

3.6.6.
As for agriculture-related objectives, the Committee
underlines the need to strike a balance between several essential
requirements: increasing world food supply; extending market
access for developing countries in particular; quality, food
the multi-
safety and consumer protection requirements;
functional and social aspects of agriculture and not just its
economic aspects, as legitimately championed by the European
Union; the well-being of farm animals; the protection of
bio-diversity and traditional know-how; rural environment
protection and support
for restructuring; and an overall
balance in the concessions granted by all the partners in their
attempts to secure increased market access. The Committee is
in particular expecting the efforts of the other WTO members
at least to match the Community’s efforts and that the review
of export support measures also take account of export credits
and food aid. The structured opening up of trade in agricultural
products, reductions in import measures and in both internal
and external subsidies must be carried out gradually, by
managing the transitional status carefully and in close cooper-
ation with the groups concerned.

3.6.9.
As for competition-related objectives, the Committee
would note that barriers to competition go hand in hand with
underdevelopment, corruption and closed markets, and all of
these pose a threat to economic development, particularly in
the developing countries, and create a number of imbalances
in international trade itself. Basic rules in this area should
therefore be defined. At this stage, the priority objective will
be above all to promote the integration of basic principles into
national legislation making it possible to combat a number
of particularly symbolic anti-competitive practices, establish
flexible arrangements for exchanging information and for
cooperation and envisage a dispute settlement mechanism in
these areas, without however calling into question national
and regulatory bodies’ prerogatives. Consideration could be
given to support for developing countries so as to boost their
administrative capacity in these spheres.

3.6.7.
As regards the services objectives, the Committee
would underline the opportunities which have opened up here
for the EU which is the foremost world trading partner in this
area, while pointing out
that increased liberalisation will
entail new rules. The GATS agreement will mean that the
international market in services can be opened up, first and
the financial services market, without affecting
foremost
members’ right to retain suitable rules and regulations in the
public interest and to keep public services operating under the
same conditions. The developing countries in particular, for
whom a vital component of development and technology
transfer is rooted in the expansion of their services sectors
(including e-commerce and the movement of key personnel),

3.6.10.
As regards objectives relating to intellectual prop-
erty, the Committee stresses the need to encourage research
and innovation and to combat piracy and counterfeiting while
also recognising the key need to optimise the advantages
brought by innovation to benefit economic, health and social
development in all countries, particularly the developing ones.
One key objective will also have to be to bring down the costs
of accessing innovation, particularly to improve developing
countries’ access to healthy, safe living conditions. In this
connection the agreement on trade related aspects of intellec-
tual property rights (TRIPS) should be clarified so as to
improve technology transfer of which the developing countries
are in urgent need. It also seems that the WTO needs to take
more account of the work and outcome of the negotiations
carried out at the WIPO.

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3.6.11.
As regards health-related objectives, the Committee
would stress the need to apply the precautionary principle in
an appropriate, non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory fashion
on the basis of strict cost-benefit analyses in a way that
involves all the parties concerned. It is also necessary to
develop a common terminology and apply international
standards such as the Codex alimentarius. International pro-
cedures ought to be agreed on for risk management. As well
as arrangements which are more favourable to technology
transfer to the developing countries (cf. the TRIPS question),
including speedy improvements to the system for producing
and distributing essential medicines, support for developing
countries could be needed to improve monitoring and com-
pliance with standards. The opening up of public procurement
should be broached. Steps to open up health services to private
investment under the GATS should ensure that quality is
maintained and social objectives kept up. These various
considerations will also warrant stronger links between the
WTO and other international organisations such as the WTO
and UNCTAD.

For environment-related objectives, the Committee
3.6.12.
underlines the need to take sustainable development objectives
into account in international trade, bearing in mind major
world-wide ecological issues and the need to secure a better
living environment for everyone. Impact indicators such as the
draft SIA — Sustainable Impact Assessment — launched by
the European Commission would appear necessary here. There
should also be reference to international standards. It may be
that support
is needed to help the developing countries
reconcile their economic development aims with these essen-
tial requirements, particularly by means of budgetary and
technical support measures involving other international bod-
ies (cf. the World Bank etc.) and technology transfer. Finally
there should be better coordination between environmental
instruments (multilateral environmental agreements — MEA)
and the WTO’s multilateral rules.

3.6.13.
On the social objectives, the Committee would refer
to its opinion on ‘Human rights at the workplace’ where it
underscores the need to launch moves to include basic labour
standards in the negotiations for a new world trade order,
advocating amongst other things stronger links between the
WTO and the ILO; the ILO is still the most suitable body for
framing international social provisions, but the WTO must
ensure that they are promoted by providing positive incentives.
the
In addition,

the Committee welcomes the fact

that

Commission’s July 2001 communication on promoting core
labour standards and improving social governance in the
context of globalisation drew attention to the need for the
European Union to take new initiatives in this sphere.

Consensus, even if it may appear to bring things to a
3.7.
standstill, is the only way to achieve a balanced outcome under
current public international law. Even then, the manner in
which such consensus is reached will have to be steered more
carefully than has been the case in the past:

by enabling all members, including the developing
3.7.1.
and least developed countries, to play a more active role,
which should make an effective contribution to setting an
agenda for the new round; this could warrant those with
the most limited institutional resources coming together in
‘clusters’ (along the lines of existing procedures in the IMF and
World Bank);

3.7.2.
by giving developing countries the certainty that they
will be provided with the financial and human resources they
need to implement rules, to which incidentally they would
have freely agreed to;

3.7.3.
sitional periods so that they can achieve the same outcome;

if necessary by granting developing countries tran-

3.7.3.1.
countries to set up the necessary institutions,

by helping the developing and least developed

3.7.3.2.
by establishing formal links between the WTO and
other international organisations responsible for sustainable
development and social progress amongst other things by
giving them the status of observer and by strengthening their
cultural ties, along the lines of action taken by the World Bank
and the IMF,
in conjunction with the WTO, to open up
markets,

3.7.3.3.
lastly by setting up consultative bodies (be they
parliamentary or associated with economic and social democ-
racy) to assist the WTO.

The Committee also underlines the need to give
3.8.
representatives of civil society organisations easier access to
the WTO:

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by giving occupational bodies, trade unions and
3.8.1.
NGOs the opportunity to express their views,
thus also
encouraging them to take into account all the parameters
involved, and not only specific issues or demands taken out of
their global context. This would warrant amongst other things:

— organising an annual WTO meeting for public debate,

along the lines of the one held in Geneva in July 2001;

— setting up thematic consultative committees;

— stepping up cooperation with the European Economic

and Social Committee in this area;

3.8.2.
by examining the possibility of involving these bodies
in certain procedures such as reports by the parties involved,
interest groups and NGOs as part of
socio-occupational
dispute settlement.

The Committee thus recommends,

3.9.
in line with a
suggestion by the Director-general of the WTO, Mike Moore,
that a code of conduct be concluded in the near future between
the WTO and representatives of civil society organisations
(socio-occupational interest groups, NGOs) so as to guarantee
interactive dialogue on a stronger, long-lasting basis where
each party is willing to hear the other’s point of view
(consultation, debriefings etc.). Concluding a code of this type
would mean that the 1996 guidelines on relations between the
WTO and NGOs could be updated. Without calling into
question the principle that the negotiations per se are the sole
responsibility of the members, this code would mean that the
WTO’s relations with civil society organisations would be
better organised, based on existing best practice in this area in
the various member countries.
In creating a framework
for dialogue, the code should also provide an operational

Brussels, 17 October 2001.

instrument for cooperation between the WTO and civil society
organisations to benefit ‘global and sustainable development’
which the Committee strongly supports. This code of conduct
could thus comprise:

3.9.1.
violence and promoting mutual dialogue;

a declaration explicitly renouncing all

forms of

3.9.2.
commitments by signatory socio-occupational inter-
est groups and NGOs to comply with certain transparency
rules (mission, members, organisation, finances etc.);

a commitment by the WTO secretariat as regards the
3.9.3.
operational organisation of such cooperation (information and
access to documents, consultation, debriefing, assessments,
Internet forum, etc.) which could amongst other things include
holding an annual conference;

3.9.4.
an invitation to representatives of civil society and
NGOs to participate in information campaigns, analyses of
situations and issues, and to shoulder responsibilities as part
of WTO activities, inter alia by making useful proposals to
WTO institutions on WTO-related issues, supporting the
implementation of WTO commitments and programmes,
contributing to panels and helping verify application problems
and implementation progress;

3.9.5.
an invitation to WTO member states to apply
cooperation arrangements with civil society representatives
and NGOs at national level.

3.10.
On the basis of these various pointers for discussion
and recommendations, the Economic and Social Committee
intends to step up dialogue with and between representatives
of civil society organisations by taking all useful initiatives to
this end.

The President

of the Economic and Social Committee

Göke FRERICHS

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APPENDIX 1

to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee

Lessons from Seattle

It seems vital to understand thoroughly and take on board the reasons behind Seattle’s failure so as not to risk the
talks becoming derailed a second time, yet again resulting in stalemate for similar reasons.

The most apparent reasons for this failure stem, inter alia, from:

— inadequate preparations and organisation beforehand to achieve consensus among the member countries in
tackling a particularly ambitious agenda, making it virtually impossible to hammer out areas of agreement
within the brief space of a one-week conference;

— a lack of effective preparation, apart from ad hoc debriefings on the spot, of dialogue with civil society
representatives and the many NGOs present in Seattle; proper dialogue could have meant that their expectations
and concerns were better taken on board in advance, instead of allowing the situation to degenerate into violent
skirmishes on the streets stirred up by the unchecked actions of certain groups.

Other perhaps less apparent reasons nevertheless proved to be decisive:

— against this background of major disruption there was not enough time to enter into coherent negotiations and
make a success of them, while last minute efforts by the EU amongst others to rebuild contacts did not meet
with enough support to break the deadlock;

— many developing countries felt marginalised in the negotiations, both with regard to the procedure and to their
own demands. The Euro-American condominium, even when extended to the QUAD (EU, United States,
Canada and Japan) and the OECD, proved to be no longer capable of steering multilateral trade negotiations:
the backing of a significant number of developing countries now also needs to be reckoned with;

— the WTO’s procedures and working methods, perceived to be elitist and secretive (the term ‘medieval’ has even
been used), have fuelled a certain amount of defiance on the part of some states, particularly amongst the
developing countries, and of civil society representatives and NGOs. Its dispute settlement system produces
solutions which anticipate or even jeopardise the outcome of future negotiations between sovereign states (c.f.
on the environment). Through its specific methodology and organisational approach, the WTO has a tendency
to extend its powers beyond the field of trade. It is criticised in such incidences for unfettered imperialism;

— also, despite the declared aim of a wide-ranging agenda, the key objective of a new round was not clearly set
out in Seattle: the reference to a ‘millennium round’ in actual fact barely concealed the lack of a common vision
on the major objectives. This was for a large part responsible for the participants’ inability to pull together the
various threads of the negotiations.

Major misunderstandings arose in Seattle which need to be resolved in Doha:

— many NGOs are not opposed in any way to the concept of more international regulation in the face of
globalisation, but they do oppose a certain type of approach adopted by the WTO. Civil society representatives
aspire in particular to making their voice heard in the WTO’s activities (consultation, assessment and
implementation);

— developing countries also want greater transparency — above all in the internal operations of the WTO, more
than in its external operations — as well as greater fairness and involvement in the way it operates, but they
are distrustful of the new rules which do not take account of the disadvantages they face and they currently
rule out any formal involvement of civil society representatives in the work of the WTO. Here one must be
fully aware of major differences in approach, which obviously complicate the conditions for reaching the wide-
ranging consensus needed for successfully launching a new round;

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— it is not so much the ambitions of a wide-ranging agenda which must be held responsible for the failure in

Seattle as a lack of understanding of that agenda and a failure to prepare it properly;

— the WTO cannot and must not do everything: its role is to contribute to shaping a new world structure in a

global framework;

— no-one is opposed in principle to adjusting the WTO rules, but this can only be undertaken gradually in a

climate of greater trust.

APPENDIX 2

to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee

Ongoing developments

In the run-up to Doha, the situation is still very uneven. However, given the results of the meetings in Mexico and
Hanoi, certain developments are taking shape which indicate that a positive outcome may be within reach.

Generally speaking, several advances have been made:

— the requirements of a new round remain intact, despite the various ups and downs that have occurred, with
progress — albeit painstaking and complex — in the preparations in Geneva and the fact that the objective
interest in a new round not only concerns individual states but also the new regional groupings such as
Mercosur, NAFTA and ASEAN;

— closer contact between the major industrialised partners, in particular between the European Union and the
United States (cf. the Zoellick/Lamy contacts, the OECD ministerial conference in May 2001, the Gothenburg
summit in June attended by President Bush, the G8 summit in Genoa in July); also note that the parties
concerned have all sought to make their bilateral and bi-regional (FTAA, Mercosur) initiatives compatible with
the WTO’s multilateral framework; the EU has thus arranged its negotiating timetable accordingly and the
United States has called for a ‘trade promotion authority’ to work to this end;

— greater convergence between industrialised countries and developing countries (c.f. the Mexico and Singapore
mini-ministerial conferences, the Hanoi ASEAN meeting, the Nairobi EU-ACP meeting and the meeting of the
Asia-Pacific countries in the context of the Shanghai APEC summit, which have all produced significant
progress), together with changes for the better in the developing countries, reinforced by a number of initiatives
such as the EU’s ‘Everything but Arms’ initiative (even if the sole beneficiaries are the least developed of the
developing countries, leaving other developing countries’ expectations unchanged);

— improved dialogue with civil society and NGOs firstly on the part of the European Commission, spurred on by
Commissioner Pascal Lamy with several meetings in Brussels, and also on the part of the WTO, as demonstrated
by the recent conference held with them in Geneva in July at the initiative of the Director-General, Mike Moore.

Nevertheless, there is very little room for manœuvre:

— disagreements persist on the shape of the new agenda;

— the international economic situation is less favourable than one or two years ago and could tempt countries to
adopt a more inward-looking approach, prompted by the greater uncertainty following the events on
11 September;

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— EU initiatives have not been fully endorsed by the QUAD, the United States or even all the other OECD

members.

Generally speaking, the EU still needs greater support in its clear calls for a wide-ranging, global round comprising
one part packed with new systemic issues, despite the converging approach adopted by the countries applying for
EU membership, together with Switzerland, Norway and Japan, and in spite of some initial encouraging but still
unconfirmed responses from a number of developing countries;

— many of the points called for by civil society and NGOs still run counter to the thinking of the developing

countries, even if these contradictions are not necessarily insurmountable;

— many NGOs themselves continue to adopt a largely confrontational attitude, as demonstrated at the latest G8

summit in Genoa in July;

— in any case, there is still some way to go towards making the WTO more transparent and developing dialogue

with civil society.

The split in the NGO camp is more clearly demarcated than in the past. Some NGOs are in reality more opposed to
globalisation than to the WTO itself, while many NGOs now see the debate on a different level, i.e. better world-wide
regulation of the multilateral trading, economic and financial system. However, the overall problem remains of
deciding which of their demands have to be taken on board, and how this should be done:

— should this be done within the WTO itself on the basis of a very wide-ranging agenda?

— or should a counterbalance to the WTO be sought by giving other international organisations new
responsibilities and entrusting them with the task of carrying through new, supplementary negotiations, either
under the auspices of the ILO, the UNDP or in the framework of some new World Environmental Organisation,
building on the work already set in motion within the United Nations?

As far as the developing countries are concerned, their demands have largely been spelt out, so much so that none
have spoken of a future development round. Most of these countries are interested above all in focusing the agenda
on the conditions required for their economic development, in particular access to both industrial and agricultural
markets in the industrialised countries. They seem more ready to discuss the terms for easier access to services
markets, which could benefit them not only as service providers, where comparative advantage would work in their
favour, but above all as users, especially with the development of the information society. Many continue to call for
adjustments to the implementation of some of the rules decided on in Marrakech (inter alia TRIPS, trade policy
instruments, anti-dumping, public tenders, textile-clothing agreement) — indeed some have even asked for them to
be abolished; all these are particularly sensitive issues for the industrialised countries, and could prove to be very
difficult to implement in some cases, when it is less the scheduling and more the very essence of the rules which is
being called into question.

Such adjustments would probably make it easier to broaden the agenda to include new subjects such as investment
and competition, about which many of these developing countries nevertheless remain suspicious. Their suspicions
are even greater as far as the environment is concerned since they fear that they will be the victims of protectionist
measures. As they are even more reticent regarding social standards, they view the WTO’s actions as unwarranted
meddling and fear unjustified questioning of their competitive abilities which takes no account of their particular
problems.

Lastly, many developing countries want to change the WTO’s decision-making process to their advantage so as to
allow them to participate more actively in the preparatory work and in setting the agenda for the new round. They
also quite rightly stress the matter of their institutional and administrative handicaps which warrant special attention.
However none of the developing countries are enthusiastic about the NGOs and civil society interfering with the
WTO’s decision-making procedures. On the contrary, they have expressed their will to stick to the sacrosanct
principle of ‘one country one vote’ (which anyway none of the members wishes at present to call into question).

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In order to rally the developing countries to the idea of launching a new round, numerous efforts have been made,
particularly by the EU: The ‘Everything but Arms’ initiative; European Commission talks on a possible multilateral
approach to investment and competition; and Commissioner Lamy’s ‘implementation’ offer to the developing
countries in the form of a three-pronged approach before, during and after Doha. The outcome of this is that the
idea of a ‘manageable’ round now gives rise to fewer fears.

The Cairns Group continues primarily to seek better outlets for their agricultural and agri-food products, which the
Group feels requires both the opening up of markets and a reduction in support measures. It considers that the
agenda of the new round might be more acceptable if it resembled the built-in agenda.

The United States is mainly concerned with capturing service, goods and agricultural markets. On the other hand, it
remains suspicious as regards environmental issues while the implementing arrangements still pose problems (e.g.
trade defence instruments and intellectual property).

For the EU, minimum negotiations focusing on market access would clearly not be enough, even if it is obvious that
the EU as the foremost world-wide trading partner both in goods and services has itself many interests, expectations
and claims to defend in this area: these negotiations must be extended to include a number of issues which go
beyond pure trade and are likely to encourage some regulation of trade and investment (investment, competition and
also the environment), even if that would require balancing, graduating or even compensatory mechanisms. Moreover
the EU wishes to continue the debate on social standards even if it acknowledges that the WTO is not the most
suitable forum for dealing with this issue directly without making use of the special role that the ILO must play in
this area. The applicant countries wishing to join the EU are themselves close to the EU’s position — which they
already supported in Seattle.

It has been noted overall that the format for the agenda of future negotiations remains to be set, even if no-one (or
hardly anyone) challenges the following points any more:

— setting an agenda based on the built-in agenda (services and agriculture), backed by supplementary measures

on ‘market access’;

— putting the finishing touches to the uncompleted parts of the Uruguay round negotiations;

— updating certain commitments made at Marrakech at least as regards the schedules, as well as taking into
account certain of the developing countries’ basic needs (essential medicines in the framework of the TRIPS
agreement);

— improving the transparency of WTO procedures;

— introducing a number of additional topics relating to market access, such as facilitating customs procedures.

The following points still cause problems:

— the scale of the negotiations on the ‘implementation’ arrangements and in particular the shape of any concession
to be granted to the developing countries as regards intellectual property, the textile/clothing agreement, trade
defence instruments and some aspects of dispute settlement — all of which are particularly delicate issues for
the industrialised countries;

— systemic and regulatory negotiations on competition and investment-related matters, the environment and,

even more controversial, social issues.

The argument in favour of a wide-ranging round, which would meet the concerns of all parties, nonetheless remains
a valid one, especially if — as is to be hoped — the aim is to accede to all or part of the requests made by civil society
in the broadest sense of the term.

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APPENDIX 3

to the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee

Glossary of abbreviations

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

Asia-Europe Meeting

Free trade area of the Americas

General Agreement on Trade and Services

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

International Labour Organisation

International Monetary Fund

Least developed countries

Multilateral environmental agreements

Multilateral trade negotiations

Non-governmental organisations

Newly industrialised countries

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

Sustainable impact assessment

Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights

APEC

ASEM

FTAA

GATS

GATT

ILO

IMF

LDC

MEA

MTN

NGO

NIC

OECD

SIA

TRIPS

UNCTAD

UN Conference on Trade and Development

WCO

WIPO

WTO

World Customs Organisation

World Intellectual Property Organisation

World Trade Organisation