Special report No 14/2001 - Follow up to Special Report No 19/98 on BSE, together with the Commission's replies
Date: 2001-09-13
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: European Commission, European Court of Auditors, bovine spongiform encephalopathy, report

20.11.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 324/1

I

(Information)

COURT OF AUDITORS

Follow up to Special Report No 19/98 on BSE, together with the Commission’s replies

SPECIAL REPORT No 14/2001

(pursuant to Article 248(4)(2) EC)

(2001/C 324/01)

CONTENTS

Paragraph

Page

SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT’S SPECIAL REPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DISCHARGE AUTHORITY’S RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

SCOPE OF THE FOLLOW UP REPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF BSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Incidence of BSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

THE COMMISSION’S BSE STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Main elements of the Commission’s BSE strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Legislative basis for BSE measures taken by the EU to date . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Epidemio-surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Specified risk materials (SRMs)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Rendering methods and regulation of animal feed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Mammalian meat and bonemeal (MBM) feed ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Animal movement and identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Monitoring and enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Assessment of implementation of BSE strategy by Member States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Measures available for enforcement of the EU’s BSE strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I-VII

1-2

3-4

5

6-10

9-10

11-46

11-16

17-18

19-23

24-27

28

29-35

36-39

40-46

40-42

43

44-46

47-54

55

ANNEX 1 — Scientific Steering Committee’s opinion on geographical risk of BSE (GBR) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ANNEX 2 — BSE controls in the Member States — overview of issues reported by the Food

and Veterinary Office, 1998 to 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

ANNEX 3 — Delays in passing EU legislation on specified risk materials (SRMs)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Commission’s replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

3

5

5

5

5

8

8

10

10

13

13

13

15

16

16

16

16

17

18

19

20

27

31

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SUMMARY

I. The Court’s Special Report No 19/98 concluded that financing measures taken as a result of BSE were not
implemented rigorously or consistently within the Member States, and that the ban on feeding ruminants with
mammalian meat and bonemeal (MMBM) was not adequately monitored (see paragraph 2). The report also
identified the need for the EU to develop a BSE strategy, as well as the importance of establishing comprehens-
ive and reliable animal registers.

II. The costs borne by the EU for the BSE measures implemented after the 1996 BSE crisis were high (4,7 bil-
lion euro) (see paragraph 1). The United Kingdom where 99 % of the BSE cases had occurred (see paragraph 9),
has been the largest recipient.

III. The Court’s follow up assessed the action the EU took to manage the risk of BSE to animal and human
health (see paragraph 5). The Court found that the Commission’s BSE strategy is generally sound and based
on available scientific knowledge, but its effectiveness has been hampered by inadequate implementation by
the Member States and by lack of effective measures available to the Commission to enforce corrective action
on Member States (see paragraphs 44 to 46). Through a combination of poor implementation of BSE control
measures and a lack of EU–wide definition of specified risk materials (SRMs) (see paragraphs 25 to 27), con-
sumers and animals were exposed to different levels of risk in the Member States.

IV. The Commission services have been reorganised so that consumer health and protection is clearly separ-
ated from the beef market management (see paragraph 12(a). The Commission’s Food and Veterinary Office
(FVO) was reinforced (see paragraph 40), but high staff turnover has caused some problems (see para-
graph 41), and the number of BSE–related inspections could be increased (see paragraph 42). The scientific
advisory committees have also been reorganised (see paragraph 12(b)) and increased funding has been pro-
vided for research into BSE (see paragraph 12(c)).

V. Whilst the major BSE prevention legislation was passed before the 1996 BSE crisis, the acceptance by
Member States of certain measures proposed subsequently by the Commission, especially the removal of SRMs
was difficult (see paragraphs 24 to 27), and delays have also been caused by the institutional procedures for
adoption of legislation (see paragraphs 17 and 18).

VI. The number of BSE cases is likely to have been under-reported in the past. More BSE cases have been
reported recently due to better surveillance, with the introduction of compulsory epidemiological surveillance
in 1998 (see paragraph 20) and the use of rapid diagnostic BSE tests (see paragraph 19). Animals with BSE
born after the 1994 mammalian MBM feed ban provide evidence that the ban has not been properly imple-
mented and controlled, and there is evidence from FVO inspections of lack of controls on trade in MBM.
Although the problems of safe sourcing, processing, use and cross contamination of MBM have been known
since 1996, and two Member States (Portugal and the United Kingdom) had their own national bans on using
mammalian MBM for farmed animals, the Commission, in the absence of a test capable of differentiating
between protein of different species, banned the use of animal proteins in feed for all farmed animals in the
whole of the EU only from 1 January 2001 (see paragraph 31).

VII. The Court’s follow up draws attention to other issues such as modern livestock production and market-
ing, and support provided through the CAP:

(a) the dangers of using mammalian MBM in feed for ruminants;

(b) promotion of extensive rearing and feeding;

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(c) reorienting subsidy payments in the beef and veal sector away from production, while at the same time

respecting the need to provide a reasonable standard of living for farmers (see paragraph 16);

(d) animal welfare issues, especially as regards the transport of live animals across the EU, with the resultant

risk of spreading disease.

VIII. The follow up report also draws attention to whether the Commission should have additional powers
to enforce action against Member States which do not comply with the relevant legislation (see paragraph 51),
and whether it requires specific additional powers where Member States do not accept proposals related to
animal or human health and protection (see paragraph 50).

MAIN CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT’S SPECIAL REPORT

2. The main conclusions of the Court’s report concerned:

In 1998, the Court of Auditors produced Special Report
1.
No 19/98 on BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy) (1) relat-
ing mainly to EU income support measures, and specific United
Kingdom measures for eradicating animals at risk of BSE. The
total cost borne by the EU budget for these market measures,
including public intervention and private storage, amounts to
4 696 million euro for the period 1996 to 2000 (see Figure 1), of
which 1 189 million euro relates to 1998 to 2000. These amounts
do not include the costs borne by the Member States themselves,
nor the loss in earnings due to the drop in consumption or lost
markets. The United Kingdom was the largest recipient, with
43,7 % of expenditure (see Figure 2).

(a) an urgent need for the EU to design and adopt a strategy to

deal with this type of crisis (2) (see paragraph 11);

(b) lack of rigour and consistency in the implementation of the

measures within and between Member States (3);

(c) failure to adequately monitor the feed ban (4) (see para-

graphs 29 to 33);

(d) the importance of establishing comprehensive and reliable
animal registers in the Member States (5) (see paragraphs 36
to 39).

(1) Special Report No 19/98 concerning Community financing of certain
measures taken as a result of the BSE crisis (OJ C 383, 9.12.1998).

(2) Special Report No 19/98, paragraph 96.
(3) Special Report No 19/98, paragraph 93.
(4) Special Report No 19/98, paragraph 92.
(5) Special Report No 19/98, paragraph 91.

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BSE related expenditure from the EAGGF, 1996 to 2000 (Total amount 4 696 Mio EUR)

Figure 1

Calf early marketing premium scheme
4,4%

Private storage
0,4%

Selective calf culling  (B, F, NL)
1,1%

Public intervention
1 386,7 Mio  EUR
29,5%

Direct income support payments
1 309,9 Mio EUR
27,9%

Selective culling
(D, F, IRL, P, UK)
2,5%

Calf processing scheme
326,6 Mio EUR
(F, IRL, P, UK)
7%

Source: Court of Auditors review of information provided by DG AGRI.

Over thirty months scheme (UK)
1 275,4 Mio EUR 
27,2%

BSE related expenditure from the EAGGF 1996 to 2000 by Member State

Figure 2

B
1,5%

DK 
1,1%

D
720,4 Mio EUR
15,3%

ES
3,3%

F
741,8 Mio EUR 
15,8%

IRL
427 Mio EUR 
9,1%

UK
2 058,4 Mio EUR
43,7%

A
1,8%

NL
3,2% 

IT
3,5%

EL, L, P, FIN, SV
1,9%

Source: Court of Auditors’ review of information provided by DG AGRI.

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DISCHARGE AUTHORITY’S RECOMMENDATIONS

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF BSE

3.
In the 1997 discharge procedure, the Council recommended (1)
that the Commission should formulate a BSE strategy. Parliament
noted (2) that the Commission had complied with most of its re-
commendations (3), but requested the Commission to recover in
full the amounts paid out in contravention of the regulations in
force and to continue its work on setting up a comprehensive sys-
tem for the identification and registration of bovine animals.

In the United Kingdom,

4.
‘the over thirty months scheme’
(OTMS) was introduced in 1996 to eliminate cattle over 30
months from the human food and animal feed chains. Due to fail-
ures to control and account for the destruction of these animals
properly, in May 1999 (4) the Commission excluded 32,7 mil-
lion euro from Community financing for expenditure up to August
1997 (calculated on the basis of a 10 % disallowance for animals
claimed up to 4 July 1996, and a 5 % disallowance for animals
claimed between 4 July 1996 and 4 August 1996), and a further
correction of about 8 million euro (calculated on the basis of a
5 % disallowance) is foreseen for the final payment. For about half
of the other BSE-reporting Member States, smaller financial cor-
rections have been proposed for weaknesses in implementation of
income support schemes introduced as a result of the BSE crisis.

SCOPE OF THE FOLLOW UP REPORT

5.
In 2001, the Court carried out a review of the BSE measures
introduced and implemented by the EU in order to identify and
manage the risk of BSE occurring, being propagated and posing a
risk to human and animal health. The main Commission services
concerned were DG Health and Consumer Protection
(DG SANCO), and DG Agriculture (DG AGRI). None of the Mem-
ber States have been visited.

6. BSE (5) is one of a number of transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies (TSEs), and is a disease of the brain character-
ised by the presence of an abnormal form of a protein called a
prion. BSE was first identified in cattle in the United Kingdom in
1986, and whilst its origins are not known, it is not contagious
and scientific evidence to date suggests that it is probably acquired
by eating feed containing meat and bonemeal (MBM) contam-
inated by the infectious agent as well as a low level of maternal
transmission (less than 10 %).

7.
In 1996, the United Kingdom Government announced that
there was a possible link between BSE and a new variant of
Creutzfeld-Jacob’s disease (NvCJD), a fatal degenerative disease of
the brain in humans, similar to BSE in cattle and scrapie in sheep.
According to current knowledge (6), the most probable cause is
exposure to BSE by eating flesh of infected cattle, although there
may be other transmission routes as yet unknown. As at April
2001, there were 99 confirmed or suspected NvCJD cases in the
EU (7), mostly in young people.

8. Figure 3 shows that a wide use is made of animals slaughtered
for human consumption. The by-products/animal waste are used
for a variety of ends in many different products, but most parts
of animals slaughtered end up in the human food chain, either
directly or indirectly.

Incidence of BSE

9. The United Kingdom has reported a total of 179 804 con-
firmed cases up to 31 May 2001, compared to 1 738 cases in
other EU countries and 1 673 cases in the rest of the world dur-
ing the same period. The number of United Kingdom cases peaked
in 1992 and has been declining since then. Since 1996, the incid-
ence of BSE in the rest of the EU has been increasing. In 2000 the
United Kingdom reported 1 428 cases, compared to 482 in other
Member States; while from January to May 2001, this situation
reversed, and the United Kingdom reported 246 cases, compared
to 323 cases in other Member States (see Figure 4). If this trend
continues, it would indicate that the reported incidence of BSE in
the other Member States is increasing significantly.

(1) Document 5911/99 FIN 34 PE — L 12.
(2) Document PE 230.646 of 17 March 1999.
(3) The European Parliament’s temporary committee of enquiry into BSE,
set up in July 1996 soon after the start of the first BSE crisis, was crit-
ical of both the Commission and the United Kingdom authorities’
response to BSE. In its report of February 1997 (European Parliament
document A4-0020/97), it made a series of recommendations on
issues mostly related to the public health implications of BSE and the
decision-making process and management within the Commission.
The European Parliament subsequently set up a follow up committee
(on the BSE enquiry recommendations) (OJ C 150, 19.5.1997), which
finalised its report in November 1997. This committee reported that
the Commission had acted on most of its recommendations.

(4) Commission Decision 1999/350/EC of 4 May 1999 (OJ L 133,

(5) Sources for technical details in this section: various opinions by the

Scientific Steering Committee, and Special Report No 19/98.

(6) Source: Opinion of the Scientific Steering Committee of 13 and
14 April 2000 ‘Oral exposure of humans to the BSE agent: infective
dose and species barrier’.

(7) All cases have occurred in the United Kingdom apart from three in

28.5.1999, p. 60).

France and one in Ireland.

Uses of bovine animals slaughtered for human consumption

Figure 3

Animals

Slaughterhouse

Ante-mortem 
inspection

Slaughter

Post-mortem
inspection

Cutting

Fats trimmed
from
carcases

Bones

Meat and offals

Hides and skins

Blood

Fats

Defatted 
bones for
gelatine

Fats

Greaves

Meat 
Meat products 
Processed
animal proteins

Leather

Gelatine
Collagen
Hydrol. 
proteins

Blood products

Human food 
Animal feed (1)
Petfood 
Pharmaceutical 
Cosmetic 
Technical

Human food
Animal feed
Petfood
Pharmaceutical
Cosmetic
Technical (2)

(1) In case of proteins, following treatment at 133 °C, 20 minutes, 3 bars. In case of fats, following ultrafiltration.
(2) Use other than non-food/ industrial.

Source: DG SANCO.

C
3
2
4
/
6

E
N

O

f
f
i
c
i
a
l

J
o
u
r
n
a
l

o
f

t
h
e

E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
i
e
s

Animals unfit for 
human consumption

Animals positive to
BSE rapid test

Parts unfit for human
consumption

BSE specified 
risk material

Destruction

.

2
0
1
1
2
0
0
1

.

Figure 4

Incidence of BSE to 31 May 2001

.

2
0
1
1
2
0
0
1

.

Country

Up to
1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001 (1)

Total

United Kingdom

442

2 473

7 166

14 294

25 202

37 056

34 829

24 290

14 475

8 090

4 335

3 197

2 281

1 428

246

179 804

Germany

Belgium

Denmark

Spain

France

Ireland

Italy

Luxembourg

Netherlands

Portugal

Total excluding UK

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

1 (2)

0

1 (2)

0

0

0

0

0

0

1

3 (2)

0

0

0

4

0

0

0

0

3

15 (3)

14 (3)

17 (3)

18 (3)

16

19 (3)

16 (3)

0

0

0

0

15

0

0

0

1 (2)

15

0

0

0

1 (2)

23

0

0

0

1 (2)

21

0

0

0

3 (2)

20

2 (2)

0

0

12

40

0

0

0

15

34

0

0

0

0

12

74

0

0

0

2 (2)

1

0

0

6

80

0

1

2

0

6

0

0

18

83

0

0

2

0

3

0

0

31 (3)

95

0

0

2

7

9

1

2

162

149

0

0

2

31

117

30

122

127

236

159

290

150 (3)

482

Total EU

442

2 473

7 181

14 309

25 225

37 077

34 849

24 330

14 509

8 207

4 457

3 433

2 571

1 910

Isle of Man, Jersey, Guernsey

Liechtenstein

Switzerland

Others (4)

4

0

0

0

41

62

113

157

224

261

146

0

0

0

0

0

3

0

2

0

0

8

0

0

15

0

0

29

1

0

64

0

87

0

68

0

59

0

45

0

58

0

38

0

38

2

14

0

20

0

50

0

14

0

33

0

68

15

2

45

86

55

15

0

8

29

323

569

0

0

17

0

81

34

4

47

328

651

17

1

16

559

1 738

181 542

1 284

2

383

4

Total world

442

2 473

7 184

14 311

25 233

37 092

34 879

24 394

14 577

8 252

4 495

3 449

2 621

1 943

586

183 215

(1) Date of confirmation of the most recent cases in 2001: Germany (29 May), Belgium (23 May), Denmark (23 February), Spain (25 May), France (30 May), Ireland (25 May), Italy (30 May), Netherlands (2 May).

United Kingdom, Isle of Man, Jersey and Guernsey (provisional data as at 25 May), Switzerland (provisional data as at 31May), Portugal (provisional data as at 31 May).

(2) Imported case.
(3) Includes imported cases: Ireland: five in 1989, one in 1990, two in 1991 and 1992, one in 1994 and 1995.

France: one in 1999; Portugal: one in 2000.

(4) Imported cases recorded in 1989 (Falkland Islands: one; Oman: two) and in 1993 (Canada: one).

Sources: Commission, DG SANCO.
Up to 1996 inclusive, OIE for all countries.
After 1996, system for the notification of animal diseases for the Member States, plus monthly BSE reports for the United Kingdom and Portugal, along with test reports;

OIE for the other countries.

E
N

O

f
f
i
c
i
a
l

J
o
u
r
n
a
l

o
f

t
h
e

E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
i
e
s

C
3
2
4
/
7

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10. As at March 2001, BSE had been reported in all Member
States except four — Austria, Finland, Sweden, which have been
classified by the Scientific Steering Committee as countries where
BSE is unlikely, but not excluded, and Greece, for which there is
no geographical BSE risk assessment (see paragraph 23 and
Annex 1).

THE COMMISSION’S BSE STRATEGY

Main elements of the Commission’s BSE strategy

11. The Commission’s BSE strategy comprises:

(a) research into BSE, its origins and how it is propagated, in
order to identify the risks and enable appropriate risk man-
agement measures be taken;

(b) epidemio-surveillance, to identify animals that are at risk of or

have BSE;

(g) a system to ensure the effective monitoring and enforcement

of the above measures by the Member States.

12. The BSE measures implemented to date aim to eliminate
possibly BSE-infected matter from entering the animal feed or the
human food chain (1). The BSE measures taken or proposed by
the Commission for implementation by the Member States are
summarised at Figure 5. In addition to these specific BSE risk
management measures, the Commission reorganised its services
and took the following action:

(a) responsibility for food safety and veterinary inspection is
clearly separated from the market management division of the
Agriculture Directorate-General (DG AGRI), in a separate direc-
torate with responsibility for health and consumer protection
(DG SANCO);

(b) the various consultative scientific committees have been
brought together under DG SANCO. A scientific steering
committee (SSC) has been created to oversee matters concern-
ing consumer health and food safety. The SSC is supported by
an ad-hoc group dealing with BSE;

(c) standards on handling of specified risk materials, to ensure
that BSE-infected animals and tissue that is more likely to
carry the BSE agent stay out of the human food and animal
feed chain;

(c) the Commission has provided approximately 50 million euro
for research into transmissible spongiform encephalopathies
(TSEs). This is in addition to Member States’ ongoing research
projects;

(d) adequate standards to ensure that all animal waste is treated

appropriately in order to minimise infectiveness;

(e) a feed ban to ensure that if there are failures in other layers,
cattle are not exposed to the BSE agent through their feed;

(d) the Commission has proposed the creation of a European
food authority (2), a Regulation laying down detailed rules for
dealing with animal by-products not intended for human con-
sumption and a Regulation to provide a framework for the
BSE strategy measures (see paragraph18);

(f) an animal identification system to ensure that the provenance
of an animal and the holdings on which it has been present
can be traced if BSE is diagnosed;

(e) the Commission has followed a policy of openness by mak-
ing scientific opinions and reports, and the inspection reports
of the Food and Veterinary Office (after discussion with Mem-
ber States) publicly available on the Internet.

(1)

In contrast, derogations are applied for the use of bovine matter in
medical/pharmaceutical products, where the industry is self regula-
tory, in that it has a code of good practice which recommends safe
sourcing of raw materials. The nature of the end product makes it dif-
ficult to verify the raw material used, and indeed, there is no regula-
tory requirement to check that safe sourcing or processing has in fact
been applied.

(2) White Paper on Food Safety, COM(1999) 719 final of 12 January

2000.

1986

1988

1990

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

Figure 5

Major events concerning BSE

Major events

11/86:UK BSE
8
identified

7/89: EU ban on 
UK exports of live
cattle born before
July 1988

2/90: EU ban on UK
exports of live cattle
over six months; 
younger calves may be
exported only if slaughtered
before age six months

4/90:BSE is
notifiable
disease

3/96:UK anounces link
between BSE & NvCJD
Embargo on UK exports

6/97:SSC created
Food & Vet Office
re- organisation

8/98:N. Ireland
exports resume

8/99:UK exports
resume

11/98:ban on
P exports

4/98: EU introduction of
annual monitoring for
animal TSEs

7/98: SSC begins GBR -
geographical risk 
assessment of BSE

10/00:F BSE 
contaminated meat
sold 

winter/00:S, D, I:
first BSE cases in
domestic herds

6/00:surveillance
programme improved: 
introduction of rapid tests 
and testing protocols

7/00:SSC adopts GBR
for all MS except EL 

11/00:all animals > 30 months 
for consumption and risk animals be
tested for BSE(1/01)

4/90:EU export ban on
UK specified bovine
materials (SBM)

7/94:EU ban on UK
SBOs extended 

11/90:UK ban on use of
SBM in animal feed & exports 
of such feed

3/96:UK OTMS
begins.

10/96:SVC recommends
removal of SRMs from 
food / feed chain in
countries with BSE risk

12/96:Council rejects 
Commissions proposals 
for SRM removal

7/97:Commission decision
534/97 prohibition of use of
SRMs from 1/98.

3/98: 534/97
implementation
postponed to 1/98

12/97: 534/97
implementation
postponed to 4/98

12/98: 534/97
implementation
postponed to 12/99

12/99: 534/97
implementation
postponed to 6/00

6/00:534/97repealed and
replaced by Com.Dec.
418/00;SRM definition
extended.

12/00:SRM list extended

7/94:Com. Dec. 94/382
sets rendering standards
from 1/1/95.

2/95:parameters for 
batch processing 
rendering systems
(CD 95/29)

7/96:parameters for
pressure cooking
MBM (CD 96/449) 

10/97:set one
standard for MBM
rendering

7/99:new conditions
for production of tallow
and MBM
CD 99/534)

7/88:UK feed ban
on ruminant derived
MBM to ruminants

90/91:7 MS ban feeding of
ruminant derived MBM
to ruminants

6/94:EU ban on
feeding mammalian
MBM to ruminants

8/96: UK bans 
MBM feed to all
farm animals and
bans all MBM exports 

7/97: SSC 
conference 
on MBM use 
& safety

10/97:EU 
restrictions on trade in MBM

9/98:SSC
reports on
safety of MBM

12/00: EU temporary 
ban on feeding MBM to 
all farm animals from 
1/01 to 6/01

BSE surveillance

Specified risk
materials

Rendering
methods

MBM feed ban

Source: Court of Auditors review of BSE legislation and Commission DG SANCO documents.

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C 324/10

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Official Journal of the European Communities

20.11.2001

13. No market measures other than those described in the Court’s
Special Report were introduced between 1998 and the start of the
current crisis in late 2000. By mid-2000, the beef and veal market
had recovered from the 1996 to 1997 BSE crisis much quicker
than expected (1). By mid 2000 consumption was actually higher
than before the crisis, prices were at their highest in five years,
and there were no intervention stocks.

14. The second crisis started in autumn 2000, first of all in
France, where the reported BSE incidence was increasing, due to
wide-scale BSE testing (see paragraph 19). Both consumption and
prices of beef fell quickly. More BSE cases were reported by the
Member States as the new BSE testing programme was imple-
mented, and consumer confidence was further eroded by the first
reported cases in domestic herds in Spain, Germany and Italy.
Individual Member States quickly imposed unilateral bans on
imports of live cattle and bovine products from affected coun-
tries, and these were joined by non-member countries and some
of the EU candidate countries. By January 2001, before the foot-
and-mouth disease, beef prices had fallen by over 25 % (2) since
October 2000.

15.
In response to the crisis, the Commission proposed veter-
inary measures aimed at increasing public health protection, and
restoring consumer confidence (testing of animals over 30 months
intended for human consumption, temporary ban on the use of
MBM for all farm animals). It also proposed market measures
aimed at reducing the production of beef and providing support
to producers. These measures envisage removing 1,3 million
tonnes of beef from the market in 2001 through intervention
storage and the purchase for destruction or storage schemes. The
net cost of these measures to the EU budget is estimated at 2 200
million euro over the period 2001 to 2006 (3).

16. The Commission has calculated that it is more cost effective
to destroy animals under the purchase for destruction scheme
(cost to Community budget: 1 260 euro per tonne) than to put
them into intervention storage (cost to Community budget
2 860 (4) euro per tonne). None the less, the total cost of the BSE
crisis is high. Indeed, the estimated 1 748 000 animals eligible for

(1) Special Report No 19/98, paragraphs 16 to 21. Updated situation is
from report ‘Prospects for agricultural markets 2000 to 2007’,
Directorate-General for Agriculture, November 2000.

(2) Drop in prices between week 42 (October) 2000 and week 5 (end of
January) 2001: beefmeat young bulls AR3 27 %; cows DO3 28 %;
heifers 16 %; steers CR3 2 %.
Source : DG AGRI working document — Market situation for bovine
meat and live animals.

(3) Estimated cost from 2001 to 2006: 3 500 million euro; estimated
savings from measures to reduce beef production: 1 300 million euro;
net estimated cost: 2 200 million euro.

(4) The Commission calculation assumes that such beef in intervention
will be impossible to sell in the future. This has added 800 euro to the
estimated cost per tonne of intervention storage.

the destruction scheme, and the animals processed for storage,
have been subsidised by the EU for several years through the vari-
ous beef premium schemes. The animal becomes unsaleable but
the producer does not lose out on the animal concerned, as Mem-
ber States’ compensation is based on the market value of the an-
imal before the crisis, and the EU contributes 70 % of this. The
BSE crisis raises the question of how to reorient subsidy payments
in the beef and veal sector away from production, while at the
same time respecting the need to provide a reasonable standard
of living to farmers.

Legislative basis for BSE measures taken by the EU to date

17. The major BSE prevention legislation had already been passed
by the Commission before the start of the first BSE crisis in
1996 (5) (see Figure 5). The current BSE measures are all based on
the veterinary safeguard clauses, which should normally be tem-
porary and based on scientific criteria, and are adopted under the
powers delegated to the Commission by the Council.

In order to provide a proper legal basis for the BSE measures,
18.
in January 1999 the Commission submitted a proposal for a
Regulation on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies
(TSEs) (6) which provides a framework for the BSE measures
passed to date as well as rules for trade, secondary processed
products, BSE eradication, and any other emerging TSEs. Once
adopted under the co-decision procedure by the Council and Par-
liament, the Regulation would supersede the current measures.
The main difference with current legislation is that measures
would depend on the BSE status of the Member States and coun-
tries exporting to the EU (see Annex 1). However, adoption of
Regulations by the co-decision procedure is slow owing to delays
in the institutions concerned — the Regulation was signed in May
2001 (7), 27 months after the proposal was first made.

Epidemio-surveillance

19. Surveillance (8) involves identifying the incidence of BSE and
animals at risk of being infected, to ensure that appropriate risk

(5) The major BSE prevention legislation was the 1994 ban on feeding
mammalian derived MBM to ruminants and treatment of animal
waste to reduce infectiveness between 1994 and 1997.

(6) COM(98) 623 final — C4-0025/1999 — 1998/0323 (COD)

(OJ C 45, 19.2.1999, p. 2).

(7) Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 May 2001 laying down rules for the prevention, con-
trol and eradication of certain transmissible spongiform encephalo-
pathies (OJ L 147, 31.5.2001, p. 1).

(8) Passive surveillance is control of notified BSE suspects i.e. cattle that
are notified because of clinical signs compatible with BSE. Active sur-
veillance is testing of cattle that are not notified as BSE suspects but
belong to risk sub-populations.

20.11.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 324/11

management procedures are taken. Currently, BSE can only be
confirmed after the death of an animal. Until the introduction of
three rapid post-mortem diagnostic tests (1) for animals over 30
months in 1999, BSE could only be confirmed by a relatively
cumbersome laboratory analysis of the brain. According to the
Commission, these rapid tests cannot identify BSE infected an-
imals early in the incubation period nor can a negative result
guarantee the absence of the BSE agent in an individual animal
tested (2).

20. The Commission only introduced compulsory epidemio-
logical surveillance for all animal TSEs (3) in 1998, based on the
minimum requirements recommended by the World Organisa-
tion for Animal Health (Office International des Epizooties (OIE)).
Initially, a relatively limited number of brains were required to be
tested. After the rapid diagnostic tests were approved in 1999, the
monitoring programmes were improved in June 2000 to exten-
sively test at-risk animals (4), to establish the national reference
laboratories and strengthen protocols for testing following OIE
recommendations (5). These measures were due to be imple-
mented in January 2001, but following the start of the crisis, the
testing programme was again extended. As of January 2001, all
bovines over 30 months, slaughtered for human consumption
(except in Austria, Finland or Sweden and intended only for their
national market), or presented for emergency slaughter must be
tested. In addition, dead-on-farm bovine animals over 30 months
of age must be tested at random (6). Between January and Febru-
ary 2001, over 900 000 rapid tests were carried out across the
EU.

21. The number of BSE cases in the past is likely to have been

under-reported, as passive surveillance (7) may not lead to identi-
fication and testing of suspect cases. The FVO inspections have
noted weak epidemio-surveillance of BSE in all the Member States
visited (see Figure 6 and Annex 2), and have concluded that BSE
probably existed in Member States which had yet to report any
cases (Germany, Italy, Spain) (8), and that in other Member States,
the real rate of BSE was probably higher than that being reported
by the competent authorities. Before the new testing programme
was introduced in January 2001, the FVO found that several
Member States needed to improve their surveillance efforts (Bel-
gium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, Austria) (9).

22. The recent increased number of BSE cases reported by Mem-
ber States (see Figure 4) is partly due to increased and better
epidemio-surveillance. The Commission considers that the recent
cases reported in Germany, Spain and Italy would probably not
have been detected otherwise. In addition, the Scientific Steering
Committee’s (SSC) geographical BSE risk assessment (GBR) (10)
considered that more BSE cases may occur in Belgium, Denmark,
France,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Spain (see
Annex 1).

23. The SSC started its geographical BSE risk assessment (GBR)
of certain countries in 1998, with the aim that future BSE meas-
ures applied would reflect their BSE risk status (11). The assess-
ment has been carried out for all Member States with the excep-
tion of Greece, (12) which did not provide the relevant information,
and for 32 other countries (see Annex 1) and (see paragraph 10).

(1) Approved rapid post-mortem diagnostic tests: Prionics, Enfer, CEA
are able to prove the presence of the BSE agent close to the end of the
incubation period for animals that are already clinically ill. These tests
cannot identify pre-clinical cases at earlier stages of incubation. They
are approved for use on animals over 30 months old, and may not be
reliable for animals under that age.

(4)

(2) Source: paragraph 4 of the preamble to Commission Decision 2000/
764/EC of 29 November 2000 on the testing of bovine animals for
the presence of bovine spongiform encephalopathy and amending
Decision 98/272/EC on epidemio-surveillance for transmissible
spongiform encephalopathies.

(3) Commission Decision 98/272/EC of 23 April 1998 on epidemio-
surveillance for transmissible spongiform encephalopathies and
amending Decision 94/474/EC (OJ L 122, 24.4.1998, p. 59).
‘Fallen stock’ dying on the farm, animals presented for emergency
slaughter and those showing neurological and /or behavioural symp-
toms.

(5) Commission Decision 2000/374/EC of 5 June 2000 amending Deci-
sion 98/272/EC on epidemio-surveillance for transmissible spongi-
form encephalopathies (OJ L 135, 8.6.2000 p. 27).

(6) Commission Decision 2000/764/EC of 29 November 2000 on the
testing of bovine animals for the presence of bovine spongiform
encephalopathy and amending Decision 98/272/EC (OJ L 305,
6.12.2000, p. 35).

(7) Passive surveillance is control of notified BSE suspects i.e. cattle that
are notified because of clinical signs compatible with BSE. Active sur-
veillance is testing of cattle that are not notified as BSE suspects but
belong to risk sub-populations.

(8) Source: Germany: DRAFT mission 1129/00 between 25 September
2000 and 29 September 2000; Italy: DRAFT mission 1306/00 between
11 December 2000 and 15 December 2000; Spain: DRAFT mission
1305/00 between 11 December 2000 and 15 December 2000.
(9) Source: FVO document reference D33459 of 8 November 2000.
(10) SSC’s final opinion of 6 July 2000 on GBR, Annex II, Section 3, coun-

tries with current GBR level III.

(11) To date (April 2001), the Commission has referred to the GBRs in
regulating imports of SRMs from non-member countries; approving
specific testing programmes for Austria, Sweden and Finland and pro-
viding for the possibility of differentiating BSE control measures by
Member State in its proposal for a TSE Regulation.

(12) The GBR has been prepared on the basis of information provided by
the Member States on Commission recommendation 98/447/EC of
22 July 1998. The Greek authorities are prepared to provide this
information once the Council and Parliament Regulation on TSE
identification and control has been adopted.

Summary of main weaknesses identified by the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) between 1998 and 2000

Figure 6

Belgium

Denmark

Germany

Greece

Spain

France

Ireland

Italy

Luxembourg Netherlands

Austria

Portugal

Finland

Sweden

United 
Kingdom

BSE surveillance
Indadequate surveillance of
BSE with significant risk of
under-reporting

Inadequate BSE monitoring
or testing programme

Inadequate training of
surveillance staff

Meat and bonemeal (MBM) feed ban
Significant risk of
contamination of ruminant 
feed by MMBM

Inadequate controls over
trade in MBM

Feedstuffs containing MBM 
were not correctly labelled as 
such

Inadequate testing of 
ruminant feed

Inadequate official 
inspections of animal feed

Rendering standards

Inadequate administrative 
controls over rendering

Inadequate rendering 
processing standards

Specified risk materials

Inadequate implementation of 
Decision 2000/418/EC

NB: The weaknesses in red are particularly serious, as they indicate that the incidence of BSE is higher than reported, and that cattle could have been fed with mammalian MBM.

Source: Court of Auditors review of FVO inspection reports, 1998-2000.

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20.11.2001

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 324/13

Specified risk materials (SRMs)

health. Consideration needs to be given to whether the Commis-
sion should have specific additional emergency powers in such
situations.

24. The SSC considered that tissues had different grades of infec-
tiveness but that it was unwise to consider the BSE agent as present
or absent in any particular tissue of an infected animal (1). As
some tissues are more likely to harbour the infective BSE agent
than others (in particular, the brain and central nervous tissue), it
is important to ensure that these tissues stay out of the human
food and animal feed chain, and that appropriate slaughter pro-
cedures are used to prevent the contamination of meat.

25. The Commission’s proposals to remove these specified risk
materials (SRMs) from the food and feed chains have taken a long
time to be adopted and implemented (see Annex 3). Its first pro-
posal to the Member States to introduce EU wide controls to
remove certain SRM tissues was rejected by the Council in Decem-
ber 1996. These were proposed again to the Member States in July
1997, and in the absence of a simple majority rejecting the pro-
posal in Council, the Commission took a decision on the removal
and exclusion of SRMs from further processing (2). The Decision
was to have been implemented in all Member States from 1 Janu-
ary 1998, but was postponed four times until June 2000, when it
was repealed and replaced (3).

26. There was no common agreement on what constituted SRMs
at the EU level (4). Acceptance of the Commission’s proposals to
remove SRMs took almost four years after EU-wide rules on SRMs
were first proposed following the advice of the Scientific Com-
mittee.

27. The legislative procedure results in inappropriate delays where
Member States do not accept the Commission’s proposals, and
timely action is required. The Commission cannot impose action
on the Member States for issues related to human and animal

(1) SSC opinion on safety of SRMs, December 1997.
(2) Commission Decision 97/534/EC of 30 July 1997 on the prohibition
of the use of material presenting risks as regards transmissible spongi-
form encephalopathies (OJ L 216, 8.8.1997, p. 95).

(3) Commission Decision 2000/418/EC of 29 June 2000 regulating the
use of material presenting risks as regards transmissible spongiform
encaphalopathies and amending Decision 94/474/EC (OJ L 158,
30.6.2000, p. 76).

(4) According to the SSC opinion on human health exposure of 10 Decem-
ber 1999, Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portu-
gal and the United Kingdom removed SRMs. Austria, Denmark, Ger-
many, Greece, Finland and Sweden did not remove SRMs. Italy and
Spain only removed SRMs from animals coming from countries with
BSE.

Rendering methods and regulation of animal feed

28. Rendering in accordance with approved standards (5) signifi-
cantly reduces infectiveness but does not eradicate the infective
BSE agent found in SRMs (see paragraph 24). Commission deci-
sions set out the rendering methods to be used in order to reduce
BSE infectiveness from infected animal waste processed into MBM
for use in feed for farmed animals (6), and on the inspection and
authorisation of rendering plants and animal feed producers. FVO
inspections have identified problems in most Member States (7)
with late transposition of the Community rules into national rules,
as well as approval procedures for rendering plants and ensuring
that the relevant processing standards have been applied (see Fig-
ure 6 and Annex 2). Particularly in those Member States in which
there was no national SRM ban (4), rendering is unlikely to have
eliminated the BSE infective agent.

Mammalian meat and bonemeal (MBM) feed ban

29. Whilst the cause of BSE is not known for certain, consump-
tion of infected material by ruminants is the most likely transmis-
sion method. The United Kingdom authorities have prohibited
feeding ruminant-derived MBM to ruminants since 1988, and

(5) The minimum standards for processing mammalian animal waste are:
maximum particle size of 50 mm; temperature of at least 133 °C, for
20 minutes without interruption, at a pressure of at least 3 bar.
(6) Commission Decision 94/382/EC of 27 June 1994 on the approval of
alternative heat treatment systems for processing animal waste of
ruminant origin with a view to the inactivation of spongiform
encephalopathy agents (OJ L 172, 7.7.1994, p. 25); Commission Deci-
sion 95/29/EC of 13 February 1995 amending Decision 94/382/EC
(OJ L 38, 18.2.1995, p. 17); Commission Decision 96/449/EC of
18 July 1996 (OJ L 184, 24.7.1996, p. 43); Commission Decision
97/735/EC of 21 October 1997 concerning certain protection meas-
ures with regard to trade in certain types of mammalian animal waste
(OJ L 294, 28.10.1997, p. 7); Council Decision 1999/534/EC of
19 July 1999 on measures applying to the processing of certain an-
imal waste to protect against transmissible spongiform encephalopa-
thies and amending Commission Decision 97/735/EC (OJ L 204,
4.8.1999, p. 37).

(7) Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Austria,

Portugal, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

C 324/14

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Official Journal of the European Communities

20.11.2001

seven Member States also introduced similar feed bans soon after
the United Kingdom (1). The EU-wide ban on feeding proteins
derived from mammalian tissues to ruminants was introduced in
1994 (2). Given their relatively high incidence of BSE and in order
to avoid cross contamination, the United Kingdom authorities
banned mammalian MBM from all feed for farmed animals in
1996 (3), and Portugal introduced a similar ban in 1998. In the
rest of the EU, mammalian MBM continued to be allowed for use
in feed for other farm animals (4), as long as minimum process-
ing standards were in place (see paragraph 28). The International
Scientific Conference on MBM in 1997 considered whether there
was a need for EU legislation to ensure that the raw materials for
MBM are safely sourced, (i.e. to exclude animals dying on farm or
in transit and all condemned materials from the animal feed chain,
so that only material declared fit for human consumption could
be used for the production of animal feed). Relevant legislation to
remove animal tissues which could present a BSE risk from the
food and feed chains did not enter into force until October
2000 (5); legislation to remove animals dying on farm or in transit
and all cadavers from the animal feed chain entered into force in
March 2001 (6).

30. The 1996 crisis in the United Kingdom showed that the
inadequate implementation of the 1988 feed ban resulted in
36 000 (reported) BSE cases in animals born after the United
Kingdom ban (by the time of Special Report No 19/98). All Mem-
ber States having reported BSE cases except Luxembourg have
now reported cases in animals born after the EU ban of 1994.

31. FVO inspections have repeatedly reported on inadequate
implementation of the feed ban in all Member States (see Figure 6
and Annex 2). Even in its inspections between 1998 and 2000, up
to six years after the ban was first introduced the FVO found that
there was a significant risk of contamination of ruminant feed by
mammalian MBM in nine Member States (7). In addition, a certain
level of contamination was tolerated by most Member States
(except Denmark, Netherlands and Ireland) despite the fact that
Community legislation does not allow any such tolerance (8). The
FVO inspections in 1998 to 2000 also found weaknesses in the
control of trade in MBM in most Member States (see Figure 6). In
December 2000, due to concerns about cross contamination and
following the opinion of the Scientific Steering Committee (9), the
Council temporarily banned the use of animal proteins in feed for
all farmed animals (10).

32. Following the United Kingdom experience, the Commission
was aware of the risk of cross-contamination in feed mills,
knowing that SRMs were not being systematically removed in all
the Member States, that animal waste used for producing MBM
was not safely sourced and that the MBM ban on ruminants only
would not be foolproof. Community legislation deals with the
minimum standards for feed mills. However, there is no EU obli-
gation to impose dedicated feed mills, which would have greatly
reduced risks of cross-contamination.

(1) The United Kingdom banned ruminant derived MBM for cattle in
1988. Other Member States introduced their feed bans in: Austria
(mammalian protein for ruminants in December 1990); Denmark
(ruminant proteins for ruminants in June 1990); Finland (mammalian
proteins for ruminants in March 1995); France (mammalian proteins
for bovines in July 1990; mammalian proteins for all ruminants in
December 1994 and all animal proteins except milk and fish for rumi-
nants in July 1996); Ireland (ruminant protein for ruminants in August
1990); Netherlands (ruminant proteins for ruminants in August 1989);
Sweden (ruminant MBM for ruminants in December 1990, and rumi-
nants proteins for all animals in December 1997); Member States that
had no feed ban in place until the EU-wide ban on mammalian pro-
teins for ruminants in 1994: Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lux-
embourg and Spain. Source: DG VI mission reports in 1996.

(2) Commission Decision 94/381/EC of 27 June 1994 on the ban on use
of proteins derived from mammalian tissue for feeding ruminants, as
amended, with effect from 4 July 1994 (OJ L 172, 7.7.1994, p. 23).
(3) The United Kingdom was banned from exporting mammalian MBM
produced before 1 January 1995, and was allowed to export MBM
produced after that date only if the recommended processing stand-
ards had been complied with. From 1996, there was a total ban on
United Kingdom exports of MBM.

(4) France banned the feeding of all proteins of animal origin (except
milk, eggs and certain other protein) to farmed animals in November
2000.

(5) Commission Decision 2000/418/EC of 19 June 2000 regulating the

use of materials presenting risk of TSEs.

(6) Commission Decision 2001/25/EC of 27 December 2000 prohibit-

ing the use of certain animal by-products in animal feed.

(7) Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portu-

gal (up to July 1999) and Finland.

(8) Source: working document of the Commission services, April 2001,
ref. SANCO/1531/2001 Rev.1 ‘Use of processed animal proteins in
animal feed’.

(9) SSC opinion of 27/28 November 2000 on the scientific basis for
banning animal protein from the feed for all farmed animals, includ-
ing pigs, poultry, fish and pet animals.

(10) Council Decision 2000/766/EC of 4 December 2000 concerning cer-
tain protection measures with regard to transmissible spongiform
encephalopathies and the feeding of animal protein, temporary ban
from 1 January to 30 June 2001 (OJ L 306, 7.12.2000, p. 32).

20.11.2001

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 324/15

Animal movement and identification

36. The transport of animals and meat products (including MBM)
within and between the Member States is significant. One of the
side effects, however, is that the risk of spreading BSE and other
animal diseases is increased by trade. According to the SSC, ‘the
export of infected animals and infected feed (from the United
Kingdom) provided the means for the spread of the BSE agent to
other countries, where it was again recycled and propagated via
the feed chain’ (5). The 1996 BSE crisis reinforced the need for an
efficient system for bovine identification and registration, and
highlighted the deficiencies of the current systems for tracing
cattle potentially at risk of BSE. In April 1997, the Council replaced
the existing 1992 Directive on animal identification and registra-
tion with a new Council Regulation (6), which adapted the rules
for eartagging (7) and herd registers, and introduced requirements
for a computerised database (8) and animal passports. Detailed
rules for inspections to verify compliance with these measures
were introduced in December 1997 (9).

37. The total export ban of March 1996 on live animals and
bovine meat or meat products from the United Kingdom was
lifted gradually to allow exports of beef produced under restricted

In addition to the failure of Member States to implement the
33.
feed ban, there is evidence from the FVO inspections that the
agro-feed industry (including renderers and feed mills) did not do
enough to avoid contamination of cattle feed by MBM, and that
feed containing MBM was not always correctly labelled (in Ger-
many, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Finland and
Sweden). These failures contributed to farmers inadvertently using
potentially infective feed for their cattle.

34. The temporary ban on the use of MBM for all farm animals,
the purchase for destruction scheme and prohibition of the use of
certain animal tissues (SRMs) will create animal waste that has to
be disposed of safely and without a negative impact on the envir-
onment. Before the current feed ban (1), an estimated 16 mil-
lion tonnes of animal waste was recycled for animal feed every
year in the EU. In the short to medium term, the Commission
considers the most common way of disposing of this waste will
be to convert it into MBM for incineration or landfill, with unavoid-
able environmental consequences (2). However, the incineration
capacity required for this is not immediately available in the EU.
The cost of such disposal is estimated to be 3 000 million euro,
and another 1 300 million euro will be lost in revenue (from the
waste) to producers and the rendering industry (3).

35. The temporary ban on using MBM in feed for farmed an-
imals, creates a need to find plant-based alternatives to processed
animal protein for use in animal feed. Animal derived proteins —
mostly MBM — provided only 2,4 % of the protein element in
animal feed in the EU (4) (and if there is even minimal contamina-
tion by infected MBM, then BSE can be spread (see paragraph 6))
and can be readily substituted by forage crops, cereals, and oilseed
products. The issue of whether it is appropriate to feed animals
which are naturally herbivores with feed which includes animal
parts has become more topical, and the Commission’s recent pro-
posals include measures to encourage more extensive farming.

(5) Chapter 2.2 final opinion of 6 July 2000 of the Scientific Steering

Committee on the geographical risk of BSE.

(6) Council Regulation (EC) No 820/97 (OJ L 117, 7.5.1997, p. 1). This
Regulation deals with the provisions directly applicable to the inte-
grated administration and control system as well as labelling of beef
and beef products.

(7) Eartags are to be applied to each ear to identify all animals on the
holding born after 1 January 1998 or intended for intra-Community
trade after that date.

(8) The computerised database should be fully operational by 31 Decem-
ber 1999. Once the database is operational, holdings must report to
the competent authority all movements, births and deaths of animals.
Council Directive 97/12/EC (OJ L 109, 25.4.1997, p. 1) concerns vet-
erinary measures for intra-Community trade, but also specifies the
requirements for the computerised database as stipulated by Council
Regulation (EC) No 820/97 (OJ L 117, 7.5.1997 p. 1). Article 14 of the
Directive refers to the information which should be available in the
computer system: the identification code, date of birth, sex, breed or
colour of coat, ID code of the mother cow (dam), the ID number of
the holdings where born, ID numbers of all holdings where the an-
imal has been kept, the dates of each change of holding, date of death
or slaughter. If these requirements are respected the database could
provide complete documentation on each bovine animal.

(9) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2630/97 (OJ L 354, 30.12.1997,
p. 23). The risk analysis must take into account the number of an-
imals on the holdings; public and animal health considerations and
any previous existence or outbreak of disease, the amount of bovine
premium claimed/paid in comparison to previous years, other signifi-
cant changes and the results of checks conducted in earlier years (e.g.
the proper keeping of holding register and passports).

(1) Source: Commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council laying down health rules concerning animal
by-products not intended for human consumption COM(2000) 574
final of 19 October 2000.

(2) Source: Commission working document SEC(2001) 631 of 10 April
2001. In addition, the report of the first session of the International
Scientific Conference on meat and bonemeal organised under the
aegis of the Scientific Steering Committee of the EU, Brussels 1 and
2 July 1997, considered the following options for waste disposal if
MBM was banned as animal feed — by application to land as fertil-
ised, by incineration or by landfill.

(3) Source: Commission note on economic impact of a total ban on an-

imal meal (undated).

(4) Source: document de travail des services de la Commission ‘Offre et
demande de plantes riches en proteins dans l’UE à la suite de la crise
de l’ESB’ SEC(2001) 431 of 16 March 2001.

C 324/16

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Official Journal of the European Communities

20.11.2001

conditions (1). The ban in Northern Ireland was lifted as of 1 June
1998 and for mainland Britain from 1 August 1999. The Stand-
ing Veterinary Committee decided in March 2001 that the export
ban of November 1998 on Portugal (2) could be lifted, but that the
date would depend on a positive inspection report by the FVO.

38. The Court’s Special Report No 4/2001 (3) on the integrated
administration and control system found that although the dead-
line for implementation of the computerised database was 1 Janu-
ary 2000, eight Member States had databases which had not been
approved by the Commission services as fully operational (4); and
that there were weaknesses in the approval, monitoring, and con-
tent of bovine identification and registration databases.

41. The FVO has undergone three reorganisations and two re-
locations since 1997. Although staff numbers have been increased,
there are not enough staff to carry out the BSE inspections. The
team that deals with BSE related matters (amongst other issues)
normally consists of six inspectors, and has currently been rein-
forced by another six inspectors. Staff turnover is high — 65 %
of the FVO inspectors in January 2001 had been there for less
than two years, making it difficult for the FVO to have sufficiently
experienced inspection team leaders.

42. The FVO carried out 96 BSE-related inspections (5) between
the crisis of 1996 and the end of 2000. This represents about
10 % of total FVO inspection activity, and an average of one
BSE-related inspection per year to each Member State (apart from
the United Kingdom, which was inspected more frequently).

39.
Inspections carried out by both the FVO of DG SANCO and
by the Clearance of Accounts unit of DG AGRI, consistently report
delays and problems with the implementation of the animal iden-
tification and registration legislation by Member States.

Assessment of implementation of BSE strategy by
Member States

Monitoring and enforcement

Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) inspections

40. Since the reorganisation of the Commission services, the
working methods of the FVO have been improved, and a work
flow programme has been developed. There is six–monthly and
annual planning, and reports are better structured, giving clear
conclusions and recommendations to the Member States and to
other Commission services. Reports undergo an in-house quality
control procedure and are finalised only after Member States have
been consulted. A record of all findings and recommendations is
maintained in a database.

(1) The date-based export scheme allows exports of meat only from an-
imals born after a certain date on farms that have been BSE free for
eight years, prepared under certain conditions and from animals
which can be traced.

(2) The OIE considers BSE risk to be important if in a 24-month period
BSE cases are reported in well over 100 per million cattle. In Janu-
ary 2001, incidence in Portugal was 167,9 compared to 247,5 in the
United Kingdom.

(3) Paragraph 42 of Special Report No 4/2001, on the audit of the
EAGGF-Guarantee — the implementation of the integrated adminis-
tration and control system (IACS) together with the Commission’s
replies (OJ C 214, 31.7.2001).

(4) Animal databases that are not fully operational: Portugal, the United
Kingdom excluding Northern Ireland, Italy, Greece, Ireland, France,
Spain and Germany.

43. The Commission (FVO) inspections since 1996 have reported
widespread and continuing problems with the implementation of
the BSE measures in all the Member States. The main problems
found are referred to in paragraphs 21 to 39. See Annex 2 for an
overview of issues reported by the FVO between 1998 and 2000,
and Figure 6 for an indication of the main weaknesses identified
by the FVO between 1998 and 2000. The fact that many of the
problems continued to be reported in inspections from 1998 to
2000, suggests that most Member States (6) have not been rigor-
ous enough in ensuring that BSE measures have been adequately
implemented in their territories.

Measures available for enforcement of the EU’s BSE
strategy

44. Where an FVO inspection highlights problems, the Commis-
sion can undertake bilateral discussions with the Member States
concerned and use single market legislation to impose trade bans
to protect human or animal health. But the only concrete measure
open to the Commission to enforce the application of relevant
legislation (for example, the control of animal feed) is to institute
infringement procedures. These procedures are slow and to date,
most cases have not been taken forward to the European Court
of Justice (see paragraph 46). Only in cases of perceived high risk
to human or animal health are trade bans on exports used, as was
the case for the United Kingdom and Portugal. There is no

(5) This figure does not include inspections relating to meat hygiene,

trade or animal identification.

(6) Particularly Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy,

Luxembourg, Portugal and Finland.

20.11.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 324/17

procedure for imposing financial corrections or penalties and
sanctions (1) on veterinary expenditure or market measures because
of failure to comply with veterinary legislation.

45. This can be contrasted with the DG AGRI clearance of
accounts procedure, where inspection reports can be used to
exclude amounts from Community funding for the market meas-
ures concerned.

46.
In the period 1997 to 1999, 19 infringement procedures
were opened by the Commission against 13 Member States (the
exceptions were Austria and Ireland (2). Most of these date from
the period 1997 to 1998, and relate to the implementation of the
feed ban and treatment of animal waste. Of these, the only
infringement taken as far as the European Court of Justice con-
cerns the internal market: in 2000 for France’s (3) refusal to
resume beef imports from the United Kingdom. The other pro-
cedures were not pursued by the Commission either because the
Member States involved undertook to improve their controls, or
because the controls required by the relevant BSE legislation at
the time were too general to allow Member States to be success-
fully prosecuted for non-compliance. The threat of carrying for-
ward infringement action against Member States that do not com-
ply with EU legislation has not been a sufficiently strong incentive
to Member States to correctly implement the EU’s BSE legislation.

CONCLUSIONS

47. The main recommendation of the Court of Auditors in its
Special Report No 19/98 was that the Commission should develop
an action plan to deal with the BSE crisis. This follow-up review
has found that the Commission’s strategy is basically sound, but
that implementation by Member States is problematic, and in-
appropriate delays occurred in the adoption and implementation
of key BSE control measures (see paragraphs 25 and 27).

48. The second BSE crisis has to be seen in the context of Mem-
ber States’ poor implementation of existing EU legislation (see
Figure 6). Poor surveillance (see paragraph 21), and poor imple-

(2)

(1) Except for penalties imposed for failures to implement animal iden-
tification and registration requirements under the integrated admin-
istration and control system premium schemes.
In the case of Ireland, bilateral discussions were held between DG
SANCO and the authorities concerned to persuade the Member State
to take corrective action. (FVO document reference D33459 of
8 November 2000).
In addition, infringement procedures were taken against Germany,
but as Germany took corrective action, the case was not proceeded
with.

(3)

mentation of the mammalian MBM feed ban (see paragraphs 30
and 31) in most Member States (with the exception, since 1996,
of the United Kingdom, and since 1999, of Portugal), and poor
controls over trade in MBM and animal feed (see paragraph 31),
might have contributed to preventing BSE from being eradicated,
and to its spread to other Member States. The 1994 feed ban has
not been effectively implemented. All Member States which have
reported cases of BSE in their native herds (except Luxembourg)
have had BSE cases born after the ban on feeding mammalian
MBM was introduced in 1994 (see paragraph 30). FVO inspection
reports between 1998 and 2000 found significant risk of con-
tamination of ruminant feed with mammalian MBM in most
Member States. The problems of safe processing, use and cross-
contamination of MBM have been known since 1996, but the
temporary ban on the use of processed animal proteins for all
farm animals was only implemented with effect from 1 January
2001 (see paragraph 31).

49. 99 % of cases of BSE reported to date in the EU have been in
the United Kingdom (see paragraph 9). However, according to
FVO inspection reports, the true incidence of BSE was probably
under-detected by other Member States until at least the end of
2000. Moreover, Member States which had long claimed to be
free from BSE (Germany, Italy, Spain) have started reporting cases
(see paragraph 21). The cost of the BSE crisis to the EU budget has
been, and will continue to be high (see paragraphs 1, 4, 15 and
16).

50. Under the current legislation, the Commission, when faced
with sufficient opposition from Member States is unable to impose
action on Member States in matters involving human or animal
health (see paragraphs 25 and 27). The institutional legislative
process has also caused inappropriately long delays in the imple-
mentation of key BSE control measures, even though speedy
action was required to implement measures to protect animal and
human health (see paragraphs 18, 25 and 29).

51. The measures currently available to the Commission to
enforce the implementation of BSE legislation by Member States
are not adequate (see paragraphs 44 and 46) and have not been a
sufficient incentive for Member States to correctly implement BSE
measures. This is in contrast with the DG AGRI clearance of
accounts procedure for market measures, whereby financial cor-
rections in EAGGF support encourages Member States to take
corrective action.

52. According to FVO inspection reports, there is evidence that
the agro-feed industry was not rigorous enough in implementing
the EU’s BSE legislation. In particular, the FVO found that rumi-
nant feed was contaminated with MBM, and feed containing MBM
was not correctly labelled (see paragraph 33).

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Official Journal of the European Communities

20.11.2001

53. The extensive intra–Community trade in bovines and MBM
also contributed to the spread of BSE throughout the EU (see
paragraph 36). The current crisis underlines the need to reassess
bovine feeding and husbandry practices (see paragraph 35). BSE
would not have been propagated if bovines had been reared
extensively and fed their natural diet.

54. Consumers (and animals) were exposed to different levels of
risks in the Member States, through a combination of poor imple-
mentation of BSE control measures (see Figure 6 and Annex 2),
and a lack (until October 2000) of an EU-wide definition of SRMs
(see paragraph 25). It is paradoxical that on the one hand, the
Member States, through the Council recommendations on dis-
charge (see paragraph 3) support the need for the Commission to
formulate a BSE strategy, yet have often been remiss when it comes
to adoption or implementation of the strategy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

55. Consideration needs to be given:

health, and whether the Commission needs additional
powers to reinforce infringement procedures (1);

(b) to the possibility of excluding funding from market measures
where inspections reveal significant non-compliance with EU
legislation, as non-compliance can have a considerable effect
on the beef market management and lead to significant extra
budget expenditure;

(c) to how, in the light of the problems for the control of BSE
(and other animal diseases) caused by the significant move-
ments of animals and MBM within the EU, animal movements
could be reduced, and better information on these movements
provided, when human or animal health is endangered;

(d) to how to reorient subsidy payments in the beef and veal sec-
tor away from production, while at the same time respecting
the need to provide a reasonable standard of living to farm-
ers;

(a) to whether the Commission should be given temporary emer-
gency powers when Member States do not agree with pro-
posals for legislation related to protection of animal or human

(e)

in the light of the continuing BSE crisis, to how to further
encourage extensive and environmentally friendly farming
practices and the replacement of animal based proteins with
plant based alternatives for ruminants.

This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meeting of 13 September 2001.

For the Court of Auditors

Jan O. KARLSSON

President

(1) The Court notes that a similar recommendation was made in the
White Paper on Food Safety COM(1999) 719 final of 12 January
2000, paragraph 94.

20.11.2001

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 324/19

ANNEX 1

SCIENTIFIC STEERING COMMITTEE’S OPINION ON GEOGRAPHICAL RISK OF BSE (GBR) (1)

1. The geographical BSE risk (GBR) is a qualitative indicator of the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being
infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, at a given point in time, in a given country.

2. The GBR is not an indicator of the risk to human health — this is dependent on the risk management measures taken
to prevent BSE-infected matter ending up in the human food chain.

3. Eight factors are taken into account for the GBR, in accordance with methodology established in 1998 — structure and
dynamics of the bovine population, BSE surveillance, BSE-related culling, cattle and MBM imports, feeding, MBM-bans, SRM-
bans and rendering.

4. The GBR has been established for all Member States except Greece and 32 other countries since July 2000, and is cur-
rently (May 2001) on-going for another 13 countries.

GBR level

Member States (1)

Non-member countries

I — highly unlikely

II — unlikely but not excluded

Austria, Finland, Sweden

Argentina, Australia, Botswana, Brazil,
Chile, Costa Rica, Namibia, Nicaragua,
Norway, New Zealand, Paraguay,
Singapore, Swaziland, Uruguay

Canada, Colombia, India, Kenya,
Mauritius, Pakistan, Slovenia, USA

III — likely but not confirmed, or

confirmed at a lower level

Belgium, Denmark, Germany (2),
France, Ireland, Italy (2), Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Spain (2)

Albania, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, Slovak Republic, Switzerland

IV — confirmed, at a higher level

Portugal, United Kingdom

None

(1) No GBR has been produced for Greece, as the requisite information was not provided. The SSC therefore considered it prudent to assume

that the geographical BSE risk in Greece was at a high level (opinion on GBR, Section 3.4 ‘The case for Greece’).

(2) At the report date (July 2000), there were no confirmed domestic cases.

5. According to the SSC, all EU Member States are faced with a certain risk of having BSE in their national herds (2):

(a)

(b)

in seven Member States (Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Spain) the SSC considered
that ‘for the time being, it cannot be excluded that (more) BSE cases may occur...’;

for Germany, Italy and Spain, which at the time of the opinion had no reported cases of BSE in domestic herds, the SSC
GBR concluded that BSE is likely to be present in the domestic cattle population, but at levels below the limits of pas-
sive surveillance.

6. The opinion also indicated what the expected GBR trend would be in the foreseeable future (3) — it was expected to
decrease in almost all the Member States if the proposed decisions for rendering (1999/534/EC for 1 July 2000) and SRM
(according to 2000/418/EC, planned for 1 October 2000) were appropriately implemented. However, for four Member States
(Belgium, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg), the GBR was expected to increase even with these measures in place.

Final opinion of SSC on the GBR, adopted 6 July 2000.

(1)
(2) Opinion on GBR, Annex 2, Section 3 — countries with current GBR level III and Table 3.
(3) Opinion on GBR, Section 3.1 and Table 6 overview of results of GBR assessment for 23 countries.

BSE controls in the Member States — overview of issues reported by the Food and Veterinary Office, 1998 to 2000

ANNEX 2

Surveillance

Feed ban

Specified risk materials

Rendering

Belgium (1)

The BSE sampling programme is not correctly
targeted.

Official inspections at feedmills are
inadequately targeted and implemented.

No satisfactory guarantees that Decision
2000/418/EC is being implemented
correctly; risk that SRM could end up
in the food or the feed chain.

Denmark (2)

Germany (3)

Under-reporting of BSE suspects cannot be ruled
out, as the monitoring programme is inadequate.

There is a high probability that cases of BSE have
gone undetected.

The monitoring and testing programmes were
inadequate.

Greece (4)

The BSE sampling programme does not comply
with Commission Decision 98/272/EC in terms of
sample size and category of animals to be tested.

The feed ban has not been applied
effectively, and there was frequent
cross-contamination of ruminant feed
by MBM.

Based on the lack of official movement
documentation for SRM materials, the
overall system cannot yet be considered
as reliable.

Some MBM was in fact being processed
(for use as feeding stuff) to a lower
standard than that specified in Decision
96/449/EC.

There is no national legal requirement to
process MBM according to the minimum
standards set out in Commission Deci-
sion 96/449/EC and legal provisions at
Länder level varied.

Rendering was not carried out to the
required standards.

Insufficient level of official controls at
rendering plants.

Cross-contamination of sterilised MBM
by non-sterilised MBM could not be
excluded, at the reprocessing plant
visited.

A rendering plant visited was not operat-
ing in accordance with the processing
standards of Decision 96/449/EC.

C
3
2
4
/
2
0

E
N

O

f
f
i
c
i
a
l

J
o
u
r
n
a
l

o
f

t
h
e

E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
i
e
s

.

2
0
1
1
2
0
0
1

.

.

2
0
1
1
2
0
0
1

.

Surveillance

Feed ban

Specified risk materials

Rendering

Spain (5)

The surveillance programme is not correctly
targeted. It was inadequate in Castilla y León but
had improved in Galicia.

Implementation of the feed ban was
improved by recent national legislation.

France (6)

Epidemio-surveillance of BSE has been effective in
France since November 2000. The number of
confirmed cases increased about fivefold in the year
2000. This increase is mainly due to increased pas-
sive and active monitoring. However before 2000,
it is probable that there was significant
underestimation of BSE incidence in France.

Instructions and training of control staff is now
generally of high quality.

Before 14 November 2000 cross-
contamination of ruminant feed was
possible.

The method now used to test for pres-
ence of MMBM in ruminant feed is of
high quality, and the number of
samples taken has increased consider-
ably.

Before the total feed ban came into
force, the competent authority did not
effectively enforce the feed ban. There
was poor cooperation between the
veterinary service and the State
attorney.

Some feed mills were not effectively
avoiding cross-contamination of
ruminant feed.

The transposition of Commission Deci-
sion 2000/418/EC is not yet complete,
lacking some aspects (production of
mechanically recovered meat, the
prohibition of certain slaughtering
techniques, the import into the EU of
certain products of animal origin).

In Galicia, the lack of incinerators/
landfill sites will result in an end to the
collection of SRM/fallen stock as soon
as the dedicated rendering plant reaches
the maximum storage capability.

In Castilla y León and Galicia,
implementation of the new SRM rules
was not yet being adequately enforced.

Provisions concerning SRM have been
implemented in France since July 1996.
Currently, the French provisions are
stricter than those laid down in Com-
mission Decision 2000/418/EC.

Although the controls were well
implemented in the plants visited, a
harmonised approach on SRM handling
cannot be guaranteed because
harmonised instructions were not
provided to the Departments, which are
free to decide how to implement the
necessary measures.

There was some non-compliance by the
abattoirs visited with the national rules.

Improperly processed MMBM was
produced and sold, at national level, to
the feed industry up until the end of
1997- spring 1998.

Rendering standards were unsatisfactory
until the end of 1998; e.g. inadequate
controls of cross-contamination, poor
records and control procedures, certain
banned substances (such as sludge) were
used for years in the production of
feedingstuffs.

Decision 96/449/EC regarding the
pressurised system in renderers has been
applied in France only since February
1998 (The French authorities initially
refused to implement it).

E
N

O

f
f
i
c
i
a
l

J
o
u
r
n
a
l

o
f

t
h
e

E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
i
e
s

C
3
2
4
/
2
1

Ireland (7)

Surveillance

Feed ban

Specified risk materials

Rendering

Epedimio-surveillance was ineffective before 2000.
The number of confirmed BSE cases increased
about 60 % in the year 2000 compared to the
previous year. This is due to increased passive
monitoring and indicates that during the past years
a significant proportion of BSE-cases may have
remained undetected.

The probability of ruminant feed being
contaminated by MBM in feed-mills has
been extremely low. However, similar
guarantees cannot be provided for
contamination outside the feed-mills, in
particular amongst the approximately
2 000 home compounders.

Although overall compliance can be
considered reasonably good, audits by
the competent authorities have identi-
fied deficiencies and non-compliance,
particularly amongst small operators
supplying domestic markets.

Two high-risk rendering plants were not
working in accordance with Commission
Decision 96/449/EC.

The microscopical method provides
good sensitivity in detecting MBM in
the samples.

Targeting and coverage of the controls,
in particular sampling, is less than
optimal.

The number of cases detected by active monitoring
remained low because targeted active surveillance
only became operational at the end of 2000 and
the number of samples remained relatively low.

Results from the active surveillance in knackeries
suggest that the number of BSE cases in fallen stock
is considerably higher than the number of cases
arising from suspect animals (i.e. passive monitor-
ing). It is estimated that about 550 cases of BSE in
fallen stock may have remained undetected in
Ireland during the year 2000.

The quality of surveillance, while improving, varies
between counties. The risk of a BSE case having
been buried on farm, sent to a knackery or to a
lesser extent, slaughtered for human consumption,
cannot be excluded.

Since September 2000 when sampling of casualties
commenced, the number of casualties and
emergencies presented at abattoirs decreased
dramatically.

The minimum requirements of Commission Deci-
sion 98/272/EC were not complied with in 1999
but by 11 December 2000, the number of brains
examined during 2000 was in excess (> 3-fold) of
the minimum requirement.

C
3
2
4
/
2
2

E
N

O

f
f
i
c
i
a
l

J
o
u
r
n
a
l

o
f

t
h
e

E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
i
e
s

.

2
0
1
1
2
0
0
1

.

.

2
0
1
1
2
0
0
1

.

Surveillance

Feed ban

Specified risk materials

Rendering

Italy (8)

Commission Decision 98/272/EC has been
transposed in Italian legislation and implementing
measures are in place, although certain discrepan-
cies between the Decision and the Italian measures
exist.

The provisions for notification of potential BSE-
cases laid down in the relevant Italian legislation
are potentially confusing.

Controls by the competent authorities
have improved since January 2000.

Sampling results indicate, at least in
feedmills, a further drop in cases of
contamination of feedingstuffs intended
for ruminants by MMBM.

The draft control protocol of the
competent authorities did not cover all
the SRM chain, nor did it contain
detailed provisions on how controls
should be carried out. Auto-control
procedures are in place, although their
correct application cannot be
ascertained due to a lack of staff and
adequate records.

The potential for SRM contamination of
carcases underlines the need for clear
instructions to slaughterhouse person-
nel and strict official control on their
application.

Tracing of SRM from slaughter to
ultimate disposal was difficult in
practice.

There were delays in inspections of
rendering plants to verify compliance
with Decision 96/449/EC on rendering
standards.

Renderers visited were not operating in
accordance with the approved standards.

The Italian authorities incorrectly
allowed mammalian fat and bones to be
processed at low pressure/temperatures.

There was no guarantee that animal
waste processed at low pressure/
temperatures was from non-mammals.

Two different authorities controlled the
feed ban, but their efforts were not
coordinated.

Luxembourg (9)

The selection of subpopulations for BSE testing did
not comply with Decision98/272/EC.

No special procedures to prevent cross
contamination between ruminant
rations and those containing MBM.

Handling of SRM was carried out in an
inconsistent manner, reflecting the lack
of clear national legislative require-
ments.

E
N

O

f
f
i
c
i
a
l

J
o
u
r
n
a
l

o
f

t
h
e

E
u
r
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p
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a
n
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
i
e
s

C
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3

Surveillance

Feed ban

Specified risk materials

Rendering

Cross-contamination of ruminant feed
by MBM occurred, particularly before
1 March 1999.

The implementation of provisions of
Commission Decision 2000/418/EC
concerning staining of SRM started late.

The system in place since 1 March
1999 considerably reduces the risk of
cross-contamination.

Since then, there has been a sharp
decrease in positive feed samples.

No clear written procedures exist
regarding record-keeping for SRM in
slaughterhouses, nor for their control
and reconciliation by the veterinary
service.

Reconciliation of the amounts of SRM
collected from slaughterhouses and the
amount processed in the only SRM
rendering plant is not accurate.

Netherlands (10)

Epidemio-surveillance of BSE is now generally
satisfactory (particularly passive surveillance
measures) and clear procedures for BSE suspects
exist. However training and expertise of those
involved in the monitoring programme is poor.

The Netherlands may not have tested the minimum
required number of cattle in 1999 and 2000,
because a high number of brains were delivered for
testing without proper data.

The active surveillance programme provides for the
testing of slaughtered cattle over 30 months of age.
However, these cattle arrive at the slaughterhouse
without documentation indicating their age.

10 to 20 % of fallen cattle are not identifiable
because the ear tags are missing, which so far has
led samplers not to include these animals in the
monitoring programme.

No procedures are in place for cases where a BSE
positive bovine is found by routine testing of
animals in slaughterhouses using rapid post-
mortem tests.

Austria (11)

The national reference laboratory was not using the
full range of BSE tests.

There were weaknesses in labelling and
controls over trade of MBM.

Certain high risk material may have
been used for the production of
imported pet food.

Animals under 20 months are sometimes included
in the monitoring programme, but are not specifi-
cally identified.

There were problems with official
controls over the renderers visited.

Greaves from at least one fat melter are
delivered to feedmills without being cor-
rectly processed.

C
3
2
4
/
2
4

E
N

O

f
f
i
c
i
a
l

J
o
u
r
n
a
l

o
f

t
h
e

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a
n
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o
m
m
u
n
i
t
i
e
s

.

2
0
1
1
2
0
0
1

.

.

2
0
1
1
2
0
0
1

.

Surveillance

Feed ban

Specified risk materials

Rendering

Portugal (12)

Finland (13)

During the last few years, the Portuguese authori-
ties have invested considerably in the improvement
of BSE epidemio-surveillance. The main problem
still existing is the control of implementation of the
legislation and instructions at local level, which
remains unsatisfactory (e.g. the delay in implement-
ing the competent authority’s instruction to include
fallen stock in the monitoring programme).

The monitoring programme is not adequately
targeted in accordance with Commission Decision
98/272/EC.

A general lack of management of the monitoring
programme has been observed in the regions
visited.

Decision 98/272/EC is generally well implemented,
but the efficiency of the monitoring programme could
be improved:
— BSE suspects were not treated as such, but were

included in the monitoring programme,

— poor follow-up of documentation accompanying

animals for sick or emergency slaughter,

— the testing programme should be better targeted,
— the documentation accompanying samples did

not contain all the necessary information.

There was a risk of cross-
contamination.

Incompletely treated MMBM was sent
for processing into feedingstuffs, but
the competent authorities could not
quantify the extent.

Written procedures on controls against
cross-contamination are not always
available.

The control programme to verify the
presence of MMBM in ruminant rations
is not risk based and the sampling is
not always adequate.

Frequent problems with the labelling of
some feedstuffs containing MMBM
where the declaration laid down in
Directive 97/47/EC was absent/
incorrect.

The precautionary measures taken by
the feed industry to avoid cross
contamination seem to be effective,
however due to a lack of sampling of
feed on farms, it is not clear if post-
production cross-contamination may
occur.

Under national legislation (NB: no EU
legislation) SRMs are not used for
human food, but are used for animal
feed, until September 1998.

Delays in implementation of Decision
96/449/EC on processing standards.

In May 1998, four of the eight plants
processing MMBM had not been
approved under Directive 90/667/EEC.

Weak procedures at rendering plants
visited to control the rendering process;
weak tracing of production batches;
weak controls over content of MBM
produced.

The competent authorities did not have
complete information on the quantity of
MMBM produced.

The frequency of official control visits to
the rendering plant visited was not suf-
ficient.

E
N

O

f
f
i
c
i
a
l

J
o
u
r
n
a
l

o
f

t
h
e

E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
i
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s

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Surveillance

Feed ban

Specified risk materials

Rendering

Sweden (14)

There was scope for improvement of training.

United Kingdom (15)

There is high awareness and knowledge of the
symptoms of BSE. Epidemio-surveillance, and
monitoring of BSE is generally of high quality.
However, as the incidence of BSE decreases, more
active BSE monitoring will be needed.

The decrease in the number of notified BSE cases
follows scientific forecasts.

The OTMS does not have a significant impact on
the number of BSE cases reported, while the selec-
tive cull has a certain influence.

Control over intra-Community trade in
MBM needed improvement.

Some pet food plants were not cor-
rectly registered under Directive
90/667/EEC. This could limit the trace-
ability of the resulting pet food.

The feed ban has been enforced
effectively since 1 August 1996, and all
suspect test results are intensively fol-
lowed up.

Rendering standards and controls were
generally adequate, but there was scope
for improvement.

At a high-risk material renderer visited,
the processing system in use until a few
weeks before the mission could not allow
proper checks on compliance with MBM
processing standards. The information
available from the new computerised
system was neither satisfactory or reli-
able.

Weaknesses in controls over rendering
plants processing both mammalian waste
and poultry waste.

Delays in implementation of adequate
rendering standards for mixes intended
for pet food.

(1) Mission 1302/2000 from 11.12.00-15.12.00 (DRAFT), except mission 1316/98 from 16.2.98-20.2.98 (for rendering).
(2) Mission 1321/98 between 23.2.98-26.2.98.
(3) Mission 1307/00 from 4.12.00-8.12.00 (DRAFT) (for SRM); mission 1129/2000 from 25.9.00-29.9.00 (DRAFT) for surveillance and feed ban; mission 1481/1998 from 26.10.98-30.10.98 for rendering.
(4) Mission 1515/1998 from 14.12.98-18.12.98.
(5) Mission 1305/00 from 11.12.00-15.12.00 (DRAFT) except for rendering — mission 1463/1998 from 28.9.98-2.10.98).
(6) Mission 1262/00 from 4.12.00-8.12.00. (DRAFT) Also for rendering, mission 1415/98 from 6.7.98-10.7.98, and mission 1234/99 from 19.8.99-20.8.99.
(7) Mission 1304/00 from11.12.00-15.12.00 (DRAFT) (except for rendering — mission 1077/99 from 11.1.99-15.1.99).
(8) Mission 1306/00 from 11.12.00-15.12.00 (DRAFT) (except for rendering — mission 1456/98 from 14.9.98-18.9.98 and mission 1024/2000 from 17.1.00-21.1.00).
(9) Mission 1506/98 from 8.12.98-10.12.98. Mission 1303/00 from 11.12.00-15.12.00 (DRAFT). Mission 1480/98 between 27.10.98-30.10.98.
(10) Mission 1303/00 from 11.12.00-15.12.00 (DRAFT).
(11) Mission 1480/98 between 27.10.98-30.10.98.
(12) Mission 1265/00 from 6.11.00-10.11.00 (DRAFT) (for surveillance) mission 1381/98 from 11.5.98-15.5.98 (for rendering and SRMs); mission 1381/98 and mission 1471/98 from 28.9.98-2.10.98 (for feed ban).
(13) Mission 1127/00 from 8.5.00-12.5.00.
(14) Mission 1436/98 from 24.8.98-27.8.98.
(15) Mission 1126/00 from 20.3.00-24.3.00, and mission 1431/98 from 20.7.98-24.7.98 (for surveillance), mission 1431/98 from 20.7.98-24.7.98 (for the feed ban); mission 1502/98 from 23.11.98-27.11.98 (for rendering).

Source: Court of Auditors review of FVO inspection reports, 1998 to 2000.

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.

2
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1

.

20.11.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 324/27

ANNEX 3

DELAYS IN PASSING EU LEGISLATION ON SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS (SRMs)

Certain bovine tissues are more likely than others to carry the infectious agent (known as specified risk materials — SRMs)
and transmit BSE. By removing these from the animal feed and human food chain, it is possible to reduce the risk of trans-
mission. The following table illustrates the main elements in the process by which an SRM ban was finally adopted in the
EU.

Date

21 October 1996

3 December 1996

Details

Scientific Veterinary Committee opinion of 21 October 1996 recommended on the basis
of its risk assessment that specified risk materials (SRMs) should be removed from all
human food and animal feed chains in countries where a potential risk was identified. In
the case of fallen bovines, sheep and goats, SRMs should be removed so that they do not
enter the food/feed chains, or the carcase be destroyed.

SRMs: brain, spinal cord and eyes from cattle, sheep and goats over one year; spleen
from sheep and goats over six months.

Commission proposed a decision to the Standing Veterinary Committee to exclude
SRMs (derived from cattle, sheep and goats) from human food and animal feed chains as
of 1 April 1997 — as there was no majority in favour (only France and United Kingdom
voted in favour, Ireland abstained and all other 12 Member States voted against), it was
put before the Council.

SRM is defined in the proposal as: head, including brain and eyes, but excluding spinal
cord of cattle, sheep and goats over 12 months; spleen of sheep and goats. SRM is
prohibited for human food or animal feed, as is use of vertebral column for mechani-
cally recovered meat (MRM).

10 December 1996

Council rejected the SRM proposal.

14 May 1997

16 July 1997

30 July 1997

9 December 1997

Commission announced that it would insist on the introduction of Community-wide
SRM proposals (which had been rejected by the Council in December 1996).

Commission re-proposed the decision to the Standing Veterinary Committee to exclude
SRMs from human food and animal feed chains as of 1 October 1997 — as there was
no majority in favour (eight Member States were against — B, DK, D, EL, I, A, P, FIN), it
was put before the Council.

Council did not give an opinion, nor reject the proposal by a simple majority. Therefore
Commission adopted the SRM proposals — Commission Decision 97/534/EC of 30 July
1997 — prohibitions of use of SRMs (mainly brain, eyes, spinal cord) applicable from
1 January 1998.

Scientific Steering Committee adopted an opinion on SRMs. It considered that tissues
had different grades of infectiveness, and it was unwise to consider the BSE agent as
present or absent in particular tissues. A true risk assessment should take into account
animal age, species and geographical origin. The opinion suggested a new and enlarged
list of SRMs, and proposed that these be excluded temporarily from human and animal
consumption depending on the geographical source.

SRMs added to list of SVC of 21 October 1996: dura mater, pituitary, skull, dorsal root
ganglia, vertebral column, intestine, tonsils and lung (when animals are killed by certain
slaughter techniques).

C 324/28

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

20.11.2001

Date

9 December 1997

Details

Commission proposed to the Standing Veterinary Committee an amendment to Deci-
sion 97/534/EC on use of SRMs. There was no formal vote on the document because
the Scientific Steering Committee’s opinion on SRMs was published on the same date.

The proposed amendment clarified the original decision, which had forbidden use of
SRMs for all purposes; to introduce derogations for essential medicinal products; to
require detention of suspect animals and appropriate destruction of TSE confirmed
cases; clarify the declarations for import of food or feed; introduce a transition period to
prohibition of use of SRMs in intermediate products and to avoid discrimination
between imported and domestic products.

16 December 1997

Commission proposed to the Standing Veterinary Committee the postponement of
implementation of Decision 97/534/EC on SRMs from 1 January to 1 April 1998 (77
votes in favour, 10 against).

4 March 1998

Reasons for postponement: More time was needed to consider the implications of the
new SSC opinion of 9 December1997 on SRMs (see above), which recommended differ-
ent lists of SRMs to be removed in different countries, and on the decision on products
other than medicinal products and cosmetics; scientific advice has been requested on
several aspects, including suitability of SRM lists and risks posed by tallow and tallow
products; also questions of practical aspects of the Decision for foodstuffs not covered
by Annex II to the Treaty.

Commission proposed decision to the Standing Veterinary Committee to replace Deci-
sion 97/534/EC on use of SRMs — rejected by the majority (17 votes in favour — EL, E,
S; 70 against — other Member States opposed regionalisation or the enlarged list of
SRMs).

Proposed (new) decision: includes enlarged list of SRMs in accordance with SSC opinion
of 9 December 1997; Member States and non-member countries importing into EU can
request partial or total derogation on SRM based on their geographical risk, if they
submit necessary information by 30 June 1998, and the enlarged list of SRMs would
apply only from 31 December 1998. No derogation should be given to countries with
native BSE cases, and these should in any case apply the shorter list of SRMs until the
SSC has given an opinion on their BSE status and the SRM conditions that shall apply;
Member States applying a compulsory single carcase test for bovines above a certain age
would be exempt from removing SRMs from the tested animal, but such a derogation
would only be possible after Commission approval of the test (no such approved tests
exists for the moment).; derogation applied for use of SRMs in certain medicinal,
cosmetic and industrial products.

17 March 1998

Council rejects the new proposed decision on the SRMs, and invites the Commission to
postpone the date of application of Decision 97/534/EC again.

27 March 1998

Commission proposed two Decisions to the Standing Veterinary Committee:

1. to replace Decision 97/534/EC on use of SRMs, with a proposal essentially the same as
that proposed on 4 March 1998, except that SRMs definition now excludes vertebral
column and intestines from duodenum to rectum replaced by distal ileum (small intes-
tine). From the discussion at the SVC, it was clear that most of the SVC members would
not accept this text, and no formal vote took place.

2. repeal of Decision 97/534/EC, with invitation to Member States to take appropriate
steps, pending proposal for TSE control and eradication. Rejected by SVC, therefore pro-
posal submitted to Council.

20.11.2001

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 324/29

Date

31 March 1998

2 December 1998

Details

Council rejects proposal to repeal Decision 97/534/EC on SRMs, and a Council decision
postpones the implementation date of Decision 97/534/EC from 1 April 1998 to
1 January 1999. Agriculture Council also called on the Commission to submit revised
SRM proposals after OIE meeting in May 1998.

Commission issues statement criticising the Council’s decision to postpone the
implementation of the SRM legislation, and renewed its recommendation to Member
States to take appropriate action.

Commission proposed decision to Standing Veterinary Committee to amend Decision
97/534/EC on SRMs, for measures to be regionalised according to the BSE risk of the
country of origin. Rejected by the SVC, and therefore proposed to the Council. Most
Member States objected to the proposed procedure for establishing the TSE status of the
countries, which would be based on the opinion of the Scientific Committee, and on the
complicated controls that would result from differing SRMs according to geographical
origin. (Against: B, DK, D, EL, F, IRL, I, L, P, FIN; abstention: NL, A, S, UK; no vote: E).

14 and15 December 1998

Council did not put Commission proposal for amending Decision 97/534/EC to vote.
Council Decision to postpone the implementation of Decision 97/534/EC from 1 Janu-
ary 1999 to 31 December 1999.

17 December 1998

Decision 97/534/EC on SRMs — implementation postponed from 1 January to
31 December 1999. Decision taken by the Council without a proposal from the Com-
mission.

8 December 1999

Commission proposed two decisions to the Standing Veterinary Committee:

1. to replace Decision 97/534/EC on use of SRMs with a proposal to modify Decision
94/474/EC regulating use of materials presenting TSE risk. The latter included a provi-
sional risk classification of the Member States. Member states objected to the risk class-
ification, and no formal vote took place. Most Member States preferred to defer the date
of entry of Decision 97/534/EC on SRMs;

2. subsequently, the Commission proposed postponing implementation date of Decision
97/534/EC for three months from 31 December 1999 to 31 March 2000. Most Member
States preferred a deferral period of six to 12 months, and the SVC rejected the Com-
mission proposal, therefore the proposal was submitted to Council. (For: DK, E, IRL, P,
S, UK; against: D, EL, F, I, L, NL, A, FIN; abstention: B).

Council decision to postpone implementation of Decision 97/534/EC from
31 December 1999 to 30 June 2000 (not 31 March as proposed by the Commission).

Scientific Steering Committee opinion on SRMs of small ruminants: skull (head exclud-
ing skin and tongue) and spinal cords of all small ruminants over 12 months and spleen
of small ruminants of all ages pose the highest risk. Certain unprocessed meat products,
such as mechanically recovered meat (MRM) derived from vertebral columns of small
ruminants constitutes a significant potential risk.

Commission proposed decision to the Standing Veterinary Committee, to replace Deci-
sion 97/534/EC on use of SRMs with a proposal to modify Decision 94/474/EC regulat-
ing use of materials presenting TSE risk. The proposal required all Member States to
remove animal tissues which could present a BSE risk from the food and feed chains as
of 1 October 2000. Annex sets out SRMs for all Member States, with an extended list
for P and UK. SVC rejected the proposal, it was therefore put to the Council. (For: B, DK,
F, IRL, I, L, S; against: EL, NL, A, FIN; abstention: D, E, P, UK).

14 December 1999

14 April 2000

7 June 2000

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Official Journal of the European Communities

20.11.2001

Date

19 June 2000

Details

Council did not give an opinion, nor reject the proposal by a simple majority. Therefore
Commission adopted the proposal — Decision 97/534/EC is repealed and replaced by
Commission Decision 2000/418/EC regulating use of material presenting risk of TSEs,
applicable from 30 June 2000.

SRMs: skulls, including brain and eyes, tonsils, spinal cord of all cattle, sheep and goats
over 12 months; ileum of bovines over 12 months; spleen of sheep and goats.

In addition, in P, UK and Northern Ireland: from bovine animals over six months: entire
head excluding tongue, including brains, eyes, trigeminal ganglia, tonsils, thymus, spleen,
intestines from duodenum to rectum, spinal cord; from cattle over 30 months: vertebral
column including dorsal root ganglia.

October to December 2000

Start of second BSE crisis.

27 December 2000

Amendment of Decision 2000/418/EC — extension of SRM to include entire intestines
of all bovine animals of any age.

20.11.2001

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 324/31

THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES

FOLLOW UP TO THE COURT’S SPECIAL REPORT ON BSE

1. The Commission has always accepted that combating BSE is
a priority. It has made a particular effort, ever since the report of
the Committee of Inquiry of the European Parliament 1997, to
ensure that its measures took place within a coherent strategy
framework. In particular, the Commission has carried out wide-
ranging initiatives (creation of the Directorate General for Health
and Consumer Protection (SANCO), publication of the White
Paper on Food Safety, proposed Food Authority, etc.). These ini-
tiatives, in turn, need to be viewed in the light of the increased
powers in relation to veterinary and public health measures intro-
duced in the Treaty of Amsterdam, including the extension of
co-decision to proposals in this field.

I.

II.

the suspension of the use of certain animal proteins, espe-
cially mammalian meat and bonemeal, in feedingstuffs for all
farm animals;

the introduction of testing for BSE of all bovine animals
intended for human consumption aged over 30 months, with
derogations provided for Member States with a lower BSE
risk;

III. the introduction of testing for BSE of all bovines aged over 30
months presented for emergency slaughter, or showing clin-
ical symptoms of any disease at slaughter (the age limit was
reduced to 24 months as of 1 July 2001);

IV. the enlargement of the list of SRMs to be removed and
destroyed to include the entire intestine of bovines and the
vertebral column;

The Court’s specific comments also need to be viewed in the light
of the extensive Community legislative framework to combat BSE
in place prior to 1 January 2001:

V. a ban on the use of mechanically recovered meat from rumi-

nant bones;

I.

a ban on the feeding of mammalian meat and bonemeal (MBM) to
cattle, sheep and goats, as of July 1994;

II. higher processing standards for the treatment of animal waste
(133 degrees, 3 bars of pressure for 20 minutes), as of 1 April
1997;

III. active surveillance measures for the detection, control and

eradication of BSE, as of 1 May 1998;

IV. the requirement to remove specified high-risk materials (SRMs)
from cattle, sheep and goats from 1 October 2000 from the
human and animal food chains.

These measures were drawn up and revised in the light of evol-
ving scientific evidence and the evolution of the disease in the EU.
Their implementation by the Member States is also closely mon-
itored by the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO). There is general
agreement that the rigorous implementation of the above meas-
ures would provide a very high level of protection against BSE.
However, arising from the most recent BSE crisis, the legislative
framework has been updated and reviewed. This has aimed both
at addressing weaknesses identified in the implementation of
measures in the Member States and at taking account of new sci-
entific evidence. The following measures in particular have been
adopted since 1 January 2001:

VI. a ban on certain slaughter techniques (‘pithing’).

VII. the extension of a range of the above measures to imports

from third countries.

The above measures are kept under regular review, especially in
relation to new scientific evidence. However, two major pieces of
legislation, both governed by co-decision in the Council and in
the European Parliament, are necessary to complete the legisla-
tive framework. First, Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 on transmis-
sible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) which brings together
a wide range of existing measures on surveillance, testing, risk
classification of countries, specified risk materials (SRMs), etc.
This Regulation entered into force on 1 July 2001 but its full
impact will only be evident when decisions have been taken on
the risk classification of countries. Second, the proposed regula-
tion on animal by-products which provides a framework for the
safe collection and processing of such products.

A range of initiatives has been taken to ensure that this frame-
work is implemented in a coherent manner. BSE is now formally
discussed at all meetings of the Agriculture Council when Mem-
ber States are updated on developments and voice their own con-
cerns and priorities. The European Parliament has also been kept
fully informed both through regular appearances by Commis-
sioner Byrne before the relevant committees and in the

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Official Journal of the European Communities

20.11.2001

discussions on the major legislative measures governed by
co-decision. Finally, the Commission has taken the necessary
measures to ensure that the process is carried out in a fully trans-
parent manner, especially through the publication of the reports
of the Food and Veterinary Office and the opinions of the Sci-
entific Steering Committee.

2. The Court draws attention to the delay in the introduction of
certain measures, notably the proposal to remove and destroy cer-
tain specified risk materials (SRMs) and the proposal to ban the
feeding of certain animal proteins to farmed animals. The Com-
mission would like to highlight the particular circumstances under-
lying both of these decisions.

SRMs

The Commission originally proposed a Community measure for
the removal and destruction of SRMs in December 1996. How-
ever, it remained blocked for several years in the Council. This
blockage existed as the repeated attempts by the Commission to
secure the necessary support for a coherent measure did not
secure a qualified majority in support of the proposal in the
Standing Veterinary Committee and the Council subsequently
rejected the proposals by a simple majority against. This situation
changed in June 2000 when, finally, there was no longer a simple
majority against and the Commission adopted the proposal on its
own authority but without the support of the Council. It entered
into force on 1 October 2000. This delay is of course deeply
regrettable but reflects the reality of the (then) decision-making
process in the Community.

The Court raises the question of whether the Commission should
have specific additional emergency powers in such situations. This
is of course a very delicate issue as Member States are reluctant to
cede such powers on very sensitive issues without the safeguard
of clearance through a regulatory committee. The situation will
improve with the introduction of the new comitology provisions
in Council Decision 1999/468/EC on implementing powers con-
ferred on the Commission. Indeed, that Decision abrogates the
possibility for the Council to reject a Commission proposal by
simple majority. With this Decision, a proposal which is not in
accordance with the opinion of the committee or for which no
opinion is delivered by that committee, can only be rejected by a
qualified majority in the Council. A number of sectoral pieces of
legislation, including Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 on TSEs, also
increase the powers of the Commission in relation to emergency
decisions. More generally, it is an issue which needs to be looked
at in the context of any further review of the relative responsibili-
ties at Community and Member State level. In the interim, there
is a heightened political awareness of the need to take no short
cuts in relation to public health protection.

Meat and bonemeal (MBM)

There is full acceptance that contaminated meat and bonemeal is
the major vector for the transmission of BSE. A ban on the feed-
ing of mammalian MBM to ruminants (cattle, sheep and goats)
has been in place since 1994 to address this threat. If this ban is
rigorously implemented the threat is addressed, as is supported by
the scientific evidence on the matter. However, it is now clear that
this ban was not implemented in an entirely satisfactory manner
by Member States.

The Commission took a number of measures in an effort to
improve compliance, including the introduction of higher pro-
cessing standards for meat and bone meal and the initiation of
infringement proceedings. In addition, as doubts increased over
the effectiveness of controls, as evidenced by the emergence of
cases of BSE in animals born after the introduction of the ban, the
Commission took stronger action. Thus, for example, the Com-
mission requested assurances at the highest level that the existing
control measures on meat and bonemeal were being rigorously
implemented. When the replies to these requests were found to be
unsatisfactory, the Commission proposed a total ban on the feed-
ing of a very wide range of animal proteins to all farmed animals.
In the event, the Council did not support this proposal and instead
adopted a less extensive ban at the meeting of the Agriculture
Council on 4 December 2000.

No national measures to ban meat and bonemeal on such an
extensive scale were in place in the Member States prior to this
decision. While the United Kingdom (UK) and Portugal did ban
the feeding of mammalian MBM to all farm animals, this was a
reflection of the high incidence of BSE in these countries. It is
notable that there was no pressure for a similar or more extensive
ban in any other Member State. Moreover, there was no Scientific
Steering Committee opinion to suggest that a total ban was neces-
sary. The report on the international scientific conference on MBM
in 1997 called for further reflection on policy in this area rather
than calling for a ban. The Commission acted on this report
through increased scientific review of the issues involved, fol-
lowed by the appropriate legislative action.

DISCHARGE AUTHORITY’S RECOMMENDATIONS

3. The Court’s report highlights on a number of occasions that
the incidence of BSE in Member States was likely to be under-
reported and that the ‘BSE-free’ status of some Member States was
questionable. It is important to highlight that the Commission in
its policy decisions always acted on the basis that both of these
assumptions were correct. This is evidenced in the approach

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 324/33

towards SRMs where the Commission insisted on a harmonised
EU measure requiring their removal and destruction in all Mem-
ber States with BSE. In order to establish accurately the true inci-
dence of BSE and its geographical spread, the Commission pro-
posed strengthened surveillance measures, including the use of
rapid tests. The Commission also asked the SSC for its assessment
on the geographical risk of BSE and provided extensive back-
ground information in this respect. The opinions of the SSC,
which the Commission fully supported, concluded that BSE was
likely to exist in a number of Member States which considered
themselves to be BSE-free. Unfortunately, several Member States
disputed this opinion until confronted with confirmation of the
presence of BSE.

The lengthy delay in processing infringement proceedings has
been highlighted by the Court as an obstacle to the Commission’s
ability to ensure better implementation. The Commission acknowl-
edges this failing, but there are few alternatives. Member States
insist on a full and lengthy process to allow their point of view to
be taken fully into account in any potential legal infringements
and there is also a very high burden of proof on the Commis-
sion. In addition, the resources available to the Commission for
inspections are also limited, as is acknowledged by the Court.
Finally, the scope for cross-compliance whereby penalties could
be applied in other areas due to poor controls on veterinary meas-
ures is not evident. The Commission is actively reflecting on what
more could be done to improve compliance and the Court’s report
is very welcome in this respect.

The confirmation of a higher incidence of BSE when using sys-
tematic testing should not come as a surprise. In the absence of
reliable rapid tests, which only became available in late 1999, it is
inevitable that a certain number of BSE cases, in the late stages of
clinical infectiveness, escape detection. The incidence of BSE should
also be looked at in perspective. Notwithstanding the increased
surveillance measures in place, including the testing of all bovines
aged over 30 months, the number of cases falls dramatically short
of the incidence in the UK. At the peak of the epidemic in the UK,
in 1992, the annual incidence was of the order of 37 000 in a
herd population of less than 11 million. This compares to the
expected incidence of less than 1 000 elsewhere in the EU in
2000 in a herd population of over 70 million.

SCOPE OF THE FOLLOW UP REPORT

5. The reflections of the Court on reorienting subsidies and
encouraging extensification constitute the major part of the deci-
sion proposed by the Commission and adopted by the Agricul-
ture Council of 20 June 2001. The decisions taken (covering the
period 2001 to 2003) include, for both premium schemes, a pro-
gressive reduction of the stocking density from 2 LU/ha to 1,8
LU/ha, for the special beef premium a substantial reduction of the
national ceilings and, with regard to the suckler cow scheme, the
introduction of a compulsory minimum number of heifers to be
kept under this scheme and a suspension of reallocating premi-
ums’ rights from the national reserves.

The Commission view is that the fall in consumer confidence in
the course of the most recent crisis is attributable to a combina-
tion of factors but especially the discovery of BSE for the first time
in a number of Member States and the higher than expected inci-
dence in a number of others. These discoveries were contrary to
public expectations in the countries concerned where consumers
had been led to believe that BSE was not a national problem. Con-
sumers reacted adversely to these discoveries. However, as evi-
dence emerged that the necessary measures were being taken to
protect against the risk of BSE, confidence gradually returned.

CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF BSE

6. The Commission considers the report in general a fair objec-
tive analysis of the BSE measures introduced and implemented
since 1998. The Commission services endorse in general the
report’s conclusions and recommendations notably that the Com-
missions strategy is basically sound, but that the implementation
is problematic (point 47).

4. There has been a comprehensive body of legislation in place
to combat BSE for several years. The scientific evidence strongly
supports the view that this legislation, if rigorously implemented,
is sufficient to protect against the risks of transmission of BSE.
The Commission has repeatedly reminded Member States of their
obligations in this respect and has given a high priority to inspec-
tions in the Member States of the implementation of control meas-
ures. These inspections have confirmed that the degree of imple-
mentation often left much to be desired. The reports of these
inspections are published on the Internet and discussed with the
Member States with a view to encouraging better compliance.
Moreover, the Commission initiated legal infringements against
most of the Member States in the period 1997 to 1999.

THE COMMISSION’S BSE STRATEGY

14. As the Court points out correctly the knock-on effect of the
BSE cases detected in several Member States resulted in a never-
before-experienced drop in consumption in the Community.
Numerous importing countries imposed bans on EU imports of
live cattle and bovine products. The situation worsened dramatic-
ally in February 2001 as the sector was hit by foot-and-mouth
disease.

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Official Journal of the European Communities

20.11.2001

The major objective of the purchase-for-destruction scheme was
to contribute immediately to a restoration of the consumer’s con-
fidence in beef, by bringing into force the compulsory BSE test-
ing on cattle slaughtered during the intermediate period before
the entry into force of Decision 2000/764/EC, as well as to take
pressure away, as much as possible, from the market, due to the
very significant imbalance between the cattle kept on farm and
the demand for meat.

ruminants. The current total ban on feeding animal protein to
farm animals was adopted as a control measure in the absence of
a test capable of differentiating between protein of different spe-
cies and pending the adoption and enforcement of the draft regu-
lation on animal by-producs. After the International Scientific
Conference on MBM, the Commission decided to seek a scientific
opinion on the safety of MBM. This opinion was delivered in June
1999 and re-edited in July 1999. The recommendations of that
opinion have been included in the proposed regulation on animal
by-products and Commission Decision 2001/25/EC.

The result of this policy, combined with an active purchase into
intervention of beef, yielded significant positive results to such an
extent that by the end of May 2001 the market loss could already
be assessed as some 10 %.

16.
It is true to say that the financial cost of this scheme is lower
than the purchase of beef into intervention. It is however also
important to underline that intervention is limited to beef origi-
nating from male animals and, therefore, for beef originating from
female animals there is no optional approach possible.

The number of male and female animals that effectively entered
the purchase-for-destruction scheme ending in June 2001 is
769 632 (situation as at 30 June 2001). It is worthwhile to
remember that premiums aim to compensate farmers partially for
price reductions decided in the context of the market support
mechanisms. The criteria of the premium schemes do not contain
incentives for increasing production.

In addition, the reflections of the Court on reorienting subsidies
and encouraging extensification constitute the major part of the
decision proposed by the Commission and adopted by the Agri-
culture Council of 20 June 2001. The decisions taken (covering
the period 2001 to 2003) include, for both premium schemes, a
progressive reduction of the stocking density from 2 LU/ha to 1,8
LU/ha, for the special beef premium a substantial reduction of the
national ceilings and, with regard to the suckler cow scheme, the
introduction of a compulsory minimum number of heifers to
be kept under this scheme and a suspension of reallocating
premiums’ rights from the national reserves.

28. All EU rendering plants are now equipped to operate appro-
priate processing standards (133 °, 3 bars, 20 minutes).

36.
It should be noted that the mentioned replacement of the
existing 1992 Directive on animal identification and registration
with a new Council regulation only concerns the provisions for
bovine animals. Furthermore, the Commission is considering a
proposal for a regulation with the aim of reinforcement of the
existing provisions for identification and registration of sheep.

45. Council legislation does not allow ‘cross compliance’ as is
the case for hormone legislation, for example.

RECOMMENDATIONS

55.

(a) The Commission considers that these proposals merit con-
sideration (see general overview). The question of whether the
Commission should have specific additional emergency
powers is a very delicate issue as Member States are reluctant
to cede such powers without the safeguard of clearance though
a regulatory committee. The situation will improve with the
introduction of implementing powers conferred on the Com-
mission and a number of sectoral pieces of legislation also
increase the powers of the Commission in relation to emer-
gency decisions. In the interim, there is a heightened political
awareness of the need to take no short cuts in relation to pub-
lic health protection. The Commission is actively reflecting on
what more could be done to improve compliance and the
Court’s report is very welcome in this respect.

29. The Scientific Steering Committee has not pointed at a gen-
eral danger in using animal-based protein in animal feed in the
context of BSE: provided certain conditions are fulfilled, the Sci-
entific Steering Committee has not advised against using animal
protein in feed for non-ruminant species. Likewise, certain animal-
based proteins, such as fish meal or milk-based protein, are not
considered to present a BSE risk in feed for any species, including

(b) The link made by the Court to the possibility of withholding
financial support is likely to be controversial with the Member
States. Such action would only be a last resort in the context
of persistent poor application of Community legislation or
failure to implement scientifically justified safeguard measures
as envisaged in the report.

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EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 324/35

(d) and (e) The reflections of the Court on reorienting subsidies
and encouraging extensification constitute the major part of
the Decision proposed by the Commission and adopted by
the Agriculture Council of 20 June 2001. The decisions taken
(covering the period 2001 to 2003) include, for both pre-
mium schemes, a progressive reduction of the stocking den-

sity from 2 LU/ha to 1,8 LU/ha, for the special beef premium
a substantial reduction of the national ceilings and, with
regard to the suckler cow scheme, the introduction of a com-
pulsory minimum number of heifers to be kept under this
scheme and a suspension of reallocating premiums’ rights
from the national reserves.