WRITTEN QUESTION E-2441/01 by Hiltrud Breyer (Verts/ALE) to the Commission. Garching FRM-II research reactor.
Date: 2001-09-11
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Belgium, dual-use good, import, nuclear reactor, nuclear research, nuclear safety, uranium

18.4.2002

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 93 E/133

The LIFE-Environment programme, examples of selected and supported demonstration activities on the
subject are sent direct to the Honourable Member and to Parliament’s Secretariat.

Additional information on LIFE projects supported by the DG Environment can be obtained from http://
www.europa.eu.int/comm/life/home.htm.

(2002/C 93 E/158)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2441/01

by Hiltrud Breyer (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

(11 September 2001)

Subject: Garching FRM-II research reactor

Under the RERTR programme the Belgian BR-2 nuclear research reactor at Mol
is scheduled to be
converted in 2006 from using weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium as
fuel. The operators of the BR-2 have currently ordered 32 kilograms of weapons-grade highly enriched
uranium as fuel in the US on the grounds that fuel supplies would last only to 2004.

The highly-respected US Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) has however calculated that the fuel supplies in
the BR-2 will last out until and even well beyond the time the reactor is converted in 2006.

The additional batch of HEU would create a surplus of weapons-grade uranium in Europe.

1.

Is the Commission aware of this situation?

Has the Commission been informed of the intended purpose of the surplus of weapons-grade highly

2.
enriched uranium?

3.
Can the possibility be ruled out that the surplus will be passed on to other European research
reactors and in particular to the new German FRM II research reactor which under the Schumer
Amendment the US is refusing to supply with weapons-grade HEU?

4.
Is the Commission aware that this supply of HEU for reactors not supplied by the USA would
circumvent the international RERTR programme and, avoiding US controls, make weapons-grade material
available as fuel for other research reactors in Europe?

5. What does the Commission intend to do to prevent such potential illegal HEU procurement for
Europe?

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(23 October 2001)

The Commission = through the Supply Agency = has knowledge of the facts referred to, as well as of the
position held by NCI, which is a United States (US) based non-governmental organisation. The Belgian user
has submitted to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission a detailed justification for the quantities it intends
to order. There is no possibility that the material is diverted to other uses than those permitted by the
conditions of supply as determined by the US authorities. No material supplied by the United States to a
European user can escape the controls applicable; all material would be subject to the nuclear co-operation
agreement between the United States and Euratom. Measures to prevent illegal supplies are in place since
long, i.e. the Commission and the Supply Agency = in implementing the provisions of the Euratom Treaty
= assure that no illegal supply to research reactors or diversion to illegal use of highly enriched uranium
takes place.