Case C-162/01 P: Appeal brought on 13 April 2000 by E. Bouma against the judgment delivered on 31 January 2001 by the Fourth Chamber of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities in Case T-533/93 between, on the one hand, E. Bouma and, on the other, the Council of the European Union and the Commission of the European Communities
Date: 2001-08-11
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: General Court (EU), action for annulment (EU), dairy production, farmer, indemnification, non-marketing premium

C 227/6

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

11.8.2001

1. Declares that, by failing to adopt within the period prescribed
the measures necessary to recover from the beneficiary undertak-
ings the aid provided for under the Maribel bis and Maribel ter
schemes which were declared unlawful and incompatible with
the common market by Commission Decision 97/239/EC of
4 December 1996 concerning aid granted by Belgium under
the Maribel bis/ter scheme, the Kingdom of Belgium has
failed to fulfil its obligations under the fourth paragraph of
Article 189 of the EC Treaty (now the fourth paragraph of
Article 249 EC) and Articles 2 and 3 of the said decision;

2. Orders the Kingdom of Belgium to pay the costs.

(1) OJ C 378 of 5.12.1998.

Appeal brought on 13 April 2000 by E. Bouma against the
judgment delivered on 31 January 2001 by the Fourth
Chamber of the Court of First Instance of the European
Communities in Case T-533/93 between, on the one hand,
E. Bouma and, on the other, the Council of the European
Union and the Commission of the European Communities

(Case C-162/01 P)

(2001/C 227/09)

An appeal against the judgment delivered on 31 January 2001
by the Fourth Chamber of the Court of First Instance of the
European Communities in Case T-533/93 between, on the one
hand, E. Bouma and, on the other, the Council of the European
Union and the Commission of the European Communities
was brought before the Court of Justice of the European
Communities on 13 April 2001 by E. Bouma, represented by
E.H. Pijnacker Hordijk, advocaat, the other parties tot the
proceedings being the Council of the European Union, rep-
resented by A.M. Colaert, and the Commission of the European
Communities, represented by T. van Rijn.

The appellant claims that the Court should:

— set aside the judgment delivered by the Court of First
Instance on 31 January 2001 in Case T-533/93 (1);

— refer the case back to the Court of First Instance;

— order the Council and the Commission to pay the costs

of the proceedings before both Courts.

Pleas in law and main arguments

— Breach of the principle of equality, the principle of the
protection of legitimate expectations, the principle of
legal certainty and the obligation to provide a statement
of reasons,
inasmuch as the Court of First Instance
incorrectly assessed the compensation claims of SLOM
83 producers (that is to say, SLOM producers whose non-
marketing undertakings expired during the course of

1983, that being the Netherlands reference year), particu-
larly in the light of the judgment in Spagl (2): there is
nothing to indicate that — as the Court of First Instance
seeks to suggest — the Court of Justice intended to
restrict the invalidity of Regulation No 857/84 (3) to cases
in which the SLOM producers concerned were unable to
resume production during the 1983 reference year,
following the expiry of their non-marketing undertakings,
which had by then come to an end. Had that indeed been
the intention of the Court of Justice, it would have had to
apply that limitation expressly, since the particular case
before it was precisely concerned whit a SLOM producer
in respect of whom it had been established that he had
produced non milk during the entire reference year,
despite the fact that his non-marketing undertaking had
expired during the course of that year (on 31 March
1983). The interpretation arrived at by the Court of First
Instance reflects the principal argument raised as a
defence by the institutions in Spagl, which was manifestly
rejected in the judgment.

The case of Spagl was in the nature of a test case, and
was, moreover, treated as such by the Court of Justice. By
purporting, over ten years later, to limit the scope of the
judgment in Spagl by applying a speculative gloss to the
significance of the underlying facts, the Court of First
Instance has misconstrued the judicial task of the Court
of Justice, thereby seriously undermining the principle of
legal certainty.

The judgment in the present case directly conflicts with
an earlier judgment delivered by the Court of First
Instance itself, in Joined Cases T-195/94 and T-202/94
Quiller and Heusmann.

— Violation of the principle of equality, the principle of the
protection of legitimate expectations, the principle of
legal certainty and the obligation to provide a statement
of reasons, inasmuch as the Court of First Instance, in
assessing Mr Bouma’s compensation claims, attached
significance to the fact that he did not produce any milk
between 31 December 1983 and 1 April 1984: it is
impossible to see why a defence previously rejected by
the Court of Justice (in paragraphs 15 and 16 of its
judgment in Mulder I, paragraph 14 of its judgment in
Spagl and paragraph 17 of
its interim judgment in
Mulder II) and also by the Court of First Instance (see
paragraph 97 of the judgment in Quiller and Heusmann)
should subsequently have been accepted by the Court of
First Instance.

— Violation of the principle of equality, the principle of the
protection of legitimate expectations, the principle of
legal certainty and the obligation to provide a statement
of reasons,
inasmuch as the Court of First Instance
wrongly assessed the compensation claims of SLOM 83
producers, particularly in the light of the judgment in
Mulder II: it is apparent that, in paragraph 23 of the
interim judgment of the Court of Justice of 19 May 1992,
cited by the Court of First
the Court of
Justice merely concluded that the four SLOM producers
concerned had made it sufficiently clear that they did in
fact intend to resume milk production. There is nothing
to indicate that the Court of Justice intended to provide
an exhaustive list of the ways in which that intention

Instance,

11.8.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 227/7

might be manifested. It is striking to note the importance
attached by the Court of Justice to the fact that in 1989,
immediately after being granted a provisional reference
quantity, the four producers concerned resumed milk
production. That circumstance is totally disregarded in
the considerations of the Court of First Instance as
contained in the contested judgment. For the rest,
it
should be noted that, in its interim judgment in Mulder II,
the Court of Justice did not deal at all with the specific
issues concerning the SLOM 83 producers.

— The Court of First Instance incorrectly allocated the
burden of proof, or at least imposed on Mr Bouma a
burden of proof which is legally impermissible: prior to
the entry into force of Regulation No 857/84, a SLOM
producer in Mr Bouma’s situation could not assume that,
if he did not resume production before 1 April 1984, he
might forfeit, definitively and completely, his right to a
reference quantity — or to alternative compensation. The
imposition of the burden of showing ‘that he had the
intention of resuming milk production upon the expiry
of his non-marketing undertaking and that he found it
impossible to do so owing to the entry into force of
Regulation No 857/84’ necessarily means that Mr Bouma
is faced, retroactively, with the consequences of the entry
into force of that regulation.

A Community citizen in the position of Mr Bouma
cannot reasonably be expected, some 17 to 18 years after
the material time, still to have at his disposal written
evidence concerning the management of his holding
during a period in the distant past — a fortiori since in no
previous judgment of the Court of Justice or the Court of
First Instance was any relevance attached to evidence
concerning the points which the Court of First Instance
now regards as crucial.

— The Court of First Instance set out and assessed the
relevant facts in such an erroneous and biased manner
that its judgment cannot be regarded as consistent with
the obligation to provide reasons or the principle of
objectivity.

(1) OJ 1993 C 334, p. 17.
(2) Judgment of 11 December 1990 in Case C-189/89.
(3) OJ 1984 L 148, p. 13.

Appeal brought on 13 April 2001 by B.M.J.B. Beusmans
against the judgment delivered on 31 January 2001 by the
Fourth Chamber of the Court of First Instance of the
European Communuties in Case T-73/94 between, on the
one hand, B.M.J.B. Beusmans and, on the other, the
Council of the European Union and the Commission of
the European Communities

(Case C-163/01 P)

(2001/C 227/10)

European Communities in Case T-73/94 between, on the one
hand, B.M.J.B. Beusmans and, on the other, the Council of
the European Union and the Commission of the European
Communities was brought before the Court of Justice of
the European Communities on 13 April 2001 by B.M.J.M.
Beusmans, represented by E.H. Pijnacker Hordijk, advocaat,
ther other parties to the proceedings being the Council of
the European Union, represented by A.M. Colaert, and the
Commission of the European Communities, represented by
T. van Rijn.

The appellant claims that the Courts should:

— set aside the judgment delivered by the Court of First

Instance on 31 January 2001 in Case T-73/94 (1);

— refer the case back to the Court of First Instance;

— order the Council and the Commission to pay the costs

of the proceedings before both Courts.

Pleas in law and main arguments

The pleas in law and main arguments are analogous to those
in Case C-162/01 P.

(1) OJ 1994 C 90, p. 25.

Appeal brought on 13 April 2001 by G. van den Berg
against the judgment delivered on 31 January 2001 by the
Fourth Chamber of the Court of First Instance of the
European Communities in Case T-143/97 between, on the
one hand, G. van den Berg and, on the other, the Council
of the European Union and the Commission of the
European Communities

(Case C-164/01 P)

(2001/C 227/11)

An appeal against the judgment delivered on 31 January 2001
by the Fourth Chamber of the Court of First Instance of the
European Communities in Case T-143/97 between, on the one
hand, G. van den Berg and, on the other, the Council of
the European Union and the Commission of the European
Communities was brought before the Court of Justice of the
European Communities on 13 April 2001 by G. van den Berg,
represented by E.H. Pijnacker Hordijk, advocaat, the other
parties to the proceedings being the Council of the European
Union, represented by A.M. Colaert, and the Commission of
the European Communities, represented by T. van Rijn.

The appellant claims that the Court s hould:

— set aside the judgment delivered by the Court of First
Instance on 31 January 2001 in Case T-143/97 (1);

— refer the case back to the Court of First Instance for
further determination of
the action brought by the
appellant before the Court of First Instance on 29 April
1997;

An appeal against the judgment delivered on 31 January 2001
by the Fourth Chamber of the Court of First Instance of the

— order the Council and the Commission to pay the costs

of the proceedings before both Courts.