State Aid Scoreboard
Date: 2001-07-18
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: State aid, dissemination of EU information, domestic market

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 18.7.2001
COM (2001) 412 final

State Aid Scoreboard

(presented by the Commission)

State Aid Scoreboard 2001

2

Contents

Introduction .............................................................................................................. 6

Structure, Contents, Development and Limitations of the State Aid Scoreboard........ 8

Structure and Contents.............................................................................................. 8

Development ............................................................................................................ 9

Limitations ............................................................................................................... 9

Overview of state aid in the European Union .......................................................... 10

Stockholm indicator – Movement in a downward direction..................................... 10

Focus on manufacturing, coal and services.............................................................. 13

Gradual changes in patterns of support granted to horizontal aid ............................. 14

Member State Forum .............................................................................................. 15

Member States' provision of information on state aid .............................................. 15

Member States' vision of the future thrust of national state aid policies ................... 15

Procedural Performance in the European Union...................................................... 17

Procedural performance .......................................................................................... 17

Recovery of State aid.............................................................................................. 23

State aid Objectives ................................................................................................ 24

State aid for horizontal objectives ........................................................................... 24

State aid for regional objectives .............................................................................. 26

State aid for specific sectors.................................................................................... 27

State aid for rescuing and restructuring companies.................................................. 28

State aid policy in the Internal Market .................................................................... 29

Reduction of State aid dispersion between the Member States ................................ 29

State aid and economic policy co-ordination ........................................................... 30

State aid and structural change................................................................................ 32

State aid and competition in the Internal Market ..................................................... 34

1.

2.

2.1.

2.2.

2.3.

3.

3.1.

3.2.

3.3.

4.

4.1.

4.2.

5.

5.1.

5.2.

6.

6.1.

6.2.

6.3.

6.4.

7.

7.1.

7.2.

7.3.

7.4.

3

Graphs and Tables

Graph 1: Long term decrease in the overall level of State aid as a percentage of EU GDP

1990-1999 .............................................................................................................. 10

Graph 2: State aid expressed as a percentage of GDP dropped in most Member States

between 1997 and 1999. ......................................................................................... 11

Graph 3: Steady decrease in aid granted to the manufacturing, coal and service sectors

since 1993 .............................................................................................................. 12

Graph 4: Share of aid granted for horizontal and regional objectives and to specific

sectors as a percentage of overall aid in the EU, less aid to agriculture, fisheries
and railway transport .............................................................................................. 13

Graph 5: Gradual changes in the pattern of horizontal aid objectives in the European

Union since 1990 .................................................................................................... 14

Graph 6: Aid cases investigated but not notified to the Commission as percentage of all

cases registered in the years 1997, 1998 and 1999................................................... 17

Graph 7: Aid cases investigated but not notified to the Commission as percentage of all

cases registered from 1997 until 1999. Breakdown by Member State...................... 18

Graph 8: Share in overall number of cases decided after the opening of the formal

investigation procedure in the years 1997, 1998 and 1999....................................... 19

Graph 9: Proportion of overall number of cases decided after the opening of the formal

investigation procedure during the period 1997 until 1999. Breakdown by
Member State ......................................................................................................... 20

Graph 10: Compatibility indicator for the EU in the years 1997, 1998, 1999 ........................ 21

Graph 11: Compatibility indicator during the period 1997 until 1999. Breakdown by

Member State ......................................................................................................... 22

Graph 12: Levels of State aid granted specifically to R&D, SMEs, Environmental

protection and Energy saving as a percentage of total aid less aid to agriculture,
fisheries and railway transport 1997, 1998 and 1999............................................... 25

Graph 13: Regional state aid as a percentage of GDP of assisted regions from 1996 to

1998 ....................................................................................................................... 26

Graph 14: State aid to specific sectors as a percentage of total aid less aid to agriculture,

fisheries and railway transport, 1990-1999.............................................................. 27

Graph 15: Rescue and restructuring aid in different sectors as a percentage of total aid

less agriculture, fisheries and railway transport, 1990-1999 .................................... 28

Graph 16: Dispersion of total aid less aid to agriculture, fisheries and railway transport as

percentage of GDP in the EU 1990-1999 ................................................................ 29

Graph 17: National aid less aid to agriculture, fisheries and railways in the Member

States from 1997 to 1999 as a percentage of government expenditure ..................... 31

4

Graph 18: Relationship between the percentage change in the contribution of the

manufacturing sector to overall national GDP and the change in the share of
manufacturing aid to total aid less aid to agriculture, fisheries and railway
transport between 1990 and 1999............................................................................ 33

Table 1: Recovery decisions in the years 1990-1999 for sectors except agriculture and

fisheries .................................................................................................................. 23

Table 2: Recovery orders pending at 31.12.2000 in sectors other than agriculture and

fisheries .................................................................................................................. 23

Table 3 State aid less agriculture, fisheries and rail transport, Trade openness and FDI, as

a percentage of GDP............................................................................................... 34

5

1.

INTRODUCTION

Strict control of State aid is essential for the proper functioning of the Internal Market. In
recent years the Commission has significantly tightened State aid control, thus ensuring
that Member States only award aid that really serves the common interest. Yet the annual
level of overall aid in the EU was still more than 79 Billion Euro in 1999. Whilst each
individual grant of aid is awarded under conditions accepted by the Commission, it is
undeniable that the cumulative effect of all the aid has a considerable distortive effect on
competition in the Internal Market.

This is recognised by Member States and the European Parliament. In 1996 the Dublin
European Council1 concluded that European competitiveness should be advanced by,
inter alia, continuing the dialogue between Council and Commission in order to improve
the effectiveness of State aid control and to reinforce control mechanisms. In 1998 the
Cardiff European Council2 further emphasised the need to promote competition and to
reduce distortions such as State aid. Early last year, the Internal Market Council3, in its
conclusions on the Cardiff economic reform process, called for strategies to be developed
for an overall reduction in State aid and stressed the importance of monitoring its level
and evaluation of its economic effects, notably through statistical data. The Lisbon
European Council in March 20004 once again reiterated its commitment to promote
competition and called upon Member States to reduce the general level of State aid and
shift the emphasis from supporting individual companies or sectors towards tackling
horizontal objectives of Community interest, such as employment, regional development,
environment and training or research. The Commission, in its Recommendations for the
2000 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines5, has also stressed the importance of reducing
the volume of State aid. It recommended that Member States make additional efforts to
avoid sector specific and especially ad hoc State aid. In March this year, the Stockholm
European Council6 asked Member States to demonstrate a downward trend in State aid
in relation to GDP by 2003, taking into account the need to redirect aid towards
horizontal objectives of common interest, including cohesion objectives. For the first time
therefore, an objective indicator was introduced against which Member States could
measure their performance. In order to improve transparency in the field of State aid the
Commission was asked to ensure the provision of a publicly accessible State aid Register
and Scoreboard by July 2001. In its 2001 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines7, the
Commission repeated this need to reduce overall state aid and to increase transparency. It
recommended that Member States should reduce the overall level of State aid in relation
to GDP by 2003 and redirect it away from ad hoc and sectorial aids and increase the
transparency of State aid policies.

1 SN 401/1/96 Annex II, page 3.
2 00150/98 point 17.
3 248th Council-Internal Market-16 March 2000, Conclusions, point 20.
4 SN 100/1/100 point 17.
5 COM(2000) 214 final dated 4th April 2000, point 3.6iii.
6 SN 100/01 point 20 and 21.
7 COM(2001) 224 final dated 25th April 2001, point 3.4ii.

6

In order to assess the possibility of reducing the distortive effect on competition in the
Internal Market caused by the cumulative effect of overall State aid levels, Member
States should ascertain their room for manoeuvre in the choice of the most appropriate
Government intervention. State aid is essentially justified to rectify market failures. If
there is a need for intervention, State aid is only one of the possible instruments that may
be used and which also include regulation, direct government provision of certain goods
or services, taxation, etc. There may, therefore, be situations where Member States could
use measures other than State aid and that are more adapted to the objective pursued.
Action based on an improved assessment of the effectiveness and the efficiency of State
aid policies could enhance the functioning of the Internal Market. It might also lead to
the improved targeting of State aid and a shift away from State aid to better-suited and
less distortive instruments thereby reinforcing the current downward trend of overall aid
in relation to GDP.

Member States’ State aid policy is influenced by a combination of factors, both at the
Community and the national levels. The former includes the requirements linked to
economic policy co-ordination, the budgetary criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact,
the co-financing priorities within the Community regional policy. The latter respond to
national specificities which may change over time. Some Member States might have to
concentrate aid on regional policy objectives for reasons of economic and social
cohesion, whilst others, during a certain period of
time, have to face massive
restructuring in particular sectors. Some Member States might not need to grant as much
State aid as others to support SMEs if their regulatory environment and capital markets
already facilitate conditions for the development of those firms.

The different needs of Member States to rely on State aid in terms of the overall amount
as well as for various objectives have to be discussed openly. Such an open discussion
will allow to fully appreciate the room for manoeuvre to choose the most efficient
economic policy instrument and thus also the potential to reduce the distortive effect on
competition in the internal market. In order to generate this wider debate and an
accelerated exchange of experience between the Member States, Commissioner Monti
initiated two new tools to increase transparency on State aid issues: a State aid Register,
already available on the Union’s Internet server EUROPA8, and the present State aid
Scoreboard.

8 http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/register/

7

2.

STRUCTURE, CONTENTS, DEVELOPMENT AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STATE
AID SCOREBOARD

2.1.

Structure and Contents

The Scoreboard is a transparent and publicly accessible source of information on the
overall State aid situation in the European Union and on the Commission's current State
aid control activities. The Scoreboard is shared with Member States and will benefit from
their contributions. This first edition comprises a series of indicators that describe
different State aid situations. This first version of the Scoreboard asks questions rather
than answering them. It points out differences, but does not necessarily explain them.
The questions raised and the differences described will certainly be a thorough basis for
discussion between the Member States and the Commission, but also, it
is hoped,
between the Member States themselves. It will raise awareness on State aid matters and
will, not
increase the often lacking understanding for the necessity of the
Commission's State aid control.

least,

The present Scoreboard consists of five parts: an overview of State aid in the European
Union over the last ten years and in the recent past, a Member State forum, procedural
performance in the European Union, current State aid policy and, State aid in the Internal
Market. In addition, a technical annex presents the underlying data for each graph and
table. Figures presented in the Scoreboard and annex are expressed in constant 1998
values.

The first part of the present Scoreboard shows State aid expenditure in the Union since
1990 expressed as a percentage of GDP and in absolute values. Overall aid expressed as
a percentage of GDP in each Member State for the period 1997, 1998 and 1999 are also
given. The shares of aid are then given according to the main purposes pursued: fostering
horizontal objectives like research and development, small and medium-sized enterprises,
environmental protection and energy saving or training and employment, helping
agriculture and fisheries, assisting the transport sector, aiding other specific sectors like
coal mining, shipbuilding or steel production, supporting regions that lag behind. This
breakdown is followed by a more detailed breakdown of the horizontal objectives into
their main constituent parts.

The second part provides seminal ideas for a Member State forum that will offer
information on their levels of transparency and should act as a catalyst for discussion
between Member States.

In the third part, an indication of Member States’ success in complying with procedural
rules is given in order to identify problems and therefore indicate where improvements
might be necessary. In addition, information on the recovery of illegally granted State aid
is included.

With a view to identifying possible areas where future action by the Commission under
State aid rules might be necessary or desirable,
the fourth part of the Scoreboard
highlights some issues and situates Member States accordingly. The Member States are
encouraged to discuss certain spending trends and patterns that might have a positive
impact upon the functioning of the Internal Market.

8

The final part of the Scoreboard attempts to situate State aid in the broader context of the
Internal Market and the structural reforms undertaken by the Member States. State aid,
even if complying with EC competition policy rules, affect, among others,
the
competitive process in the Internal Market, economic policy co-ordination and the
adjustment of the EU economy to new competitive conditions. In light of the broader
implications of State aid and beyond the mere respect of EC competition rules, Member
States may wish to consider re-evaluating their State aid policies for reasons of economic
effectiveness and efficiency.

2.2.

Development

The Scoreboard will be developed gradually in response to the needs of its various future
user constituencies. It will be based on a core set of indicators that will, over time,
demonstrate policy shifts and State aid spending patterns. These core indicators will be
accompanied in each Scoreboard by other indicators that will focus on certain topics for
deeper analysis. The Scoreboard will also be developed with a view to add value to other
the proposals for Broad Economic Policy
Commission documents,
Guidelines, Structural Indicators and Benchmarking Enterprise Policy. The concept
behind the initial structure is essentially to propose the direction in which the Scoreboard
will develop in future.

in particular

2.3.

Limitations

State aid data collected for the Scoreboard are grouped according to primary objectives.
It has to be noted that primary objectives cannot always give a completely accurate
picture of the final beneficiaries: e.g. a part of regional aid is in fact paid to small and
medium size enterprises, aid for R&D goes to particular sectors, and so on.

Throughout the Scoreboard a series of indicators is presented. It has to be underlined that
the purpose of these indicators is to highlight factual developments, without attempting
to establish causal links. In this way, the Scoreboard does not make judgements but is
offering factual data, which allow to start discussions without prejudging their outcome.
It is important to keep this limitation in mind when using the Scoreboard data.

9

3.

OVERVIEW OF STATE AID IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

This chapter gives an overview on aid granted in the European Union since 1990 and
shows the changing patterns of State aid granted to agriculture and fisheries, railways
and, the manufacturing, coal and service sectors. A breakdown of aid granted to the
manufacturing and service sectors and of aid that supports certain horizontal objectives is
also given.

3.1.

Stockholm indicator – Movement in a downward direction

The EU level of overall State aid expressed as a percentage of GDP has been coming
down over the years after having peaked in 1993. With the latest data indicating an aid
level of 1% of EU GDP, there may still be some room for further decreases in future. The
Member States have agreed in 2001 in Stockholm to use this room for further decreases.

Graph 1: Long term decrease in the overall level of State aid as a percentage of EU
GDP 1990-1999

2,0

1,8

1,6

1,4

1,2

1,0

0,8

0,6

0,4

0,2

0,0

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Agriculture
and Fisheries

Railways

Manufacturing,
Coal and Services

10

Graph 2: State aid expressed as a percentage of GDP dropped in most Member
States between 1997 and 1999.

Manufacturing, Coal and Services

Railways

Agriculture and Fisheries

2,5

2,0

1,5

1,0

0,5

0,0

A

B

DK

D

H

E

FIN

F

IRL

I

L

NL

P

S

UK

EU

From 1997 to 1999 overall aid expressed as a percentage of GDP dropped in the majority
of Member States. Slight increases are only seen in Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands.

11

Graph 3: Steady decrease in aid granted to the manufacturing, coal and service
sectors since 1993

Expressed in million Euro in constant 1998 values, absolute amounts of aid granted in
the EU have dropped by over 20% from the 1993 peak. This drop is all the more
important when one considers that since 1995, the Union comprised fifteen Member
States. The largest decrease has been seen in levels of aid granted to the manufacturing,
coal and service sectors.

in million Euro

120.000

100.000

80.000

60.000

40.000

20.000

0

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Agriculture
and
Fisheries

Railways

Manu-
facturing,
coal
mining &
services

12

3.2.

Focus on manufacturing, coal and services

At the Lisbon European Council in 2000, Member States subscribed to the need to tackle
horizontal objectives of common interest such as employment, environment, training or
research and regional development. The Scoreboard will therefore concentrate on these
objectives in the context of the manufacturing, coal and service sectors.

Large parts of the agricultural and fisheries sector traditionally receive substantial
support from the Community budget. A separate analysis will be made in future
Scoreboards.

State aid for railway transport is usually granted to undertakings that perform a public
service obligation. Despite the different nature of aid granted for public service
obligations, it constitutes, according to recent Court decisions, State aid. An analysis of
aid to this sector will be considered in future.

Aid to the Agricultural, Fisheries and Railway transport
hereafter in this chapter.

is therefore not

included

Graph 4: Share of aid granted for horizontal and regional objectives and to specific
sectors as a percentage of overall aid in the EU, less aid to agriculture, fisheries and
railway transport

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

Regional aid

Specific sectors

Horizontal objectives

1997

1998

1999

Graph 4 shows a gradual shift in the share of aid away from specific manufacturing, coal
and service sectors towards horizontal aid. Moreover the sharp drop in 1999 of the share
of aid destined to specific sectors - mainly steel, shipbuilding, some other manufacturing
sectors, coal mining, air transport, tourism, financial services, media and culture - was
matched by a significant increase in the shares of aid granted for horizontal objectives -
research and development, environmental protection and energy saving, small and
medium sized companies, employment and training.

13

3.3.

Gradual changes in patterns of support granted to horizontal aid

Most categories of horizontal aid are considered as having the potential to create benefits
that are greater than their cost measured in terms of aid amounts alone. Strictly speaking
aid for rescue and restructuring is also a horizontal aid as it is not limited per se to any
particular economic activity or geographic area. Nevertheless this type of aid has a
greater potential for distorting competition than other horizontal aid and is considered
separately.

Graph 5: Gradual changes in the pattern of horizontal aid objectives in the
European Union since 1990

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%

Other Objectives,
Employment and Training

SME

Environment and Energy saving

Research and Development

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Over close to a decade the shares of aid for research and development and to a lesser
extent, environmental protection and energy saving increased their relative importance
whilst the share of aid for SMEs has remained stable.

14

4.

MEMBER STATE FORUM

4.1.

Member States' provision of information on state aid

An important component of a peer review process that the Commission wishes to
encourage by way of the Scoreboard is a transparent exchange of information between
Member States on various aspects of their respective State aid/Competition policies. The
Scoreboard is therefore designed to provide links to relevant Internet sites operated by or
on behalf of the Member States. In this way the profile of information already provided
to the public by Member States on their aid policies should be increased.

Each Member State will gradually provide further information on relevant Internet
addresses where information on national competition activities is available.

For the time being the addresses below provide access to information and reports on
State aid, subsidies and competition issues that have been published in Germany, Italy
and the UK by the Bundesministerium der Finanzen, Ministero delle Attività Produttive
and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) respectively.

–

–

–

http://dip.bundestag.de/btd/14/015/1401500.pdf

http://www.minindustria.it/dgcii/Relazione/relazione.htm

http://www.dti.gov.uk/opportunityforall/indicators2/index.htm

4.2.

Member States' vision of the future thrust of national state aid policies

To add a further dimension to information on national activities, Member States provide
details on official sources of information that provide an indication of current thinking on
the development of national State aid policies. In this context documents on budgetary
impression on future
planning of the Member States typically provide an initial
developments of aid policies.

The UK has indicated the following addresses:

http://www.dti.gov.uk/europe/stateaid/index.htm

This address gives information from the Department of Trade and Industry on State aid.

http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/docs/2001/enterprise_1806.html

This address provides a link to a joint HM Treasury/DTI document that is mainly about
reforms to the UK competition regime and in addition is linked to the EU competition
agenda, including comments about State aid.

Budgetary planning of Germany for the period of 2001 to 2005:

http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/fach/abteilungen/bundhaus/bhh2002.pdf
page 10 of the document).

(see

15

As regards Finland, the Business Aid (General Conditions) Act of 1998 is given as an
example. Under the Act, business aid (excluding agriculture and fisheries) must be
allocated primarily to correct market shortcomings. At the same time the Act stipulates
that the business aid programmes must be drawn up in such a way that they have as little
effect as possible in terms of distorting competition. Another central feature is that the
Act also requires the authorities to evaluate the attainment and effectiveness of the
objectives laid down for the aid programmes in order to identify whether the aid is
necessary and where it may need to be developed.

For the purpose of the Scoreboard, contact data for all the bodies involved in supervising
and granting State aid, along with descriptions of the national projects on this subject will
be provided in future.

16

5.

PROCEDURAL PERFORMANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

5.1.

Procedural performance

The Commission controls the Member States’ granting of State aid by means of a formal and
transparent procedure, Council regulation No 659/1999. In the following six graphs, three
indicators are used to illustrate Member States’ compliance with the state aid control
procedure in all sectors except agriculture, fisheries, railway transport and coal (See technical
annex for details).

Graph 6 shows the share of investigated aid cases for which, contrary to the procedural
provisions, not the Member State, but the Commission had to initiate the control procedure
after having found out about the aid, for example following a complaint. The share in the total
number of registered aid cases, of these so-called non-notified aids hints to differing degrees
of the correct understanding of the notion of State aid, to differences in the complexity of
cases and may also indicate administrative difficulties that the Member States may encounter
when applying the state aid rules.

Graph 6: Aid cases investigated but not notified to the Commission as percentage of all
cases registered in the years 1997, 1998 and 1999

Non - notified

Notified

e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
P

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

78

78

22

1997
(693)

22

1998
(485)

83

17

1999
(610)

Number in brackets: Total number of registered cases per year

17

The following graph gives a breakdown of the above information by Member State.

Graph 7: Aid cases investigated but not notified to the Commission as percentage of all
cases registered from 1997 until 1999. Breakdown by Member State.

Non - notified cases

Notified cases

e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
P

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

71

68

89

87

90

83

87

83

83

80

88

85

92

100

78

80

11

A
(83)

13

B
(82)

10

DK
(48)

29

32

17

13

17

17

20

12

15

8

22

D
(560)

EL
(25)

E
(228)

FIN
(39)

F
(99)

IRL
(22)

I
(288)

L
(8)

N
(119)

P
(59)

S
(39)

UK
(90)

20

EU
(1788)

Number in brackets: Total number of registered cases per Member State

In Germany, Greece, Italy and the UK, the proportion of non-notified cases are equal to or
greater than the EU average.

18

Graph 8: Share in overall number of cases decided after the opening of the formal
investigation procedure in the years 1997, 1998 and 1999

Cases decided after the formal
investigation procedure

Cases decided without opening
the formal investigation procedure

s
e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
P

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

92

8

1997
(442)

85

15

1998
(394)

82

18

1999
(354)

Number in brackets: Total number of decisions per year

Where the Commission has doubts whether certain aid measures comply with State aid rules,
it carries out a formal investigation during which third parties and all Member States are
invited to provide observations. In most of the cases, the Commission has, however, no doubt
on the compatibility with the State aid rules and allows Member States to award such aid
without carrying out a formal investigation procedure. It only opens this procedure, when
doubts exist. Graph 8 shows the share of these doubtful cases, i.e. which were only decided
upon after the formal investigation procedure, as a percentage of all final decisions taken
between 1.1.1997 and 31.12.1999. Graph 8 also shows that whilst the number of decisions
taken on aid by the Commission decreased from 1997 to 1999, the actual number of formal
investigations has steadily gone up during the same period thus indicating an increasing share
of complex cases.

19

The following graph gives a breakdown by Member State of the above information.

Graph 9: Proportion of overall number of cases decided after the opening of the formal
investigation procedure during the period 1997 until 1999. Breakdown by Member State

Cases decided without opening the formal investigation procedure

Cases decided after opening the formal investigation procedure

s
e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
P

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

92

96

97

74

83

89

96

78

80

89

67

94

95

96

97

87

8

4

3

26

17

11

A
(65)

B
(45)

DK
(35)

D
(361)

EL
(23)

E
(149)

22

F
(73)

11

IRL
(18)

4

FIN
(23)

33

20

6

5

4

3

I
(182)

L
(3)

NL
(90)

P
(37)

S
(28)

UK
(58)

13

EU
(1190)

Number in brackets: Total number of decisions per Member State

The proportion of aid decisions only taken after a formal investigation procedure is above the
EU average in Germany, Greece, France, Italy and Luxembourg.

20

When, at the end of the formal investigation procedure, the Commission comes to the
conclusion that the examined aid does not comply with State aid rules and hence is not
compatible with the Common Market, it takes a negative decision.

The following graph 10 shows the share of incompatible and compatible aid cases that have
been examined by the Commission. The total number of decisions between 1.1.1997 and
31.12.1999, are broken down into negative and positive decisions, the latter sometimes only
being made under certain conditions. The share of such conditional decisions in the overall
number of decisions did not exceed 2% in this period.

Graph 10: Compatibility indicator for the EU in the years 1997, 1998, 1999

Negative decisions

Positive and conditional decisions

e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
P

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

98

2

1997
(442)

91

91

9

1998
(394)

9

1999
(354)

Number in brackets: Total number of decisions per year

In 1997, four conditional Commission decisions were taken on cases from Germany, Italy and
France. In 1998, eight such decisions were taken on cases from Austria, Germany, Italy and
France and, in 1999, a further three conditional decisions were taken on cases from Germany,
Italy and the Netherlands.

21

The following graph gives a breakdown by Member State of the above information.

Graph 11: Compatibility indicator during the period 1997 until 1999. Breakdown by
Member State

Negative decisions

Positive and conditional decisions

e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
P

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

94

98

97

91

87

94

100

92

94

92

99

100

100

98

94

67

33

6

2

3

9

A
(65)

B
(45)

DK
(35)

D
(361)

13

EL
(23)

6

8

6

8

E
(149)

FIN
(23)

F
(73)

IRL
(18)

I
(182)

L
(3)

1

NL
(90)

2

UK
(58)

P
(37)

S
(28)

6

EU
(1190)

Number in brackets: Total number of decisions per Member State

The share of negative decisions for Germany, Greece, France, Italy and Luxembourg is above
the EU average.

22

5.2.

Recovery of State aid

When the Commission comes to the conclusion that an aid is not compatible with the EC
Treaty, it takes a negative decision and, as a general rule, orders the Member State to recover
aid from the beneficiary if the aid has already been awarded.

The following table shows for the last ten years the number and distribution of Commission
decisions ordering the recovery of aid in sectors other than agriculture and fisheries.

Table 1: Recovery decisions in the years 1990-1999 for sectors except agriculture and
fisheries

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Manufacturing
and Services

Transport

Total

5

-

5

4

-

4

5

-

5

3

1

4

1

1

2

6

2

8

13

1

14

10

2

12

26

1

27

24

-

24

The following table shows for the same sectors the number of recovery orders the execution
of which is still pending at the end of the year 2000. It also indicates the share of recovered
cases where legal procedures are pending or which are subject to a bankruptcy procedure.

Table 2: Recovery orders pending at 31.12.2000 in sectors other than agriculture and
fisheries

In process of
execution

Forming part of
bankruptcy
procedures

Currently object
of National court
procedures

Currently object
of European court
procedures

Total number
pending

31

11

5

20

67

23

6.

STATE AID OBJECTIVES

This chapter deals with the State aid objectives outside of aid granted to the agricultural,
fisheries and rail transport sectors.

6.1.

State aid for horizontal objectives

State aid for horizontal objectives, i.e. aid that is not targeted towards specific sectors or
geographic areas, is usually considered as being less distortive than sectorial and ad hoc aid,
such as aid for rescue and restructuring. The possibility to grant aid horizontally to all sectors
implies that it has a less selective effect than the other kinds of aid. Its positive effect in
addressing market failures is therefore more likely to outweigh its negative impact on
competition.

During the Lisbon and Stockholm European Council, Member States agreed to the
importance of redirecting aid towards horizontal objectives of common interest. Research and
development, safeguarding the environment and energy saving and supporting small and
medium-sized enterprises are the most prominent horizontal objectives pursued with State aid.
The following graph shows the Member States' efforts by way of State aid that is granted
specifically to attain these objectives. Until such time that State aid data can be classified
according to objectives and final impact, aid also supporting these goals but actually granted
for other primary objectives, regional aid for example, cannot be included. However there is a
very unequal distribution of aid that specifically supports horizontal objectives and in many
Member States the reorientation requested in Stockholm will have to be a priority objective
for national State aid policy. Nevertheless, with only few exceptions, the development over
time is clearly going in the direction desired by the European Council.

24

Graph 12: Levels of State aid granted specifically to R&D, SMEs, Environmental
protection and Energy saving as a percentage of total aid less aid to agriculture, fisheries
and railway transport 1997, 1998 and 1999

d
i
a

l
a
t
o
t

f
o

e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
p
a

s
a

s
y
a
w

l
i
a
R
d
n
a

s
e
i
r
e
h
s
i
F

,
e
r
u
t
l
u
c
i
r
g
A
s
s
e
l

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

A

B

DK

D

EL

E

FIN

F

IRL

I

L

NL

P

S

UK

EU

1997

1998

1999

25

6.2.

State aid for regional objectives

Regional aid is also considered to be generally less distortive than aid directed to specific
sectors or ad hoc aid. It is also considered to be an acceptable tool for improving cohesion in
the European Union. Consequently, the Stockholm Council also asked the Member States to
redirect State aid in support of cohesion objectives.

The impact on regional economies of using State aid to tackle regional problems can be
illustrated by the following graph 13. With the exception of Luxembourg where a breakdown
of GDP by assisted region is not available, this graph expresses regional aid as a percentage
of GDP of assisted regions. It has to be stressed that in addition to such regional aid, the
Community also awards support to projects that are financed jointly with Member States.
However, Community funding is not included here.

Graph 13: Regional state aid as a percentage of GDP of assisted regions from 1996 to
1998

2

1,8

1,6

1,4

1,2

1

0,8

0,6

0,4

0,2

0

A

B

DK

D

EL

E

FIN

F

IRL

I

L

NL

P

S

UK EU

1996

1997

1998

Apart from the quite important differences amongst the Member States that are shown in this
graph, it appears that Member States are either reducing levels of regional state aid or
maintaining a relatively low but stable level of regional aid. Of the four “cohesion countries”,
Spain and Ireland have in 1997, relatively low levels of regional aid, whilst in both Greece
and Portugal, between 1997 and 1998, regional aid levels appear to be decreasing rapidly.

Information on maximum aid intensities allowable in each Member State in 1999 is provided
under:

http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/state_aid/regional/

26

6.3.

State aid for specific sectors

Aid to support specific sectors is likely to distort competition to a larger degree than aid that
is directed towards the horizontal objectives discussed in paragraph 6.1. Aid destined to coal
mining and specific manufacturing sectors is mainly directed either to declining industries in
order to attenuate the social repercussions of structural change or, unfair price competition on
the world shipbuilding market. In contrast the bulk of aid that is directed towards specific
service sectors favours those areas of activity that are continually growing in importance, such
as tourism or, sectors that have recently been liberalised such as air transport and financial
services. Graph 14 displays the relative size of State aid granted to these sectors in
comparison to aid given to coal mining and the manufacturing sector.

Graph 14: State aid to specific sectors as a percentage of total aid less aid to agriculture,
fisheries and railway transport, 1990-1999

50

40

30

20

10

,
e
r
u
t
l
u
c
i
r
g
a

s
s
e
l

d
i
a
l
a
t
o
t

f
o
e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
p
s
a

s
y
a
w

l
i

a
r
d
n
a

s
e
i
r
e
h
s
i
f

0
1990 1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Total sectorial aid

Coal mining

Services

Specific sectors in manufacturing

Manufacturing includes steel, shipbuilding and other manufacturing sectors. Services include
the media, culture, tourism, financial and air transport sectors.

27

6.4.

State aid for rescuing and restructuring companies

The graphs presented in the preceding paragraphs on horizontal and regional aid reflect
differences between Member States' aid policies based on medium and long-term policy
objectives. A more complete picture has to take account of Member States' other necessities,
which are often found in rescue and restructuring of ailing companies. The bulk of rescue and
restructuring aid is granted ad hoc.

Aid for rescuing and restructuring companies is more likely to distort competition than aid
directed towards the above-mentioned horizontal objectives. Consequently, such ad hoc aid
should not be granted to attain long-term State aid policy objectives, but rather for temporary
and diminishing needs.

Graph 15: Rescue and restructuring aid in different sectors as a percentage of total aid
less agriculture, fisheries and railway transport, 1990-1999

d
n
a

s
e

i
r
e
h
s

i
f

,

e
r
u
t
l
u
c

i
r
g
a

s
s
e

l

d
a

i

l

a
t
o
t

f
o

e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
p

s
a

s
y
a
w

l
i

a
r

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Total Rescue and Restructuring aid

Financial services

Manufacturing

Airline services

Shipbuilding

Steel

Graph 15 above displays State aid granted in the European Union for rescue and restructuring
in different sectors during the years 1990 until 1999. The graph reflects the different
restructuring cycles that have been followed in the Union over the past ten years to address
the various needs of those economic sectors where restructuring has been needed most.

28

7.

STATE AID POLICY IN THE INTERNAL MARKET

7.1.

Reduction of State aid dispersion between the Member States

At the Stockholm Council Member States were called upon to demonstrate a downward trend
in State aid in relation to GDP by 2003. This has to be placed in the context of alignment of
economic policies within the Internal Market. The following graph 16 shows the diminishing
EU annual level of State aid during the last ten years, expressed as a percentage of GDP, to
the manufacturing, coal mining and service sectors. It furthermore illustrates that
the
differences of State aid award amongst Member States, i.e. the range between the highest and
lowest level of aid in terms of GDP are striking.

Graph 16: Dispersion of total aid less aid to agriculture, fisheries and railway transport
as percentage of GDP in the EU 1990-1999

EU average

P
D
G
e
g
a
t
n
e
c
r
e
p

s
a
d
i
a

e
t
a
t
S

2,0

1,8

1,6

1,4

1,2

1,0

0,8

0,6

0,4

0,2

0,0

1990
(I-NL)

1991
(I-NL)

1992
(D-UK)

1993
(D-UK)

1994
(D-NL)

1995
(I-NL)

1996
(P-NL)

1997
(P-NL)

1998
(IRL-NL)

1999
(IRL-NL)

Expressed as a percentage of GDP, in 1990 and 1991 Italy granted the highest amount of aid
whilst the Netherlands granted the lowest. During the period from 1992 to 1994 Germany
granted, particularly to the new German Bundesländer, relatively high amounts of aid as a
percentage of GDP whilst in the UK and the Netherlands, aid levels remained the lowest in
the Union. Since 1994 the Netherlands have consistently granted the lowest level of aid in the
Union in terms of percentage of GDP.

29

7.2.

State aid and economic policy co-ordination

EU State aid control is mainly concerned with the distortions of competition caused by State
aid having an impact on trade between Member States. There are however additional reasons
why controlling and containing State aid is important and these relate to the efficiency of
Member States' product markets and the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU).

Efficient product markets and the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines

State aid distorts competition and, whether or not it has an impact on trade between Member
States, may damage the allocative efficiency of the European economy. In particular, it
modifies economic incentives and so may cause the inefficient allocation of scarce private
resources to industries receiving aid and away from others. State aid may also encourage
rent-seeking behaviour and "capture" of government by industries, and moral hazard in the
case of failing industries. Like other government expenditures, the financing of State aid also
raises the issue of the marginal cost of public funds, i.e. the loss of efficiency due to taxation.

The consequences of State aid in terms of inefficient functioning of product markets imply
that the European Commission's control of State aid needs to be supplemented by an effort of
self-discipline on the part of the Member States themselves. In view of the cross-border
this self-discipline can be more rigorous and politically
spillover effects of State aid,
acceptable if the efforts of the Member States are co-ordinated. To this end, since 1999
recommendations on State aid are included in the framework of the Broad Economic Policy
Guidelines (BEPG).

The BEPG are at the centre of the process of multilateral surveillance of the economic
policies in the EU, and provide impetus to Member States in the area of structural reforms.
The reduction of State aid has received increasing attention since the Cardiff European
Council of 1998, which highlighted the need to promote competition and to reduce distortions
in product markets. The Commission's Recommendations for the 2001 BEPG continue to put
high priority on containing State aid and Member States are requested to "reduce the overall
level of State aid in relation to GDP by 2003 and redirect it away from ad hoc and sectoral
aids, and increase the transparency of their State aid policies".

Budgetary discipline and the Economic and Monetary Union

In budgetary terms, expenditure on State aid in the EU as shown in graph 17, is not huge
having dropped below 1% of General Government Expenditure in 1999. Nevertheless, State
aid competes for scarce budgetary resources with many other important activities. From the
public finance point of view, this raises the question of determining priorities, given the
constraints imposed on the budget by the politically acceptable level of taxation and the
sustainability of the public debt.

30

Graph 17: National aid less aid to agriculture, fisheries and railways in the Member
States from 1997 to 1999 as a percentage of government expenditure

t
n
e
c
r
e
p

4,5

4,0

3,5

3,0

2,5

2,0

1,5

1,0

0,5

0,0

1997

1998

1999

A

B

DK

D

EL

E

FIN

F

IRL

I

L

NL

P

S

UK

EU

In particular, within the Economic and Monetary Union, Member States are required to
pursue budgetary discipline with a view of supporting a monetary policy targeted to price
stability. Budgetary discipline avoids the risk of spill-over effects of unsound fiscal policies
and allows Member States to retain enough room of manoeuvre for using their national fiscal
policy to address country-specific circumstances. More recently, sound public finances have
been also associated with the need to prepare for the budgetary consequences of ageing
populations.

The Stability and Growth Pact lays down the basic principles for the conduct of fiscal policy
within the European Monetary Union (EMU). It establishes a comprehensive surveillance and
co-ordination procedure to ensure sustainable public finances and budgetary discipline during
the third stage of EMU.

The provision of State aid therefore takes place within relatively tight budgetary limits, strict
surveillance mechanisms and increasing attention to the quality of public finances. All these
constraints contribute to raising the opportunity cost of government resources, since within
the available spending limits State aid now competes more intensely with other possible uses
of government resources. Member States therefore face an even stronger incentive to monitor
the efficiency of the State aid they grant.

Between 1997 and 1999, increases in State aid as a percentage of Government expenditure are
seen in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and Sweden.

31

7.3.

State aid and structural change

In a changing environment, the competitiveness of firms, industries and nations depends on
their ability to react quickly to new opportunities and challenges: adaptation, as captured by
structural change, is a manifestation of competitiveness. The processes of country or regional
specialisation, of concentration of the industry into some locations and changing sector shares
in the economy are driven, of course, by the decisions of individual firms and investors. The
speed of change depends mainly on economic forces such as changing factor prices,
technology shocks and changing consumer tastes. Open and competitive markets and an
active entrepreneurial culture facilitate change.

The speed of structural change correlates positively with output (GDP) and productivity
growth. In comparison with the US, Europe tends to be slower in adjusting its economy.

In principle, State aid could weigh in favour of structural change by contributing for example,
to an acceleration of workforce adaptation or technology transfer. One of the aims of the
Scoreboard is to measure the contribution of State aid in facilitating structural change.

Even if the use of State aid meets its immediate goals in the context of a region or country,
State aid raises issues with respect to cohesion. Indeed, it might contribute to a slow-down of
economic convergence, if “front runners” mobilise more public aid resources than those
“catching up”.

At the level of the firm, data do not allow addressing questions such as to what extent have
beneficiaries of restructuring State aid succeeded, how many jobs have been maintained and
what was the total opportunity cost of these operations. In view of these difficulties, State aid
for restructuring must be monitored very closely.

Graph 18 below shows the change in the contribution of the manufacturing sector to overall
national GDP and the change in the share of manufacturing aid to total aid less agriculture,
fisheries and railway transport in the years 1990 and 1999. The graph does not show any
correlation between State aid and structural change.

32

Graph 18: Relationship between the percentage change in the contribution of the
manufacturing sector to overall national GDP and the change in the share of
manufacturing aid to total aid less aid to agriculture, fisheries and railway transport
between 1990 and 1999

40

30

20

10

0

-10

-20

-30

-40

-50

-60

A

B

DK

D

EL

E

FIN

F

IRL

I

L

NL

P

S

UK

EU

percentage
change

Share of manufacturing aid to total aid less agriculture, fisheries & rail

Share of manufacturing sector to GDP

* Data for Austria, Finland and Sweden only cover the period from 1995 to 1999.

In all Member States the contribution of the manufacturing sector to national GDP has
decreased during the observation period whilst
in six Member States, Austria, Belgium,
Germany, Finland, France and Sweden, aid to manufacturing increased its share of total aid
less aid to agriculture, fisheries and railway transport.

33

7.4.

State aid and competition in the Internal Market

State aid is a powerful public policy instrument which can have a significant impact on
competition conditions within the Internal Market, but it is not the only one. Other regulatory
legal and policy instruments in the hands of public authorities have an impact on the Internal
Market.

An overall assessment of competition conditions in the Internal Market must also take into
account the degree, nature and evolution of public policy intervention on other fronts. The
favourable effects of a progressive reduction in State aid spending may vanish if public
authorities engage in other policies aiming at replacing protectionist subsidies with for
example, non-tariff barriers. On the other hand, a reduction in State aid spending will be more
beneficial in a context of increasingly open, transparent and competitive markets.

It is difficult to capture all the possible legal, regulatory and policy variables in the hands of
public authorities. Table 3 shows State aid and two indicators of market openness related to
trade and inward foreign direct investment. Although they are not the direct result of public
policy intervention only, a positive evolution of these two indicators results in increased
competition due to increasing exposure to foreign competition.

The Table shows that the overall evolution of competitive conditions is positive. In most
countries, State aid reductions are accompanied by increasingly open markets.

Table 3 State aid less agriculture, fisheries and rail transport, Trade openness and FDI,
as a percentage of GDP

State aid* as a
percentage of GDP

Trade openness
(Exports plus imports)
as a percentage of GDP

Inward FDI as a
percentage of GDP

1999

1999

1999

Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Greece
Spain
Finland
France
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Portugal
Sweden
United Kingdom

0,27
0,37
0,63
0,64
0,37
0,55
0,38
0,46
1,01
0,36
0,23
0,17
0,82
0,25
0,22

(5+)
(8-)
(12-)
(13+)
(7+)
(11+)
(9+)
(10+)
(15+)
(6+)
(3+)
(1+)
(14+)
(4+)
(2+)

44,09
100,89
37,01
28,67
20,44
30,95
35,41
29,35
84,57
23,21
100,89
75,42
48,02
40,46
24,07

(6+)
(1+)
(8-)
(12+)
(15+)
(10+)
(9+)
(11+)
(3+)
(14+)
(1+)
(4-)
(5+)
(7+)
(13-)

1,1
12,3
1,5
2,2
0,9
0,9
2,0
1,5
8,4
0,6
12,3
6,5
0,3
21,1
9,4

EU 15
* State aid less agriculture, fisheries and railway transport as percentage of GDP

0,44

(+)

4,0

34

+

(11+)
(2+)
(10+)
(7+)
(12-)
(13-)
(8+)
(9+)
(5+)
(14+)
(2+)
(6+)
(15-)
(1+)
(4+)

(+)

34

The figure in the parenthesis shows the relative rank of each Member State among the EU 15.
The “+” sign indicates a positive evolution in the indicator whilst a “-” sign shows a negative
evolution. Thus, a “+” sign in State aid as a percentage of GDP indicates a decrease whilst a
“+” sign in Trade openness and FDI indicates an increase.

35

Technical annex

36

All State aid data refer to the implementation of Commission decisions and not cases that are
still under examination, which once decided upon, may have an effect on historical data. State
aid expenditure is attributed to the year it was made. In cases that result in expenditure over a
number of years, the total amount is attributed to each of the years in which expenditure took
place.

___________________________________________________________________________

Source:

DG Competition database on State aid expenditure in the Member States. Gross
Domestic Product at market prices taken from the Eurostat database Newcronos.

Graph 1

Remarks: All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.

Data:

Total State aid
Agriculture and Fisheries
Railways
Manufacturing, Coal and Services

1990
100.555
14.156
31.342
55.057

1991
95.479
14.988
30.291
50.200

1992
101.321
14.709
30.248
56.364

1993
109.466
13.839
33.981
61.646

1994
105.085
13.163
34.984
56.937

1995
105.066
15.467
35.752
53.847

1996
103.757
15.489
33.868
54.399

1997
98.133
15.488
31.333
51.313

1998
91.863
13.328
32.018
46.517

1999
79.660
13.972
31.263
34.424

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

GDP

5.815.768 6.004.973 5.939.115 6.375.439 6.613.255 6.990.420 7.121.262 7.383.993 7.610.830 7.817.449

___________________________________________________________________________

Graph 2

Source:

DG Competition database on State aid expenditure in the Member States.
Gross Domestic Product at market prices taken from the Eurostat database
Newcronos.

Remarks:

All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.

37

Data:
Overall state aid

A

B

Total state aid
Agriculture and Fisheries
Railways
Manufacturing, Coal and Services
Total state aid
Agriculture and Fisheries
Railways
Manufacturing, Coal and Services

DK Total state aid

D

H

E

Agriculture and Fisheries
Railways
Manufacturing, Coal and Services
Total state aid
Agriculture and Fisheries
Railways
Manufacturing, Coal and Services
Total state aid
Agriculture and Fisheries
Railways
Manufacturing, Coal and Services
Total state aid
Agriculture and Fisheries
Railways
Manufacturing, Coal and Services

FIN Total state aid

F

Agriculture and Fisheries
Railways
Manufacturing, Coal and Services
Total state aid
Agriculture and Fisheries
Railways
Manufacturing, Coal and Services

GDP data

1997

1998

1999

1997

1998

1999

2.304
1.077
649
578
3.122
259
2.110
752
1.531
261
445
825
29.089
1.839
10.139
17.112
1.608
181
337
1.090
6.307
1.172
1.577
3.557
2.074
1.521
44
509
19.617
3.369
6.079
10.168

2.175
996
657
522
3.117
217
2.093
807
1.536
236
362
938
27.503
1.612
10.262
15.629
1.210
187
478
544
6.219
1.151
1.424
3.644
2.060
1.530
41
489
18.559
2.793
5.996
9.770

2.061 IRL

905
646
511
3.217 I
278
2.085
854
1.975 L
248
735
992
23.555 NL

1.598
9.520
12.436

1.096 P
165
515
416
5.734 S
1.367
1.349
3.017
1.848 UK
1.358
39
451
15.311 EU

3.102
6.065
6.144

722
93
142
488
16.580
1.752
5.169
9.659
162
35
77
49
2.935
1.531
772
632
2.054
318
21
1.716
1.739
321
905
512
8.291
1.758
2.867
3.665
98.133
15.488
31.333
51.313

1.133
92
137
904
13.700
1.706
5.035
6.959
245
30
163
52
3.054
864
1.599
592
1.331
305
20
1.006
1.899
344
996
559
8.121
1.265
2.755
4.101
91.863
13.328
32.018
46.517

1.339
354
131
854
10.537
1.675
4.962
3.900
246
29
177
40
3.489
1.121
1.764
604
1.219
287
96
836
1.739
363
818
559
6.294
1.123
2.361
2.810
79.660
13.972
31.263
34.424

A
B
DK
D
EL
E
FIN
F
IRL
I
L
NL
P
S
UK
EU

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

188.426
125.717
1.514.586
90.998
435.363

1.136.071
45.073
949.534
11.611
273.336
77.999

192.453
126.725
1.700.379
92.784
444.973

1.148.171
46.006
961.205
12.150
279.615
79.772

195.883
121.164
1.728.733
87.963
437.911

1.132.968
45.407
938.191
12.456
274.009
80.732

196.851
125.907
1.731.349
94.128
444.705

1.145.880
49.893
959.746
13.096
285.740
82.839

202.617
133.841
1.776.767
95.189
465.343

1.173.978
53.954
980.375
14.125
293.774
84.535

1.054.774
5.815.768

1.031.437
6.004.973

1.021.678
5.939.115

1.058.651
6.375.439

1.103.984
6.613.255

1995
177.523
208.403
143.129
1.843.146
99.337
471.469
99.078
1.217.693
59.519
1.017.939
14.141
315.784
89.082
199.773
1.155.568
6.990.420

1996
181.040
210.453
146.738
1.857.238
101.680
482.968
103.053
1.231.090
64.098
1.029.099
14.549
325.377
92.260
201.925
1.185.038
7.121.262

1997
183.183
217.870
151.336
1.883.194
105.249
501.967
109.539
1.254.607
70.979
1.047.752
15.606
337.875
95.693
205.933
1.226.739
7.383.993

1998
188.452
223.749
155.190
1.921.864
108.464
523.647
115.532
1.293.104
77.052
1.063.825
16.389
351.620
99.004
212.003
1.259.035
7.610.830

1999
192.378
229.432
157.790
1.951.751
112.108
544.715
120.177
1.330.890
84.627
1.078.948
17.618
365.215
101.879
220.023
1.286.225
7.817.449

___________________________________________________________________________

38

Graph 3

Source:

State aid data are taken from the DG Competition database on State aid
expenditure in the Member States.

Remarks:

All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.

Data:

See table graph 1

___________________________________________________________________________

Graph 4

Source:

State aid data are taken from the DG Competition database on State aid
expenditure in the Member States.

Remarks:

All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.

Data:

Horizontal objectives
Other specific sectors
Regional aid
Total less Agriculture,
Fisheries and Railways

1990
12.488
24.071
18.498

1991
11.773
21.449
16.978

1992
13.284
21.575
21.505

1993
11.132
23.707
26.807

1994
10.358
21.534
25.045

1995
11.016
19.078
23.753

1996
13.319
20.229
20.852

1997
12.161
18.527
20.625

1998
12.483
17.708
16.326

1999
12.675
10.484
11.265

55.057

50.200

56.364

61.646

56.937

53.847

54.399

51.313

46.517

34.424

___________________________________________________________________________

Graph 5

Source:

State aid data are taken from the DG Competition database on State aid
expenditure in the Member States.

Remarks:

All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.

Data:

Researchand Development
Environment and Energysaving
SME
Other Objectives
Employment and Training
Total

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2.889
768
3.070
5.358
403
12.488

3.187
1.019
3.239
3.887
441
11.773

3.636
1.345
3.471
4.232
599
13.284

3.248
1.038
3.112
3.152
582
11.132

3.496
1.184
3.057
1.830
791
10.358

3.672
1.343
3.312
1.080
1.609
11.016

4.152
1.222
3.718
899
3.329
13.319

4.068
1.226
3.495
744
2.629
12.161

3.750
1.363
3.111
1.156
3.102
12.483

3.897
1.418
2.926
983
3.452
12.675

___________________________________________________________________________

39

Methodology used for graphs 6 to 11:
The methodology used is the following: cases and decisions on all sectors have been
examined except for agriculture, fisheries and coal. All final decisions, defined in the
Procedural Council Regulation, 659/99 (0J 83/1 of 27.03.1999), were taken into account
except: ‘appropriate measures’, ‘referral to the Court of Justice or the Council’, ‘linguistic
revision’ and ‘corrigendum of a previous decision’. In order to soften peculiarities when
calculating percentages of small samples a three-year period was chosen for the Member
States.
Source: Reports on Competition policy 1997, 1998 and 1999.
Ratio of non-notified cases to notified cases:
Formula: (Non notified cases / all registered cases, except existing cases) * 100 = X%
Ratio of opening of formal investigation procedures to approval without opening of
formal investigation procedures:
Only final decisions that closed cases within the reported period were considered for the
investigation indicator. The registration of the case or the decision to open the procedure for a
registered case might have been taken prior to the indicated period.
For Luxembourg it has to be noted that the Commission only took three final decisions to
close a formal procedure.
Formula: (positive closing of procedure + negative closing of procedure + conditional closing
of procedure) /(closing of all procedures + approval without opening of procedure) * 100 =
X%
Final decisions to close the formal procedure after withdrawals by the Member State are not
taken into account for this indicator.
Ratio of negative decisions to positive decisions:
In the case of Luxembourg the Commission only took three final decisions on aid measures.

Formula: (negative closing of procedure) /(closing of all procedures + approval without
opening procedure) * 100 = X %
Final decisions to close the formal procedure after withdrawals by the Member State are not
taken into account for this indicator.

40

Source:

XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy 1997

Graph 6

XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998

XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999

Remarks:

Data:

1997
1998
1999

The 1999 data differ from the data published in the 1999 Competition
Report because 5 notified cases registered in 1999 have later been split
into 9 additional cases and 1 NN case registered in 1999 has later been
split resulting in 1 additional NN case.

Data on existing cases are only given for information and are not taken
into account for this graph.

N
(notified cases)
541
378
504

NN
(non notified cases)
152
107
106

E
(existing cases)
2
5
6

TOTAL

695
490
616

NN as %
of total
21,9
21,8
17,2

___________________________________________________________________________

Source:

XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy 1997

Graph 7

XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998

XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999

Remarks:

The breakdown by Member State has been taken from the Commission's
notifications register.

The 1999 data differ from the data published in the 1999 Competition
Report because 5 N cases registered in 1999 have later been split into 9
additional cases and 1 NN case registered in 1999 has later been split
resulting in 1 additional NN case.

Data on existing cases are only given for information and are not taken
into account for this graph.

41

Data:

N
(notified cases)

NN
(non notified cases)

E
(existing cases)

N N as %
of to tal

A U

B

D K

D

E L

E

FIN

F

IR L

I

L

N L

P

S

U K

E U

1997
1998
1999
A verage
1997
1998
1999
A verage
1997
1998
1999
A verage
1997
1998
1999
A verage
1997
1998
1999
A verage
1997
1998
1999
A verage
1997
1998
1999
A verage
1997
1998
1999
A verage
1997
1998
1999
A verage
1997
1998
1999
A verage
1997
1998
1999
A verage
1997
1998
1999
A verage
1997
1998
1999
A verage
1997
1998
1999
A verage
1997
1998
1999
A verage
1997
1998
1999
A verage

27
13
34
25
27
22
22
24
20
9
14
14
181
94
124
133
5
7
5
6
53
46
89
63
9
11
14
11
27
25
30
27
4
6
8
6
91
59
79
76
6
0
2
3
45
31
29
35
19
22
9
17
13
11
12
12
15
22
33
23
541
378
504
474

6
2
1
3
3
2
6
4
1
4
0
2
75
54
32
54
6
2
0
3
10
8
22
13
0
1
4
2
6
4
7
6
2
1
1
1
21
18
20
20
0
0
0
0
4
2
8
5
3
3
3
3
2
0
1
1
13
6
1
7
152
107
106
122

42

0
0
1
0
0
1
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
0
3
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
2
5
6
4

18,2
0,0
2,8
10,7
10,0
0,0
20,0
12,9
4,8
30,8
0,0
10,4
29,3
36,0
20,5
28,6
54,5
22,2
0,0
32,0
15,6
14,8
19,8
17,5
0,0
8,3
22,2
12,8
18,2
13,8
18,9
17,2
33,3
11,1
11,1
16,7
18,8
23,4
19,6
20,3
0,0
0,0
0,0
0,0
8,2
6,1
21,6
11,8
13,6
12,0
25,0
15,3
13,3
0,0
7,7
7,7
44,8
21,4
2,9
22,0
21,9
21,8
17,2
20,3

___________________________________________________________________________

Sources:

XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy 1997

Graph 8

XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998

XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999

Remarks:

Data:

1997
1998
1999

The following decision types, defined in the Procedural Regulation,
659/99 (0J 83/1 of 27.03.1999) have not been taken into account for this
table:
- Injunction decisions
- Decisions to open proceedings
- Decisions to close proceedings because of withdrawal
- Appropriate measures to modify existing aid measures
– Referral to the Court of Justice or Council.

Approval
without
objections
407
334
290

Closing of proceedings with a:

Positive
decision
19
17
30

Conditional
decision
6
8
3

Negative
decision
10
35
31

Total
number of
decisions
442
394
354

Closing decisions as
% of total

Negative decisions as
% of total

7,9
15,2
18,1

2,3
8,9
8,8

___________________________________________________________________________

Source:

Remarks:

Graph 9

XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy 1997
XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998
XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999
The breakdown by Member State has been taken from the Commission's
notifications register.

The following decision types, according to the Procedural Regulation
659/99 (0J 83/1 of 27.03.1999), have not been taken into account for this
table:
- Injunction decisions
- Decisions to open proceedings
- Decisions to close proceedings because of withdrawal- Appropriate
measures to modify existing aid measures
- Referral to the Court of Justice or Council

43

Data:

A U

B

D K

D

E L

E

F I N

F

I R L

I

L

N L

P

S

U K

E U

A p p r o v a l
w i t h o u t
o b j e c t i o n s

2 8

1 8

1 4

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

A v e r a g e

2 0 ,0

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

1 2

2 0

1 1

A v e r a g e

1 4 ,3

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

A v e r a g e

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

A v e r a g e

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

A v e r a g e

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

1 8

1 0

6

1 1 ,3

1 4 4

9 2

6 2

9 9 ,3

4

8

5

5 , 7

3 9

2 9

6 5

A v e r a g e

4 4 ,3

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

A v e r a g e

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

8

7

7

7 , 3

2 7

1 7

1 3

A v e r a g e

1 9 ,0

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

A v e r a g e

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

3

2

1 1

5 , 3

4 7

4 9

5 0

A v e r a g e

4 8 ,7

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

A v e r a g e

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

A v e r a g e

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

A v e r a g e

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

A v e r a g e

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

A v e r a g e

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

A v e r a g e

1

1

0

0 , 7

3 3

3 5

1 7

2 8 ,3

1 4

1 4

7

1 1 ,7

6

1 3

8

9 , 0

2 3

1 9

1 4

1 8 ,7

4 0 7

3 3 4

2 9 0

3 4 3 ,7

C lo s i n g o f p r o c e e d i n g s w it h a :

P o s i t i v e
d e c i s i o n

C o n d i t i o n a l
d e c i s i o n

N e g a t iv e
d e c i s io n

C l o s i n g
d e c is i o n s
a s %
o f t o t a l

N e g a t i v e
d e c i s i o n s
a s %
o f t o t a l

0

0

0

0 ,0

0

0

1

0 ,3

0

0

0

0 ,0

5

8

1 3

8 ,7

1

1

1

1 ,0

4

1

2

2 ,3

0

0

1

0 ,3

2

2

2

2 ,0

0

0

1

0 ,3

5

2

7

4 ,7

0

0

0

0 ,0

1

1

1

1 ,0

1

1

0

0 ,7

0

1

0

0 ,3

0

0

1

0 ,3

1 9

1 7

3 0

2 2 ,0

0

1

0

0 ,3

0

0

0

0 ,0

0

0

0

0 ,0

2

1

1

1 ,3

0

0

0

0 ,0

0

0

0

0 ,0

0

0

0

0 ,0

2

2

0

1 ,3

0

0

0

0 ,0

2

4

1

2 ,3

0

0

0

0 ,0

0

0

1

0 ,3

0

0

0

0 ,0

0

0

0

0 ,0

0

0

0

0 ,0

6

8

3

5 ,7

1

3

0

1 ,3

0

1

0

0 ,3

1

0

0

0 ,3

4

1 5

1 4

1 1 , 0

0

1

2

1 ,0

1

5

3

3 ,0

0

0

0

0 ,0

1

2

3

2 ,0

0

1

0

0 ,3

2

5

8

5 ,0

0

1

0

0 ,3

0

1

0

0 ,3

0

0

0

0 ,0

0

0

0

0 ,0

0

0

1

0 ,3

1 0

3 5

3 1

2 5 , 3

3 , 4

1 8 ,2

0 , 0

7 , 7

0 , 0

4 , 8

8 , 3

4 , 4

5 , 3

0 , 0

0 , 0

2 , 9

7 , 1

2 0 ,7

3 1 ,1

1 7 ,5

2 0 ,0

2 0 ,0

3 7 ,5

2 6 ,1

1 1 ,4

1 7 ,1

7 , 1

1 0 ,7

0 , 0

0 , 0

1 2 ,5

4 , 3

1 5 ,6

2 6 ,1

2 7 ,8

2 1 ,9

0 , 0

3 3 ,3

8 , 3

1 1 ,1

1 6 ,1

1 8 ,3

2 4 ,2

1 9 ,8

0 , 0

5 0 ,0

0 , 0

3 3 ,3

2 , 9

5 , 4

1 0 ,5

5 , 6

6 , 7

6 , 7

0 , 0

5 , 4

0 , 0

7 , 1

0 , 0

3 , 6

0 , 0

0 , 0

1 2 ,5

3 , 4

7 , 9

1 5 ,2

1 8 ,1

1 3 ,4

3 ,4

1 3 ,6

0 ,0

6 ,2

0 ,0

4 ,8

0 ,0

2 ,2

5 ,3

0 ,0

0 ,0

2 ,9

2 ,6

1 2 ,9

1 5 ,6

9 ,1

0 ,0

1 0 ,0

2 5 ,0

1 3 ,0

2 ,3

1 4 ,3

4 ,3

6 ,0

0 ,0

0 ,0

0 ,0

0 ,0

3 ,1

8 ,7

1 6 ,7

8 ,2

0 ,0

3 3 ,3

0 ,0

5 ,6

3 ,6

8 ,3

1 2 ,1

8 ,2

0 ,0

5 0 ,0

0 ,0

3 3 ,3

0 ,0

2 ,7

0 ,0

1 ,1

0 ,0

0 ,0

0 ,0

0 ,0

0 ,0

0 ,0

0 ,0

0 ,0

0 ,0

0 ,0

6 ,3

1 ,7

2 ,3

8 ,9

8 ,8

6 ,4

___________________________________________________________________________

44

Source:

Remarks:

Graph 10

XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy 1997
XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998
XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999

The following decision types, according to the Procedural Regulation,
have not been taken into account for this table:
- Injunction decisions- Decisions to open proceedings
- Decisions to close proceedings because of withdrawal
- Appropriate measures to modify existing aid measures
- Referral to the Court of Justice or Council

Data:

See data graph 8

___________________________________________________________________________

Source:

XXVIIth Report on Competition Policy 1997

Graph 11

XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy 1998

XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999

Remarks:

The breakdown by Member State has been taken from the Commission's
notifications register.

The following decision types, according to the Procedural Regulation,
have not been taken into account for this table:
- Injunction decisions
- Decisions to open proceedings
- Decisions to close proceedings because of withdrawal
- Appropriate measures to modify existing aid measures
- Referral to the Court of Justice or Council

Data:

See data graph 9

___________________________________________________________________________

Source:

Data:

Manufacturing
and services
Transport
Total

Table 1

DG Competition and DG Transport and Energy

1990
5

1991
4

1992
5

1993
3

1994
1

1995
6

1996
13

1997
10

1998
26

1999
24

0
5

0
4

0
5

1
4

1
2

2
8

1
14

2
12

1
27

0
24

___________________________________________________________________________

45

Table 2

DG Competition and DG Transport and Energy

Source:

Data:

In process of
execution

31

Forming part of
bankruptcy
procedures
11

Currently object
of National court
procedures
5

Currently object
of European court
procedures
20

Total number
pending

67

___________________________________________________________________________

46

Source:

Remarks:

Data:

Graph 12

DG Competition database on State aid expenditure in the Member States.

All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.

1997

1998

1999

1997

1998

1999

R&D
Environmental protection
SME
Energy saving

Total of the above

Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways
R&D
Environmental protection
SME
Energy saving

Total of the above

A

B

Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways
R&D
Environmental protection
SME
Energy saving

DK

Total of the above

Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways
R&D
Environmental protection
SME
Energy saving

Total of the above

Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways
R&D
Environmental protection
SME
Energy saving

Total of the above

Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways
R&D
Environmental protection
SME
Energy saving

D

EL

E

Total of the above

Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways
R&D
Environmental protection
SME
Energy saving

FIN

Total of the above

Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways
R&D
Environmental protection
SME
Energy saving

F

Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and railways

Total of the above

177
50
88
4
318
578
129
2
110
1
240
752
163
223
24
138
549
825
1.206
129
1.415
153
2.902
17.112
0
0
0
0
0
1.090
234
15
244
23
516
3.557
152
5
77
10
243
509
1.251
31
297
21
1.600
10.168

155
55
62
1
274
522
99
10
127
1
236
807
166
259
7
140
571
938
1.260
142
1.328
152
2.881

146
55
53
2
255
511
148
5
213
0
366
854
157
248
8
162
575
994
1.239
114
1.061
148
2.563
15.629 12.436
0
2
17
0
19
416
219
19
220
27
485
3.017
166
7
59
57
288
451
1.159
30
270
48
1.507
6.144

0
0
23
0
24
544
200
15
257
25
498
3.644
157
5
72
54
288
489
1.145
30
238
21
1.435
9.770

IRL

I

L

NL

P

S

UK

EU

14
0
5
3
21
488
340
11
820
45
1.216
9.659
3
2
8
0
13
49
141
80
21
187
430
632
13
0
10
11
33
1.716
88
30
44
26
188
512
158
1
333
24
516
3.665
4.067
580
3.495
646
8.788
51.313

10
0
3
2
16
904
186
21
599
15
822
6.959
4
2
11
0
17
52
152
93
20
155
420
592
12
0
26
8
46
1.006
98
101
41
23
263
559
105
10
296
22
434
4.101
3.750
744
3.111
619
8.225
46.517

13
0
4
5
22
854
306
15
647
21
988
3.900
6
2
11
0
19
40
149
74
24
151
398
604
12
0
32
8
52
836
81
148
27
39
295
559
97
9
280
22
408
2.810
3.897
729
2.925
689
8.240
34.427

___________________________________________________________________________

47

Graph 13

Source:

State aid data have been taken from the DG Competition database on
State aid expenditure in the Member States.

Regional GDP data have been taken from the Eurostat database
Newcronos.

Remarks:

Aid data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.

Regional GDP data have been selected at NUTS 3 level. GDP data for
Italy are only available at NUTS 2 level.

Data:
Regional state aid

1996

1997

1998

A

B
DK

D

EL

E

FIN

F

IRL

I

L
NL
P
S

UK

EU

Aid under 87(3)a
Aid under 87(3)c
Total regional aid
Aid under 87(3)c
Aid under 87(3)c
Aid under 87(3)a
Aid under 87(3)c
Total regional aid
Aid under 87(3)a
Aid under 87(3)a
Aid under 87(3)c
Total regional aid
Aid under 87(3)c
Aid under 87(3)a
Aid under 87(3)c
Total regional aid
Aid under 87(3)a
Aid under 87(3)a
Aid under 87(3)c
Total regional aid
Aid under 87(3)c
Aid under 87(3)c
Aid under 87(3)a
Aid under 87(3)c
Aid under 87(3)a
Aid under 87(3)c
Total regional aid
Aid under 87(3)a
Aid under 87(3)c
Total regional aid

31
93
124
258
13
8.868
742
9.609
601
90
197
287
67
506
766
1.272
206
6.398
127
6.524
31
82
633
208
210
725
935
17.543
3.309
20.851

31
141
172
214
15
6.339
768
7.107
447
88
239
327
68
847
1.341
2.188
175
3.593
184
3.778
32
71
706
177
253
595
849
12.480
3.845
16.325

30
134
163
229
15
7.165
727
7.891
677
85
219
303
63
650
1.300
1.950
197
6.548
128
6.676
35
77
1.187
185
256
719
976
16.794
3.832
20.625

48

GDP data

total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Non assisted regions

total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Non assisted regions

total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Non assisted regions

total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Non assisted regions

total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Non assisted regions

1996

A
182363

181819

50755

50832

3907

3879

13994

14113

32855
131608
B
211910

32840
130987

215305

137087

138923

0

0

1283

1301

135804
74823

DK
144155

137622
76382

148586

57681

59352

0

0

11986

12214

45695
86474
D

47138
89234

1878200

1866496

512915

505883

214792

211985

298123

293898

0
1365289
EL

97972

0
1360615

107009

97973

107010

97973

107010

0

0
0

0

0
0

1997

1998

1996

1997

1998

IRL

57514

70581

77052

57514

70581

77052

11516

13680

14934

45998

56901

62118

0
0

I
971065

0
0

0
0

1028273

1063828

950092

1006357

1040762

209537

223789

231255

0

0

0

740555
20973

L

782569
21916

809508
23065

14339

15409

16389

14339

15409

16389

0

0

0

0

0

0

14339
0

NL
324479

15409
0

16389
0

332654

351621

69381

70610

73148

0

0

0

11029

11180

11740

58352
255095
P

88828

59430
262046

61408
278469

93568

99124

88828

93568

99125

51557

54252

57473

37271

39317

41651

0
0

0
0

0
0

53119

188723 total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c

14878

34247

3995

135604 Non assisted regions

144255

223569 total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c

142904

1351

0

79314 Non assisted regions

61801

155191 total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c

49069
93390 Non assisted regions

12732

0

515934

1921866 total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c

301108

214826

0

1405935 Non assisted regions

108465

108465

108464 total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
0
0 Non assisted regions

0

49

total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Non assisted regions

total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Non assisted regions

total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Non assisted regions

E

480535,6

494672,1

480536

494672

232492

237943

40382

41691

207662
0

FIN
100523

215038
0

108072

100523

108072

10294

10946

6946

7436

83284
0

F
1224606,3

89690
0

1241129,2

737398

749570

18120

18306

75457

76892

643820
487208

654372
491560

523647

523646,3 total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
0 Non assisted regions

227977

250908

44761

115256

115257 total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
0 Non assisted regions

96005

11485

7766

783455

1293104 total GDP
of which
total GDP of
assisted regions
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.a
Totally assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c
Partially assisted regions
under Art. 87.3.c

683814
509649 Non assisted regions

80505

19137

S
206273

210815

213702

90578

89775

90042

0

0

0

20490

20977

21029

70088
115695
UK
929049

68799
121040

69013
123660

1163365

1259035

447544

554555

595596

57735

71435

76434

21164

26639

28223

368645
481506
EU
6911813

456482
608810

490939
663440

7277758

7610570

3893143

4115169

4298046

907922

953224

988912

584122

602558

627862

2401099
3018670

2559387
3162590

2681273
3312524

___________________________________________________________________________

Graph 14

Source:

DG Competition database on State aid expenditure in the Member States.

Remarks:

All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.

Data:

Manufacturing
Services
Coal mining
Total sectorial aid
Total aid less agriculture,
fisheries and railways

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

5.423
1.379
17.065
23.867

1.800
3.639
14.925
20.364

1.875
1.596
16.620
20.090

4.051
2.109
15.116
21.275

4.618
3.974
11.190
19.783

4.529
4.553
8.772
17.854

3.002
7.650
7.777
18.430

2.231
6.066
7.924
16.221

2.195
6.921
8.262
17.378

1.478
2.355
6.546
10.378

55.057

50.200

56.364

61.646

56.937

53.847

54.399

51.313

46.517

34.424

___________________________________________________________________________

50

Graph 15

Source:

DG Competition database on State aid expenditure in the Member States.

Remarks:

All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.

Data:

Manufacturing
Steel
Shipbuilding
Airline services
Financial services
Total Rescue and Restructuring aid
Total aid less agriculture, fisheries and
railways

1990

250
2.573
0
0
0
2.823

1991
1.348
13
47
1.991
0
3.400

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1.902
555
252
0
0
2.709

2.620
1.060
674
113
806
5.273

1.843
1.722
1.302
2.447
514
7.828

1.224
94
360
2.390
1.002
5.070

1.799
338
1.192
1.404
4.879
9.613

1997
2.301
208
635
1.238
3.246
7.628

1998

1999

330
3
1.078
42
5.150
6.604

107
0
303
0
939
1.349

55.057

50.200

56.364

61.646

56.937

53.847

54.399

51.313 46.517 34.424

___________________________________________________________________________

Graph 16

Source:

State aid data, excluding aid to agriculture, fisheries and railway transport,
taken from DG Competition database on State aid expenditure in the
Member States.

Gross Domestic Product at market price taken from the Eurostat database
Newcronos.

Remarks:

All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.

1995

Data:
Total state aid less agriculture, fisheries and railway transport.
1992
-
1.508
441
25.730
1.279
2.388
-
9.538
277
11.674
78
668
585

1993
-
1.602
691
30.835
789
2.577
-
9.391
421
12.946
48
507
680

1991
-
3.936
409
19.391
1.203
1.924
-
7.813
263
11.281
76
687
466

1994
-
1.071
770
28.838
907
2.343
-
7.563
349
10.765
47
549
1.182
-
2.553
56.937

510
1.009
734
20.666
1.173
4.201
480
5.945
387
12.659
48
588
872
698
3.877
53.847

1996

1997

1998

1999

515
1.079
846
19.031
1.021
3.544
398
9.075
447
11.657
47
678
1.258
693
4.111
54.399

578
752
825
17.112
1.090
3.557
509
10.168
488
9.659
49
632
1.716
512
3.665
51.313

522
807
938
15.629
544
3.644
489
9.770
904
6.959
52
592
1.006
559
4.101
46.517

511
854
992
12.436
416
3.017
451
6.144
854
3.900
40
604
836
559
2.810
34.424

1990
-
2.601
432
17.460
1.520
2.208
-
9.342
397
16.115
62
681
1.094
-
3.145
55.057

-
2.751
50.200

-
2.198
56.364

-
1.160
61.646

A
B
DK
D
EL
E
FIN
F
IRL
I
L
NL
P
S
UK
EU

GDP data: See table graph 2.

___________________________________________________________________________

51

Source:

State aid data are taken from the DG Competition database on state aid
expenditure in the Member States.

Graph 17

General Government Expenditure, according to Commission Regulation
(EC) No 1500/2000 with respect to general government expenditure and
revenue (OJ L 172 of 10 July 2000), data are taken from the AMECO
database of DG Economic and Financial Affairs.

Remarks:

All data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.

Data:

Total state aid less aid to agriculture, fisheries and railway transport, see
data graph 16.

General government expenditure

1997

1998

1999

A
B
DK
D
EL
E
FIN
F
IRL
I
L
NL
P
S
UK
EU

98.300
112.680
87.985
927.396
47.041
212.040
62.266
689.612
26.829
536.104
6.760
162.958
42.613
131.457
515.704
3.665.214

102.311
113.801
88.684
934.240
48.327
218.655
61.522
698.613
27.432
528.576
7.070
165.692
43.768
130.762
512.962
3.691.825

104.105
115.741
88.305
948.899
50.647
221.588
62.401
717.175
30.284
530.776
7.529
169.871
46.363
135.890
513.473
3.741.739

___________________________________________________________________________

Graph 18

Source:

Overall total and total manufacturing state aid data have been taken from
the DG Competition database on state aid expenditure. For Austria,
Finland and Sweden Graph 19 only compares the period 1995 - 1999 data.

The gross value added at basic prices - total industry (excluding
construction) - as percentage of GDP has been taken from the Eurostat
database Newcronos. Missing Newcronos data have been completed with
indicators used in the DG Competition database on state aid expenditure.
For Austria, Finland and Sweden Graph 20 only compares the period
1995 - 1999 data.

Remarks:

Aid data are expressed in million Euro at constant 1998 values.

52

Data:

1990

1995

1999

1990

1995

1999

AU

B

DK

D

EL

E

FIN

F

Total aid
Manufacturing aid
Total aid
Manufacturing aid
Total aid
Manufacturing aid
Total aid
Manufacturing aid
Total aid
Manufacturing aid
Total aid
Manufacturing aid
Total aid
Manufacturing aid
Total aid
Manufacturing aid

2.601
1.243
432
358
17.460
6.089
1.520
1.518
2.208
1.279

9.342
5.415

510
441

480
402

511
446
854
705
992
634
12.436
7.537
416
409
3.017
1.120
451
402
6.144
4.109

IRL

I

L

NL

P

S

UK

EU

Total aid
Manufacturing aid
Total aid
Manufacturing aid
Total aid
Manufacturing aid
Total aid
Manufacturing aid
Total aid
Manufacturing aid
Total aid
Manufacturing aid
Total aid
Manufacturing aid
Total aid
Manufacturing aid

397
334
16.115
15.665
62
62
681
681
1.094
853

3.145
2.687
55.057
36.184

854
526
3.900
3.252
40
36
604
555
836
180
559
442
2.810
1.239
34.424
21.592

698
360

Value added Industry as % of GDP

1990

1995
21,8

24,4
18,3
29,9
22,4
24,1

21,2
27,0
25,0
19,9
23,8
22,0

25,1

23,6

25,2

23,4

1999
21,4
20,1
17,7
23,0
11,0
20,0
23,6
18,9
26,7
21,6
12,9
18,6
19,6
21,8
20,6

21,0

A
B
DK
D
EL
E
FIN
F
IRL
I
L
NL
P
S
UK

EU

___________________________________________________________________________

Table 3

Source:

DG Competition database on State aid expenditure in the Member States.
Data on Inward FDI and Trade openness from DG MARKT.

Gross Domestic Product at market price taken from the Eurostat database
Newcronos.

Remarks:

GDP data see table graph 2. State aid data see table graph 16.

___________________________________________________________________________

53