WRITTEN QUESTION E-2103/01 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council. Democratic control over European trade policy.
Date: 2001-07-13
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Council of the European Union, European Parliament, common commercial policy, interinstitutional relations (EU), parliamentary scrutiny, transparency in decision-making

C 81 E/108

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

4.4.2002

Answer given by Mrs Wallstr(cid:246)m on behalf of the Commission

(6 September 2001)

The Commission took notice of the article edited by the (cid:145)New Scientist(cid:146) of 9 June 2001 and reacted on
12 June by sending a letter to the editor reading as follows:

Your readers may be forgiven to gaining the impression from the article (cid:145)Sick as a parrot(cid:146) [http://
www.newscientist.com/dailynews/news.jsp?id=ns9999836] that the European Union (EU) does not
implement international agreements designed to regulate trade in parrots.

In fact the European Union legislation which implements the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is amongst the most comprehensive of its kind in
the world. This is despite the fact that the EU has been unable to become a Party to CITES because an
insufficient number of existing CITES Parties have ratified an amendment to the treaty which would
allow this to happen.

The vast majority of trade in parrots between Latin America and the EU is undertaken under quotas
established by the countries of export themselves. EU Member States help to ensure that these quotas
are respected by checking that each consignment is a proper part of the quota before the shipment is
made. If we are not satisfied that the trade is at sustainable levels we can temporarily suspend import
of certain species from certain countries. We have not hesitated to do this where necessary and then
have worked with the exporting countries to help put things right.

We are always seeking to improve our controls and welcome suggestions from all quarters at any
time. Regrettably the authors of the study quoted chose not to consult us before drawing their
conclusions.

With regard to the question of an import ban for all species listed under CITES, the Commission would
refer the Honourable Member to its answers to his Written Questions E-238/01, E-239/01, E-240/01 (1)
and E-1786/01 (2) explaining the various aspects of the effectiveness of the Community legislation on trade
in wildlife and its compliance with the principle of sustainable use of wildlife, the latter principle being
considered a better solution for conservation of wildlife by many authorities worldwide.

(1) OJ C 261 E, 18.9.2001, p. 71.
(2) OJ C 40 E, 14.2.2002, p. 106.

(2002/C 81 E/129)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2103/01

by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council

(13 July 2001)

Subject: Democratic control over European trade policy

The fifteen Member States oppose any role for the European Parliament
in the European Union(cid:146)s
commercial and industrial policy. This is apparent from the joint answer to questions E-0619/01 (1),
E-4034/00, E-4036/00 and E-4037/00 (2). According to the ministers, the relevant committee(cid:146)s proposals
and working documents are confidential and are subject to the decisions on public access to Council
documents.

However, the Council has not adopted an unambiguous position regarding the Commission(cid:146)s proposal (cid:145)to
enhance the role of the European Parliament substantially in all aspects of trade policy(cid:146) (3) (P-3674/00). Yet
Lamy says that (cid:145)this would not only increase the accountability of trade policy but also its efficiency
because our trading partners would know that the Commission negotiates with the full backing of the
democratically elected representatives of European citizens(cid:146).

4.4.2002

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 81 E/109

This gives rise to the following questions:

(cid:129) does the Council endorse the Commission(cid:146)s view that parliamentary control at European level would
(cid:145)not only increase the accountability of trade policy but also its efficiency because our trading partners
would know that the Commission negotiates with the full backing of the democratically elected
representatives of European citizens(cid:146)?

(cid:129) If so, what will the Council do to develop full parliamentary control over European trade policy?

(cid:129) If not, on what grounds does the Council not intend to develop full parliamentary control over

European trade policy, despite the Commission(cid:146)s arguments?

(1) OJ C 261 E, 18.9.2001, p. 160.
(2) OJ C 261 E, 18.9.2001, p. 21.
(3) OJ C 163 E, 6.6.2001, p. 190.

Reply

(29 November 2001)

The Council attaches great importance to its regular contacts with the European Parliament in the area of
commercial policy, in particular through the appearances of the Council Presidency before the Commission
on Industry, External Trade, Research and Energy. These contacts enable the Council to maintain dialogue
with the Parliament and to keep abreast of
the Parliament(cid:146)s concerns regarding the Community
commercial policy.

Moreover, the Council regularly briefs the European Parliament on the salient aspects of Community
commercial policy and, under the 1973 (cid:145)Westerterp procedure(cid:146), keeps the European Parliament informed
of trade agreement negotiations with third countries before the negotiations begin, as they progress and
when they are concluded.

However,
the decision-making procedures relating to Community commercial policy are defined in
Article 133 of the Treaty establishing the European Community; the Council is bound to comply with
those provisions, which were examined by the Intergovernmental Conference concluded at the Nice
European Council. The amendments made to the wording of this Article did not cover the issues raised by
the Honourable Member.

(2002/C 81 E/130)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-2110/01

by Olivier Dupuis (TDI) to the Council

(12 July 2001)

Subject: Georgia/Chechnya: Russo and Robrillard affairs

On 16 October 2000, Antonio Russo, a correspondent of Radio Radicale (Italy) who was covering the war
in Chechnya from Tbilisi, was found murdered a few kilometres from the Georgian capital. Since then,
despite repeated requests, no data have emerged to shed light on the circumstances of his death or make it
possible to track down his murderers. Recently it was learned that on 28 November 2000, a few weeks
after the murder of Antonio Russo, Jan Robrillard, a French national and legal adviser in the human rights
field for the OSCE mission in Tbilisi, had been found dead in his apartment. It emerged from the inquest
that he died of suffocation following a gas leak. Well-informed sources state that Antonio Russo and Jan
Robrillard knew each other and met regularly.

On the basis of these conclusions (cid:129) which are, at the least, disturbing (cid:129) it may reasonably be supposed
that Jan Robrillard may have been the person to whom Antonio Russo had entrusted the video cassettes
and documents in his possession, asking him to keep charge of them and translate and duplicate them (cid:133)