WRITTEN QUESTION E-1811/01 by Luis Berenguer Fuster (PSE) to the Commission. The internal electricity market and competition.
Date: 2001-06-19
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Spain, State aid, application of EU law, competition law, domestic market, electrical energy, liberalisation of the market, public sector

16.5.2002

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 115 E/13

To date Council Regulation (EC) No 856/1999 of 22 April 1999 establishing a special framework of
assistance for traditional ACP suppliers of bananas (2) and Commission Regulation (EC) No 1609/1999 of
22 July 1999 (3) laying down the detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 856/1999
have been implemented as follows:

+ In its 1999 budget, on budget line B7-8710, Assistance to ACP banana producers, the Commission
reserved 45 million euros for financing projects relating to the special framework of assistance for
traditional ACP suppliers of bananas established by the Regulations cited above. The amounts
allocated in the 2000 and 2001 budgets were € 44 475 million and € 44 million respectively. In the
preliminary draft budget for 2002 the provisional allocation is € 45 million.

+ Under the 1999 budget, project financing agreements were signed for a total of € 44,5 million with
nine of the 12 countries listed in the Regulations as traditional ACP suppliers of bananas. Two of the
others (Madagascar and Somalia) submitted neither projects nor long-term strategies and so under the
rules did not qualify to benefit from the system. Their allocations were shared out among the others.
No agreement could be signed with the twelfth, Cape Verde, because of administrative delays. Its
individual allocation of € 0,5 million was therefore lost. Overall, the nine countries that signed
financing agreements used 77 % of the funds to make their bananas more competitive and 23 % to
diversify.

+ Under the 2000 budget there were 10 agreements for a total of € 44 075 million. Madagascar and
Somalia were again excluded for the same reasons and their appropriations were re-distributed among
the others, apart from € 400 000 which was used to finance a project-monitoring contract. Cape
Verde was included this time and was even partially compensated for the loss of its 1999 funding.
Overall, 73 % of
the 10 agreements was used to increase the
the funding allocated under
competitiveness of bananas and 27 % to diversify.

+ The new projects for 2001 are still at being appraised.

A total of € 3 345 000 has been disbursed so far. This figure should be considered in the light of the fact
that the first agreements were not signed by the Commission until August 2000 and were signed by the
beneficiaries between September and February 2000. Conclusion of these agreements was held up by a
large number of legal problems. Since a new 10-year programme was involved, with 12 beneficiaries and
so, potentially, 120 agreements, the Commission had to develop a system that was as simple and
harmonised as current legislation permitted. From the point of view of the signatory countries, the status
of the end beneficiaries varied widely from one country to another, from a single state-owned enterprise in
Surinam to thousands of small family farms in the Windward Islands

(1) COM(2000) 477 final.
(2) OJ L 108, 27.4.1999.
(3) OJ L 190, 23.7.1999.

(2002/C 115 E/012)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1811/01

by Luis Berenguer Fuster (PSE) to the Commission

(19 June 2001)

Subject: The internal electricity market and competition

The Spanish Government repeatedly maintains that it has liberalised the electricity sector (and that it did so
even before it was required to by law), although such a claim does not correspond to reality. The
generating companies are still the same ones as were in operation in the days of the oligopoly and there is
no evidence of competition on the distribution side either, since there has been only a 1,5 % shift in the
market. If that were not enough the Spanish electricity companies’ costs of transition to competition (CTC),
which were calculated on the basis of asset evaluations which the market has subsequently trimmed quite

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16.5.2002

significantly, are being generously subsidised by users when they pay their monthly bills. In a recent
appearance before the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, Mr Monti, Commissioner, reversed
his initial opposition to the Spanish Government’s ban on the entry of foreign companies armed with
public capital and demonstrated an indulgent attitude towards such a measure.

How does such a decision affect the competitiveness, on the market in public companies, of the actions of
those wishing to acquire another company?

If the reason for refusing to allow French, German or Portuguese public companies to buy shares in
companies from other European countries is the fact that they have received public aid, does the same
apply in the case of the CTC received by Spanish electricity companies?

For the purpose of speeding up the liberalisation of the electricity sector, would courses of action other
than the ones taken by the Spanish Government (which prevent the internal market from being achieved)
not be more effective?

Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission

(11 October 2001)

The Commission is neutral as regards the public or private character of companies, in accordance with
Article 295 of the EC Treaty (former Article 222). Consequently, the public character of a company is not
deemed relevant under the competition rules when it decides to acquire another company.

The EC Treaty and Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules
for the application of Article 88 (former Article 93) of the EC Treaty (1) spell out the Member States’
obligations and the Commission’s powers in the state aid field. These rules do not provide for a Member
State to prevent public companies from another Member State from acquiring shareholdings in companies
located in the first Member State on the pretext that the companies in question had received state aid
within the meaning of Article 87(1) (former Article 92(1)) of the EC Treaty. Therefore no legal problems
arise in connection with the question raised by the Honourable Member.

In answering the Honourable Member’s third question, the Commission refers to its Press Release of
20 June 2001 (2) which indicates that, in the meeting held on that date, the Commission reiterated the
need for the Council of Ministers and Parliament to adopt without delay the March 2001 proposals for the
full liberalisation of Community energy markets. It also stated that it was determined to ensure that the
Treaty’s competition rules were applied in full in the energy sector.

(1) OJ L 83, 27.3.1999.
(2)

IP/01/872.

(2002/C 115 E/013)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1820/01

by Cristiana Muscardini (UEN) to the Commission

(21 June 2001)

Subject: New Temelin nuclear power-station

The Commission is surely aware that since October 2000, according to press reports, as many as 18 faults
have occurred at the new Czech Temelin nuclear power-station, which has entered the technical trial stage.

Does the Commission know the nature of these faults?

Can it say that safety standards at the power-station are as high as those accepted in the Union?

If not, what steps will it take to protect Union citizens from the risks posed by inadequate safety standards?