WRITTEN QUESTION E-1642/01 by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission. Price rises and pressure to reduce taxes as a consequence of increasing exports of petroleum products to America.
Date: 2001-06-12
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: United States, common commercial policy, economic analysis, export (EU), export restriction, fuel tax, petroleum product, price increase

14.2.2002

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 40 E/67

(2002/C 40 E/065)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1642/01

by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(12 June 2001)

Subject: Price rises and pressure to reduce taxes as a consequence of increasing exports of petroleum

products to America

1.
Can the Commission confirm that recent rises in petroleum-product prices have in part been caused
by under-capacity in United States refineries, in particular those capable of refinery techniques that comply
with modern environmental requirements, and that the output of European refineries consequently is
being bought up by purchasers in the United States?

2.
Is the Commission also aware that the extent to which American purchases cause shortages of
petroleum products varies widely between Member States, with the result that consumer prices for motor-
vehicle fuel also vary more widely, and are being forced strongly higher in the Netherlands in particular?

3.
How does the Commission assess the fact that, as a consequence of the developments referred to in
paragraphs (1) and (2) above, pressure is again being exerted on governments of particular Member States
to align fuel prices with those in neighbouring Member States by reducing taxes on them, so that the cash
that has hitherto been collected in taxes goes instead to benefit the petroleum companies, with the result
that exports are being indirectly subsidised?

4. What options are open to Member States to protect their home markets against prices being driven
up as a consequence of unanticipated exports? Can they prevent petroleum products from being exported,
and if so how?

5.

Is the Commission considering a freeze on petroleum-product exports?

6.
How, other than with a freeze on petroleum-product exports, does the Commission think it can help
to counteract falling tax revenues in Member States, price rises in response to exports, and widening price
disparities between Member States?

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(3 September 2001)

1.
The price volatility on the petroleum markets since winter 1999-2000 is essentially due to the
historically low level of oil stocks (crude and refined products) since that time, this in turn being the result
of the restrictive production policy of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The level
of stocks we have had since winter 1999-2000 does not allow the market the fluidity it needs. The
limitations of US refining capacity are making matters worse.

The price rises of April-May 2001 were due in particular to the fraught situation on the petrol market in
the Atlantic basin, especially in the United States. This brought with it a considerable improvement in
refining margins in April-May, leading European refineries to increase their capacity utilisation. As the
Honourable Member points out, there was indeed a substantial increase in petrol exports from Europe to
the United States at that time. The situation has calmed down since: margins were back to normal in June
and accordingly European refineries reduced their capacity utilisation.

2.
It is true that the Dutch market was more sensitive than the other European markets to the recent
tension in the Atlantic basin. This is understandable when one considers the central part played by
Rotterdam in the operation of the refined products market. But such a purely ephemeral phenomenon
(it has more or less disappeared since) must not be allowed to hide the structural phenomenon of price
differentials which is unrelated to exports and was analysed in the Commission Communication on the
European Union(cid:146)s oil supply (1): the price of Eurosuper 95 petrol before tax and duties is higher in the
Netherlands than it is in France and Germany.

C 40 E/68

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

14.2.2002

3. With regard to taxation, the Commission considers, as it states in its Communication on the
European Union(cid:146)s oil supply, that the temptation to cushion oil price rises by reducing tax on petroleum
products is to be discouraged. Such an approach would be contrary to the Community(cid:146)s environmental
objectives, linked in particular to the Kyoto Protocol, and would amount to transferring tax revenue to the
producer countries.

4. and 5.
The problem of price volatility is not going to be solved by putting up trade barriers. Measures
to restrict or redirect trade in petroleum products are only conceivable in the framework of the 1974
Agreement on an International Energy Programme, which set up the International Energy Agency. These
procedures are applicable in conditions precisely (and quantitatively) defined by this Agreement,
corresponding to a real shortage situation which is clearly not one in which we find ourselves at the
moment.

Generally speaking, it ought to be clear that the only short-term way to put an end to price volatility
6.
is for OPEC to recognise that stocks have to be built up again and to adopt a production policy which
allows this. More specifically, as regards price disparities between Member States, given the Commission(cid:146)s
verdict that the only explanation for such disparities is oligopolistic behaviour and a lack of competition in
distribution, the solution must lie in a vigorous competition policy. The Commission(cid:146)s Communication on
oil supply gives a full and detailed overview of Commission policy with regard to the oil prices issue and
the Green Paper (cid:145)Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply(cid:146) (2) outlines a long-term
energy strategy.

(1) COM(2000) 631 final.
(2) COM(2000) 769 final.

(2002/C 40 E/066)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1643/01

by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(12 June 2001)

Subject: Abrupt imposition of implausibly explained charges by Netherlands KPN telephone company for

voice-mail reception

Is the Commission aware that in 1998 KPN, the biggest telephone company in the Netherlands,
1.
offered its subscribers a free voicemail connection, only to announce, at the beginning of May 2001, that it
would be imposing separate charges, as from 10 May, for listening to every incoming voicemail?

Does the Commission consider the short period of notice between announcing and imposing the
2.
increased charges as compatible with Article 17(5) of Telecommunications Directive 98/10/EC (1) of
26 February 1998, which lays down a substantial period of notice?

Does the Commission share the assumption that a better explanation for these charges can be found
3.
by looking at KPN(cid:146)s need to cover its high expenditure on the recent purchase of major interests in
Germany (E-Plus and UMTS frequencies, together costing € 17 billion), as opposed to the cost of providing
voicemail, not least because users very often ring back in response to receiving a voicemail message, with
the result that the telephone company(cid:146)s outgoings and income will tend to balance each other out?

Is the provider of telephone services under an obligation,

4.
in the event of any such increase in
charges, to take active steps (in particular by publishing information about procedures to be followed and
stating a deadline) to provide subscribers in good time with the opportunity to deactivate their voicemail
option so that they will not be forced to incur higher costs as a consequence of retaining their connection?

5.
Is the Commission also aware that the action described in question 1 is being justified by an appeal
to technical innovations which most subscribers will never use, viz. forwarding voice messages to e-mail
and fax?