Special Report No 3/2001 concerning the Commission's management of the international fisheries agreements, together with the Commission's replies
Date: 2001-06-07
Institutions: European Court of Auditors
Subjects: cost-effectiveness analysis, fishing agreement, international agreement

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I

(Information)

COURT OF AUDITORS

concerning the Commission’s management of the international fisheries agreements, together with
the Commission’s replies

SPECIAL REPORT No 3/2001

(pursuant to Article 248(4), second subparagraph, EC)

(2001/C 210/01)

CONTENTS

Paragraph

Page

SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

GENERAL CONTEXT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-12

The fisheries agreements: what is at stake? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Nature of the fisheries agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The main parties involved in the fisheries agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Objective and scope of the audit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Budgetary aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

THE COST-BENEFIT RATIO OF THE FISHERIES AGREEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

An instrument for monitoring the agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Underutilisation of the agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sharing out the financial burden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Indispensable information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

THE INTENDED PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Stability of fishing opportunities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Supply to the market and aid to employment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Restructuring strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Coordination of Community policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Management shortcomings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Control shortcomings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1-3

4-5

6

7-10

11-12

13-27

13-18

19-23

24-25

26-27

28-39

28-29

30-31

32-36

37-39

40-53

40-47

48-53

54-59

ANNEXES I to III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Commission’s replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

4

4

4

5

5

5

6

6

7

8

8

8

8

8

9

9

10

10

10

11

13

20

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SUMMARY

Aim of the audit

The Court examined the Commission’s management of the international fisheries agreements, particularly the
extent to which their objectives had been clearly defined and ultimately achieved. The Court’s audit focused
on the five most important agreements in terms of the cost borne by the Community budget (92 % in 1999).
The Court’s main observations are set out below.

Cost-benefit ratio

I. The Commission still needs to set up a system enabling an ongoing monitoring and a detailed cost-benefit
analysis to be made of the international fisheries agreements. These measures should enable it to evaluate the
extent to which the objectives of these agreements (market supply, fishing opportunities, restructuring, jobs)
have been achieved.

— It is up to the Commission to define criteria and performance indicators for these agreements in order to

measure their effectiveness.

II. The fishing opportunities available to Community fishermen in the waters of third countries under inter-
national agreements are not always used to the full. The Community has thus paid financial compensation for
fish which only existed on paper.

— The Commission is invited to ensure above all that actual use is made of the fishing opportunities offered

by these agreements.

Intended purposes

III. The Court has found a lack of consistency and poor coordination between these international agreements
and the structural aspect of the common fisheries policy.

— The Commission could in particular ensure that the restructuring objectives of these agreements are con-

sistent with those of the Structural Funds, for example, in the financing of new boats.

IV. Several of the fisheries agreements are intended both to play a commercial role and to assist in develop-
ment aims. This intertwining of different purposes means that it is difficult to evaluate the agreements and
makes it even harder to distinguish between the responsibilities that lie with the Community and those which
belong to the third countries.

— If the Commission were to give a clear-cut definition of the various objectives of the fisheries agreements, it

would be able to measure their benefits and costs and compare them on the same basis.

Management and control

V. Management of the fisheries agreements is undermined by the faulty or unsuitable application of certain
clauses and by the fact that they do not stipulate any compulsory exchange of information.

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— It would be expedient if the Commission were to make them more legally binding and to improve their monitor-
ing, for example, by inserting control clauses or by making payments dependent on progress; it should
review certain unwarranted practices of systematically unloading and reloading frozen fish.

VI. The Court’s audit identified shortcomings in the implementation and monitoring of the checks made by
the Commission and the Member States.

— The Commission should plan its control activities and ensure that previous findings are followed up more
closely. Together with the Member States, it should also lay down guidelines on the detailed arrangements
for their inspections.

GENERAL CONTEXT

The fisheries agreements: what is at stake?

economic zones of the third countries. They differ according to
the partner involved. A distinction is made between so-called
‘first-generation’ and ‘second-generation’ agreements.

1. Fishery products are an important food resource for the Mem-
ber States of the EU. Their fishing fleets have traditionally pro-
vided a significant economic resource and source of employment.
A common fisheries policy has been set up for conserving fish
stocks, managing and adapting the development of the Member
States’ industrial structures, ensuring the common organisation of
the market and concluding fisheries agreements with non-
Community countries.

2. The principle of free access to the high seas gradually disap-
peared from the mid-1970s onwards and in the wake of the third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. Around that
time, more and more third countries decided to extend their
exclusive economic zone from 12 to 200 nautical miles and thus
about 90 % of fish resources came under the control of coastal
countries. As a consequence, the fleets of the European Union
Member States, which had previously fished these waters, no
longer had access to them (representing 9 % (1) of Community
consumption).

3. As a result of this state of affairs, plus the need for sound
management of fish stocks in short supply, the Community nego-
tiated fisheries agreements with third countries, thus enabling the
Member States’ fleets to continue their previous activities. By
1 January 2001, the Commission had signed fisheries agreements
with 33 countries, 14 of which were still in force.

Nature of the fisheries agreements

4. These agreements define the level, the terms of allocation and
the use of the rights of access to fish resources in the exclusive

The first-generation agreements are chiefly :

(a) reciprocal agreements, involving an exchange of fishing possi-
bilities between the fleets of the Member States and those of
third countries; in general, the latter (for example Iceland,
Norway, the Faeroe Islands) fully exploit their resources. These
agreements do not require any financial contribution on the
part of the Community nor any fee (licence fee) to be paid by
the shipowners.

(b) agreements involving financial compensation, signed with third
countries which want to concede part of the use of their
resources, without any reciprocity of access rights, in return
for financial compensation borne by the Community budget
and (licence) fees paid by the shipowners holding these access
rights.

This financial compensation takes the form of contributions:

(i)

to the State budget of the third country;

(ii) to measures in support of development cooperation;

(iii) to the public services of the fisheries sector (training pro-
grammes for fishermen and inspectors, scientific research
programmes concerning fish stocks, administration, etc.).

The cost of some of the development measures provided for
in these agreements, such as the presence of observers on
board or the recruitment of local crews, is borne directly by
the shipowners. The agreements with the African and Indian
Ocean countries come under this category; or

(1) The Commission’s evaluation, carried out by Ifremer/CEP (Institut
français de recherche pour l’exploitation de la mer/Centre d’etudes de
projets), p. 63, September 1999.

(c) agreements involving financial compensation and access to the Com-
munity market of fishery products coming from third countries
(without any customs duties or quantitative restrictions),

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enabling the Community, in return, to exploit certain fishing
resources in the waters of those countries (for example Green-
land), without the shipowners having to pay any fee.

5. From the outset, the purpose of the fisheries agreements has
been to safeguard the continued activity of the Member States’
fishing fleets, in return for financial contributions or fishing
opportunities, thus confirming that these agreements are com-
mercial in nature.

The second-generation agreements aim at the setting-up by private
operators of joint ventures, which are responsible for the manage-
ment of European vessels and which are allocated fishing quotas
in the waters of third countries (the agreements may provide for
financial compensation for the fishing quotas). Furthermore, their
objective is for vessels making up the fleets of Member States to
be definitively or temporarily transferred to the fleets of third
countries (for example Argentina, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania).

The main parties involved in the fisheries agreements

6. The main responsibilities of the parties involved in the fisher-
ies agreements are as follows:

Main responsibilities

Council

Budgetary authority; gives the Commission a mandate to negotiate an agreement,
including the level of fishing opportunities; adopts the agreement by means of a regula-
tion and signs it

Parliament

Budgetary authority; consulted for an opinion

Commission: Brussels

Negotiates the agreements; takes care of the administrative, financial and technical man-
agement

Commission: Delegations

On a case-by-case basis, deconcentrated management by a fisheries unit in accordance
with the provisions of the agreement

Member States

Third countries

Shipowners

Responsible for applying the control measures and other provisions of the fisheries
agreements

Negotiate the agreements; control and supervision in their ports and exclusive economic
zones

For the ’agreements involving financial compensation’ mentioned in paragraph 4(b),
payment of licence fees to the third country in return for access rights; compliance with
any specific conditions (for example crews to consist of nationals of the third country)

Objective and scope of the audit

7. The objective of the audit was to examine whether the Com-
mission had clearly defined the objectives of the international
fisheries agreements and whether it had set up adequate perfor-
mance monitoring systems to measure their achievement.

8. The audit examined the management, during the period 1993
to 1999, of the agreements made with Morocco, Mauritania,
Greenland, Senegal and Argentina, which together accounted for
92 % of the payments charged to the financial year 1999. These
are agreements involving financing by the Community budget.
Taken as a whole, they are also the most important in terms of
fishing opportunities and in terms of first or second generation
agreements.

9. Through documentary analysis of the management systems,
the key activities were identified and then underwent audit tests.
Audit visits were conducted at the Commission, in the Member
States (Spain, France and Portugal) and in the Commission’s del-
egations in Morocco, Mauritania and Senegal. Audit evidence was
obtained by checks on documents and registers, the observation
of port activities, requests for and confirmation of information,

supplemented by interviews with representatives of third coun-
tries and selected organisations.

10.
In its Annual Report concerning financial year 1999, the
Court stated that, for budget headings relating to international
fisheries agreements, the Commission had entered into legal obli-
gations which exceeded available appropriations by 129 million
euro and that, as a consequence, the commitments for the finan-
cial year had been understated (1). This question has therefore not
been dealt with in this Report.

Budgetary aspects

11. Annex I shows the budgetary expenditure for the interna-
tional fisheries agreements for the period 1993 to 2000, and its
relationship with the total expenditure borne by the common
fisheries policy. Between 1993 and 1997 there was an upward
trend in the amounts paid to the partner countries in return for
fishing rights, but since 1998 the level of these amounts has sta-
bilised (see the Graph).

(1) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999 (OJ C 342,

1.12.2000, p. 189).

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International fisheries agreements — Commitments and payments (implementation), value of catches

Graph

Commitments
Payments
Value of catches

R
U
E
o
i
M

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

1993

1994

1995

1996
Year

1997

1998

1999

NB: Figures for catches not available at the Commission for 1998 and 1999.

12. This trend is mainly due to the impact of new or renegoti-
ated agreements. Other contributory factors are the new catego-
ries of fishing inserted into some of the agreements, as in the case
of Mauritania and Senegal, higher rates of financial compensation
and the increasing scarcity of fish stocks. The increase in com-
mitments and payments that occurred from 1995 to 1996 is due
in particular the
to the implementation of new agreements,
Morocco Agreement. See Annex II: Morocco, providing 74 % of
the catches under the ‘Southern’ Agreements (1) for the period
1993 to 1997, was the most important partner, whereas Spain,
with more than 87 % of the catches, was the prime beneficiary of
these agreements (2).

monitoring of these agreements by the Commission. These analy-
ses require the definition of criteria and indicators making it pos-
sible to evaluate the extent to which the agreements’ objectives
have been achieved. In the Fisheries Council’s conclusions of
30 October 1997, the Commission was requested to draw up
cost-benefit analyses for each agreement (or renegotiation of an
agreement) well before they were signed. The Commission’s
response to this request by the Council has been twofold: it has
arranged for an external evaluation to be made and it has drawn
up individual technical data sheets.

THE COST-BENEFIT RATIO OF THE FISHERIES AGREEMENTS

An instrument for monitoring the agreements

In its Annual Report for financial year 1992 (3), the Court
13.
stressed the importance of cost-benefit analyses, as part of the

14. The evaluation of the international fisheries agreements for
the period 1993 to 1997, for which the Commission used the ser-
vices of an external consultant (4), consists of an examination of
various aspects of the agreements, but does not constitute a full
cost-benefit analysis. This evaluation contains reservations con-
cerning the quality, completeness, relevance and reliability of the
information available. These reservations undermine the conclu-
sions of the evaluation and indicate that the Commission needs
to improve its collection of data from the Member States.

(1)

International Fisheries Agreements signed with certain countries situ-
ated to the south of the Strait of Gibraltar.

(2) Spain is also the second largest market in Europe in terms of both the

supply available and the per capita consumption.

(3) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1992, Chapter 5

(OJ C 309, 16.11.1993).

(4)

Ifremer/CEP.

 
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15. Although this evaluation pinpointed weaknesses and set out
useful conclusions and recommendations on the management
and monitoring of the agreements, the Commission is still study-
ing whether and how to implement these findings. However, this
evaluation, together with its recommendations, ought to be used
as a basis for developing an ongoing monitoring system which
also incorporates a cost-benefit analysis.

16. For the Community, the added value of some agreements is
higher than others and, in some cases, it is even negative. In terms
of the value of the catch, one euro spent on financial compensa-
tion represented 0,9 euro for the Greenland Agreement and
3,4 euro for the Mauritania Agreement (see Annex III). Without
calling into question the very existence of the fisheries agree-
ments, an ongoing monitoring system and an analysis of their
cost-benefit ratio could enable this situation to be clarified.

17. Between 1993 and 1999 there was a 42 % increase in the
appropriations for payments under these agreements. The same
period saw a slight decline in the fishing opportunities offered by
the agreements. As pointed out above, the increase in the cost to
the budget can in part be attributed to various factors (such as the
increase in the rates of financial compensation under some agree-
ments, or the depletion of fish stocks). However, in order to quan-
tify the effects or impact of these factors on the actual increase in
the cost of an agreement, a detailed analysis is needed.

18. As regards the technical data sheets drawn up by the Com-
mission for each individual agreement, four of the eight sheets
examined by the Court did not contain data on catch quantities
and none of them contained information on the value of these
catches. Although these data sheets contain certain aspects of a
cost-benefit analysis and have improved since they were first
introduced, some of the key data are still too vague to allow a
meaningful analysis. They also fail to satisfy the requests made by
the Council, referred to in paragraph 13.

so far as, even where the fishing opportunities available to Com-
munity fishermen are not fully used, the Community pays finan-
cial compensation for the total catches initially provided for.

21. By way of example, two of the agreements (Senegal, Green-
land) were underused, despite price increases at recent renewals.
The Senegal Agreement continues to be underused: in addition to
the longer period of the new Agreement (1997 to 2001), the total
Community contribution has increased by 33 % per year. This has
been criticised by the Commission’s own Financial Controller (1).
Furthermore, this Agreement (2) covers the new category of fish-
ing, ‘pelagic freezer trawlers’, which has not been used at all, but
the cost of which has been borne by the Commission. The prob-
lem is that the Commission pays an overall amount for each
agreement, without the costs being divided up between the vari-
ous fishing categories. As a result, even if one of the fishing cat-
egories (belonging under the same agreement) is underused or
not used at all, this does not lead to a reduction in the overall cost
borne by the Commission.

22. The Greenland Agreement, for its part, has been underused
in the main fishing categories (cod and redfish). The Commis-
sion’s technical data sheets (3) pointed out that, owing to the low
utilisation rate, the costs involved had not brought any benefit in
terms of catches for most of the fishing possibilities provided for
by the 1995 to 2000 Agreement. The scientific data available
show that the underuse of this Agreement is largely due to a
severe depletion of fish stocks. The EU has therefore paid for
catches which potentially did not exist, i.e. for ‘paper’ fish (see the
Table). In the meantime, the agreement with Greenland was
renewed in 2000, without the Commission taking sufficient
account of its high cost, the October 1999 evaluation or even its
technical data sheets.

Underutilisation of the agreements

19. When an agreement is being negotiated, the Commission
uses the catches declared by the shipowners in the previous pro-
tocols, the rates of use in terms of the number of licences taken
out and the estimates made by the Member States of their fishing
needs. The Commission’s evaluation of these estimates ought to
be the basis for the agreements to be negotiated, given the impact
they may have on the cost to be negotiated, on the balance of fish
stocks and on the level of take-up of fishing opportunities.

20.
In practice, the Member States’ fishing fleets tend to overes-
timate their needs, which may lead to extra cost for the agree-
ment, but also to underutilisation of the catch opportunities pro-
vided for by the agreement. This underutilisation may to some
extent be explained by the shipowners’ wish to safeguard for
themselves the possibility of fishing in these waters, even if the
latter are not economically viable. Their interest is speculative in

23. The Commission should ensure that the Member States’ fish-
ing fleets undertake actually to make use of the catch opportuni-
ties, so as to avoid unnecessary costs. One solution could be to
require them to lodge guarantees or to pay a higher advance (4) in
order to deter purely speculative applications. There needs to be
close cooperation between the Commission and the Member
States in this respect.

(1) Letter from the Financial control DG sent to the Fisheries DG on 5

October 1997.

(2) Agreement lasting from 1 May 1997 to 30 April 2001.
(3) Commission working paper of 2 February 2000, p. 9.
(4) Usually, the owners of tuna fishing vessels have to pay fees calculated
on the basis of 20 euro per tonne, with a minimum catch which var-
ies from one agreement to another. In this context, this amount is
called an ‘advance’. The shipowner has to pay it in order to obtain a
fishing licence. At the end of the fishing period, there is a settlement
procedure and, if the catch is higher than foreseen, the shipowner
pays the difference. The advance, by contrast, is not refunded.

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Utilisation of fishing opportunities — Greenland Agreement

Table

Quota available/fishing opportunity

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Greenland (t) (all species)
— Utilisation
— Percentage
Financial compensation (mio EUR)

267 144
80 330
30,0
37,7

267 294
148 588
55,6
37,7

253 294
142 388
56,1
37,7

250 034
128 786
51,5
37,7

239 309
90 004
37,6
37,7

Source: Internal Commission document of 2 February2000.

Sharing out the financial burden

THE INTENDED PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENTS

24. The costs to be shared consist of financial compensation
paid by the Community and a fee paid by the private shipowners
wanting to fish in the waters of third countries (see also above).

25. The share of the financing which the Community has had to
bear out of public funds can be put at 85,7 % of the total cost of
the agreements involving financial compensation (1). In the light
of the intentions it has expressed in the past (2), the Commission
should investigate the advisability, methods and consequences of
sharing out the costs in a more balanced manner.

Indispensable information

26. Lastly, in spite of the weaknesses pointed out in the preced-
ing paragraphs, the Commission was not able to draw up a com-
plete balance sheet of the costs and benefits of the international
fisheries agreements since the last evaluation, made in 1999: it
was able to supply data on costs but not for the value of the
catches nor for their direct or indirect impact (on jobs, for example).
In commercial negotiations, however, as is the case with the inter-
national fisheries agreements, it is absolutely vital for these figures
to be available.

27. Furthermore, in its Resolution of 15 May 1997 (3), the Euro-
pean Parliament called on the Commission to draw up a set of
guidelines to enable a uniform procedure when evaluating the
implementation of expiring protocols on fishing opportunities or
preparing for negotiations on new protocols or agreements.

(1) The Community’s share in the financing of the total cost of the fisher-
ies agreements, for 1992 and 1997 respectively, was 82 % and 84 %
for Morocco, 73 % and 82 % for Mauritania, 89 % and 90 % for Sene-
gal and 100 % (constant figure) for Greenland.

(2) COM(96) 488 of 30 October 1998.
(3) Minutes of the European Parliament, Resolution on international fish-

eries agreements, 15 May 1997, A4-0149/1997.

Stability of fishing opportunities

28. One of the general objectives of these agreements is to offer
stable fishing opportunities to the fleets of Member States. Dur-
ing the period 1993 to 1999, there was a slight decline in the fish-
ing opportunities, because of their reduction under the Morocco
Agreement, as well as their stability or slight increase in other
agreements (4).

29. Nevertheless, during the same period the payment appro-
priations devoted to the agreements increased, which confirms
the Commission’s wish to ensure that these fishing opportunities
have a more stable basis. In the 12 months following the expiry
of the EU-Morocco Agreement on 30 November 1999, there was
a substantial overall decrease in the fishing opportunities pro-
vided for by the agreements, notably at the expense of the
Spanish and Portuguese fishermen.

Supply to the market and aid to employment

30. The fisheries agreements aim to ensure supplies to a market
which on the whole has a shortage, and to safeguard jobs. The
Commission does not have up-to-date figures on the impact of
each agreement on these two aspects, which, moreover, are not
systematically analysed in the technical data sheets referred to
above. The only source of information in this respect is the evalu-
ation of the agreements that was made on the Commission’s
behalf for the period 1993 to 1997.

31.
In order systematically to measure the impact of the agree-
ments on the supply to the market and on employment, suitable
criteria and indicators need to be defined (for example: data on
landings and catches in terms of their quantity and value; direct
or indirect jobs). Furthermore, this would make it possible to
evaluate the potential risk and the consequences to which the
Commission is laying itself open when agreements are not renewed,

(4) The Commission’s ‘Ifremer’ evaluation, Chapter 4.1, p. 131.

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and therefore to anticipate what the effects of this would be. In
this context, the non-renewal of the agreement with Morocco in
1999 had considerable economic and social repercussions (about
7 000 direct jobs and 470 vessels) in the regions of Europe which
were heavily dependent on it (in particular, Spain and Portugal).

Restructuring strategy

32. The structural aspect of the common fisheries policy aims in
particular to achieve:

(a) a balance between the capacities of the fishing fleets and fish

stocks;

(b) promotion of the development of the regions that are depen-

dent on fishing;

(c) elimination of surplus capacities;

(d) the construction and modernisation of fleets, under certain

conditions.

This aspect of ‘structural measures’ is linked, amongst other things,
to that of the international fisheries agreements, and thus clear,
consistent objectives need to be set and the measures taken need
to be closely coordinated.

33. During the negotiations for the International Fisheries Agree-
ment with Morocco in 1994 and 1995, it was found that fish
stocks in Moroccan waters were tending to become depleted and
that the fishing sector in Morocco was being developed. This
ought to have prompted a policy of gradually restructuring the
fleets of the Member States operating in these waters, as the Com-
mission stated during the negotiations. A policy of this kind would
have allowed the gradual implementation of restructuring mea-
sures (such as the redeployment of vessels) and of social measures
to limit the effects on the Community fishing sector; it would also
have made the Community fleets less dependent on this Agree-
ment. The sector’s stability and sustainable development could
thus have been safeguarded. As it was, out of a total of 125 new
boats (in particular Spanish and Portuguese) having fished in
Moroccan waters (the 1995 to 1999 Agreement), 54 were found
to have been constructed using European Community
co-financing. The Commission, in partnership with the Member
States, had not set any clear objectives for the granting of the
(Structural Fund) aid for the construction of new vessels nor had
it monitored the subsequent use of this aid. There are two ques-
tions which spring to mind here: was this instrument an integral
part of an overall plan for restructuring the Member States’ fish-
ing fleets? Was the decline in the number of fishing licences, as
reflected in the decrease in the number of vessels from 590 to 477
between 1996 and 1999, the sole outcome of the implementa-
tion of the restructuring objective? Thus, for some agreements,
the Commission was not able to show any relationship between
the negotiating aim and the common fisheries policy objective to
reduce the fishing effort in Community waters (1). There is thus
still a lack of consistency between these two aspects of the com-
mon fisheries policy.

34. Furthermore, the construction of the vessels was undertaken
without any systematic check as to whether the catch capacities
were appropriate for the resources covered by the agreements.
Since the expiry of the Moroccan Agreement and the consequent
discontinuation of fishing in Moroccan waters, the fleets con-
cerned have, on certain conditions, received indemnities that are
co-financed by the Community and are intended to offset the cor-
responding losses in income. For 2000, the amount budgeted for
these indemnities was 124 million euro, 59 million euro of which
was financed by the Community budget.

35. Other initiatives of a structural nature have not always had
the expected impact. This appplies to the second-generation agree-
ments (see definition in paragraph 4) which aim, through the
setting-up of joint ventures, to preserve the fishing opportunities
available to the Community fleet, to maintain a certain level of
Community employment (2) and to transfer fishing vessels to the
waters of third countries. The only agreement of importance was
signed with Argentina (162 million euro); this allowed the transfer
of 32 vessels and the safeguarding of about 1 000 Community
jobs, until Argentina decided to increase the minimum number of
Argentinian seamen to be included in the crews of these vessels
(in the long term, this measure could affect 600 Community jobs).
The limited impact of this type of agreement can be attributed to
a lack of interest on the part of the third countries and the deple-
tion of fish stocks.

36. All in all, before Structural Fund aid is granted to the Com-
munity fleet fishing under international agreements, the Commis-
sion and the Member States should set clear objectives. The vari-
ous aspects of the common fisheries policy could be made more
consistent, in particular with the Structural Funds. Given the risks
faced by the Community, in particular in the event of the non-
renewal of the agreements, it is especially important under these
agreements for there to be strategic planning and for the imple-
mentation of the measures to develop a stable fishing sector to be
monitored effectively.

Coordination of Community policies

37. Some of the countries that are signatories of an international
fisheries agreement also benefit from other Community policies,
such as development aid financed by the Community budget or
by the European Development Fund (EDF). It is therefore neces-
sary to ensure that there is consistency between and coordination
of the measures taken in the fisheries and development fields (2).
This means that due regard needs to be paid to the specific nature
of each area (the commercial nature and development aid), since
each is valid in its own way.

(1) The Commission’s ‘Ifremer’ evaluation, p. 153.

(2) Council Conclusions 11784/97 of 4 November 1997.

C 210/10

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Official Journal of the European Communities

27.7.2001

In some third countries, the income earned from the inter-
38.
national fisheries agreements may form a substantial portion of
the national revenue: for example in 1998, this proportion was
15,2 % in Mauritania and 12,7 % in São Tomé.

39. When the agreement with Senegal expired in 1997, the
Commission was unable to accept the price requested. Agreement
was reached after the Commission drew attention to an increase
of an undefined amount in the EDF funding (1). In this instance,
neither transparency nor the budgetary principle of specification
of expenditure was abided by. The budgetary authorities should
always be able to establish the full actual cost of fishing rights. All
too often, the intended purposes of the two Community policies
are intertwined in these agreements. Their objectives therefore
need to be clearly defined in the agreements. Furthermore, the
Commission should ensure that its own departments act in coor-
dination with one another when implementing all the policies
likely to affect the EU’s relations with developing countries, pur-
suant to Article 178 of the Treaty and the Lomé Convention.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS

Management shortcomings

40. Each international fisheries agreement is managed by a ‘Joint
Committee’, consisting of the Commission, the partner third
countries and, for certain agreements, representatives from the
Council and the Member States concerned.

41. These Joint Committees operate throughout the duration of
the agreements. For the most part, they have to deal with two
types of difficulty, which they have not always managed to settle
satisfactorily: the financing of development projects and the imple-
mentation of projects for the satellite surveillance of vessels.

42. The Commission’s negotiating hand has been weakened
where the agreements do not contain a clause providing for the
compulsory exchange of scientific information, the stopping of
payments in the event of disputes or the adjustment of financial
components when measures are taken that may affect the fishing
opportunities. In 1998 and in 1999, for example, Morocco sus-
pended cephalopod fishing for two months on grounds relating
to the biology of the species, in addition to the two months’ stop
already agreed by the parties involved. The Commission will
remain committed to paying Morocco the full financial compen-
sation, even for the period covered by this unilateral suspension,
not provided for by the agreement.

43. The agreements include clauses stipulating that part of the
financial compensation may be devoted to financing specific mea-
sures and to training, with the aim of contributing to the sustain-
able development of the fishing sector in the third country. If this

is the case, it would be logical for those managing the agreements
to be informed of how these clauses have been applied. However,
since the third countries consider that these agreements are above
all commercial in nature, giving access to territorial waters in
return for financial compensation, they regard the financing of
such measures as more or less optional. As a consequence, some
of these countries (2) do not allow outside checks and so the
Commission does not have any information on the use of these
funds.

44.
If such clauses are to be included in these agreements, the
Commission should make them more legally binding and improve
their monitoring, for example by inserting clauses concerning
checks or payments which are dependent on the progress made.
In any case, a clearer distinction needs to be made between the
commercial aspects and the development aid aspects.

45. Some agreements provide for voluntary or compulsory land-
ing of catches in the partner country, in order to contribute to
employment in the fishing sector. In this case, the vessels benefit
from reduced fees for their fishing licences.

46. For the Morocco Agreement, the Court found, on the basis
of random sampling, that the practice of European vessels unload-
ing and reloading their entire catch had occurred in four of the
five cases examined in the period from 4 December 1998 to
2 March 1999. Even if the aim is to obtain a reduction in the
licence fee, this practice cannot be justified: there is no point
whatsoever in frozen fish being systematically unloaded and then
reloaded at a Moroccan port when it is intended to be sold else-
where. It means that a fundamental aspect of the Morocco Agree-
ment is not being observed, namely greater cooperation in order
to develop the Moroccan fishing sector.

47. The Commission should ensure that the agreements are
applied literally but also that the shipowners interpret them in a
common-sense manner. If need be, it should issue them with
explanatory guidelines.

Control shortcomings

48. The Commission has set up an Inspection and Control Unit
within the Fisheries DG to supervise the application of Commu-
nity regulations, and the monitoring thereof, concerning the
activities of the Member States’ fishing fleets in the waters of third
countries. The Unit’s inspectors regularly attend national inspec-
tions in the Member States as observers.

(1) Commission letter 000405 of 4 March 1997 to the Senegalese authori-

(2) The countries concerned are those coming under the scope of the

ties.

audit referred to in paragraph 8.

27.7.2001

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 210/11

49. This Unit would perform better if it were to lay down detailed
control objectives and specific checks for the international fisher-
ies agreements. These objectives and checks should also be
reviewed, approved and monitored by those in charge of the Unit.
Moreover, there has not always been adequate follow-up of the
infringements detected during the Unit’s inspections in the Mem-
ber States.

50. Furthermore, Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/
93 (1) requires Member States to introduce the necessary mea-
sures to ensure the effectiveness of the common fisheries policy
and also covers the activities of EU fishing vessels operating in the
waters of third countries. Articles 2 to 5 require Member States
to carry out inspections and monitoring of fishing vessels.

51. The weaknesses identified by the Court’s audit were as fol-
lows:

(a) the catch and landing declarations due to be submitted were
not systematically required by the national authorities and
were often incomplete or missing from the files;

(b) inspection practices were not uniform and there were short-
comings in the landings, found during the on-board inspec-
tions;

(c) requests for administrative cooperation between the flag Mem-
ber State and the country where the landing took place, pur-
suant to Article 33 of the Regulation, were not always acted
upon.

52. Although primary responsibility for inspection of the fish-
ing activities in the waters of a third country lies with the country
concerned, European vessels must comply with the international
fisheries agreements and with the provisions of the regulations in
force. Their landings of catches are thus subject to checks when
they are made in the port of a Member State.

53. The Court’s audit, at the time of the inspections in which it
took part, revealed infringements found to have been committed
by fishing vessels. These concerned the landing of juvenile fish,
incomplete or incorrect logbook information (mostly underdecla-
ration of catches), incomplete logbook pages and infringements
of the crewing requirements. The shortcomings that have been
identified, especially those concerning the logbook, do not enable
the Commission to ensure proper monitoring of the implementa-
tion of the agreements nor to evaluate their benefit.

(1) Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 of 12 October 1993

(OJ L 261, 20.10.1993).

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Cost-benefit ratio

54. Even though the Commission made an evaluation in 1999
of the international fisheries agreements and has introduced tech-
nical data sheets for use when an agreement is being negotiated
or renegotiated, this has enabled neither ongoing monitoring nor
a detailed cost-benefit analysis of each agreement to be made. As
a result, the Commission can neither identify nor remedy the
weaknesses detected by the Court (lack of good-quality informa-
tion on the fish stocks situation, on the financial compensation
which is calculated without taking into account the rate of utilisa-
tion of the agreements, on the return obtained or expected from
these agreements, etc.), which give rise to extra costs (see para-
graphs 13 to 18).

— The Court recommends that the Commission put in place an
ongoing monitoring system (and therefore allocates itself the
means to do so) which would make it possible to analyse the
benefits of each agreement throughout its cycle: (ex ante)
negotiation or renegotiation, implementation, ex post evalu-
ation. To this end, the Commission should on the one hand
determine criteria making it possible to assess the extent to
which clearly defined objectives have been achieved and, on
the other, establish suitable performance indicators. The sys-
tem to be set up must make it possible to analyse the fishing
opportunities available (the supply) and the use actually made
of them (the demand), whilst taking into account the capaci-
ties of the fishing fleets and their specialisation.

55. The Commission currently finances about 80 % of the cost
of the fisheries agreements involving financial compensation. At
the same time, the fishing opportunities offered by some agree-
ments are not used to the full, leading to extra cost for the Com-
munity budget. For want of a detailed analysis of the economic
and financial value of these agreements, it is impossible to pass
judgement on their usefulness (see paragraphs 19 to 27).

— The Commission should analyse whether it would be expedi-
ent to share out the costs in a more balanced manner, how
best to achieve this and what the consequences would be. The
aim of such a study would also be to analyse the relationship
between the cost of a fishing licence and the amount of turn-
over resulting from it. The Commission should also take
measures to ensure actual take-up of the fishing opportuni-
ties offered by these agreements. Possible solutions that could
be considered include the lodging of guarantees, payment of
higher advances by the shipowners, or payment, by either the
Commission or the shipowners, only for actual catches.

The intended purpose of the agreements

56. Some fisheries agreements include a commercial aspect, i.e.
an access fee, whilst at the same time being intended to contribute
to the development of the fishing sector in the third country. In
some cases, the development aid funds are additional to the finan-
cial compensation, a practice which is contrary to the principle
of budgetary specification. The intended purposes of two Com-
munity policies are thus closely intertwined, making it difficult to

C 210/12

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Official Journal of the European Communities

27.7.2001

assess what impact they each have. The inclusion of development
activities in an agreement of a commercial nature makes it even
harder to distinguish between the responsibilities of the Commis-
sion and those of the third countries (see paragraphs 37 to 39).

— If a clearer distinction were to be made between these two
intended purposes, it would be possible to measure their costs
and benefits, to compare these agreements on the same basis
and to identify those which were most burdensome. It is
essential that their various aims be defined and translated
into practice. The Commission departments should take
action to ensure that the various Community policies are
consistent with one another.

fleets concerned and make provision for the necessary accom-
panying measures.

Management shortcomings

58. The present management of the fisheries agreements by the
Commission departments is purely administrative. It lacks con-
sistency, mainly because of the intertwining of the aims of most
of the agreements and because their legal framework is not very
strict (see paragraphs 42 to 46).

57. The international fisheries agreements have to a certain extent
helped to make the fishing opportunities available to the Member
States’ fleets more stable. However, their impact on the supply to
the market and on employment is not systematically analysed and
the Commission does not have any up-to-date figures. There could
be greater consistency between the common fisheries policy’s
structural aspect and the international fisheries agreements (see
paragraphs 28 to 36).

— Their various objectives should be spelled out and at the same
time there should be a clear demarcation of the responsibili-
ties of the Commission’s management departments. The lat-
ter’s management of fish stocks should be more careful and
more forward-looking. The Commission should ensure the
reciprocal application of the agreements and, if need be, make
them stricter (clause stipulating checks or payment depen-
dent on the progress made).

— The Commission should strengthen its global strategy for
developing the fishing sector and ensure that the stabilising
and restructuring measures taken are monitored. This strat-
egy should be based on a detailed economic and financial
analysis of the agreements, and on a study of the conse-
quences for the Community of the non-renewal of any of
these agreements, especially for those regions of Europe which
depend on them. This strategy should also be based on an
analysis of changing trends whose impact could prove to be
important (for example, the depletion of fish stocks). This
would make it possible to anticipate the intervention mea-
sures that needed to be taken by the public authorities. When
the Commission finds that a third country has been able to
develop its own fishing sector, the Community, in partner-
ship with this third country, should promote a sustainable
fishing policy, start restructuring the Community fishing

Control shortcomings

59. The Court has identified a number of weaknesses in the
inspection activities carried out by the Commission and by the
Member States (see paragraphs 47 to 52).

— The Commission and the Member States should be encour-
aged to work together on drawing up guidelines on the
detailed arrangements for the checks to be carried out by the
Member States. The inspection and monitoring activities car-
ried out by the Commission departments could be more
effective if objectives were set, the activities better planned
and if previous findings were follow up more closely.

This report was adopted by the Court of Auditors in Luxembourg at its meeting of 6 and 7 June 2001.

For the Court of Auditors

Jan O. KARLSSON

President

27.7.2001

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 210/13

ANNEX I

BUDGETARY EXPENDITURE 1993 to 2000

(1993 to 1999: OUTTURN; 2000: APPROPRIATIONS)

Budget heading B7-8000: ‘International fisheries agreements’

Budget year

Type of
appropriation

Final budget

Execution

Total expenditure
CFP

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

C

P

C

P

C

P

C

P

C

P

C

P

C

P

C

P

(a)

210,0

213,5

266,0

221,0

126,0
35,0 (*)

221,0
35,0 (*)

295,8

270,0

223,3

293,9

272,3

277,3

249,5
30,5 (*)

262,8
26,2 (*)

117,3
155,0 (*)

121,8
148,0 (*)

(b)

181,3

188,9

258,3

140,6

111,8

158,0

289,7

250,9

221,7

283,3

269,4

271,4

263,2

269,0

121,6

124,8

(d)

657,1

575,7

716,4

604,3

677,5

481,3

854,5

752,6

727,3

864,3

910,1

824,2

1 143,4

991,1

694,0

747,1

(*) Amounts allocated in Chapter B0-4 0.
IFA: International fisheries agreements.
CFP: Common fisheries policy.
C = commitments, P = payments.

(Mio EUR)

IFA/CFP
%

(e)=(b)/(d)

27,6

32,8

36,1

23,3

16,5

32,8

33,9

33,3

30,5

32,8

29,6

32,9

23,0

27,1

17,52

16,70

ANNEX II

INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES AGREEMENTS — LEGAL BASIS PER AGREEMENT

Duration

Financial
compensation
(in euro)

Other expenses
(in euro)

Scientific
programmes

Grants

Other

Description

Subtotal
other
expenses

Total
Agreement

Percentage
other
expenses in
total

Agreement

EU-Angola

Council Regulation (EEC) No 594/93 of 8.3.1993

3.5.1992 to 2.5.1994

13 900 000

2 800 000

1 800 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 3020/94 of 6.12.1994

3.5.1994 to 2.5.1996

13 900 000

2 800 000

1 800 000

4 600 000

18 500 000

4 600 000

18 500 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 910/97 of 14.5.1997

3.5.1996 to 2.5.1999

31 000 000

5 000 000

3 000 000

1 050 000

Research

9 050 000

40 050 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 103/2000 of 29.11.1999

3.5.1999 to 2.5.2000

10 300 000

1 700 000

1 000 000

350 000

Subtotal

69 100 000

12 300 000

7 600 000

1 400 000

EU-Argentina

Council Regulation (EEC) No 3447/93 of 28.9.1993

5 years (valid on
24.5.1994)

162 500 000

28 000 000

Subtotal

162 500 000

28 000 000

0

3 050 000

13 350 000

21 300 000

90 400 000

Unidentified

EU-Cape Verde

Council Regulation (EEC) No 2321/90 of 24.7.1990

6.9.1991 to 5.9.1994

Council Regulation (EC) No 2028/95 of 29.6.1995

6.9.1994 to 5.9.1997

Council Regulation (EC) No 200/98 of 20.1.1998

6.9.1997 to 5.9.2000

EU-Comoros

Subtotal

Council Regulation (EEC) No 2885/92 of 28.9.1992

20.7.1991 to 19.7.1994

Council Regulation (EEC) No 1893/95 of 29.6.1995

20.7.1994 to 19.7.1997

Council Regulation (EC) No 2127/98 of 1.10.1998

28.2.1998 to 27.2.2001

EU-Ivory Coast

Council Regulation (EEC) No 3939/90 of 19.12.1990

Subtotal

22.12.1990 to
10.1.1994

Council Regulation (EC) No 1894/95 of 29.6.1995

1.7.1994 to 30.6.1997

Council Regulation (EC) No 238/98 of 20.1.1998

1.7.1997 to 30.6.2000

EU-Gabon

Subtotal

0

0

1 950 000

1 063 500

1 086 000

500 000

261 900

267 440

160 000

174 600

178 300

4 099 500

1 029 340

512 900

900 000

675 000

540 000

325 000

260 000

250 000

175 000

145 000

60 000

2 115 000

835 000

380 000

230 000

230 000

28 000 000

190 500 000

15 %

28 000 000

190 500 000

15 %

660 000

436 500

445 740

2 610 000

1 500 000

1 531 740

1 542 240

5 641 740

500 000

405 000

540 000

1 400 000

1 080 000

1 080 000

1 445 000

3 560 000

25 %

29 %

29 %

27 %

36 %

38 %

50 %

41 %

6 000 000

600 000

500 000

1 100 000

7 100 000

15 %

2 100 000

2 400 000

250 000

100 000

150 000

100 000

10 500 000

950 000

750 000

400 000

400 000

400 000

600 000

2 500 000

3 000 000

2 100 000

12 600 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 2469/98 of 9.11.1998

3.12.1998 to 2.12.2001

Subtotal

810 000

810 000

200 000

105 000

200 000

105 000

910 000

910 000

1 215 000

2 025 000

1 215 000

2 025 000

C
2
1
0
/
1
4

E
N

O

f
f
i
c
i
a
l

J
o
u
r
n
a
l

o
f

t
h
e

E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
i
e
s

.

.

2
7
7
2
0
0
1

25 %

25 %

23 %

23 %

24 %

16 %

20 %

17 %

60 %

60 %

Agreement

Duration

Financial
compensation
(in euro)

EU-Gambia

Other expenses
(in euro)

Scientific
programmes

Grants

Other

Description

Subtotal
other
expenses

Total
Agreement

Percentage
other
expenses in
total

Council Regulation (EC) No 634/94 of 10.5.1994

1.7.1993 to 30.6.1996

1 100 000

80 000

220 000

Subtotal

1 100 000

80 000

220 000

0

300 000

1 400 000

300 000

1 400 000

EU-Greenland

Council Regulation (EEC) No 2647/90 of 16.7.1990

1.1.1990 to 31.12.1994

171 250 000

6 000 000

Joint ventures

6 000 000

177 250 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 3354/94 of 19.12.1994

1.1.1995 to 31.12.2000

226 200 000

0

226 200 000

Subtotal

397 450 000

0

0

6 000 000

6 000 000

403 450 000

EU-Guinea (Conakry)

Council Regulation (EEC) No 3680/92 of 7.12.1992

1.1.1992 to 31.12.1993

6 700 000

400 000

400 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 2663/95 of 24.7.1995

1.1.1994 to 31.12.1995

1 700 000

450 000

550 000

800 000

7 500 000

1 000 000

2 700 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 909/97 of 14.5.1997

1.1.1996 to 31.12.1997

2 450 000

400 000

250 000

900 000

1 550 000

4 000 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 1660/98 of 20.7.1998

1.1.1998 to 31.12.1999

3 250 000

450 000

390 000

2 410 000

3 250 000

6 500 000

Subtotal

14 100 000

1 700 000

1 590 000

3 310 000

6 600 000

20 700 000

EU-Guinea-Bissau

Council Regulation (EEC) No 410/94 of 14.2.1994

16.6.1993 to 15.6.1995

12 000 000

450 000

250 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 576/96 of 21.3.1996

16.6.1995 to 15.6.1997

12 000 000

150 000

100 000

450 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 2615/97 of 18.12.1997

16.6.1997 to 15.6.2001

27 363 000

300 000

400 000

1 300 000

700 000

12 700 000

700 000

12 700 000

2 000 000

29 363 000

Specific
actions

21 %

21 %

3 %

0 %

1 %

11 %

37 %

39 %

50 %

32 %

6 %

6 %

7 %

Subtotal

51 363 000

900 000

750 000

1 750 000

3 400 000

54 763 000

6 %

EU-Equatorial Guinea

Council Regulation (EEC) No 1236/90 of 25.4.1990

27.6.1989 to 26.6.1992

6 000 000

500 000

665 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 1892/95 of 29.6.1995

1.7.1994 to 30.6.1997

412 500

120 000

127 500

Council Regulation (EC) No 114/98 of 18.12.1997

1.7.1997 to 30.6.2000

600 000

50 000

140 000

170 000

Surveillance

1 165 000

7 165 000

247 500

360 000

660 000

960 000

Subtotal

7 012 500

670 000

932 500

170 000

1 772 500

8 785 000

EU-Madagascar

Council Regulation (EEC) No 983/93 of 6.4.1993

21.5.1992 to 20.5.1995

1 350 000

375 000

450 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 498/96 of 19.3.1996

21.5.1995 to 20.5.1998

1 350 000

375 000

450 000

825 000

2 175 000

825 000

2 175 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 2585/98 of 26.11.1998

21.5.1998 to 20.5.2001

912 000

168 000

300 000

900 000

1 368 000

2 280 000

Subtotal

3 612 000

918 000

1 200 000

900 000

3 018 000

6 630 000

16 %

38 %

38 %

20 %

38 %

38 %

60 %

46 %

.

.

2
7
7
2
0
0
1

E
N

O

f
f
i
c
i
a
l

J
o
u
r
n
a
l

o
f

t
h
e

E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
i
e
s

C
2
1
0
/
1
5

Agreement

Duration

Financial
compensation
(in euro)

EU-Morocco

Other expenses
(in euro)

Scientific
programmes

Grants

Other

Description

Subtotal
other
expenses

Total
Agreement

Percentage
other
expenses in
total

Council Regulation (EEC) No 3954/92 of 19.12.1992

1.5.1992 to 30.4.1996

270 000 000

7 000 000

7 000 000

34 400 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 150/97 of 12.12.1996

1.12.1995 to
31.11.1999

355 000 000

16 000 000

8 000 000

121 000 000

Specific
actions

Specific
actions

48 400 000

318 400 000

15 %

145 000 000

500 000 000

29 %

Subtotal

625 000 000

23 000 000 15 000 000

155 400 000

193 400 000

818 400 000

24 %

EU–Mauritius

Council Regulation (EEC) No 1616/89 of 5.6.1989

Council Regulation (EC) No 1797/94 of 18.7.1994

Council Regulation (EC) No 1975/97 of 7.10.1997

1.12.1990 to
30.11.1993

1.12.1993 to
30.11.1996

1.12.1996 to
30.11.1999

1 200 000

480 000

120 000

150 000

Research

750 000

1 950 000

38 %

975 000

380 000

100 000

480 000

1 455 000

33 %

1 218 750

418 000

110 000

528 000

1 746 750

30 %

Subtotal

3 393 750

1 278 000

330 000

150 000

1 758 000

5 151 750

34 %

EU-Mauritania

Council Regulation (EEC) No 1177/91 of 18.4.1991

1.8.1990 to 31.7.1993

27 750 000

900 000

360 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/94 of 2.6.1994

1.8.1993 to 31.7.1996

26 000 000

900 000

360 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 1258/96 of 25.6.1996

15.11.1995 to
30.6.1996

7 259 000

350 000

150 000

1 260 000

29 010 000

1 260 000

27 260 000

500 000

7 759 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 408/97 of 24.2.1997

1.8.1996 to 31.7.2001

266 800 000

2 250 000

3 000 000

Research

5 250 000

272 050 000

Subtotal

327 809 000

2 150 000

3 120 000

3 000 000

8 270 000

336 079 000

4 %

5 %

6 %

2 %

2 %

EU-Mozambique

Council Regulation (EEC) No 593/93 of 8.3.1993

1.1.1992 to 30.9.1993

EU-Estonia

Subtotal

300 000

300 000

180 000

180 000

0

0

180 000

180 000

480 000

480 000

38 %

38 %

C
2
1
0
/
1
6

E
N

O

f
f
i
c
i
a
l

J
o
u
r
n
a
l

o
f

t
h
e

E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
i
e
s

Council Regulation (EEC) No 519/93 of 2.3.1993

5.7.1993 to 4.7.2003

Council Decision of 5.11.1993

Council Regulation (EC) No 3685/93 of 20.12.1993

Council Regulation (EC) No 3368/94 of 20.12.1994

Council Regulation (EC) No 3082/95 of 21.12.1995

1993

1994

1995

1996

197 340

378 641

649 400

736 000

replaced by

Council Regulation (EC) No 2396/96 of 2.12.1996

1.1.1997 to 31.12.2006

(Amounts
determined by
annual
con-
sultation)

.

.

2
7
7
2
0
0
1

Agreement

Duration

Council Regulation (EC) No 398/97 of 20.12.1996

Council Regulation (EC) No 53/98 of 19.12.1997

Council Regulation (EC)No 57/1999 of 18.12.1998

Council Regulation (EC) No 2517/2000 of 9.11.2000

1997

1998

1999

2000

Financial
compensation
(in euro)

765 530

465 467

519 000

448 895

Other expenses
(in euro)

Scientific
programmes

Grants

Other

Description

Subtotal
other
expenses

Total
Agreement

Percentage
other
expenses in
total

Subtotal

4 160 273

0

0

0

0

4 160 273

0 %

EU-Latvia

Council Regulation (EEC) No 520/93 of 2.3.1993

5.8.1993 to 4.8.2003

Council Regulation (EC) No 3687/93 of 20.12.1993

Council Regulation (EC) No 3370/94 of 20.12.1994

Council Regulation (EC) No 3084/95 of 21.12.1995

replaced by

1994

1995

1996

Council Regulation (EC) No 2394/96 of 2.12.1996

9.12.1996 to 8.12.2002

Council Regulation (EC) No 400/97 of 20.12.1996

Council Regulation (EC) No 55/98 of 19.12.1997

Council Regulation (EC) No 59/1999 of 18.12.1998

Council Regulation (EC) No 2742/1999 of 17.12.1999

1997

1998

1999

2000

166 817

426 455

496 100

534 300

430 300

177 923

252 000

Subtotal

2 483 895

0

0

0

EU-Lithuania

Council Regulation (EEC) No 521/93 of 2.3.1993

13.4.1993 to 12.4.2003

Council Regulation (EC) No 3689/93 of 20.12.1993

Council Regulation (EC) No 3372/94 of 20.12.1994

Council Regulation (EC) No 3086/95 of 21.12.1995

replaced by

1994

1995

1996

352 350

498 500

763 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 2395/96 of 2.12.1996

1.1.1997 to 31.12.2003

Council Regulation (EC) No 402/97 of 20.12.1996

1997

1 041 048

(Amounts
determined
on
annual
consultation)

(Amounts
determined
on
annual
consultation)

0

0

2 483 895

0 %

0

.

.

2
7
7
2
0
0
1

E
N

O

f
f
i
c
i
a
l

J
o
u
r
n
a
l

o
f

t
h
e

E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
i
e
s

C
2
1
0
/
1
7

Agreement

Duration

Council Regulation (EC) No 57/98 of 19.12.1997

Council Regulation (EC) No 2473/1999 of 22.11.1999

Council Regulation (EC) No 2765/2000 of 14.12.2000

1998

1999

2000

Financial
compensation
(in euro)

563 510

669 700

614 200

Other expenses
(in euro)

Scientific
programmes

Grants

Other

Description

Subtotal
other
expenses

Total
Agreement

Percentage
other
expenses in
total

Subtotal

4 502 308

0

0

0

0

4 502 308

0 %

EU-São Tomé e Princípe

Council Regulation (EEC) No 1295/91 of 14.5.1991

1.6.1990 to 31.5.1993

Council Regulation (EC) No 3221/93 of 22.11.1993

1.6.1993 to 31.5.1996

Council Regulation (EC) No 1130/97 of 17.6.1997

1.6.1996 to 31.5.1999

1 650 000

1 650 000

1 800 000

150 000

250 000

187 500

375 000

275 000

35 000

Council Decision 2000/92/EC of 24.1.2000

1.6.1999 to 31.5.2002

EU-Senegal

Subtotal

956 250

6 056 250

286 875

874 375

191 250

876 250

International
organisations

152 500

478 125

630 625

Council Regulation (EEC) No 2296/93 of 22.7.1993

2.10.1992 to 1.10.1994

31 200 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 1982/95 of 29.6.1995

2.10.1994 to 1.10.1996

15 800 000

600 000

458 000

200 000

230 000

1 512 000

Council Decision 97/531/EC of 24.7.1997

2.10.1996 to 1.11.1996

750 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 542/98 of 9.5.1998

1.5.1997 to 30.4.2001

48 000 000

525 000

525 000

375 000

2 175 000

2 175 000

2 175 000

956 250

2 381 250

1 912 500

8 437 500

800 000

32 000 000

2 200 000

18 000 000

0

0

750 000

48 000 000

Subtotal

95 750 000

1 058 000

430 000

1 512 000

3 000 000

98 750 000

EU-Seychelles

Council Regulation (EEC) No 3193/90 of 29.10.1990

18.1.1990 to 17.1.1993

6 900 000

2 700 000

Council Regulation (EEC) No 2718/93 of 28.9.1993

18.1.1993 to 17.1.1996

6 900 000

2 700 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 2407/96 of 12.12.1996

18.1.1996 to 17.1.1999

6 900 000

2 700 000

Council Regulation (EC) No 341/1999 of 10.5.1999

18.1.1999 to 17.1.2002

6 900 000

1 950 000

300 000

300 000

300 000

300 000

1 200 000

Subtotal

27 600 000 10 050 000

1 200 000

1 200 000

3 000 000

3 000 000

3 000 000

9 900 000

9 900 000

9 900 000

3 450 000

10 350 000

12 450 000

40 050 000

24 %

24 %

17 %

50 %

28 %

3 %

12 %

0 %

0 %

3 %

30 %

30 %

30 %

33 %

31 %

EU-Tanzania

Council Regulation (EEC) No 3941/90 of 19.12.1990

22.12.1990 to
21.12.1993

1 050 000

430 000

200 000

630 000

1 680 000

38 %

Subtotal

Grand total

1 050 000

430 000

200 000

0

630 000

1 680 000

1 821 867 476 86 602 715 35 196 650

176 962 625

298 761 990 2 120 629 466

38 %

14 %

C
2
1
0
/
1
8

E
N

O

f
f
i
c
i
a
l

J
o
u
r
n
a
l

o
f

t
h
e

E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
i
e
s

.

.

2
7
7
2
0
0
1

27.7.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 210/19

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COST OF THE AGREEMENTS AND THE QUANTITIES
CAUGHT/JOBS/VALUES OF CATCHES

ANNEX III

Morocco

Mauritania

Senegal

Greenland

Cost of the agreement (mio
EUR)
Value of the catches (mio EUR)
Catches (tonnes)
Jobs (number of employees)
Cost of the agreement (mio
EUR)
Value of the catches (mio EUR)
Catches (tonnes)
Jobs (number of employees)
Cost of the agreement (mio
EUR)
Value of the catches (mio EUR)
Catches (tonnes)
Jobs (number of employees)
Cost of the agreement (mio
EUR)
Value of the catches (mio EUR)
Catches (tonnes)
Jobs (number of employees)

Cost/tonne (euro)
Morocco
Mauritania
Senegal
Greenland
Cost/job (euro)
Morocco
Mauritania
Senegal
Greenland

Value of catches/cost (euro)

Morocco
Mauritania
Senegal
Greenland

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

Average

102

102

2

127

121

91

221
188 973
7 201
9

223
199 633
6 737
9

98
37 019
3 570
9

94
31 059
1 461
18

36
18 297
878
38

470
330 013
8 115
62

109
51 880
1 703
0

19
6 038
395
38

82
32 368
1 457
0

24
12 389
526
36

24

n/a

13
30 423
Average of 400 jobs

41
43 976

509
268
8

n/a

15 072
5 948
190
90 650

41
283
977
1 239

426
6 014
20 364
94 250

385
1 204
17
872

15 649
36 688
253
95 850

288
209 329
7 199
54

150
133 038
2 466
13

9
4 352
233
39

58
49 244

578
409
2 930
789

16 807
22 044
54 721
97 125

260
192 993
6 564
29

98
55 879
1 712
9

24
11 444
515
37

34
24 729
400

469
512
818
1 508

13 801
16 697
18 190
93 210

58
31 049
1 475
16

33
16 145
542
35

33

n/a

539
279
990
n/a

14 156
5 876
29 502
88 175

2,2
6,7
2,1
0,9

2,2
9,4
242,0
0,7

64,7
10,7
2,0
0,3

3,7
1,7
185,7
1,1

2,4
2,8
0,7
1,5

2,9
3,4
2,6
0,9

Source: Table drawn up by the Court of Auditors on the basis of figures in the Ifremer/COM evaluation.

This table shows the relationship between the cost of the agreements (borne by the Community budget) and the added value in terms of jobs,
quantities and values of catches. There are substantial differences, not only from one agreement to another, but also within one and the same
agreement. For example, for the period 1993 to 1997, the cost/job ratio of the Greenland Agreement was four times higher than that of the
Morocco Agreement (93 210 euro as against 13 801 euro). In the absence of any evaluation or detailed, ongoing monitoring, no explanation
for these differences can be given. These figures, which are only global and indicative in nature, have to be interpreted with caution, as their
reliability cannot be guaranteed and some of them do not take important parameters into account, for example, the cost/tonne ratio does not
distinguish between the species that are caught (lack of more precise data). Furthermore, the financial compensation paid under an agree-
ment is global in nature, i.e. it is not possible to identify the cost of a particular activity or that of fishing for a specific species. It is therefore
impossible to compare the cost to the Community budget of two different agreements relating to the same species.

C 210/20

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.7.2001

SUMMARY

Cost-benefit ratio

THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES

In the case of Senegal, the Commission has negotiated a new cat-
egory of fishing in the Protocol for 1997 to 2001, in the light of
the negotiating directives it received from the Council.

I. The Commission agrees that there are weaknesses in the sys-
tem for monitoring and evaluating the international fisheries
agreements that need to be addressed. An important step was
taken in 1999 when the results of an outside evaluation study
were forwarded to the Council for discussion. It would seem that
this study was also very useful to the Court when drawing up its
special report. Furthermore, the Commission has improved the
preparatory arrangements for the negotiation of new protocols by
drawing up specific assessment reports containing, among other
things, data on the state of stocks, on catch levels, on the use of
fishing possibilities and on the amounts allocated to targeted
measures, research, control and technical aspects. These reports
are available to the European Parliament and the Council.

The Commission, finding that Member States occasionally over-
estimate their needs in terms of fishing opportunities, emphasises
to them each time negotiations take place that they should keep
their requests at a level at which they can be used up in full.

Intended purposes

III. The Commission is aware of the potential for conflict between
the structural and international aspects of the common fisheries
policy.

Despite the progress that has been achieved, further improvement
is needed. On the question of ongoing monitoring, the Commis-
sion would like to point out that data from the Member States for
determining the attainment of objectives are very often lacking.
The Commission hopes that the adoption on 14 March 2001 of
the rules for the implementation of the ‘Control Regulation’ will
help ensure more regular and fuller information from Member
States, allowing in particular better monitoring of actual catches
under the various agreements.

In addition, in accordance with the Financial Regulation rules, the
Commission intends to launch a new external evaluation study
within two to three years.

In the light of the conclusions of the debate on the Green Paper
on the future of the common fisheries policy, and as part of the
administrative reform now under way, the Commission will
endeavour to establish criteria and performance indicators for the
agreements.

II. The Court refers to the Agreements with Greenland and
Senegal.

Together with the Member States, it will address this question in
the course of the debate on the future of the common fisheries
policy after 2002, in order to achieve greater consistency between
the different objectives.

IV. The fisheries agreements, which to start with were purely
commercial, have gradually introduced aims for the development
of the fishing industry in the countries concerned. This approach
reflects, among other things, concern to ensure consistency
between the Community policy and agreements and development
policy.

Funding for measures to develop fisheries in the developing coun-
tries comes from the Financial Instruments for development coop-
eration (EDF and budget headings).

Fisheries cooperation measures such as those contained in certain
bilateral fisheries agreements (targeted measures) receive funding
under the only budget heading to which fisheries agreements may
be charged (heading B7-8 0 0 0) and full details are given in the
terms of the agreements.

Article 1(2) of the new Protocol to the Agreement with Greenland
sets out the catch possibilities available to Community vessels for
the period 2001 to 2006. These have been fixed on the basis of
scientific assessments and historical catches.

Since the adoption of the conclusions of the October 1997 meet-
ing of Fisheries Ministers the targeted measures have been extended
to encourage the introduction of means for ensuring the more
responsible exploitation of fishery resources, in particular in the
area of evaluation and in the surveillance and control of fishing
activities.

27.7.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 210/21

The principal objective of the fisheries agreements concluded with
non-member countries is to maintain fishing opportunities, which
themselves create jobs in the areas dependent on fishing. The con-
clusions of the October 1997 meeting of Fisheries Ministers pro-
vide that aspects which cannot be quantified such as the Union’s
political relations and the strategic importance of the presence of
the Community fleet in non-member countries must also be taken
into account.

Management and control

V.
In order to strengthen the legally binding nature of fisheries
agreements and improve their monitoring, the Commission, when
negotiating new protocols, seeks to include a requirement on the
compulsory exchange of scientific information. In addition, the
majority of fisheries agreements provide that where conservation
or other measures affecting the fishing activities of the Commu-
nity fleet are adopted by the authorities of the non-member coun-
try, the terms of the protocols and technical annexes, including
the financial provisions, may be adapted in consequence.

As well, in the case of targeted measures, for example, reporting
requirements have been included in new protocols since the
October 1997 Council meeting of Fisheries Ministers.

As regards landings and reloading under the Agreement with
Morocco, it should be noted that, although the terms of the agree-
ment on this matter were complied with, the Commission had
made known its intention of revising the clauses concerning land-
ings during the negotiation of the new protocol, which proved
unsuccessful.

With a view to sound financial management and the protection
of the Community’s financial interests, Directorate-General (DG)
Budget and the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF), and any other
departments concerned, will be involved from the start of the
preparations for negotiations and asked to attend meetings before
and during the negotiation of new protocols.

VI. Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 sets out the general obligations
of both the Member States and the Commission regarding moni-
toring, inspection and surveillance of fishing activities in Com-
munity waters and of Community fishing vessels operating beyond
those waters. Specific obligations concerning these matters are
contained in fisheries agreements and regulations laying down
regional fisheries organisations’ schemes.

Before the start of the fishing year, the Commission establishes
the inspection priorities. Inspection programmes are drawn up
for its inspectors as and when fishing proceeds. Each inspection

assignment is carefully prepared. However, once on board Com-
mission inspectors may only observe the control operations car-
ried out by the Member States and verify that they are being car-
ried out in accordance with the agreed rules.

The Commission has taken a number of steps in recent years to
improve the control of fisheries. Major progress has been achieved.
The Commission is well aware of the continuing weaknesses and
will take further action to address them.

Concerning the follow-up to previous findings, the Commission
examines all alleged breaches contained in the inspection reports.
A decision is then taken whether to exchange information with
the Member States or initiate legal proceedings.

As part of the 2002 review of the common fisheries policy, the
Commission will examine with Member States ways of improv-
ing inspection by the Commission and control by the Member
States.

GENERAL CONTEXT

Objective and scope of the audit

7 and 8. The general findings in the Court’s report are based on
a study of five agreements out of the 23 in force when the audit
was carried out. It is very difficult, therefore, to draw general con-
clusions. Three of the five agreements examined by the Court
have very specific characteristics, and account for a very substan-
tial proportion of the Community budget allocated to the agree-
ments. They are of major political interest however.

It should be noted also that two of them no longer exist and
another has been substantially recast (the Agreement with Argen-
tina having expired, that with Greenland having been totally
revised and that with Morocco not having been renewed). The
Protocols to the Agreements with Mauritania and Senegal are
being renegotiated.

10. On account of the Court’s repeated observations, the Com-
mission has included in its proposal for the revision of the Finan-
cial Regulation specific provisions to take account of this situa-
tion. Furthermore, in the interests of transparency, the Commission
includes each year under contingent liabilities all amounts that
have not yet been committed corresponding to legal obligations
under agreements in force. On 31 December 1999 these amounts
stood at EUR 129 million.

C 210/22

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

27.7.2001

THE COST-BENEFIT RATIO OF THE FISHERIES AGREEMENTS

Underutilisation of the agreements

An instrument for monitoring the agreements

14 to 16. Following the conclusions of the October 1997 Coun-
cil meeting of Fisheries Ministers, the Commission undertook an
evaluation with the assistance of an outside consultant, the results
of which were presented to and discussed with the Council in
1999.

19. An evaluation such as the one referred to by the Court is
always at the basis of any agreement concluded but other politi-
cal and economic criteria may also have an impact on the final
result.

20. The Commission, finding that Member States occasionally
overestimate their needs in terms of fishing possibilities, asks
them, each time negotiations take place, to fix their requirements
at a level at which they can be used in full.

A new evaluation is planned in two to three years. Until then,
internal work will be improved following the reinforcement of the
evaluation function.

21.
In the case of Senegal, the Commission asked for a new cat-
egory of fishing because of firm requests from within the Council.

The evaluation of international fisheries agreements will be one
factor among others during the debate on the Commission Green
Paper on the future of the common fisheries policy.

22. The fishing possibilities in the Protocol to the Greenland
Agreement initialled on 13 September 2000 are set at a much
lower level than previously, following a detailed review.

17. The use of budgetary appropriations did indeed increase from
1993 to 1999, as a result mainly of significant increases in the
financial compensation associated with the Agreements with
Morocco, Mauritania, Greenland and Argentina. None of these
Agreements can easily be compared with its predecessors. The
Council decides whether the cost negotiated is a reasonable one
for the opportunities received.

The catch possibilities available to Community vessels in the
period 2001 to 2006 have been fixed on the basis of scientific
assessments and historical catches.

One of the advantages of the Greenland Agreement is that it
allows the Community to exchange quotas with Norway, Iceland
and the Faeroe Islands, and to purchase additional quotas.

18. The technical data sheets (evaluation reports) referred to by
the Court were introduced following the October 1997 Council
meeting of Fisheries Ministers. The sheets, which have been
improved since then, are sent to Parliament and the Council before
negotiations start on new protocols.

In addition to examining historical, legal, political, economic and
other aspects, the Commission considers in the evaluation report
consistency with other areas of the common fisheries policy and
other Community policies, in particular development policy. This
assessment report contains data on the state of stocks, on catch
levels, on the rate of use of fishing possibilities, and on the use of
the funds allocated to targeted measures, research, the monitor-
ing of fishing activities and technical aspects.

It should be noted also that the Greenland Agreement is and has
been the only Community funding instrument which provides
assistance for Greenland. This means that, implicitly at least, its
scope is wider than that of other fisheries agreements. This was
recognised on the conclusion of the negotiation of the fourth Pro-
tocol by the following unilateral Community statement: ‘... that
on the basis of its own assessments, an amount of EUR 28 mil-
lion out of the financial compensation ... was deemed to reflect
the genuine fisheries components as they stand at present’.

23. The Commission agrees that guarantees could reduce under-
utilisation of agreements. There is no consensus in the Council,
however, on their application.

However, despite the progress that has been achieved, the con-
tents of the evaluation reports need further improvement.

A system like this would require financial guarantees from ship-
owners when applying for fishing possibilities during the negotia-
tion of new agreements or protocols. The payment of advances by
tuna vessels is a specific case of a guarantee.

27.7.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 210/23

Sharing out the financial burden

complete information about jobs linked to the fisheries agree-
ments is contained in the evaluation study presented to the Coun-
cil in 1999.

25. The Commission is systematically trying to ensure that ship-
owners bear a larger share but the final outcome will depend on
the negotiations with the Member States, some of which are
strongly opposed to any increase. The Commission, nevertheless,
is continuing to seek one.

Since the October 1997 meeting of Council Ministers, the Com-
mission has secured an increase in the relative share of the costs
for some tuna agreements (Gabon, Seychelles, Angola, São Tomé,
Guinea, Mauritius, Côte d’Ivoire) in the sense that shipowners
now pay relatively more (European Union/shipowners’ shares
having changed from 80/20 to 75/25).

31. The performance criteria will have to focus on essential
aspects of the agreements such as the attainment of the objectives
regarding fishing possibilities, which is the most important one
for the Community when examining the rate of utilisation of indi-
vidual agreements. The attainment of the objectives regarding tar-
geted measures will also have to be assessed in so far as it is ben-
eficial not only to the fishing interests of the coastal country but
also to the sustainable nature of the management of the resources
in question to which Community fishermen have access. Aspects
concerning restructuring and employment will have to be incor-
porated in a more broad-based way in the light of the mobility of
the fleets.

Indispensable information

Restructuring strategy

26 and 27. The Commission is progressively introducing assess-
ment criteria in accordance with the Council conclusions of
October 1997. Since then, before negotiations start on the renewal
of existing protocols, the Commission sends an evaluation report
to the Council and, from late 2000, to Parliament as well.

The contents of the evaluation report are described in point 18.

32. The Commission shares the view of the Court. The Green
Paper on the future of the common fisheries policy states that
there is a problem of consistency within the common fisheries
policy between, for example, fisheries agreements on one hand
and vessel transfers receiving support under the Financial Instru-
ment for Fisheries Guidance on the other. Vessels owned by com-
panies with predominantly European financial interests are com-
peting for the same resource but under different rules.

THE INTENDED PURPOSE OF THE AGREEMENTS

The Commission will seek to ensure greater consistency between
the various components of the common fisheries policy in the
framework of the 2002 review.

Stability of fishing opportunities

29. The level of catches taken by Community vessels operating
under fisheries agreements in non-member countries declined
sharply in 2000 as a result of the failure to renew the Agreement
with Morocco; the share of the Community budget earmarked for
fisheries agreements was cut by half in that year.

The Commission would like to underline the considerable tight-
ening of the rules on the grant of assistance to the fleet under the
new Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (Regulation (EC)
No 2792/1999) for the period 2000 to 2006, in particular for
joint enterprises. Unfortunately, the Council was unwilling to
adopt the Commission proposal to prevent the issue of licences
to vessels belonging to fleet segments which failed to comply with
the objectives of the multiannual guidance programmes.

Supply to the market and aid to employment

30. The principal objective of the fisheries agreements con-
cluded with non-member countries is to maintain fishing possi-
bilities, which themselves create jobs in the Community regions
dependent on fishing. It is true, as the Court says, that the most

33 and 34. The Commission agrees with the Court of Auditors’
analysis that a resegmentation of the Spanish and Portuguese
fleets operating in Moroccan waters would have been desirable as
a way of better regulating a programmed decrease in fishing effort
as provided for in the fisheries agreement. For reasons linked to
the regulatory provisions (the presence of a single international
fleet segment in the multiannual guidance programme (MAGP)
and the timetable (non-overlap of periods of application of MAGPs
and the Agreement), the Spanish authorities, when asked to

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consider this approach in 1994 and 1995, raised objections and
it could not then be adopted by the Commission. Politically, as it
was not possible to redeploy the overcapacity identifiable at the
time because of lack of alternative fishing possibilities, the pro-
grammed scrapping of 40 % of the vessels in question was an
indefensible option in circumstances where at that particular time
the collapse of the agreement had not been established with suf-
ficient certainty.

The Commission recognises the special nature of investments in
shipbuilding in a fishery under threat: it is true that 125 vessels
began fishing under the Agreement with Morocco during the
period of the last Protocol (1 December 1995 to 30 November
1999), including 54 newly-built ones that had received public
funding. It should be noted, however, that the selection of invest-
ment projects, which was a matter for the Member States con-
cerned, was made in compliance with the criteria laid down in
Community rules. As in the case of the implementation of the
MAGPs, it must be emphasised that the Commission has no power
to oppose aids for shipbuilding once the objectives set for the cor-
responding fleet segment are not overrun. Consequently it was
not possible to create a fleet segment for this particular case. This
matter will have to be dealt with in the future.

The reduction in the number of licences during the term of the
last Protocol to the Agreement with Morocco represents part of
the overall restructuring of the international segment.

The common fisheries policy seeks to improve the balance between
fishing effort, and hence fleet capacity, and the resources avail-
able, including under fisheries agreements and in international
waters. The existing available instruments (MAGPs) and the object
to which they apply (vessels with a life of some 30 years) are dif-
ficult to reconcile however with political decisions that can rap-
idly reduce fishing possibilities to levels that create situations
which are difficult to manage.

35. The main aim of the Agreement with Argentina was to assist
in efforts to restructure the fleet and in particular to seek the
transfer of vessels which had lost fishing opportunities in other
fishing areas.

The Commission considers that the goal of restructuring the
Community fleet has been attained through the definitive transfer
to Argentina of 29 vessels as part of joint enterprises and the tem-
porary transfer of three vessels as part of joint ventures.

Regarding other aspects of this Agreement on which the Com-
mission considered that Argentina had failed to comply, it should
be noted that the Commission has suspended payment of the bal-
ance of EUR 6 million of the aid for scientific and technical coop-
eration.

36.

(See reply to point 32.)

Coordination of Community policies

37. To ensure consistency between development policy and the
common fisheries policy, in particular through its bilateral agree-
ments, the Commission has made a number of adjustments to the
two policies in question and to their implementing procedures.

Considerable progress has been achieved since the October 1997
Council meeting of Fisheries Ministers: evaluation reports on
agreements and protocols are now prepared by DG Fisheries
(FISH) in close cooperation with DG Development (DEV); the lat-
ter takes part in negotiations; an interdepartmental group has
been set up between DG FISH and DG DEV; DG FISH attends
annual meetings on individual countries arranged by DG DEV
(country reviews); targeted measures have been extended to encour-
age the more responsible exploitation of resources. In addition,
since the October 1997 meeting, reporting requirements for these
measures have been introduced during the negotiation of new
protocols.

The Commission adopted a communication on fisheries and pov-
erty reduction in November 2000 and examined the international
dimension in the Green Paper on the future of the common fish-
eries policy, presented in March 2001. In both cases, coordina-
tion is the focus of the Commission’s analysis and proposals.

39. On the question of the increase in EDF funding, the alloca-
tion for Senegal rose from EUR 22,7 million in the period 1994
to 1996 to EUR 27,9 million in the period 1997 to 1998. This
increase had been decided on independently of the negotiations
on the fisheries agreement, all of the funds having been earmarked
for development measures (road maintenance, education, health,
etc.) totally unconnected with fisheries. The development mea-
sures for fisheries contained in certain bilateral fisheries agree-
ments (targeted measures) are funded under the only budget head-
ing to which fisheries agreements can be charged and full details
of the amounts are given in the terms of the agreement.

By its nature the Agreement with Argentina implies that, as part
of joint enterprises, the vessels are transferred definitively and
consequently fly the Argentinian flag and are fully subject to
Argentinian law.

Development measures for fisheries in developing countries are
funded under the Financial Instruments for development coop-
eration (EDF).

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Concerning coordination between the Commission departments
concerned, considerable progress has been achieved in recent
years, as explained in point 37.

allocated to developing the national fishing industry. At the Com-
mission’s request, the Senegalese authorities have presented reports
on the use made of the compensation.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENTS

Management shortcomings

42. On the question of the unilateral two-month suspension by
Morocco of fishing for cephalopods on biological grounds, the
Joint Committee was effectively blocked over this issue due to a
difference of interpretation of the justification. The Moroccan side
refused to provide scientific data.

The Commission, when negotiating new protocols, seeks to
include a requirement on the compulsory exchange of scientific
information. In addition, the majority of fisheries agreements
provide that where conservation or other measures affecting the
fishing activities of the Community fleet are taken by the authori-
ties of the non-member country, the terms of the protocols and
technical annexes, including the financial provisions, may be
adapted in consequence. The Agreement with Morocco for the
period 1995 to 1999 did not contain such a clause.

In the case of Argentina, while the Agreement made no direct
provision for the possibility of reducing the Community contri-
bution to scientific and technical cooperation (financial compen-
sation), the Commission, considering that the fishing possibili-
ties had been reduced unilaterally and that some terms of the
Agreement had not been observed, suspended payment of the
balance of the aid for scientific and technical cooperation.

44. The Green Paper on the future of the common fisheries
policy recognises that in order to allow for an assessment of value
for money, fisheries agreements should distinguish clearly between
fisheries and development.

46 and 47.
In the case of the landings and reloading under the
Agreement with Morocco referred to by the Court, the Commis-
sion would point out that the vessels’ obligations regarding land-
ings were respected.

In addition, Annex III to the Agreement states clearly that landed
fishery products are regarded as goods in ‘temporary transit’.
Shipowners decide on the use to which the goods on their vessels
are put. They may be processed, stored under customs control,
sold in Morocco or exported.

However, despite the fact that the Agreement was observed, the
Commission made known its intention of revising the clauses on
landings during the negotiations on the new protocol, which were
unsuccessful.

Control shortcomings

48 and 49. At the start of each year the Commission draws up a
general programme for fisheries inspections under which its
inspectors attend inspections carried out by the Member States at
sea and in ports, and at fish marketing venues.

43. The Commission is aware of concerns about the monitor-
ing of specific measures. However, a uniform approach cannot be
applied and the special circumstances of each agreement have
also to be considered.

The inspection unit keeps a detailed list of the dates of assign-
ments planned and of ports likely to be visited and prepares a
report on its activities during the previous year.

In any negotiation there is a question of balance as regards objec-
tives. Non-member countries consider that the agreements rep-
resent an exchange of fishing possibilities in return for funding.

However, the small number of Commission inspectors available
means that priorities have to be set for inspection assignments.

The Commission, however, would like to mention the recent
agreements which include reporting requirements.

In the case of Senegal, for example, the Protocol for 1997 to 2001
provided that a substantial part of the compensation would be

In the case of fisheries agreements, control objectives and specific
checks are comprehensively provided for already in the Commu-
nity rules and the terms of the agreements. Responsibility for
checking the agreed arrangements is a matter for the non-member
countries and the Member States concerned under the Commu-
nity rules in force. These rules, in particular Articles 17 and 18 of
Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93, impose obligations on the Member
States, compliance with which has to be checked by the Commis-
sion.

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49. All alleged breaches contained in inspection reports are
studied by the competent departments in DG FISH which, acting
in accordance with the Community rules on the monitoring of
fishing activities, make an evaluation of each shortcoming detected
during inspections carried out in the Member States. A decision
is then taken whether to exchange information with the Member
States or to initiate legal proceedings.

tions on the renewal of existing protocols take place, the Com-
mission sends an assessment report to the Council and, from late
2000, to Parliament as well. These assessment reports contain
data on the state of stocks, on catch levels, on the rate of use of
fishing possibilities, on the use of amounts allocated to targeted
measures and other relevant matters.

However, as it may be possible to tighten up the system, this mat-
ter will be raised with the Member States during the debate on the
Green Paper on the future of the common fisheries policy.

Internal work has already been carried out and more evaluation
is planned with the development of the evaluation function. In
addition, in accordance with the Financial Regulation, the Com-
mission intends to launch a new external evaluation study in two
to three years.

51. The Commission is aware of the shortcomings referred to by
the Court and regularly draws Member States’ attention to the
need to record catches and landings.

In order to improve knowledge of the state of stocks, the Com-
mission has stepped up cooperation with the FAO in this field.

In addition, it encourages cooperation between inspection depart-
ments within and between Member States.

It should be pointed out too that the regular meetings of the Joint
Committees are an essential tool in the ongoing monitoring of
the functioning of the agreements.

The implementation of the special provisions on control in the
fisheries agreements has substantially improved compliance with
the existing obligations.

53.
It is true that some irregularities involving entries in log-
books were committed by certain vessels operating under fisher-
ies agreements.

It is important to remember in this respect that there are two sov-
ereign parties, the Community and the non-member country, and
that the proper functioning of an agreement depends on coopera-
tion on both sides. In the light of the conclusions of the debate
on the Green Paper on the future of the common fisheries policy,
and also as part of the administrative reform now under way, the
Commission will seek to establish criteria and performance indi-
cators for the agreements.

The Commission considers that these breaches are not systematic.
Furthermore, the logbook is only one of several factors used to
measure the benefits of fisheries agreements.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Cost-benefit ratio

55. The Commission is systematically seeking to ensure that
shipowners bear a larger share of the cost of international agree-
ments. However, the final outcome will depend on the negotia-
tions with the Member States. Since the October 1997 Council
meeting of Fisheries Ministers, the Commission has secured an
increase in the relative share of the costs for a significant number
of tuna agreements (Gabon, Seychelles, Angola, São Tomé, Guinea,
Mauritius, Côte d’Ivoire) in the sense that shipowners now pay
relatively more (European Union/shipowners’ shares having
changed from 80/20 to 75/25).

The Commission is continuing to seek an increase even if some
Member States are strongly opposed.

54. The Commission agrees that there are weaknesses in the sys-
tem for monitoring and evaluating international fisheries agree-
ments that need to be addressed. However, the situation has much
improved recently. An important step was taken in 1999 when
the results of an external evaluation study were forwarded to the
Council for discussion. Furthermore, the Commission has gradu-
ally been introducing assessment criteria in accordance with the
Council conclusions of October 1997. Since then, before negotia-

The Commission agrees with the Court that requests from Mem-
ber States during negotiations should actually be used by vessel
owners. Guarantees could be a means of achieving this. Under the
new Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance Regulation, guar-
antees have been introduced for the establishment of joint enter-
prises.

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The Green Paper on the future of the common fisheries policy
calls for an examination of the extension of the obligation, already
existing in a number of agreements with developing countries, of
a financial contribution from shipowners receiving fishing rights
under agreements involving Community financial compensation,
also in the case of fisheries agreements with the northern and Bal-
tic States.

The intended purpose of the agreements

measures have been extended to encourage the introduction of
means of ensuring the more responsible exploitation of resources,
particularly in the area of evaluation and the surveillance and
control of fishing activities.

The Commission adopted a communication on fisheries and pov-
erty reduction in November 2000 and examined the international
dimension in the Green Paper on the future of the common fish-
eries policy, presented in March 2001. In both cases, coordina-
tion is the focus of the Commission’s analysis and proposals.

56. The fisheries agreements, which to start with were purely
commercial, have gradually introduced development aims for the
fishing industry in the countries concerned. This approach reflects,
among other things, concern to ensure consistency between Com-
munity policy and agreements and development policy.

57. The Commission is aware of the need to ensure consistency
between the structural and international aspects of the common
fisheries policy. In partnership with the Member States, the Com-
mission will endeavour to provide appropriate instruments for
strengthening consistency between those two aspects, in particu-
lar during the debate on the Green Paper on the future of the
common fisheries policy.

Funding for measures to develop the fishing industry in the devel-
oping countries comes from the Financial Instruments for devel-
opment cooperation (EDF and budget headings).

When negotiating with non-member countries on the renewal of
protocols, the Commission takes account of the circumstances in
the country, and in particular of the emergence of a fishing sec-
tor or the establishment of a national fleet. It provides support,
through targeted measures, for funding to that end.

Fisheries cooperation measures such as those contained in certain
bilateral fisheries agreements (targeted measures) receive funding
under the only budget heading to which fisheries agreements may
be charged (heading B7-8 0 0 0) and full details are set out in the
terms of the agreements.

Management shortcomings

It should be noted also that the amount earmarked for the tar-
geted measures forms part of the funding which the Community
has decided to allocate to the agreement. In addition, this means
that part of the Community contribution can be used for mea-
sures to encourage the more responsible exploitation of the non-
member country’s fishery resources.

58. The principal objective of the fisheries agreements con-
cluded with non-member countries is to maintain fishing oppor-
tunities, which themselves create jobs in the areas dependent on
fishing. The conclusions of the October 1997 meeting of Fisher-
ies Ministers provide that aspects which cannot be quantified such
as the Union’s political relations and the strategic importance of
the presence of the Community fleet in non-member countries
must also be taken into account.

To ensure consistency between development policy and the com-
mon fisheries policy, in particular through its bilateral agree-
ments, the Commission has made a number of adjustments to the
two policies in question and to their implementing procedures.

Considerable progress has been achieved since the October 1997
Council meeting of Fisheries Ministers: evaluation reports on
agreements and protocols are now prepared by DG FISH in close
cooperation with DG DEV; the latter takes part in the negotia-
tions; an interdepartmental group has been set up between DG
FISH and DG DEV; DG FISH attends annual meetings on indi-
vidual countries arranged by DG DEV (country reviews); targeted

In order to reinforce the legally binding nature of fisheries agree-
ments and improve their monitoring, the Commission, when
negotiating new protocols, seeks to include a requirement on the
compulsory exchange of scientific data. In addition, the majority
of fisheries agreements provide that where conservation or other
measures affecting the fishing activities of the Community fleet
are adopted by the authorities of the non-member country, the
terms of the protocols and technical annexes, including the finan-
cial provisions, may be adapted in consequence.

In addition, in the case of targeted measures, for example, report-
ing requirements have been included in new protocols since the
October 1997 Council meeting of Fisheries Ministers.

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Control shortcomings

59. Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 sets out the general obliga-
tions of both the Member States concerned and the Commission
regarding monitoring, inspection and surveillance of fishing activi-
ties in Community waters and of Community fishing vessels
beyond those waters. Specific obligations concerning these mat-
ters are contained in fishery agreements and regulations laying
down regional fisheries organisations’ schemes.

The Commission has taken a number of steps in recent years to
improve fisheries control. Major progress has been achieved. The
Commission is well aware of the continuing weaknesses and will
take further action to address them.

Concerning the follow-up to previous findings, the Commission
departments examine all alleged breaches contained in the inspec-
tion reports. A decision is then taken on whether to exchange
information with the Member States or to initiate legal proceed-
ings.

In view of the limited powers conferred on it in this respect, the
Commission regularly checks the way in which the Member States
apply the agreed rules.

As part of the 2002 review of the common fisheries policy, the
Commission will examine with the Member States ways of improv-
ing inspection by the Commission and control by the Member
States.