Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation and creating a European Aviation Safety Agency"
Date: 2001-05-30
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: European Aviation Safety Agency, air transport, transport safety

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breach of the terms of the concession; these would have to be
settled in the national courts, or even go to the Court of Justice
in Luxembourg for a preliminary ruling.

8.1.5.
automatically take care of 17(2).

The proposed amendment to Article 17(1) would

8.1.3.
The Committee proposes raising the transitional
period to 8-10 years, with consideration being given to the
possibility of applying different arrangements in the various
Member States.

8.1.6.
As a constructive alternative the Committee therefore
suggests a selective system of transitional periods differen-
tiating between the various categories and modes of transport.

A r t i c l e 1 7 ( 2 )

The additional period of up to three years specified
8.1.4.
in Article 17(2) for operators investing in rail infrastructure is
still too short to amortise the investment.

8.1.7.
The Committee is very pleased to note that applicant
country operators are treated as Community operators for the
purposes of this Regulation and it hopes that these countries
will also be able to apply the provisions of the Regulation in
full when the treaties of accession come into force.

Brussels, 30 May 2001.

The President

of the Economic and Social Committee

Göke FRERICHS

Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation and
creating a European Aviation Safety Agency’

(2001/C 221/05)

On 22 December 2000 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under
Article 80 (2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the above-mentioned proposal.

The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for
preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 8 May 2001. The rapporteur was
Mr von Schwerin.

At its 382nd plenary session held on 30 and 31 May 2001 (meeting of 30 May) the Committee adopted
the following opinion by 112 votes to one, with one abstention.

1.

Introduction

1.1.
In its Introduction, the Commission recalls the need to
establish, as a logical complement to the rules establishing the
internal air transport market, common rules in the field of
aviation safety. The current system, based on Regulation (EEC)
3922/91 and the work of the Joint Aviation Authorities (1),

(1) The JAA consists of a number of civil aviation regulatory
authorities who have agreed to co-operate in developing and
implementing safety regulatory standards and procedures. For this
purpose, they develop and adopt Joint Aviation Requirements
(JARs) and undertake to implement these in a co-ordinated and
uniform manner.

has, in the opinion of the Commission, been shown to be not
working properly. The current system is seen as lengthy,
inflexible and often inconsistent with Community obligations
and policies.

1.2.
In order to remedy the perceived deficiencies of
the current system, and to create a European Safety body
comparable to the US Federal Aviation Authorities (FAA), the
Council adopted on 16 July 1998 a decision to authorise the
Commission to negotiate with non-Community JAA member
states an agreement establishing a European Aviation Safety
Authority (EASA) with the legal status of an international
organisation, covering all tasks related to the regulation of
aviation safety.

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1.3.
The Commission however, expressed doubts about the
feasibility of this system in view of constitutional problems
with some Member States, the lengthy procedures involved,
and the perceived uncertainty of the Parliament and national
parliaments willingness to accept
the wide delegation of
powers involved. At the invitation of the Council, the Com-
mission presented an analysis of a possible Community
alternative, which was considered by the Council as the most
practicable way forward. The current Proposal contains the
Community alternative.

2. Gist of the Commission’s Proposal

The Commission’s explanatory memorandum to the

2.1.
proposal makes the following points:

2.2.
The achievement of the original objectives and the
implementation of related means require the creation of a
specialised agency, with a high level of expertise. Moreover,
the Commission considers that in order to play its role
effectively in protecting public interests internally and promot-
ing European views externally, the agency needs to be vested
with real powers and enjoy the necessary independence.

However,

the Commission is also of

2.3.
the opinion
that the exercise of executive powers and the control of
implementation of rules and regulations is the prerogative of
the Commission. Delegation to another body may only be
done on the basis of rules limiting its discretion to a technical
judgement within the sphere of competence.

Thus, to remain in line with this described institutional

2.4.
architecture, the Commission proposes a two step approach:

— the proposal contains basic principles for the certification
and maintenance of aeronautical products and prescribes
essential requirements based on Annex 8 to the Chicago
Convention and existing Community legislation appli-
cable to environmental protection;

— as for all other fields of aviation safety, in particular safety
aspects of air operations, flight crew licensing, airport
operations and air traffic management, basic principles
and essential requirements will have to be adopted in due
course in accordance with the normal legislative process,
to complement the present proposed Regulation.

Thus the proposal limits itself to those aviation safety aspects
which relate to products, important for the European aeronaut-
ical industry, and does not cover airline operational aspects,
airport aspects and air traffic control aspects.

As regards the system the Commission proposes, it is

2.5.
based on the following principles:

— the European Parliament and the Council set basic
principles for regulation and essential requirements defin-
ing the level of safety and environmental protection
required;

— in the way the essential requirements are to be implement-
ed, in particular the procedure to be followed to obtain
the necessary approvals, the privileges attached to such
approvals, as well as applicable technical standards, the
option of delegation to the Commission has been chosen.

As noted under 2.4, the Commission envisages to
2.6.
implement this system for products and their maintenance. As
regards the basic principles and essential requirements for
operations, personnel, airports and ATC services, Article 7
merely determines that the Commission shall, where appropri-
ate and as soon as possible submit proposals thereon. Thus, a
two tier approach is introduced, separating for the time being
products from other aviation safety aspects.

2.7.
In cases where rules are to be applied by Member
States they would need to be set by the European Parliament
and the Council. The Commission would then be given the
capacity to complement them when they refer to very specific
technical fields and to adapt them to specific scientific or
technical progress. This would in particular apply to air
operators’ certification requirements or flight crew licensing,
which are at this stage, not covered by the proposed legislation,
but which will have to be adopted in due course.

The Commission considers that for products, a differ-
2.8.
ent situation applies. Uniformity would be best achieved
through centralised certification. Moreover,
in view of the
rapid technological evolvement, it is considered that over-
specification of technical details at legislative level is undesir-
able. The Commission would thus be empowered to adopt the
necessary implementing rules. The agency would have the
technical discretion to evaluate the conformity of the product
with the essential requirements.

2.9.
For products, implementing rules would be mainly
procedural requirements as contained in applicable Joint
Airworthiness Requirements (1) (JAR) of the JAA. The agency

(1) The JAA are committed to the joint certification of new aircraft,
engines, and propellers and have established a joint system of
approval. Apart from the JAR-21 ‘Certification Procedures for
Aircraft and Related Products and Parts’, the JAA has currently
adopted, amongst others, codes for the certification of large
aeroplanes (JAR-25), small aeroplanes (JAR-23) and powered/sail
planes (JAR-22), helicopters (JAR-27/29) engines/APU (JAR-APU),
props (JAR-P) and equipment (JAR-TSO).

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would be empowered with the granting of certificates attesting
the conformity of products with the essential requirements,
because this is considered to be a purely technical judgement.

2.10.
For maintenance, where centralisation is not envis-
aged, the Commission proposes a mixed approach, where the
Commission is
the necessary
implementing rules in a sufficiently detailed manner, based on
the applicable existing JAR.

empowered

adopt

to

2.11.
In Article 46, the Agency is awarded investigative
powers (also referred to as ‘inspections’) for the purpose of
carrying out the duties assigned to it by the Regulation. Two
specific types of investigative powers are further defined in
Articles 47 and 48. In order to ensure the correct application
of the safety rules, the Agency is empowered to inspect
Member States (Article 47), in assistance to the Commission,
and undertakings (Article 48).

Finally,

2.12.
the Commission has included a judicial
control mechanism. In order to prevent that technical cases
are presented to the Court of Justice, a specialised level of
boards of appeal is proposed as a place of first instance. The
members of such a Board (or Boards) will be appointed by the
Agency Administrative Board from a list of candidates pre-
pared by the Commission (Articles 31-36).

3. General comments

3.1. General aim

The Committee endorses the objective of the Com-
3.1.1.
munity policy on aviation safety and welcomes the proposal
of the Commission.

3.1.2.
The Committee shares the view that there is a need
for a strong organisation with extended powers in all fields of
aviation safety and the potential for taking over executive tasks
currently exercised at national level when collective action
appears more efficient. It endorses the view expressed by the
European Parliament that a single aviation safety regulatory
authority should be established, with the prime task of
ensuring a uniform high level of safety in Europe through the
gradual integration of the national systems. The Committee
agrees with the Commission, that in order to attain such a
body, the best possible use should be made of the framework
provided for by the European Union. The Committee wel-
comes the proposal of the Commission to establish common
rules in the field of civil aviation and to create a European
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).

3.2.
Nevertheless, the Committee does have a number of
critical points which would need to be addressed. The Com-
mittee considers it vital that the proposed Regulation should
indeed achieve its stated goals. Although the current Com-
mission’s proposal is a creative and novel first step, it does not
yet appear to fulfil its promise. It still contains a number of
uncertainties and inconsistencies that need to be eliminated.
More importantly, on a number of points the proposal could
be enhanced substantially. The Committee recalls the comment
made in an earlier Opinion that it is important that the Agency
would be able to set up all the rules governing aviation
safety (1). The proposal would need to ensure that this goal is
indeed achieved in due course.

3.3. The proposed approach

The Committee notes that

3.3.1.
the
Commission builds on the work and experience gained with
Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 on the harmonisation of
technical requirements and administrative procedures in the
field of civil aviation.

the proposal of

The Committee welcomes that the proposal takes
3.3.2.
due account of the views expressed by the European Parliament
in the earlier discussions on the draft
and the Council
Convention and has worked closely with the Council
in
preparing the current proposal.

3.3.3.
The Committee is pleased that the Commission has
presented a creative and studied approach that contains novel
concepts to attain the stated goals.

3.4. Criticisms and suggestions

3.4.1. T h e a u t o n o m y o f t h e a g e n c y

3.4.1.1.
As regards products and their maintenance the
proposal envisages to implement a system of delegation of
powers to the Commission. The Committee acknowledges that
when it comes to implementing rules, delegation to the
Commission is both useful and desirable. Nevertheless, the
proposal could further clarify those cases where the necessary
supervising role of European Parliament and Council would
remain intact.

3.4.1.2. Moreover, while the Committee welcomes the
efforts made by the Commission to accommodate an auton-
omous agency, the Committee wonders whether the current
institutional
framework could not accommodate a more
independent position for EASA, particularly when it comes to
establishing highly technical implementing rules and standards.

(1) OJ C 14 of 16.1.2001, p. 33, see conclusions regarding Regu-

lation (EEC) 3922/91.

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The Committee notes that

3.4.1.3.
the proposal does
contain some scope for the Agency in its ability to provide
guidance material and acceptable means of compliance.
Whether this can be seen as rulemaking or policy could be a
matter for debate. The Committee notes that there is certainly
some room for manoeuvre in the proposal in this respect to
claim that the Agency indeed does have independent powers
to implement technical rules. The Commission has included
an in itself welcome amount of independence in the proposal.

3.4.1.4.
The Committee welcomes the principle embodied
in the proposal that the legislator would not have complete
and detailed technical responsibility, which would enhance its
oversight and policy function. The Committee wonders wheth-
er while this is indeed relevant for the Parliament and Council,
it would also not be relevant to the Commission. Particularly
in the field of aviation safety, it is important that the basic
system for safety is determined at the right political level (thus,
there is a clear task for the European Parliament and the
Council to take their responsibility). The basis on which
individual safety elements are arranged is also a task for the
regulator, either directly the European Parliament and the
Council or, through delegation, the Commission. However, it
would seem undesirable for the regulator to be too specific
on technical detail, which could entail automatic political
responsibility in case of accident. It is here that the role of the
Agency, expert in these matters, would come into play. What
under normal circumstances under a national legislation would
be further delegation of rulemaking powers to an Agency,
would not seem to be possible under the Treaty.

3.4.1.5.
In its Explanatory Memorandum, the Commission
adheres to a strict interpretation of the jurisprudence of
the Court which determined that delegation of powers is
permissible only when ‘it involves clearly defined executive
powers, the exercise of which can, therefore, be subject to
strict review in the light of objective criteria determined by the
delegating authority’.

Thus, the Commission only limits the delegation
3.4.1.6.
of powers for EASA on the issue of type certification. The
initial focus of the proposal is on products. It is submitted by
the Commission that products need centralised certification.
Moreover, since technological advances evolve rapidly, it is
not good to over-specify technical details. Although no specific
motivation of this claim is offered, the Committee considers
that this could indeed be the case.

3.4.1.8.
seem to be valid for all fields of technical safety.

The conclusion of the Commission would thus

3.4.1.9.
The Committee considers that implementing rules
of a strictly technical nature (guidance and recommended —
or rather: acceptable — practices) could be well seen to fall
within the scope of the jurisprudence. Much will depend on
the wording of the basic regulations put forward by the
Commission and the technical detail involved. In this respect
the Committee feels that, in line with the call of the European
Parliament and in accordance with the stated desire of the
Commission to provide the necessary independence, more
could be done to award the agency with the necessary technical
implementing powers, including specific technical rulemaking
powers, provided the wording is precise enough and indeed
limited to the technical rules only, and submitted to strict
review by the delegating authority. Much depends on the
interpretation of the word ‘rulemaking’. It would be hard to
legally binding regulations.
delegate the power to adopt
However, when it comes to implementing rules, like standards
and guidance material, technical specifications, there would
seem to be room for improvement. There is no reason not to
view them as binding, certainly in the sense that individuals
and undertakings can rely on them and invoke them in Court.

3.4.1.10. Moreover, this independent position could be
more emphasised in the other Articles of
the proposed
Regulation, where it is noted that the independence is not
reflected and the agency would rather be seen to be fully part
of the Commission. At this stage, the role of EASA seems to
be mainly assisting and support the Commission and providing
technical expertise to the Commission.

3.4.1.11.
EASA is clearly closely linked to the Commission,
staffed with people who have the status of Commission
temporary and permanent staff. As regards the use of tempor-
ary staff, the proposal would need to consider the necessity to
maintain continuity both in staff levels and expertise. Where
possible longer-term contracts should be considered.

3.4.1.12.
In preparing draft legislation the Agency has no
option but to follow the instructions of the Commission. It is
doubtful whether the text allows the Agency any possibility to
refuse or initiate. The Agency would at least need to have the
right to refuse to prepare regulations that it does not support
from the point of view of aviation safety.

3.4.1.7.
The Committee does not see however, why such a
conclusion would not also be applicable to all aviation
operations, maintenance or personnel requirements. Similarly,
this would seem to apply to airport and air traffic management
aspects.

3.4.1.13.
In international affairs, the Agency is obliged to
assist the Commission, and thus must of necessity, bear or at
least share the burden of responsibility, even if it would not
agree with something.

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3.4.1.14.
The emphasis of the position of the Executive
Director of EASA is on independence. He/she is not to take
instruction from any government or body. But as far as the
Commission is concerned, that is clearly not the case. Since
the Commission is the main regulator, this would seem to be
confusing at least.

On the independent position of the Agency and its ability to
act in international matters, the Council in particular would be
in a position to strengthen the Regulation.

3.4.2. S c o p e o f t h e p r o p o s a l

The proposal

3.4.2.1.
initially focuses on products and
appliances only. Operations, personnel, airports and air traffic
management are not dealt with at all or not completely. It
would seem that on these issues, the Commission considers
that political agreement would be feasible, while for the other
elements that would be more complicated.

3.4.2.2.
The Committee considers that as regards airports
and Air Traffic Management, this would indeed seem to be the
case. In these areas, views and concepts are still
in need
of further development before effective inclusion could be
contemplated. However, as for operational and personnel
issues and to a certain extent related operational maintenance
issues, this is seen as a major deficiency. The stated goal of a
high uniform level of safety in aviation is thus not reached.

3.4.2.3.
The Committee welcomes therefore Article 7 that
states that the Commission shall, with regard to the basic
principles and essential requirements, where appropriate and
as soon as possible, submit proposals to the Parliament and
the Council for adoption on the basis of Article 80(2) of the
Treaty.

JAR/OPS

of Regulation

The Committee considers

3.4.2.4.
that Article 8 (jo.
Article 56) where the Regulation repeals Regulation (EEC)
3922/91 creates a difficult situation, particularly when the
(EEC)
amendment
proposed
No 3922/91 enters into force before the adoption of this
proposed Regulation (1). The JAR/OPS amendment of Regu-
lation (EEC) No 3922/91 after all ensures harmonised
implementation of the JAR/OPS in the Community and is a
valuable first step in the direction of a truly Community wide
harmonisation of operational safety. Abandoning this with the
implementation of the proposed Regulation on EASA, would
mean that all operational aspects of 3922/91 could be lost.
Although Article 56 of the proposal does contain a provision
which could be interpreted to prevent this, it would need
further clarification. Moreover, the proposal, in particular its

(1) OJ C 14, 16.1.2001, p. 33.

Annex, would need to ensure that the benefits of the JAR-OPS
amendment of Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 would be
preserved (2). The Committee agrees that
the JAR-OPS
amendment
implemented, withdrawal of Regu-
lation (EEC) No 3922/91 would not matter greatly, since it
currently covers mainly airworthiness elements, adequately
covered by the proposed Regulation.

is not

if

3.4.2.5.
Apart from safeguarding this important element,
the Committee considers that it is important that the proposed
Regulation would do more and already would include two
issues:

— a clear time-frame and schedule should be provided for
the mentioned proposals of the Commission required to
fully cover the operational, maintenance and personnel
issues essential for air transport operations in the Com-
munity;

— a clear and detailed transitional arrangement should be
included that acknowledges the work and position of the
JAA and its relation with the Community framework.

The Committee acknowledges that it would need to be a
specific point of concern of the Council
to provide the
Commission with the political support to include these.

The Committee is of the opinion that, particularly
3.4.2.6.
when it comes to safety,
it is important that concurring
competence and authority are clearly identified and defined,
particularly on all that concerns the investigating powers(3) of
the Agency, and that a complicated and non-transparent
situation is avoided as much as possible.

3.4.2.7.
Finally, in this respect, the Committee is of the
opinion that the transition period and the relationship with
the JAA work should also more clearly specify what the
position would be of the European States that are not bound
by the Acquis Communautaire. This means further clarification
of Article 54, including the introduction of the possibility for
a meaningful transition period for countries acceding to the
acquis communautaire.

(2) The Committee would like to quote its final observation men-
tioned in its Opinion CES 1179/2000 of 19.10.2000, OJ C 14,
16.1.2001, p. 35: ‘The Committee feels it is essential to establish
the planned European Air Safety Authority (EASA) as quickly as
possible. This authority would then be able to issue all the rules
governing air traffic — including the EU OPS’.

(3) The ESC notes that the Proposal for a Regulation of the EP and
the Council establishing a European Maritime Safety Agency,
COM(2000) 802 final, refers to ‘visits’ as opposed to ‘inspections’.

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3.4.3. T h e p o s i t i o n o f d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e d p a r -

3.4.5. S a f e t y a n d t h e e n v i r o n m e n t

t i e s

3.4.3.1.
Both the worker unions and industry have empha-
sised that there is a need to closely involve stakeholders in all
phases of the rulemaking process. There is indeed reason to do
so. Aviation is a highly complex technical world and much of
the know-how lies with industry and the individuals that work
there. Because of this, much of the actual responsibility in for
implementation is delegated to the ‘workfloor’, naturally under
strict supervision. The Committee is of the opinion that both
on all levels of implementation (i.e. comitology and EASA)
such representation and participation of worker unions,
industry and users could be enhanced.

3.4.3.2.
Overall, the proposal would benefit from more
transparency, not only as regards those stakeholders directly
falling under the applicability of the safety rules, but also as
regards consumers and, should environmental concerns be
maintained in the proposed Regulation, environmental inter-
ests.

3.4.3.3. Moreover, as regarded the Appeals Board,
it is
considered that the required expertise in the field of aviation
safety would need to be a major consideration for the selection
of possible candidates. Such expertise would be a requirement
in most, if not all, of the positions of the Agency’s staff.

The Committee considers that next to the Commission and
the technical representatives, also the political responsible
should be included in an appropriate manner.

3.4.4. I C A O b a s i c r e q u i r e m e n t s

3.4.4.1.
The Commission considers that adding Annex 8 to
the Chicago Convention to the Regulation, sufficiently estab-
lish the essential requirements referred to in the proposal. It is
the view of the Committee that ICAO Annex 8 only contains
a minimum standard, which needs to be met by the required
detailed national standards. On a number of product categories
Annex 8 provides no guidance at all, and changes might be
incorporated in Annex 8 in future.

3.4.4.2.
Therefore, the Committee considers this is an issue
of great concern, because it directly affects the goal of
maintaining a high level of aviation safety and also influences
the credibility of the EASA — indeed of the whole system —
with our international partners. Nevertheless, the Committee
acknowledges that in order for Annex 8 to apply within a
Community context, and in the absence of Community
membership of ICAO, including Annex 8 under the proposed
Regulation would be unavoidable.

3.4.5.1.
The Committee notes that the proposal does not
only limit itself to safety issues, but also to environmental
protection. While the proposal as yet is limited to ensuring
that products and appliances shall be certified to comply with
agreed noise standards in the Community, this element puts a
fundamental question on the table, the role and responsibility
of EASA, and moreover, the purpose of this Regulation.
Economic and environmental considerations may well conflict
with safety. The balance and possible choices that need to be
made belong to the political and regulatory level, not to the
level of implementation or implementing rules. The Committee
considers that this combination should be re-considered, also
in view of the possible extension of the scope of EASA, which
could lead to such conflict and also, confusion in the
perception of the public.

3.4.6. I n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s

The beginning of the Regulation does not provide
3.4.6.1.
for the conclusion of any sort of Agreement with third
countries, only for what is described as co-operation. Yet in
Article 9 the concept of Mutual Recognition Agreements
(MRAs) appears. As yet, MRAs are mainly used in the
context of trade discussions. The Committee considers that the
proposal would need to contain a broader wording covering
co-operation, agreements and other international arrange-
ments.

3.4.6.2.
No specific independent role is envisaged for EASA.
All contacts with third countries (including the FAA) would
have to be through the Commission. The EASA can of course
assist the Commission, but it is always under the full control
of, and working on behalf of, the Commission. The Committee
considers that this should be further enhanced. The agency
can co-operate under the working arrangements concluded by
the Commission. The Committee notes that is a very vague and
uncertain description, which may provide some administrative
flexibility, but does not bring clarity or enhance the indepen-
dence of the agency.

4. Conclusions

4.1.
The Committee feels that it is essential to establish the
planned European Aviation Safety Authority (EASA) as quickly
as possible. This authority would need to be able to issue all
the rules governing aviation safety (1).

(1) OJ C 14, 16.1.2001, p. 33, see conclusions regarding Regulation

(EEC) No 3922/91.

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4.2.
The Committee does consider it vital that the proposed
Regulation indeed reaches its stated goals. The current proposal
by the Commission is a creative and novel first step, but would
as yet not seem to fulfil its promise.

4.3.
The Committee is of the opinion that the proposal still
has a number of flaws and inconsistencies that need to be
eliminated. More importantly, on a number of elements, the
proposal should be substantially enhanced.

4.4.
The Committee feels that, in line with the call of the
European Parliament and in accordance with the stated desire
of the Commission to provide the necessary independence,
more could be done to award the Agency with the necessary
technical implementing powers, including specific technical
rulemaking powers, provided the wording is precise enough
and indeed limited to the technical rules only, and submitted
to strict review by the delegating authority.

The independent position of the Agency could be more
4.5.
emphasised in the Articles of the proposed Regulation, where
it is noted that the independence is not reflected and the
Agency would rather be seen to be fully part of the Com-
mission

4.7.
The Committee considers that Article 8 (jo. Article 56)
where the Regulation repeals Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91
creates a difficult situation, particularly when the proposed
JAR/OPS amendment of Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 enters
into force before the adoption of this proposed Regulation.
The Committee considers that Article 56 should be further
clarified in order to ensure that the benefits of EU-OPS are
preserved.

The Committee feels that much would be gained by

4.8.
including the following points:

— a clear time-frame and schedule should be provided for
the mentioned proposals of the Commission required to
fully cover the operational, maintenance and personnel
issues essential for air transport operations in the Com-
munity;

— a clear and detailed transitional arrangement should be
included that acknowledges the work and position of the
JAA and its relation with the Community framework.

4.9.
The Committee acknowledges that it would need to be
a specific point of concern of the Council to provide the
Commission with the political support to include these.

4.6.
On the independent position of the Agency and its
ability to act in international matters, the Council in particular
would be in a position to strengthen the Regulation.

transparency, stakeholder participation,

Finally, the Committee considers that on the points
4.10.
of
transition and
relations with third countries, the proposal could be substan-
tially enhanced and clarified.

Brussels, 30 May 2001.

The President

of the Economic and Social Committee

Göke FRERICHS