Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the "Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on action by Member States concerning public service requirements and the award of public service contracts in passenger transport by rail, road and inland waterway"
Date: 2001-05-30
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: State aid, award of contract, carriage of passengers, competition law, public service

7.8.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 221/31

Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on action by Member States concerning public service requirements
and the award of public service contracts in passenger transport by rail, road and inland
waterway’

(2001/C 221/04)

On 20 October 2000 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under
Article 71 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the above-mentioned proposal.

The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for
preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 8 May 2001. The rapporteur was
Mr Garcı´a Alonso and the co-rapporteur Mr von Schwerin.

At its 382nd plenary session (meeting of 30 May 2001) the Economic and Social Committee unanimously
adopted the following opinion.

1.

Introduction

1.1.
The aim of this Regulation is to enhance legal certainty
by creating a harmonised framework for exclusive rights and
State aid in passenger transport, thereby ensuring that they are
compatible with the single market in the transport sector.

As is pointed out in the explanatory memorandum to
1.2.
the proposal,
the situation varies considerably from one
Member State to another: some markets are open to compe-
tition (on the basis of tendering for public service contracts of
varying duration), while in a substantial number of countries
there is no competition as the markets are closed; in one
country, part of the market is totally deregulated. In addition,
there are public and private enterprises (this is mentioned only
in the explanatory memorandum), often competing together
in the same market segments.

Passenger transport may be divided into three broad

1.3.
categories:

1.5.
In the passenger transport sector, certain public service
obligations are imposed on operators, including the obligation
to operate, the obligation to carry and tariff obligations (1),
e.g. to cover a particular geographical area (containing zones
of both high and low or very low user density) or to provide a
certain quality of service (e.g. frequency); which the operator,
if it were considering its own commercial interests, would not
assume or would not assume to the same extent or under the
same conditions (2). In return for these obligations, which
usually form part of a concession, the operator is granted:

— exclusive rights for that area. The reason for these
exclusive rights is to provide a service and to compensate
the operator, in part or in full, for the additional costs
occasioned by certain routes or special conditions. The
exclusive rights give the operator security and mean that
costs can be offset within its concession area,
thus
encouraging the provision of more regular and reliable
services;

— urban transport;

— and/or financial compensation for the costs incurred in

meeting the public service requirements.

— inter-urban transport, with three sub-categories: peri-
urban transport (local transport to surrounds of large
cities);
long-distance transport (linking widely spaced
major population centres); and regional transport (links
to rural or thinly populated areas);

— occasional transport (e.g. school or works buses); on
account of its nature such transport is liberalised and
therefore not covered by this Regulation.

1.4.
Clearly each of these categories of transport has its
own economic and social characteristics which must be taken
into account when framing the legislation which is to govern
them.

(1) The obligation to operate is the obligation for transport undertak-
ings to ensure the provision of a transport service satisfying fixed
standards of continuity, regularity and capacity. The obligation to
carry is the obligation for transport undertakings to accept and
carry passengers and goods at specified rates and subject to
specified conditions. The tariffs obligation is the obligation for
transport undertakings to apply, in particular for certain categories
of passengers (...) or on certain routes, rates fixed or approved by
an authority which are contrary to the commercial interests of
the undertaking and which result from the imposition of, or
refusal to modify, special tariff provisions.
(2) Article 2, Council Regulation (EEC) 1191/69.

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1.6.
This makes for relatively fair tariffs (which are also
covered by the concession contracts) for different groups of
users, irrespective of the real cost of providing the service. In
addition, in certain cases, the concessionary arrangements may
provide for supplementary aid to keep down tariffs. It is
important to highlight the word ‘tariffs’ because what it means
is that the operator cannot unilaterally set the prices which
users have to pay; they are set (and adjusted) by the relevant
authority as stipulated in the concession contract.

1.7.
This Regulation covers the organisation of various
modes of transport (rail, road and inland waterway) and the
aforementioned categories,
insofar as the authorities grant
exclusive rights to operators, impose minimum requirements
or grant compensation for providing services. Transport modes
which do not meet any of these three requirements are
therefore excluded from the scope of the Regulation.

1.8.
Four of the Regulation’s chapters concern: ensuring
the quality of public passenger transport, public service
contracts, minimum criteria for public passenger transport
operation, and procedural issues.

1.9.
Ensuring the quality of public passenger transport
involves criteria such as: safety, frequency, punctuality, accessi-
bility for persons with reduced mobility, environmental factors,
and the transport needs of people living in less densely
populated areas. Further criteria are integration with other
transport modes and the level and transparency of tariffs.

Public service contracts are compulsory in all cases
1.10.
where financial compensation is given for the expenditure
incurred in meeting the public service requirements and where
exclusive rights are guaranteed. Public service contracts are
generally awarded by tender. These concessionary contracts
have a maximum duration of five years, though a number of
derogations are provided for. Operators must furnish econ-
omic and social information annually for each route.

1.11.
case-by-case basis for any rail, metro or light rail initiative:

Public service contracts may be awarded directly on a

— provided that it can be shown that:

— it would be impossible to meet national or inter-

national rail safety standards, or

— the costs of maintaining coordination between the
the infrastructure

operator and the manager of
would exceed the benefits accruing from the bid;

— where an operator provides transport services other than
rail transport but they are integrated with directly awarded
rail services;

— for public service contracts with an annual value of less
than EUR 400 000 (or in the case of a network, less than
EUR 800 000);

— with an exclusive right, provided that no financial com-

pensation is given and it involves

— a new service, or

— an individual route which is awarded on the basis of

quality criteria.

Finally, some safeguards are established for the auth-
1.12.
ority: a requirement to subcontract a defined proportion of
the total contract, the possibility of not awarding new contracts
to an operator who controls more than 25 % of the passenger
transport market, a requirement to keep on staff who worked
for the operator which held the concession previously, a
requirement for the operator to establish itself in the Member
State in question, save as otherwise stipulated in Article 71
ECT.

1.13.
The minimum criteria for providing services will be
applied without discrimination to all transport services of a
similar character in the area for which a single authority is
responsible. These minimum criteria may include compen-
sation, provided that any limitation on tariffs applies only to
certain categories of passenger, that the compensation does
not exceed 20 % of the value of that operator’s services in
that area, and that compensation is granted on a non-
discriminatory basis. In this case the compensation granted in
accordance with this Regulation will be exempt from the
notification procedure laid down in Article 88(3) ECT for State
aid.

The purpose of

the procedural provisions is to
1.14.
safeguard the transparency and fairness of the whole process
and its compatibility with the rules governing public contracts
in the single market.

1.15.
Finally, the transitional measures include a general
period of three years (with certain exceptions) for terminating
arrangements which do not comply with the proposed Regu-
lation.

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2. General comments

2.1.
The Committee shares the thinking behind this Regu-
lation as set down in recital 7: ‘with appropriate safeguards, the
introduction of regulated competition between Community
operators in this sector leads to more attractive services’.

2.2.
The Committee welcomes the Commission’s intention
of introducing a market regime for public passenger transport
based on controlled rather than full competition.

The Committee basically approves the most important

2.3.
regulatory instruments listed in the Regulation, in particular:

— the obligation for the competent authorities to provide

adequate public passenger services;

— the establishment of quality criteria;

— financial compensation that covers expenditure incurred

in meeting the public service requirements;

— compensation for the cost of public services;

— the granting of exclusive rights (for a specified period);

Interest

2.7. With particular reference to the Commission Com-
in Europe’ (1) of
munication ‘Services of General
20.9.2000, the Committee suggests underpinning the import-
ance of general interest services by means of better instruments.
For instance, where a decision has to be made between
tendering or derogation (direct award), every Member State
should be free — in the case of services which this State defines
interest within the meaning of Commission
as of general
Communication COM(2000) 580 — to decide whether it
wants to create additional criteria for amending its legislation
in order to improve its transport system.

2.8.
This amendment would also respond better to the
question-mark still hanging over the draft Regulation, namely
compliance with the subsidiarity principle. In the Committee’s
view, the arguments advanced so far by the Commission for
direct responsibility for local public passenger transport do
not hold water.

Greater respect for the competences of the Member
2.9.
States on the basis of the Communication on general interest
services would also meet the arguments of those Member
States which, in the case of local public passenger transport,
invoke the fundamental rights of local authorities as laid down
in their constitutions (e.g. Germany).

2.10.
In the interests of improving and helping to stream-
line the proposed Regulation, the Committee would neverthe-
less set out the following comments:

— the organisation of competition through tendering, with

appropriate derogations.

3. Chapter I — Scope and definitions

These instruments serve the Commission’s intention — sup-
ported by the Committee — of achieving an optimum balance
between public mission and the competition principle.

3.1. Article 2 — Relationship to public procurement law

2.4.
The Committee also notes with satisfaction that hence-
forth equality of opportunity and competition between all
types of enterprise, irrespective of their legal form, will be
achieved through legal and accounting transparency.

2.5.
However, the Committee cannot conceal the fact that
it is sceptical as to whether the arrangements laid down for
applying the specified resources and instruments will result in
practice in a cohesive balance between public mission and
competitive market regulation.

2.6. While the Committee regards the instruments for
regulating competition, especially the tendering procedure, as
very practical and solid, the derogations and quality criteria are
rather imprecise and unwieldy. They need to be considerably
expanded and clarified.

3.1.1. With an eye to Article 12 of the draft Regulation,
which concerns a special award procedure, Article 2 should be
deleted. It is more important to spell out clearly the award
provisions in Article 12. The present wording of Article 2
could lead to demarcation problems and consequent legal
uncertainty.

3.2. Article 3 — Definitions

‘public service obligation’

3.2.1.
The scope of the ‘public service requirement’ is not
defined clearly. The Committee would have preferred to retain
laid down in
the definition of
‘“Public service obli-
Regulation (EEC) 1191/69, namely:
gations” means obligations which the transport undertaking in
question, if it were considering its own commercial interests,
would not assume or would not assume to the same extent or
under the same conditions’.

(1) COM(2000) 580 final of 20.9.2000.

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3.2.2.
The Committee further proposes widening the defi-
nition so that ‘integrated services’ covers several operators
cooperating on the same terms, e.g. in a transport consortium
owned by the same body.

3.2.3.
reformulating or are missing altogether:

The following definitions are imprecise and need

— competent authority: replace ‘State body’ by ‘public body’;

— the term ‘route’ used in various articles, and ‘individual
route’ in Article 8, should be defined precisely. At all
events the latter term should also encompass regional
services.

4. Chapter II — Ensuring the quality of public passenger

transport

4.1. Article 4

to flow of passengers,
level of comfort provided for
customers, the extent of the network and the service
information that is provided;

(c)

integration between different transport services, including
integration of information, tariffs, ticketing, timetables,
consumer rights and the use of
interchanges in the
geographical area under the responsibility of the com-
petent authorities and with operators designated by other
competent authorities;

(new letter)

the provision, where necessary, of inte-
grated intermodal services;

(f)

(g)

the balanced development of regions and coordination
with long-distance transport services;

the transport needs of people living in less densely
populated areas, including the ability to propose appro-
priate innovative solutions without any deterioration in
the service provided (choice of mode, method and
adaptation of the service, ticketing);

(h) passenger health and safety, cleanliness and hygiene of

equipment, safety of passengers and goods;

(i)

the qualifications of the staff, in particular those with
responsibility for safety;

4.1.1.
For the ESC it is not enough to establish criteria
for the ‘qualifications’ of staff; it is necessary to meet the
requirements of the directives on minimum social standards in
general, e.g. working time and rest periods.

4.1.2.
Generally speaking the Committee regards the pre-
sent wording of Article 4 as too weak on the actual quality
criteria. The Commission should once again consider whether
it should not recommend specific Europe-wide minimum
criteria for services in conurbations as well as rural areas.
Thought should also be given, in the interests of best practice,
to organising a permanent information exchange on the
quality of local transport and to using benchmarking. One
such example is ELTIS (European Local Transport Information
Service — www.eltis.org).

(new letter)

(new letter)

(new letter)

for

respect
agreements
collective
and/or labour regulations in force in
the sector concerned;

having a system for maintaining equip-
ment and facilities that ensures the
reliability of the transport services on
a daily basis;

the financial strength of the company
and existence of an adequate system of
guarantees to cover claims by third
parties.

4.1.3.
Nor is it clear what the connection is between quality
criteria and the corresponding obligation to finance the costs
which cannot be covered by fares. A clear obligation must be
created whereby quality requirements must be part-financed
by public funds if the receipts from fares are not enough.

5. Chapter III — Public service contracts

5.1. Article 6 — Award of public service contracts

4.1.4.
as follows:

The Committee would suggest amending Article 4(2)

(a)

consumer protection factors including the accessibility of
the services, in terms of their frequency, speed, punctu-
ality, reliability, capacity of the resources used in relation

Article 6(b): the stipulation that the operator has to
5.1.1.
meet certain costs in full is unworkable in the Committee’s
view as ticket revenue may depend to such an extent on
transport policies that such costs cannot be adequately covered.
The Committee therefore calls for the deletion of Article 6(b).
Tariffs will also be subject to negotiation between operators
and the authorities.

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5.1.2.
Article 6(c): the five-year limit on public service
contracts is too low and should be raised. The derogations
provided for in (c) already make it clear that five years is not
long enough. Moreover, these derogations are worded so
imprecisely that it will be difficult for the operator to claim
them vis-à-vis the competent authority. The depreciation
period for buses, for instance, is currently far more than five
years. In the Committee’s view the duration of contracts should
be such as to guarantee exclusive rights for a period long
enough to enable operators to recover their investment, and
should be from eight to fifteen years depending on the type of
service (see point 1.3).

5.1.3.
The proposal establishes a similar operational frame-
work for all countries, but ignores the fact that degrees of
market openness currently differ considerably from one coun-
try to another and that many of these countries already have
established concession systems which are to a great extent, but
not entirely, compatible with the Regulation. Others have
embarked on a process of devolving responsibilities to the
regions including the negotiation of new, directly awarded,
public service contracts and are making significant process on
improving transport quality and increasing flows.

to be opened up to new competitors, especially in very closed
sectors or countries.
the five-year period
In this respect
provided for in the Regulation would generally seem too short.
There is in addition the need to avoid any threat to jobs, which
would have an adverse impact on service quality and safety.

Seen in this light, the derogation criteria are too
5.1.6.
general and not tailored to the different categories of passenger
service defined in point 1.3. The Committee suggests fixing
the duration of
the concession on a case-by-case basis,
differentiating between the various categories of service and
passenger transport modes; seeking in each case to strike the
optimum balance between more intensive competition, with
rapid renewal of concession contracts, and longer periods of
exclusive rights allowing tariffs to be geared to the long term.
This would also make it possible to reduce the considerable
discretionary powers allowed by the extensive special con-
ditions provided for in the Regulation, even though they are
subject to scrutiny by the European Commission.

5.1.7.
In the Committee’s view Article 6 should include
a new paragraph stating that contracts entailing reckless
underbidding will not be accepted.

5.1.8.
Article 6(d): the words ‘or for specific sectors of their
network’ should be added after ‘each route’. Operators of
smaller networks should be required to provide information
on the whole network.

The proposal quite rightly differentiates between
5.1.4.
passenger transport modes (rail and metro, road,
inland
waterway), but does not differentiate in the same way between
the very different features of these modes in the way they serve
their user categories (see point 1.3).

5.2.1.
In line with the basic principle of general interest
services laid down in the general part of the text under
consideration the Committee proposes that a new first para-
graph be added to Article 7:

5.2. Article 7 — Direct award of public service contracts

5.1.5.
In some instances criteria such as openness to
competition, limitation of aid and scope of exclusive rights are
confused, thereby introducing potentially incorrect options at
certain points in the Regulation. As the central plank of the
proposal is to provide passengers with public services of a
certain standard at as low a cost as possible (with or without
tariff subsidies), the granting of exclusive rights for a specific
period allows operators to minimise costs over the long term
provided that the concession is granted for long enough. This
means that the competition factor (which makes for the lowest
tariffs possible) must be applied when the concession (and
associated exclusive rights) is granted; nevertheless, the con-
cession must strike a balance on the duration of the contract;
this should be long enough to enable operators to make more
competitive bids by allowing them enough time to recover
their fixed and start-up costs but short enough for the process

‘1. As soon as a Member State has defined a transport
service as a service of general interest within the meaning
of Communication COM(2000) 580 of 20.9.2000, the
competent authorities should be allowed to opt for direct
management of these services (1).’

5.2.2.
following added:

Old paragraph 1 becomes new paragraph 2, with the

‘In addition to “national and international safety stan-
dards”, it should be possible for the competent authority
to cite “regional and local safety and quality criteria” as
grounds for a derogation.’

(1) Demand formulated by various Member States at the Council of
Transport Ministers on 20 and 21 December 2000 in Brussels;
session No 2324 of
the Transport Council; Press: 470 —
No 14004/00.

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5.2.3.
amended as follows:

Old paragraph 2 becomes new paragraph 3,

‘Only the “additional costs for maintaining coordination”
should be mentioned and the rest of the paragraph
deleted. It should be added that the direct award of a
contract is also possible if “existing integrated services are
threatened or their further integration impeded”.’

5.4.2.
Article 9(3): the Committee welcomes the Com-
mission’s intention of providing direct protection for staff in
the case of a change of operator. But the proposed provision
is too weak in that the competent authority ‘may’ require the
operator to offer rights; it is proposed amending this to ‘must’.
The Committee also doubts whether the protection afforded
by the reference to Directive 77/197/EEC is sufficient. It would
be better to state expressly that in the event of a change of
operator staff are to be retained on the same terms as
previously.

The Committee approves direct award on the basis
5.2.4.
of a new initiative, as provided for in Article 7(6). However, it
considers that the quality criteria which the operator agrees to
abide by and which justify the award of such exclusive rights
should be assessed and taken into account when the contract
is awarded.

6. Chapter IV — Minimum criteria for public passenger

transport operation

5.3. Article 8 — Award of public service contracts following

quality comparison

6.1. Article 10

5.3.1.
The direct award of contracts on the basis of quality
criteria as provided for in Article 8 should not be limited to
‘individual routes’ and should be extended to regional services
as set out in point 1.3.

The Committee endorses the wording of the first
6.1.1.
paragraph which requires the general rules or minimum
criteria to be adhered to by all operators but regards any
limitation [e.g. the 20 % clause in paragraph (b)] as superfluous.
As the neutral
it must
remain a matter for the individual Member States to grant
compensation for special services without limiting it to a
percentage of the total value of the services.

impact on competition is assured,

5.4. Article 9 — Safeguards

6.1.2.
comments on the minimum criteria set out in Article 10:

The Committee would also like to make the following

5.4.1.
safeguards laid down in Article 9, in particular:

The Committee has some criticisms to make of the

— The power of the competent authority to require the
award of subcontracts, albeit limited to 50 % of the
contract value, is contrary to the principle of efficiency
which the Regulation seeks to establish. This requirement
severely limits operators’ freedom to manage and intro-
duces reasonable doubts as to whether operators will be
able to choose subcontractors freely, especially when the
competent authority is regional or local.

— The decision not to award a service to any operator
which would have more than 25 % of the market is also
a matter of considerable concern to the Committee.
Firstly, on account of the virtually unlimited discretion
which it gives the competent authority not to award a
contract. Secondly, because of the vagueness of the phrase
‘market for public passenger transport services’. What is
the scope of this market: national, regional, local? How
can a competent authority be familiar with the market
position of an operator outside its own area?

6.1.2.1.
Article 3 of the recent proposal for a Community
Regulation on aid for the coordination of transport (1) states
that ‘Aid ... for the management, maintenance or provision of
inland transport infrastructure, shall be compatible with the
EC Treaty’; by its very nature, such infrastructure aid benefits
all categories of users equally. The EU has frequently reiterated
its policy of promoting public over private transport for
environmental and social reasons.

6.1.2.2.
Similarly, the limitation of compensation to 20 %
of the value of the services covered seems to spring more from
a desire to help balance the budget than to meet a social need.
This is all the more serious as the same criterion covers such
diverse categories as long-distance transport
(where such
modes as train and bus compete), urban transport (often
heavily subsidised), and regional transport (which by nature is
always potentially in deficit if a certain minimum level of
quality is to be maintained).

(1) COM(2000) 5 final.

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6.1.2.3.
It also unduly penalises enterprises which carry out
only one of these activities within an area and cannot set it off
against other categories of service or increase the amount of
revenue eligible for compensation, the services they provide
not requiring the same level of compensation.

Nevertheless, the Committee agrees with the pro-
6.1.2.4.
posal that such compensation be available to all operators on
a non-discriminatory basis provided the various transport
categories are differentiated.

8. Chapter VI — Final provisions

8.1. Article 17 — Transitional measures

A r t i c l e 1 7 ( 1 )

7. Chapter V — Procedural issues

The Committee supports the Commission on all
7.1.
procedural
issues and would merely suggest that a more
precise legal definition be developed of the ‘public appeal
body’ whose features mean that at least partially it will be
called upon to play the role of independent regulator as in
other sectors where intervention is customary (water, gas,
electricity, telecommunications). If so, consideration should be
given to it also playing the role of arbitrator between
competent authorities and operators with regard to the setting
of tariffs.

7.2. Article 12 — Award procedures

7.2.1.

Article 12(3): add a new indent (d):

‘employees to be retained and their contractual rights in
accordance with Article 9(3)’.

7.3. Article 13 — Transparency

In the interests of greater transparency for citizens
7.3.1.
and hence users, it should be ensured that before any decision
is taken to initiate a tendering procedure, consultations are
held at local or regional level with operators, other competent
institutions and consumer and passenger groups to clarify
whether tendering or direct award is the right course. This
recommendation is linked to the proposed amendment to
Article 7 regarding further direct award options.

7.4. Article 15 — Accounting provisions

8.1.1.
The Committee regards the proposed transitional
period of three years as totally inadequate. For instance, some
of the concessions currently running in the Member States are
of substantially longer duration. Three years is also too little to
amortise existing investments.

8.1.2.
The Committee also has serious doubts about the
effectiveness of the transitional measures provided for in
Article 17 as some of them could give rise to the expropriation
of legally acquired rights and a barrage of legal actions which
could block the further progress of the current provisions.
This assessment is based on the following considerations:

8.1.2.1.
Article 17(1) stipulates that: ‘schemes, contracts or
arrangements implemented otherwise than in compliance with
the provisions of this Regulation [shall] cease to be valid
within three years’.

However, as the explanatory memorandum to the
8.1.2.2.
proposal points out, there are other countries whose markets
have been opened up to competition through tendering
procedures or concessions (the latter based on a combination
of exclusive rights of a duration directly linked to the
amortisation of the investment required to provide the service,
thereby eliminating the need for regular compensatory pay-
ments to the operator), all in accordance with the laws of the
Member State concerned. Nevertheless, no Member State’s
current national or local tendering or concession scheme, even
if guided by the philosophy behind this Regulation, can fully
comply with its provisions. Thus under the present wording
of the draft Regulation such tendering procedures and con-
cessions are not valid and must be abolished within three
years.

The accounting provisions laid down in Article 15
7.4.1.
deserve the Committee’s full support. Their aim is to guarantee
the transparency and non-discrimination of the award pro-
cedures and a fair balance between compensation and
additional costs incurred in complying with public service
obligations. These provisions should be seen in conjunction
with Annex I.

8.1.2.3.
These existing public invitations to tender and
concessions, which were originally open to competition
between various operators, each specified a duration, generally
more than ten years, enabling the operator to quantify its costs
(and in many cases enter into fixed agreements with third
parties for the purchase of rolling stock or the use of
infrastructure). Shortening these periods would lead to finan-
cial claims against the competent authority for the unilateral

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breach of the terms of the concession; these would have to be
settled in the national courts, or even go to the Court of Justice
in Luxembourg for a preliminary ruling.

8.1.5.
automatically take care of 17(2).

The proposed amendment to Article 17(1) would

8.1.3.
The Committee proposes raising the transitional
period to 8-10 years, with consideration being given to the
possibility of applying different arrangements in the various
Member States.

8.1.6.
As a constructive alternative the Committee therefore
suggests a selective system of transitional periods differen-
tiating between the various categories and modes of transport.

A r t i c l e 1 7 ( 2 )

The additional period of up to three years specified
8.1.4.
in Article 17(2) for operators investing in rail infrastructure is
still too short to amortise the investment.

8.1.7.
The Committee is very pleased to note that applicant
country operators are treated as Community operators for the
purposes of this Regulation and it hopes that these countries
will also be able to apply the provisions of the Regulation in
full when the treaties of accession come into force.

Brussels, 30 May 2001.

The President

of the Economic and Social Committee

Göke FRERICHS

Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European
Parliament and of the Council on establishing common rules in the field of civil aviation and
creating a European Aviation Safety Agency’

(2001/C 221/05)

On 22 December 2000 the Council decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under
Article 80 (2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on the above-mentioned proposal.

The Section for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure and the Information Society, which was responsible for
preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 8 May 2001. The rapporteur was
Mr von Schwerin.

At its 382nd plenary session held on 30 and 31 May 2001 (meeting of 30 May) the Committee adopted
the following opinion by 112 votes to one, with one abstention.

1.

Introduction

1.1.
In its Introduction, the Commission recalls the need to
establish, as a logical complement to the rules establishing the
internal air transport market, common rules in the field of
aviation safety. The current system, based on Regulation (EEC)
3922/91 and the work of the Joint Aviation Authorities (1),

(1) The JAA consists of a number of civil aviation regulatory
authorities who have agreed to co-operate in developing and
implementing safety regulatory standards and procedures. For this
purpose, they develop and adopt Joint Aviation Requirements
(JARs) and undertake to implement these in a co-ordinated and
uniform manner.

has, in the opinion of the Commission, been shown to be not
working properly. The current system is seen as lengthy,
inflexible and often inconsistent with Community obligations
and policies.

1.2.
In order to remedy the perceived deficiencies of
the current system, and to create a European Safety body
comparable to the US Federal Aviation Authorities (FAA), the
Council adopted on 16 July 1998 a decision to authorise the
Commission to negotiate with non-Community JAA member
states an agreement establishing a European Aviation Safety
Authority (EASA) with the legal status of an international
organisation, covering all tasks related to the regulation of
aviation safety.