Case C-495/00: Reference for a preliminary ruling by the Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio by order of that court of 6 July 2000 in the case of Aziende Agricole Visentin and Others v Azienda di Stato per gli Interventi nel Mercato Agricolo (AIMA), the other parties to the proceedings being Ind. Caseificio Silvio Belladelli & Figli and Others
Date: 2001-04-21
Institutions: Court of Justice
Subjects: agricultural levy, derogation from EU law, interpretation of the law, milk, milk product, production quota

21.4.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 118/9

(1) May the provisions contained in Articles 1 and 4 of
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 (1) of 28 December
1992 and Articles 3 and 4 of Commission Regulation
(EEC) No 534/93 (2) of 9 March 1993 be interpreted as
meaning that it is possible, in cases of administrative or
judicial challenge to the relevant measures, to derogate
from the time-limits prescribed for the allocation of
quotas and the operation of adjustments and levies?

If not:

(2) Are the provisions contained in Articles 1 and 4 of
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 of 28 December
1992 and Articles 3 and 4 of Commission Regulation
(EEC) No 534/93 of 9 March 1993 valid, in the light of
Article 33 (ex 39) of the Treaty, in so far as they do not
provide that derogations may be made from the periods
prescribed by those provisions for the allocation of
individual reference quantities, for adjustments and levies
in cases of administrative or judicial challenge to those
provisions?

(1) OJ L 405 of 31.12.1992, p. 1.
(2) OJ L 57 of 10.3.1993, p. 12.

If not:

(2) Are the provisions contained in Articles 1 and 4 of
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 of 28 December
1992 and Articles 3 and 4 of Commission Regulation
(EEC) No 534/93 of 9 March 1993 valid, in the light of
Article 33 (ex 39) of the Treaty, in so far as they do not
provide that derogations may be made from the periods
prescribed by those provisions for the allocation of
individual reference quantities, for adjustments and levies
in cases of administrative or judicial challenge to those
provisions?

(3) May Regulations No 3950/92 and 536/93 be interpreted
as meaning that the individual reference quantity need
not necessarily be notified separately to each producer,
but may be communicated in other ways such as the
publication of notices?

(1) OJ L 405 of 31.12.1992, p. 1.
(2) OJ L 57 of 10.3.1993, p. 12.

Reference for a preliminary ruling by the Tribunale
Amministrativo Regionale per il. Lazio by judgment of
that court of 6 July 2000 in the case of Carlo Balestreri
against Azienda di Stato per gli Interventi nel Mercato
Agricolo (AIMA) and the Ministry of the Treasury, the
Budget and Planning, the other party being Parmalat SpA

Reference for a preliminary ruling by the Tribunale
Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio by order of that
court of 6 July 2000 in the case of Aziende Agricole
Visentin and Others v Azienda di Stato per gli Interventi
nel Mercato Agricolo (AIMA), the other parties to the
proceedings being Ind. Caseificio Silvio Belladelli & Figli
and Others

(Case C-484/00)

(2001/C 118/13)

(Case C-495/00)

(2001/C 118/14)

Reference has been made to the Court of Justice of the
European Communities by judgment of 6 July 2000 of the
Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio, received at
the Court Registry on 29 December 2000, for a preliminary
ruling in the case of Carlo Balestreri against Azienda di Stato
per gli Interventi nel Mercato Agricolo (AIMA) and the Ministry
of the Treasury, the Budget and Planning, the other party being
Parmalat SpA, on the following questions:

Reference has been made to the Court of Justice of the
European Communities by order of 6 July 2000 of the
Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale per il Lazio, received at
the Court Registry on 29 December 2000, for a preliminary
ruling in the case of Aziende Agricole Visentin and Others v
Azienda di Stato per gli
Interventi nel Mercato Agricolo
the other parties to the proceedings being Ind.
(AIMA),
Caseificio Silvio Belladelli & Figli and Others on the following
questions:

(1) May the provisions contained in Articles 1 and 4 of
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 (1) of 28 December
1992 and Articles 3 and 4 of Commission Regulation
(EEC) No 534/93 (2) of 9 March 1993 be interpreted as
meaning that it is possible, in cases of administrative or
judicial challenge to the relevant measures, to derogate
from the time-limits prescribed for the allocation of
quotas and the operation of adjustments and levies?

(1) May the provisions contained in Articles 1 and 4 of
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 (1) of 28 December
P92 and Articles 3 and 4 of Commission Regulation
(EEC) No 534/93 (2) of 9 March 1993 be interpreted as
meaning that it is possible, in cases of administrative or
judicial challenge to the relevant measures, to derogate
from the time-limits prescribed for the allocation of
quotas and the operation of adjustments and levies?

C 118/10

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

21.4.2001

If not:

(2) Are the provisions contained in Articles 1 and 4 of
Council Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 of 28 December
1992 and Articles 3 and 4 of Commission Regulation
(EEC) No 534/93 of 9 March 1993 valid, in the light of
Article 33 (ex 39) of the Treaty, in so far as they do not
provide that derogations may be made from the periods
prescribed by those provisions for the allocation of
individual reference quantities, for adjustments and levies
in cases of administrative or judicial challenge to those
provisions?

(3)

is not possible, does the
If retrospective adjustment
Community legislation permit
the Member State to
assume responsibility for paying the sums owed to the
Community without incurring liability to penalties?

(1) OJ L 405 of 31.12.1992, p. 1.
(2) OJ L 57 of 10.3.1993, p. 12.

Reference for a preliminary ruling by the Oberste Ge-
richtshof by order of 19 December 2000 in the case of
Pippig Augenoptik GmbH & Co KG v 1. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH and 2. Estate of Franz Josef
Hartlauer

(Case C-44/01)

(2001/C 118/15)

Reference has been made to the Court of Justice of the
European Communities by order of 19 December 2000 by the
Oberste Gerichtshof
(Supreme Court), Austria, which was
received at the Court Registry on 2 February 2001, for a
preliminary ruling in the case of Pippig Augenoptik GmbH &
Co. KG v 1. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH and 2. Estate
of Franz Josef Hartlauer on the following questions:

1.

to be interpreted to the effect

Is Article 7(2) of Directive 97/55/EC (1) of the European
the Council of 6 October 1997
Parliament and of
amending Directive 84/450/EEC (2) concerning mislead-
ing advertising so as to include comparative advertising
(‘the directive’)
that
‘comparative advertising, as far as the comparison is
concerned’ means the statements regarding the product
offered by the advertiser himself, the statements regarding
the product offered by the competitor and the statements
regarding the relationship between the two products (the
result of the comparison)? Or is there a ‘comparison’
within the meaning of Article 7(2) of the directive only
in so far as the statements are made regarding the
result of the comparison, with the consequence that
misconceptions regarding other features of the compared
goods/services may be assessed on the basis of a national
standard governing misleading statements which is poss-
ibly more strict?

Is the reference in Article 3a(1)(a) of the directive to
Article 7(1) of the directive a lex specialis in relation to
Article 7(2) of the directive, with the result that a national
standard governing misleading statements which is poss-
ibly more strict may be applied to all elements of the
comparison?

Is Article 3a(1)(a) of the directive to be interpreted as
meaning that the comparison of the price of a brand-
name product with the price of a no-name product of
equivalent quality is not permitted where the name of the
manufacturer is not indicated, or do Article 3a(1)(c) and
Article 3a(1)(g) of the directive preclude indication of the
manufacturer? Is the image of a (brand-name) product a
feature of the product/service within the meaning of
Article 3a(c) of the directive? Does it follow from a
(possible) negative answer to this question that any (price)
comparison of a brand-name product with a no-name
product of equivalent quality is not permitted?

2.

Is Article 7(2) of the directive to be interpreted as meaning
that differences in the procurement of the product/service
whose features are compared with features of the adver-
tiser’s product/service must also be assessed solely on the
basis of Article 3a of the directive?

If this question is answered in the affirmative:

Is Article 3a of the directive to be interpreted as meaning
that a (price) comparison is permitted only if the com-
pared goods are procured through the same distribution
channels and are thus offered by the advertiser and his
competitor(s) in a comparable selection?

3.

Is ‘comparison’ within the meaning of Article 7(2) of the
directive to be construed as including the creation of the
bases for comparison through a test purchase?

If this question is answered in the affirmative:

Is Article 3a of the directive to be interpreted as meaning
that the deliberate initiation of a (price) comparison
which is favourable to the advertiser through a test
purchase which is made before the beginning of the
advertiser’s own offer and is arranged accordingly makes
the comparison unlawful?

4.

Is a comparison discrediting within the meaning of
Article 3a(1)(e) of the directive if the advertiser selects the
goods purchased from the competitor in such a way that
a price difference is obtained which is greater than the
average price difference and/or if such price comparisons
are repeatedly made with the result that the impression is
created that the prices of the competitor(s) are generally
excessive?