WRITTEN QUESTION E-1083/01 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council. The Sensus project: the European equivalent of DARPA.
Date: 2001-04-09
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: EU police cooperation, EU programme, United States, espionage, exchange of information, information technology, secret service, strategic defence

4.12.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 340 E/161

Coordination of Sensus is in the hands of Stephan Bodenkamp/Christoph Kionowski, a secret agent of the
Bundesnachrichtendienst. He is also behind three language Development Companies of Lernout & Haspie
(L & H). Thanks to his dual role,
the Bundesnachrichtendienst can have access to L & H(cid:146)s language
technology. It is immediately apparent that the Sensus-Bundesnachrichtendienst-L & H set-up results in (a)
a dubious blurring of interests between the private and the (cid:145)public sector(cid:146), (b) an imbalance in the language
technology know-how of the various police and security services and (c) unfair competition between those
language technology firms which are involved in Sensus and those which are not.

1.
Does the Council acknowledge that the dual role of the Sensus coordinator leads to a blurring of
interests between the public and the (cid:145)private(cid:146) sector (in this case the Bundesnachrichtendienst)? If not, what
guarantees does the Council have that the set-up referred to above has not resulted in this blurring?

2.
Does the Council acknowledge that the dual role of the Sensus coordinator has led to an imbalance
in the language technology know-how of the various police and security services, in particular in favour of
the Bundesnachrichtendienst? If not, what guarantees does the Council have that the set-up referred to
above has not resulted in this imbalance?

Does the Council acknowledge that the dual role of the Sensus coordinator has led to unfair
3.
competition between those language technology firms which are involved in Sensus and those which are
not? If not, what guarantees does the Council have that the set-up referred to above has not resulted in
unfair competition?

(1) OJ C 187 E, 3.7.2001, p. 154.

(2001/C 340 E/183)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1083/01

by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council

(9 April 2001)

Subject: The Sensus project: the European equivalent of DARPA

The Sensus project, the successor to Aventinus, seeks to develop an information exchange programme for
European police and intelligence services by analogy with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA). Coordination of Sensus is in the hands of Stephan Bodenkamp/Christoph Kionowski, a secret
agent of
the Bundesnachrichtendienst. DARPA, a government body, coordinates the research and
development programmes of the American Department of Defense.

Two language technology laboratories appear to play a crucial role in DARPA and the Sensus project.
Dragon has developed translation technology for US intelligence services and it has cooperated in the
Multilingual Interview System (MIS). This system was intended for automatic translation of Croatian,
Serbian and Bosnian interviews in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Spring 1998) and of Arabic, Farsi, Hindi and Urdu
in the Persian Gulf (Summer 1998). Via its subsidiary Sail Labs, formerly Gesellschaft f(cid:252)r Multilingual
Systeme mbH, Lernout & Haspie (L & H) was closely involved in the European Sensus project. To complete
the picture it should be pointed out that L & H took party in DARPA(cid:146)s (cid:145)Dominate the Battlespace(cid:146) project in
1997.

Inspired by the MIS success of its rival Dragon, L & H has set up a number of so-called Language
Development Companies to develop language technology in Hindi, Farsi, Arabic and Urdu. Stephan
Bodenkamp/Christoph Kionowski, secret agent of the Bundesnachrichtendienst and coordinator of the
Sensus project, set up three Language Development Companies. In early 2000 L & H took over Dragon.
The US National Security Agency was strongly opposed to this take-over because of the strategic and
sensitive technology which came into the possession of the European group.

Is the Council aware of the National Security Agency(cid:146)s opposition to L & H(cid:146)s take-over of Dragon, given the
possible impact of the American attitude on the Sensus project, because of (a) the participation of L & H
subsidiary Sail Labs and (b) the shareholdings of Sensus coordinator Stephan Bodenkamp/Christoph

C 340 E/162

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

4.12.2001

Kionowski in three Language Development Companies? If not, will the Council seek information about the
National Security Council(cid:146)s attitude towards L & H(cid:146)s take-over of Dragon, in view of the possible impact
this attitude might have on the Sensus project?

Joint answer
to Written Questions E-1064/01, E-1081/01 and E-1083/01

(16 July 2001)

The events mentioned in the three Questions E-1064/01, E-1081/01, E-1083/01 are not within the
competence of the Council of the European Union.

(2001/C 340 E/184)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-1069/01

by Harlem DØsir (PSE) to the Commission

(26 March 2001)

Subject: Infringement of Directive 91/308/EC on prevention of the use of the financial system for money

laundering

What action does the Commission intend to take to investigate the facts presented in the book
(cid:145)RØvØlation$(cid:146), published by Les ArŁnes in March 2001 in France, on serious breaches of Community
legislation, in particular the June 1991 Directive 91/308/EC (1) on prevention of the use of the financial
system for the purpose of money laundering?

What action is the Commission going to take in view of that fact that a third-country company implicated
in the embezzlement of IMF funds in Russia, Menatep, would appear to have been able to open an
unpublished account at the Luxembourg-based clearing house Clearstream, as have other third-country
banking establishments, e.g. Banque Colombienne? It would appear that sums far in excess of the ceiling
indicated in Article 3 of Directive 91/308/EC have been transferred to Clearstream accounts from
establishments offering no guarantees, without raising suspicions, and that transfers have been made to
offshore centres regarded as uncooperative by the OECD.

(1) OJ L 166, 28.6.1991, p. 77.

Answer given by Mr Bolkestein on behalf of the Commission

(2 May 2001)

The Commission is responsible for checking that Community directives are correctly incorporated into
national law by the Member States and correctly applied by national public authorities. However, it is up
to the national authorities in the Member States to check that national legislation implementing a directive
is correctly applied by individuals and firms.

Luxembourg has correctly incorporated into its national law Directive 91/308/EC of 10 June 1991 on
prevention of the use of the financial system, the purpose of money laundering and, as far as the
Commission is aware, the Luxembourg authorities are applying it extensively and correctly. They are
taking account, inter alia, of the requirements of combating corruption and consider this crime to underlie
money laundering. In particular, pending ratification of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Convention on combating corruption of foreign officials in international trans-
actions, they have taken the necessary steps to ensure that Luxembourg(cid:146)s financial system effectively
applies measures to combat such crime.

In these circumstances, the Commission has at present no reason to think that the Luxembourg authorities
are not taking tough action if, in the case cited by the Honourable Member, they consider it necessary to
conduct an in-depth investigation. However, in exercising its prerogatives, the Commission will not fail to
ensure that Community law is applied correctly and to take any measures that may be necessary for this
purpose.