Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Central Bank: Practical aspects of the euro: state of play and tasks ahead"
Date: 2001-03-29
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee
Subjects: consumer information, dissemination of EU information, euro, public awareness campaign, small and medium-sized enterprises

29.5.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 155/57

Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Communication from the Commission
to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of
the Regions and the European Central Bank: Practical aspects of the euro: state of play and tasks
ahead’

(2001/C 155/11)

On 19 September 2000 the Commission decided to consult the Economic and Social Committee, under
Article 262 of the Treaty establishing the European Community, on ‘Practical aspects of the euro: state of
play and tasks ahead’.

The Section for Economic and Monetary Union and Economic and Social Cohesion, which was
responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 13 March 2001.
The rapporteur was Mr Burani.

At its 380th plenary session of 28 and 29 March 2001 (meeting of 29 March), the Economic and Social
Committee adopted the following opinion by 73 votes to one with four abstentions.

1.

Introduction

1.1.
As the date for the euro’s entry into circulation as
banknotes and coins approaches, the Commission thought it
useful to take stock of the situation with the Communication (1)
of 12 July 2000, which was followed by the Recommendation
303/05 of 11 October 2000. Between the two dates, the
Commission brought out two Euro Papers (2) which complete
the picture and provide much valuable information.

out by events; at the same time, it cannot but confirm the
validity of some of its suggestions which, although not taken
up, are still well-founded.

2.

Part I — The Communication and the Euro Papers

1.1.1.
By means of this opinion, the Economic and Social
Committee intends to make its own contribution — in the
light of the experience and knowledge of the social and
occupational groups whom it represents — to an objective
assessment of the problems, at the same time formulating
proposals which it hopes will be useful.

2.1. The current situation

2.1.1. E n t e r p r i s e s

1.1.2.
A rational approach would lead it to examine first
and foremost the Communication and the Euro Papers which
make up the basis for a line of reasoning, and then the
Recommendation which is the practical consequence of that
line of thought.

1.2.
The ESC has already dealt with the practical problems
concerned with the introduction of the euro on a number of
occasions; in particular it draws attention to the following
opinions:

— Opinion on the Green Paper (3);

— implications for the market (own-initiative opinion) (4);

— practical aspects (5).

It would point out that nearly all the observations and forecasts
made in the past, in these and other opinions, have been borne

(1) COM(2000) 443 final.
(2) No 38 and No 41 of August 2000.
(3) OJ C 18, 22.1.1996, p. 112.
(4) OJ C 56, 24.2.1997, p. 65.
(5) OJ C 73, 9.3.1998, p. 130.

2.1.1.1. Many of the large enterprises — especially multi-
nationals — have already adopted the euro as their accounting
currency and others are at an advanced stage of preparation.
The Commission expected a ‘snowball’ or ‘trickle-down’
effect (6) in relation to the SMEs, but this effect did not occur.
In this context the Committee had pointed out (7) that ‘the
need to establish some form of
interface between Single
Currency internal operations and transactions in national
currency could be a source of increased costs and compli-
cations’. This point — based on the rationality of the choices
— is still relevant and will remain so until the end of 2001: it
should be borne in mind when planning actions for the
intervening period before the euro comes into circulation.

2.1.2.
However, the rationality of earlier choices does not
in any way justify either the failure to recognise the strategic
consequences of the switch to the euro or, in practical terms,
the disturbing tardiness of many — too many — firms in
preparing themselves for the introduction of the euro: whilst

(6) See point 1 (a) of the Communication.
(7) OJ C 18, 22.1.1996, p. 112, point 6.5.1.

C 155/58

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

29.5.2001

60 % of large firms are due to complete the conversion by the
end of 2000, more than half of SMEs estimate that they will
not be ready for the final deadline of 31 December 2001. If
this is a realistic picture of the situation,
it is more than
disturbing: the Commission takes the view that there is a
serious risk that at the end of 2001 bottlenecks may develop
in terms of availability of IT and accounting resources. The
Committee had drawn attention to this aspect (1), calling
upon the Commission to ascertain,
in cooperation with
the computer industry, whether the latter’s resources were
consistent with planned deadlines and the resources available.

2.1.2.1.
However, IT preparation is the final stage of the
administrative preparation phase — rather a lengthy task
even in the smallest enterprises. The most serious problem,
therefore, is not that of a possible lack of IT resources, but that
of a lack of preparation tout court. If a large number of firms
were unprepared, a risk would arise for society — other firms
and citizens/consumers — from a nucleus of firms incapable
of working in the legal currency. For the moment, the risk is
only theoretical, but the Member States should devote all
possible attention to this possibility: in addition to preventive
measures, it must be decided what to do if the risk does in the
end materialise.

2.2. Citizens/consumers

Acceptance of the euro on the part of most citizens/
2.2.1.
consumers has been somewhat lukewarm — ‘significantly less
than was anticipated before the introduction of the euro on
1 January 1999’ (2). This lack of interest has perhaps been
sustained by the euro’s disappointing performance against the
dollar, particularly in 2000. The fact is that demand for new
accounts in euro has been minimal, as have been payments in
euro, apart from those for transactions in securities which are
compulsorily expressed in euro; the payment terminals (50 %
of which are already designed to work in two currencies) are
very little used.
It is also worth noting that institutional
investors have shown much greater interest in the euro than
have ordinary consumers.

The Communication (3), like the Euro Paper (4), pro-
2.2.2.
poses that ‘owners of terminals could be encouraged to speed
it states
up the conversion to the euro’; more generally,
‘thought will have to be given to the ways of prompting
citizens to make more active use of the euro means of

payments’. It attributes the fall
in interest on the part of
consumers to a reaction to the high bank charges on financial
transfers in the euro area, among other reasons.

2.2.3.
The reasons given by the Commission for the fall in
interest appear to have no basis, at any rate in this field: the
opening of accounts and the use of terminals have nothing to
do with international transfers, which in any case constitute a
tiny proportion — 1 % — of the total of domestic transfers;
bank charges (which will be discussed below) are the same for
transfers in the national currencies of the euro zone as in euro,
and it does not seem that their overall value has diminished.
The Committee thinks that the reasons are to be found
elsewhere, as it will explain in more detail below.

2.3. The dual display of prices

The Communication (5) points out that the dual
2.3.1.
display of prices is very widespread in a majority of countries,
particularly in the large scale retail sector and in trading and
service firms of a certain size. As was predictable, SMEs
account for the most significant exceptions, as they lack the
necessary means and know-how. However, questions are
beginning to be asked ‘as to the real effectiveness of dual
pricing. It seems that consumers pay little attention to prices
in euros’. The Committee had foreseen this in its opinion on
the Green Paper, (6) had strongly advised against ‘adopting any
measures which imposed dual display of amounts’ and had
suggested alternative or complementary solutions which
would probably be more effective.

2.4. Public administrations and local authorities

2.4.1.
Public administrations in general, with one or two
significant exceptions, seem to be well advanced in preparing
for the transition to the euro; the situation with local authorities
appears to be less positive, as they give the impression of
having underestimated in many cases the importance and
implications of the problem; that at least is the apparent
conclusion to be drawn from the Communication (7).

2.4.2.
By contrast, the efforts made in terms of communi-
cation to the citizens by the Member States and the public
administrations — and to some extent by the local authorities
— are really considerable. In the light of the previous point,
one could be forgiven for thinking that some public authorities
are giving priority to those programmes regarded as ‘easier’
and ‘more popular’,
i.e. direct communication with citi-
zens/electors, before tackling the more difficult and more
technical problems of reorganising their own administration.

(1) OJ C 18, 22.1.1996, p. 112, point 5.3.4.
(2) See the Commission’s Euro Paper No. 38 of August 2000, point 2

(page 5 of the English-language version).

(3) Point 2a.
(4) Euro Paper No 38.

(5) Point 2b.
(6) OJ C 18, 22.1.1996, p. 112, point 6.1.5.
(7) Chapter B, 2a.

29.5.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 155/59

3. Communication

In the entire history of

3.1.
the European Union, no
initiative has been the subject of such massive commitment in
terms of resources and funds as the adoption of the euro:
commitment by all parties — Commission, European Parlia-
ment, Member States, European Central Bank, Economic
and Social Committee, Committee of the Regions, public
administrations and private organisations — has been intense,
aware, indefatigable and unstinting as regards funds. There is
no similar precedent even in the history of world currencies:
in the past, changes of currencies have been a recurring event
of which not too much was made, accepted fatalistically as
inevitable in economic life: examples are decimalisation of
sterling and the switch in Brazil from the cruzado to the real .

The Commission has carried out coordinating work
3.1.1.
but has also taken the initiative,
in many directions. The
campaign on the euro — ‘A single currency for Europe’ was
launched in 1996 and is still continuing. Over the last two
years, 117 million euro have been spent, two-thirds of which
through agreements with Member States. Funds have been
allocated for preparatory work (publications, conferences,
seminars, teaching in schools, etc.); the financial commitment
of the Member States is at least equal to the funds allocated by
the Commission.

Funds have also been allocated for ‘multiplier’ organ-
3.1.2.
isations, for the ‘Euro Made Easy’ programme and for pilot
operations in regions and cities. For a more ‘technical’ public,
the Commission has organised seminars in the major financial
centres and 80 initiatives of various kinds in third countries.
All this, in addition to education and training courses and
seminars (both general and specifically targeted on ‘vulnerable’
social groups), participation in international fairs, publications,
documents, the InfEuro periodical, kits, guides, videos and
posters, as well as an Internet site with an interactive data base.
One can say that no field of communication has been
neglected.

The European Parliament, for its part, has allocated
3.1.3.
sums for similar activities,
including some with a direct
commitment on the part of some of its Members, but more
often in association with the Commission and the Member
States.

3.1.5.
The ECB, for its part, prepared the ground impeccably
for the transition to the euro in 1999 by the European financial
system; as well as setting up the TARGET system, which
operated smoothly from the start,
it contributed to the
formulation of a ‘euro policy’ both in the euro zone and in
relation to third countries. Its task was by no means easy — to
coordinate the work of the national central banks in preparing
coins and banknotes — and this was accompanied by an
extremely efficient communication effort. It should be noted
that the ESB has earmarked a substantial sum (80 million euro)
to publish brochures depicting the new coins and notes.

3.1.6.
The Committee has not neglected its duty towards
civil society: many ESC members have launched or taken part
in information campaigns aimed at the general public and
national and international organisations.

Private organisations have responded to the appeal
3.1.7.
by the Commission and the governments in a knowledgeable
and unstinting way. Consumer organisations have carried out
their work, as one might expect, with citizens/consumers in
and the more disadvantaged groups, whereas
general
vocational organisations have worked mainly with their mem-
bers; it is estimated that in practice, all firms have been reached
by the communication work channelled to them by their
own sectoral organisations. The financial sector (banks, in
particular) has informed all its clients and the public in general
— through brochures (estimated at a total of 300 million
copies), publication of financial results in euro, and with
information printed on every piece of paper sent to their
customers, repeated at every opportunity. The dual display of
amounts is almost universal practice now.

3.2. The results

3.2.1.
Inevitably, the sector which has best adapted to the
euro is the financial one: having had to adopt the single
currency for monetary, financial and stocks transactions from
the beginning of 1999, and having the small-scale, but
significant, experience of clients opening euro accounts, the
conversion of all dealings at the end of 2001 — or even earlier
— does not give rise to special problems, except perhaps in
terms of volume of work.

3.1.4.
The Member States and public administrations, too,
have multiplied their general or sectoral initiatives, above all
addressed to citizens, firms and disadvantaged groups in the
population; at present, there is a lack of precise data on the
way the funds have been used, but it is certain that the effort
has been general and made with conviction.

On the other hand, as stated above, the muted
3.2.2.
response from SMEs and citizens/consumers is generally
disappointing and in some respects worrying. Surveys by
Eurobarometer and private organisations paint a picture in
which either no-one knows anything about the euro, or they
have forgotten it, or they will provide for it at the ‘right time’,
or they doubt whether the euro will really be adopted.

C 155/60

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

29.5.2001

3.3. Lessons to be drawn

itself

Except for the financial sector, which was obliged to
3.3.1.
adapt
to the euro, and those who saw immediate
advantages in it (above all, large firms and multinationals) it
can be said that experience provides the proof of the principle
which marketing and communications experts know all too
well:
they can influence individual patterns of behaviour
through communication and other means, but it is virtually
impossible to impose choices on people if there is no direct
and immediate interest involved.

As far as firms in particular are concerned, the
3.3.2.
Communication states that ‘A communication drive is there-
fore necessary to inform businesses of the exact stage the
timetable ... has reached and to impress on them the existence
of a 31 December 2001 deadline and the need to speed up
their preparations’. The Committee takes the view that the
‘communication drive’ should be geared primarily to sectoral
organisations, which should make it their business to send a
message to businesses, using the content and style with which
they are the most familiar. Generally speaking, this message
should urge their members to consult the documentation —
which is already copious — and to take the necessary steps in
good time; otherwise, the consequences will have to be borne
by those who fail to meet the deadline. It is the task of
the Commission and the Member States to inform trade
organisations and keep them updated on the practical arrange-
ments for the change to the euro, but it is these organisations
which must forward this information to their members: in
other words, the Commission does not consider the use of
‘European’ public funds to finance campaigns directed at
business circles to be acceptable. Each Member State must be
able to decide — in circumstances which the Committee hopes
will be exceptional — to grant financial assistance to the most
‘needy’ national organisations.

3.3.3.
As regards citizens/consumers, a calm, balanced
analysis must be made, which must not be influenced by
extraneous considerations. The Commission (1) notes that
‘most people have received some information on the single
currency but may be forgetting it. After the massive publicity
following the launch of the euro ... there were encouraging
levels of public interest in, awareness of, and support for the
euro. More recent polls suggest that, with some notable
exceptions, this has since fallen; and people are tending to
forget what they once knew’. This confirms a basic principle
of mass psychology: a message which is not of direct and
immediate interest tends to be ignored or forgotten.

The only group of consumers which appears to have
3.3.4.
higher than average ‘euro-awareness’ is that of bank customers,

particularly those who are more up-to-date (but not necessarily
richer). This, too, confirms the validity of the Committee’s
observations (2) that ‘companies (especially the banking sector)
should clearly be primarily responsible for getting information
across on a wide scale, for the obvious reason that only such
messages are practical and of direct interest to the consumer.’

In brief, the experiment has shown up the failings of
3.3.5.
purely theory-based assumptions: apart from the predictably
meagre results of dual display of prices, the Green Paper’s
assumption that competition would induce private operators
to offer services in euro, resulting in considerable benefits for
the consumer, also proved unfounded.

3.3.5.1.
certain
The Committee had warned against
unfounded assessments; in the opinion already cited, it stated
that running accounts in euro would be ‘a mere accounting
in familiarising the
strategy which might well be useful
consumer with the new currency, but would be of no practical
use’. Only now is it being realised that barely 1 % of consumers
have opened accounts in euro. The messages were technically
excellent; unfortunately, they ignored the principle set out in
point 2.2.1: recommendations fall on deaf ears if consumers
see no direct, immediate benefit for themselves.

3.3.6.
The idea now is to resume the information campaign
with renewed vigour; the Committee strongly recommends
that it be limited to the practical and technical arrangements
for transition to coins and banknotes in euro, conversion of
accounts, cash amounts, etc. without dwelling on other aspects;
a few simple concepts are most likely to be retained. Most
importantly, the actual event should be ‘played down’: the
message must be conveyed that conversion is perfectly access-
ible to everyone, with a minimum of normal care: separate
plans should however be made for the most ‘vulnerable’ sectors
of society (the blind, those living in poverty, illiterate or semi-
literate people or inhabitants of remote areas), for whom
specific measures and messages should be devised.

3.3.6.1.
The information campaign should not, however,
be ‘Europe’-driven, but implemented mainly by the Member
States: only they are aware of their general environment and

(1) Euro Paper No 38, point 2.2, p. 10.

(2) OJ C 18, 22.1.1996, p. 112, point 8.2.3.

29.5.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 155/61

the way their citizens think, and can judge the right approach
to cope with specific national or local situations. They should
take particular care to ensure that the necessary information is
conveyed to geographical areas and sectors of society which
are hard to reach via mass communication.

3.3.6.2.
Another recommendation concerns the implemen-
tation timetable: the campaign should be prepared in advance,
but launched only towards the last three months of 2001. To
start earlier would be once again to run the risk already
identified by surveys: information given too early is forgotten.

As already argued in the case of businesses, in the
3.3.6.3.
area of communication with the general public, public money
should be used only if and when spontaneous initiatives by
the mass media or private sector do not achieve the aim: the
Commission and above all the Member States should have a
full picture of the situation in the various sectors — private
individuals, companies and public bodies — and should take
any measures to ‘fill the gaps’. Hence it is necessary to avoid
overlapping and duplication of measures.

3.3.6.4.
It is essential that the temptation to combine two
messages — one ‘technical’ and the other, on the benefits of
the euro, ‘political’ — be resisted. Linkage may be useful in
some cases, but it should be left to individual Member States:
further confirmation of the need for ‘national’ rather than
‘European’ campaigns (see point 3.3.6.1).

The approach should change to one based on the urgency and
the compulsory nature of the transition to the euro: those to
whom the messages are addressed must understand that time
is short and that those who do not adapt — by learning and/or
taking adequate measures — will run into all the problems
associated with being ‘out of the loop’. In short, the principle
which applies is ‘ignorance of the law is no excuse’ — a
principle of Roman law which underpins all legal systems. A
‘robust’, albeit politely-worded, message, designed to recall the
addressees to their duties as citizens towards society while
protecting their own interests,
is worth more than any
number of invitations and exhortations delivered in an almost
apologetic tone.

3.3.9.
Rounding-off of prices in euros, which may occur
especially in countries which are not, or no longer, used to
using ‘cent’ denominations in their currency,
is an aspect
which needs to be looked at. While in a free market vendors
retain the ability to set prices, a widespread tendency to round
prices upwards may well trigger an increase in inflation,
although this should be inhibited by inter-company compe-
tition. Companies and consumer organisations should be
alerted to this issue, which will also prevent conflict being
generated over it.

4.

The introduction of the banknotes and coins

3.3.7.
The Committee trusts that, in the preparatory cam-
paigns for practical introduction of the euro, account will be
taken of a suggestion which it has repeatedly made but which
seems to have gone unheeded: the Committee recommended (1)
that information campaigns on the practical aspects of the
introduction of the euro should highlight the benefits of
extensive use of payment cards which would make conversion
calculations automatic and remove the need to calculate
change. This aspect should be stressed in all the messages,
especially in the banking and commercial sectors:
the
calculations seem complicated or one does not have confidence
in those made by the other party in the transaction, cards
should be used as much as possible.

if

4.1.
In the Communication the Commission states that the
euro coins are more secure than any of the national coins in
circulation; the Committee takes note of this, but warns against
any complacency: technology is now so far advanced, and the
resources available to organised crime are so considerable, that
one cannot afford to ‘lower one’s guard’. The central banks,
the OLAF and Europol are taking protective measures which
are already far from being a simple task: although obvious and
possibly already catered for, it might be worth recalling the
need for coordination with Interpol, since the euro is set to be
in wide circulation across the world.

3.3.8.
One consideration, which the Committee regards as
not unimportant, concerns the ‘tone’ of the communication:
earlier campaigns were based on stressing the advantages of
the euro, and encouraging the public to prepare themselves.

(1) OJ C 73, 9.3.1998, p. 130, points 5.4 and 5.4.1.

4.2.
The Commission adds that it is satisfied with the
parameters that enable the coins to be recognised by automatic
vending machines. It does not mention the recognisability of
banknotes used in machines in a number of countries,
particularly in car parks and filling stations. In view of the high
value of banknotes in euros and the costly technology for their
it would be desirable for the use of vending
recognition,
machines which accept banknotes to be discouraged. Thus the
machines should only accept coins or payment cards.

C 155/62

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

29.5.2001

5. Measures against counterfeiting

6. National cash changeover plans

5.1.
The Committee takes note of the Council Decision of
May 2000 on reinforcing protection of the euro (1), which
recommended that the Member States lay down effective,
proportional and deterrent penalties for counterfeiting the
single currency and trafficking counterfeit notes. However, it
notes with regret that once again the suggestion for the
decision to include similar preventive and repressive measures
against counterfeiting and use of alternative forms to cash
(cards, cheques or travellers’ cheques) has not been taken up (2).

5.2.
Given the spread of these means of payment and the
likely increase in them with the introduction of the euro
(already in some supermarkets in certain countries payment
by card constitutes 70 % to 80 % of the daily turnover), it is
advisable to protect alternative means of payment through
similar measures — albeit proportionately less severe — to
those adopted for the cash form of the official currency.

Such measures should be taken both with a view to
5.2.1.
protecting citizens’ interests and — even more so — as part of
the effort to combat organised crime. Confining attention to
protection of the official currency displays a limited vision of
protection of the public interest, confined to the state as such;
the interests of society (defence of the citizen and combating
organised crime) are equally important, in economic terms but
above all
in social terms. The Committee trusts that the
Commission will take urgent action to ensure that suitable
measures are adopted.

5.3.
The question of counterfeiting and trafficking in official
currency and means of payment comes under the broader
heading of combating organised crime, discussed in an earlier
Committee opinion (3). The opinion called upon the Member
States to take urgent steps to reorganise their structures and
regulations to achieve effective coordination of anti-crime
action. The Commission has proposed a regulation on the
matter, restricted to counterfeiting of euros, but adoption
seems to be held up by delays and obstacles which are
completely unjustifiable given the urgency and importance of
the problem.

(1) See also the steps to establish a Steering Group and a common
interinstitutional strategy for the protection of the euro (Europol/
European Central Bank Joint Press Release, 24.3.2001).

(2) OJ C 18, 22.1.1996, p. 112, points 7.13 and 7.14.
(3) OJ C 268, 19.9.2000, p. 48.

The period immediately after 31 December 2001 will
6.1.
perhaps be the most delicate phase of
the whole ‘euro
operation’ since it involves not just groups who are profession-
ally prepared but also the general public, including sectors of
society who cannot be expected to have perfect knowledge of
the rules and procedures. Each Member State has taken
appropriate measures, which presumably take account of the
needs and customs existing in each country.

6.2.
As regards advance supplies of banknotes and coins,
each Member State has adopted its own policy. In the retail
sector and for service companies, especially those located in
remote areas, the greatest problem will be having sufficient
funds available from the first day to give change in euros to
customers, as well as familiarising staff with operations
involving the new currency. For the general public, on the
other hand, the main question is getting used to recognising
the various coins and banknotes; for that purpose it should be
enough to look at pictures in the booklets and leaflets already
in circulation, or which will be reprinted and distributed at a
suitable time. As regards being able to recognise forgeries, it is
doubtful whether the ordinary citizen could acquire the
necessary skill to distinguish them from genuine currency.

The sectors which most need to defend themselves
6.3.
against forgeries are the retail and services sectors: they ought
to have available to them — from the very start! — low cost,
efficient equipment capable of recognising forgeries.
It is
possible that suitable measures to this end have been adopted
or are in the process of being adopted, but the Committee has
no information on this.

6.4.
Two of the main problems seem to be firstly, that of
avoiding the formation of queues at bank counters to acquire
the new currency on the first day and secondly, in retailing,
where — insofar as is possible — change in euros should
be given for payments made in national currency. Here
communication must play a decisive role — and it should be
remembered that television is the most effective, convincing
means, with low cost per contact. The citizen must be
informed that the national currency can go on being used
without problems for a certain period two months after
the changeover (two months almost everywhere):, it would
however be useful for him or her to pay into a bank account
in December all the cash which is not essential to meet
immediate expenditure, although this should not be compul-
sory. Neither will it be a problem if traders who are temporarily
out of euros give customers change in national currency. The
message must therefore play down the assumed complications
and difficulties, provided that the citizen is prepared to do
In this respect, the Committee would
what is suggested.
redirect attention to its proposal — made on a number of
earlier occasions — to convince consumers and trade to adopt
the widespread use of electronic means of payment. These are
the only means which do not involve conversion calculations
with the resulting checks and doubts, or having to give change
in cash.

29.5.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 155/63

6.5.
Currency exchange in banks will be free of charge in
‘reasonable’ quantities, but in this connection it will be worth
pointing out that only the national currency can be exchanged
free of charge, whereas foreign currencies (banknotes) remain
subject to the payment of the costs of handling and return to
the relevant countries, under the existing conditions which
must not be changed, unless it is to lighten them. It should
also be specified that the exchange of foreign coins is not
usually provided for, given the excessive cost of their handling
in relation to their value. This is only a minor problem for
individuals: in some countries publicity campaigns are under
way in favour of donating coins to charities or research
institutes. Such initiatives should be encouraged everywhere.

6.6.
On the problem of exchanging modest — or better,
‘reasonable’ — sums, for people who do not have a bank
account, the banking system should make provision free of
charge. If approached properly, the question should not give
rise to serious problems: those who do not have a bank
account are unlikely to hold significant sums. However, the
maximum amount must be such as not to facilitate money
laundering by organised crime; the latter could take advantage
of the opportunity to convert ill-gotten gains through a
number of people going to different bank counters and
claiming that they do not hold an account.

In contrast to the point made above, it has been
6.6.1.
noted in some countries that not everyone has a bank (or
postal) account, and that many people still hoard large sums
of money at home. Since compelling individuals to open bank
or postal current or savings accounts is inconceivable, the
from ‘illicit’ money
problem of distinguishing ‘legitimate’
remains: this can be done by using existing money laundering
legislation. In most countries such laws stipulate that the
possession of cash sums over certain limits must be justified
by clearly-identified persons: any exception to this rule would
be to open a door to launderers which the law had already
sought to shut. The Committee urges that this rule be applied
universally.

One aspect affecting the practical arrangements for
6.7.
converting paper and metallic money into euro is the logistical
one; the general public has little knowledge of the volume
of currency involved, the problems of transport, guarding,
protection, distribution, collection and destruction of the
currencies which are no longer in circulation. The central
banks and national banking systems have been seeking for
some time to tackle the difficult problems involved, but the
Committee has the impression that some of them have not yet
been entirely solved. A recommendation of greater diligence
seems out of place, and would run the risk of being unfair to
the professionalism of those dealing with the matter; however,

the Committee thinks it useful to draw attention to the
possibility that practical obstacles arising at the last minute
may make impracticable some of the measures now regarded
as rational and useful.

7.

Part II — The Recommendation

7.1.
As stated in the introduction, the information and
considerations contained in the Communication and the Euro
Papers find a logical conclusion in the Recommendation. The
Committee has adopted a similar layout, commenting on the
various documents in the same order, with a view to clarifying
its views and making its viewpoints more comprehensible.

In particular,

7.2.
Article 1. The recommendations in this article (entitled
‘informing future users’) follow the right logic of ‘capillary
penetration’ of information, and the Committee can only
agree, but would draw attention to various reservations and
comments contained in point 3 above.
it
recommends relying mainly on sectoral organisations and
banks, and secondarily on the Member States and their official
institutions, only when this turns out to be indispensable.
Given that the campaigns are aimed at national populations
and categories, there is no obvious need for the European
institutions to be involved. Above all, account should be taken
of what has already been spent overall: even without the data,
one can say with certainty that no communication campaign
has ever involved such high ‘costs per contact’ with such
disappointing results.

7.3.
Article 2 — ‘helping citizens to become accustomed to
the euro’. It is recommended that the Member States ensure,
during the third quarter of 2001 at the latest, that the order of
display of dual prices be inverted: first a highly visible euro
price and then the corresponding price in national currency.
The measure is rational, but one should not have too many
illusions as to its effectiveness in every case: it will be effective
if the consumer already has an account in euro; on the other
hand, if he is using national currency (in cash or in his own
account), he will in any case have to consult the amount given
in that currency. More generally, it is far from certain that this
measure will get consumers into the habit of converting
amounts: only practice will tell. Shrewder consumers will
probably assume this habit, but their ‘weaker’ counterparts
must be able to expect help from suppliers.

7.3.1.
In the course of the year 2001, public administrations
and businesses should pay their employees’ wages and salaries
in euro, and pensions should also be paid in euro. This could
lead some of the employees to start holding their bank
accounts in euro — a decision which would in itself be
encouraging in terms of creating a familiarity with the new

C 155/64

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

29.5.2001

currency. However, the Committee draws attention to one
problem:
if, as is probable, only some of the employees
take this decision, cooperation will be necessary between
employers, employees and the banking system to ensure that
the amounts to be credited in euro (for those who already have
euro accounts) and those to be converted into national
currency are identified at the source. Considering the dynamic
of the opening of the accounts — which will certainly not all
be opened at the same time — the continual updating of the
files will be quite a serious administrative burden.

7.3.2.
Television could do much more to familiarise the
general public with the euro than any official publicity
campaign, through game-shows, quizzes etc., provided that
efforts are made — as a matter of urgency — to ensure that
winnings or potential prizes are always expressed in euros
rather than national currency. The same applies to lotteries,
betting and so on. This may seem a trivial point, but the
intention is perfectly serious, and the Committee is convinced
that the matter merits careful consideration.

Article 3 — ‘Encouraging economic operators to gain
7.4.
experience in using the euro’.
It is proposed that at the
beginning of the third quarter of 2001, the banking system
should, of its own initiative, transform accounts and means of
payment into euro unless the customer expressly requests
otherwise. Bank statements should show every amount in euro
and equivalent amounts in the national currency unit. This is
intended to anticipate by at least three months the obligatory
transition to the euro — a measure which some of the
customers could view favourably. In addition, part of the
banking sector could draw an advantage from this since it
would dilute the impact of the ‘big bang’ at the end of the year,
provided that conversion programmes already adopted allow
it. However, this does not seem to be the case for all credit
institutions. The Member States should consult the parties
concerned and should at all events avoid making this provision
a coercive one.

7.4.1.
The Committee would also draw attention to the
correlation between the provisions of Article 2 and Article 3:
should wages continue to be paid in national currency to the
end of 2001 — which is probably the case for many firms —
the employee would find himself having to count in two
currencies if his account was obligatorily converted into euro.
The same problem, only the other way round, concerns
employees receiving their wages in euro but who have national
currency accounts. In principle, it would be best for wages to
be paid in euros and accounts to be converted at the same
time. This would not be a straightforward operation, and
would have to be accomplished following consultation with
the interested parties: trade unions, consumers and banks.

Committee: contracts and the registered capital of new firms
should all be expressed in euro, above all — and indeed
obligatorily — if their validity extends beyond 31 December
2001. Similar measures should be taken with regard to
employment contracts between the social partners. The Com-
mittee has already given a favourable view on the suggestion
to ask customers to deposit in banks in December all the cash
which they do not immediately need (1).

7.5.1.
An additional measure, designed to reduce the flow
of operations to be converted into euro, could be the adoption
of a provision which has long been adopted by certain Member
States for other purposes: a ban on paying salaries and
pensions in cash, instead making payments into bank or postal
accounts. Apart from the benefit in terms of conversion into
euro, this would diminish the incentive for robbing people
and banks or post offices and would in addition combat the
problem of undeclared labour. Some voices have been raised
against making such a measure compulsory, although it does
not seem to have caused problems in a range of countries. The
Committee believes that if it is decided not to impose any
obligation, then at least every possible disincentive should put
in the path of paying salaries and pensions in cash.

7.6.
Article 5 — ‘facilitating the cash changeover to the
euro’. The measures provided for in this article have been
commented on in point 6 above. The Committee agrees, but
draws attention to possible obstacles of a logistical nature
(point 6.7),
to the need to prevent money laundering
(point 6.6), and to safeguarding against fraud and forgery
(points 5.2 and 6.2). It is worth pointing out in this connection
that replacing cash with fiduciary money (payment cards in
particular)
is already being advocated by the commercial
sector, independently of the changeover to the euro: consumers
are specifically asked to use cards each time strikes are called
by cash-in-transit personnel, but reducing cash stocks is in any
case necessary, even under normal conditions.

8. Conclusions

8.1.
The Committee agrees that a further multimedia
information campaign, principally via television, is necessary
for the changeover from national currencies to the euro, but it
recommends that this be done in good time, with as little
public expenditure as possible and, above all, with a minimal
contribution from Community funds: in practical terms, each
country is responsible for its own communication policy.

7.5.
Article 4 — ‘reducing the flow of transactions to be
converted into euro’. This article is fully endorsed by the

(1) See point 6.4 above.

29.5.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 155/65

8.2.
Similarly, the ‘political’ message on the advantages of
the euro and its benefits for Europe must be left up to national
authorities, who alone can judge whether and how to transmit
the message in the light of their citizens’ feelings.

8.3.
The practical problems arising from the introduction
of the single currency are numerous, but should not be
exaggerated, either in practice or in messages directed to the
public. The general public should help by taking on board the
recommendations: not keeping or changing large sums in
cash, avoiding queues to obtain new cash, opening bank or
postal accounts where they have not yet done so, and using
payment cards whenever possible.

8.4.
The bank and retail sectors will have a key role to play:
banks in changing the currency in which accounts are held

and transactions effected and, in logistical terms, storing and
distributing the new currency; and retail outlets in taking
national currency from customers, paying it into banks and,
where necessary, giving change in euros. This raises issues of
prior supply of coins and notes with the ensuing problems of
logistics, security and calculation of interest.

8.5.
The Committee intends to make no comments on this
aspect, realising that it is a matter for the national authorities
and is the subject of delicate negotiations. Logistical problems
must be resolved by those responsible and mindful of the
duration of dual circulation of new and old currency. Here, the
Committee would emphasise that the logistical problems are
all the greater in that the period of dual circulation will be
short.

Brussels, 29 March 2001.

The President

of the Economic and Social Committee

Göke FRERICHS

Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on ‘Wage discrimination between men and
women’

(2001/C 155/12)

On 21 September 2000 the Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 23(3) of the Rules of
Procedure, decided to draw up an opinion on ‘Wage discrimination between men and women’.

The Section for Employment, Social Affairs and Citizenship, which was responsible for preparing the
Committee’s work on the subject, adopted its opinion on 7 March 2001. The rapporteur was Ms Florio.

At its 380th plenary session (meeting of 28 March 2001), the Economic and Social Committee adopted
the following opinion by 65 votes to eight, with 14 abstentions.

1.

Introduction

Article 141 of the Amsterdam Treaty amends and
1.1.2.
replaces Article 119, and provides the Council with a legal
base for adopting measures to guarantee the principle of equal
treatment.

The right to equal pay has been enshrined in Com-
1.1.
munity legislation since its very beginnings: Article 119 of the
1957 Treaty of Rome requires the Member States to apply the
principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ for men and women.

1.1.3.
solidate this right within the European Union (1).

Other directives have also helped indirectly to con-

1.1.1.
Later, Directive 75/117/EEC on the approximation
of the laws of the Member States relating to the application of
the principle of equal pay for men and women states the need
for ‘equal pay for the same work or for work to which equal
value is attributed’.

(1) Amongst the most important are Directive 76/207/EEC (Access
to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working
conditions); Directives 79/7/EEC, 86/378/EEC and 96/97/EC (on
social security).