WRITTEN QUESTION E-0113/01 by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission. Whistle-blowers (3): encouraging whistle-blowers to use OLAF voluntarily by giving practical proof that it is effective and rapid.
Date: 2001-02-01
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: European Anti-fraud Office, administration of the Institutions, administrative procedure, fraud, fraud against the EU, operation of the Institutions, rights of civil servants, rights of the defence

21.8.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 235 E/123

The Commission considers that an investigation by OLAF is the most appropriate means of enabling
action to be taken by the employing Institution if the allegations are confirmed by the investigation.
At the same time such an investigation provides a safeguard for third persons from being wrongly
accused of wrongdoing. To allow an effective investigation the Office must meet a time limit which is
reasonable and commensurate with the difficulties of investigating each case. In the nature of such
it is not possible for any investigating body to meet pre-determined and explicit
investigations,
timetables for concluding their activities.

2. The Commission considers that the obligation to report concerns related to serious wrongdoing, and
the corresponding protection for those who fulfil this obligation, provide the necessary protection for
staff, whichever specified reporting channel is used.

The only (cid:145)burden(cid:146) for a staff member is to consider carefully whether, to the best of his or her
knowledge,
the evidence gives rise to a presumption of a serious wrongdoing. The additional
possibility of informing a President of another Institution or the European Ombudsman is proposed
in the consultation document in order to cover eventualities in the unlikely event that the independent
European Anti-fraud Office has not taken appropriate action.

3. The protection foreseen for legitimate reporting, whether under the reporting obligation or wider
disclosure to one of the defined additional channels, would be guaranteed by the Staff Regulations and
respect of these rights would therefore be subject to judicial control.

4. The Commission considers,

in line with the recommendations of the Committee of Independent
Experts and the OECD, that independent advice should be available for staff members confronted with
the situation of deciding whether or not a disclosure to a party outside the employing Institution,
other than OLAF,
is likely to be protected. The Commission understands that people who find
themselves in such a situation can face personal dilemmas, and in the consultative document the
Commission has emphasised that the advice must clearly be independent and confidential.

The advice clearly needs to relate to the facts of the case and also to the legal environment established
in the Staff Regulations and specific to EU civil servants. The Commission is therefore proposing in its
consultative document to attach this function to its mediation service or to create a new facility for
impartial and confidential advice. Civil servants would have the opportunity, but not the obligation, to
seek advice from this body. The provision of such a facility is intended entirely to be helpful to
officials. Its use would be voluntary.

(1) See p. 120.
(2) OJ L 136, 31.5.1999.

(2001/C 235 E/128)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0113/01

by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(1 February 2001)

Subject: Whistle-blowers (3): encouraging whistle-blowers to use OLAF voluntarily by giving practical

proof that it is effective and rapid

Can the Commission confirm that following consultation between the services, and after the meeting
1.
of the Commission last November, part of the text of Commissioner Kinnock(cid:146)s original proposal relating to
a proposed change to the Staff Regulations (new Article 22b(1)) has been deleted, even though it was this
text which gave whistle-blowers the opportunity of approaching not only the President of the Commission,
the Council of Ministers or the European Parliament but also, if necessary, a third party ((cid:145)such other person
as the official can demonstrated was justified(cid:146))?

2.
Does the Commission agree that omitting the right referred to in question 1 reduces the scope for
protecting whistle -blowers and can therefore be to their disadvantage alone? Why did the Commission
decide to do this?

C 235 E/124

Official Journal of the European Communities

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21.8.2001

Does the Commission realise that restricting the channels open for reporting facts within and beyond
3.
the civil service creates the impression that in practice the rules will boil down to restricting the
opportunity for sounding the alarm at suspected abuse, because the most effective means of doing so (cid:129)
transparency and public discussion (cid:129) has been cut off?

Is the Commission prepared to work towards a better balance of interests by providing fewer rules
4.
and regulations on the opportunities open to whistle-blowers but
instead greatly encouraging the
voluntary use of approaching OLAF (cid:129) an approach set up specifically for this purpose (cid:129) by giving
practical proof of OLAF(cid:146)s effectiveness and speed of response?

5.
Is the Commission prepared to interpret the principle of presumed innocence, as applied in answer
2000/C374-E/001 of 3 November 1999 to questions by Mr SacrØdeus, MEP, so that it does not create any
unnecessary obstacles to taking seriously information which should give rise to concern?

Is the Commission prepared to take supplementary measures to give whistle-blowers greater

6.
protection from harassment, demotion or dismissal?

Answer given by Mr Kinnock on behalf of the Commission

(11 April 2001)

1. to 3.
The Commission considered the alternative of legitimate disclosure to persons other than those
enumerated in the consultative document. However, the Commission did not retain this alternative, opting
instead for precise reporting channels.

The Commission considered that providing for a clearly identified person to whom disclosure or reason-
able suspicion may be reported offers the best way of ensuring that allegations of serious wrongdoings are
correctly investigated; that if warranted, action is taken; and that, simultaneously, the necessary safeguards
for the respect of confidentiality are provided where that is required under the provisions of the Treaty.

Such arrangements are also in the interests of all staff because they clarify the responsibility for such
a report as well as the means of making it. By specifying the highest ranking persons in the Institutions as
recipients for reports of alleged wrongdoing, the Commission considers that it is making provision to
facilitate effective action against serious offences whilst ensuring against forms of disclosure which could
transgress against legal obligations of confidentiality, natural justice, or subsequent effective prosecution of
wrongdoers.

Far from inhibiting the effective opportunities (and duties) of giving the alarm the arrangements proposed
by the Commission would greatly enhance those opportunities and the likelihood of appropriate action
being taken when reports of suspected wrongdoing prove, after investigation, to be valid.

The Commission considers that public disclosure and debate have great value, but untimely public
disclosure can have the effect of compromising legal or disciplinary proceedings that may arise from the
apprehension of wrongdoing.

The Commission has published a consultative document and will only adopt its final position on the
4.
matter after a careful examination of all comments made. Meanwhile, and in the future, officials have
a duty to report suspicions of wrongdoing.

The principle of the presumption of innocence must be respected in the investigation of any alleged
5.
wrongdoing. The proposals put forward by the Commission in the Consultative Document respect this
essential principle of civil rights without creating any unnecessary obstacles to serious treatment of
information related to alleged wrongdoing.

The Commission refers to its answer on point 2 of Written Question E-0112/01 of the Honourable

6.
Member (1).

(1) See p. 121.