WRITTEN QUESTION E-0111/01 by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission. Whistle-blowers (1): their socially useful function in solving problems in large and small organisations.
Date: 2001-02-01
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: access to information, administration of the Institutions, administrative procedure, administrative transparency, dissemination of EU information, duties of civil servants, fraud, fraud against the EU, information policy, right to information

C 235 E/120

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

21.8.2001

Reply

(14 May 2001)

The European Parliament shall appoint an Ombudsman after each election of the European Parliament for
the duration of its term of office. The Ombudsman presently in office is M. Jacob S(cid:246)derman. He receives
complaints and conducts inquiries concerning instances of maladministration in the activities of the
Community institutions or bodies, with the exception of the Court of Justice and the Court of First
Instance acting in their judicial role.

The particular question concerning Ireland and the appointment of an ombudsman for farming raised by
the Honourable Member is a matter of national competence and does not fall within the competence of
the Community.

(2001/C 235 E/126)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0111/01

by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(1 February 2001)

Subject: Whistle-blowers (1): their socially useful function in solving problems in large and small organisa-

tions

1.
Does the Commission agree that transparency and public discussion have always proved the most
effective means of focusing attention on suspected abuse within organisations and that such attention can
help prevent the problems remaining unresolved for a long time?

2. What is the Commission(cid:146)s view of the idea that it is defensible for persons with knowledge of abuse
to delay the transparency approach referred to in question 1 only, and for as long as, it is certain that the
problems in question are limited in scope and/or that they can be rapidly and effectively resolved within
the organisation itself?

3.
Does the Commission acknowledge that it is a predictable, and virtually inevitable, desire on the part
of managers of all types of organisations to keep instances of abuse that come to light concealed from the
public, to deny the problems or to delay resolving them, and that as a result it often happens that criticism
and information which do not fit in with this approach are not appreciated?

4.
Does the Commission also acknowledge that because of the desire referred to in question 3 serious
conflict may arise between, on the one hand, the management(cid:146)s desire for peace and quiet in the
organisation in question and, on the other, the socially useful role of (cid:145)whistle-blowers(cid:146)?

5. What is the Commission(cid:146)s view of the consequences of the conflict referred to in question 4 for
whistle-blowers whose livelihood depends on the organisation within which they work and who accord-
ingly may be afraid of being punished with dismissal or demotion as bringers of bad news?

6.
Does the Commission agree that its civil service apparatus should not be an exception to the rule
that society as a whole benefits from encouraging the speedy application of solutions to problems, from
the ending of undesirable developments and from public discussion of the best way of working?

Answer given by Mr Kinnock on behalf of the Commission

(11 April 2001)

The Commission considers transparency to be an essential quality of modern public administration. It gives
high priority to providing information to citizens on its activities and remains committed to the principle
of giving citizens the greatest possible access to information and documents.

In relation to the public disclosure of concerns about maladministration and potential wrongdoings, the
Commission shares the view of the Committee of Independent Experts that an effective balance between
the public interests of confidentiality and loyalty of public servants and those of transparency and
accountability must be achieved. Indeed, the principal aim of (cid:145)whistleblowing(cid:146) provisions is to provide an
incentive for staff to report concerns internally, and for their employer to investigate those concerns
effectively. The Commission believes that this applies with equal force to the EU Institutions.

21.8.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 235 E/121

On 29 November 2000, the Commission adopted a consultative document entitled (cid:145)Raising concerns
about serious wrongdoings(cid:146) (SEC(2000) 2078/6). It sets out proposals that are currently the subject of
consultation with its staff and their representatives. At the end of the consultation period, the Commission
will formulate a conclusive proposal to be put to the Inter-Institutional Staff Regulations Committee for
the amendment of the Staff Regulations. The document proposes to include in the Staff Regulations the
duty for all staff (cid:129) introduced in 1999 with the creation of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (cid:129)
to report wrongdoings either within their Institution or direct to OLAF, with the assurances that they will
face no adverse treatment for making such disclosures. The document also considers the circumstances in
which such concerns may justifiably be disclosed more widely, and concludes that raising concerns about
serious wrongdoing outside the employing Institution or OLAF should be an option of last resort, to be
exercised legitimately only in the unlikely situation in which neither has addressed the concern in an
appropriate way. In this extreme case the Commission considers it appropriate that the concern may be
raised with the highest authorities of other European Institutions without fear of negative consequences for
whistleblowers who act in good faith.

In the Commission(cid:146)s opinion the most effective way to encourage staff to report concerns within the
organisation is to provide clearly defined and secure internal reporting channels. As a further guarantee of
serious attention, however, it is sensible to provide for safe and specified routes through which staff may
raise legitimate concerns outside the organisation as an option of last resort.

The Commission is confident that by ensuring acceptable, safe and serious ways in which staff can raise
a concern about wrongdoing, an open and self-disciplined culture is encouraged with consequent effect of
deterring wrong or unacceptable conduct. A culture in which staff has confidence to raise such concerns
ensures that it is more likely in those rare cases where wrongdoing actually occurs, that it can be detected
at an early stage and addressed responsibly and effectively. Equally where a concern is based on mistaken
information or there is an innocent explanation, such a culture allows such misunderstandings to be
swiftly corrected.

Far from seeking to be an exception from good practice, the Commission is seeking to strengthen existing
provisions for civil servants to discharge their duty of reporting suspected wrongdoing. Implementation of
arrangements of the kind proposed will give the Commission and its staff rules which are comparable with
the best in any Member States in the Union.

The principles which would be made operational would facilitate reporting in good faith, serious and
thorough treatment of reports, the conduct of investigations in ways that would not compromise civil
rights (including the presumption of innocence), the career security of an official exercising the reporting
duty, or the effective disciplinary or prosecution of any persons found to be guilty of wrongdoing.

A basic purpose of having good (cid:145)whistleblowing(cid:146) arrangements is to deter potential wrongdoers and to
apprehend actual wrongdoers and deal with them in a just way. A system which did not have the
characteristics of the proposals set out by the Commission could give the appearance of being transparent,
but in practice could also be rendered ineffectual by untimely disclosure or faults in procedure.

(2001/C 235 E/127)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0112/01

by Erik Meijer (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(1 February 2001)

Subject: Whistle-blowers (2): how shortcomings in the rules discourage and prevent their activities

The Commission(cid:146)s new internal rules on whistle-blowing (Raising concerns about serious wrongdoing
(cid:145)whistle-blowing(cid:146)),
(SEC(2000) 2078 A/5 of 29.11.2000), do not appear likely to satisfy the high
expectations invested in them.