WRITTEN QUESTION E-3821/00 by W.G. van Velzen (PPE-DE) to the Commission. Follow-up question on international roaming charges for mobile telephones.
Date: 2000-12-07
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: fixing of prices, radio telecommunications, telecommunications policy, telephone charges

11.12.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 350 E/5

(2001/C 350 E/005)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3757/00

by Carlos Ripoll y Mart(cid:237)nez de Bedoya (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(4 December 2000)

Subject: Interreg programme

Can the Commission state whether the province of Almer(cid:237)a, which forms part of the Andalusia region
(Spain), is eligible for the Interreg programmes?

If not, can the Commission explain why it is excluded, given its geographical location opposite the North
African coast?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission

(12 February 2001)

The Spanish province of Almer(cid:237)a, which belongs to the Autonomous Community of Andalusia, is eligible
in 2000-2006 under the programmes for the Western Mediterranean and South West Europe in strand B
(transnational co-operation) of the Community Initiative Interreg III and under strand C of that initiative.

The Western Mediterranean programme aims at encouraging transnational co-operation projects between
the European areas concerned and the countries of North Africa. The Member States concerned have
recently submitted their proposals for programmes in these two target areas to the Commission. The
Western Mediterranean programme will receive around € 97 million from the European Regional
Development Fund and the South West Europe programme € 66 135 million.

Conversely, Almer(cid:237)a is not eligible under strand A of Interreg III (cross-border co-operation), since this type
of co-operation concerns geographically adjacent areas. Only very few maritime borders are eligible for
this programme.

(2001/C 350 E/006)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3821/00

by W.G. van Velzen (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(7 December 2000)

Subject: Follow-up question on international roaming charges for mobile telephones

On 4 October 2000 Commissioner Monti replied on behalf of the Commission to my question of 13 July
2000 on international roaming charges for mobile telephones (E-2648/00).

The Commission(cid:146)s answer gives rise to a number of further questions:

1. When will the Commission publish the results of its study on the structure and level of mobile phone

roaming charges in the European Union?

2. What method did the Commission use to compare the roaming charges of the various operators?

3.

Is the Commission also in a position to carry out a benchmarking study of the various operators(cid:146)
roaming charges and to draw comparisons with practice in the USA?

4.

Is the Commission prepared to carry out such a study in the near future?

5. What opportunities does the Commission have for enforcing transparency with regard to roaming

charges?

6. What proportion of the price of international mobile phone conversations can be attributed to

roaming?

7. Does the Commission consider that, in this period of convergence, the method for setting mobile

phone roaming charges currently used by operators is still the correct one?

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Official Journal of the European Communities

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11.12.2001

Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission

(12 February 2001)

1.
On 24 November 2000 the Commission reported and discussed its confidential findings at a meeting
with the national competition authorities and national regulatory authorities. The Commission published
on 13 December 2000 a non-confidential version of its report that is publicly available (1).

2.
Because operators tend to set their retail roaming rates by marking up the underlying wholesale rates
with a standard percentage (of between 10 and 35 %), the wholesale charges applied between mobile
network operators largely determine the cost of retail roaming rates. In the absence of preferential roaming
and discounting the cost of buying wholesale roaming in a particular country appears to be practically
identical for different operators.

For wholesale rates, the Commission has compared the wholesale charges of different operators with the
retail charges for comparable non-roamed international calls offered by the same operator, with best
practice levels, and with cost data where available. However, because most mobile network operators are
not presently under ex ante regulatory obligations to keep detailed cost accounting data, such data are
rarely available. Based on the data collected in the sector inquiry, there does not appear to be any
significant relationship between differences in costs involved, and the different wholesale prices charged, or
indeed between roaming costs and prices more generally.

3.
Because the sector inquiry is an inquiry under the competition rules it does not aim to establish
benchmarks. Instead a comparative assessment of prices is used as one of several prima facie indicators to
establish priorities in investigating price levels and pricing practices of particular operators or groups of
operators. Moreover, even best practice roaming prices do not appear to be cost-based. Using benchmarks
could cause prices to converge at levels that are not cost-based and could facilitate collusion.

In the United States the billing principle for mobile calls is (cid:145)receiving party pays(cid:146), whereas in the
Community it is (cid:145)calling party pays(cid:146). Hence, mobile use and take-up in the United States differs from the
Community, and roaming prices for calls within the United States and between Member States are not
readily comparable (2).

A study looking at price levels in the United States will add little value, as Community and United

4.
States data are not readily comparable. Hence, undertaking such a study is not contemplated.

5.
At wholesale level, roaming prices are already highly transparent between mobile operators, which
may facilitate tacit or active collusion between these operators. At retail level, enforcing or encouraging
price transparency for operators under sector specific or general consumer protection rules, is primarily
a task for national regulatory authorities (NRAs) and consumer watchdogs. In the context of individual
competition cases the Commission may on a case by case basis require retail price transparency, and/or
insist that wholesale price reductions are passed on to benefit consumers.

6.
Because roamed calls received or made on a visited network do not constitute part of an
international mobile call made on a home network, but instead are a different type of call, there can be
no (cid:145)share(cid:146) of the price of an international mobile call that would be reasonable to attribute to roaming. If
the wholesale prices of roamed calls are compared with the retail prices of comparable non-roamed calls
on the same visited network, there appears to be no sound reason why wholesale roaming calls should be
more expensive. Although some additional costs are usually incurred for the handling of roamed calls (e.g.,
the cost of setting up roaming agreements and billing arrangements), considerable costs are saved as well
(e.g. the cost of marketing, advertising, and customer credit risk). However, as the inquiry is based on the
competition rules it is not possible to make statements on what would constitute a reasonable cost or
a reasonable price for international GSM roamed calls in general.

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 350 E/7

It is not for the Commission to declare whether particular pricing methods are appropriate unless
7.
they infringe the competition rules as such.
technological and commercial
developments, convergence may provide new incentives to compete in roaming markets. If sufficient
competitive pressures emerge it appears likely that neither the mechanism by which operators determine
retail rates by applying standard mark-ups to wholesale rates, nor the parallel pricing at wholesale levels
that is prevalent today, will be sustainable.

In addition to other

(1) http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/sector_inquiries/roaming/.
(2) See e.g. the comparative discussion in Cellular Mobile Pricing Structures and Trends, OECD, Paris, May 2000 (DSTI/

ICCP/TISP(99)11/FINAL).

(2001/C 350 E/007)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-4017/00

by Elizabeth Lynne (ELDR) to the Commission

(21 December 2000)

Subject: Longline fishing

As the Commission is no doubt aware, there are concerns about the effect that longlining has on seabirds.
It is estimated that, each year, tens of thousands of seabirds are drowned as they become ensnared on
longlines. I understand that there are a number of measures that vessels could take to reduce the risk of
bird bycatch. Has the Commission taken, or does it intend to take, any action to assess the need to
implement these measures?

Answer given by Mr Fischler on behalf of the Commission

(7 February 2001)

The Commission has received several enquiries about this issue and it is increasingly aware of possible
problems regarding incidental catches of seabirds in longline fisheries. However not every longline fishery
requires the adoption of mitigation measures because incidental catch of seabirds does not occur
universally.

The Commission, after supporting the technical meetings that helped to define the Food and Agriculture
Organisation (FAO) International Plan of Action (IPOA) for reducing incidental catches of seabirds in
longline fisheries (FAO-IPOA Seabirds), is currently drafting a Community action plan starting from the
information made available by the Member States in response to a questionnaire sent them in August
2000.

Wherever such problems are caused by Community fishermen, the Commission is willing to attempt to
find solutions. However, as far as the Commission is aware, and after receiving the first replies to the
above-mentioned questionnaire, the incidental catches of seabirds do not constitute a real threat within
Community waters. The main problems seem to be caused by non-Community vessels fishing either in
international waters or in their own waters. The Community has no direct legal power to control the
activities of non-Community vessels in these geographical areas.

The main concerns regard albatrosses and other species, essentially in the Southern Oceans.

To tackle this problem, the Community has already incorporated the following mitigation measures into
Community legislation (1) (2), using bird-scaring line with plastic streamers attached; weighting the lines so
that they sink faster and pose less risk; prohibiting the discharge of offal at sea, which attracts seabirds to
the lines; setting the longlines at night when albatrosses and other seabirds are less likely to be foraging;
using only thawed bait.