WRITTEN QUESTION P-3933/00 by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council. Common Foreign Policy and Kosovo.
Date: 2000-12-07
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Kosovo, common foreign and security policy

19.6.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 174 E/193

Under the authority of United Nations (UN) Resolution 1244, the United Nations Interim Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK) has legalised the utilisation of any currency widely accepted in the territory of Kosovo.
Under this resolution, the Yugoslav Dinar retains its legal status and can be used to the extent that
businesses and people so desire. Thus, albeit recognising that the DM has been the preferred currency in
Kosovo for some time, the resolution does not introduce the DM as the sole legal tender.

7.
UN Resolution 1244 does not apply for Montenegro. The question of the creation of sustainable
monetary and exchange rate arrangements in the FRY should be addressed in the framework of
negotiations on the future constitutional relations between Serbia and Montenegro.

Similarly as in the case of Montenegro, the legal utilisation of the DM in Kosovo provides for a stable
framework to support economic development. From an economic and social point of view, it would have
been impossible for UNMIK to stabilise the Kosovo economy after the conflict, while using the Yugoslav
Dinar, a high inflation currency, and having no control on the money supply. As said above, the resolution
does not prohibit the utilisation of the Yugoslav Dinar.

According to information that

the
8.
circulation of DM notes and coins in countries outside Germany does not represent a problem with
respect to the conduct of monetary policy, neither to the Deutsche Bundesbank nor to the European
Central Bank. No correlation is seen between the circulation of DM notes and coins outside Germany and
forgery of Euro notes. The Commission has no reason to disagree with this position.

the Commission received from the Deutsche Bundesbank,

(2001/C 174 E/203)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-3933/00

by Bart Staes (Verts/ALE) to the Council

(7 December 2000)

Subject: Common Foreign Policy and Kosovo

The former president of Finland, Martti Ahtissari, has published a book called (cid:145)Mission to Belgrade(cid:146) in
which he describes how, as the former EU peace emissary, he and the Russian emissary Viktor
Chernomyrdin went to Belgrade on 2 June 1999 to present the international community(cid:146)s peace plan to
the Yugoslav president, Slobodan Milosevic. Ahtissari says that at first Milosevic resolutely refused to
negotiate the peace plan but that the following morning he suddenly agreed to accept it. Ahtissari says that
the logical explanation for this volte-face was that Milosevic had concluded a secret deal with the Russian
generals to make northern Kosovo a Serbian zone.

1.

Can the Council confirm Ahtissari(cid:146)s hypothesis? If not, why not?

2.
If so, how does the Council explain the fact that the region of Kosovo north of Mitrovica has now
become de facto a Serbia enclave despite the fact that the Russian army has not been able to enforce the
pact on its own and despite the presence of KFOR?

3.
Is the Council prepared to do everything in its power to put an end to the creation of a Serbian
enclave in northern Kosovo as soon as possible and to return this area to its inhabitants? If not, why not?

4.
If so, when will the ethnic Albanian inhabitants be able to return to their homes in northern
Mitrovica? And when will the hospital and university of Mitrovica be accessible once again to the ethnic
Albanians?

C 174 E/194

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

19.6.2001

Reply

(12 March 2001)

President Ahtisaari went to Belgrade on 2 June 1999 at the initiative of the European Union. At its
meeting on 31 May 1999 the Council had expressly supported his efforts and invited him to speak at the
Cologne European Council so that he could contribute to the discussions on the Western Balkans.

The Honourable Member will quite understand that the Council does not intend to comment on a
publication by a well-known figure such as President Martti Ahtisaari, but the Council can state that it has
no information on any supposed (cid:145)secret pact(cid:146) between Mr Milosevic and the (cid:145)Russian generals(cid:146) with a view
to making Kosovo a Serbian zone.

It is worth recalling that the Council has on several occasions expressed its confidence in and full support
for the initiatives of UNMIK/KFOR in Kosovo, and more specifically the town of Mitrovica, aiming at the
full application of Resolution 1244 of the United Nations Security Council and in particular at normal-
isation of inter-ethnic relations, including the free movement of persons and the return of refugees.

(2001/C 174 E/204)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3936/00

by Paul R(cid:252)big (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(13 December 2000)

Subject: Market surveillance and the EC trade mark

With regard to market surveillance and the EC trademark, would the Commission kindly answer the
following questions:

1. Does it merely send written questions to the individual Member States concerning market surveillance,
or does it carry out its own spot checks on the premises of individual companies? How often does it
do so?

2.

3.

In the first instance, are the Member States required to produce accurate documentation to prove that
shortcomings have been remedied, and do they do so?

Since no comprehensive market surveillance can currently be guaranteed at European level, what is
the timescale within which that should be achieved, or will it prove impossible to implement in the
near future because of the current streamlining of the administration?

4. Might it be possible to use certification by private-sector third parties to close any loophole in market

surveillance?

Answer given by Mr Liikanen on behalf of the Commission

(28 February 2001)

Market surveillance falls under Member States(cid:146) competence. Member States must nominate their competent
authorities and the Commission(cid:146)s role consists in verifying that Member States fulfil their obligations. The
Commission is not entitled to undertake its own spot checks on the premises of individual companies.

Defects must be notified to the Commission through the safeguard clause procedure. Member-States must
keep the Commission informed of measures introduced in accordance with the safeguard clause, including
the necessary technical justifications.