WRITTEN QUESTION E-3135/00 by Rosa Miguélez Ramos (PSE) to the Council. EC-Greenland fisheries agreement.
Date: 2000-10-16
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: EU aid, Greenland, agreement (EU), catch quota, development aid, financial compensation of an agreement, fishery resources, fishing agreement, fishing rights

C 163 E/40

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

6.6.2001

The Council position on Echelon was clearly set out in the JHA Council conclusions of 29 May
2.
2000, following an exchange of views on debates in the European Parliament on telecommunications
interception outside any legal
for the
fundamental principles relating to the protection of human rights and personal freedoms, both for natural
and legal persons, as recognised by the Treaty.

framework. The Council reaffirmed its attachment to respect

(2001/C 163 E/039)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3135/00

by Rosa MiguØlez Ramos (PSE) to the Council

(16 October 2000)

Subject: EC-Greenland fisheries agreement

On 14 September 2000, the Commission completed negotiations on a new fisheries agreement with
Greenland, providing for an annual EU contribution of € 42,82 million for 2000-2006. The Council has
not yet adopted this agreement, which does not separate the two types of funding, one for fishing rights
and the other for development aid, despite the Commission(cid:146)s undertaking that this agreement would
distinguish between these two areas according to the Commission(cid:146)s own unilateral declaration, € 28
million being assigned, to fishing rights, and the rest to development aid.

One of the controversial aspects of the present agreement with Greenland is that there is no real uptake of
the quotas assigned to the EU, and certain fleets from countries interested in using these quotas are
prevented from doing so because of the current distribution patters, which favours specific countries which
in practice do not use their quotas.
It would appear to be legitimate to reallocate these fishing
opportunities, acquired and paid for with Community money, to fleets which are interested in them, but
are presently blocked from using these fishing grounds.

Another issue in dispute is the complete failure to carry out exploration to investigate the existence of new
stocks and identify new fishing opportunities, alongside the non-contribution of the shipowners concerned
to the cost of the agreement, unlike most agreements signed by the Community.

How does the Council evaluate the implementation and development of the third protocol which expires
on 31 December, and the use which has been made of it?

Does the Council intend to amend the new text so as to ensure respect for the principle of co-funding, in
the shape of a levy paid by the Community shipowners benefiting from the Agreement? If not, how does
the Council justify such discrimination?

Does the text of the new agreement envisage greater emphasis on exploratory fishing?

With a view to making maximum use of the fishing opportunities, is the Council going to introduce
a mechanism for redistributing unused fishing opportunities?

Reply

(26 February 2001)

The Commission on 13 September 2000 initialled the draft Fourth Fisheries Protocol with Greenland, after
the successful conclusion of negotiations with the Government of Denmark and the Home Rule
Government of Greenland. In line with the negotiating mandate adopted by the Council on 4 August
2000, the Commission conducted these negotiations on behalf of the European Community, assisted by
a special committee in accordance with Article 300 of the Treaty. The Council would also inform the
Honourable Member that at its meeting on 14/15 December 2000 it decided to apply this Protocol
provisionally pending the Commission proposal on the conclusion of the Agreement.

6.6.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 163 E/41

The Council notes the Honourable Member(cid:146)s comment on the financial compensation. The Council wishes
to emphasise that the Community(cid:146)s view that, for the sake of enhanced transparency, the financial
compensation should be split into a fisheries component and a cooperation and development component
was expressed in the Agreed Record of Conclusions. Negotiations will continue in 2003 under the review
process aiming at achieving this financial transparency and better addressing the development needs of
Greenland.

The Council has not specifically evaluated the utilisation of the Third Fisheries Protocol. However, within
the scope of the negotiation directives with Greenland, the Council and the Commission invited the
Member States concerned to envisage the possibility of transfer of non- or under-utilised quotas to other
Member States, with due regard to the requirements of sustainable fisheries and without prejudice to the
principle of relative stability. The Council would like to recall that the principle of relative stability applies
in the waters of Greenland and that the European Court of Justice held this view in cases C-63/90 and
67/90.

In its Conclusions of 30 October 1997 on Fisheries Agreements with Third Countries, the Council invited
the Commission to consider the implementation of sharing of the financial cost of agreements between
Community funds and payment by shipowners. In the case of Greenland, it was a matter for negotiation
and the view that licence fees should be introduced was not acceptable to the other party. For its part, the
Council will carefully study the Commission(cid:146)s proposals for the implementation of the Fourth Protocol
when they are forwarded, before ascertaining whether there is in fact any discrimination of Community
fishermen operating in the North Atlantic.

The new draft Protocol provides for the fishing of new species (snow crab) in the framework of joint
ventures and joint enterprises and for the promotion of experimental fisheries.

(2001/C 163 E/040)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3139/00

by Jacques Poos (PSE) to the Commission

(6 October 2000)

Subject: Oil crisis

The spiralling price of oil is not essentially the result of a deliberate policy on the part of OPEC; rather, it
may be attributed to a severe shortage caused by extremely strong world economic growth.

This shortage may destabilise prices and disrupt growth.

Bearing the above considerations in mind, would the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Why has the Commission not proposed to the Ecofin Council that there should be a concerted,

temporary and reversible reduction in the taxes levied on liquid fuels?

2. Why has it not taken the step of negotiating an agreement with the producer countries on stabilising

oil prices on a long-term basis?

3. Why does (cid:145)the biggest economic area in the world(cid:146) not succeed in ensuring that it is able to pay for at

least some of its imports in its own currency?

Answer given by Mr Bolkestein on behalf of the Commission

(23 November 2000)

The Commission(cid:146)s powers remain limited where energy is concerned, as the treaties do not give the
Commission a specific legal basis for developing a Community energy policy.

However, the considerable rise in the price of crude oil since 1999 has prompted the Commission to put
a clear and ambitious strategy to the Member States, which was presented to the Biarritz European Council
in a document entitled (cid:145)The European Union(cid:146)s oil supply(cid:146) (1).