WRITTEN QUESTION E-3178/00 by Luis Berenguer Fuster (PSE) to the Commission. Independence of the Commission in the case involving the Kingdom of Spain concerning the costs of transition to competition for electricity companies.
Date: 2000-10-10
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: European Commissioner, Spain, duties of civil servants, electrical industry, infringement procedure (EU), liberalisation of the market, political morality

C 136 E/198

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

8.5.2001

It has emerged from Spanish press reports that the Spanish Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Rato, travelled
incognito to Brussels on 14 September 2000 to hold a meeting with Mr Monti.

In the interests of transparency, will the Commission answer the following questions:

1. Was a meeting held between Mr Monti and Mr Rato on 14 September 2000?

2. Was the meeting a normal scheduled appointment for Mr Monti or was secrecy requested by the

Spanish side?

3. Did Mr Rato bring pressure to bear regarding any matters currently being dealt with by the

Commission?

4.

If so, what were the matters concerned and what was he seeking to achieve?

Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission

(15 November 2000)

The Member of the Commission with responsibility for competition met Mr Rato, second Vice-

1.
President of the Spanish Government on 14 September 2000.

2.
The meeting had been planned for quite some time. As Mr Rato was in Brussels on that day and the
Member of the Commission with responsibility for competition had no prior engagements that evening,
the meeting was organised quickly. The Spanish authorities certainly did not request the meeting to be
kept secret.

3. and 4.
The meeting discussed the costs of transition to competition in the Spanish electricity sector
((cid:145)CTC(cid:146)) and was part of normal contacts between the Commission and the Member States for handling state
aid cases. No pressure was brought to bear,
it was simply a matter exchanges of information and
discussions on various points of view. The Honourable Member must be aware that any such pressure
would have been unacceptable.

(2001/C 136 E/231)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3178/00

by Luis Berenguer Fuster (PSE) to the Commission

(10 October 2000)

Subject: Independence of the Commission in the case involving the Kingdom of Spain concerning the costs

of transition to competition for electricity companies

In the past the Commission has maintained that, in its view, it was not inappropriate for Commission
Vice-President Mrs de Palacio to act in the case relating to the costs of transition to competition (CTCs) for
the electricity companies, despite having been a member of the government which adopted this measure.

New developments have now occurred which may alter that situation. On the one hand, it has been
announced that the Commission is to open formal proceedings and, on the other, the Spanish Government
(essentially the same as the one of which Mrs de Palacio was a member) has stepped up its pressure, while
the statements made by the Vice-President show a great deal of understanding and sympathy for the
government(cid:146)s position.

In the light of the above:

(cid:129) Does the Commission still believe that it is in no way inappropriate for Mrs de Palacio to be involved

in the CTCs case?

8.5.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 136 E/199

(cid:129) Is it not significant that not only was Mrs de Palacio involved in taking the decision concerned, but
also that the current government, which wants to achieve a particular result, is the same as the one to
which she belonged?

(cid:129) How can the Vice-President(cid:146)s independence be guaranteed under such circumstances?

Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission

(30 October 2000)

1.
For the reasons outlined on behalf of the Commission by the Member with responsibility for
competition (in his answer to the Honourable Member(cid:146)s Written Questions E-1761/99 and P-1889/
99 (1)), the Commission(cid:146)s decision on this matter will be taken in line with the principle of collective
responsibility.

2.
The fact that a Member of the Commission has belonged to a particular government should not
prevent that Member from taking part in the Commission(cid:146)s decision-making process. In this context the
Honourable Member(cid:146)s attention is drawn to the provisions of Article 213(2) of the EC Treaty (formerly
Article 157).

(1) OJ C 170 E, 20.6.2000.

(2001/C 136 E/232)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3181/00

by Theresa Villiers (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(10 October 2000)

Subject: ERM II

Should the UK decide to join the euro, does the Council believe that the Treaty would require the UK

1.
to join ERM II prior to joining the euro and, if so, for how long?

If membership of ERM II is not a pre-requisite of membership, how would the UK be expected to

2.
fulfil the exchange rate stability requirements contained in the Treaty?

Answer given by Mr Solbes Mira on behalf of the Commission

(20 November 2000)

Should the United Kingdom decide that it wishes to adopt the euro, the Council will undertake a broad
assessment of its eligibility to do so. This broad assessment will cover a number of criteria. As far as the
exchange-rate stability criterion is concerned, the relevant EC Treaty provision is the third indent of Article
121(1) (ex Article 109j). This specifies that the exchange-rate criterion is (cid:145)the observance of the normal
fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism of the European monetary system, for at
least two years, without devaluing against the currency of any other Member States(cid:146). Article 3 of the
Protocol on the convergence criteria also makes reference to the (cid:145)criterion on participation in the
exchange-rate mechanism of the European monetary system referred to in the third indent of Article
121(1) of this EC Treaty.(cid:146)

It should be noted that neither the decision to widen the Exchange rate mechanism (ERM) band to – 15 %
from – 2,25 % nor the move to the ERM II are considered valid reasons to remove the requirement of
ERM/ERM II membership. Therefore, in order to be consistent with the Treaty provisions, the participation
of sterling in the ERM II for two years prior to the United Kingdom adopting the euro would be expected,
although exchange rate stability during a period of non-participation would be taken into account.