Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Commission support to nuclear safety in the Newly Independent States and Central and Eastern Europe
Date: 2000-09-06
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: Central and Eastern European countries, Commonwealth of Independent States, Euratom loan, nuclear power station, nuclear safety

COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

Brussels, 6.9.2000
COM(2000) 493 final

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
TO THE COUNCIL AND THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Commission support to nuclear safety in the Newly Independent States
and Central and Eastern Europe

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Commission support to nuclear safety in the Newly Independent States and Central
and Eastern Europe

1.

INTRODUCTION

The EU and its eastern neighbours are dependent on each other in matters of
nuclear safety. Recognising this inter-dependence the EU has taken a prominent
role in international efforts to help the countries of Central and Eastern Europe
and the Newly Independent States (NIS) to improve their levels of nuclear
safety. The enlargement process initiated in 1997 has added a new dimension
and led the EU to stress repeatedly the importance of high levels of nuclear
safety in central and eastern Europe.

In March 19981 the Commission adopted a Communication which set out the
actions taken by the Community in the area of nuclear safety in central and
eastern Europe and the NIS2. The Communication contained proposals for the
re-orientation of policy in this
the present
Communication is to provide an update on developments since 1998 and to
the Commission’s current approach, both in terms of policy and
present
implementation. The importance of these issues has been underlined by the
European Parliament and the Court of Auditors.

sector. The purpose of

2.

CURRENT COMMISSION APPROACH

The Commission’s approach to nuclear safety in central and eastern Europe and
the NIS is based on two main objectives which are fully in line with the policy
of the international community as decided by the G7 in 1992:

– in the short term, to improve operational safety; make near term technical
improvements to plants based on safety assessments and to enhance
regulatory regimes;

– in the longer term, to examine the scope for replacing less safe plants by the
development of alternative energy sources and more efficient use of energy
and to examine the potential for upgrading plants of more recent design.

1

2

COM (1998) 134 of March 1998
In 1999 the Commission published a report on actions undertaken under the Phare and Tacis
programme, entitled “The European Commission and nuclear safety in central Europe and the
NIS”

2

In pursuit of these objectives the Commission has developed a range of actions
and instruments. It works with partner countries to promote policy dialogue and
regulators and
provides technical and financial assistance to government,
operators to support the improvement of safety levels and also aims to ensure a
high level of human health protection in Member States and in neighbouring
. Starting in 1992, the regulatory authorities of the NIS and the
countries.
Countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been invited to participate in a
number of Commission working groups and committees3 together with their
counterparts from the Union. More recently a new group was formed bringing
together the nuclear regulators and operators from the Member States4 and the
candidate countries.

The Phare (for Central and Eastern Europe) and Tacis (for the NIS) nuclear
safety technical assistance programmes have been developed to pursue the
Community's nuclear safety policy objectives. Euratom loans, and a number of
other small grant programmes, are also available. As part of wider international
co-operation in this field the EU has been instrumental in establishing the
Nuclear Safety Account (NSA), administered by the EBRD. These actions also
form part of wider efforts to help partner countries to introduce reforms in the
energy sector which respect sound economic, financial and environmental
criteria. Nevertheless, the financial support which the EU can make available
remains limited when compared to the needs.

In the enlargement process the Commission’s actions take account of a number
of Council conclusions and EP resolutions. For example, in December 1998 the
Council reaffirmed its commitment to help the candidate countries to improve
nuclear safety, as well as to develop economically and environmentally sound
energy strategies for the replacement of the less safe nuclear reactors. As
requested by the Council the Commission has given a high priority to nuclear
safety in the Accession Partnerships and is using pre-accession funds to pursue
these priorities.

Progress to date

Increasing nuclear safety levels in these countries is a long term project but
already the following achievements can be indicated

• Agreement

to close non-upgradable units in Lithuania, Slovakia and
Bulgaria. The Commission is now working closely with each government to
ensure the implementation of the agreed closure commitments and to support
the decommissioning process. Three special national PHARE programmes
have been established to provide financial assistance to support
the
decommissioning efforts and consequential measures in the energy sectors of
the three countries. A donors’ conference for the decommissioning of the

3

4

The CONCERT group and the Nuclear Regulators Working Group (NRWG)
The European Nuclear Installations Safety Group (ENIS – G)

3

Ignalina power plant
Commission on 20 June 2000 and yielded more than
commitments.

in Lithuania was organised together with the
200 M of

€

• The EU has made a major contribution to dealing with the problems at the
Chernobyl nuclear power plant. It has helped towards the decommissioning
of units 1, 2 and 3 and has helped to draw up the shelter implementation plan
for reactor 4 which was destroyed in 1986. The combination of international
pressure, willingness to help improve safety levels and develop alternative
energy sources have all contributed to the recent decision of the Ukrainian
authorities to close Chernobyl by 15 December 2000.

• On site assistance has been provided on a continuous basis through EU
operators at 14 sites in the NIS and in Bulgaria. The assistance has
concentrated on the level of design safety, operating and surveillance
conditions, the organisation of operational safety and on the provision of
equipment.

• Independent regulatory authorities have been strengthened through EU
technical and financial assistance and their closer involvement with EU
regulators in a number of forums. These include the CONCERT Group which
involves regulators from the EU, NIS and the candidate countries and the
Nuclear Regulators Working Group (NRWG) that is open to regulators from
Member States and the candidate countries. The necessary legal framework
has been put in place in central and eastern Europe and the NIS, although the
quality and performance of the regulatory authorities varies from one country
to another, and is generally improving more rapidly in the candidate countries
than in Russia or Ukraine. Despite the progress made further work is still
needed. The overall safety culture is being improved through more formal
and regular dialogue between plant operators and regulatory authorities.

• Technical assistance has been provided through Phare and Tacis (linked with
possible Euratom loans) to help raise the level of safety at new nuclear
power plants under construction (Mochovce in Slovakia, Khmelnitsky and
Rovno in Ukraine and Kalinin in Russia).

• Operating practices have been improved throughout the region and some

plants have been modernised thanks to the provision of equipment.

• Attention has been focused on the problem of waste management and on
problems linked to the treatment, storage and disposal of nuclear waste and
spent fuel. In particular, the international community has been made aware of
the magnitude of the environmental threat posed by the spent nuclear fuel
from icebreakers and nuclear submarines in north west Russia where there is
a dramatic shortage of storage or other management facilities. In the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe, the situation with regard to radioactive waste
management has been comprehensively documented and reported..

4

• The profile of the issues related to the decommissioning of nuclear facilities
has been raised. Many of the problems, which are not just of a technical but
also of a legal, environmental and financial nature, are now being addressed
and, in particular, funds are being set up by nuclear utilities to collect the
money that will be needed to cover the costs of dismantling facilities and
disposing of the waste.

• The opening of the Russian Methodological and Training Centre (RMTC)
was a major step in support for the establishment of a State System for
Nuclear Material Accounting and Control in Russia, which include several
other projects (training, metrology, analytical development, production of
equipment, implementation in nuclear power plants). Support was also given
to the authorities of the Candidates Countries in their fight against illicit
trafficking.

• In total, over the period 1991-1999 the EU has committed

913 million to
international efforts to improve nuclear safety levels in central and eastern
Europe and the NIS (
721
under Tacis, including a 100 million contribution to the Chernobyl Shelter
Fund). A total of 950 projects have been financed (300 under Phare and 650
under Tacis), 450 projects are ongoing and another 200 are being prepared.

192 million under the Phare programme and

€

€

€

• In addition to support for nuclear safety, the EU has also provided support for
developing and improving energy strategies including the development of
alternative energy sources and improving energy efficiency.

3.

ANALYSIS BY REGION AND NEXT STEPS

a) Candidate countries

Nuclear energy generation will continue to be an important part of the overall
energy mix in at least six of the candidate countries in the foreseeable future.
Seven of the thirteen candidate countries have nuclear power plants either in
operation or under construction.

Three candidate countries have also undertaken to decommission nuclear power
units which were considered not to be upgradable at a reasonable cost.

The Commission is
commitments on the one hand and in other nuclear safety issues on the other.

therefore involved in implementation of closure

Closure commitments

Following discussions with the Commission, Bulgaria, Lithuania and Slovakia
have undertaken commitments for early definitive closure of
their non-
upgradable nuclear power reactors. In Bulgaria, Kozloduy units 1 and 2 (VVER-
440/230 type reactors ) will be closed before 2003. The decision on the closure

5

dates of units 3 and 4 (VVER-440/230 type reactors) will be taken in 2002 in
agreement with the Commission:
these dates will be before the presently
envisaged dates of 2008 and 2010 and the Commission understands that closure
will be in 2006 at the latest. In Lithuania, Ignalina unit 1 (RBMK type reactor)
will be closed before 2005, a decision on the closure of unit 2 (RBMK type
reactor) will be taken in 2004 and the Commission understands that the closure
will take place in 2009 at the latest. In Slovakia the two units of Bohunice VI
(VVER-440/230 type reactors) will shutdown in 2006 and 2008 respectively.

€

the
The Commission has undertaken to provide financial assistance for
implementation of the decommissioning of the Bohunice V1, Ignalina and
Kozloduy 1-4 nuclear power reactors as well as for some consequential
measures in the energy sector. Financing Memoranda on support from Phare
funds from the 1999 budget have already been signed with Slovakia and
Lithuania, committing
10 million to each of these countries. The Commission
has indicated further annual support of at least
20 million each. The total
165 for Lithuania by
support will amount to at least
the end of the present 2000-2006 Financial Perspective. As part of the
Understanding reached with Bulgaria, the Commission offered a multi-annual
200 M for the period up to 2006. The delivery
assistance package amounting to
in 2002, of the
of half of this amount will depend on the confirmation,
Understanding on definitive closure dates for Units 3 and 4. The Commission
will deliver the bulk of this financial support via EBRD-managed international
grant funds established on 12 June 2000 (respectively, the “Ignalina, Bohunice
or Kozloduy International Decommissioning Support Fund”).

150 M for Slovakia and

€

€

€

€

In addition, EURATOM loans have been offered to the three countries. So far,
212.5 M for
Bulgaria has taken advantage of this offer by concluding a loan of
the modernisation and safety upgrading of Kozloduy units 5 and 6 (VVER-1000
type reactors).

€

The Commission will continue to work together with Bulgaria, Lithuania and
Slovakia as they implement the agreed closure commitments, including on early
closure dates for Kozloduy units 3 and 4 and Ignalina 2. Community financial
assistance, and in particular the grants channelled through the international
funds and Euratom loans are linked to the
decommissioning support
implementation by the countries of their agreed closure commitments.

Commitments to close non-upgradable reactors do not in themselves increase
nuclear safety levels. As long as these reactors are in operation, operators will
have to remain committed to a high level of operational nuclear safety.
Simultaneously, regulators will need to remain vigilant and, in view of their
additional responsibilities related to preparations for decommissioning, even be
reinforced during this period.

Other nuclear safety issues.

6

In a number of candidate countries other nuclear power reactors are either of
Western design or of a Soviet design which can be upgraded to acceptable safety
levels. These reactors are thus suitable for operation over the period of their
technical lifetime. They comprise VVER-1000 reactor units 5 and 6 at Kozloduy
in Bulgaria; the Western designed Cernavoda-1 (operating) and Cernavoda 2
(under construction) in Romania; two VVER-440/213 units at Bohunice and two
further such units at Mochovce in Slovakia, the Western designed Krsko NPP in
Slovenia (jointly owned by Slovenia and Croatia); four units also of VVER-
440/213 design at Paks in Hungary and four units of the same type at Dukovany
in the Czech Republic. Also in the Czech Republic, at Temelin, two VVER-
1000 units are to be commissioned following extensive modernisation.

To further promote safety in nuclear energy operations, the Commission will,
together with the concerned candidate countries, define additional support which
could include the following:

• Support for nuclear regulators and technical support organisations. This
support should continue. The competence and independence of the Nuclear
Safety Authorities in Phare Countries has
improved during the last
seven/eight years. It is nonetheless true that progress has been uneven: several
countries have progressed further than others but support should continue as
this is a corner-stone of nuclear safety. The role of the Regulatory Assistance
Management Group (RAMG) and the Technical Support Organisation Group
(TSOG) continues to be very important in this area.

• Safety improvements at the Ignalina 2 and Kozloduy 3 and 4 reactors. The
Lithuanian Government has undertaken to decide on the decommissioning of
Unit 2 of Ignalina in 2004 and operation is likely to continue for a limited
number of years beyond this date. Some basic improvements are already
underway with Phare support. A new safety analysis is to be performed for
the period beyond 2002. For Kozloduy units 3 and 4 it is also necessary to
ensure that adequate safety be maintained for the rest of the foreseen lifetime.
No Community assistance will be considered for projects which could
contribute to prolonging the operation of these reactors beyond the provisions
of the agreed closure commitments.

• In specific cases, support for the safety enhancing programmes of VVER
440-213 and VVER 1000 reactors, in the form of regulatory review, project
management and operational assistance. It should be noted that Agenda 2000
already stated that
these upgradable
the improvement programmes for
reactors have to be carried out in the next 6-7 years. In principle, as in the
EU,
the full cost of all safety
improvements for their units and make appropriate regulatory and financial
provisions for their eventual decommissioning.

the utilities themselves should cover

• Research. The candidate countries will be increasingly involved in research
co-operation with the Member States under the fifth framework programme.

7

• Off-site emergency preparedness. Among other measures, due regard will
be given to surveillance measures for public health, particularly with regard
to exposure to radiation.

• Radioactive waste and spent fuel. Continued efforts aimed at: strengthening
the regulatory, institutional or safety culture infrastructure in these countries;
evaluating the situation at specific sites, especially in those fields in which
local expertise is still
lacking, such as long-term safety assessments of
existing repositories; storage of spent fuel from nuclear reactors, assessing the
threats posed by contaminated uranium mining sites and
environmental
encouraging their restoration etc.

• Safeguards projects. The objective is to ensure that the Candidate Countries
will fully adopt the Community acquis. Specific attention should be devoted
to the support of
inspectors and
the training programme for
development of methodologies for the accountability of nuclear material and
techniques preventing illicit trafficking.

local

Accession negotiations

On several occasions, the European Council has recalled the importance of a
high level of nuclear safety in Central and Eastern Europe and called on the
Council to consider how to address the issue of nuclear safety in the framework
of the enlargement process in accordance with the relevant Council conclusions.
The Commission is contributing to these deliberations.

b) New Independent States (NIS)

The context of the Commission’s programme in the NIS is very different from
that in the candidate countries. It has been difficult to agree a general approach
to safety issues with some of these countries. The budget available for nuclear
safety projects is very small in relation to needs and the situation is aggravated
by the fact that both the countries and their utility companies continue to face
severe economic difficulties and budgetary shortages. There is still no full cost
recovery for electricity sold. As a result, there is little money available for
improving safety, decommissioning of the plants, management of the spent
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste or for developing alternative sources of
energy.

8

Future policy orientations

Safety levels in the NIS continue to give cause for concern in western countries
and it will take time and considerable financial investment to raise them. Future
policy of the Commission has to bear in mind the differences between the
industrial base, geography and
countries of the region (in terms of size,
willingness to engage in debate on nuclear safety) and the limited financial
resources available to the Community and to these countries.

The new Tacis Regulation5, which covers the period 2000-2006, sets out three
priorities for the nuclear safety programme in the NIS:

• The promotion of an effective nuclear safety culture, in particular through
continuous support for regulatory bodies and technical support organisations
and, at the plant level, through on-site assistance, including in the form of
supply of equipment

• The development and implementation of strategies for dealing with spent

fuel, decommissioning and managing nuclear waste

• Contributing to international initiatives such as the G7/EU initiative on the

closure of Chernobyl

The new Regulation also provides for support in the application of efficient
safeguards systems.

Future EU assistance could include financial support:

1.

2.

3.

To strengthen the role of the national nuclear safety authorities to
encourage improved licensing procedures and to ensure regulatory
involvement in all relevant nuclear activities

For on-site assistance,
linking NIS nuclear power plants with EU
operators. In a limited number of larger projects, the supply of equipment
may be funded as part of a comprehensive approach covering safety
installation and
aspects of project proposals,
adaptation of operational procedures. In such cases the regulator must be
fully involved. The contractual responsibility of the on-site consultant for
timely implementation will be increased.

licensing, procurement,

For certain design safety projects which are not linked to a particular
installation if the need arises from more strict regulatory requirements
and/or if such projects are necessary to prepare larger projects.

5

Official Journal 99/2000 L12 of 18/01/2000

9

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Regulatory type work may include safety analyses which are compatible
with the remaining lifetime of the reactors. For the oldest reactors, such
analyses should not be used to try to extend life beyond design life.

For improving spent fuel and radioactive waste management and
encouraging the timely preparation of decommissioning. This will include
establishing the necessary regulatory, liability, environmental and financial
regimes.

To help improve the corporate structures of nuclear utilities and
industrial nuclear operators in order to bring about a financially sound
electricity and nuclear sector. Such assistance may also help to foster co-
operation with EU industry.

To provide Euratom loans, where possible and appropriate, for significant
safety upgrading investments as well as for the completion of reactors up
to Western safety levels in the context of an overall agreed nuclear safety
and energy efficiency policy.

To promote and develop safeguards projects with three major
objectives: training of inspectors and plant operators, development of
national
infrastructures for the accountability of nuclear material and
implementation at plant level, to prevent illicit trafficking.

The implementation of this assistance will be subject to appropriate technical
control and each project will be technically followed up by the Commission. The
Commission will also ensure that nuclear safety issues are discussed in the
various fora established under the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements,
including at the highest political level, and in other international groups and
committees..

Country specific aspects

Armenia

The Armenian government has repeatedly reconfirmed its commitment to close
this plant within a few years (by 2004), provided that a secure energy alternative
supply is available. A working group of experts from the Commission and the
Armenian government has been set up to develop a comprehensive plan for this
purpose.

It
is expected that work on alternative sources of supply will progress
sufficiently so as to allow the Armenian government to formalise its policy soon
and the EU is ready to provide financial support as part of this process. In the
very short term, Tacis continues to provide on-site assistance at the Medzamor
Nuclear Power Plant with limited supply of safety equipment.

Kazakhstan

10

In Kazakhstan, the Aktau nuclear power plant has benefited since 1994 from on-
site assistance. The plant has received a range of equipment as well as general
the
operational assistance. Moreover, a rather unique case in the NIS,
government decided in 1999 not to restart the plant which needs thus to be
decommissioned. An important study is planned to assist the plant in preparing
decommissioning.

For the time being, assistance is limited to the preparation of decommissioning,
in co-ordination with other interested parties (IAEA, US, Japan).

If a wider international initiative is taken to support actual decommissioning, the
EU might need to reconsider its position.

Russian Federation

As far as nuclear safety in the NIS is concerned, the Russian Federation is
particularly important. Russia is the only state of the former Soviet Union
involved in all aspects of nuclear power, from uranium mining to plant design,
power generation and spent fuel reprocessing. Some 12% of electricity in Russia
is generated by nuclear power. Russia’s civil nuclear industry is also a major
source of employment, accounting for approximately 300.000 people (direct
jobs).

More than in other countries, EU funding is not a vital element but considered as
a welcome addition to national efforts. Given the limited size of the available
EU budget, the large number of operating reactors and the special economic
conditions in Russia, it would be impossible for the EU to offer Russia financial
assistance equivalent to what has been made available to the candidate countries
and to Ukraine. Nonetheless, the basic policy orientation is the same – to use the
technical and financial resources available to the EU to help the Russian
Federation to improve safety levels.

Although there has been substantial co-operation between EU and Russian
experts during the last years in the framework of a very large number of Tacis
projects, it often appeared that there were basic differences of approach to
nuclear safety matters. This is also demonstrated by the difficult dialogue in the
framework of the G7 on nuclear issues and the lasting de facto breach by Russia
of important provisions of its agreement with the EBRD Nuclear Safety
Account. These breaches consist of the restart of Kursk 1 (RBMK type) without
an adequate safety assessment and failure to abide by the agreed licensing
procedures and end of operation for its first generation reactors.

Russia argues that these reactors are needed to support the local economy and
has a policy of life extension for its first generation VVER-440/230 reactors,
beyond the original design life of 30 years. The Commission does not support
this policy.

11

It is clear, nevertheless, that Russia is committed to maintaining a substantial
contribution of nuclear energy in its overall energy mix. The Russian
government is pursuing the completion of several new reactors over the coming
years and has a long term programme to develop a new generation of nuclear
reactors. This policy background has to be respected and the Commission wishes
to promote increased co-operation with Russia in order to help Russia use
nuclear energy safely. Where possible and appropriate, the Commission will
support the use of Euratom loans for significant safety upgrading investments as
well as for the completion of reactors to Western safety levels, in the context of
an overall agreed nuclear safety and energy policy.

Future policy could be based on the following elements:

• Continuation of support to the nuclear regulatory bodies with a view to
increasing the strength and independence of the regulatory body/bodies and
enhancing safety culture.

• Within the limit of the overall policy outlined above concerning first
generation reactors, support to as many as possible nuclear operators to
enhance safety culture, in particular through continued on-site assistance.
This would include a limited number of larger equipment supplies with
increased participation of local industry.

• Follow-up to Russian requests for Euratom loan financing for

the
completion and safety upgrading of the Kalinin 3 reactor (VVER-1000 type).
This should be linked to the phasing out of at least one of the first generation
VVER 440-230 reactors.

• Continuation of co-operation in promoting a high standard of nuclear safety.
Full and timely implementation of the Nuclear Safety Account Grant
Agreement.

• Co-operation in spent fuel and radioactive waste management in North
West Russia. An enormous quantity of spent fuel from nuclear submarines is
stored under poor conditions. This poses a major threat
to the Arctic
environment. The primary objectives of this co-operation would be to help
increase the capacity for the storage of the spent nuclear fuel from the
Russian nuclear submarines and to remove the fuel from those submarines
already removed from service.

• Active pursuit of current negotiations by the Commission and a number of
donor countries to conclude a new multilateral agreement with Russia
should enable international
this agreement
(MNEPR). Once adopted,
assistance to be efficiently implemented as it provides for a common legal
basis as well as for co-ordination and co-financing mechanisms.

12

• Co-operation in the field of nuclear safeguards through the implementation of
a long term programme agreed by the European Council in December 1994:
methodological and training centres, metrological and analytical laboratories,
production of equipment and establishment of a certification centre,
implementation at plant level, support to Gosatomnadzor.

• Close co-ordination with the Research Framework Programme of
European Commission and with the projects promoted by the ISTC.

the

• Co-operation in the reform of the energy sector and support to promote more

efficient energy use

Ukraine

The EU has been the driving force in the implementation of the 1995
Memorandum of Understanding between the G7 and Ukraine on the closure of
Chernobyl. The Commission has focused on addressing the following key
priorities,
the Tacis nuclear safety
programme 1994-1996:

funded by a grant of

100 M under

€

• The establishment of a decommissioning plan for the Chernobyl reactors and
the construction of specific decommissioning facilities (solid waste recovery,
treatment and storage) at Chernobyl.

• Support for power sector reform and non- nuclear energy projects in

Ukraine.

• Support for the preparation of the major power replacement project
(Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4, also known as “K2R4”), which is to ensure that
the two VVER-1000 reactors under construction will be completed to an
internationally acceptable safety level. For this project, the Commission is
considering a Euratom loan with complementary financing from the EBRD
and from bilateral export credit agencies. Tacis has been implementing an
extensive programme including support
in the due diligence procedure
required by the Banks as well as support to the Ukrainian safety authorities,
engineering
the Ukrainian
organisations. As a result, a modernisation programme has been developed
which would bring the completed plants to a safety level consistent with
international practices.

and Ukrainian

organisations

operating

• Designing a programme to transform the current shelter (sarcophagus) around

unit 4 of Chernobyl NPP into a stable, environmentally safe system.

This Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP) is now being implemented under a
special fund, the Chernobyl Shelter Fund, managed by the EBRD, and to which
90.4 M ($100 M) over 1998-1999.
Tacis has contributed

€

13

In the light of the announcement the government of Ukraine that Chernobyl is to
close by 15 December 2000, the following strategy is proposed:

• Continuation of Community assistance to Chernobyl

through the Tacis
programme and other means, even when the last Chernobyl reactor is closed.
This will in particular include decommissioning of the Chernobyl reactors,
management of the radioactive wastes and assistance to mitigate the social
consequences of the plant closure in the Slavutich region.

• Continuation of Tacis grants to the nuclear regulatory bodies and to nuclear

installations with a view to enhancing safety culture

• Encouragement

including
privatisation and improved cash collection.. Continued technical assistance to
improve energy efficiency

to press ahead with energy sector

reform,

• A second contribution to the Chernobyl Shelter Fund of

100m (to be
delivered over the period 2001-2004). This amount was pledged by the
Commission at a donor conference on 5 July 2000.

€

• Continuation of co-operation with Ukraine and the EBRD on the K2R4
project to ensure, through constant political dialogue with Ukraine, that these
two reactors are completed and operated to the highest possible safety
standard. The Commission confirms its commitment
in line with the
Memorandum of Understanding to assist the Ukraine in the preparation and
implementation of energy projects based on least cost principles.

• Close co-ordination with the Research Framework Programme of

the

European Commission and by the STCU.

Other initiatives

With the end of the Soviet Union came the need to redirect the talents of nuclear
weapons experts. In order to promote mutual confidence and inter-action
between EU and NIS scientists the Commission has been active in promoting the
International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) of Moscow which was
established in 1992 by the European Communities and the governments of the
USA, Japan and the Russian Federation. It operates in the Russian Federation
and other CIS countries including Kazakstan, Armenia, Kyrgyztan, Georgia and
Belarus. A similar centre was established in Kiev (STCU). The area of nuclear
safety offers real potential for long-term civil employment. Both the Russian and
other NIS authorities have indicated that nuclear safety projects aim to promote
the diffusion of a safety culture within the competent and complementary
organisations of Gosatomnadzor and Minatom.

14

4.

IMPLEMENTATION

In implementing the approach described above the Commission has to take
account of the specific nature of the nuclear sector. The Commission’s rules for
tendering and contracting Community assistance are designed for situations
where normal competition exists. However, in the nuclear safety sector there are
very few potential suppliers of technical assistance and equipment and the
Commission needs to be satisfied that the entities/companies delivering the
assistance have the capacity to take appropriate responsibility in this important
sector. There is a high degree of involvement by the public authorities (for
example, there are nine independent regulatory authorities in the EU) and the
assistance which is being provided is also channelled directly to public
regulators in the beneficiary countries. Technical support is provided by a small
number of non commercial bodies established in the Member States, several of
which are integrated into the national safety authorities.
Therefore the
Commission considers that, in the absence of competition and given the need to
work with public bodies in order to deliver the desired improvement in nuclear
safety levels, contracting rules need to be applied taking account of the realities
of the sector

In the past the pace of project implementation has been adversely affected by a
number of factors. Much has already been done to improve performance, for
example, by reducing the overall number of contracts, cancelling certain
projects, substitution of TPEG6 by increasing the involvement of the JRC etc.
However, a large backlog remains. Annex 1 gives more details on contracting
figures. These delays can partly be explained by organisational deficiencies and
staff shortages within the Commission and partly by the fact that the general
financial assistance rules and procedures are ill-adapted to the complex and
specialised requirements of the nuclear sector. As a result much time has been
spent in obtaining derogations, for example in cases where open competition
was either impractical or not applicable, where projects were to be implemented
by EU regulators, or where there was only one possible supplier of technical
equipment.

The Commission has now decided to clarify the rules and to set out the cases
where direct agreements will be used in future. Further details are provided in
Annex II. For on-site assistance, given the limited number of qualified operators
in the Member States, the Commission's general policy will be to conclude
direct agreement contracts directly with utilities following calls for proposals
(for new sites) and to entrust them with tasks which in the past were handled by
procurement agents for supplies. These contracts should be for several years in
view of the complexity of the on-site assistance which is provided, instead of the
system of annual renewals which has been used up to now. Direct agreement
contracts will be concluded with the nuclear safety authorities of the Member

6

The “Twinning Programme Engineering Group” of EU nuclear operators

15

technical support organisations (TSO). Finally,

States and with their
the
Commission’s Joint Research Centre will be used for technical follow up of
projects, for dissemination of Tacis/Phare project results and in the area of
control of fissile material.

The revised rules can be summarised as follows:

Assistance to be supplied

Type of contract

Technical assistance to safety authority

direct agreement

Technical assistance to technical support

Organisation

Supply of equipment

Design and studies

Control of fissile materials

On going on site assistance

New on site assistance

direct agreement

contract
with
procurement agents or
direct agreement with
operator of on site
Direct
assistance.
agreements
in cases
of urgency or need for
specific equipment

restricted tenders

contracts with Joint
Research Centre

direct agreement

negotiated procedure

Following a recent decision by the Commission to reform the management of its
external assistance programmes, responsibility for nuclear safety has also been
clarified. In future full responsibility for external nuclear safety questions will be
with DGs Relex, Enlargement and SCR. DG Enlargement will be responsible for
the full project cycle in the candidate countries, DG Relex will be responsible
for programming for nuclear safety issues in the NIS and the SCR will be
responsible for the rest of the project cycle from project identification onwards.
Responsibility for nuclear safety questions within the EU currently with DG

16

ENV will be taken over by DG TREN in order to provide for an appropriate
concentration of staff and expertise.

At present funds for nuclear safety in the NIS are provided within the overall
allocations for the Tacis programmes. In order to give greater visibility and
transparency in this important area the Commission has proposed that from 2001
onwards there should be a single budget line for financial assistance to nuclear
safety for the NIS.

These modifications to previous practice should help to streamline project
implementation and speed up the delivery of assistance. They are also designed
to take account of the comments of the Court of Auditors and of the European
Parliament, on which the Commission has already commented extensively
elsewhere 7

5.

CONCLUSION

Since 1991 the Commission has made an important contribution to improving
nuclear safety levels in Central and Eastern Europe and the NIS. However, much
remains to be done. While international and EU efforts cannot substitute for the
efforts of the countries themselves, the EU can help its partners as they face
these challenges and work to ensure that nuclear safety continues to receive high
priority. The Commission will continue to work to build a supportive economic
and legal environment in these countries in which operators and regulators can
fulfil their different responsibilities.

7

OJ C35 of 9/2/1999: Court of Auditors special report No 25/98 together with the Commission’s
replies. European Parliament Committees: Mr Liikanen Budgetary Committee 16/11/1998, Mr
van den Broek Budgetary Control Committee 26/11/1998, CERT 23/2/1999

17

ANNEX 1

PHARE
(EURO MILLION)

NUCLEAR

SAFETY

PROGRAMME

YEAR

COMMITMENTS CONTRACTED

PAYMENTS

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

3.74

16.70

29.30

25.20

31.00

27.00

6.00

12.00

31.00

11.00

3.74

16.50

28.90

25.00

28.50

23.70

5.95

7.90

3.60

-

3.74

16.50

26.90

23.60

22.50

14.17

0.50

1.90

0.19

TOTAL

192.94

142.59

110.00

18

TACIS NUCLEAR SAFETY PROGRAMME

(million

€

)

YEAR

Committed

Contracted

Paid

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

53.00

60.00

88.00

67.50

58.50

80.00

68.00

33.80

22.98

52.00

58.40

83.80

63.60

51.60

76.00

47.44

11.27

00.87

50.00

55.00

65.33

43.37

28.43

36.48

10.97

2.66

00.35

Total

531.78

444.98

292.99

19

TACIS NUCLEAR SAFETY PROGRAMME FOR UKRAINE

(million

€

)

(CHERNOBYL)

YEAR

Committed

Contracted

Paid

1994

25.0

1995

37.5

1996

37.5

24.2

37.12

36.31

22.15

7.04

11.832

Total

100

97.63

41.022

1998

50.0

1999

40.4

50.0

40.4

50.0

0

CSF

CSF

20

ANNEX 2

New rules for contracts in the field of nuclear safety

1. Constraints specific to the nuclear safety sector

The specific constraints and characteristics of the nuclear safety sector are related to:

•

•

•

•

•

•

popular perception of the scale and sensitivity of safety operations in Member States
and partner countries;

our partners' determination to retain their right to decide for themselves in this highly
sensitive sector;

the importance of ensuring sole responsibility both for European contractors and
operators and for the safety authorities of partner countries;

the limited nature of the market due to the very small number of public and private
operators;

the need to ensure that nuclear safety operations are carried out solely by contractors
whose competence in handling such complex technology has been reliably
established;

the importance of not becoming too dependent on these companies by ensuring that a
sufficiently wide range of contractors are used, without sacrificing the need for
technical competence.

2. Types of contract and related procedures

Contracts in the nuclear safety sector fall into six categories. These categories and related
procedures are defined below.

21

a) Technical assistance contracts with the safety authorities

The purpose of these contracts is to provide national organisations (both governmental
and independent) which are responsible for drawing up safety regulations, defining a
national
framework, granting operating licenses and supervising and
inspecting nuclear installations, with the technical assistance they need.

institutional

This assistance is provided by the central safety authorities of the Member States. There
are nine such regulatory authorities in the Union, all of them either public or non-profit
making organisations.

The highly specialised nature of such technical assistance, the fact that it is provided by
public-sector non-profit making bodies and the strategic importance of ensuring an
adequate number of different sources of assistance, mean that it is vital that contracts be
concluded by direct agreement between the parties concerned.

b) Technical assistance contracts with Technical Support Organisations (TSO)

The TSOs are the operational arm of national safety authorities. They consist of a group
of experts who undertake technical support missions on the instructions of the safety
authorities (for instance, for licensing or on-site inspections).

The TSOs of partner countries receive technical support, as well as help with training,
from experts who belong to Member States' TSOs.

There are nine TSOs in the Member States. Some are an integral part of the national
safety authorities, others are separate legal non-profit making bodies. The services
provided by their experts are charged at a standard rate.

For the reasons cited above (specialised technical skills required, reliance on generally
public-sector non-profit-making bodies and adequate diversification), technical assistance
contracts with TSOs will be concluded directly between the parties involved.

So as to monitor the fees charged for expert missions by the Member States' TSOs, the
Commission will regularly check their declared cost structure and the amounts invoiced
by means of audit missions carried out by independent consultants.

c) On-site assistance contracts

On-site assistance is when a Community nuclear operator is asked to support a national
operator by providing technical assistance at a given national site.

This assistance may include a broad range of services, in particular training, maintenance,
quality assurance, management and implementation of safety equipment.

Continuity of the safety work and the contractor's sole responsibility are the two
determining factors in this type of contract.

22

The choice of Community operator, either alone or as part of a consortium, will largely
depend on their technical experience and expertise, according to the kind of installation in
question and the type of nuclear reactor used.

In addition, when several nuclear sites in the same country are to be taken in hand, it is
important to take care that the site operators do not come to depend exclusively on a
single Community operator, and that an adequate variety of sources of technical
assistance and sub-contracting is preserved.

There are ten nuclear operators managing sites across the 15 Member States.

Given these facts, on-site assistance contracts should be concluded in the following ways:

• For sites where a Community operator is already working, contracts will be
concluded and extended by direct agreement between the partners, and preference
will be given to multiannual contracts which are better suited to ensuring continuity
of both safety operations and operational responsibility;

• For new sites, where assistance by a Community operator is being considered,
contracts will be concluded by negotiated procedure and after publication of a call for
in which all European consortia and operators who are
expressions of interest
interested in providing on-site technical assistance can take part as candidates. In this
way, a broad range of sources of technical assistance is guaranteed, while also taking
into account the technical constraints on this type of activity and the limited size of
the market.

•

In order
to improve the results obtained and reinforce the concept of sole
responsibility, on-site assistance contracts will gradually be changed for every such
site into results-based contracts, or 'turnkey' safety contracts, under which sole
responsibility for design, management, selection of equipment, implementation and
control at any given site would be shared equally by the national operator and the
Community operator.

In implementing such procedures, the Commission will draw heavily on the technical
expertise of the JRC, especially in drawing up the schedule of conditions for technical
assistance contracts, drafting technical specifications for equipment to be provided and
work to be carried out, identifying and approving experts to sit on evaluation panels, and
technical monitoring and control of these panels' work.

In addition,
controls and audits of costs and expenditure declared under such contracts.

the Commission will regularly ask independent consultants to conduct

23

d) Contracts for the purchase of specific equipment

When safety equipment is purchased for specific tasks, outside the context of a turnkey
assistance project, these purchases will be made through an invitation to tender conducted
by procurement agents with whom technical assistance contracts have already been
signed.

JRC experts will validate the technical specifications laid down in the invitation to tender
and will check that these specifications are technically neutral.

So as to avoid the contracts in question being reserved for particular companies, the
certification process for such equipment will, wherever possible, form part of an
invitation to tender.

So as to ensure that tendering for such contracts is an open process, assistance will be
provided to those specialised institutions in the partner countries which are responsible
for the certification process, through technical assistance contracts with Community
institutions.

Notwithstanding, in cases of great urgency or highly specialised equipment, directly
concluded contracts may be signed on a case-by-case basis.

e) Contracts for specific project designs and studies

These contracts will be allocated by the conventional
(publication of a restricted invitation to tender).

invitation-to-tender process

The JRC will approve the invitations' terms of reference and guarantee their technical
neutrality.

f) Contracts for control of fissile materials

The purpose of these contracts is to enable countries to set up reliable national control
systems for fissile materials, in particular so as to prevent their unauthorised trafficking.

in particular
They provide funding for control and accounting of fissile materials,
plutonium and enriched uranium which can be used for purposes other than electricity
generation.

Within the Union, control of fissile material is undertaken by the Safeguards Directorate
with the help of the JRC.

There are only three fissile material control centres in the world which are recognised by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

One of these is in the United States, the second is attached to the IAEA in Vienna, and
the third is part of the JRC.

24

Contracts for fissile materials control will therefore continue to be concluded directly
with the JRC.

25