WRITTEN QUESTION E-2469/00 by Mario Mantovani (PPE-DE), Antonio Tajani (PPE-DE) and Stefano Zappalà (PPE-DE) to the Council. The Echelon spy system.
Date: 2000-07-24
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: common foreign and security policy, espionage, protection of communications

C 103 E/156

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

3.4.2001

Reply

(7 November 2000)

The interpretation of the provisions of the EC Treaty is not within the Council(cid:146)s competence.

The Council recalls the principle established by the Court of
Justice whereby the interpretation of
Community law cannot depend on national law. The terms of any provision of Community law that
makes no express reference to the law of the Member States to determine its meaning and scope must
normally be given an autonomous interpretation, which should be sought by taking account of the context
of the provision and of the objective aimed at by the regulations in question. If there is no express
reference to the law of the Member States, Community law may, if applicable, entail reference to the law
of the Member States only when the Community judge is unable to detect in Community law or the
general principles thereof a basis enabling him to clarify the content and scope of a Community provision
through autonomous interpretation (CFI, judgment of 18 December 1992, Diaz Garcia/Parliament, case
T-43/90, ECR p. II-2619).

(2001/C 103 E/174)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2436/00

by Mario Mantovani (PPE-DE), Antonio Tajani (PPE-DE)
and Stefano Zappal(cid:224) (PPE-DE) to the Council

(24 July 2000)

Subject: The Echelon spy system

According to recent reports in the Italian press, the Echelon spy system, set up by the National Security
Agency (NSA) in collaboration with GCHQ in the United Kingdom, CSE in Canada, DSD in Australia and
GCSB in New Zealand, has been used to intercept phone calls, faxes and e-mails in all parts of the world.

According to statements obtained by the Italian weekly Panorama made by former Lieutenant Wayne
Madsen, a former US naval officer responsible for communication surveillance at the White House during
Ronald Reagan(cid:146)s presidency, there are two NSA bases in Italy, one at San Vito dei Normanni and one at
Gera Lario to the north of Lake Como, both of which are still partly in operation.

According to former Lieutenant Madsen, the station at Gera Lario, which began operation in 1976 and
today belongs to Telespazio, a private company belonging to the Telecom Italia group and providing
satellite services to the European Space Agency and the Italian Space Agency, is a listening post shrouded
in mystery.

Telespazio has recently announced an agreement under which ships in the Italian Navy can communicate
with each other and with the control centre using their own instruments.

What steps will the Council take to ascertain whether these reports are true and, if there is any truth in
them, what will it do to put an end to these activities?

(2001/C 103 E/175)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2469/00

by Mario Mantovani (PPE-DE), Antonio Tajani (PPE-DE)
and Stefano Zappal(cid:224) (PPE-DE) to the Council

(24 July 2000)

Subject: The Echelon spy system

According to recent reports in the Italian press, the Echelon spy system, set up by the National Security
Agency (NSA) in collaboration with GCHQ in the United Kingdom, CSE in Canada, DSD in Australia and
GCSB in New Zealand, has been used to intercept phone calls, faxes and e-mails in all parts of the world.

3.4.2001

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 103 E/157

According to statements obtained by the Italian weekly Panorama made by former Lieutenant Wayne
Madsen, a former US naval officer responsible for communication surveillance at the White House during
Ronald Reagan(cid:146)s presidency, there are two NSA bases in Italy, one at San Vito dei Normanni and one at
Gera Lario to the north of Lake Como, both of which are still partly in operation.

According to former Lieutenant Madsen, the station at Gera Lario, which began operation in 1976 and
today belongs to Telespazio, a private company belonging to the Telecom Italia group and providing
satellite services to the European Space Agency and the Italian Space Agency, a listening post shrouded in
mystery.

Telespazio has recently announced an agreement under which ships in the Italian Navy can communicate
with each other and with the control centre using their own instruments.

What steps will the Council take to ascertain whether these reports are true and, if there is any truth in
them, what will it do to put an end to these activities?

Joint answer
to Written Questions E-2436/00 and E-2469/00

(10 November 2000)

the European Parliament,

As has been indicated in a number of replies given by the Council to the questions put by several members
of
in accordance with the
procedures laid down in the treaties, that would enable it to ascertain the existence of a telecommunica-
tions interception system such as that described by the Honourable Members.

the Council has never received information,

Moreover, the Council would reiterate the fact that it could not accept the creation of a telecommunica-
tions interception system, insofar as its powers are concerned, which did not comply with the rules of law
of the Treaties establishing the European Union and which would infringe the fundamental principles
which aim to safeguard human dignity.

Furthermore, the Council would remind the Honourable Members that, at its meeting on 29 May 2000, it
adopted conclusions on the interception of telecommunications outwith any legal framework. Those
conclusions read as follows:

The Council had an exchange of views on the European Parliament(cid:146)s debates on interception of
telecommunications outside of any legal framework.

The Council reaffirms its attachment
for the fundamental principles relating to the
protection of human rights and personal freedoms, both for natural and legal persons, as recognised
by the Treaty on European Union.

to respect

If telecommunications interception can be an important tool in combating crime or for the defence of
national security, in no case can it be used for the objectives of gaining commercial advantage.

The Council has noted that the Commission intends shortly to bring forward appropriate measures for
achieving a more secure information society.

The Council asks the Presidency to see to it that the relevant Council working parties ensure respect
for the above principles and that they encourage, in particular, any preventive measure which may
protect against the abuse of new technologies.