WRITTEN QUESTION E-2427/00 by Jeffrey Titford (EDD) to the Council. European Union military rapid reaction force.
Date: 2000-07-24
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: armed forces, common security and defence policy

3.4.2001

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Answer given by Mr Bolkestein on behalf of the Commission

(12 October 2000)

Article 297 of the EC Treaty, ex Article 224, has rarely been invoked. As the Court of Justice stated in the
case of Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (1) it concerns (cid:145)a wholly exceptional
situation(cid:146), in fact three such situations, in which a Member State may take action capable of affecting the
functioning of the common market. Those three situations are, firstly, in the event of serious internal
disturbances affecting the maintenance of
in the event of war or serious
international tension constituting a threat of war, and thirdly, in order to carry out obligations it has
accepted for the purpose of maintaining peace and international security.

law and order, secondly,

The serious internal disturbances which only require consultation between Member States in accordance
with Article 297 are those (cid:145)affecting the maintenance of law and order(cid:146). In this opinion in the case
Commission v. Greece (2), the Advocate general considered that (cid:145)what seems to be envisaged is a situation
verging on a total collapse of internal security, for otherwise it would be difficult to justify recourse to a
sweeping derogation which is capable of authorising the suspension of all of the ordinary rules governing
the common market(cid:146).

The procedure to be followed if measures taken under Article 297 have the effect of distorting the
conditions of competition in the common market is set out in Article 298 (ex Article 225) of the
EC Treaty. The Commission examines with the Member State concerned (cid:145)how these measures can be
adjusted to the rules laid down in the Treaty(cid:146). Article 298 further specifies that (cid:145)the Commission or any
Member State may bring the matter directly before the Court of Justice if it considers that another Member
State is making improper use of the powers provided for in Article 296 and 297(cid:146).

The sole implementation of this last provision is the case Commission v. Greece (3) where the Commission
considered that Greece had made improper use of the powers provided in Article 224 (now Article 297)
EC Treaty in prohibiting trade between its territory and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM) and that by so doing it had failed to fulfil
its obligation under in particular Article 113
(now Article 133) of the EC Treaty. The case was finally discontinued at the request of the Commission
because it considered that it no longer had an interest in pursuing the proceedings in view of the fact that
a temporary agreement had been reached between Greece and FYROM on certain matters, as a result of
which the former had lifted the trade restrictions it had imposed.

(1) Case 222/84 (1986) ECR 1651, paragraph 27 of the judgement.
(2) Case 120/94 (1966) ECR I-1514, paragraph 47 of the opinion.
(3) Case 120/94 discontinued by an Order of the President of the Court of 19 March 1996) ECR I-1535; see also the
Order of the Court of 29 June 1994 where the Court dismissed the application for the adoption of interim
measures lodged by the Commission (Case C-120/94R (1994) ECR I-3040).

(2001/C 103 E/171)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2427/00

by Jeffrey Titford (EDD) to the Council

(24 July 2000)

Subject: European Union military rapid reaction force

1. What plan does the Council have for creating a military rapid reaction force?

2.

Can the Council indicate:

(a) Who would decide how this Rapid Reaction Force is used?

(b) How many troops will be deployed?

(c) How many other military personnel will be deployed in addition to the troops?

(d) As for troops and ancillary personnel from the United Kingdom, they currently swear an Oath of
Loyalty to the British Queen and the Crown. To whom will they bear allegiance when fighting within
the European Union Rapid Reaction Force?

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(e) Might there be a conflict between the Oath of Loyalty given by British military personnel to the

Queen and any Oath of Loyalty that they may have to swear for the Rapid Reaction Force?

(f) What disciplinary arrangements have been made for the Rapid Reaction Force and ancillary personnel?

(g) Will disciplinary matters within the Rapid Reaction Force be dealt with by the national governments,

or by the European Union?

Reply

(10 November 2000)

The principles and general guidelines relating to a rapid reaction force were adopted by the Heads of
1.
State and of Government at the Helsinki European Council. Those decisions envisage inter alia that
Member States should be able by 2003 to deploy within 60 days military forces of up to 50 000 to 60 000
capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks and to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. That
objective is known as the (cid:145)headline goal(cid:146). The European Council also envisaged that it should be possible to
deploy smaller rapid response elements (cid:129) to which the Honourable Member alludes (cid:129) at very high
readiness (cid:129) well within that 60-day period. The Helsinki European Council also stipulated that the
Member States would cooperate voluntarily in EU-led operations and emphasised that that process did not
imply the creation of a European army.

2.
The European Council in Santa Maria Da Feira noted the progressive development of the interim
Political and Security Committee and the interim military bodies and structures established at Helsinki (cid:129)
the Military Body, which is to become the European Union Military Committee, and the military experts,
who are to become the European Union Military Staff. The Council noted that the principles and
modalities have been defined for the arrangements needed to allow European members of NATO which
are not EU Member States and other EU applicant countries to contribute to EU military crisis manage-
ment. It also invited all the EU(cid:146)s third country partners to contribute to the improvement of European
capabilities.

The Nice European Council is to receive a report on preparations for that headline goal and for the
3.
collective objectives (i.e. command, control and intelligence capabilities,
logistics and other support
services) of military capabilities. That report is also to include the outcome of the Capabilities Commitment
Conference on 20 November at which the individual Member States are to outline their national
contribution offers and third countries may offer additional contributions. Preparatory work on the matter
is focusing in particular on the definition of the list of forces for Petersberg operations led by the European
Union. That work is progressing well within the Council(cid:146)s new military structures and bodies, calling,
where necessary, on the assistance of NATO experts.

4.
It is for the Council to decide on the initiation of an operation using military forces. As with all
decisions having military or defence implications, the Council acts unanimously (Article 23 TEU). The
decision taken by each of the representatives of the Member States meeting within the Council
is a
sovereign national decision. Furthermore, each Member State will decide in full sovereignty whether or not
to contribute through its national forces. There can therefore be no question of conflicting loyalties facing
national troops when they are part of a multinational contingent in an operation led by the European
Union. Contrary to the Honourable Member(cid:146)s fears, such troops will not need to swear any additional oath
before joining a multinational force.

The number of troops deployed depends on the type of operation. It should be borne in mind that
5.
the Union must be capable of conducting all the types of operation provided for in Article 17(2) of the
TUE. However,
the
the military implications are variable throughout such operations:
numbers involved will be smaller where, for example, the operation is one of humanitarian assistance to
refugees or displaced persons or an evacuation mission, whereas they will be larger where the mission
involves restoring peace, implying the need to separate the conflicting parties by force.

in particular,

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Disciplinary provisions have not yet been discussed in the Council(cid:146)s subordinate bodies. In the event
6.
of deployment in a multinational force, each person is usually subject to national disciplinary provisions,
as is, moreover, personnel under the responsibility of the national command structure of each State,
represented by the highest-ranking officer of that State.

(2001/C 103 E/172)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2428/00

by Jeffrey Titford (EDD) to the Commission

(18 July 2000)

Subject: Removing the national veto on tax and other matters

With reference to the European Union(cid:146)s draft paper on institutional reform, is it correct that it calls for the
abolition of the national veto on 39 separate areas of policy to (cid:145)forestall possible blockages(cid:146) in an enlarged
European Union?

What are these 39 areas of policy?

The document apparently contains a list of tax matters which are (cid:145)closely linked to the internal market(cid:146) and
those which are (cid:145)not closely linked to the internal market(cid:146).

Can the Commission provide a full list of those tax matters said to be (cid:145)closely linked to the internal
market(cid:146), and those that are said not to be?

Answer given by Mr Barnier on behalf of the Commission

(7 September 2000)

The Honourable Member is referring to the Presidency(cid:146)s report to the Feira European Council on the
Intergovernmental Conference on Institutional Reform(Confer 4750/00 (1)). Annex 3.1 to the report
contains a list of 39 provisions which should be examined with a view to a changeover to qualified
majority voting. Annex 3.2 contains a draft by the Presidency for the reformulation of Article 93 (former
Article 99) of the EC Treaty which would retain the principle of unanimous voting with regard to taxation.
It also gives a brief list of specific measures linked to the internal market in respect of which voting by
qualified majority could be envisaged. The report by the Presidency (Part I, Chapter 3, paras.6 to 8)
indicates what stage the negotiations have reached.

(1) http://db.consilium.eu.int/cigdocs/EN/04750f.pdf.

(2001/C 103 E/173)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2430/00

by Gorka Kn(cid:246)rr Borr(cid:224)s (Verts/ALE) to the Council

(24 July 2000)

Subject: Peoples

What is the Council(cid:146)s interpretation of (cid:145)peoples(cid:146), within the meaning of Articles 151, 189 and 190 of the
EC Treaty? In the case of the Spanish State, does it correspond to that which the Spanish Constitution
recognises as (cid:145)nationalities(cid:146)?