WRITTEN QUESTION E-2253/00 by Wolfgang Ilgenfritz (NI) to the Commission. Cafés in car parks on Austrian motorways.
Date: 2000-07-07
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Austria, catering industry, dominant position, intra-EU trade, motorway

C 89 E/168

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

20.3.2001

(2001/C 89 E/190)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2253/00

by Wolfgang Ilgenfritz (NI) to the Commission

(7 July 2000)

Subject: CafØs in car parks on Austrian motorways

By virtue of the right of usufruct, Asfinag (cid:129) a motorway operating company (cid:129) is able to collect all the
possible revenue from operating the high-grade road network in Austria.

In return it is obliged to operate and maintain the network. Because of the right of usufruct it is entitled to
rent land on the motorways to service station tenants, and to conclude contracts with them.

The great majority of the contracts concluded between Asfinag and the tenants have been incorporated in
the contracts between the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the service stations, and hence in the
corresponding agreements.

These contracts regulate the conditions for establishing and maintaining motorway service stations.

Accordingly, an Austrian restaurant operator (K(cid:228)rtnerische Bauernimbi(cid:223) GmbH) was refused permission to
erect a cafØ on a motorway lay-by (which only had toilet facilities) on the grounds that it would be a
violation of the contracts concluded between Asfinag and the service stations. This is because in order to
open a cafØ the operator would require the permission of the nearest service station for which a (cid:145)protective
zone(cid:146) of 25 km is incorporated in the contract. This approval has been refused by both service stations in
question.

This is a clear infringement of Article 81 of
undertakings, and Article 82 which prohibits abuse of a dominant position.

the TEU, which prohibits price agreements between

1. What does the Commission intend to do (as soon as possible) in this instance in order to prevent this
restriction on free competition?

2. What consequences will this form of restriction on competition have for all parties concerned?

3.
How does the Commission intend to compensate restaurant operators who have expressed an
interest in setting up service stations and who have suffered a loss of profits because such anti-competition
clauses have been included in contracts over a period of years?

Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission

(14 September 2000)

The Honourable Member states that in Austria the motorway operating company Asfinag is entitled to
rent properties at the motorway to service station tenants. According to the contracts between the Asfinag
and the service stations the establishment of a lunch counter requires the agreement of the nearest service
station,
for which a protected zone is intended. The application of a restaurant operator for the
establishment of a lunch counter for a motorway parking lot was refused, since the agreement of the
nearest service station was refused. The Honourable Member is of the opinion that these facts infringe
Article 81 and 82 (ex Articles 85 and 86) EC Treaty.

The Commission cannot judge finally on the basis of the present information whether European rules of
competition are infringed. The grant of a protected zone seems to have a competition-restricting effect.
However it would have to be examined whether an effect on intra-Community trade is possible.
Furthermore it would be necessary to clarify the role played by the contracts of the ministry of Economic
Affairs specified by the Honourable Member. In addition the grant of a protected zone could qualify for an
exemption (Article 81 EC Treaty) or could be judged not be an abuse (Article 82 EC Treaty).

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The Commission cannot in any case award any claims for damages. Such claims can potentially be made
in national courts or other national instances, in accordance with national procedural rules.

(2001/C 89 E/191)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2256/00

by Theresa Villiers (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(4 July 2000)

Subject: Action to support the euro

Following the Ecofin meeting of 8 May 2000, the French Finance Minister, Laurent Fabius, commented
that (cid:145)concrete action(cid:146) could be taken to boost the euro.

It was reported that the Finance Ministers agreed that an (cid:145)instrument of intervention exists, and is
available(cid:146), referring to the reserves of the European System of Central Banks.

Could the Commission indicate which instruments could be invoked to support the euro, the circum-
stances under which they could be invoked, and who would be responsible for taking such a decision?

Answer given by Mr Solbes Mira on behalf of the Commission

(28 July 2000)

Economic policies have an impact on the development of the exchange rate through various channels.
While monetary policy has a direct impact through its interest rate and intervention policies, other
economic policies have an indirect influence as they affect expectations of economic agents.

The European Central Bank (ECB) can modify the attractiveness and profitability of portfolio investments
in euro by changing interest rates. An increase in the main refinancing rate, the main policy instrument of
the ECB, would normally attract capital inflows, thus supporting the exchange rate. Rising interest rates
would also favourably influence inflation expectations, thus underpinning the stability oriented credibility
of the ECB. Another instrument for exchange rate policy is intervention on foreign exchange markets. By
buying the euro on foreign exchange markets against foreign reserves, the ECB would signal to the market
that the exchange rate is undervalued. Unsterilised interventions would reduce liquidity on the domestic
money market and tend to increase interest rates while sterilised interventions would have a demand effect
only. The effect of interventions on the exchange rate would be larger if jointly undertaken by the
respective central banks.

Other economic policies, in particular fiscal and structural policy, have an indirect effect on the exchange
rate. A well balanced fiscal-monetary policy mix would strengthen the exchange rate development in the
medium term. Structural reform and a well-functioning labour market may raise the expected rate of
return thus attracting investment in the euro area.

The EC Treaty distinguishes clearly between the responsibilities for economic policies in the euro area.
While the ECB decides independently about monetary policy, fiscal and structural policies are in the
responsibility of the Member States. Therefore, the ECB decides about interest rates with a view to
safeguard price stability in the euro area. Fiscal policies are decided at the national level with a view to
support monetary policy in its goal of price stability. The stability and growth pact is an effective co-
ordination tool to achieve this objective.

Concerning interventions, the EC Treaty provisions (Articles 105, 111) suggest that the (cid:145)ECB conducts
foreign exchange operations consistent with general orientations formulated by the Council(cid:146). However,
such general orientations are without prejudice to the primary objective of the European system of central
banks (ESCB) to maintain price stability. For the time being, the Council has not formulated such general
orientations.