WRITTEN QUESTION E-2276/00 by Reinhold Messner (Verts/ALE) to the Commission. Italian Tyrrhenian-Brenner motorway link.
Date: 2000-07-07
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Emilia-Romagna, Italy, common transport policy, environmental impact, motorway, road building

20.3.2001

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 89 E/173

Can the Commission assure us that it has absolutely no intention of imposing an unjustifiable fine on the
CrØdit Mutuel or of dismantling the French system of public savings collection by retreating into a
restrictive interpretation of the Community competition rules, thus favouring external financial interests
which are entirely alien and hostile to our deep-rooted, living tradition of mutualist solidarity?

Answer given by Mr Monti on behalf of the Commission

(13 September 2000)

The task facing the Commission as a result of the request to it by French and other competitors of CrØdit
Mutuel
(CM) to determine whether state aid is involved in the Livret Bleu, very much a sui generis
mechanism, is major. The system combines tax exemption on a savings product with the carrying-out of a
task in the public interest. Whilst it is true that the bank is acting as an intermediary, it is necessary to
determine under Article 86(2) (formerly Article 90) of the EC Treaty whether the exclusive right to
distribute a tax-exempt savings product is likely to give CM advantages exceeding the costs of the task in
the general economic interest entrusted to it by the State.

The Commission does not dispute either the purpose or the extension of general interest tasks. However, it
must check whether the mechanism used has not unduly overcompensated CrØdit Mutuel. Such over-
compensation would amount to incompatible state aid.

In order to arrive at a correct assessment of the system-related costs and income for CM, it is necessary to
study in detail the relationship between the State, the bank and its customers. A study of this nature would
already be complex because of the triangular nature of the problem, but it is further complicated by the
fact that the system in question must take account of two of CM(cid:146)s characteristics: the lack of separate
analytical accounts for the Livret Bleu and the fact that a bank like CM is a multi-product business.

For that reason, an analytical cost accounting study of CM has been carried out and an expert assessment
of the undue effects of the Livret Bleu on the bank(cid:146)s other activities is underway.

The Commission does not intend to impose a penalty or a fine on the bank, nor does it have the means to
do so. But it must restore fair competition, if necessary by requiring the repayment of any aid which
exceeds the amount justified by the task in the general interest entrusted to the bank by the French State
and which does not qualify for exemption under any of the other provisions of Article 87 (formerly
Article 92) of the Treaty. It should be noted in this respect that CM is in direct competition with the other
Community banking institutions, offering as it does the same financial products other than the Livret Bleu.

It is not for the Commission to propose a solution for the future: its sole task is to examine whether any
solutions that may be proposed by the Member State are compatible with the Treaty.

(2001/C 89 E/195)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2276/00

by Reinhold Messner (Verts/ALE) to the Commission

Subject: Italian Tyrrhenian-Brenner motorway link

(7 July 2000)

Autocisa and Autobrennero, the motorway operators, intend to build a motorway link called the (cid:145)Tibre(cid:146)
(Tirreno-Brennero) for which they have proposed two alternative routes: the upper route, supported by
Autocisa, from Nogarole Rocca to Fontevivo di Parma, and the lower route, favoured by Autobrennero,
from Mantua South to Fontevivo di Parma. Meanwhile, a link between the two motorways is already being
constructed and involves the upgrading of the Cispadano road from Autobrennero(cid:146)s Reggiolo Rolo exit to
Parma. This road is being financed by the Italian State, the Emilia-Romagna region and Autobrennero.
Once it is completed there is a risk that the (cid:145)Tibre(cid:146) link, whatever the route chosen, will simply duplicate
existing infrastructure serving the same area (1).

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Official Journal of the European Communities

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20.3.2001

Recently, supporters of one of the two proposed routes claimed in the local press that the European Union
would finance 10 % of the cost of the (cid:145)Tibre(cid:146) (2), which would amount to some ITL 2 billion, given that the
total cost of the link is estimated at around ITL 2 000 billion. Any such commitment would fly in the face
of current national and European investment aimed at switching the transport of goods from road to rail
using the Brenner line and improving infrastructures for the Tyrrhenian-Brenner rail corridor, and would
be incompatible with the Brenner railway tunnel project.

The Commission, meanwhile, has proposed a European programme to combat climate change with a view
to meeting the greenhouse gas reduction targets set at Kyoto (3). In 1996, road transport was responsible
for 22 % of greenhouse gas emissions in the Union (source: Eurostat), and that percentage is set to rise by
2010. Italy has undertaken to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 6,5 % by 2010 in relation to 1990
levels (4), and in 1995 its emissions had already increased by 3,2 % The (cid:145)Tibre(cid:146), meanwhile, whichever route
was chosen, would cut across one of by far the most productive agricultural regions in Europe.

Is it true that the Commission is prepared to finance the (cid:145)Tibre(cid:146) motorway link?

Does the Commission not, on the contrary, consider that, in view of the undertakings made with a view to
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, it is necessary to reduce investment in new motorway infrastuctures,
particularly when they duplicate existing investment in road transport, as in the case of the link between
the Autocisa and the Autobrennero motorways?

What measures does the Commission intend to take to ensure the environmental
procedure is applied to this project to ascertain whether it is appropriate and in the public interest?

impact assessment

(1)

Inter alia, a degree thesis disputed in October 1999 at the Milan Politecnico and presented at a meeting in Mantua
(Tyrrhenian-Brenner: Road? Rail? Which road? Which railway? supervisor: Prof. Giuseppe Boatti, graduates:
Mahmoud Mataei and Simona Mattioli, 1998-1999 academic year) estimated that the average monthly volume of
traffic using the (cid:145)Tibre,(cid:146) based on current traffic flows, would be roughly equivalent to 69 000 vehicles in each
direction, about one twelfth of capacity. The infrastructure can only be interpreted, therefore, as intended to carry
new road traffic, mainly goods vehicles, to the Tyrrhenian ports.

(2) Gazzetta di Mantova, 30 May 2000, p.17.
(3) See the Commission(cid:146)s Communication COM(2000) 88, 8 March 2000.
(4) See the Commission(cid:146)s Communication COM(1999) 230, Preparing for implementation of the Kyoto Protocol,

19 May 1999.

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(19 September 2000)

The route between the two motorways mentioned by the Honourable Member has been identified as a
planned link on the map of the road network included in Annex I of the Community guidelines for the
development of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T) (1) adopted by the Parliament and the
Council in 1996. The Italian government submitted a formal application for financial aid for this project in
the framework of the trans-European transport network (budget year 2000). The Commission did however
not consider this project for the granting of aid. As a result of its evaluation on the basis of the conditions
and selection criteria, set out in the relevant regulations of the Council and the Parliament (2), the project
did not stand up to other projects competing for the limited financial resources available under the budget
in question.

In the framework of the TEN-T budget, the Commission gives the priority for the financing of rail projects.
This policy is in accordance with the objectives of reduction of the imbalance between modes and the
development of a sustainable mobility taking care of the environment concerns as set out in the common
transport policy white paper of 1992 (3). In some specific cases, investments in new motorway infrastruc-
ture can nevertheless qualify as project of common interest, for instance in peripheral regions, in the
context of regional development, or to connect these areas with the rest of the Community. However, if it
is established that there are overlaps with investments in other roads the project would probably not be
economically viable and therefore would not qualify as project of common interest.

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Official Journal of the European Communities

C 89 E/175

According to Article 8 of Decision 1692/96/EC, when projects, identified as projects of common interest
in the trans-European transport network, are developed and carried out, environmental protection must be
taken into account by the Member States through execution of environmental impact assessments which
are to be implemented pursuant to Directive 85/337/EEC, amended by Directive 97/11/EC (4) and through
the application of Directive 92/43/EEC (5). In case certain organizations or people are doubtful about the
proper implementation of the relevant stipulations of these directives they are invited to report the
possible misapplication to the Commission. However, on the basis of the information given by the
Honourable Member, due to a lack of grounds of complaint on the application of Community law, no
breach of it can be identified at present.

(1) Decision No 1692/96/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 23 July 1996 on Community Guidelines

for the development of a trans-European transport network (OJ L 228, 9.9.1996).

(2) Council Regulation (EC) No 2236/95 of 18 September 1995 laying down general rules for the granting of
Community financial aid in the field of trans-European networks, amended by Regulation No 1655/1999 of the
Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 1999 (OJ L 197, 29.7.1999).

(3) COM(92) 494 final.
(4) Council Directive No 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private
projects on the environment, amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997 (OJ L 73, 14.3.1997).
(5) Council Directive No 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and

flora (OJ L 206, 22.7.1992).

(2001/C 89 E/196)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2289/00

by John Bowis (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(11 July 2000)

Subject: Health promotion funding

Is the Commission aware that, whereas bids for the health promotion action programme were submitted
in response to the September 1999 invitation on the announced basis of a funding split of 90 % EU grant
and 10 % applicant
funding, applicant organisations have now been told that, without warning or
consultation, the funding split has been changed to 70 % and 30 % respectively; is the Commission further
aware of the negative impact this will have on small but efficient organisations who have provided quality
work for the Commission in the past; and will the Commission reconsider this, particularly for smaller
organisations deemed to be (cid:145)in partnership(cid:146) as applies in other directorates?

Answer given by Mr Byrne on behalf of the Commission

(13 September 2000)

At no time has the Commission announced that the normal basis for funding under health programmes
was 90 % Community grant and 10 % applicant funding.

In 1999, as an indication to applicants, the call for proposals mentioned that the average funding for 1998
projects was about 60 %. No other indication was given as to a minimum or maximum amount in
percentage for the Community funding.

It is true that in 1999, a few projects were financed up to 90 % of eligible direct costs. In the application
form,
it was always clearly stipulated that this was an absolute and exceptional maximum that the
Commission would allow, the actual grant being decided by the Commission, on a case to case basis. The
programme committee was fully informed of this.

However in 1999 it was decided that the funding would normally be limited to a maximum of 70 % of
eligible costs. Otherwise, the viability of the beneficiary and of the proposed action may be doubtful and
the Commission grant loses its incentive and complementary nature.