2000/647/EC: Commission Decision of 3 May 2000 on aid granted by France to TASQ SA (notified under document number C(2000) 1337) (Text with EEA relevance) (Only the French text is authentic)
Date: 2000-05-03
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: France, application of EU law, capital increase, computer equipment, control of State aid, maintenance

25.10.2000

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Official Journal of the European Communities

L 272/29

COMMISSION

COMMISSION DECISION

of 3 May 2000

on aid granted by France to TASQ SA

(notified under document number C(2000) 1337)

(Only the French text is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(2000/647/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

(2)

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community, and in particular the first subparagraph of Article
88(2) thereof,

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic
Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof,

Having called on interested parties to submit their comments
to those Articles (1), and having regard to those
pursuant
comments,

Whereas:

(1)

I

PROCEDURE UNDER ARTICLE 88(2) OF THE EC
TREATY

in April 1998 through a
The Commission learnt
complaint
from a competitor that TASQ had been
recapitalised several times by Consortium de Réalisations
(CDR), the hive-off vehicle set up in 1995 for the non-
performing assets of Crédit Lyonnais. On 20 May 1998
the Commission wrote to the French authorities asking
them for information on the recapitalisation operations.
The French authorities
replied by letter dated 14
September 1998, confirming that TASQ had been
recapitalised on several occasions by CDR and, earlier,
by Crédit Lyonnais, its previous shareholder. In the same
letter, the French authorities also stated that TASQ had
been sold by means of agreements signed, subject to
conditions precedent, on 24 July 1998 and 8 August
1998. On 22 December 1998 the complainant wrote to
the Commission to withdraw the complaint
it had
lodged against TASQ on 16 April 1998.

(3)

(4)

(5)

By letter dated 2 March 1999 the Commission informed
France of its decision to initiate the procedure provided
for in Article 88(2) of the EC Treaty in respect of the
measures. The Commission considered that the recapita-
lisation of TASQ in 1988 and 1991 by Crédit Lyonnais
and the capital injections by CDR in 1995 and 1997
were liable to include aid elements. It also pointed out
that the conditions under which the firm was privatised
could involve aid to the purchaser.

The Commission decision to initiate proceedings was
published in the Official Journal of the European Communi-
ties (2). The Commission invited interested parties to
submit their comments on the measures in question.

The French authorities sent a reply by letter dated 2 June
1999, together with a file containing the information
requested by the Commission in its Ietter initiating the
procedure. Following the publication of the Commission
notice in the Official Journal of the European Communities,
a letter was received from CDR dated 4 August 1999
and a file received from TASQ dated 10 August 1999.

II

DESCRIPTION OF TASQ

TASQ provides businesses with computer maintenance
and other services. It is independent of computer manu-
facturers and supplies multi-brand services on behalf of
third parties. This activity accounts for nearly 60 % of its
turnover. TASQ also supplies IT services, in particular
the integration, deployment, installation and cabling of
systems.

(1) OJ C 194, 12.7.1999, p. 9.

(2) See footnote 1.

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(6)

(7)

(8)

TASQ as it stands was created out of the merger in 1991 of the former TASQ (a company set up in
1988 to externalise maintenance of the Crédit Lyonnais microcomputers) and Metroservice (set up in
1983 by the Métrologie group, subsequently taken over by Crédit Lyonnais in 1991 and renamed
‘TASQ International’).

In 1995 TASQ was transferred to CDR as part of the hive-off plan for Crédit Lyonnais.

At 31 December 1997, TASQ employed some 460 people. Following the merger with Metroservice
in 1991, its turnover fluctuated between FRF 200 million and FRF 270 million. It often recorded a
loss, except in 1990, 1995 and 1997, as shown in the following table (figures in millions of FRF):

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Turnover

Earnings

4

– 6

65

– 1

92

270

266

235

210

250

215

235

202

5

– 48

– 25

– 42

– 1

2

– 76

30

– 6

(9)

Crédit Lyonnais increased the capital of TASQ in two
stages: the first was a capital increase of FRF 4 million
in 1988; the second was in November 1991, during
preparations for the merger between TASQ and Metro-
service, when both these companies injected capital of
FRF 30,6 million and FRF 26 million respectively. In
increase of
December 1991 TASQ made a capital
FRF 51 million in return for the assets contributed by
TASQ International (formerly Metroservice).

(10) After TASQ was transferred to CDR, two operations
were carried out, consisting in a first capital increase in
1995 by offsetting claims amounting to FRF 5 million.
A second capital increase was made in June 1997 by
means of a cash injection of FRF 60 million. CDR was
the only subscriber to these two capital increases total-
ling FRF 65 million.

(11)

It should be noted that none of the abovementioned
transactions was notified to the Commission.

Competition Report (3), which would have allowed all
possibility of aid to be ruled out.

III

REPLY FROM THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES

(15)

In their reply, the French authorities took the view that
the capital injected by Crédit Lyonnais before 1995 into
TASQ and Metroservice did not constitute State aid as it
did not use State resources but complied with the
criterion of a private investor operating in a market
economy and had not affected trade between Member
States.

(12)

In August 1998, about a year after the last capital
increase of FRF 60 million, CDR sold TASQ for FRF 16
million.

(16)

For the same last two reasons, the two transactions
engaged in by CDR after 1995 could not be regarded as
In any case, according to the
constituting State aid.
French authorities, the last capital increase qualified for
exemption under Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty.

(13)

(14)

that

initiated this
The Commission considered, when it
procedure,
increases described above
were liable to include State aid, owing to the apparent
lack of any prospect of an adequate return on the invest-
ment.

the capital

(17) As regards the sale of TASQ to the private sector, the
French authorities considered that it had complied with
the principles set out by the Commission in its Twenty-
Third Competition Report.

it did not have sufficient

The Commission also stated when it opened this proce-
dure that
information to
conclude that the sale of TASQ complied with the prin-
ciples of openness, transparency and non-discrimination,
as defined by the Commission in its Twenty-Third

(18)

The arguments of the French authorities are examined in
detail

in Section V.

(3) See Twenty-Third Competition Report, point 403, page 276. The
principles to which the Commission refers in the Report had been
communicated to the French authorities
from the
Director-General for Competition dated 14 July 1993.

in a letter

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IV

COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES

(19)

In a letter dated 10 August 1999, TASQ put forward the
same arguments as the French authorities and submitted
a detailed file of information. CDR, in a letter dated 4
August 1999, subscribed to the view of
the French
authorities.

V

ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURES UNDER ARTICLE 87

(20)

(21)

(22)

(i) Financing of the firm by Crédit Lyonnais prior to

the hive-off to CDR

The French authorities firstly challenged the view that
the funds provided by Crédit Lyonnais for TASQ were
State resources. In their view, the use by a public enter-
prise of
funds from private sources, such as those
obtained from the collecting of savings by Crédit Lyon-
nais, is not covered by Article 87 unless it can be shown
that the behaviour of the firm managing the private
funds can be ascribed to the State. In the present case,
specific support from the French authorities for TASQ
was not possible owing to the smallness of the firm and
its slight impact from a socio-economic standpoint. In
addition, the public holding in TASQ was far from being
a direct stake as it was held through a series of firms.
Hence the decisions on increasing the capital of TASQ
were not even discussed by the Crédit Lyonnais board
but by the board of CLIO, which does not include any
State representatives.

The Commission considers in the present case that the
Crédit Lyonnais resources are State resources within the
meaning of Article 87(1) of
the Treaty as they are
resources available to the bank, controlled by the State,
like all the resources
its shareholder. Those resources,
entered on the balance sheet of a public enterprise, must
be categorised as State resources. That is sufficient to
characterise the investments in question as State action
which may constitute aid within the meaning of Article
87(1) of the Treaty (4).

That characterisation does not mean that the use of the
State resources by Crédit Lyonnais automatically entails
State aid. The Commission does not normally have any
reason to consider that, where Crédit Lyonnais has
granted financing, it constitutes aid. Most of the bank's
actions, before and after 1995, are not, despite the
serious difficulties it experienced, regarded as aid and are
in principle based on commercial market principles and
aimed at achieving a margin contributing to profits,

even if the investments subsequently proved to have
resulted in losses. The Commission describes such meas-
ures as State aid only when it can be established, on the
basis of specific facts, that the measures seen in their
context
to comply with the market economy
investor principle.

fail

(23)

In order to determine whether the financing received by
TASQ comprises elements of aid, the Commission does
not examine the current position, where the result of the
financing is known, but rather the context in which the
financing was granted by Crédit Lyonnais before 1995.

(24)

(25)

In order to determine whether such financing from
public resources contains aid, the Commission applies
the market economy investor principle (5) and concludes
that State aid is involved if that principle is not satisfied,
i.e. if a private investor operating under identical condi-
tions would not have granted such financing to the firm,
in view of the risk and expected profitability.

encountered

considerable

The first capital increase was in 1988 and amounted to
FRF 4 million. The French authorities explained that the
involvement of Crédit Lyonnais in the transaction had
been limited to FRF 2,6 million. In assessing the reasons
for the transaction, it must be remembered that the firm
in question had just been set up with a small capital of
FRF 4 million and a limited number of staff. It had
immediately
commercial
success. By 1989 it already had 150 third-party
customers and a turnover of almost FRF 65 million,
against FRF 4 million in the previous year. The growth
in turnover thus made it essential to increase the capital,
taking account of the necessary tangible fixed assets. The
increase was also desirable because of the success of the
firm and its expected profitability, which was also
consistent with the market growth predictions of several
experts who forecast a 20 % — 25 % growth per annum
of the French third-party maintenance market in the
period 1987 to 92. In view of the firm's start-up phase,
it would be wrong to regard the losses of 1988 as
evidence of a crisis in the firm. The information in the
possession of the Commission thus indicates that the
investments by Crédit Lyonnais are consistent with the
actions of a private investor in similar circumstances.
The favourable predictions were indeed confirmed two
years later, in 1990, when TASQ produced significant
results at
(FRF 7 million) and
overall (in excess of FRF 5 million), which corresponds
to a particularly high return on capital (about 67 %) and
allowed almost three quarters of the losses incurred in
the early years to be absorbed. In view of these factors,
the Commission considers that the capital
increase in
1988 does not comprise State aid.

the operational

level

(4) See in particular the judgment of the Court of First Instance in Case
the Euro-

T-358/94 Compagnie nationale Air France v Commission of
pean Communities [1996] ECR II-2109.

(5) See in particular Commission communication to the Member States,

OJ C 307, 13.11.1993, p. 3.

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(26)

The increases of FRF 26 million in the capital of TASQ
and of FRF 30,6 million in that of Metroservice were
carried out
in November 1991 with a view to the
merger of the two companies. Given the slowdown in
market growth and also the development of microcom-
puting and information technologies, the merger was
intended to enable TASQ both to gain broader access to
the third-party maintenance market in order to reposi-
tion activities that were still too focused on the Crédit
Lyonnais markets and rapidly to attain the critical size
that would have enabled it to achieve significant econo-
mies of scale. At the time, the market in question was
experiencing a growing number of restructuring and
merger operations. TASQ thus required an injection of
capital in order to sustain the surge in activity in 1991
and adapt its structures and resources to the nature and
volume of business. Metroservice, on the other hand,
which was emerging from a more serious position, had
to cover the losses forecast for the year preceding the
merger. The acquisition of Metroservice by Crédit Lyon-
nais, its former creditor, thus gave the bank the oppor-
tunity it had hoped for to allow TASQ more easily to
reach a size better suited to economies of scale and to
make use of synergies between the two firms. The
conduct of Crédit Lyonnais appears, given the favourable
market trend, to be consistent with the actions of a
prudent investor. It forms part of the trend towards
mergers in the sector and is based on the complemen-
tary nature of the two companies concerned and on the
economies of scale resulting from the merger in terms of
geographical cover and technical investments. In view of
these factors, the Commission considers that the two
capital increases may be regarded as consistent with the
investor and hence as not
actions of a prudent
containing State aid.

(27)

The French authorities explained that the capital increase
of FRF 51 million in December 1991, referred to in the
initiation of the procedure, was not a recapitalisation but
the mechanical effect of the merger between the two
firms controlled by Crédit Lyonnais. At the time of the
merger, the absorbing company (TASQ) had issued new
securities in exchange for the cancellation of the securi-
ties of the firm taken over in order to remunerate the
net assets contributed. The exchange rate adopted (15
TASQ International (formerly Métropole) shares for two
TASQ shares) was based on the different comparison
methods available, which produced a similar estimate of
the value of the two firms. The assets and liabilities
contributed by TASQ were assessed in detail, in accord-
ance with the usual principles applicable in this area.
The whole operation and its details were approved by
the Stock Exchange Committee (COB) and the auditors
appointed by the Commercial Court.
In view of the
foregoing, which confirms that the transaction did not
bring any financial advantages to TASQ, the Commis-
sion considers that the transaction does not contain any
State aid.

(28)

(29)

(ii) Financing of TASQ by CDR

CDR financed TASQ on two occasions:
in December
1995, shortly after the hive-off, CDR provided FRF 5
million; in June 1997, following a particularly poor year
(a loss of FRF 76 million), TASQ received FRF 60
million. In August 1998, CDR sold the firm for FRF 16
million.

that

In order to examine the two operations, it should first be
noted, as the Commission stated in its Decision 98/
490/EC on aid to Crédit Lyonnais (6),
‘CDR's
resources are State resources within the meaning of
Article 92 of the Treaty (7), not only because CDR is the
wholly owned subsidiary of a public undertaking but
also because it is financed by a participating loan guar-
anteed by the State and because its losses are borne by
the State. The Commission notes that such transactions
do not qualify for any derogation exempting them from
the obligations arising out of Articles 92 and 93 of the
Treaty, and in particular that the French authorities and
CDR cannot be exempted from such obligations under
Decision 95/547/EC or under this Decision. It should be
noted that CDR's operations with regard to its subsidia-
ries are deemed not to include any aid component only
if they conform with the “market economy investor”
principle and that any injection of funds (or abandon-
ment of claims) complies with this principle.
In its
communication to the Member States (8) concerning the
principles to be applied to determine whether public
intervention should be regarded as aid, the Commission
considers that injections of capital into public undertak-
ings contain elements of State aid if, in similar circum-
stances, a private investor, in view of the expected return
on the contribution of funds, would not have made the
capital injection in question. In a letter dated 16 October
1997 addressed to the Minister for Economic, Financial
and Industrial Affairs, Mr Van Miert pointed out that
CDR operations involving a recapitalisation of its assets,
a sale at a loss or a cancellation of debt were likely to
include aid and should be notified to the Commission.
Similarly, sales of CDR assets other than by open, trans-
parent tendering procedures must also be notified to the
Commission. Only operations definitely below the de
minimis aid threshold of ECU 100 000 are exempt from
this obligation.’

(30)

The recapitalisation measures taken by CDR as regards
TASQ should for the reasons set out be examined as
such and cannot be deemed to be approved under the
rescue and restructuring plan for the bank, the sole
object of which is the aid granted to Crédit Lyonnais as
such.

(6) OJ L 221, 8.8.1998, p. 28.
(7) On 1 May 1999 Article 92 became Article 87 of the EC Treaty, as
amended by the Amsterdam Treaty, Article 93 becoming Article 88.

(8) OJ C 307, 13.11.1993, p. 3.

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(31)

The Commission acknowledges the merits of the reasons
for taking the banking and off balance-sheet risks into
account in the calculation of the economic rationale for
the decisions taken by CDR. It also acknowledges that, if
viewed as an isolated act, the measures taken by the
State through CDR, starting from the hive-off in 1995,
could on the whole be regarded as constituting sound
management, aimed at minimising losses and safe-
guarding the interests of the State.

(32)

In order for the assumption that CDR acted as a prudent
investor to be confirmed in the present case, it must first
be shown that CDR sought to maximise the proceeds of
the sale of the firm and that the sale was open, trans-
parent and non-discriminatory (see subdivision (iii)), so
that its recapitalisations would be fully justified and very
clearly not include any aid to the purchaser.

(33)

(34)

In its assessment of the transactions under Article 87,
however, the Commission takes account of the contin-
uous nature of the State's assistance to TASQ through
Crédit Lyonnais and its subsidiaries and CDR which the
hiving-off of TASQ to CDR cannot interrupt as though
nothing had happened before 1995. If the Commission
did not take this approach, Member States could easily
grant aid and avoid the consequences of Article 87 of
the Treaty and the Commission controls provided for by
the Treaty by setting up structures to which firms
receiving aid are hived off with their debts and obliga-
tions and invoking the rationality of
the financial
conduct of the manager of the hiving-off in relation to
the hive-off itself and its obligations.

In the present case,
it should be noted that the first
recapitalisation took place just after TASQ was trans-
ferred to CDR. The funds are not new but simply a
conversion into capital of a debt of FRF 5 million. The
extent of CDR's exposure in respect of TASQ did not
change. Following years affected first by post-merger
restructuring costs and then by a poor economic
performance in the sector, 1995 saw a significant
improvement in TASQ's turnover and a return to profit-
ability, despite a loss of FRF 9 million resulting from
unfair competition. TASQ thus appears to be a recov-
ering firm with good prospects of viability on a market
where growth has been restored, according to the finan-
cial analyses carried out at the time. The financial indica-
tors concerning TASQ and the market situation allowed

(35)

(36)

(37)

CDR to anticipate an adequate return on its investment.
The Commission considers that, under
the circum-
stances, the behaviour of CDR can be justified on the
basis of the private investor principle. It also considers
that the conversion of CDR's loan to TASQ into capital
is not the final materialisation of aid granted at the end
of a lasting process of support for the firm, undertaken
earlier by Crédit Lyonnais before its hive-off to CDR.
Consequently, the Commission considers that the trans-
action does not contain State aid.

There is no doubt that TASQ experienced considerable
losses in 1996, which could throw doubt on the advis-
ability of the 1995 decision. However, some of the
losses were due to unforeseeable events, whilst others
were inevitable. All
the losses can be explained by
one-off events resulting in the creation of exceptional
provisions.

Firstly, TASQ had been active in business with the
general public, but this led to significant losses in 1996
(of FRF 6 million), as a result of which it decided to
create provisions for the following year of FRF 16
million for losses incurred through the termination of
the contracts concerned. TASQ also had to write off,
through a provision of FRF 10 million, the residual
goodwill connected with the maintenance contract with
Crédit Lyonnais, which had informed TASQ in 1996
that it intended in future to conclude its contracts on an
annual basis.

Secondly, TASQ was faced with problems connected
with the property of which it had the use, subject to
penalising conditions. Thus provision had to be made
for some FRF 60 million in order to take account of the
extra cost of rent and the under-occupation of the busi-
ness premises. Although these problems had already
emerged in 1995, they gained in importance later and,
in any event, they left CDR with no alternative in view
of its commitments to Crédit Lyonnais in this connec-
tion. At the time of the hive-off, CDR had granted Crédit
Lyonnais a repayment guarantee for property commit-
ments which TASQ had entered into with two subsidia-
ries of the bank.
In addition, under the Protocol of
Agreement of 5 April 1995 between the French State
and Crédit
authorised by Commission
Decision 95/547/EC of 26 July 1995 on aid to Crédit
Lyonnais (9), CDR acted as guarantor in the event of
default by TASQ for the repayment to the two subsidia-
ries in question of two leasing contracts. The value of
the guarantee is estimated at over FRF 81 million.

Lyonnais,

(38)

The decision taken by CDR to inject FRF 60 million
into TASQ in 1997 must be assessed in the light of
three factors: the commitments described in recital 37,
the task assigned to CDR of selling or liquidating its
holdings as soon as possible and the restructuring
started by TASQ in 1996.

(9) OJ L 308, 21.12.1995, p. 92.

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(39)

(40)

(41)

The radical restructuring plan ended in 1997 with a
significant reduction in turnover (– 14 %). The results of
this extensive and controlled action were immediately
in 1997 TASQ recorded very positive results
evident:
both at the operational
(+ FRF 14 million) and
level
overall (+ FRF 30 million). It is worth noting that TASQ
achieved the highest profits in 1997 of all French
companies in this sector. The business plan drawn up by
the stockbrokers Ferri
in collaboration with TASQ
anticipated a negative result in 1998, equilibrium in
1999 and a return to profit in 2000, with a return on
capital after
the
following years indicated a return on capital of 20 % in
2002. Even if the 2002 result is viewed with caution,
the return in 2000 would be satisfactory to a private
investor, in view in particular of the level of long-term
interest rates for investments without risk (between 5 %
and 6 %).

some 17 %. Forecasts

tax of

for

The French authorities state in this connection that the
option of recapitalising and selling TASQ chosen by
CDR was in any case the least expensive option. First,
because the estimated cost of winding-up TASQ would
have been higher than the costs of recapitalisation less
the proceeds from the sale of TASQ. Second, because
CDR was tied to the repayment guarantee given to
Crédit Lyonnais for property commitments entered into
by TASQ and described in recital 37, the cost of termi-
nating the guarantee exceeded FRF 81 million.

that

it considers

The Commission rejects the first reason given by the
French authorities as
the eligible
winding-up costs for determining the aid content of an
operation carried out by the State as shareholder are
limited to the value of the shares held by the State. The
Commission and the Court of Justice of the European
Communities,
in similar precedents (10), have already
rejected the argument that extends the liability of the
State as shareholder for liquidation debts beyond its
capital contribution on the ground that extending liabi-
lity in that way amalgamates the roles of the State as
shareholder and the welfare State.

(42)

In the present case, however, in view of the fact that the
Commission approved the guarantee given by CDR to
Crédit Lyonnais in its decisions on aid to Crédit Lyon-
nais,
it acknowledges that CDR may have had other
obligations with regard to Crédit Lyonnais taken over
when the hive-off was created, in so far as the obliga-
tions stem from the charges borne by the firm even
before it was decided to transfer it to CDR. As the cost

(10) See in particular Commission Decision 94/1073/EC (Bull), OJ L
386, 31.12.1994, p. 5, and the Court Judgment in Joined Cases
C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 Kingdom of Spain v Commission
of the European Communities (Hytasa) [1994] ECR I-4103, paragraph
22.

of the obligations (FRF 81 million taken over by the
purchaser) was higher than the net cost of the recapitali-
sation (FRF 60 million minus FRF 16 million = FRF 44
million), the Commission considers that CDR acted like
a private investor operating under normal market
economy conditions, provided that it can be shown that
the privatisation followed the principles set out by the
Commission and guaranteed effective and transparent
competition between potential buyers in order to obtain
the maximum price for TASQ (subdivision (iii)).
In
deciding whether the decision of CDR was prudent, the
Commission also takes account of
the
operation in question is part of a major restructuring
plan and is likely to restore TASQ to a normal market
position as a viable concern so that it can be sold under
the best conditions.

the fact

that

(iii) Possibility of aid during the privatisation of

TASQ

(43) As stated in the notice initiating this procedure, in order
to determine whether a privatisation includes aid, the
Commission applies general criteria that have been
defined over the years on the basis of individual cases
and are set out in its 1993 Competition Report (11). It
also specifically reminded the French authorities of these
principles in a letter sent by the Director-General for
Competition on 14 July 1993. According to the letter,
the sale of certain public undertakings may comprise
elements of State aid which must be notified in advance
under Article 88 of the Treaty.

(44)

The principles set out in the letter are as follows:

(a) the presence of aid is ruled out and notification is
not required if the following conditions are fulfilled:

— the sale takes place by competitive, uncondi-
tional tender, in accordance with non-discrimina-
tory and transparent procedures and conditions,

— the firm is sold to the highest bidder, and

— the bidders are given enough time to prepare
their bid and receive all the necessary informa-
tion to carry out a proper valuation of the assets;

(b) on the other hand, the following sales must be noti-
fied in advance in accordance with Article 88(3) of
the Treaty as they are likely to contain elements of
State aid:

— all sales carried out by restricted procedure or

between individuals,

— all sales preceded by the writing-off of debt by
the State, other public undertakings or bodies,

(11) See footnote 4.

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equity or capital

— all sales preceded by the conversion of debt
increases,
— all sales on conditions that would not be accept-
able to private investors operating in a market
economy.

(45)

In the present case, the French authorities stated that the
privatisation had been carried out by a specialised inde-
pendent firm (Développement et Finances) which invited
tenders from some 60 potential purchasers of TASQ,
including several foreign firms or firms under foreign
control. The French authorities also showed that the
invitation to tender was transparent and unconditional,
that the deadlines were reasonable and that the bidders
had been fully and continuously informed. In particular,
the documents submitted to the Commission showed
that
for
the sale of TASQ was not conditional on,
example, job maintenance, locations or continuation of
activity.

(46) As regards the choice of buyer, the French authorities
stated that, of the three bidders selected, only two had
made a firm offer. The difference between the two bids
was only 1 %. The highest bid was not chosen because
of its weak financing, the financing guarantee given not
complying with the law. The successful bid was adjusted
to take account of the most recent valuation of TASQ's
own capital at 30 June 1998, in accordance with the
TASQ sale agreement. The final price corresponds to the
top value of the range calculated by the independent
experts appointed by CDR, Mazard et Guerard. In view
of these elements, the Commission considers that the

privatisation of TASQ did not give rise to State aid either
to TASQ or to its purchaser.

VI

CONCLUSIONS

(47)

The Commission concludes that,
in the present case,
taking account of the data available, the transactions
examined above do not
involve State aid to TASQ
within the meaning of Article 87 of the Treaty,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The capital
increases of FRF 4 million and FRF 56 million
injected into TASQ by Crédit Lyonnais in 1988 and 1991 and
the capital
increases of FRF 5 million and FRF 60 million
injected into TASQ by CDR in 1995 and 1997 do not consti-
tute aid under Article 87(1) of the EC Treaty.

This Decision is addressed to the French Republic.

Article 2

Done at Brussels, 3 May 2000.

For the Commission

Mario MONTI

Member of the Commission