Opinion of the European Central Bank of 20 January 2000 at the request of the Luxembourg Ministry for the Treasury and the Budget on a draft legislative proposal implementing Directive 98/26/EC on settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems in the law of 5 April 1993, as amended, relating to the financial sector and completing the law of 23 December 1998 creating a commission in charge of the prudential supervision of the financial sector (CON/99/19)
Date: 2000-01-20
Institutions: European Central Bank
Subjects: Luxembourg, financial supervision, national law, payment system

OPINION OF THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

of 20 January 2000

at the request of the Luxembourg Ministry for the Treasury and the Budget on a draft legislative

proposal implementing Directive 98/26/EC on settlement finality in payment and securities

settlement systems in the law of 5 April 1993, as amended, relating to the financial sector and

completing the law of 23 December 1998 creating a commission in charge of the prudential

supervision of the financial sector

(CON/99/19)

1. 

On  19  November  1999  the  European  Central  Bank  (ECB)  received  a  request  from  the

Luxembourg Ministry for the Treasury and the Budget for an ECB Opinion on a draft legislative

proposal  implementing  Directive  98/26/EC  on  settlement  finality  in  payment  and  securities

settlement  systems  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  “Directive”)  in  the  law  of  5  April  1993,  as

amended, relating to the financial sector and completing the law of 23 December 1998 creating a

commission in charge of the prudential supervision of the financial sector (hereinafter referred to

as the “Draft Law”).

2. 

To the extent that the Draft Law represents the implementation of the Directive in the Luxembourg

legal system, the Luxembourg authorities were not, strictly speaking, legally obliged to consult the

ECB under Article 1 (2) of Council Decision (EC) 98/415 of 29 June 1998 on the consultation of

the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions. The ECB

is seeking to promote proactively a harmonised EU-wide implementation  of the  Directive  in the

legislation of the Member States, in order to foster maximum transparency and legal certainty for

the  closely  connected  payment  and  securities  settlement  systems,  and  to  ensure  a  level  playing-

field  throughout  the  European  Union.  In  view  thereof,  the  ECB  very  much  welcomes  the

opportunity to give its opinion on the Draft Law. 

3. 

In addition, the Draft Law addresses matters pertaining directly to the core fields of competence of

the  European  System  of  Central  Banks  (ESCB)  and  introduces  elements  which  go  beyond  the

scope of the  Directive.  In  this  respect,  the  ECB’s  competence  to  deliver  an  opinion  is  based  on

Article 105 (4) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (hereinafter referred to as the

“Treaty”)  and  Article 2 (1)  of  Council  Decision  (EC)  No. 98/415  of  29 June  1998,  as  the  Draft

Law deals with clearing and payment systems. In accordance with Article 17.5, first sentence, of

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the  Rules  of  Procedure  of  the  European  Central  Bank,  this  Opinion  has  been  adopted  by  the

Governing Council of the ECB. 

A.  General observations on the competence of the Eurosystem in the field  of  oversight

and  on  the  concept  of  central  bank  oversight  of  clearing  and  payment  systems  as

distinct from the prudential supervision of financial institutions

4. 

The Draft Law proposes entrusting the national prudential supervisory authority (the “Commission

de  surveillance  du  secteur  financier”  –  “CSSF”)  with  the  oversight  (including  the  prior

authorisation) of payment and securities settlement systems to the exclusion of the Banque centrale

du  Luxembourg  (the  “BcL”).  Indeed,  the  Draft  Law  strictly  confines  the  role  of  the  BcL  to  the

provision  of  settlement  facilities  to  some  systems,  and  excludes  it  from  the  oversight  function.

Moreover, the Draft Law intends to entrust the CSSF with the “prudential supervision” of payment

and  settlement  systems,  with  the  “prudential  supervision”  of  systems  as  envisaged  in  the  Draft

Law corresponding to the usual oversight tasks performed by central banks. 

5. 

First, this proposal would directly infringe the payment system oversight competence of the ECB

and  the  national  central  banks  of  the  Member  States  participating  in  Monetary  Union  (the

“Eurosystem”), which is one of the core competences attributed to it by the Treaty. Second, if not

reconsidered, the Draft Law would create a situation of conflict between the BcL and the CSSF in

relation to the oversight function, since the BcL would  continue  to  conduct  oversight  within the

framework  of  the  Eurosystem.  Third,  the  Draft  Law  would  fail  to  make  an  adequate  distinction

between the functions of prudential supervision, on the one hand, and those of payment systems

oversight, on the other.

6. 

Prior to the adoption of the Treaty, the oversight of payment systems had already been recognised

as one of the main functions of the national central banks, although this was not always based on a

specific  and  clearly  formulated  legal  basis.  The  framework  for  this  function,  although  informal,

was  effective  and  successful,  since  it  was  based  on  the  technical  experience  and  on  the  moral

authority of the national central banks. Moreover, international consistency and effectiveness were

ensured  through  co-ordinated  action  among  central  banks  on  the  basis  of  principles  established

either at the G-10 or at the EU level. 

7. 

Article 105 (2)1 of the Treaty and Article 3.12  of the Statute of the European System of Central

Banks and of the European Central Bank (hereinafter referred to as the “Statute”) now provide the

1  “The basic tasks to be carried out through the ESCB shall be: […] to promote the smooth operation of payment systems.”

                                                     
3

legal  basis  for  the  oversight  activities  of  the  Eurosystem.  In  addition,  the  competence  of  the

Eurosystem for systems oversight results  from  Article  22  of the  Statute,  which reads:  “the  ECB

and national central banks may provide facilities, and the ECB may make regulations3, to ensure

efficient  and  sound  clearing  and  payment  systems  within  the  Community  and  with  other

countries”. Within the Eurosystem oversight activities are generally performed at the level of the

national central banks, in line with the common oversight policy stance defined for the Eurosystem

by the Governing Council of the ECB. The aim of the oversight of clearing and payment systems

is the maintenance of systemic stability, the promotion of efficiency and the safeguarding of the

transmission  channel  for  monetary  policy.  In  particular,  payment  arrangements  are  of  crucial

importance for the conduct of monetary policy in both the strategic and the operational sense. The

above  excludes  the  interference  in  the  field  of  the  Eurosystem’s  oversight  competence  by  any

Community  or  national  body  other  than  a  central  bank  acting  within  the  framework  of  the

ESCB/Eurosystem.  Article  254  of  the  Luxembourg  law  of  23 December  1998  concerning  the

monetary status and the BcL is the national reflection of the framework created at the European

level.

8. 

On the basis of the Articles of the Treaty and of the Statute referred to above, read together with

Article 12.1, first indent,5 of the Statute, the Governing Council of the ECB is the decision-making

body  responsible  for  the  performance  of  the  tasks  of  the  Eurosystem  in  the  field  of  oversight.

According to Article 12.1, third indent,6 of the Statute, within the Eurosystem, the national central

banks shall be available, and the ECB shall have recourse to them to the extent deemed possible

and appropriate, for the implementation of the oversight  policy  stance.  Against this  background,

the Draft Law cannot entrust the oversight function to any authority other than the BcL, as part of

the Eurosystem. 

9. 

The  payment  system  put  in  place  by  the  Eurosystem  and  through  which  the  Eurosystem’s

operations are carried out is the TARGET system, the Luxembourg component of which is LIPS-

Gross.  The  Governing  Council  is  responsible  for  the  direction,  management  and  control  of

2  “In  accordance  with  Article  105  (2)  of  the  Treaty,  the  basic  tasks  to  be  carried  out  through  the  ESCB  shall  be:  […]  to

promote the smooth operation of payment systems.”

3  See Article 34.2 of the Statute: “A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly

applicable in all Member States.”

4  “The Central Bank may provide facilities to ensure efficient and sound clearing and payment systems.”
5  “The Governing Council shall adopt the guidelines and take the decisions necessary to ensure the performance of the tasks

entrusted to the ESCB under this Treaty and this Statute.”

6  “To the extent deemed possible and appropriate and without prejudice to the provisions of this Article, the ECB shall have

recourse to the national central banks to carry out operations which form part of the tasks of the ESCB.”

                                                                                                                                                                         
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TARGET. The basic principle of independence, as enshrined in Article 7 of the Statute, would be

hindered if the Governing Council were subject, in this capacity, to the authority of the CSSF. 

10.  The “prudential supervision” of systems, as defined in the “Exposé des motifs” (the “Explanatory

Memorandum”) and in the Draft Law itself, with regard to the CSSF in fact encompasses activities

which  are traditional  oversight tasks,  and  refers to some  of  the  principles  defined  by  the  central

banks for the conduct of their oversight activities as indicated under point 6 above. Moreover, the

notion of “prudential supervision” of systems (as such) is unknown in the developed world, where

it  is  standard  practice  that  payment  systems  are  “overseen”  by  central  banks.  Should  the  CSSF

nonetheless  be  entrusted  with  competence  for  the  “prudential  supervision”  of  clearing  and

payment systems under Luxembourg law, the Eurosystem will, for its part, remain entrusted with,

and will have to perform, these oversight functions as prescribed by the Treaty and the Statute. In

Luxembourg  this  would  result,  in  practice,  in  an  unusual,  complex  and  potentially  conflicting

situation in which the oversight of clearing and payment systems would be carried out by both the

BcL and the CSSF at the same time. 

11.  The  Explanatory  Memorandum  reasons  that  the  CSSF  would  be  in  an  appropriate  position  to

assume  prudential  functions  in  relation  to  Luxembourg’s  payment  systems  because  it  does  not

itself  operate  systems  and  therefore  cannot  be  subject  to  a  conflict  of  interest  between  its

operational and prudential functions. It should be noted that Article 22 of the Statute itself states

that  national  central  banks  and  the  ECB  may  operate  systems  while  at  the  same  time  being

entrusted  with  oversight  functions  within  the  framework  of  the  Eurosystem.  This  possibility

expressly  afforded by  the  very  legal  basis  of  the  Eurosystem  should  be  seen  as  an  indication  of

confidence  in  the  ability  of  the  Eurosystem  to  avoid  a  possible  conflict  of  interest  between  the

operational and oversight activities of central banks. 

12. 

In  the  same  vein,  and  more  specifically  in  relation  to  securities  settlement  systems  (SSSs),  the

ECB notes that the Draft Law does not mention any need for collaboration between the CSSF and

the  BcL in the  oversight  of  SSSs in  Luxembourg,  despite the international  tendency  to  consider

that the oversight of SSSs also requires the expertise of central banks. At least, whenever part of

the service provided by the SSSs in Luxembourg has a direct impact on the smooth functioning of

TARGET,  the  CSSF  cannot  be  granted  exclusive  oversight  competence.  Indeed,  Cedelbank

provides services for the delivery of collateral securing intraday liquidity credit in TARGET and

will  soon  provide  facilities  to  settle  in  central  bank  money.  With  regard  to  these  two  aspects  at

least,  the  BcL  should  be  directly  involved  in  the  oversight  of  that  SSS.  In  addition,  the

“partnership”  of  the  German  SSS  –  Deutsche  Börse  Clearing  AG  –  with  Cedelbank  leaves  at

present  two  national  SSSs  held  by  the  same  Luxembourg  holding  company,  New  Cedel

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International.  Therefore,  the  attribution  of  oversight  competence  by  the  Draft  Law  can  initially

relate only to the system operated by Cedelbank and not address the oversight of any other system

operated outside Luxembourg or of any system that would have a “multi-country” dimension. 

13.  As indicated under point 5 above, the Draft Law does not make an adequate distinction between

supervisory  and  oversight  functions.  Although  drawing  the  dividing  line  between  prudential

supervision and payment systems oversight may be complex, a basic element of the distinction lies

in  the  different  subjects  of  the  respective  activities,  which  can  clearly  be  separated.  Prudential

supervision aims to promote the stability of financial institutions (which may participate in and/or

operate  clearing  and  payment  systems),  while  oversight  pursues  the  promotion  of  the  smooth

operation of clearing and payment systems themselves. Both functions thus certainly have partially

shared objectives, the clearest one of these being the stability of the financial system as a whole.

The main focus of prudential supervision is, however, upon the safety and soundness of individual

financial institutions, whereas the primary focus of oversight is the clearing and payment systems

themselves  in  order  to  ensure  their  smooth  operation,  to  avoid  systemic  risk  within  or  between

such  systems  and  to  ensure  the  efficient  and  sound  transmission  of  monetary  policy  impulses.

Hence, the objectives of prudential supervision and of oversight are conceptually distinct and are

pursued with different viewpoints and tools. They need not therefore be combined and entrusted to

a single authority. When the central bank is not also the banking supervisory authority, the shared

objectives, the links between the systems and their participants, and the impact of failures in one

area on the other call for close and extensive co-operation between the two functions in order to

achieve the shared objectives in an optimal manner. With regard to this last point, the ECB would

welcome  the  inclusion  in  the  Draft  Law  of  a  specific  provision  governing  the  co-operation  and

exchange of information between the CSSF and the BcL.

14. 

In  this  respect,  the  ECB  also  notes  that  the  consulting  authority  is  not  required  to  combine  the

implementation of the Directive with the modification of the Luxembourg law on the organisation

of the prudential supervision of the financial sector. If, however, such is the preferred choice, then

it  will  be  important  for  the  respective  competence  in  the  areas  of  prudential  supervision  and

oversight to be clearly defined. 

6

B.  Comments on the articles of the Draft Law

- 

With regard to Article I of the Draft Law: 

15. 

 (A), (C), (G), (H), (I), (J): The ECB notes the proposed role of the CSSF under the Draft Law and

would  like,  in  addition  to  the  observations  made  under  Part  A  above,  to  make  a  number  of

comments in this regard. 

The ECB suggests that the Draft Law – including the Explanatory Memorandum – should identify

and refer explicitly to the specific nature of the oversight of clearing and payment systems, on the

one hand, and the prudential supervision of financial institutions, on the other. In this regard, the

CSSF  should  maintain  responsibility  for  the  prudential  supervision  of  the  financial  institutions

involved in systems under the Draft Law, while the ECB recommends that the role of BcL, as part

of the Eurosystem, as regards oversight (addressing clearing and payment systems as opposed to

the entities involved) should be explicitly referred to in the Draft Law. 

16. 

(A): Article 28-2: “Les opérateurs de systèmes de paiement ou de systèmes de règlement des

opérations sur titres”

(1)  As  also  indicated  below  with  reference  to  other  articles,  in  Article  28-2  (1)  the  reference  to  the

CSSF should be replaced by a reference to the BcL.

(2)  The ECB would favour clarification that this paragraph does not apply to the BcL. 

17. 

(C): Article 34-2: “Définitions” provides a variety of definitions, including the following:

a) “système”: Again, the arrangements for oversight should make reference to the basic task of the

BcL, which is to promote the safety and efficiency of payment systems (which corresponds to the

equivalent task of the ESCB as determined by Article 105 (2) of the Treaty and Article 3 of the

Statute).  It  should  be  noted  that  the  Directive  does  not,  as  such,  require  that  Member  States

establish  a  systems  authorisation  procedure.  Should  several  Member  States  participating  in  the

euro area find it necessary to implement such a procedure in a formal manner, the Eurosystem may

at some point have to ensure that the level playing-field is maintained among the systems within

the euro area. At a local level, this will involve the participation of the BcL. As a consequence, and

although the CSSF may be assigned the task of formally designating the systems (as “systems”)

and  giving  notification  of  such  systems  to  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  the

verification (e.g. checking against principles which belong to the oversight activities) and approval

of systems (as “systems”) should, in the ECB’s view, be undertaken by the BcL, possibly in co-

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ordination  and  co-operation  with  the  CSSF  for  all  payment  systems;  with  regard  to  SSSs,  this

should at least be the case for all aspects relating to the settlement of Eurosystem credit operations

and settlement in central bank money. Finally, the ECB would welcome an acknowledgement in

the  Draft  Law  that  all  payment  systems  for  which  the  BcL  acts  as  settlement  agent  are

automatically  designated  as  systems  to  be  notified  to  the  Commission  of  the  European

Communities.

l)  “moment  d’ouverture  d’une  procédure  d’insolvabilité”.  In  this  respect,  the  Draft  Law  has

inserted an addition to the definition provided in Article 6.1. of the Directive, this addition reading

“or any other moment defined by the national law applicable to the insolvency of a participant as

being the moment of opening of an insolvency procedure”. This addition  should  be  deleted. The

Directive  does  not  provide  for  this  alternative,  but  determines,  in  an  imperative  manner,  the

moment of opening of the insolvency proceedings as the moment at which a competent authority

hands  down  its  decision.  This  second  part  of  the  definition  poses  material  risks  and  uncertainty

which should be avoided. In the Draft Law it is important that the terms chosen for the definition

in question be clear in relation to the Luxembourg legal system and that they do not depart from

the definition stated in the Directive, since this is the point at which significant legal consequences

arising from other parts of the Directive would be entailed.

18.

34-3:  “Champ  d’application”:  The  ECB  notes  that  the  new  Chapter  5  on  the  authorisation  of

payment systems and securities settlement systems “shall apply to all payment systems and/or all

securities settlement systems authorised in Luxembourg”. The ECB notes the intention to cover all

payment and securities settlement systems authorised under the Draft Law, and considers that such

authorisation  should  be  processed  along  the  lines  indicated  under  point  17  above.  As  for  Lux

Clear, to which reference is made in the Explanatory Memorandum as a system in itself, it is the

ECB’s understanding that Lux Clear refers only to certain services of another existing system and

not to a system or legally separate entity as such. 

19.  Article 34-4: “La demande d’agrément”: 

(1) The ECB notes that the Draft Law implements the possibility to cover “a formal arrangement

between two participants”, which is allowed under Article 2 (a), final paragraph, of the Directive,

provided  that  such  a  designation  is  warranted  on  the  grounds  of  systemic  risk.  The  ECB  would

welcome  an  express  reference  to  systemic  risk  in  the  Draft  Law,  to  be  evaluated  within  the

framework of the ESCB (including BcL). 

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(2) The ECB would like to  propose  that the sentence  “La  Commission  est l’autorité compétente

pour  accorder  l’agrément  aux  systèmes”  be  amended  along  the  lines  indicated  under  point  17

above.

20.  Article  34-5:  “La  procédure  d’agrément”:  The  Draft  Law  subjects  any  amendment  to  the

agreement,  which  forms  the  basis  for  the  system,  to  prior  authorisation.  If  it  is  the  case  that  an

“amendment” is also to be understood as the event of a new member joining, this request would

appear to be too restrictive for the operation of the system. Moreover, the time-limits for a decision

to be taken would appear to be unduly long.

21.

(H): Article 47-1: “La surveillance prudentielle des systèmes de paiement et des systèmes de

règlement  des  opérations  sur  titres  agréés  au  Luxembourg”:  The  ECB  proposes  that  the

reference to “prudentielle” in the title of Chapter 2bis and Article 47-1 be deleted. It also proposes

replacing  the  reference  to  “La  Commission”  with  a  reference  to  “La  Banque  centrale  du

Luxembourg” and deleting the references to “prudentielle” and to the “systèmes de règlement des

opérations  sur  titres”  in  the  sentence  “La  Commission  est  l’autorité  compétente  pour  la

surveillance  prudentielle des  systèmes  de  paiement  et  des  systèmes  de  règlement  des  opérations

sur titres qu’elle a agréés”. The ECB also proposes replacing “La Commission” with “La Banque

centrale  du  Luxembourg”  in  the  sentence  “A  ce  titre,  la  Commission  veille  à  l’application  des

règles de fonctionnement dont sont dotés les systèmes qu’elle a agréés”. 

Paragraph (G) of the Draft Law would also need to be adapted along these lines.

22.

(I): Again, the ECB proposes that the reference to “La Commission” be replaced with a reference

to “La Banque centrale du Luxembourg” in the sentence “La Commission tient en outre le tableau

officiel des systèmes de paiement et des systèmes de règlement des opérations sur titres agréés au

Luxembourg”. 

23.

(J)  Article  61-2:  “Les  dispositions  spécifiques  au  caractère  définitif  du  règlement  dans  les

systèmes de paiement et de règlement des opérations sur titres agréés au Luxembourg.” 

(1): The Draft Law does not incorporate the text of Article 3 (2) of the Directive concerning the

rules relating to the “suspect period”. Given the general nature of the wording used in Article 61-2

(1), these provisions would not call into question the operations performed, at least not within the

system.  Nevertheless,  legal  certainty  would  be  reinforced  if  the  text  of  Article  61-2  explicitly

referred to the rules concerning fraudulent operations. 

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(2): Paragraph 2 of Article 61-2 to a very large extent incorporates the wording of Article 3 (1) of

the Directive. The following major differences should be noted and given further consideration: 1)

the Draft Law inserts “between parties” after the words “shall be legally enforceable”; 2) the Draft

Law adds the operator of the system to the list of persons who should not have been aware of the

insolvency;  3)  the  text  uses  the  conjunctive  “and”  instead  of  the  disjunctive  “or”  in  the  list  of

persons mentioned. 

(3):  The  ECB  notes  that,  according  to  the  Explanatory  Memorandum  (pages  12  and  20),  the

abolition of the “zero-hour rule” in Luxembourg is confirmed by the first indent of Article 61-2 (2)

of the Draft Law. In this respect, the position adopted in the Explanatory Memorandum, namely

that the above provision in the Draft Law is sufficient, should be further considered since Article 7

of the Directive, which relates to the disqualification of any “zero-hour rule”, is a key provision.

Unless the abolition of the “zero-hour rule” is already clear and extensive enough under existing

provisions  of  Luxembourg  law  as  further  specified  by  the  Draft  Law,  an  explicit  statutory

provision should be added to the Draft Law in order to reflect Article 7. Moreover, as was pointed

out above, under the current wording of Article 34-2 (l) of the Draft Law, and contrary to Article

6.1. of the Directive, the moment of opening of the insolvency proceedings (which leaves it up to

the  national  law  applicable  to  the  insolvency  of  the  participant  to  determine  otherwise)  is  not

necessarily  the  moment  at  which  the  relevant  authority  hands  down  its  decision,  but  could,  for

instance, be before. In the context of Article 7 of the Directive, this could lead to an indirect re-

introduction of a retroactive effect of insolvency in spite of the provision contained in Article 61-2

(2) of the Draft Law. 

(4): This provision is not part of the implementation of the Directive. It provides for the exemption

from attachment of settlement accounts in respect of the operator of the system or the settlement

agent. The provision seems to have been inspired by Article 9 of the Belgian law of 28 April 1999.

The  ECB  notes,  however,  that  this  provision  applies  to  any  settlement  account,  whereas  the

corresponding Belgian provision is limited to cash settlement accounts. The ECB is pleased with

the  introduction  of  this  rule,  which  would  enhance  the  safeguarding  of  the  systems,  thus

eliminating the danger that untimely attachments, or even improper attachments, could completely

paralyse the settlement of a payment or securities settlement system.

24. Article  61-3:  “Les  dispositions  spécifiques  à  la  préservation  des  droits  du  titulaire  de

garanties  constituées  dans  le  cadre  de  systèmes  communautaires  de  paiement  ou  de

règlement des opérations sur titres ou dans le cadre d’opérations des banques centrales des

Etats Membres ou de la Banque centrale européenne contre les effets de l’insolvabilité de la

partie ayant constitué les garanties.” This provision implements Article 9 of the Directive. The

10

ECB is of the view that the protection provided for by Article 61-3 (2) of the Draft Law should be

interpreted  in  general  terms  as  covering  any  form  of  security  interest  in  favour  of  participants,

irrespective of the purpose underlying the creation of such security interest (i.e. it  should  not  be

limited to securing the obligations of participants vis-à-vis the operator or other participants in a

system, these obligations arising from participation in such a system). It is worth mentioning that

the conflict of law rules in the Directive are consistent with (i) the rule contained in Article 8 of the

US Uniform Commercial Code, (ii) the national laws already in place in several Member States,

and (iii) the current trend of academic authority on the complex matter of the cross-border trading

of securities.

25.  Article 61-4 (2) and (3): The ECB proposes that the reference to “la Commission” be replaced by

“la Banque centrale du Luxembourg” in this Article.

-

With regard to Article II of the Draft Law:

26.

The  ECB  refers  to  the  developments  contained  in  Part  A  of  this  Opinion  and  proposes  that  the

envisaged  addition  of  a  new  paragraph  3  to  Article  2  of  “la  loi  du  23  décembre  1998  portant

création d’une commission de surveillance du secteur financier” be deleted.

27.

The  ECB  confirms  that  it  has  no  objection  to  this  ECB  Opinion  being  made  public  by  the

competent  national  authorities  at  their  discretion.  In  the  light  of  the  general  application  of  the

observations  made,  and  the  importance  to  the  international  financial  markets  of  a  uniform

application of Community law in this field, the ECB will arrange for this Opinion to be copied to

the competent national authorities of Member States responsible for implementing the Directive. 

Done at Frankfurt am Main on 20 January 2000.

The President of the ECB

[signed]

Willem F. Duisenberg