WRITTEN QUESTION E-2865/99 by Luis Berenguer Fuster (PSE) to the Commission. Structure of the Spanish electricity market and costs of the transition to competition.
Date: 2000-01-18
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: Spain, State aid, control of State aid, economic consequence, electrical industry, liberalisation of the market, oligopoly

C 330 E/64

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

21.11.2000

The Commission does not know if the project mentioned by the Honourable Member has been made
subject to the impact assessment procedure provided for in Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985
on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment. It must be
pointed out, however, that Article 2 of this Directive provides that projects likely to have significant effects
on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location must be made subject to an
assessment with regard to their effects before consent is given. This provision applies to the projects listed
in Annexes I and II to the Directive. For those projects listed in Annex II, such as the road project under
discussion in this written question, Article 4.2 of the Directive provides that such projects must be made
subject to this procedure where Member States consider that their characteristics so require. As a result,
projects of this class shall be made subject to an assessment, in accordance with Articles 5 to 10 of the
Directive, where the Member State considers that their characteristics so require. It should be noted that
Directive 85/337/EEC was amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC of 3 March 1997 (1). However, under
the terms of Article 3.2 of Directive 97/11/EC, if a request for development consent was submitted before
14 March 1999, the provisions of Directive 85/337/EEC prior to these amendments continue to apply.

In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the Commission will take the necessary measures to ensure that
Community law is respected in each individual case.

(1) OJ L 73, 14.3.1997.

(2000/C 330 E/070)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-2865/99

by Luis Berenguer Fuster (PSE) to the Commission

(18 January 2000)

Subject: Structure of the Spanish electricity market and costs of the transition to competition

According to reports in the Spanish press (see (cid:145)Expansi(cid:243)n(cid:146), 7 December 1999), after 22 months of a
competitive regime the Spanish electricity companies still have a 98 % share of the market. As the National
Commission for the Electricity System has stressed in its reports, competition in the sector in Spain is
extremely limited, thanks to the existence of entry barriers (high levels of investment are required) and the
fact of Spain(cid:146)s quasi-insular status. In view of this, the costs of the transition to competition may have a
double effect: firstly, that of creating yet further obstacles to the entry of new operators (cid:129) who would be
at a disadvantage since they would receive nothing under that heading (cid:129) and, secondly, that of producing
the paradoxical circumstance of payments being received for the transition to a non-existent competition.

Does the Commission consider that the existing structure of the Spanish electricity market, as described in
the press, has repercussions on the determination of the costs of the transition to competition?

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(3 March 2000)

Whilst the measures taken by the Spanish Government implementing the Parliament and the Council
Directive No 96/92/EC of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in
electricity (1) are widely viewed as likely to lead to the progressive development of effective competition, it
is correct that the market presently remains characterised by a limited number of companies holding high
collective market shares, and insufficient interconnector capacity.

It is clear that over time this situation will evolve, partly due to the actions presently under examination by
the Commission and the appropriate Spanish authorities with respect to interconnector capacity, and
partly through market entry by new generators.

Furthermore, practical and beneficial effects can already be seen from liberalisation. Electricity prices have
already decreased significantly as indicated in the table sent directly to the Honourable Member and to
Parliament(cid:146)s Secretariat. In addition, a number of new plants will be constructed in the coming years.

21.11.2000

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 330 E/65

Clearly all these issues are relevant in any consideration by the Commission of a transitional regime, as by
definition any state aid examination must take fully into account all relevant legal and factual circum-
stance.

(1) OJ L 27, 30.1.1997.

(2000/C 330 E/071)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-0001/00

by Brigitte Langenhagen (PPE-DE) to the Commission

(19 January 2000)

Subject: Implementation of access to the grid under EU Directive 96/92/EC of 19 December 1996 (cid:129)

transmission conditions for independent power suppliers

The conditions governing access to the grid in Germany are currently being examined to see whether they
are compatible with the internal market rules.

Is the objective of Directive 96/92/EC (1), namely to give power suppliers non-discriminatory access
1.
to the grid, achieved by agreements on transmission fees between German power corporations and interest
groups?

2. What fees are regarded as compatible in a Union context?

How does the Commission assess the actual cost structures of the grid operators; does it, for

3.
example, require them to disclose these structures?

Does the Commission not agree that unjustifiably high fees offer scope for cross-subsidisation and

4.
the shifting of costs in integrated electricity undertakings, and thus distortion of competition?

5.
Does it not share the view that, through the level of fees they charge, old-established energy supply
companies might take advantage of their natural monopoly grid to exclude new competitors as far as
possible?

6. What does the Commission intend to do to ensure that new power suppliers have free and
transparent access to the market?

(1) OJ L 27, 30.1.1997, p. 20.

Answer given by Mrs de Palacio on behalf of the Commission

(1 March 2000)

the Verbaendevereinbarung (VV)

The Commission has made a first analysis of

to which the
1.
Honourable Member refers. The Member of the Commission responsible for competition wrote to the
German associations describing the findings. The letter contains a number of elements, particularly with
respect to the potential discrimination that results and which raises serious issues of compatibility with the
competition rules of the EC Treaty. The Director-general for energy and transport wrote to the German
authorities outlining the potential non-conformity of some aspects of the VV with Directive 96/92/EC of
the Parliament and the Council of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in
electricity.

In the framework of the Florence Regulatory Forum where Member States, regulators, the Association
2.
of European transmission system operators (ETSO), consumers and industry are represented, agreement
has been reached that transmission fees giving access to the interconnected Community network will be
independent of the commercial transactions in which the network users may engage. These fees should
therefore not be based on individual transactions, but should be based on a calculation of the effective use
of the network, the net physical flows.