Crowd control technologies : an appraisal of technologies for political control : final study.
Date: 2000-01-01
Institutions: Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services
Subjects: biological weapon, chemical weapon, civil defence, conventional weapon, laser weapon, public safety, security services

CROWD CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES 
(An appraisal of technologies for political control) 

Final Study 

Working document for the STOA Panel 

Luxembourg, June 2000  

            PE 168.394/FinSt.  

QA-ST-OA-139-EN-N

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
Cataloguing data: 

Title: 

CROWD CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES 
(An appraisal of technologies for political control) 

Workplan Ref.:  

EP/IV/B/STOA/99/14/01/A 

Publisher: 

Author: 

Editor: 

European Parliament 
Directorate General for Research 
Directorate A 
The STOA Programme 

OMEGA Foundation, Manchester, UK 

Graham Chambers, 
Head of STOA Unit 

Date: 

June 2000 

PE number: 

PE  168. 394/Fin.St. 

This document is a working Document for the 'STOA Panel'.  It is not an official publication of 
STOA. 
This document does not necessarily represent the views of the European Parliament 

ii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)Crowd Control Technologies : An Assessment Of 
Crowd Control Technology 
Options For The European Union(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2) 

(An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control) 
(EP/1/1V/B/STOA/99/14/01) 

The Omega Foundation.  
May 2000. 

iii 

 
 
 
 
 
Crowd Control Technologies - An Assessment Of Crowd Control Technology  
Options For The European Union 
(EP/1V/B/STOA/99/14/01) 

FINAL REPORT TO STOA FROM THE OMEGA FOUNDATION  

ABSTRACT 

This study grew out of the 1997 STOA report, 'An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control' 
and takes that work further. Its focus is two fold:(i) to examine the bio-medical effects and the social & 
political impacts of currently available crowd control weapons in Europe; (ii) to analyse world wide trends 
and developments including the implications for Europe of a second generation of so called (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) 
weapons. Seven key areas are covered by the report(cid:2)s project: (a) a review of available crowd control 
technologies; (b) relevant legislation at national and EU levels; (c) the relative efficiency of crowd control 
technologies; (d) their physical and mental effects on individuals; (e) the actual and potential abuse of 
crowd control technologies; (f) an assessment of future technologies and their effects; and finally (g) an 
appraisal of less damaging alternatives such as CCTV.The report presents a detailed worldwide survey 
of crowd control weapons and the companies which manufacture supply or distribute them. It was found 
that at least 110 countries worldwide  deploy riot control weapons, including chemical irritants, kinetic 
energy weapons, water cannon and electro-shock devices. Whilst presented as humane alternatives to 
the use of lethal force, the study found examples in 47 countries of these so called (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2)  crowd 
control weapons being used in conjunction with lethal force rather than as a substitute for it, leading 
directly to injury and fatalities. 

Within Europe, the study found that the biomedical research necessary to justify the deployment of 
certain  crowd  control  technologies  was    either  absent,  lacking  or  incomplete  and  that  there  was 
inadequate quality control at production level to ensure that adverse or even lethal effects were avoided. 
Evidence  is  also  presented  of  the  misuse  of  these  technologies  and  the  breach  of  deployment 
guidelines which can make their effects either severely damaging or lethal. Member States currently 
have inadequate export controls to prevent the transfer, brokerage or licensed production of crowd 
control weapons to human rights violators, including weapons such as electroshock devices which have 
been directly implicated in torture. The report warns against adopting ever more powerful crowd control 
weapons as (cid:1) technical fixes(cid:2). It suggests their use should be limited and provides a number of options to 
make  the  adoption  and  use  of  these  weapons  more  democratically  accountable.    These  include 
licensing and independent evaluation of the biomedical impacts of such weapons via a formal process 
of (cid:1)Social Impact Assessment(cid:2); legal limits on weapons which are exceptionally hazardous or lethal; 
legally  binding  rules  of  engagement;  better  post  incident  inquiry  procedures  and  more  effective, 
accountable and transparent export controls. 

iv 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)Crowd Control Technologies - An Assessment Of Crowd Control Technology  Options 
For The European Union(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2) (EP/1V/B/STOA/99/14/01) 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

This study grew out of a 1997 STOA report, 'An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political Control' and 
takes that work further. Its focus is two fold:(i) to examine the bio-medical effects and the social & political 
impacts  of  currently  available  crowd  control  weapons  in  Europe;  (ii)  to analyse world wide trends and 
developments  including  the  implications  for  Europe  of  a  second  generation  of  so  called  (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) 
weapons. Seven key areas are covered by the report(cid:2)s project: (a) a review of available crowd control 
technologies; (b) relevant legislation at national and EU levels; (c) the relative efficiency of crowd control 
technologies; (d) their physical and mental effects on individuals; (e) the actual and potential abuse of crowd 
control technologies; (f) an assessment of future technologies and their effects; and  (g) an appraisal of less 
damaging alternatives such as CCTV.  

The report presents a detailed worldwide survey of crowd control weapons and the companies which 
manufacture supply or distribute them. It was found that at least 110 countries worldwide  deploy riot control 
weapons, including chemical irritants, kinetic energy weapons, water cannon and electro-shock devices. 
(Appendix 7). Whilst presented as humane alternatives to the use of lethal force, the study found examples 
in 47 countries of these so called (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2)  crowd control weapons being used in conjunction with lethal 
force rather than as a substitute for it, leading directly to injury and fatalities.(Appendix 6). 

It suggests their use should be limited and provides a number of options to make the adoption and use of 
these weapons more democratically accountable. Three guiding principles were used in formulating these 
options, namely (i) the precautionary principle that health and safety considerations should be consistently 
applied across the EU and these should be independently and  objectively assessed; (ii) assertions that a 
particular crowd control technology is safe within particular rules of engagement should be given legal force, 
both  in  terms  of  the  accountability  of  the  crown  control  personnel  and  the  alleged  quality  control  and 
technical  specification  of  a  particular  weapon;  and  (iii)  human  rights  considerations  should  guide  the 
licensing of all exports of crowd control weapons to countries which have a track record of violating them.  

Assessments of maintaining the status quo option are compared with the benefits of options which take a 
more pro-active approach to implementing the provisions of the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty agreements on 
creating areas of freedom, security and justice for both citizens who enjoy such rights and the officers who 
are charged with ensuring their protection. These options include licensing and independent evaluation of 
the biomedical impacts of such weapons via a formal process of (cid:1)Social Impact Assessment(cid:2); legal limits on 
weapons which are exceptionally hazardous or lethal; legally binding rules of engagement; better post 
incident inquiry procedures and more effective, accountable and transparent export controls. The report and 
the  comprehensive  appendices  provide  considerable  documentation  in  support  of  the  policy  options 
presented in Section A: Briefly:- 

GENERAL PRINCIPLES - LICENSING Within Europe, the study found that biomedical research necessary 
to justify the deployment of certain crowd control technologies was  either absent, lacking or incomplete and 
that there was inadequate quality control at production level to ensure that adverse or even lethal effects 
were avoided. Currently,  alleged non-lethality of any crowd control weapon is dependent on its purported 
technical specification presented by the manufacturer. However, hard evidence has already come to light 
during the course of the study that certain manufacturers have failed to carry out adequate quality control on 
their products to ensure that they meet the technical specification required to assure their alleged safety.  
Thus in the case of certain plastic baton rounds too much propellant was used which meant that the kinetic 
energy surpassed the technical specification taking the baton round further into the (cid:1)severe damage and 
lethality(cid:2) range.  Likewise, in the case of French CS sprays, a failure to carry out adequate quality control 
meant that concentrations of the irritant chemicals were far in excess of the technical specifications. Such 
sloppy quality control would never be permissible in the pharmaceutical industry where alleged standards 
are subject to independent scrutiny and potential legal redress. 

v 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The study suggests that the  manufacture, supply, distribution, brokerage and licensed production of crowd 
control weapons should all be licensed. All products should be subject to common criteria of quality control. 
In the event of malpractice or lax quality control, licenses should be withdrawn, production curtailed and 
legal sanctions initiated against those responsible. Further, a publicly available harmonised coding system 
should be adopted across the European Union Member States. 

Past experience has shown that to rely on manufacturers(cid:2) unsubstantiated claims about the absence of 
hazards is  unwise. In the US, companies making crowd control weapons, (e.g. pepper-gas manufacturer 
Zarc International), have put their technical data in the public domain without loss of profitability. It would be 
good practice for all European companies making such weapons to be legally required to do likewise and 
for all research justifying the alleged harmless status of any less lethal weapon to be published in the open 
scientific press before authorisation and that any product license granted be subject to such scrutiny. It is 
also recommended that legal force should be given to the official guidelines or terms of engagement for 
using such weapons, which would make any officers who breached them, open to prosecution. 

CHEMICAL IRRITANTS The study questions the wisdom of maintaining the status quo where government 
and company research, often undertaken after chemical irritant weapons have been authorised, continues 
as the main  approach to justifying alleged (cid:1)harmlessness.(cid:2) Given that different countries even within the EU 
have adopted different stances, there is a risk of not having proper regard to health and safety concerns, 
since many problems with toxic chemicals only emerge many years after operational usage. Both citizens 
and officers could have a future legal claim if scientific assertions of safety were later found to be less than 
well informed or negligent. An alternative option would be to further consider the options outlined in a 
previous STOA  report   ( http://jya.com/stoa-atpc.htm) which suggested that all EU Member States should 
establish  the following principles:-  

(cid:1)(cid:2) Research on chemical irritants should be published in open scientific journals before authorization for 
any usage is permitted and that the safety criteria for such chemicals should be treated as if they were 
drugs rather than riot control agents;  

(cid:1)(cid:2) Research on the alleged safety of existing crowd control weapons and of all future  innovations in crowd 
control weapons should be placed in the public domain prior to any decision towards deployment;  

Within that context, the report takes the view that  deployment of OC (pepper-gas) should be halted across 
the EU until independent  research has more fully evaluated the risks it poses to health.  Evidence emerging 
from work undertaken for this study, particularly the way that French chemical irritant sprays were hastily 
deployed in the United Kingdom, reinforces the need for these principles to be given legal force.  The 
rejection of OC by the Swedish authorities because of its potential for causing eye damage, reinforces the 
need for a cautious and consistent view to be adopted by all European member states where citizens have 
equal worth under the commitment to provide universal areas of freedom, security and justice. A further 
precautionary  measure  would  be  to  ask  Member  States  within  the  terms  of  European  data  protection 
legislation, to tag the health records of all those affected by the spray who seek medical treatment, in case 
common health problems emerge in the future. 

KINETIC IMPACT MUNITIONS.  Evidence is presented in the study of the misuse of these technologies 
and the breach of deployment guidelines which can make their effects either severely damaging or lethal. 
This is particularly so in the case of kinetic energy weapons. Maintaining the status quo in this regard  
allows potentially lethal crowd control weapons to be used on our streets which because of their inaccuracy 
could be targeted on to innocent bystanders, children etc. Yet, no European State has the death penalty for 
public order offences.  An alternative option is to assume that all European citizens who enjoy areas of 
freedom, security and justice in their home member state should have equal enjoyment of such rights no 
matter where they are within the European Union.  Such a notion implies a consistent and harmonised 
approach to the use of potentially hazardous riot weapons, one based on the precautionary principle that 
best and safest practices of public order policing should be adopted by all member states on the basis of 
the highest standards adopted by all.  

vi 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It  is  recommended  that  new  limits  should  restrict  inherently  unsafe  technology  which  because  of  its 
technical and design characteristics is potentially lethal in many of the operational circumstances where it 
might realistically be deployed.  US military data suggests that limits on the kinetic energy of baton round 
type munitions should be set excluding any weapon with more that 122 joules of kinetic energy. Indeed, the 
recommendations of one of the most exhaustive official inquiries ever commissioned on the use of kinetic 
weapons,  i.e.  those  contained  within  the  Patten  Commission  Report,  September  1999,  should  be 
considered as providing a sound basis for the future use of kinetic energy weapons anywhere in Europe.  
These  guidelines  cover  the  need  for  a  legalistic  approach  in  defining  the  guidelines  to  be  used  both 
operationally and post incident when these weapons are used.  Patten(cid:2)s view is that (cid:3)guidance governing 
deployment and use should be soundly based in law, clearly expressed and readily available as public 
documents.(cid:4) 

Any European wide adoption of these guidelines should incorporate the legal duties of the Member States 
of the European Parliament police forces to use only (cid:1)reasonable force(cid:2) which means that there needs to be 
appropriate mechanisms to ensure accountability after any incident where (cid:1)less lethal(cid:2) weapons have been 
used. Any crowd control weapon capable of producing a lethal impact should be subject to the same legal 
procedures and post incident inquiry as if it were a lethal firearm. Similarly, any Kinetic Impact Weapons 
with an energy greater than 122 joules should be considered as a lethal firearm as recommended in the 
Patten report and their use should be regarded as illegal if the use of lethal firearms in the same context 
would be illegal, for example where innocent bystanders may become unwitting targets. In this context, 
steps should be taken to ensure that all Kinetic Energy munitions are ballistically traceable to the weapon 
and security unit. 

ELECTROSHOCK & STUN WEAPONS. The study questions  the role, deployment, trade and certification 
of electroshock weapons. It recommends that if stun weapons are deployed, there is a clear requirement for 
effective personnel training and transparent recording of usage. However this would enable electroshock 
weapons to come into the EU from the United States where they can be exported to any NATO member 
without a licence and for other trade and brokering in these weapons to continue. The question is why, 
given that so few countries in the EU now  use them? This study found that no EU member countries 
officially admit to using electroshock weapons for policing but that there was significant evidence of EU 
collusion in supplying this (cid:1)universal tool of the torturer(cid:2) to the torturing states. Further more, the EC has 
actually given  CE quality control markings for such weapons and foreign manufacturers such as those from 
Taiwan boast that it gives an official seal of approval in promoting  their overseas sales (Taiwan bans such 
weapons for home use).  This practice should be terminated and the considered view of the report is that 
they  should  no  longer  be  deployed  or  traded  in  Europe.  The  European  Union  is  advised  to  give 
consideration to taking up the formal request of the British government made on the 28th July 1997, which 
asked all of member States to follow their example in taking (cid:3)the necessary measure[s] to prevent the 
export  or  transhipment  of    (cid:3)Portable  devices  designed  or  modified for riot or control purposes or self-
protection to administer an electric shock, including electric-shock batons, electric-shock shields, stun guns, 
and tasers, and specially designed components for such devices....(cid:4). 

2ND.  GENERATION  CROWD  CONTROL  WEAPONS  The  report  warns  against  adopting  ever  more 
powerful crowd control weapons as (cid:1) technical fixes(cid:2) and allowing the policing assumptions of the United 
States to organise, militarise and market public order options for the European Union without public debate 
or  accountability.  Questions  over  the  reliability  and  safety  of  certain  US  crowd  policing  weapons  and 
practices should urge caution. Technical data in regard to the 2nd. Generation of crowd control weapons 
from the US are discussed in this report, which advises that they should not be taken at face value. All such 
weapons  should  be  subject  to  independent  testing  and  licensing  control  and  until  and  unless  such  a 
checking regime is in place, a moratorium should be considered on accepting any of this technology into 
European military and police crowd control arsenals. This would mean that no US made or licensed 2nd. 
generation chemical irritant, kinetic, acoustic, laser, electromagnetic frequency, capture, entanglement, 
injector or electrical disabling and paralysing weapons,  should be deployed within Europe unless legally 
binding guarantees are forthcoming from the agencies deploying these weapons about their alleged safety 

In assessing the effects of such 2nd. Generation weapons, the report advises that adoption of the principles 
of ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) SIrUS project (which suggests that because of their 

vii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
technical characteristics and human targeting mechanisms, certain weapons should be banned because 
they are intrinsically inhumane or capable of causing unnecessary suffering). Since much of this work is 
shrouded in secrecy, the European Parliament may wish to request the Commission to report on  the 
existing liaison arrangements for the second generation of non-lethal weapons to enter European Union 
from the USA and call for an independent  report on their alleged safety as well as their intended and 
unforseen social and political effects.  

ALTERNATIVES TO CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS The military police industrial complex has spawned 
an ever growing arsenal of new crowd control weapons  offering the dubious promise of even more powerful 
 technical fixes for social and political problems. In practical terms since the main seat of innovation in this 
area is the United States, this would let an alien American policing culture set the public order agenda in 
Europe.  It would also entail a wealth of unwelcome impacts, including escalation of conflict and a loosening 
of community support for the police. More socially sensitive alternatives need to be found but there are 
obvious dangers in substituting one technical fix for another. 

SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF POLICE TECHNOLOGIES. The report advocates an alternative 
option of  institutionalising  the decision making process so that common parameters are examined when 
deciding on innovations regarding crowd control weapons. The Committee may wish to consider requesting 
STOA to formally examine what might be involved in setting up the bureaucratic procedures to achieve such 
an objective, along the lines of the current environmental impact assessment regimes. In practical terms 
that  would  mean  having  formal,  independent  (cid:1)Social  Impact Assessments(cid:2) of new police technologies 
before  they  are  deployed.  These  assessments  could    establish    objective  criteria  for  assessing  the 
biomedical  effects  of  so  called  (cid:1)less  lethal(cid:2)  weapons  undertaken  independent  from  commercial  or 
governmental  research.  Some  of  the  other  options  covered  in  the  report  from  health  and  safety, 
accountability of rules of engagement etc might be appropriately used to provide EU wide recognised bench 
marks. Some effective alternative options might be first thought to be counter-intuitive, such as the South 
Korean police decision to use more highly educated female officers without riot gear to more peacefully 
police public demonstrations. Members of the Committee may wish to invite the South Korean officials 
involved in this decision to discuss their thinking and its apparent success.  There may be opportunities to 
emulate this successful change of tactics in Europe. 

The report questions whether CCTV cameras could be used throughout European cities to provide a chill 
effect  to  dissuade  potential  rioters  from  creating  civil  disturbances  as  a  substitute  for  crowd  control 
weapons.(The approach is based on algorithmic face recognition systems linked into these networks could 
then be used to track down and target malefactors). The problem with this option is that it does not enable 
any real time intervention to further contain trouble as it is breaking out. Experience in those countries which 
already have mass city centre surveillance, such as the UK, is that they adopt both CCTV and public order 
tactics and technologies,  not either/or. Troublemakers have learnt to mask their face and operate outside of 
the cameras reach. The other danger here is of course in creating a network of mass supervision which 
may be used for very different purposes to those for which it was originally intended. To effectively deploy 
these systems would mean putting the whole of society under continuous surveillance which would be 
assuming a continuing benign level of political stability which rarely exist in the long term, not even in 
Europe. 

Nevertheless, Crowd control options using biometric based or face recognition systems could still play a 
powerful role in preventing public disorder occurring at fixed locations such as enclosed sports stadia, 
where there are inevitably considerable public safety considerations. The report recommends that a series 
of pilot projects be explored with member states who have had experience of crowd behaviour problems in 
recent years and that any plans to extend these pilot schemes be made in conjunction with supporters 
clubs,  the  police  and  with  government on the basis of the practical experience of how effectively  the 
systems worked in practice. 

NEW  BIO-WEAPONS  FOR  CROWD  CONTROL  Evidence  emerged  during  the  course  of  this  study 
indicating that advances in neuroscience modelling of receptor sites in the human brain, coupled with new 
knowledge of the human genetic code (emerging from both the Human Genome Project and the Human 

viii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diversity Project), is already opening a path for malign use of the biological sciences for targeted human 
control. Whilst the research is still embryonic, there is a risk of behaviour modification, race specific crowd 
control weapons and area denial technologies emerging with profound implications which need to be further 
assessed in terms of both current capabilities and what the results of thee projects might mean in terms of 
the state of the art, which is rapidly changing. Given that the EC has already agreed to ban any weapons 
which directly work on the basis of targeting or otherwise interfering  with the operation of the human brain, 
a new STOA study is proposed, covering the potential malign implications of human genetic modification 
research and related genome projects on human control weapons of the future. 

EXPORTS  OF  CROWD  CONTROL  WEAPONS  TO  HUMAN  RIGHTS  VIOLATORS  Member  States 
currently have inadequate export controls to prevent the transfer, brokerage or licensed production of crowd 
control weapons to human rights violators, including weapons such as electroshock devices which have 
been directly implicated in torture.  EU member states currently have inconsistent policies in regard to 
controlling  the  export  of  certain  (cid:1)crowd  control(cid:2)  technologies.    If  this  situation  continues,  European 
companies and governments will continue colluding with human rights violations in States that have very 
poor human rights records.  It would be hypocritical for the European Union to define (cid:3)areas of freedom, 
justice and security(cid:4) inside its territories, whilst undermining the same rights of freedom, justice and security 
 because of inappropriate and ineffective export controls and procedures on the supply,  licencing and 
brokerage of crowd control weapons and munitions to other countries. 

The report recommends severe restrictions on the creation, deployment, use and export of weapons which 
cause inhumane treatment, superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. There is a good case presented in 
this report for banning electroshock weapons. In this context this would mean not only no manufacture, but 
no imports, no exports, no transhipment , licensed production, no public access to such devices through the 
web and of course no use by anyone. 

Using the same principled approach, the report recommends that effective limits should be set on the 
exports or licensed production of any crowd control technology, ancillary equipment and training, which is 
not seen as acceptable for use within the EU. Clearly, it is hypocritical for European states to export crowd 
control weapons abroad that had been deemed too hazardous for use on Europeans. 

STOA is also advised to consider commissioning  a new study on the available evidence revealing the 
extent to which  European companies have profited from the transfer of technologies of political control, 
which  have then  been used to perpetrate human rights violations. The purpose of this study would be to 
present new policies to plug the loopholes in current arms control policies and hence recommend effective 
mechanisms for implementing the agreed EU common criteria. 

To further this process of transparency and accountability, Member States should be requested to dis-
aggregate export licences and trade data so that proper scrutiny becomes possible. Common agreement on 
dis-aggregation of all data relating to the export of crowd control weapons would be an appropriate step in 
the right direction. Given the EU commitment to the CWC, it would also help members to fulfill their legal 
responsibilities under this treaty not to proliferate chemical weapons. 

ix 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPTIONS BRIEF 
(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)Crowd Control Technologies - An Assessment Of Crowd Control Technology  Options For 
The European Union(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2) 
(EP/1V/B/STOA/99/14/01) 

[1]  The  status  quo  option  could  be  maintained  whereby  alleged  non-lethality  of  any  crowd  control  weapon  is 
dependent on its purported technical specification presented by the manufacturer. 

[2] The manufacture, supply, distribution, brokerage and licensed production of crowd control weapons should all be 
licensed. All products should be subject to common criteria of quality control. In the event of malpractice or lax quality 
control, licenses should be withdrawn, production curtailed and legal sanctions initiated against those responsible. A 
publicly available harmonised coding system should be adopted across the European Union . 

[3] Legal force should be given to the terms of engagement which would make any officers who breached their codes 
of conduct and guidelines for using crowd control weapons, open to prosecution. 

[4] The status quo option could be maintained where government and company research, often undertaken after 
chemical irritant weapons have been authorised, continues as the main  approach to justifying alleged (cid:1)harmlessness.(cid:2) 

[5] Research on chemical irritants should be published in open scientific journals before authorization for any usage is 
permitted and that the safety criteria for such chemicals should be treated as if they were drugs rather than riot control 
agents; Research on the alleged safety of existing crowd control weapons and of all future  innovations in crowd 
control weapons should be placed in the public domain prior to any decision towards deployment;  

[6] That deployment of OC (pepper-gas) should be halted across the EU until independent  research has more fully 
evaluated any risks it poses to health.  A further precautionary measure would be to ask Member States to tag the 
health records of all those affected by the spray who seek medical treatment, in case common health problems 
emerge in the future. 

[7] The Status quo option could be maintained which allows potentially lethal crowd control weapons to be used on 
our streets which because of their inaccuracy could be targeted on to innocent bystanders, children etc. However, no 
European State has the death penalty for public order offences.  

[8] New legal limits as suggested by the Patten Commission in Northern Ireland should restrict inherently unsafe 
technology which because of its technical and design characteristics is potentially lethal in many of the operational 
circumstances where it might realistically be deployed. Any Kinetic Impact Weapons with an energy greater than 122 
joules should be considered as a lethal firearm and their use should be regarded as illegal if the use of lethal firearms 
in the same context would be illegal. For example, where innocent bystanders may become unwitting targets. In this 
context, steps should be taken to ensure that all Kinetic Energy munitions are ballistically traceable to the weapon and 
security unit. 

[9]  The  Status  quo  option  on  the  role,  deployment,  trade  and  certification  of  electroshock  weapons  could  be 
maintained and the European Commission could continue to give  CE quality control markings for such weapons.  

[10] Alternatively, the European Union could terminate the practice of giving CE quality control marks to electroshock 
instruments and give consideration to taking up the formal request of the British government made on the 28th July 
1997, which asked all of member States to follow their example in taking (cid:3)the necessary measure[s] to prevent the 
export or transhipment of  (cid:3)Portable devices designed or modified for riot or control purposes or self-protection to 
administer  an  electric  shock,  including  electric-shock  batons,  electric-shock  shields,  stun  guns,  and  tasers,  and 
specially designed components for such devices....(cid:4). 

[11] The status quo option can be maintained which will enable the policing assumption of the United States to 
organise, militarise and market public order options for the European Union without public debate or accountability.  

[12] Alternatively, technical data in regard to the 2nd. Generation of crowd control weapons from the US, discussed in 
this report, should not be taken at face value. All such weapons should be subject to independent testing and licensing 
control and, until and unless such a checking regime is in place, a moratorium should be considered on accepting any 
of this technology into European military and police crowd control arsenals. This would mean that no US made or 
licensed 2nd. generation chemical irritant, kinetic, acoustic, laser, electromagnetic frequency, capture, entanglement, 
injector or electrical disabling and paralysing weapons,  should be deployed within Europe unless legally binding 

x 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
guarantees are forthcoming both from the manufacturers and the government agencies deploying these weapons 
about their alleged safety.. The European Parliament may wish to request the Commission to report on  the existing 
liaison arrangements for the second generation of non-lethal weapons to enter European Union from the USA and call 
for an independent  report on their alleged safety as well as their intended and unforseen social and political effects.  

[13] The  ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) SIrUS principles ( which suggests that because of their 
technical characteristics and human targeting mechanisms, certain weapons should be banned because they are 
intrinsically inhumane or capable of causing unnecessary suffering) should be adopted 

[14] The decision making process for procuring any new crowd control technologies could be subject to more formal 
controls so that common parameters are examined when deciding on innovations regarding crowd control weapons. 
The Committee may wish to consider requesting STOA to formally examine what might be involved in setting up the 
bureaucratic procedures to achieve such an objective, along the lines of the current environmental impact assessment 
regimes. In practical terms that would mean having formal, independent (cid:1)Social Impact Assessment(cid:2) of new police 
technologies before they are deployed. 

[15]  Other  alternatives  options  to  (cid:1)Darth  Vader(cid:2)  like  riot  squads  to  policing  protest  should  not  be  seen  in  purely 
technological terms. Some effective options might be counter-intuitive, such as the Korean police decision to use more 
highly educated female officers without riot gear to more peacefully police public demonstrations. Members of the 
Committee may wish to invite the South Korean officials involved in this decision to discuss their thinking and its 
apparent success.  There may be opportunities to emulate this successful change of tactics in Europe. 

[16] Crowd control options using biometric based or face recognition systems could  play a powerful role in preventing 
public disorder occurring at fixed locations such as enclosed sports stadia, where there are inevitably considerable 
public safety considerations. A series of pilot projects be explored with member states who have had experience of 
crowd behaviour problems in recent years and that any plans to extend these pilot schemes be made in conjunction 
with supporters clubs, the police and with government on the basis of the practical experience of how effectively  the 
systems worked in practice. 

[17] The status quo option would be to attempt to assess the risks posed by the new emergent bio technologies only 
after they had been actually weaponised. 

[18] Given that the EC has already agreed to ban any weapons which directly work on the basis of targeting or 
otherwise interfering  with the operation of the human brain, a new STOA study should be commissioned on the 
potential malign implications of human genetic modification research and related genome projects on human control 
weapons of the future. 

[19] The EU Status Quo on exports of crowd control weapons could be maintained, i.e. that following the voluntary 
EU Code of Conduct on Arms, weapons should not be exported to countries where they can be used for (cid:1)internal 
repression(cid:2) or contribute to (cid:1)external aggression(cid:2). However, EU member states have inconsistent policies in regard to 
controlling the export of certain (cid:1)crowd control(cid:2) technologies.  If this situation continues this option will mean that 
European companies and governments will continue colluding with human rights violations in States that have very 
poor human rights records.  It would be hypocritical for the European Union to define (cid:3)areas of freedom, justice and 
security(cid:4)  inside  its  territories,  whilst  undermining  the  same  rights  of  freedom,  justice  and  security    because  of 
inappropriate and ineffective export controls and procedures on the supply,  licencing and brokerage of crowd control 
weapons and munitions to other countries. 

[20] Effective limits should be set on the exports or licensed production of any crowd control technology, ancillary 
equipment and training, which is not seen as acceptable for use within the EU. This option begs the case for banning 
electroshock  weapons  in  this  context  which  would  mean  no  manufacture,  no  imports,  no  exports,  no  licensed 
production, no use. 

[21] STOA should consider commissioning  a new study on  the extent to which  European companies have profited 
from the transfer of technologies of political control and their role in perpetrating human rights violations. The purpose 
of this study would be to present new policies to plug the loopholes in current export controls and hence recommend 
effective mechanisms for implementing the agreed EU common criteria. Member States should be requested to dis-
aggregate export licences and trade data so that proper scrutiny becomes possible. 

Acknowledgements 

xi 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whilst responsibility for the content and accuracy of this report is the sole responsibility of the Omega 
Foundation,  we  would  like  to  acknowledge  the  invaluable  assistance  and information provided by the 
following individuals and organisations. 

Researchers at Amnesty International UK and International Secretariat, Maggie Beirne (Committee on the 
Administration of Justice), Tony Bunyan and researchers at Statewatch, Heiner Busch, Robin Coupland 
(ICRC), Professor Malcolm Dando, Rob Evans, Bill Hebenton, David Hoffman, David Isenberg, Dr Robert 
Jones, Dominique Loye (ICRC), Caroline Mojert, Clive Norris (University of Hull), Brian Rappert (SATSU, 
University of York), Zvi Shulman (B(cid:2)Tselem, Israel), Julian Perry-Robinson and colleagues at the Harvard 
Sussex Programme on Chemical and Biological Warfare,  Professor Harry Rothman, Jean Pascal Zanders 
(SIPRI). 

Front Cover photograph: X-ray of a Palestinian casualty with six (cid:1)plastic bullets(cid:2) lodged in his head after 
being shot by Israel Defence Forces in Nablus, December 1988 and who subsequently died. 

xii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 

Section 

Page 

Table of Contents 

SECTION A:  POLICY OPTIONS 

General Principles - Licensing 

Chemical Irritants 

Kinetic Impact  

Electroshock and stun weapons 

2nd Generation crowd control weapons 

Alternatives to crowd control weapons 

Social Impact Assessments of Police Technologies 

New Bio-Weapons for Crowd Control 

Exports of Crowd Control weapons to Human Rights Violators 

SECTION B: ARGUMENTS & EVIDENCE 

INTRODUCTION 

CURRENTLY AVAILABLE CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS & THEIR 
EFFECTS 

1. 

2. 

2.1 

Chemical Crowd Control Weapons - Design & Effects 

2.1.1 

Disabling Chemical Irritant & Harassing Agents 

2.1.2 

Delivery & Dispersion Mechanisms 

2.2 

Kinetic Impact Weapons & Their Effects 

2.2.1 

Truncheons 

2.2.2 

Impact Projectile Effects 

2.2.3 

Delivery Mechanisms 

2.2.4 

Delivery Of Kinetic Impact Rounds By Conventional Weapons 

2.2.5 

Varieties Of Kinetic Impact Munitions 

2.2.6 

Water Cannon 

2.3 

Electro-Shock Stun Weapons Technologies & Their Effects 

xiii 

1

1

2

3

3

4

4

5

5

6

8

10

10

11

12

12

12

12

12

13

13

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Table of Contents 

Section 

Stun Grenades 

Area Denial and Barrier technologies 

LEGISLATION AT INTERNATIONAL, EU AND NATIONAL LEVELS 

Proposed EU Ban on Weapons Directly Interfering With Brain Function 

The International Committee Of The Red Cross SIRius Project 

International Human Rights Law & Crowd Weapons Of The Future 

International Legal Prohibitions Against Torture & Blinding Systems 

Limits Imposed By Provisions Of Chemical Weapons Convention 

Universal declaration On Human Genome Project & Human Rights 

EU & National Laws And Exports To Human Rights Violators  

HEALTH & SAFETY ISSUES 

Health & Safety Issues Regarding Chemical Irritant Weapons 

No 

2.4 

2.5 

3. 

3.1 

3.2 

3.3 

3.4 

3.5 

3.6 

3.7 

4. 

4.1 

4.1.1 

Hazards Of Crowd Control Chemicals 

4.1.2 

Hazards Of Dispensing Excess Levels Of Chemical Irritant 

4.1.3 

Hazards of Carrier Solvents & Propellants 

4.1.4 

Hazards Of Pyrotechnic & Blast Chemical Irritant Delivery Systems 

4.1.5 

Training & Professional Codes Of Conduct 

4.2 

Kinetic Impact Weapons - Health & Safety issues 

4.2.1 

Hand Held Baton technology 

4.2.2 

Water Cannon 

4.2.3 

Kinetic Impact Munitions 

4.2.4 

Northern Ireland 

4.2.5 

Occupied Territories 

4.2.6 

Worldwide 

4.3 

Electroshock weapons 

4.3.1 

Intended Effects Of Stun Weapons 

4.3.2 

Effects from deployment of stun weapons 

xiv 

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14

14

16

16

17

17

17

17

18

18

18

19

19

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25

25

25

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No 

Section 

Page 

Table of Contents 

5 

5.1 

5.2 

5.3 

6 

6.1 

6.2 

6.3 

ABUSE OF TECHNOLOGIES 

Chemical Irritant weapons 

Kinetic Weapons 

Electro-shock weapons 

AN ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE CROWD CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES 

History 

Design, Role & Function of 2nd Generation (cid:1)Less-Lethal(cid:2) Weapons 

Varieties of 2nd Generation (cid:1)Less-Lethal(cid:2) Weapons 

6.3.1 

Calmatives 

6.3.2 

Upgrades of Existing Riot Technologies 

6.3.3 

Entanglements 

6.3.4 

Directed Energy Weapons 

6.3.5 

Area Denial Munitions 

6.4 

6.5 

7. 

7.1 

7.2 

7.3 

7.4 

8. 

8.1 

8.2 

8.3 

8.4 

Designer Bio-Weapons for Selective Mass control 

International Humanitarian Agencies 

AN APPRAISAL OF LESS DAMAGING ALTERNATIVES 

Crowd Control Technologies and Social Contexts 

The Need for Social Impact Assessments. 

Alternative Crowd Control Methodologies 

CCTV Surveillance and Algorithmic Systems 

EXPORT OF CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 

Transfers (export) of Crowd Control Technologies 

Kenya - Tear gas, plastic bullets and water cannon     

Indonesia 

Zambia 

xv 

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35

36

36

39

39

42

42

44

45

45

45

46

47

48

49

49

49

50

51

52

52

53

54

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No 

Section 

Page 

Table of Contents 

Table 1. The Main Chemical Irritant Riot Control Gases 

Table 2. Comparative Effects of Various (cid:1)Less Lethal(cid:2) Kinetic Impact Munitions 

Figures 

Figures 1 - 4. Some examples of Currently Available Crowd Control Technologies 

Figure 5. Severe blistering following exposure to French CS Spray. 

Figure 6. Modern Israeli pulsed jet Water Cannon. 

Figures 7 - 8. Severe skull damage caused by Kinetic Impact munitions. 

Figure 9. Police officer targets WTO protestor in Seattle. A misuse of Kinetic Impact 
Weapons. 

Figure 10. Example of Taiwanese manufactured Electro-shock weapons with European CE 
markings. 

Figures 11 -14. Some examples of 2nd Generation (cid:1)Non Lethal(cid:2) weapons. 

56

57

15

21

29

31

37

40

43

xvi 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An Assessment Of Crowd Control Technology -  
Options For The European Union 
FINAL REPORT(EP/1V/B/STOA/99/14/01) 

SECTION A: POLICY OPTIONS 

GENERAL PRINCIPLES - LICENSING 

Three guiding principles have been used in formulating these options, namely (I)the precautionary principle 
that  health  and  safety  considerations  should  be  consistently  applied  across  the  EU  and  these  should  be 
independently and  objectively assessed; (ii) assertions that a particular crowd control technology is safe within 
particular rules of engagement should be given legal force, both in terms of the accountability of the riot squad 
personnel and the alleged quality control and technical specification of a particular weapon; and (iii) human rights 
considerations should guide the licensing of all exports of crowd control weapons to regimes which have a track 
record of violating them. Assessments of maintaining the status quo option (highlighted) are compared below 
with the benefits of options which take a more pro-active approach to implementing the provisions of the 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty agreements on creating areas of freedom, security and justice for both citizens who enjoy such 
rights and the officers who are charged with ensuring their protection.1  

[1] The status quo option could be maintained whereby alleged non-lethality of any crowd control 
weapon is dependent on its purported technical specification presented by the manufacturer. However, 
hard evidence has already come to light during the course of the study that certain manufacturers have 
failed to carry out adequate quality control on their products to ensure that they meet the technical 
specification required to assure their alleged safety.  Thus in the case of certain plastic baton rounds 
too  much  propellant  was  used  which  meant  that  the  kinetic  energy  surpassed  the  technical 
specification taking the baton round further into the (cid:1)severe damage and lethality(cid:2) range.  Likewise, in 
the case of French CS sprays, a failure to carry out adequate quality control meant that concentrations 
of the irritant chemicals were far in excess of the technical specifications. Such sloppy quality control 
would never be permissible in the pharmaceutical industry where alleged standards are subject to 
independent scrutiny and potential legal redress. 

[2] The manufacture, supply, distribution, brokerage and licensed production of crowd control weapons 
should all be licensed. All products should be subject to common criteria of quality control. In the event 
of  malpractice  or  lax  quality  control,  licenses  should  be  withdrawn,  production  curtailed  and  legal 
sanctions initiated against those responsible. A publicly available harmonised coding system should be 
adopted across the European Union Member States. 

[3]  Past  experience  has  shown  that  to  rely  on  manufacturers(cid:2)  unsubstantiated  claims  about  the 
absence of hazards is  unwise. In the US, companies making crowd control weapons, (e.g. pepper-gas 
manufacturer Zarc International), have put their technical data in the public domain without loss of 
profitability. It would be good practice for all European companies making such weapons to be legally 
required to do likewise and for all research justifying the alleged harmless status of any less lethal 
weapon to be published in the open scientific press before authorisation and that any product license 
granted be subject to such scrutiny.  

[4]  Legal  force  should  be  given  to  the  terms  of  engagement  which  would  make  any  officers  who 
breached their codes of conduct and guidelines for using crowd control weapons, open to prosecution. 

CHEMICAL IRRITANTS 

[5] The status quo option could be maintained where government and company research, often 
undertaken after chemical irritant weapons have been authorised, continues as the main  approach to 
justifying  alleged  (cid:1)harmlessness.(cid:2)  Given  that  different  countries  even  within  the  EU  have  adopted 
different stances, there is a risk in adopting this option of not having proper regard to health and safety 

xii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
concerns, since many problems with toxic chemicals only emerge many years after operational usage. 
Both citizens and officers could have a future legal claim if scientific assertions of safety were later 
found to be less than well informed or negligent. 

[6] An alternative option would be to further consider the options outlined in a previous STOA  report   ( 
http://jya.com/stoa-atpc.htm)  which  suggested  that  all  EU  Member  States  should  establish    the 
following principles, that:  

[7] Research on chemical irritants should be published in open scientific journals before authorization 
for any usage is permitted and that the safety criteria for such chemicals should be treated as if they 
were drugs rather than riot control agents;  

[8] Research on the alleged safety of existing crowd control weapons and of all future  innovations in 
crowd  control  weapons  should  be  placed  in  the  public  domain  prior  to  any  decision  towards 
deployment;  

[9] That deployment of OC (pepper-gas) should be halted across the EU until independent  research 
has more fully evaluated any risks it poses to health.  Evidence emerging from work undertaken for this 
study, particularly the way that French chemical irritant sprays were hastily deployed in the United 
Kingdom reinforce the need for principles [7] and [8] to be given legal force.  The rejection of OC by the 
Swedish authorities because of its potential for causing eye damage together with the fact that the US 
Marine Corps delayed training with this agent because of health & safety fears reinforce the need for a 
cautious and consistent view to be adopted by all European member states where citizens have equal 
worth under the commitment to provide universal areas of freedom, security and justice. 

[10] A further precautionary measure would be to ask Member States within the terms of European 
data protection legislation, to tag the health records of all those affected by the spray who seek medical 
treatment, in case common health problems emerge in the future. 

KINETIC IMPACT 

[11] The Status quo option could be maintained which allows potentially lethal crowd control weapons 
to  be  used  on  our  streets  which  because  of  their  inaccuracy  could  be  targeted  on  to  innocent 
bystanders, children etc. However, no European State has the death penalty for public order offences.  

[12] An alternative option is to assume that all European citizens who enjoy areas of freedom, security 
and justice in their home member state should have equal enjoyment of such rights no matter where 
they are within the European Union.  Such a notion implies a consistent and harmonised approach to 
the use of potentially hazardous riot weapons, one based on the precautionary principle that best and 
safest practices of public order policing should be adopted by all member states on the basis of the 
highest standards adopted by all.  

[13] New limits should restrict inherently unsafe technology which because of its technical and design 
characteristics is potentially lethal in many of the operational circumstances where it might realistically 
be deployed.  US military data suggests that limits on the kinetic energy of baton round type munitions 
should be set excluding any weapon with more that 122 joules of kinetic energy. 

[14] The recommendations of one of the most exhaustive official inquiries ever commissioned on the 
use of kinetic weapons, i.e. those contained within the Patten Commission Report, September 1999,2 
should  be  considered  as  providing  a  sound  basis  for  the  future  use  of  kinetic  energy  weapons 
anywhere  in  Europe.    These  guidelines  cover  the  need  for  a  legalistic  approach  in  defining  the 
guidelines to be used both operationally and post incident when these weapons are used.  Patten(cid:2)s 
view  is  that  (cid:3)guidance  governing  deployment  and  use  should  be  soundly  based  in  law,  clearly 
expressed and readily available as public documents.(cid:4) 

xiii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[15] Any European wide adoption of these guidelines should incorporate the legal duties of the Member 
States of the European Parliament police forces to use only (cid:1)reasonable force(cid:2) which means that there 
needs to be appropriate mechanisms to ensure accountability after any incident where (cid:1)less lethal(cid:2) 
weapons have been used. Any crowd control weapon capable of producing a lethal impact should be 
subject to the same legal procedures and post incident inquiry as if it were a lethal firearm. Similarly, 
any Kinetic Impact Weapons with an energy greater than 122 joules should be considered as a lethal 
firearm as recommended in the Patten report and their use should be regarded as illegal if the use of 
lethal  firearms  in  the  same  context  would  be  illegal,  for  example  where  innocent  bystanders  may 
become  unwitting  targets.  In  this  context, steps should be taken to ensure that all Kinetic Energy 
munitions are ballistically traceable to the weapon and security unit. 

ELECTROSHOCK & STUN WEAPONS 

[16] The Status quo option on the role, deployment, trade and certification of electroshock weapons 
could be maintained. This would enable electroshock weapons to come into the EU from the United 
States where they can be exported to any NATO member without a licence and for other trade and 
brokering in these weapons to continue. The question is why given that so few countries in the EU now 
use them? This study found that no EU member countries who officially admit to using electroshock 
weapons for policing but that there was significant evidence of EU collusion in supplying this (cid:1)universal 
tool of the torturer(cid:2) to the torturing states. Further more, the EC has actually given  CE quality control 
markings for such weapons and foreign manufacturers such as those from Taiwan boast as an official 
seal of approval in promoting  their overseas sales (Taiwan bans such weapons for home use).  This 
practice should be terminated. 

[17] Alternatively, the European Union could give consideration to taking up the formal request of the 
British  government  made  on  the  28th  July  1997,  which  asked  all  of  member  States  to follow their 
example  in  taking  (cid:3)the  necessary  measure[s]  to  prevent  the  export  or  transhipment  of    (cid:3)Portable 
devices designed or modified for riot or control purposes or self-protection to administer an electric 
shock, including electric-shock batons, electric-shock shields, stun guns, and tasers, and specially 
designed components for such devices....(cid:4).3 

2ND. GENERATION CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS 

[18] The status quo option can be maintained which will enable the policing assumption of the United 
States to organise, militarise and market public order options for the European Union without public 
debate or accountability. Questions over the reliability and safety of certain US crowd policing weapons 
and practices should urge caution 

[19] Alternatively, technical data in regard to the 2nd. Generation of crowd control weapons from the US, 
discussed in this report, should not be taken at face value. All such weapons should be subject to 
independent testing and licensing control and until and unless such a checking regime is in place, a 
moratorium should be considered on accepting any of this technology into European military and police 
crowd  control  arsenals.  This  would  mean  that  no  US  made  or  licensed  2nd.  generation chemical 
irritant, kinetic, acoustic, laser, electromagnetic frequency, capture, entanglement, injector or electrical 
disabling  and  paralysing  weapons,    should  be  deployed  within  Europe  unless  legally  binding 
guarantees are forthcoming both from the manufacturers and the government agencies deploying 
these weapons about their alleged safety 

[20] In assessing the effects of such 2nd. Generation weapons, note should be taken of the ICRC 
(International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross)  SIrUS  project  which  suggests  that  because  of  their 
technical  characteristics  and  human  targeting  mechanisms,  certain  weapons  should  be  banned 
because they are intrinsically inhumane or capable of causing unnecessary suffering. Since much of 
this work is shrouded in secrecy, the European Parliament may wish to request the Commission to 
report on  the existing liaison arrangements for the second generation of non-lethal weapons to enter 
European Union from the USA and call for an independent  report on their alleged safety as well as 
their intended and unforseen social and political effects.  

xiv 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ALTERNATIVES TO CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS 

[21]  The  Status  Quo  option    could  be  maintained  whereby  new  crowd  control  weapons  emerge 
offering even more powerful  technical fixes for social and political problems. In practical terms since 
the main seat of innovation in this area is the United States, this would let an alien American policing 
culture set the public order agenda in Europe.  It would also entail a wealth of unwelcome impacts in 
their including escalation of conflict and a loosening of community support for the police. More socially 
sensitive alternatives need to be found but there are obvious dangers in substituting one technical fix 
for another. 

SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF POLICE TECHNOLOGIES. 

[22] An alternative option is  to institutionalise the decision making process so that common parameters 
are examined when deciding on innovations regarding crowd control weapons. The Committee may 
wish  to  consider  requesting  STOA  to  formally  examine  what  might  be  involved  in  setting  up  the 
bureaucratic procedures to achieve such an objective, along the lines of the current environmental 
impact assessment regimes. In practical terms that would mean having formal, independent (cid:1)Social 
Impact Assessment(cid:2) of new police technologies before they are deployed. These assessments could  
establish  objective criteria for assessing the biomedical effects of so called (cid:1)less lethal(cid:2) weapons 
undertaken  independent  from  commercial  or  governmental  research.  Some  of  the  other  options 
covered in this report from a health and safety, accountability of rules of engagement etc might be 
appropriately used in this process to provide EU wide recognised bench marks. 

[23] Other alternatives options to Darth Vader like riot squads to policing protest should not be seen in 
purely technological terms. Some effective options might be counter-intuitive, such as the Korean 
police decision to use more highly educated female officers without riot gear to more peacefully police 
public  demonstrations.  Members  of  the  Committee  may  wish  to  invite  the  South  Korean  officials 
involved in this decision to discuss their thinking and its apparent success.  There may be opportunities 
to emulate this successful change of tactics in Europe. 

[24] One option included in this project(cid:2)s task brief is that CCTV cameras could be used throughout 
European cities to provide a chill effect to dissuade potential rioters from creating civil disturbances. 
Algorithmic face recognition systems linked into these networks could then be used to track down and 
target malefactors. The problem with this option is that it does not enable any real time intervention to 
further contain trouble as it is breaking out. Experience in those countries which already have mass city 
centre  surveillance,  such  as  the  UK,  is  that  they  adopt  both  CCTV  and  public  order  tactics  and 
technologies,  not either or. Troublemakers have learnt to mask their face and operate outside of the 
cameras reach. The other danger here is of course in creating a network of mass supervision which 
may be used for very different purposes to those for which it was originally intended. To effectively 
deploy these systems would mean putting the whole of society under continuous surveillance which 
would be assuming a continuing benign level of political stability which rarely exist in the long term, not 
even in Europe. 

[25] Nevertheless, crowd control options using biometric based or face recognition systems could still 
play a powerful role in preventing public disorder occurring at fixed locations such as enclosed sports 
stadia,  where  there  are  inevitably  considerable  public  safety  considerations.  In  some  stadia,  the 
structure and seating configuration of supporters from opposing teams or countries, can lead to the 
creation of classic flash points. In these settings, such systems could have a double impact. Not only 
could they aid the process of quickly identifying troublemakers and the individual police officers who 
were actively involved in the incident, they could also have a public safety role in  emergencies. It is 
recommended that a series of pilot projects be explored with member states who have had experience 
of crowd behaviour problems in recent years and that any plans to extend these pilot schemes be 
made in conjunction with supporters clubs, the police and with government on the basis of the practical 
experience of how effectively  the systems worked in practice. 

xv 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NEW BIO-WEAPONS FOR CROWD CONTROL 

[26] The status quo option would be to attempt to assess the risks posed by the new emergent bio 
technologies only after they had been actually weaponised. However, evidence emerged during the 
course of this study indicating that advances in neuroscience modelling of receptor sites in the human 
brain,  coupled  with  new  knowledge  of  the  human  genetic  code  (emerging  from  both  the  Human 
Genome Project and the Human Diversity Project), is already opening a path for malign use of the 
biological sciences for targeted human control. Whilst the research is still embryonic, there is a risk of 
behaviour modification, race specific crowd control weapons and area denial technologies emerging 
with profound implications which need to be further assessed in terms of both current capabilities and 
what the results of thee projects might mean in terms of the state of the art, which is rapidly changing.  

[27] Given that the EC has already agreed to ban any weapons which directly work on the basis of 
targeting or otherwise interfering  with the operation of the human brain4, a new STOA study should be 
commissioned on the potential malign implications of human genetic modification research and related 
genome projects on human control weapons of the future. 

EXPORTS OF CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS TO HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS 

[28] The EU Status Quo on exports of crowd control weapons could be maintained, i.e. that following 
the voluntary EU Code of Conduct on Arms, weapons should not be exported to countries where they 
can be used for (cid:1)internal repression(cid:2) or contribute to (cid:1)external aggression(cid:2). However, EU member states 
have inconsistent policies in regard to controlling the export of certain (cid:1)crowd control(cid:2) technologies.  If 
this situation continues this option will mean that European companies and governments will continue 
colluding with human rights violations in States that have very poor human rights records.  It would be 
hypocritical  for  the  European  Union  to  define  (cid:3)areas  of  freedom,  justice  and  security(cid:4)  inside  its 
territories,  whilst  undermining  the  same  rights  of  freedom,  justice  and  security    because  of 
inappropriate and ineffective export controls and procedures on the supply,  licencing and brokerage of 
crowd control weapons and munitions to other countries. 

[29] There should be severe restrictions on the creation, deployment, use and export of weapons which 
cause  inhumane  treatment,  superfluous  injury  or  unnecessary  suffering.  There  is  a  good  case 
presented  in  this  study  for  banning  electroshock  weapons  in  this  context  which  would  mean  no 
manufacture, no imports, no exports, no licensed production, no use. 

[30] Using the same principled approach, effective limits should be set on the exports or licensed 
production of any crowd control technology, ancillary equipment and training, which is not seen as 
acceptable for use within the EU. Clearly, it is hypocritical for European states to export crowd control 
weapons abroad that had been deemed too hazardous for use on Europeans. 

[31] STOA should consider commissioning  a new study on the available evidence revealing the extent 
to which  European companies have profited from the transfer of technologies of political control, which 
 have then  been used to perpetrate human rights violations. The purpose of this study would be to 
present new policies to plug the loopholes in current arms control policies and hence recommend 
effective mechanisms for implementing the agreed EU common criteria.5  

[32] Member States should be requested to dis-aggregate export licences and trade data so that proper 
scrutiny becomes possible. Common agreement on dis-aggregation of all data relating to the export of 
crowd control weapons would be an appropriate step in the right direction. Given the EU commitment to 
the  CWC,  it  would  also  help  members  to  fulfill  their  legal  responsibilities  under  this  treaty  not  to 
proliferate chemical weapons. 

xvi 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION B: ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE 

1. INTRODUCTION 

This present study grew out of a 1997 STOA report, 'An Appraisal of the Technologies of Political 
Control' of which crowd control weapons were a part, and takes that work further.6 Its focus is two fold:- 

(cid:5)(cid:6) (i) to examine the bio-medical effects and the social & political impacts of currently available crowd 

control weapons in Europe;  

(cid:5)(cid:6) (ii)  to  analyse  world  wide  trends  and  developments  including  the  implications  for  Europe  of  a 
second  generation  of  so  called  (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2)  weapons  originating  from  the  national  nuclear 
laboratories of the United States & private corporations. 

Seven key areas are covered by the report(cid:2)s project brief, (for both within and outside the European 
Union), namely: (a) a review of available crowd control technologies; (b) relevant legislation at national 
and EU levels; (c) the relative efficiency of crowd control technologies; (d) their physical and mental 
effects  on  individuals;  (e)  the  actual  and  potential  abuse  of  crowd  control  technologies;  (f)  an 
assessment of future technologies and their effects; and finally (g) an appraisal of less damaging 
alternatives such as CCTV. 

Whilst allegedly (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) crowd control weapons have gained increasing prominence in recent 
years as tools for managing contemporary internal security demands, there has been a long standing 
search for, and deployment of, such weapons throughout the 20th Century dating from their use in the 
former European colonies. Historic examples include so called (cid:1)tear gas(cid:2), wooden and rubber bullets, 
electric cattle prods and watercannon used by British colonial forces in Cyprus and Hong Kong, who 
also developed a new set of riot control techniques.7 The earlier STOA report on this subject (PE 
166.499) emphasised that new crowd control technologies encompassed not just the (cid:1)hardware(cid:2) or 
apparatus  of  technical  performance,  but  also  the  (cid:1)software(cid:2)  -  the  standard  operating  procedures, 
routines, skills and associated tactics for deploying public control weapons. Thus these riot control 
tactics  themselves  can  be  considered  as  a  technology,  capable  of  refinement  and  transfer  and 
consisting of a spectrum of options containing increasing levels of coercion. 

Many of these riot control techniques have been further systematized in terms of collective tactics 
e.g.  using  wedges,  shields,  batons,  horses  and  riot  weapons  which  work  on  a  formulaic  basis 
according to the military model which spawned them. It is now widely recognised that this process can 
militarise the police into (cid:1)Special Weapons and Tactics(cid:2) Units such as the Grenz Shutz Gruppe in 
Germany; the Gendarmeries in France, the Caribiniere in Italy; the Special Patrol and Tactical Aid 
Groups in the UK and the FBI,DEA and BATF paramilitary teams in the USA. Such groups undertake 
tactical training that is the mirror image of their military counterparts involved in (cid:1)operations other than 
war(cid:2)  and  adopt  the  same  weapons  technologies.  The  perceived  utility  of  this  class  of  technology 
derives  from  the  flexibility  it  supposedly  offers  states  in  their    use  of  force  during  public  order 
operations, whether organised by the police, military or another force in between. 

The subject matter presented here is inevitably sensitive since there is little agreement on what 
constitutes a (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) weapon. There is little agreement on terminology with (cid:1)less lethal(cid:2), (cid:1)less than 
lethal(cid:2) and (cid:1)non lethal(cid:2) used as interchangeable terms, even though as this report makes clear in certain 
circumstances could be described as (cid:1)lethal(cid:2) or (cid:1)pre-lethal(cid:2) technologies.  A key concern here is public 
relations.  For example, one US definition from the Department of Defence has defined (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) 
weapons as (cid:3)discriminate weapons that are explicitly designed and employed so as to incapacitate 
personnel or material, while minimising fatalities and undesired damage to property and environment.(cid:4)8 
 However,  significant  grounds  can  be  presented  for  challenging  this  stance.  There  has  been  a 
revolution in the availability of crowd control weapons and a second generation of weapons is emerging 
including new chemical irritants and calmatives; kinetic and electroshock weapons; sticky  foams; 
entanglements; directed energy acoustic devices, pulsed plasma and radio frequency weapons, which 
are further elaborated in Section 6 below and tabulated in Appendix 4.9 Fuelled by (cid:1)operations other 

xvii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
than war(cid:2) in Bosnia, Somalia and Kosova, an accompanying revolution in military affairs has created a 
new demand for (cid:1)intervention technologies(cid:2) where direct contact with divided populations will become 
more common place, meaning that insurgents and non-combatants will be targeted together. 

Yet  despite  the  rapidly  expanding  literature  on  (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2)  weapons,  few  commentators  have 
scrutinized them in a systematic fashion. What might be seen as relatively minimum force when used 
by the military during  (cid:1)peacekeeping interventions(cid:2), may be plainly illegal when used by police in a 
democratic country where they are legally bound to operate in a discriminate way using minimum force. 
Much depends on the accountability of the forces using these weapons and whether their extant codes 
of practice have been adhered to or ignored. Proponents of such weapons present them as providing 
additional options for intervention between the use of lethal force and no response at all. A sliding scale 
of options has been presented which offers the possibility of defeating (cid:1)trouble makers(cid:2) with minimum 
aggression; less-lethal weapons allow force to be viewed as a continuum.  

Opponents have charged that this perspective is naive since the potential blurring of boundaries 
between lethal and (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) weapons and the associated blurring of boundaries between police and 
military operations, has awesome implications for human rights, civil liberties and (cid:1)due-process(cid:2) and 
may actually undermine the effectiveness of state security forces. In such circumstances they are 
essentially  (cid:1)less-lethal(cid:2)  weapons    and  merely  a  fall  back  option  to  complement  lethal  force.10 
Substantive evidence and examples of (cid:1)less-lethal(cid:2) weapons augmenting rather than replacing lethal 
weapons is presented below as Appendix 6. 

Such differences of opinion are more than academic, since significant resources are being invested 
in creating new (cid:1)less-lethal(cid:2) weapons and NATO approved a new (cid:1)Non-Lethal Doctrine(cid:2) in October 
1999, to legally facilitate their future deployment.11 A key consequence is that as technical innovations 
take place, powerful new tools are placed at the disposal of states in need of solutions to pressing 
social and political problems whilst the (cid:1)control(cid:2) they offer may be more imaginary than real. The social, 
political  and  physical  effects  are  often  uncertain,  potentially  severe  and  perhaps  fundamental  in 
character. The phenomena of militarisation of the police and para-militarisation of the military could 
have far reaching consequences on the way that future episodes of sub-state conflict are handled and 
whether those involved are reconciled, managed, alienated or repressed.  

Clearly, any sensible framework for coping with the uncertainty associated with deploying weapons 
against citizens who have certain rights under the law, means preventing unacceptable consequences. 
Whilst it is impossible to establish an authoritative set of precautions, most commentators would agree 
that  the  following  negative  effects  are  worth  avoiding,  namely:  (i)causing  unnecessary  or  harmful 
effects  to  users  and  recipients;  (ii)  exacerbating  conflict;(iii)spurring  weapons  research  and 
development;(iv)proliferating  (cid:1)less-lethal(cid:2)  weapons  to  human  rights  violators;(v)reducing  public 
confidence in security forces; (vi)breaching or undermining international human rights conventions or 
extant weapons conventions, EU directives and agreements.12 

Through a series of case examples (including practices in countries such as Northern Ireland 
where the Patten Commission makes new recommendations on 'less potentially lethal(cid:2) weapons, Hong 
Kong,  Zambia,  Kenya,  Malaysia,  South  Korea,  Israel/Palestine,  Spain,  and  Indonesia,  as  well  as 
examples of particular technologies in action), the  report examines the extent to which such weapons 
have led to human rights abuses and whether or not such technologies have replaced or augmented 
the State(cid:2)s use of lethal force. These case examples take up the intrinsic abusability of some of these 
weapons and their utility for street punishment, torture and extra-judicial execution.  

Questions  of  culpability  in  international  law  are  also  raised,  specifically  the  issue  of  the 
responsibility of law enforcement officers to use minimum force and for countries to stay within the 
limits of international conventions such as those covering human rights, torture and chemical and 
biological weapons. A scientific approach has been applied to objectively assessing the extent to which 
commonly used (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) weapons are hazardous or harmless. This study also covers  the human 
rights, legal, biomedical and health impacts of so called (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) crowd control weapons. Specific 
examples  are  provided  on  the  lack  of  quality  control  in  achieving  a  (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2)  force  in  certain 

xviii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European kinetic energy weapons and in the strengths of certain chemical incapacitating weapons. A 
key  focus  of  the  report  is  to  present  policy  options  which  can    ensure  that  such  commercial 
irresponsibility  or  failure  to  implement  adequate  health  and  safety  precautions,  do  not  negate  or 
undermine  the  recent  provisions  of  the  1997  Treaty  of  Amsterdam  which  protects  the  rights  of 
European citizens to live in (cid:1)areas of freedom, security and justice(cid:2).13  

This  report provides  detailed technical data on existing weapons and those which now lie on the 
horizon.  It  also  seeks  to  examine  the  extent  to  which  certain  of  these  weapons  are  intrinsically 
(cid:1)abusable(cid:2). Such concerns  are also used to assess and evaluate the second generation of (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) 
weapons which are emerging from national military and nuclear weapons laboratories in the United 
States as part of the Clinton Administration(cid:2)s (cid:1)Non-lethal Warfare(cid:2) doctrine, now adopted in turn by 
NATO. These devices include weapons using chemical, optical, kinetic impact, electroshock, directed 
energy beam, sticky foam, radio frequency, laser and acoustic mechanisms to incapacitate human 
targets. Open source documentation is presented to evaluate both the official justification for deploying 
such technologies and whether or not commercial pressures may lead to uncontrolled proliferation of 
such systems into the hands of human rights violators. 

This report has been compiled using data derived from  commercial and scientific sources as well a 
postal survey of crowd control weapons, conducted by Amnesty International. (See Appendix 2).  It 
places  this  data  in  the  context  of  the  secrecy  surrounding  the  evolution  and  deployment of these 
weapons and the political and military ideologies surrounding their use. It relies heavily on data from the 
United Kingdom since the ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland has seen the most intense use of so 
called (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) weapons out of all the European Member states.  Britain also relies most heavily on 
electronic surveillance and has the most experience of using weapons and surveillance in counter-
insurgency operations providing a suitable case study of whether or not such control technologies can 
substitute for each other or whether it is a case of both and more. 

   A key responsibility here is to suggest options which deny deployment of any so called (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) 
weapons which are not safe or properly tested, or any other weapons technology which has inherent 
characteristics which lend themselves to human rights violations. Therefore a section of this  report 
looks at the proliferation of these weapons, including the variety of mechanisms used in different states 
to effect licencing and end user control, if any. A key concern is the relative lack of transparency in the 
official data publicly provided on these transfers and how this  failing undermines efforts to achieve 
proper parliamentary accountability and scrutiny of such transfers. 

2.  CURRENTLY  AVAILABLE  CROWD  CONTROL  WEAPONS  AND  THEIR 
EFFECTS. 

Over the last 30 years the range of available crowd control weapons and the number of companies 
and countries supplying them has massively increased.  For example, authoritative reference works in 
the 1970's such as Jane(cid:2)s Infantry Weapons (1978)14  and Dewar (1979)15 identify only 13 companies 
in  5  countries  (only  2  of  which,  Israel  and the USA, were non-European) supplying crowd control 
weapons.  By 1999, 10 of the 15 EU countries were involved in the manufacture, supply or distribution 
of crowd control weapons. Indeed, according to company information held by the Omega Foundation 
this  figure  had  grown  to  more  than  369  major  manufacturers,  suppliers  or  distributers  across  40 
countries (See Appendix 1). 

The current market in crowd control weapons covers everything from basic truncheons; side-handle 
batons16; riot shields17; kinetic impact weapons such as rubber and PVC plastic baton rounds;18 single 
and multi-shot riot guns19; water cannon which have been enhanced to fire (cid:1)slugs(cid:2) or (cid:1)bullets(cid:2)of water, 
marker dye and a range of chemical irritants for punishing demonstrators20; stun grenades;21 a wide 
variety of chemical irritant grenades22; tear gas projectiles23; aerosols24; and bulk sprayers 25 (yet all 
based primarily on 5 disabling chemicals namely CS, CN, CR, OC and Pava); a range of electro-shock 
weapons including 50,000 volt riot shields and  hand held shock batons varying from 50,000 to 400,000 
volts.26 (A comprehensive list of these technologies and effects is provided as Appendix 3). (Figures 1-
4 provide examples of some currently available technologies). 

xix 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most of these crowd control weapons have also been configured into vehicle or aircraft launched 
formats, some of which are served by a crew acting as a mobile riot dispersal unit.  Examples include 
water cannon, armoured personnel carriers & internal security vehicles with CS dispensers, plastic 
baton guns, helicopters equipped with CS sprayers, electrified riot control vehicles and mobile razor 
wire dispensing vehicles. Many of these (cid:1)non lethal(cid:2) weapon platforms also carry lethal weapons and 
munitions. 

This increasing availability means that many more countries are now  willing to actually use these 
technologies.  A key finding of this study is that at least 110 countries worldwide have deployed (cid:1)crowd 
control weapons(cid:2) including chemical irritants, kinetic weapons and water cannon. (See Appendix 7). 
This figure is an underestimate because not all countries report on their crowd control arsenals. Of 
these 110 countries, it was found that 44 also manufacture, supply or distribute such crowd control 
weapons  and  ammunition.  One  of  the  most  salient  findings  of  this  study  concerns  the  alleged  
effectiveness of these weapons as an humane substitute for lethal force. The present study found 
many examples in 47 countries, of these so called (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) alternatives being used in conjunction 
with lethal force, in many cases leading directly to injury and fatalities.(See Appendix 6).  Again this 
assessment probably underestimates the level of augmentation of lethal and (cid:1)non lethal(cid:2) weapons 
deployment. The survey conducted via Amnesty International for this study found that some States 
themselves are ignorant about the crowd control weapon holdings of their Military, Security, Police 
forces. (See Appendix 2) The commitments made in the Amsterdam Treaty cannot possibly be fulfilled 
whilst  governments  are  ignorant  of  there  own  instruments  and  capabilities  for  crowd  control.  All 
European governments should be in a position to report on their crowd control weapon holdings as a 
matter of policy and this data should be readily available as public documents. For example, it was of 
concern  that  the  German  Embassy  responded  that  (cid:3)according  to  the  German  Authorities,  the 
detailed information in the form requested is not held centrally and could only be obtained at 
disproportionate  cost(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2).  This  inability  to  supply  data  on  chemical  irritant  holdings  would  appear 
puzzling, given  the German governments(cid:2) obligation to provide such data to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention Inspectorate in the Hague, as stipulated by the CWC Treaty. 

In the mid 1990's, the range of available (cid:1)non lethal(cid:2) weapon technologies rapidly changed in the 
wake of the US (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) weapons doctrine and procurement program discussed in Section 6 below. 
 These include some of the variants already mentioned such as crowd control agents, kinetic energy 
weapons and others which are coming into use such as capture nets and entanglements as well as a 
range of what are  colloquially known as (cid:1)stick-ums(cid:2) and (cid:1)slick-ums(cid:2). NATO has quite recently  adopted 
(on 27th September 1999) a new  (cid:3)NATO policy on non-lethal weapons(cid:4) which cover a range of options 
for military commanders especially for the purposes of peace-keeping and peace-enforcement.  A key 
motivation behind this policy statement is thought to be a political one i.e. removing the political and 
legal obstacles to deploying these technologies, which is further discussed in Section 6 below. 

Nevertheless,  despite  this  substantial  proliferation,  until  fairly  recently  the forms of technology 
commonly available were almost identical to the 34 categories of crowd control weapons identified in 
the 1972 US National Science Foundation report on (cid:3)Non-Lethal Weapons(cid:4).27  At the end of the 1990's, 
outside of the USA, this typology of crowd control weapons continues to consist largely of systems 
based on chemical irritant; kinetic energy;  water jets; thunder flashes (stun-grenades); and electro-
shock devices.  What has changed is the relative power, sophistication and the combination of different 
operational effects within single weapon systems to achieve enhanced dispersion, capture, control or 
punishment.  

Overall performance characteristics of all crowd control weapons generally fall into two categories 
namely:- (i) those that determine the effect on the target if the target is hit (muzzle velocity, projectile 
weight and drag), and (ii) those that determine if the target is hit (accuracy and reliability).The relative 
importance of these two categories will vary from weapon to weapon.  For example, with chemical 
devices even though the performance characteristics fall into the same two categories, the distinction 
between  a  (cid:3)hit(cid:4)  and  a  (cid:3)no-hit(cid:4)  is  not  required  to  be    so  precise    as compared with kinetic energy 

xx 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
devices.28  What follows is a brief account of the lines of research that have produced today(cid:2)s chemical 
irritant, kinetic energy and electro-shock weapons.  

2.1 Chemical Crowd Control Weapons - Design & Effects. Disabling chemical weapons used for 
law enforcement consist of a disabling chemical and a dispersion mechanism. There are inherent 
difficulties inevitable in marrying a chemical which  has high effectiveness at very low doses with the 
requirement of low toxicity. Intensive work began in the 1950's, particularly in the USA and the UK, who 
shared  their  information  on  Chemical  &  Biological  Weapons  (CBW).  In  1956,  the  UK  War  Office 
established the need for a chemical weapon able to drive back (cid:3)fanatical rioters(cid:4) which led to the 
adoption of CS, (then code numbered T792) for use in the colonies of Cyprus and British Guyana. In 
1958, a Task Group on CBW was set up in the USA. The US Chemical Corps recommended two CW 
agents for consideration, namely CS and the vomiting agent DM,  whilst describing mustard gas as 
(cid:3)primarily a non-lethal agent.(cid:4)29 Work also began on searching for chemical incapacitants (cid:3)particularly 
(cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) persistent chemical agents that are capable of attacking through the skin and can produce 
incapacitation for one to three weeks.(cid:4)30 

 Nowadays,  the  Chemical  Weapons  Convention  permits  the  use  of  (cid:1)tear  gas(cid:2)  and  other  toxic 
temporarily disabling chemicals and their precursors for law enforcement and domestic riot control 
purposes (which it does not define) as long as the chemicals listed in Schedule 1 of the convention are 
not used.31 This provision rules out  DM, which is a toxic arsenic based substance previously held by 
certain countries outside the EU, including South Africa, which secretly explored the use of MDMA 
(Ecstasy) as a crowd control incapacitant.32 

2.1.1 Disabling Chemical Irritant and Harassing Agents.  By the 1970's, 15 different chemicals with 
sensory irritant properties had been reported for use in civil disturbances.33 However, despite intensive 
research,34  only  four  chemicals  are  commonly  used  for  crowd  control  purposes,  namely  CN  (1-
chloroacetophenone), CS (2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile), CR (dibenz (b:f)-1:4 oxazepine), and OC 
 (Oleoresin Capsicum). Until recently, the two former agents were  the ones most likely to be found in 
European police arsenals but increasingly European security forces are introducing OC. Whilst CR is 
usually a special forces weapon, although one company in India has packaged it for crowd control 
operations.35    In  the  Nineties,  various  US  companies  started  to  aggressively  promote  the  use  of 
Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) - a plant toxin extract derived from hot chilli peppers and therefore popularly 
known as (cid:1)pepper-gas(cid:2) and later a more standardized synthetic variant emerged, known as PAVA 
(Pelargonic Acid Vanillyamide).36   

CN was first prepared by Graebe in 1871 and like most so called (cid:1)tear gas(cid:2) weapons is a solid 
which becomes a fine mist of particles when distributed. Thus technically speaking, the riot control 
agents are not gases but aerosols. In concentrations of about 10 mg/m3 it produces burning or stinging 
sensations in the throat, eyes and nose accompanied by excess salivation and profuse crying. It also 
causes exposed skin to sting and constricting sensations in the chest. In high concentrations this riot 
agent kills. It has a very low vapour pressure and is therefore persistent, contaminating room areas, 
vehicles,  clothing  and  furniture  all  of  which  will  require  decontamination  if  untoward  biomedical 
implications are to be avoided.  

CS was first synthesized in the US by Corson and Stoughton in 1928 and is up to 5 times more 
potent than CN (based on the concentration per cubic metre that would be intolerable to 50% of an 
exposed population (ICt50) see Table 1), with marked harassment at concentrations of 4mg/m3. CS 
causes a burning sensation in the eyes which may be severe enough to precipitate involuntary eye 
closure (blepharospasm). It also produces severe irritation of the respiratory tract, burning pain in the 
nose, sneezing, soreness and tightness of the chest with coughing bouts following initial exposure and 
is a primary irritant of the skin. Even very light exposures can cause a rapid rise in blood pressure and 
as this increases, these effects become more intense with gagging, nausea and vomiting.  A temporary 
fear of light, or photophobia is an associated side effect which occurs in roughly 10% of the people 
exposed.  

xxi 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CR was first synthesized by Higginbottom and Suchitzsky at Salford College of Technology (UK) in 
1962 and is even more potent being six times more powerful than CS and 30 times more powerful than 
CN. It does not hydrolyse (i.e. split up or breakdown in water) which means that it can be dispersed 
from  water  cannon.  The  effects  are mainly upon the eye and skin with the most severe effect on 
exposed mucous membranes. Concentrations as low as 0.01 -0.1% (0.1-1mg CR/ml) when splashed 
onto the face result in immediate eye pain and temporary blindness which persists for about 15-30 
minutes. Over all areas of exposed skin contact, a nettle stinging sensation is produced which grows 
more severe as exposure increases. Even after a person is removed from the contaminated area, 
these effects will persist. Other effects include raised blood pressure, inner eye pressure, and, because 
of the general shock of the effects upon some individuals, hysteria. 

OC is a mixture of extracts from the chilli pepper family, the exact constituency of which varies 
depending on the identity of the particular crop of pepper chosen to manufacture the OC product. 
PAVA is a synthetic formulation of one active OC constituent (known as capsaicinoids) which has been 
standardized to a specific level of irritant activity, measured in Heat Scoville Units (HSU) which register 
 the relative level of heat inducing power. OC is the most potent of all of the commonly available riot 
control  irritants  although  the  ICt50  is  unreported.  OC  and  PAVA  are  classified  as  inflammatories, 
causing  acute  burning  and  closing  of  the  eyes,  along  with  severe  inflamation  of  the  mucous 
membranes  and  upper  respiratory  system.  OC  causes  temporary  blindness  and  uncontrollable 
coughing fits as the rapid inflammation of the respiratory tract restricts breathing. Being an organic 
agent, OC is usually mixed with a carrier agent for dispersion, normally an oil, alcohol or kerosene etc. 

2.1.2 Delivery & Dispersion  Mechanisms. There are essentially two ways of delivering chemical 
crowd control agents either by a pyrotechnically delivered aerosol or  as a sprayed solution. Many hand 
thrown cartridges are available consisting of a fused primer, irritant and a pyrotechnic ejection charge 
which delivers a dense cloud of irritant smoke. Some varieties fragment, others eject the chemical via a 
number of pierced holes in the container body. Manufacturers have also produced varieties which 
(cid:1)jump(cid:2) across the ground erratically to avoid being thrown back. Micro-pulverised versions of irritants 
such as CS1 and CS2 are available for more effective dispersal via blast grenades such as the ISPRA 
404D. Special barricade penetration devices such as Mace International(cid:2)s Ferret, have been designed 
to pierce doors, cars, plate glass windows etc, from a range of 100 metres. 

Many pyrotechnic chemical irritant grenades are designed to be fired from both standard adapted 
conventional rifles or from a variety of 37/38mm multipurpose riot guns. Bulk distribution has been 
facilitated by manpack devices such as the Manroy mist sprayer which can spray up to two kilograms of 
specially formulated micronised CS at a rate of 300 grams per minute with a range of up to 17 metres 
using a 14 kg. two stroke engine. 

The  other  main  method  of  delivery  is  by  a  (cid:1)fly-spray(cid:2)  type  cannister  consisting  of  the  irritant 
dissolved in a solvent with a propellant under pressure which is used to eject the chemical via a spray- 
nozzle, delivering either a cone of spray or a direct and targetable stream. CN, CS and OC can all be 
delivered this way via a variety of solvents and propellants.  SAE Alsetex(cid:2)s CS sprays for example, use 
a 5% solution of CS in the solvent MIBK (methyl iso-butyl ketone). Other U.S manufacturers such as 
Advanced Defense Technologies and Federal Laboratories use the solvent methylene chloride.  Zarc 
International quantify their spray delivery of capsaicinoids at 43,000 - 1,300,000 micro grams, per burst 
and  is  capable  of  a  range  of  between  4.5  -  300  metres  depending  on  the  product.  Many  of  the 
manufacturers of spray cannister chemical irritants also produce bulk delivery crowd control versions. 
Increasingly,  manufacturers  are  fitting  chemical  irritant  delivery  systems  to  their  internal  security 
vehicles,  helicopter  and  aircraft.    Purpose  built  chemical  irritant  packs  for  water  cannon  are  now 
appearing on the market.37 The cannon operator just adds the pack to the water cannon tanks for a 
specific concentration of chemical. 

2.2 Kinetic Impact Weapons and Their Effects. Kinetic impact weapons can be defined as  a class of 
weapon that on impact with the human body, produce a deterrent or punishment effect through the 
transfer of kinetic energy in the form of blunt or penetrating trauma. They include wooden, rubber and  

xxii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
plastic  projectiles  (also  called  Speciality  Impact  Munitions  -  SIM38  or  Extended  Range  Impact 
weapons39), truncheons of all descriptions and water cannon.  

2.2.1 Truncheons, clubs, batons, night-sticks, billys and slappers  have  been the standard police 
crowd control weapon for the past two centuries. They are made in a multitude of materials and lengths 
including: wood, bamboo, rubber, plastic, composite plastics, leather, metal and range in length from 
about 30 to 200cm. They are generally used one handed but the longer riot batons can be wielded two 
handed. Modern developments have produced extendable or telescopic batons, side-handle batons 
and  (cid:3)control(cid:4) batons used to subdue subjects and provide the possibility of control by leverage applied 
to the limbs. Since  truncheons are usually hand held, they force personnel  into close proximity with 
the subject. 

2.2.2  Impact  Projectile  Effects.  The  need  for  the  security  personnel  to  put  distance  between 
themselves and the subject to be controlled led to the development of weapons that provide a (cid:3)stand 
off(cid:4) capability (ie the ability to (cid:3)control(cid:4) a situation at a greater distance).40 Impact projectiles gain their 
energy from the explosion of the munitions(cid:2) propellant charge. The projectile is fired at high muzzle 
velocity with a kinetic energy of between 120 and 265 joules (see Table 2), which is transferred to the 
target on impact, causing tissue cells to move away from the path of the projectile. This energy may be 
in the form of fluid shock or the kinetic energy transfer of a solid object that strikes a fluid mass object 
such as the human body. The physical consequences of this action, depending on the rate of speed of 
the  cell  displacement  or  the  effects  of  fluid  shock,  may  result  in  two  possible  outcomes:  blunt  or 
penetrating trauma. The most desired (cid:3)design effect(cid:4) of a kinetic energy munition is blunt trauma, i.e.  
the  impact  from  an  object  that  leaves  the  body  surface  intact,  but  may  cause  sufficient  ((cid:3)non  life 
threatening(cid:4)) injury to incapacitate, whereas the most undesired (cid:3)design effect(cid:4) is penetrating trauma. 

2.2.3 Delivery Mechanisms include hand thrown munitions, based upon the same principle as a 
military hand grenade where an explosive charge is activated by either pulling out a pin or releasing a 
lever  mechanism,  or  by  a  time  delay  fuse.  The  grenade  is  thrown  at  the  individual  or  group  and 
explodes, ejecting high speed projectiles. It is indiscriminate and inaccurate. This type of weapon 
necessitates close proximity to the target. Types include rubber ball grenades, rubber pellets and stun 
grenades.41  To give the possibility of a much greater distance between launcher and target, many of 
these projectiles are designed to be weapon delivered. Two types are common, those that can be fired 
from conventional lethal weapons without modification and those that require special weapons such as 
grenade launchers. 

2.2.4 Delivery of Kinetic Impact Rounds By Conventional Weapons such as the 12 gauge shotgun 
or  riot  gun  and  the  standard  rifle.  A  wide  range  of  ammunition  is  available for 12 gauge delivery, 
including single baton, multiple baton, (cid:3)bird shot(cid:4) pellet & bean bag. Rifle launched  projectiles are fired 
by fitting the launch device over the end of a standard rifle barrel - generally called a rifle grenade. A 
standard bullet is fired and is trapped in the launcher device and its energy launches the projectile. 
Grenades firing single or multiple projectiles are available. Grenade launchers are basically a weapon 
with a large barrel and the standard for crowd control is 1.5 inches ( 37/38mm) or 40mm. They can be 
either  a  smooth  bore  or  rifled  weapon  (intended  to  give  a  higher  degree  of  accuracy).  Grenade 
launchers can be carried like conventional weapons or ground launched with up to seven tubes. They 
can be single or multi shot  (between 3 and 12 shot)  and can be vehicle mounted. Very high rates of 
fire are achievable by some of the weapons, for example the South African TFM Slingshot is capable of 
170 rounds per minute.42 

2.2.5  Varieties  of  Kinetic  Impact  Munitions  are  manufactured  in  a  range  of  types  but  can  be 
classified as follows: high or low energy, flexible or non-flexible (rigid) projectiles, single or multiple, 
direct  or  indirect  fire  or  by  method  of  delivery.  High  and  low  energy  refers  to  the  amount  of  the 
munitions(cid:2) propellant charge enabling either short or long range fire and not to the energy delivered to 
the target. Flexible projectiles are generally composed of powdered lead, lead shot, a gelatin substance 
or silica housed in a heavy square or circular bag made from cloth, canvas or nylon.43 Non-flexible 
projectiles are generally composed of rigid or semi-rigid materials such as wood, rubber, plastic or 
dense foam. They consist of blocks, balls or slugs of material and cover a number of standard types 

xxiii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and some speciality ones. These include 12 gauge rubber fin-stabilized rounds, rubber sabots, single 
wood/rubber/plastic blocks, multiple pellets, small balls, or single large tennis balls44. Another standard 
is  the  37/38mm  munition,  available  as  a  single  baton  (a  solid  cylinder  of  material),  multi  baton  - 
basically the single split into 3 or 5 sections or the (cid:3)cross cartridge(cid:4) (which is similar to the single baton 
but split lengthways into quarters, opening out in flight to present a larger profile and commensurate 
chance of hitting a target). Other varieties include multiple rubber pellets or segments, large balls45, 
beanbags, balls joined together with wire/string. A rather more lethal variation consists of essentially 
steel balls coated in rubber or plastic - a type much favoured by the Israeli military.46 (See front cover 
for an illustration of the lethal impact of these bullets). 

2.2.6 Water cannon are essentially crew served high pressure pumping systems, usually mounted on 
a heavy truck, designed to shoot jets of water at the target. Early water cannon vehicles were heavy 
and cumbersome and had little control of the water jet, they ran out of water quickly needing frequent 
refilling and were of little utility.47 Their unwieldy nature meant that they were most often used to police 
static  assemblies  or  slow  moving  processions.  The pressure of the water can be varied from low 
pressure, to soak the target and deter or demoralise, to high pressure to impart a blunt trauma which 
can push back the target or knock people to the ground.   

More recent developments have led to a pulse jet cannon system where small quantities of water - 
as little as 5 litres - are shot out at high pressure, in effect (cid:3)bullets(cid:4) or (cid:3)shells(cid:4) of water.48 An even 
higher pressure (cid:3)water gun(cid:4) shooting as little as 0.25 litres of water per shot is now on the market. This 
new flexibility has led to a renewed role for the water cannon in breaking up and punishing even fast 
moving protests. To increase the effectiveness of the water cannon chemical agents or dye are added. 
The chemical agent has a higher deterrent effect on the target than water. Generally the tear agents 
CS or CN are used. The dye can be used to ruin clothes or mark out individuals for later identification 
and (cid:1)snatch squad(cid:2) capture.  

2.3 Electro-shock Stun Weapons Technologies and Their Effects. Whilst the truncheon or baton 
has been the standard police riot control weapon for the last two centuries or more,49 in the last 20 
years it has been supplemented by batons, and other devices, using electronic stun technology for 
crowd control purposes.  Such devices are commonly known as stun batons, stun guns, shock batons, 
electric riot sticks, electronic batons or electric prongs. The stun technology has also been used to 
produce electronic capture shields and electronic restraint staffs.  It is important to note that the modern 
stun weapons are based on different electrical technology to that which is used in the old-style (cid:1)cattle 
prods(cid:2).    Cattle  prods  are  non-incapacitating  devices  that  produce  a  continuous,  low  frequency 
alternating current.  Electric stun batons produce high intensity, short duration (high frequency) pulses 
and are capable of causing temporary incapacitation of the whole body. 

The stun baton is a portable, hand held device, with a length of between 45 - 90cms. The weapons 
are typically powered by a 9v battery which, via a switching circuit, invertor transformer, capacitor and 
output coil, will produce a high voltage, low amperage discharge from electrodes at the end of the 
baton. The electrical discharge is represented by a spark and a sharp crackling noise.  The baton does 
not  have  to  be in contact with skin as the electric shock will pass through clothes.  However, the 
thickness of the clothes, condition of skin and the humidity will affect the impact of the electric shock.  
Manufacturers advertise output voltages ranging from 50,000 to 400,000 volts but it should be noted 
that these values are often significantly lower when independently tested.50 

A range of other devices are available that use the same stun technology. For example, stun guns 
are smaller, hand held weapons but tend not to be marketed for crowd control purposes as their short 
length would not provide significant (cid:1)stand off(cid:2) distance.  Electronic riot shields are available with metal 
strips on the front of the shield which act as the electrodes and produce 50,000 volt sparks when 
activated. Some countries, such as the USA, use such shields for (cid:1)cell extraction(cid:2) of prisoners, whilst 
the United Kingdom has authorised police forces to use them against (cid:1)dangerous dogs(cid:2).  These shields 
are marketed by a number of manufacturers for crowd control purposes.  Some manufacturers also 
provide stun weapons that fire darts over distances of up to 5-7 metres, which have trailing wires that 
deliver 50,000+ volt shocks when the darts hit their target.  The two US manufacturers, Tasertron and 

xxiv 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taser International (formerly Air Taser), market these weapons to the civilian and law enforcement 
markets for personal protection.   However, Tasertron provide an optional (cid:1)probe pack(cid:2) for the TE-86/95 
that (cid:3)can be plugged into the TASER unit to give the officer up to three feet of touch stun capability.(cid:4)51   

The effects of stun weapons, depend on the length of time of application and the characteristics of 
the recipient. However frequently reported effects include: a discharge up to 0.5 seconds startles and 
repels the victim; 1 to 2 seconds and the victim loses the ability to stand up; 3 to 5 seconds and the 
victim in immobilised, incapacitated, left dazed and weak for at least five, perhaps, fifteen minutes. 
Other reported short term effects include severe pain, loss of muscle control, nausea, convulsions, 
fainting,  and  involuntary  defecation  and  urination.  Longer-term  effects  from  electric  shock    can 
reportedly include muscle stiffness, impotence, damage to teeth, scarring of skin, hair loss, as well as 
post-traumatic stress disorder, severe depression, chronic anxiety, memory loss and sleep disturbance. 
In cases where there are physical signs of electric shock torture such as skin reddening and scarring, 
these usually fade within weeks.52 53 54 

There are a wide range of manufacturers and suppliers of these devices worldwide and many 
European Union member states continue to allow companies in their countries to manufacture, supply 
and  export    such  electro-shock  weapons.    Appendix  1  provides  details  of  companies  in  Belgium, 
France and Germany who have manufactured, supplied or distributed electro-shock weapons between 
1990 and the present.  Some of these companies continue to trade. 

2.4  Stun  Grenades,  percussion  grenades,  thunderflashes  and  flash-bangs  are  essentially  hand 
grenade devices whose cases are designed to split rather than fragment. Their effects include  an 
extremely loud blast and a brilliant flash of light designed to disorientate and shock rather than cause 
outright injury. The grenade consists of a standard military fuse with a pull ring and safety lever, sub-
munition charge container of cardboard to alleviate the danger of fragments and an explosive. Stun 
grenades are used to effect hostage rescue, although several states  ( e.g. Poland, Russia) have used 
them as a means of terrifying protestors - a softening up tactic before other riot tactics and technologies 
are used. Some varieties create a smokescreen as well. 

2.5 Area Denial and Barrier technologies include a variety of different perimeter and zone exclusion 
devices which can either be passive or active. Traditionally barrier devices were merely a series of 
mobile fences ( or in some cases just a roll of chequered police tape) which could be deployed around 
streets,  thoroughfares  and  buildings.  However  for  the  purposes  of  (cid:1)corralling(cid:2)  more  determined 
protestors modern technologies include a capacity to inflict pain or some other form of punishment 
when its limits are infringed (for example concertinas of razor wire or barriers consisting of sprayed 
irritant  foam).    In  recent  times  these technologies have been deployed for (cid:3)active(cid:4) area denial by 
means of motorized rapid deployment which can (cid:3)seal in(cid:4) or (cid:3)seal out(cid:4) a crowd. For example, the 
Cochrane (cid:1)Modular Razor Wire Rapid Deployment System(cid:2) capable of deploying 75 metres of 3 coil 
razor wire in 20 seconds.  Some of these systems are already mounted on permanent standby at 
(cid:3)strategic gateways(cid:4).55  

xxv 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some Examples of Currently Available Crowd Control Technologies. 

Fig 1.Arwen Multi-shot riot gun & ammunition. (cid:1) David Hoffman                                        Fig 2. Shock batons & Stun guns on display at Taiwenese  

                                     Security Fair. (cid:1) R. Ballantyne. 

          Fig 3. ISPRA Projectojet Bulk Chemical Irritant Sprayer.   (cid:1) David Hoffman                                         Fig 4. Chinese Electrified Riot Shield. (cid:1) R. Ballantyne. 

xvi 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. LEGISLATION  AT INTERNATIONAL, EU AND NATIONAL LEVELS. 

Existing international, EU and national legislation was not specifically designed to accommodate 
modern  crowd  control  weapons,  some  future  developments  of  which  may  have  the  potential  to 
undermine international treaties. If crowd control weapons are not to be used in ways which go beyond 
the limits of the law, it is important to identify which specific national and international laws currently 
apply and to treat their legality within existing legislation.56 

At present, such  legislation covers the different dimensions of weapons usage. These include the 
manner in which the weapons are deployed, the intrinsic effects of particular weapons on both the 
human body and psyche and  whether  rules of engagement have been implemented in practice.   

Such considerations cover the notion of minimum force, proportionality, discriminate use and any codes 
of conduct in regard to specific technologies.  More general EU and national legislation covering health 
and safety, the sale of goods in relation to quality control and the adherence to technical standards are 
also pertinent. 

There are many different levels of potential control that need to be considered in this context. For 
example, there are general laws governing specific rights which can be undermined by the deployment 
of inappropriate crowd control apparatus and public order policing tactics. Such legislation includes the 
1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights57; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(1976); 
the  International  Covenant  on  Economic,  Social  and  Cultural  Rights(1976)58  and  the  European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms(1950) and more recently, 
the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam which refers to implementing areas of Freedom, Security 
and  Justice.    In  theory,  this  legislation  should  protect  the  right  to  life  and  the  right  of  assembly.  
However, the exercise of these rights will be undermined if lethal or sub-lethal crowd control weapons 
are deployed against those citizens who exercise them.  

Therefore four legal elements need to be considered, namely:  (i) the alleged harmlessness of the 
weapons technology; (ii) whether they are discriminate or indiscriminate (i.e. affecting anyone in a 
control zone whether innocent or guilty of any public order crimes or misdemeanours); (iii) codes of 
conduct governing minimum force and correct adherence by law enforcement personnel to approved 
rules  of  engagement  and  appropriate  usage  of  the  particular  weapons  and  (iv)  appropriate 
accountability procedures where code of conducts or guidelines are breached. Such matters are also 
reflected in the obligations of law enforcement personnel under the UN Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement officers.59 

A key issue is whether case law in each state suggests that any abuse of these technologies will 
result in a successful prosecution. Many states pay lip service to rules of minimum force but even 
where very good evidence exists that these weapons have been abused, few prosecutions result and 
the  perception  of  immunity  of  state  law  enforcement  officers  from  prosecution  for  human  rights 
violations persists.60 Some 'non lethal' weapons (such as electroshock and stun technology) ostensibly 
designed for crowd control, have intrinsic features such as the facility to inflict excruciating pain without 
leaving  tell tale marks, which make them useful instruments for torture. Crowd control weapons on the 
horizon which create paralysis,  immobility, the removal of certain brain and hearing functions, the 
induction of vomiting or involuntary defecation have similar potential utility for implementing gross 
human rights violations, including mass rape or summary street executions. 

3.1 Proposed EU Ban on Weapons Directly Interfering With Brain Functioning. The European 
Parliament  has  already  approved  a  resolution    in  January  1999  which  called  for  (cid:1)an  international 
convention for a global ban on all research and development, whether military or civilian, which seeks 
to apply knowledge of the chemical, electrical, sound vibration or other functioning of the human brain 
to the development of weapons which might enable the manipulation of human beings, including a ban 
on any actual or possible deployment of such systems.(cid:2)61 

xvii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 The International Committee Of The Red Cross(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)s (ICRC) SIrUS Project. The ICRC is already 
beginning  to  explore  the  extent  to  which  their  SIrUS  Project  ("Superficial  Injury  or  Unnecessary 
Suffering") can be applied to specific effects caused by 'less-lethal weapons'. Their concern regarding 
superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering relates to design-dependent effects of specific weapons 
on health.62 Based on considerable experience, ICRC(cid:3)s view is that conventional weapons are not 
necessarily fatal. Their statistics gathered as part of the SIrUS project indicate that the proportion of 
wounded who die in the field from injuries inflicted by so called lethal weapons is less than 25%, 60% of 
those wounded by conventional weapons suffer no (cid:1)permanent injury(cid:2) and go on to complete physical 
recovery. Such findings underline the fact that so called (cid:4)non-lethal weapons(cid:3) cannot be considered as 
a separate unique category of weapons but rather according to ICRC as new weapons coming within 
the scope of the existing laws of war. Whilst any (cid:4)non lethal(cid:3) weapons need to be measured against the 
norms and principles of international humanitarian law particularly before they can be used in United 
Nation  mandated  operations,  it  has  to  be  recognised  in  this  context  that  much  of  international 
humanitarian law is only applicable to armed conflicts where war has been declared.63 

3.3 International Human Rights Law & Crowd Control Weapons Of The Future. The development 
of certain types of weapons such as radio frequency, acoustic or directed energy weapons like the 
plasma gun, depends on a knowledge of patho-physiological or psychological effects. A victim may not 
even be aware that an attack is taking place or be able to surrender and, if wounded, may not be able 
to seek medical assistance. Unlike other restrictions on weapons created in biomedical laboratories 
such as chemical and biological weapons, no specific international treaty yet applies. However,  some 
of these weapons present the risk of permanent disability or long lived post traumatic stress syndrome 
(PTSS) which will require specialised treatment. For example those subject to electro-shock torture with 
stun batons or targeted by sticky foam and left adhered to the ground all day under a tropical sun, are 
likely to suffer some PTSS requiring specialist treatment if that person is to be fully rehabilitated and not 
suffer (cid:4)flashbacks(cid:3). In the light of continued development of (cid:4)non lethal(cid:3) weapons, ICRC are proposing 
amendments to the SIrUS proposals.64 65 

3.4 International Legal Prohibitions Against Torture & Blinding Systems. The practice of torture is 
already covered by the Code of Conduct for Law enforcement Officials, adopted by the UN in 1979; 
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 7 of the Convention of Civil and Political 
Rights; Article 3 of Human Rights European Convention and the principles of medical ethics adopted 
by the UN General Assembly in 1982. More specifically torture is banned by the Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (12th April 1949); and the 
1997 European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. This report submits that the use of torture weaponry  is also covered by 'The Certain 
Conventional Weapons Convention (Inhumane Weapons Convention) of 1980.  Some crowd control 
technologies are also covered by the provisions of international legislation which encompasses their 
modus operandi. For example, the Blinding Laser Weapon Ban of 1995 has implications for future UV 
tetanizing lasers which can induce electroshock in human muscle tissue at a distance. 

3.5  Limits  Imposed  by  Provisions  of  the  Chemical  Weapons  Convention  (CWC).  Careful 
interpretation  of  this  international  legislation  is  required  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  it 
encompasses  current  and  future  crowd  control  weapons.  For  example,  the  Biological  Weapons 
Convention of 1972 applies to weapons which  use plant toxins to create dispersal effects and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993, (updating and extending the Geneva Protocols of 1925) has 
implications  for  mass  use  of  calmative  drugs  or  rocket  delivered  pre-encapsulated  chemical 
immobilising agents.66 Within the CWC,  riot agents are classified as toxic chemicals, falling under the 
general purpose criterion.67 Although the CWC makes specific exceptions which allow the usage of 
chemicals for law enforcement purposes, the treaty does not define exactly what is meant by 'law 
enforcement'.68  This  issue  becomes  particularly  vexed  in  relation  to  so-called  (cid:4)peacekeeping 
operations(cid:3), where the line between law enforcement and use as a method of warfare can become 
blurred should UN troops be deployed between hostile factions.   This has happened in recent times, 
for example on 28 August 1997 the NATO SFOR contingent had to evacuate part of its International 
Police Task Forces from the Bosnian Serb town of Brcko. After clashes erupted between civilians and 
NATO peacekeeping forces, US helicopters dropped teargas and soldiers fired warning shots to effect 

xviii 

 
 
 
 
 
crowd dispersal.69  In such situations, the key question is establishing who has the requisite legal 
authority  to  use  chemical  weapons  for  law  enforcement  purposes.70  According  to  SIPRI,  in  this 
instance, there were at least three separate sources of authority.71  

The duties of the CWC contracting parties also include a responsibility not to proliferate chemical 
weapons, a responsibility which will be examined in greater detail in the policy options (Section A). 
There is an urgent need to clarify this issue if chemical weapons are not going to be used as a normal 
means of waging internal security conflicts. At the moment the Hague based Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has no independent intelligence gathering capacity to check 
the  accuracy  of  submissions  by  governments  which  are  legally  required  under  the  treaty.  Further 
controls by the EU in meeting Member State obligations under the CWC would ensure that any such 
transfers  were  both  transparent  and  subject  to  appropriate  parliamentary  scrutiny.  In  addition  to 
international legislation, some countries also have national legislation which prohibits certain types of 
weapons for crowd control , setting out  various codes of conduct to control the operational usage of 
the weapons which are permitted. Also relevant are the different protocols governing the reporting and 
assessment of any post-incident justification for weapons deployment, which vary from nation to nation. 

3.6 Universal Declaration On Human Genome & Human Rights & Genetic Weapons.  Human 
genome  research  is  an  area  of  rapid  innovation  and  scientific  development  is  making  potentially 
awesome capabilities available to the State to manipulate and manage human crowd behaviour. A 
good case in point is the Human Genome Project and the Human Diversity project discussed in section 
6.4 which have the potential to release race specific control functions and to create weapons which 
induce heightened levels of anxiety and submission. International agreements are already in place 
which attempt to prevent the abuse of such innovations e.g the Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights, adopted by UNESCO on November 11, 1997.72 Such legislation needs to 
be more effective particularly in guarding against the import of relatively alien US concepts of crowd 
domination and control (using technologies which have been literally dreamt up in their national atomic 
laboratories).  European  democratic  traditions  are  quite  different.  Options  and  mechanisms  are 
presented  above    which  could  make  such  legislation  more  effective  in  regard  to  regulating  the 
appropriate usage of crowd control weapons and further restricting any  abuse of such systems in 
creating gross human rights violations. (Policy options. Section A). 

3.7 EU & National Laws & Exports To Human Rights Violators Finally, there is the facility of extant 
legislation to effectively control the export and proliferation of crowd control technologies. If further 
human rights violations are not to continue to be perpetrated against foreign citizens abroad with EU 
manufactured or brokered crowd control weapons, policy changes need to be made to ensure that 
national and EU export controls are more effective. Current indications reveal that export licence data is 
aggregated to such an extent that meaningful parliamentary monitoring and scrutiny is not  possible. 

4. HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUES 

           In purely technical terms a particular device can be evaluated using some basic performance 
data against technical specifications. Yet the safety and efficiency of disabling crowd control weapons 
are often mutually antagonistic concepts. An earlier STOA report (PE 166.499, Section 5.1) suggested 
that a dominant assumption behind the acquisition of new crowd control weapons was a belief that they 
can create both a faster policing response time and a greater cost-effectiveness. That report suggested 
that this logic was flawed. The  concept of efficiency covers the capability that a system has of actually 
doing what may be required. It encompasses notions of effectiveness, i.e. that the results produced are 
those intended. Crowd control weapons are deployed because they save policing resources by either 
automating certain control functions, amplifying the rate of particular control activities or decreasing the 
number of officers required to perform them.  

Since  crowd  control  weapons  are  functionally  designed  to  yield  an  extension  of  the  scope, 
efficiency  and  growth  of  policing  power,  they  enable  security  force  personnel  to  distribute  more 

xix 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
coercion to a greater number of people. The most efficient crowd control weapons, if efficiency was the 
only  criterion,  would  be  lethal.  However,  the  Omega  Foundation(cid:3)s  Scoping  report  for  this  study 
suggested that efficiency was probably not the best way of describing these technologies,73 since in 
terms of dispersal potential, a machine gun is a rather efficient crowd control weapon and according to 
data gathered by the SIrUS programme of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), is 
surprisingly  less-lethal  with  only  25%  of  fatalities  amongst  those  successfully  targeted.  Yet  no 
responsible authority in Europe would hold that such usage would be either appropriate or legal.74   

 Since such weapons need to be deployed lawfully, the concept of minimum force and non-lethality 
must  apply  and  there  needs  to  be  some  means  of  ensuring  that  such  weapons  are  deployed 
discriminately at identified (cid:4)law-breakers(cid:3) rather than randomly against innocent bystanders. Thus this 
notion of efficiency also means that the weapons actually deliver their intended non-lethal effects. That 
is:  (a) their technical specification and the manner in which they are used are commensurate with this 
objective;(b) they are legally seen to be so and (c) that accountable and enforceable disciplinary and 
compensatory measures are in force to bring either manufacturers or personnel to account when this is 
not the case.  

Health and safety considerations must therefore address three linked themes: (i) the extent to 
which the technical specifications actually deliver (cid:4)non-lethality(cid:3); (ii) an assessment of whether codes of 
conduct and training are currently adequate to ensure the prevention of (cid:4)abuse(cid:3) (See section 5 below) 
and (iii) whether the deployment of crowd control technologies as a dispersal mechanism in a context 
of lethal weapon usage can lead to indiscriminate public order policing tactics which lead to greater 
fatalities  (see  section  8  and  the  analysis  of  worldwide  incidents,  presented  as  Appendix  6).  It  is 
inconsistent for different EU member states to have contradictory notions of safety in regard to specific 
crowd control weapons. These safety standards should be founded on the precautionary principle to 
establish benchmarks  which apply objective criteria based on scientific evidence.  Such standards 
should be untainted by either commercial pressures or immediate political demands for technical (cid:1)quick 
fixes(cid:2) arising from any particularly pressing public order episode of the day. 

4.1  Health  &  Safety  Issues  Regarding  Chemical  Irritant  Weapons.  The  Chemical  Weapons 
Convention  defines  toxic  chemicals  as  (cid:4)any  chemical  which  through  its  chemical  action  on  life 
processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals(cid:3).75  
Within this definition, all chemical irritants used for riot control should rightly be considered as toxic 
chemicals. Scientists working at the UK Chemical Defence Establishment had no illusions about any 
such  toxic chemicals being given an absolutely safe bill of health.(cid:2)76  Indeed other scientists have 
argued that it is almost impossible to have a low toxicity weapon which is effective and safe at low 
concentrations.(cid:2)77 Does this comment apply to the most commonly used crowd control irritants? 

There are five elements to the alleged safety of any crowd control weapons based on the use of 
toxic chemicals to induce disabling effects, namely: the (i) innate relative toxicity of the chemical used; 
(ii) ability of security force personnel to use the dispersion mechanisms to deliver a measured dose 
which remains non-damaging and (cid:4)non-lethal(cid:3); (iii) relative toxicity and safe dose of any carrier, solvent 
or propellant used to deliver the chemical to target subject(s); (iv) safety from blast damage or fire 
hazard  of  any  pyrotechnically  dispersed  irritant  munition;  (v)  professionalism  and  training  of  any 
operatives to ensure that such devices are used within the context of their training, codes of conduct 
and in accordance with manufactures instructions. Any failures in fulfilling set standards in these five 
elements must imply that the munition can no longer be described as non-hazardous or (cid:4)non-lethal(cid:3). 
Considering the hazards associated with each of these element in turn:- 

4.1.1 Hazards of Crowd Control Chemicals are associated with the way chemical irritants enter the 
human body via skin, lungs, mouth, nose and eye. To assess whether the epithet (cid:4)safe(cid:3) can be applied 
to  the  currently  authorised  chemical  crowd  control  irritants,  it  is  worth  examining  the  biomedical 
research literature used to justify their introduction, particularly in regard to lung and eye damage, 
carcinogenicity, mutagenesis, effects on heart rate, positional asphyxia and alleged (cid:4)non-lethality(cid:3). 
Experts on chemical warfare refer to safety margins i.e. the ratio of the lethal to the incapacitating dose. 
This is a finite measure. If it is surpassed, deaths will occur. However such agents are capable of 

xx 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
producing  a  range  of  permanent  injuries  and  such  considerations  are  legally  important  when  the 
targeting of the irritant is less than discriminate and innocent bystanders fall prey to any effects. 

CN has always been associated with potential hazards particularly in regard to its effects on skin and 
eyes, which provided the impetus to find a standard replacement. It was found to be between 3 and 10 
times more toxic than CS in rats, rabbits, mice and guinea pigs.78 (See Table 1). It creates more severe 
damage to the lung with more edema, patchy acute inflammatory cell infiltration of the trachea, bronchi 
and bronchioles and more evidence of early bronchopneumonia.79 Very early on it was noted that CN 
can induce primary irritant dermatitis.80 In skin tests it was found CS caused no effects below 20 mg, 
whereas  moist  CN  caused  vesication  (blistering)  in  most  subjects.81  It  is  also  a  more  potent  skin 
sensitizer than CS82 with several people developing allergic dermatitis.83 CN has also been associated 
with longer lasting burning of the cornea84 and even permanent eye injuries,85 particularly if the irritant 
has been propelled into the eye at short range.86 In higher doses it is lethal,87 particularly in enclosed 
spaces where even one 128g grenade in a 27 m3 room, is sufficient to kill.88 

CS - There is extensive scientific literature on CS, one recent search claims to have found 115,107 
articles.89 Only some of the most salient aspects can be discussed here. Advocates of CS claim that 
high levels of exposure to CS are precluded because people are adverse to remaining where this agent 
is present.90 More critical authors have noted the lack of epidemiologic inquiry on its use in actual field 
conditions.91 However, operational usage sometimes means individuals face additional punishment or 
even death if they seek to leave a contaminated zone. (See examples in Appendix 6). At higher levels 
of  exposure,  inhalation  toxicology  studies  indicate  CS  can  cause  chemical  pneumonitis  and  fatal 
pulmonary edema. (Victims die by drowning in their own lung fluids).92 CS exposure can also lead to 
reactive airways dysfunction.93 Oral toxicological studies note the facility of CS to cause severe gastro 
enteritis  with  perforation.94  CS  is  a  primary  skin  irritant  and  some  individuals  will  develop  contact 
dermatitis even after what appears to be an unproblematic initial exposure and severe blistering can 
emerge several hours later.95  An exposure to even a low concentration of CS   raises blood pressure 
and there is a particular risk of health damage to anyone over 30, under physical strain or having an 
undetected aneurysm.96  At higher levels CS has been associated with heart failure, heptacellular (liver) 
damage and death.97 98 One US based CS manufacturer, Federal Laboratories, has warned that "Firing 
one Federal No. 230 Flite-Rite [tear gas projectile] in a room [eight-feet by eight-feet by seven-feet], 
could endanger the life of an average subject if he stayed in the room for seven minutes(cid:2).99   CS from 
canisters has also caused acute mass chemical burns.100 (Figure 5 illustrates the severe blistering 
following exposure to French CS Spray). 

In vitro laboratory testing has shown CS to be clastogenic, (i.e. causes disruption of chromosomes) 
and mutagenic (ie it has a facility to cause inheritable genetic changes in organisms).101 Other studies 
have shown CS to cause an increase in the number of abnormal chromosomes.102 The risks of a build 
up  of  exposure  are  increased  because  of  the  acquisition  of  tolerance  to  CS.103  This  tolerance  is 
stronger in those of higher commitment and or intelligence104. One military study on the carcinogenicity 
(cancer causing ) potential of CS was inconclusive but observed that chronic exposure to very low 
concentrations of CS is of greater concern and should be further studied.105 This is an important safety 
consideration for police officers who may be regularly exposed to cross contamination when using CS 
which is particularly persistent. Military CS1, a micronised powder version (and CS2 - a siliconized, 
micro-encapsulated version of CS1) are even more persistent and therefore form an environmental 
clean up hazard. 

CR - is normally restricted to special operations units, like the SAS, engaged in anti-terrorist operations. 
Only one EU member State, the UK is definitely known to hold stocks.  However, when the relevant 
Home Office department was asked by researchers about its holdings of this agent, it simply omitted 
data which in fact was already in the public domain.106  Whilst a range of studies have been presented 
to suggest that CR is less toxic and more potent than CS or CN,107 (See Table 1) 

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Fig 5. Severe blistering following exposure to French CS Spray. 

xxii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
there are no operational case studies, only military studies on human volunteers.108  These studies 
found  that  CR  increased  blood  pressure  and  anxiety  and  later  studies  asserted  that  there  was 
significantly less risk of eye damage than with CN and CS109, neither was CR teratogenic (the facility to 
cause congenital foetal abnormalities, ie birth defects).110  

In the UK, the real significance of CR was as a test case for the Himsworth recommendations 
following the massive use of CS in Northern Ireland. Himsworth said that in future riot agents should be 
treated more as drugs with full reporting of the data justifying assertions of safety in the open scientific 
press  before  they  could  be  authorised  for  use.111  Despite  assertions  that  it  followed  Himsworth(cid:1)s 
recommendations, the UK Government failed the test - when asked about studies used to justify claims 
that  CR  was  not  mutagenic  or  carcinogenic,  it  quoted  studies  published  several  years  after 
authorisation had been given.112  

For  legal  reasons,  it  is  difficult  to  think  of  a  drug  that  would  be  given  the  go-ahead  in  such 
circumstances where the biomedical effects had not been properly evaluated before the drug goes on 
to the market. Yet given the Health and Safety implications of the use of chemical irritants (not only on 
those targeted but on the police and security officers who may be exposed on a regular basis)  it is 
important that these biomedical effects are understood and analysed, as if these chemical irritants were 
in fact new drugs. For reasons of public safety, this report suggests that such studies should be a legal 
requirement. Then any assertions of safety and less-lethality can be properly defended in a court of 
law, so that in the future should such assertions prove untrue, it is possible to firmly establish where 
culpability lies, either with the manufacturer or with the operator. 

OC & PAVA  An earlier STOA Report(PE 166.499) covered the alleged hazardous health effects of 
Peppergas particularly for those with asthma, taking other medical or recreational drugs or subject to 
restraining techniques which restrict the breathing passages posing a risk of death. The Los Angeles 
Times reported at least 61 deaths associated with OC since 1990 in the US and there have been more 
since.113 Much of the disquiet was associated with the corruption which took place in regard to the FBI 
approval  of  this  chemical  irritant  for  police  use.  FBI  special  agent  Thomas  WW  Ward  was  later 
prosecuted for taking a kickback of $57,000 from a pepper gas manufacturer. Claims that OC was 
mutagenic and a neurotoxin were later rejected by the US Marines.114 However for a period afterwards 
the Marines restricted field training with the irritant because of worries about its safety. US police are 
enthusiastic about the alleged 90% effectiveness of this irritant in incapacitating humans and reducing 
injuries to officers.115  It is easy to understand the need for such an aggressive alternative in the highly 
armed context of the US. In Europe however, it may be wiser to be more circumspect especially given 
the need to medically supervise anyone who has been sprayed with peppergas. The previous STOA 
report advised the European Parliament to err on the side of caution and called for a moratorium on the 
acquisition, sale and deployment of Oleoresin Capsicum irritant sprays, until independent research is 
undertaken on its safety and published in full in the scientific press for peer review. Such work is 
beginning. For example in the Netherlands,116 the UK and in Sweden. However, different EU States 
have reached different conclusions , for example Sweden has refused to adopt the agent, partially 
because of research findings that there was a risk of severe  damage to the cornea.117 These findings 
are  consistent  with  those  of  researchers  in  North  Carolina  (USA)  which  report  that  capsicum  is 
mutagenic, leads to degeneration of nerve fibres in the cornea with associated neuroparalytic keratitis 
(manifested by corneal edema), brain and nerve damage, liver damage, an increase in peptic ulcer 
disease and kidney damage. Stopford also stated that there was a range of medical risks associated 
with the use of OC spray including eye damage; skin blistering and allergic dermatitis; laryngospasm 
(constriction of breathing passages) and respiratory arrest (with asthmatics being more sensitive with 
up to 40% decrease in air flow compared to health individuals);  pulmonary oedema (fluid in the lungs - 
the risk of which significantly increases with prior infection); airways reactivity and broncho-spasm; 
hypertensive crisis leading to acute elevation of blood pressure and hypothermia.118 

There are also contradictory positions on PAVA (the synthetic OC irritant) between different EU 
states. Whilst IDC of Freienbach, Switzerland, the key European distributer of PAVA (with 18 European 
patents119) claims its PAVA products are both safe and legal in Switzerland, Austria, and Germany, the 
UK position is that the (cid:2)Home Office Police Scientific Development Branch considers the information 

xxiii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
currently available is not sufficient to allow the use of PAVA as an incapacitant in the United Kingdom 
at present(cid:3).120  However, Civil Defence Supply Ltd has been awarded (cid:4)45,000 from the UK Department 
of Trade and Industry to research PAVA as an allegedly  safer alternative to CS to become what the 
company hopes will be the (cid:5)incapacitant for the millennium.(cid:1)121  

Finally, in regard to safety, it is worth recalling that way back in 1975, the Stockholm International 
Peace  Research  Institute  was  warning  about  delayed  toxic  effects  from  chemical  warfare  agents 
including tear-gases.122 Not all the effects of using these chemicals will emerge straight away and just 
as the full implications of tobacco and asbestos only became apparent many years after their popular 
usage, so might be the case with chemical crowd control agents. Given the overall costs of litigation 
associated with tobacco and asbestos, it is worth reminding ourselves that the precautionary principle 
pays off in the longer term. 

4.1.2 Hazards of Dispensing Excess Levels of Chemical Irritant There are many instances of the 
police and the military using CS either excessively or indiscriminately. For example, the South Korean 
government admitted to using 351,000 canisters and grenades of CS throughout the major cities, in 
June 1987.123 There are reports of demonstrators passing out or experiencing heart attacks during 
episodes where helicopters were used to spray teargas.124 No official scientific studies on the bio-
medical impacts of this CS barrage on the health implications for those working in Seoul, including the 
police themselves appear to have been published either then or since.125 However, in 1999 the South 
Korean authorities in Seoul announced a policy of not using CS as a crowd control option. (See Section 
7). 

When  such  indiscriminate  mass  sprayings  involve  different  riot  agents,  the  health  risks  are 
compounded.  For example, severe health problems were reported in at the anti WTO protests in 
Seattle last December, where the police used a combination of CS,CN and OC.126  Even some of the 
manufacturers of these products warn about the synergistic consequences of such mixing (cid:2)which can 
prove harmful or even fatal in real life situations(cid:3).  Zarc International also asserts that a mixture of CS 
with OC in pepper sprays has caused (cid:2)documented eye injury and blindness(cid:3).127 

The issue of excessive delivery of agent to subject also touches on product design and actual 
adherence to technical specification. For example, in November 1996, a UK Channel 4 Dispatches 
programme found that the concentration of CS in UK sprays at 5%, was five times higher than similar 
sprays in the USA and the flow rate was also five times greater which means that anyone targeted in 
the UK would receive 25 times the amount of chemical irritant used in America.128  Even that figure may 
be an underestimate. An internal Home Office note suggests that the French manufactured CS sprays 
may contain an even higher concentration than the stipulated 5%. Spot checks carried out by one UK 
police force revealed concentrations of CS between 5.4 and 6.8 per cent, ie a CS (cid:2)dump rate(cid:3) of  
between 27 and 34 times that used in the USA.129 The Home Office has asked SAE Alsetex, which 
manufactures the spray, about their alleged failure to ensure product quality control in terms of the 
higher than stipulated concentrations. According to the note of February 1997, the company simply said 
that they had not been measuring the concentrations of CS in their canisters up to that point. The UK 
Home Office admitted that it had no system of regular spot checking these devices. When forces do 
undertake such an inspection the results are worrying. In December 1997 another force checked their 
canisters and found concentrations of  8.5 % or a  (cid:2)dump rate(cid:3) of 42.5 times more than would be 
permissible in the USA. 

Other  hazards  of  excess  application  of  chemical  irritants  are  related  to  the  development  of 
tolerance. Such tolerance has been associated with people taking medication because of mental health 
problems and/or recreational drug users, factors which can diminish the effectiveness of the chemical 
irritants. Why tolerance occurs in these groups is unclear but it may be related to reduced anxiety.130 A 
recent report by the UK Police Complaints Authority has recommended that where mental illness is 
involved  (cid:2)that  training  should  emphasise  the  risks  involved  in  using  the  spray  on  those  who  are 
vulnerable through mental illness, alcohol or drugs, and that the [CS] spray may not work in these 
circumstances and may also exacerbate a violent situation(cid:3) and (cid:2)that training should reinforce the need 
for consultation with family and mental health professionals where possible, to find alternatives to the 

xxiv 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
spray as suggested in ACPO(cid:1)s 1999 guidance(cid:3).131 However no guidance is provided on how mentally ill 
people are recognised at a distance. 

The tolerance phenomena is proportionally significant. For example, in regard to CS, the UK Police 
Complaints Authority reported a failure of subject response at 18%.132 Cincinnati police in Ohio reported 
a 13% failure rate with CS and cited this as the main reason for testing OC products because of the 
manufacturers claims that it is effective on psychotics and persons under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol.133 However, analysis of the effectiveness of OC pepper spray in Berkeley contradicted this 
notion, reporting OC to be ineffective 35% of the time.134 Such tolerance has implications for dosage 
levels since it is experienced by the spraying officers as ineffectiveness or potency of their weapon. A 
common  reaction  to  such  a  lack  of  impact  is  for  officers  to  use  more  of  the  irritant.  Often  police 
guidelines contradict those provided by the manufacturers. A worrying example of the implications of 
such confusion regarding appropriate dosage is the Novato (California, USA) police case which led to 
the death of a man who was sprayed with OC.  Novato police OC guidelines advise that suspects (cid:2)shall 
not  be  exposed  to    oleoresin  capsicum  (pepper  spray)  for  longer  than  absolutely  necessary  to 
accomplish control(cid:3). John Crew, Director of the Police Practices Project for  the ACLU of Northern 
California  stated  that,  (cid:2)this  contradicts  how  the  manufacturers  say  pepper  spray  should  be  used 
because it implies that you spray until the suspect is subdued... the manufacturers advise that if you hit 
the suspect's target area, and it doesn't work, it's not going to work, and improperly prolonged spraying 
poses a health risk to the suspect".135   

Other hazards associated with excess dosage include delayed allergic contact dermatitis, the severity 
depending on the level of exposure136 - in some cases leading to vesication, the time course of which is 
the same as that for skin damage caused by exposure to mustard gas.137 

4.1.3 Hazards of Carrier Solvents & Propellants can be illustrated by the case of French made CS 
sprays  being  prematurely  introduced  into  the  UK  on  1  March  1996,  before  the  requisite  scientific 
research  was  accomplished.  One  of  the  key  issues  considered  by  the  UK  Department  of  Health 
Committee (subsequently set up to assess the product(cid:1)s safety) were the hazards posed by the solvent 
Methyl Isobutyl Ketone (MIBK) - used to dissolve solid CS so that it can be used as a targetable spray. 
Official reports  show that government scientists have warned on at least two occasions that MIBK is 
too dangerous to be used in CS sprays. But the UK Home Office and Police Forces ignored both 
reports and continued using MIBK. Four years ago the Home Office  commissioned scientists at Porton 
Down to compare the toxicities of MIBK and an alternative solvent methylene chloride. 

In July 1996, the Porton scientists "strongly recommended" that the police should use methylene 
chloride, rather than MIBK in their CS sprays. Just a month before Home Secretary Michael Howard 
introduced MIBK based CS sprays, Porton Down was advocating that the available information would 
suggest that methylene chloride, in the vapour form, is likely to be less hazardous than MIBK.138 139 140 
In addition, Porton Down was of the view that methylene chloride would pose a significantly reduced 
risk given that the current handheld spray containing CS dissolved in MIBK delivers liquid droplets 
rather than solid particulate CS. This comment is significant because it raises questions about the 
controllability of the amount of chemical irritant and associated solvent dumped on the target. In the 
following  year,  Porton  scientists  were  again  commissioned  by  the  Home  Office    to  scrutinize  28 
solvents to advise on one which would be both safe and effective in CS sprays. Again they concluded 
that MIBK was 'a serious hazard' and put it into a group of chemicals which were 'clearly' not safe 
solvents because they were "either confirmed or suspected carcinogens with associated mutagenic 
potential." This time, the Porton Down scientists(cid:1) considered advice was that for a definitive answer on 
a low toxicity solvent for CS spray devices the properties of di(propylene) glycol and polyethylene glycol 
should be investigated.141  As before,  this report was brushed aside in a way which would be politically 
and legally unforgivable if these substances were drugs rather than riot control agents. Yet the UK 
Committees on Toxicity, Mutagenicity and Carcinogenicity gave the product the all clear despite noting 
(cid:2)the sparsity of data on the combination of CS dissolved in MIBK(cid:3).142  The UK Police Complaints 
Authority report already referred to has also advised that research should be progressed rapidly on 
finding alternatives to the solvent MIBK. 

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4.1.4  Hazards  Of  Pyrotechnic  &  Blast  Chemical  Irritant  Delivery  Systems.  Blast  injuries  from 
fragmentation  devices  are  far  from  uncommon.  The  fact  that  pyrotechnic  devices  are  incendiary 
creates both a risk of burn injuries and the initiation of a fire. For example 96 cases of acute burn 
injuries were reported when teargas was used against refugees in a Hong Kong Detention centre.143 
The  Material  safety  sheet  on  CS  assigns  a  flammability  rating  of  4  (on  a  scale  0-4)  and      some 
commentators now ascribe incendiary CS grenades as a large contributor to the conflagration which 
burned the Branch Davidian Compound and its inhabitants at Waco, Texas, in 1993144. 

4.1.5 Training & Professional Codes Of Conduct. The notion that such chemical irritants are (cid:5)non-
lethal(cid:1) is based on an assumption that they are used in accordance with manufacturers instructions and 
not in enclosed spaces. When disputes over appropriate usage occur, there needs to be a clear line of 
accountability.  In Canada, when an innocent man was sprayed with pepper-gas and suffered injuries 
to his eyes and lungs he sued the local police because of the longer term effects (bronchial asthma and 
reactive airways dysfunction syndrome). The police officers in Ottawa defended the claim by filing a 
third party claim against the manufacturer Defense Technology (Def-Tec). However, the company 
claimed the fault was that of the police for failing to train its officers properly. The company alleged that 
(cid:2)police negligently caused the product to be activated for an excessive period of time145.(cid:3)  

In the UK , complaints about tear gas by members of the public have ballooned. In the year up to 
March 1998, the Police Complaints Authority received 425 complaints about the sprays compared to 
254 in the previous year. The UK guidelines  insist that CS spray was introduced only for self defence, 
yet the UK Police Complaints Authority Report already referred to,  revealed that in nearly 40 % of the 
cases in their study, it was not used primarily in self defence. Similarly, the original guidelines said the 
sprays would not be used in crowd control, however, the new Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) guidelines enable it to have a public order role. Such drift in the ground rules which originally 
legitimated the introduction of this weapon illustrates the threat to civil liberties well. If Chemical irritant 
weapons are not to become indiscriminate weapons then codes of conduct should have legal weight.  

4.2 Kinetic Impact Weapons - Health and Safety Issues.  In compiling this report it has become clear 
that there is a lack of independently conducted research into kinetic impact weapons. The country that 
has seen, by far, the greatest use of kinetic impact weapons in Europe is Northern Ireland. More data 
and medical reports exist from the usage there than in any other country and will be used as a baseline 
for the discussions that follow. 

 In January 1977, the UK Secretary of State for Defence was asked about  the research on the 
likely death and injury rates from rubber and plastic bullets carried out prior to their introduction. His 
reply referred to a report by four surgeons working at the Victoria Hospital in Belfast in 1972 - two years 
after rubber bullets had been used in Northern Ireland - and said that comparable data for plastic 
bullets was not available146. The UK(cid:1)s inability to carry out basic safety testing was revealed by US 
military scientists who developed a comprehensive set of procedures to evaluate blunt trauma impact 
devices to establish their injury potential and the relevant characteristics that would enable them to 
operate safely.147  The US researchers also found that the injury potential of a projectile was dependant 
on  its  kinetic  impact  energy.  The  researchers  described  Impact  energies  below  15  foot  lbs  (20.3 
Joules)  are  safe  or  low  hazard  (provided  the  projectile  is  large  enough  not  to  damage  the  eyes); 
between  30  and  90  foot  pounds  (40.7  -  122  Joules)  as  a  dangerous  area  for  impact  energy  and 
impacts above 90 foot pounds (122 Joules) as being in the severe damage region.148  The present 
study has assessed a number of currently deployed riot weapons against this baseline for safety (see 
Table  2).  Figures  for  different  types  of  kinetic  energy  weapons,  including  eight  from  Europe,  are 
presented.  At  the  range  that  the  weapon  is  intended  to  strike  its  target,  seven  of  the  European 
weapons were in the (cid:2)severe damage(cid:3) region and one was in the (cid:2)dangerous(cid:3) region. Thus nearly all 
of the kinetic energy  weapons currently authorised for use in Europe operate in the severe damage 
region and are therefore potentially lethal. One European government has announced that it will fund 
research into a less damaging alternative. Given the findings of this report this research be reported in 
public forums and not, as in the past, kept secret.149 

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The fundamental problem with kinetic impact weapons is that, as one US specialist has written 
(cid:2)there is only a small margin of safety between a high velocity, small cross section impact which would 
knock one off balance or stun and the infliction of permanent or deadly injury(cid:3), 150 i.e. at short range 
where it may be accurate, its kinetic energy will be too lethal, and at a range where the impact is less 
lethal, it will be inaccurate  151. This is graphically illustrated by the plastic bullet which at 20m (the 
minimum range it is designed to be (cid:2)less lethal(cid:3)) it will neatly punch through plywood up to 11mm 
thick.152 Manufacturers descriptions of the effect of kinetic impact munitions on an individual give an 
impression of the level of impact, ranging from (cid:2)the stopping power of a .38 special(cid:3) 153 to (cid:2)a punch 
from a professional boxer(cid:3) 154 - however a punch that may leave one person unaffected may well injure 
or kill another.  

Safety problems of kinetic impact weapons include the weapon, the ammunition and the guidelines 
for their use. The defence industry seems unable to agree on the efficacy of the weapons with some 
manufacturers claiming their weapon can be fired accurately at an individual,155 whilst others say this is 
impossible to achieve in a riot situation, 156 157. Other manufacturers warn against firing baton rounds 
directly at people but only to ricochet them off the ground. 158  The accuracy of the weapon is vital if 
areas of the body most susceptible to injury are to be avoided.  Examples of accuracy figures provided 
by manufacturers give figures for the spread of shots of 17cm,159 20cm, 160 2.4 metres 161 and up to 
3m.162  It is doubtful whether any riot weapon currently in use is sufficiently accurate to rule out a 
potentially  lethal  shot  to  a  vulnerable  area  of  the  body,  or  indeed  of  even  hitting  the  target  at  all. 
Accuracy further deteriorates when multiple batons or balls are used because these spread out in flight 
and cannot be targeted at an individual.163  However countries such as Israel, continue to use multiple 
projectiles against individuals. 164  The implication of this finding is that if kinetic impact munitions are 
not targeted precisely, which is currently the case, then there is much more likelihood of severe injury 
or death. The temptation given this level of inaccuracy is for security force personnel to move closer, 
further exacerbating the risk of injury or fatalities.  

Crowd control weapons often have sighting mechanisms that whilst simple to use are too crude to 
be effective. The weapon currently in use in Northern Ireland, the Heckler and Koch riot gun, has a 
fixed sight front and rear for quick shooting at 25 to 50m range, plus folding sights for firing at ranges of 
20, 50 and 75m 165. It is debatable wether in the confusion of a riot these interchangeable sights would 
be correctly used. Even if a weapon can be made to fire accurately the ammunition has been found to 
cause  many  problems.  In  Northern  Ireland  difficulties    have  arisen  because  the  plastic  batons 
expanded in hot weather causing breach explosions (and injuries to over 20 security personnel). 166  
Lack of quality control in the manufacture led to excessive muzzle velocities and hence increased injury 
potential of the ammunition in France167 and in Northern Ireland over 300,000 bullets were withdrawn 
because they either had excessive muzzle velocities or  weight.168 169  A technological fix to overcome 
propellant problems has been tried by a number of manufacturers of gas powered weapons - however 
muzzle velocity here is greatly affected by ambient temperature and one weapon whose stated muzzle 
velocity is 300 feet per second was found to be 425 fps on a hot day greatly increasing its kinetic 
energy and contradicting its stated (cid:5)non lethality(cid:1).170  

In the countries where kinetic energy weapons have been most widely used the authorities have 
frequently tried to reassure the public by stating that strict guidelines cover their lawful and safe use. 
However, in Northern Ireland until 1997 the guidelines were secret. Once published they were found to 
permit use of such weapons in many situations other than for riot or crowd control, including  (cid:2)to protect 
life or property, preserve the peace, prevent crime or detect crime(cid:3). The wording of the Northern Ireland 
guidelines and similar ones in Israel are so ambiguous and ill defined that they have proved ineffective 
and unenforceable.171 

Such  considerations  are  of  growing  importance  given  the  attempts  by  US  DoD  (Defense 
Department) and National Institute of Justice funded researchers to develop more accurate targeting of 
these weapons to specific parts of the human body. A consequence of this effort is a recalibration of 
the very process of risk assessment in regard to these  weapons. Based on the so-called (cid:2)three rib 
machine modelling(cid:3) of the human body, this research calculates different impact levels of munitions  

xxvii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
on particular parts of the human body. Little public data has emerged to justify the US effort to move 
the risk assessment goalposts which could lead to a justification of higher kinetic impact energies 
targeted to less vulnerable parts of the body. On the basis of past experience the EU should not take 
these findings at face value but must independently test and evaluate any kinetic weapons imported 
from the US to ensure they do not breach the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty. 

4.2.1 Hand held baton technology has developed from the simple straight, short truncheons to the 
introduction of types which increase the kinetic energy of the blow, such as the side handled baton and 
expandable or telescopic batons. Batons are used in a variety of ways, such as striking, jabbing or 
crushing / compression, that can produce specific injuries - all are blunt trauma impact injuries. The 
most common types of injuries inflicted by batons are minor cuts, bruises and sprains. Studies by the 
Los Angeles Police Department show that suspects sustained moderate to major injuries in 61% of the 
cases involving batons. 172 Serious injuries or death can occur when vulnerable areas of the body are 
targeted, such as temple, ears, eyes, bridge of nose, upper lip, throat, collar bone, knee joint and the 
hollow behind the ear.173 174 They include laceration, bruising, fracture of limbs, mandibles, eye socket, 
shattering of joints and depressed fractures of the skull. 175 176  The newer types of baton have been 
recognised as presenting a problem especially in relation to the type of training given to officers. 177 
Some forces have started to withdraw batons because of excessive injuries,178 and because forms of 
striking have been found to cause excessive force, such as overarm or over-the-head strikes. However, 
the newer types of baton allow even short stabs and swings to be extremely powerful. One US security 
firm has trained its guards to strike in a certain way that looks benign but inflicts severe pain,179 they 
also  enable a much higher level of leverage or twisting force to be applied to the subject.  This (cid:2)allows 
all officers, even those without significant upper body strength, to use leverage and pain compliance to 
quickly bring an adversary into an escort position without striking(cid:3).180  However there is a danger that 
stronger officers could easily apply excessive force and there is some evidence to indicate that as at 
least one European police force adopting US side handle batons has tended to use them more often. 
These  weapons give the police more confidence, so they are used more frequently. 181  

4.2.2 Water Cannon are predominantly used in conjunction with other riot technologies. Although there 
are many reports of their deployment, unless injuries are of a very specific nature they tend to be 
aggregated with the general injuries recorded from other weapons such as batons or chemical irritants. 
Experience has shown that water cannon can be highly dangerous. An obvious danger is that of a 
large, heavy, unwieldy vehicle being used in the middle of a crowd and several deaths have been 
reported of people crushed or run down by water cannon vehicles. 182  Jets of water have high kinetic 
energy and can knock people to the ground. Injuries such as fractures, bruising and concussion have 
been reported when people are bowled over. 183 For example, a German case reported a water jet 
knocking a person to the ground causing broken bones as well as shattering their spectacle lenses  
and forcing the glass into their eyes. 184 

When security forces direct water jets at people who have fallen down, debris or broken glass can 
be picked up by the water jet and fired at the prone bodies. Its force can also roll them over directly into 
solid objects such as lamp-posts etc. The direct strength of the water jet has been found to strip the 
bark off tree trunks, split clothes, cause cases of massive bruising to the thighs and the whole rib cage. 
Cases  of  internal  injury  from  the  water  jet  have  also  been  reported,  one  of  which  required 
gynaecological examination. 185 The potential of water cannon to cause injury has been recognised by 
the UK police.  Although a parliamentary answer on the suitability of water cannon ruled them out due 
to tactical disadvantages, privately the police had concluded from their testing that there was a (cid:2)real 
danger of killing innocent people with the force of the water(cid:3). 186 With the more powerful pulse jet water 
cannon system 187 and higher pressures now available, the dangers of inflicting injuries and fatalities 
will increase. 

The eye is the most vulnerable part of the body when exposed to water cannon. A senior UK police 
officer was reported as saying of water cannon that (cid:2)they could tear your eyes out(cid:3).188 The danger to 
the eyes is highlighted in a number of medical reports. For example, a blast of water has been reported 
to cause loss of the globe of the eye.189  A  report on low pressure water jets (150 lbs/in2 (psi) pressure) 
found them to cause serious eye injuries with permanent damage.  190 A further report on 3 people 

xxviii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
injured by an Israeli water cannon used for crowd dispersal, operating at 177 psi, found eye injuries and 
permanent damage. It concluded that (cid:2)injuries caused by water jets may be more severe than those 
caused by solid objects because of the high kinetic energy of the water jet, and the longer duration of 
the impact(cid:3).  191   A report from Finland on a water jet travelling at 120 Km/h also detailed severe 
damage, including rupturing and laceration of the eye. 192 

These medical reports contradict the biomedical research carried out at Porton Down that was used 
to  justify  the  safety  of  water  cannon.  This  research  utilised  relatively  low  pressure  water  jets  and 
concluded that no damage was likely to occur.193 194  As eye damage is related to the kinetic impact 
energy  and  duration  of  the  blow,  the  pressure,  speed  and  mass  of  water  delivered  is  of  vital 
importance. Most modern water cannon now operate at much higher pressures and faster jet speeds 
than those reported in the medical press, typically at between 175 and 360psi 195 and would therefore 
be expected to be more dangerous and damaging, especially with the common practice of adding 
chemical irritants to the water stream. Little research has been reported in the scientific literature on 
these aspects. (Figure 6. provides an example of a modern Israeli pulsed jet water cannon). 

4.2.3 Kinetic Impact Munitions are by far the most dangerous weapons used for crowd control and 
have caused a huge number and range of injuries and deaths and have been reported from their 
earliest usage. Wooden baton rounds first used in Hong Kong in the 1960's killed a 14 year old girl and 
reported injuries included broken limbs and serious splinter wounds 196 . Rubber and plastic bullets 
have proved even more dangerous with numerous deaths and injuries including fractured skulls, brain 
damage,  blindings,  scalpings,  broken  bones,  permanent  disability,  soft  tissue  damage  to  internal 
organs such as kidney, liver, spleen, intestine and heart, loss of sense of smell, psychological problems 
and post traumatic stress.197 

The specialist security press has reported that, (cid:2)all officers must understand that speciality impact 
munitions can and sometimes do cause serious injuries. Many of these injuries are serious and can be 
fatal(cid:3) 198 A survey by the US National Tactical Officers Association showed that in 95% cases where 
special impact munitions were used some injuries were caused. These  included bruising or abrasions 
(73%), penetration wounds (4%) , fracture (5%), laceration (2.5%), internal injury (<1%) and death 
(2%). 199 The defence industry recognises their lethality, Robert Oliver, the chief executive of Defense 
Technologies, a US manufacturer of less lethal weapons has been quoted as saying (cid:2) rubber bullets 
can be as lethal as lead bullets(cid:3). 200 

The ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland has witnessed the most intensive use of kinetic energy 
munitions  in  Europe  and  has  produced  the  most  reliable  scientific  and  biomedical  data.  Outside  
Europe, hard data has been difficult to access but the case examples of the Occupied Territories and 
South Africa have been used here to illustrate a convergence of the problems discussed. 

4.2.4 Northern Ireland.  Three deaths occurred with rubber bullets and a death rate of 1 in 18,500 
rubber bullets fired has been calculated. 201 In total 14 people have been killed by plastic bullets in 
Northern Ireland, half of them children under the age of 16 years old. Five were killed when plastic 
bullets impacted on the chest, 9 killed by impact to the head. A death rate of 1 in 5,000 plastic bullets 
fired has been calculated.202  
Doctors in Northern Ireland have reported chest injuries to children 
203,  scalping,  skin  lacerations,  fractures  of  limbs  and  facial  bones,  eye  damage  including  eye  lid 
laceration, damage to the eye ball or complete destruction of the eyes leading to blindness, damaged 
liver, ruptured spleen, damaged intestine and 17 cases of permanent disability or disfigurement caused 
by rubber bullets. 204 

Plastic bullets were introduced to Northern Ireland in 1973 and completely replaced rubber bullets 
by the end of 1975. Because they are more aerodynamically stable than rubber bullets they do not 
generally tumble in flight, and therefore usually hit the target end on, delivering the maximum kinetic 
energy to a small area and creating the so called (cid:2)target lesion(cid:3). They have proved to be even 

xxix 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 6. Modern Israeli pulsed jet Water Cannon. 

xxx 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
more fatal than rubber bullets, with impact to the chest or head particularly life threatening.205 Rocke 
reported  injuries  such  as  scalp  lacerations,  skull  and  brain  injuries,  concussion,  blindings,  facial 
fractures, rib fractures, limb fractures, lung contusion, spleen, liver and gut damage 206 and Redgrave 
also reported loss of sense of smell, psychological and emotional damage. 207  An example of this was 
Gary Lawlor who was two weeks short of his 14th birthday when he was shot in the head in July 1997. 
He spent four days on a life support machine, and was close to death. However he began to improve, 
but still in March 1988 his mother said of him: (cid:2)he is not the same boy as before... he can(cid:1)t eat and he 
can(cid:1)t sleep. He has been taking epileptic fits since he came out of hospital. He is deaf in one ear and 
has lost his sense of smell. His right hand trembles and he trails his right leg behind him(cid:3). 208 

The  type  and  number  of  injuries  caused  by  rubber  and  plastic  bullets  in  Northern  Ireland  is 
impossible to quantify for a number of reasons. Record keeping by the security forces is inaccurate.209 
During a riot security force personnel are stationed at the hospital casualty departments to intercept any 
injured people thus physically deterring those seeking medical treatment 210,  and finally any (cid:2)gunshot 
wounds(cid:3), which includes plastic bullet injuries, are immediately reported to the security forces leading 
to possible charges of riot - this obviously deters people, even innocent bystanders, from seeking 
medical advice and indeed street hospitals and medical stations are frequently set up during periods of 
unrest . Because of this, it is likely that there is under reporting of injuries. 

4.2.5 Occupied Territories. 
Deaths  and  serious  injuries  have  also  been  reported  from  the 
Occupied Territories  where rubber coated metal ammunition (balls or cylinders) and plastic/metal 
composite ammunition is used. The rubber ammunition is fired from an adaptor fitted over the end of 
the muzzle of the rifle, the plastic ammunition is fired as normal from the rifle. Hiss et al reported more 
than 20 deaths from rubber and plastic ammunition. In 17 cases of death, mostly on teenagers, death 
was caused by penetrating wounds to the head, lung, and heart and by non penetrating blunt trauma to 
the head and spinal cord. The wounds were characteristic of high velocity ammunition and of missiles 
fired  from  low  ranges.  211  Yellin  et  al  reported  on  penetrating  thoracic  wounds  to  26  Palestinian 
casualties, two of whom died.212 Damage to the eye was reported by Jaouni and O(cid:1)Shea who identified 
154 cases of injuries caused by rubber or plastic ammunition, of which 67 led to loss of the eye. 213 A 
report  on  a  similar,  but  less  dense,  ammunition  to  the  Israeli  plastic  type  conclude  that  it  had  a 
(cid:2)reasonable capacity to incapacitate(cid:3) at short range. 214  

According  to  a  report  by    B(cid:1)Tselem  (Israeli  Information  for  Human  Rights  in  the  Occupied 
Territories) from January 1988 to November 1998, at least 58 Palestinians were killed by rubber coated 
steel bullets. This figure includes 28 children under the age of 17 years of whom thirteen were under 13 
years of age. They note that the figures are an under-estimate because in many instance autopsies are 
not conducted and it is impossible to determine which type of bullet was involved. 215 (Figures 7 and 8 
illustrate some of the severe damage caused by Kinetic Impact munitions). 

4.2.6 Worldwide. Reports from South Africa detail injuries to the face and jaws which were severe, 
resulting in soft and hard tissue damage, eye rupture, mandible fracture and severe bruising 216. A 
report by Dr Clifford Goldsmith of the South African Bishops(cid:1) Conference described injuries including 
chest muscles (cid:2)ripped open(cid:3) and other muscles (cid:2)ripped down to the bone(cid:3). 217 

Four case studies in Austria have shown that a 12 gauge rubber pellet cartridge described as an 
(cid:2)anticrime  cartridge(cid:3)  can  cause  fatal  penetrating  wounds  when  shot  from  distances  of  4-5m  at 
susceptible target areas of persons wearing light clothing. 218 This type of munition is widely advertised 
and used for crowd control. 

Other types of kinetic impact weapon have also been reported to cause deaths and serious injury. 
For example in Prince George(cid:1)s County, USA, a 61 year old woman with osteoporosis died in 1992 
when an Arwen plastic baton round shot by sheriff(cid:1)s deputies broke three of her ribs, and a bone 
splinter punctured her heart. 219 Bean bags (cloth bags filled with lead shot) have also proved to be 
fatal, despite manufacturers claims to the contrary. Ian Hogg, editor of the authoritative Jane(cid:1)s Infantry 
Weapons has been reported as saying (cid:3) I once witnessed the test of a (cid:2)stun bag(cid:3) designed to stop but 
not kill a criminal...it blew a hole in a sheep(cid:3). 220 In New Mexico beanbags have caused fatalities 

xxxi 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Severe skull damage caused by Kinetic Impact munitions. 

Fig 7. Severe jaw damage caused by plastic bullet impact on South African victim. 

Fig 8. X-ray of a Palestinian casualty with six (cid:5)plastic bullets(cid:1) lodged in his head after being shot by 
Israel Defence Forces in Nablus, December 1988 and who subsequently died. 

xxxii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 when fired at too close a range. 221 In Canada, the Ottawa-Carleton regional police agreed to stop 
using  beanbag  shotguns  after  a  man  died  shortly  after  being  struck  by  a  projectile.  The  autopsy 
indicated that the beanbag shot was lodged inside the mans body.222 Penetrating injuries have also 
occurred when the bean bag bursts. 223 

Recently doctors in Northern Ireland re-graded their calculations of the relative lethality of plastic 
bullets  by  including  any  impact  on  the  body  on  the  abdomen  or  above  as  being  fatal.  Previously 
medical reports had assumed that only impacts on the chest or above were potentially lethal.224 Despite 
these  medical  reports,  the  newly  introduced  guidelines  for  plastic  bullet  usage  in  the  UK  actually 
recommends shots up to the abdomen.225  Failure to absorb scientific and biomedical research into 
operational procedures in regard to crowd control weapons is a depressing feature common to many of 
the technologies covered in this report. It highlights the need for proper independent social impact 
assessment procedures for all these weapons. (Discussed in section 7). 

4.3  Electro-shock  weapons.  The  health,  medical  and  safety  effects  of  stun  weapons  can  be 
considered within two key areas, namely: a) the intended design and use effects of the weapon, and b) 
the effects resulting from the use (and abuse) of such weapons. A number of medical professionals 
and human rights organisations have highlighted the lack of independent medical, safety and scientific 
evaluation  of  stun  technology  -  a  lack    identified  in  a  Amnesty  International  report,  (cid:5)Arming  the 
Torturers(cid:1), published in March 1997.226  Since that publication, a growing number of reports of injuries  
sustained  from  the  use  of  stun  weapons  and  reports  of  fatalities  associated  with the use of such 
weapons has made the need for independent medical and scientific evaluation an urgent requirement. 

Whilst most of the consideration of health and safety relates to the impact of stun weapons on the 
subject, it is important to note that such weapons can have health and safety implications for the user, 
especially  if  badly  designed.  For  example,  badly  designed  on/off  switches  that  can  result  in  self-
activation and excessive current leakage from the activation switch which can cause significant pain.227 

4.3.1 Intended effects of stun weapons according to the stated design criteria, are to temporarily 
immobilize the recipient by delivering a series of short duration, high voltage pulses that lead to tetanic 
contraction of the body(cid:1)s muscles.  Thus the body is involuntarily paralysed as long as the current is 
flowing.228   Most manufacturers and suppliers of stun weapons such as Stun Tech Products229 and 
Taser International (formerly Air Taser Inc)230 231  state that the devices are medically safe and non-
lethal, although some manufacturers caution against the possibility of fatalities.232 

A range of other effects have been claimed, e.g. some stun gun suppliers have claimed that stun 
guns were an effective treatment for venomous snakebites.233  Yet medical studies have refuted these 
claims  and  found  that  (cid:1)Shocks  delivered  by  the  Parali/azer  Stun  gun  actually  delayed  wound 
healing...(cid:3).234 Indeed, most of the manufacturers(cid:1) research and evaluation reports of stun weapons 
refer to non-lethality in relation to  (cid:2)normally healthy people(cid:3)235.  The impact on people with existing 
medical conditions has received less attention.  For example, in December, 1995, Harry Landis, a 
Texas correctional worker, who had a history of heart problems236  was reported to have died after 
receiving two 45,000 volt shocks from an electronic riot shield.237 238  

Why  the  discrepancy  between  alleged  safety  and  reported  fatalities  of  such  weapons?  Some 
members of the medical profession have highlighted the lack of independent medical research. A 1991 
study reviewing the safety of electronic weapons reported that, (cid:1)Electronic weapons represent a new 
class of weapon available to law enforcement and the lay public. Although these weapons have been 
available for several years, there is inadequate research to document their safety or efficacy.(cid:2)  This 
study  found  that  whilst  the  electronic  weapon  was  initially  and    is  currently  approved  by  the  US 
Consumer  Product  Safety  Commission,  this  questionable  approval  was  based  on  the  theoretical 
calculations of the physical effects of (cid:1)damped sinusoidal pulses(cid:2), not on the basis of animal or human 
studies.   

xxxii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The report also stated that (cid:2)these devices are widely available and heavily promoted, despite 
limited research into their safety or efficiency and despite recent animal studies documenting their 
potential for lethality(cid:2).239 In 1991, the US Consumer Product Safety Commission stated that (cid:1)The only 
electronic weapon evaluated by the US Consumer Product Safety Commission was the TASER in 
1976".240 However the Commission noted that  (cid:1)...At the outset, it was recognised that the product, as 
manufactured, is a (cid:1)dangerous weapon(cid:2) and that the Commission(cid:3)s role was to assess the (cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)risk of 
unreasonable injury(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2) rather than the (cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)unreasonable risk of injury(cid:2) [emphasis added](cid:3).241  Despite 
only testing the TASER, Stun guns using similar theory were introduced without further evaluation.  (cid:1)In 
1983, the stun gun was introduced, reportedly using the same electrical theory as the TASER.  The 
output of the device was designed to be just slightly less than that of the TASER in its shock values 
and pulse profiles. ...The manufacturer stated that the stun gun was (cid:1)designed under standards set by 
the  Underwriters  Labs,  the  US  Government  Product  Safety  Commission,  and  the  US  Bureau  of 
Standards after they  conducted extensive tests on pulsed electric fields.... It was claimed that (cid:1)under 
the guidelines set by the United States Government Consumer Product Safety Commission...it would 
effectively immobilize an attacker without any risk of being lethal or causing injury(cid:2).242 

The Office of the General Counsel of the US Product Safety Commission, in a series of letters and 
memoranda, responded to the manufacturer claims by stating that (cid:1)Although no agency of the United 
States government exists which is called the (cid:4)United States Government Product Safety Commission,(cid:3) 
the name is sufficiently similar to the United States Consumer Product Safety Commission to lead the 
public to believe that this agency is the one to which the advertisement makes reference(cid:2)  and went on 
to state that (cid:1)Any and all statements that the commission has (cid:4)endorsed(cid:3) the safety of this product are 
false. The fact that we tested the TASER has no bearing on the Nova XR-5000 (stun gun) which we 
have never seen(cid:2)...(cid:1)Your consumer brochure indicated that the Commission has set safety guidelines, 
which it has not. Furthermore your police brochure indicates that the Commission declared that it would 
be impossible for harm to result from this combination of voltage, amperage, and pulse. I am not aware 
of any staff document containing such a statement(cid:2).243 

In 1984, the Douglas County, Nebraska Sheriff(cid:1)s office commissioned an evaluation of the Nova 
XR-5000 Electronic Stun gun.244  The report concluded that (cid:1)cardiac muscle tissue appears to be 
completely insensitive to its effects(cid:3). The author draws a similar conclusion from a later study245  but a 
conclusion  that  is  contradicted  by  a  1989  report  that  describes  apparent  ventricular  fibrillation 
associated with the direct epicardial application of a stun gun to exposed pig hearts.246 Research 
conducted by United Kingdom Home Office scientists on stun guns indicated that they can cause high 
levels of pain and even death through ventricular fibrillation in certain circumstances.247   

Injuries and deaths associated with stun weapons have been reported in Los Angeles,248 249 250, 
other  cities  in  the  USA251,  within  US  prisons252  and  the  UK.253  254    Stun  weapons  have  also  been 
reported as having a causal link with the miscarriage of a pregnant woman.255  The author of the report 
on miscarriage stated that (cid:2)As use of the TASER becomes more common, obstetrical clinicians may 
encounter complications from the TASER more often(cid:2). It was reported in November 1994 that a woman 
had killed her 7-month nephew with an electric stun gun in an effort to stop him crying.256  

It is not only incidents in the United States that have highlighted the lack of independent technical, 
medical or legal evaluations. The need for such investigations on electric batons was one of the key 
conclusions of the South African Joint Committee report on the 31 July 1996 incident at Tembisa 
railway station.  The report noted that (cid:1)Even the manufacturers concede that the electric baton is 
experienced differently by different people.  The electric batons may cause current induced effects on 
the  heart  or  on  other  electro-sensitive  parts(cid:2)    and  that    (cid:1)Even  the  International  Electrotechnical 
Commission  (IEC),  an  international  body  which  represents  international  technical  consensus  on 
electrical equipment does not yet offer any reference points for evaluating certain kinds of electric 
pulses as far as their effects on human organism are concerned. The use of electric batons may entail 
secondary heart and circulation effects which may constitute a danger in the case of persons with 

xxxiii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
unstable circulation, hypertensive patients or carriers of heart pacemakers. That the use of the electric 
batons may result in a sudden fall in blood pressure and cause the collapse of such a person(cid:2).257 

Many suppliers of electro-shock batons have cited research undertaken in 1985 by a  professor at 
Dusseldorf University, Germany.  However, the professor stated that  (cid:1)his expert opinion only  referred 
to an apparatus type (cid:1)Paralyser(cid:2) produced by the company Dicom Electronics Ltd, which was on the 
market at the time(cid:2) and that (cid:1)as far as I know this specific model we examined is not any more on the 
market..it is the nature of things that risk assessments only apply to a very concrete version of an 
apparatus of this kind and that it is impossible to derive any general clearance certificates in respect to 
technical variants of these systems(cid:2)...(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:3)(cid:3)If manufacturers refer to my expert opinion as proof their 
products are (cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)unobjectionable(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2), they do so without being authorised(cid:2). [emphasis added].258 

An  increased  awareness  of  the  dangers  of  stun  weapons  amongst  the  medical  profession  is 
emerging - illustrated by reports of their possible involvement in the sudden deaths of men restrained in 
the prone position by police officers.259 

4.3.2 Effects from the deployment of stun weapons. Whilst the health and safety impacts of the stun 
weapons(cid:1) intended effects are disputed, it is clear that there are a number of negative impacts caused 
by  the  deployment  of  such  weapons.  Some  of  these  effects  have  unintended  or  unforeseen 
consequences and result from the interaction  with other crowd control technologies or their facility to 
induce panic or fear reactions. For example, it was reported in 1990 that New York police officers use 
of a stun gun inadvertently set fire to a young boy who had been sprayed with pepper-spray which 
contained a flammable propellant.260   

An incident in Tembisa, South Africa in 1996 also highlighted the dangers associated with the 
deployment of electric batons for crowd control purposes.  Following the use of electric batons by 
railway  security  personnel,  16  passengers  were  crushed  to  death  in  the  ensuing  panic.    The 
subsequent inquiry established that there was no legal or regulatory framework within which electric 
batons were manufactured, sold or used in South Africa.  The inquiry recommended that (cid:2)the use of 
electric batons be banned in South Africa. This should remain the case until a regulatory framework 
exists for the manufacture, sale and use of electric batons and reliable and independent medical and 
legal research establishes that the use of the electric baton on any person would not subject such a 
person to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment.(cid:3)261 

Stun  weapon  manufacturers  and  law  enforcement  agencies  recognise  the  need  for  adequate 
training before deployment of these weapons.  However, even where training is available and existing 
systems or accountability and oversight are in place there have been reports of unacceptable use. For 
example, it was reported that the (cid:2)Greek Government had outlawed the use of such weapons by law 
enforcement agencies following cases of severe ill-treatment by the Greek police(cid:3).262 If stun weapons 
are deployed there is a clear requirement for effective personnel training; effective and transparent 
recording of usage, together with the establishment and maintenance of appropriate accountability and 
disciplinary procedures. However, the considered view of this report is that they should no longer be 
deployed or traded in Europe. 

5. ABUSE OF TECHNOLOGIES 

There are many and varied ways in which either the design or  the operational usage of crowd 
control weapons facilitate human rights violations.  Abuse of these weapons consists of the breach of 
several layers of alleged safeguards. These include undermining set rules of engagement; a failure to 
ensure that any deployment of force is appropriate, transparent and accountable and the inherent 
characteristics  of  the  technology  itself  which  might  lend  themselves  to  abuse.  To  understand 
abusability we also need to understand the context and the extent to which police and military culture 
permit or even encourage such abusability and whether or not these cultures punish members who 
breach extant human and civil rights protocols. One of the most undermining trends in recent years is 
the militarisation of the police which has cross-fertilized what should be two very different operational 

xxxiv 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cultures. This process is perhaps most pronounced in the United States where for the last twenty years 
 Congress has encouraged the US military to supply new weapons and training to the civilian police 
forces. This has institutionalised Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) squads in almost every state. 
263    A  new  study  by  the  US  CATO  Institute    warns  that  (cid:5)the  mindset  of  the  soldier  is  simply  not 
appropriate for the civilian police officer. Police officers confront not an (cid:5)enemy(cid:1)(cid:5) but individuals who are 
protected by the Bill of Rights.264  

According to the Cato Institute study, since such armaments are only necessary in extraordinary 
circumstances,  the  deployment  of  such  units  should  therefore  be  infrequent  rather  than  routine. 
Instead, the CATO Institute reports that SWAT Teams (cid:2)are everywhere, doing everything... Police are 
now patrolling mundane non-emergency situations, serve warrants etc in full battledress. Confusing the 
police functions with the military function can lead to dangerous and unintended consequences - such 
as  unnecessary  shootings  and  killings.(cid:3)265    Soldiers  expect  a  war  of  attrition  which  can  often  be 
indiscriminate. Police officers however, work within the premises of a legal framework predicated on 
minimum force and discriminate control rather than free-fire zones. Unfortunately, once this process of 
militarisation  of  the  police  begins,  it  is  quickly  normalised  and  justified  in  new  budget  allocation 
proposals  and  institutionalised  standard  working  procedures.266  Thus  by  1994,  the  Department of 
Justice and the Department of Defense had signed a memorandum of understanding which enabled 
the military to transfer technology to state and local police forces giving civilian police high-tech military 
hardware previously only issued during wartime. These technologies have included some of the crowd 
control weapons which are the subject of this present study.267 Any move towards adopting these (cid:5)alien(cid:1) 
principles in Europe will undermine  agreements made under the  Amsterdam Treaty in 1997,  to create 
zones of  freedom, security and justice within the European Union.268 

5.1 Chemical Irritant Weapons can facilitate human rights abuses in several different ways including 
the infliction of street punishment, an activity explicitly prohibited in most guidelines. There is a long 
history of such practices, in the US for example.269 More recently, the UN Committee Against Torture 
criticised the USA about the number of cases of police ill-treatment of civilians. Evidence submitted to 
the UN Committee by Amnesty International covered the misuse of pepper-gas spray.  On the 4th May 
2000 the San Francisco Federal Appeals Court ruled that (cid:2)Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray (also known 
as (cid:2)pepper spray(cid:3)) may in some circumstances constitute an unconstitutionally and (cid:5)unreasonable use 
of force(cid:1). (cid:2)270 This ruling stemmed from cases of officers deliberately breaching guidelines by using OC 
(pepper-gas) to inflict punishment. Video evidence showed California police deputies pulling back the 
heads of environmental protestors, opening their eyelids and swabbing the burning liquid directly onto 
their eyeballs - an action described by Amnesty International as (cid:5)tantamount to torture.(cid:1)271  The US 
police had subsequently continued to use this strategy as evidenced by the treatment of non-violent 
protestors during the WTO demonstrations in Seattle, November 1999 (some non-violent protestors 
who refused to leave Police buses on arrival at Seattle detention centers have alleged that police 
officers pulled back their eyelids and put pepper spray or gel into their eyes, nose and mouth).   

Amnesty International has stated that the San Francisco Federal ruling (cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)should clearly signal to 
law enforcement officers that it is no longer acceptable to use pepper spray in such a calculated 
and deliberate way to inflict pain as a way of subduing demonstrators who pose no threat(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2). 
Amnesty further stated that (cid:2)we now hope it will influence police practices not only in California, but in 
the USA as a whole(cid:3).  Europe is not immune from such abusive practices. Evidence has emerged in 
the UK of police abusing CS sprays in breach guidelines to make the targets more compliant. More 
seriously, in Austria the UN Committee on the Prevention of Torture found a recent case of pepper gas 
being  used  by  the  Austrian  police  to  carry  out  a  racial  attack.272  It  is  reasonable  to  suggest  that 
Amnesty International(cid:1)s advice should also be adopted by any European Union member that deploys 
any chemical irritant weapons.  

There is a risk when lethal weapons are used in used in conjunction with chemical irritants (and 
other crowd control technologies) that escape is inhibited or prevented leading to excessive exposure. 
This is particularly true when (cid:2)carpet gas bombing(cid:3) tactics are used by security forces. These should 
always be seen as an abuse because there is no way of distinguishing targets from innocents. The 
excessive  use  of  chemical  irritants  is  widespread  as  is  their  use  in  conjunction  with  more  lethal 

xxxv 

 
 
 
 
 
 
weapons.  Appendix 6 catalogues some cases where disabling chemicals were used to incapacitate a 
target prior to executing, wounding or beating the victim in a manner where a whole community was 
punished indiscriminately by blanket gassing.  

Targets have included hospitals where victims have no means of escaping the build up of toxic gas. 
Such practices were for example common in the late 1980s, in the Occupied Territories. 273 However, 
as  detailed  in  Appendix  6,  far  too  often  disabling  chemicals  are  used  to  expel  civilians  from  safe 
sanctuary to enable their beating, wounding or extra-judicial execution. Anyone trapped or injured will 
be vulnerable.274 (Also, see case examples in Section 8) 

5.2 Kinetic Weapons. 

Systematic misuse of truncheons has almost become a metaphor of the archetypal repressive 
police state.275  Modern kinetic energy weapons have also been systematically abused, particularly in 
Northern  Ireland,  the  Occupied  Territories  and  South  Africa  in  a  wide  range  of  ways  including:  i) 
doctoring of projectiles to enhance lethality; 276  ii) breaching of guidelines on:- use only as a last resort 
277, firing below the minimum distance 278, firing at areas of the body that should not be targeted (ie 
head, face, neck or chest) 279 shot out of moving vehicles 280; iii) used as street punishment for example 
during zone clearing operations,281 iv) intimidation, 282 v) denial of the right to peaceful protest 283, vi) 
used in a sectarian or racist manner,  284 and vii) used as disproportionate and excessive force.285 
(Figure 9 illustrates an the misuse of Kinetic Energy weapons against protestors in Seattle) 

Even when these weapons are used in a criminal way, for example when children are targeted 
leading to fears of street execution, the weapons leave no ballistic trail that could be used in an enquiry 
to trace the officers responsible. 286 A failure by the authorities to prosecute officers who use excessive 
force or who breach the guidelines has led to a culture of impunity, a disregard for the rules of law and 
made the use of these weapons ordinary instead of extra-ordinary. This is especially true in Northern 
Ireland  287  and  Israel.  288  However  whilst  failing  to  prosecute  the  officers,  governments  have 
acknowledged the misuse of the weapons by offering financial compensation to victims and families, 
often on condition of secret payment and the cessation of any criminal charges being laid. 289 Such 
(cid:2)cheque book litigation(cid:3) has ensured that the full examination and public disclosure of the misuse of 
these weapons has been avoided by the authorities. 

5.3 Electro-shock weapon  manufacturers and proponents cite the (cid:5)non-lethal(cid:1) characteristics of such 
weapons as reasons to deploy them instead of lethal force or other types of crowd control weapons 
such as blunt trauma batons.  These characteristics include the claims that stun weapons are: (cid:5)non-
lethal(cid:1), do not cause blunt trauma injuries and leave no long-term physical effects.  However, these 
characteristics are exactly those that have led human rights organisations and medical personnel 
helping to rehabilitate victims of torture to suggest that stun weapons have inherent characteristics that 
facilitate abuse, ill-treatment and torture.  What makes the abusability factors with stun weapons so 
high is not just their apparent degree of unreliability, technical variability or very narrow safety range of 
the technology, but also the practical difficulty of finding evidence which proves they have been used to 
facilitate human rights violations. 

Due  to  her  experience  with  victims  who  have  been  tortured  with  electro-shock  weapons,  the 
Director of the London-based, Medical Foundation for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture 
Victims has described electro-shock batons as (cid:2)the modern universal tool of the Torturer(cid:3).290  The 
Executive Director of Amnesty International USA has highlighted the contradiction between the law 
enforcement use of stun weapons and their widespread use worldwide as instruments of torture and ill-
treatment. 291 The potential for abuse has been also highlighted by other health professionals working 
in law enforcement and correctional services. 292 

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Fig. 9.  Police officer targets WTO protestor in Seattle. A misuse of Kinetic Impact weapons. 
(cid:1) AP / Wide World Photos.  

xxxviii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xxxix 

 
 
 
Electro-shock weapons have been deliberately, and often repeatedly, applied to sensitive parts of 
prisoners' bodies, including their: armpits, necks, faces, chests,  abdomens, the inside parts of legs, the 
soles of the feet, inside  mouths and ears, on genitals and inside vaginas, rectums and on the back. 
Such practices are often combined with other forms of torture and ill-treatment, including psychological 
torture.  In many cases electro-shock weapons are used against women in addition to rape or other 
sexual assaults. A Mexican woman, Layda Silva reported how the Cobras security force had used 
electro-shock batons on her. (cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)I fell to the ground, but they carried on giving me the shocks - on 
my breasts, vagina, stomach, legs, all over my body,(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2).293 

In March 1997, Amnesty International published a report which documented electric shock torture 
and ill-treatment in 50 countries worldwide since 1990.  In 18 of these countries there was evidence 
that hand-held electro-shock weapons had been used to commit such human rights violations. These 
countries included: Algeria, Austria, Bulgaria, China, Egypt, Greece, Lebanon, Russian Federation, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sudan, Turkey, United States of America, Uruguay, Vietnam, Yugoslavia 
(Kosovo), Zaire.294  Despite their stated adherence to the basic principles of international human rights 
laws, including ratifying international human rights treaties, governments continue to permit electric 
shock torture and ill-treatment in prisons, detention centres and police stations.   

Some of these cases have occurred in European member states. In October 1996, the Austrian 
government agreed to the publication of a report by a delegation from the ECPT [Council of Europe(cid:1)s 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture] which contained serious allegations that detainees of Austrian 
as well as foreign nationality were at risk of grave ill-treatment particularly while detained at the Bureau 
of Security in Vienna.295  There are also reports of the police use of electric batons against protestors in 
Nicosia, Cyprus in March 1996 296 and in States that are seeking membership of the European Union.  
For example, in July 1997, the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
advised the Bulgarian Government that he had received information on what was alleged to be a 
substantial incidence of torture or other ill-treatment inflicted by members of the police against street 
children, especially those of Roma ethnicity.  The ill-treatment, which was said to take place both at the 
time of arrest and during detention at police stations, was allegedly carried out to intimidate or extract a 
(cid:2)confession(cid:3). The children so detained were reportedly sometimes picked up on suspicion of such 
crimes  as  theft,  but  might  also  be  arrested  as  part  of  generalized  (cid:2)street  sweeps(cid:3).    The  abuses 
reported  included:  (cid:1)beatings  with  fists,  boots,  electric  shock  batons,  clubs, chains, rubber hosing, 
boxing gloves or a metal rod with a ball attached to its end (beech) and beatings on the soles of the 
feet, sometimes with electric batons (falaka)(cid:2).297  Bulgaria(cid:1)s police force was re-equipped with new anti-
riot equipment in 1990 including electro-shock batons.298  

Recent reports by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights document the use of  torture in 
a wide range of countries including Turkey. One report stated that the (cid:2)torture of men, women and 
children continues to be widespread throughout Turkey, and people have (cid:4)disappeared(cid:1) or died in 
police custody(cid:3).299 Other reports have identified specific police units that practice widespread torture 
including electric shock torture and ill-treatment 300 In the United States, the record of electro-shock 
weapons is far from unblemished. Prison guards in Arizona, California, New Mexico301 and Texas302 303 
have been accused of tormenting inmates  with stun batons.  There have also been allegations that 
officers  of  the  INS  (Immigration  &  Naturalisation  Service)  have  used  stun  weapons  against 
detainees.304  The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture raised a series of cases where it had been 
reported that stun weapons had contributed to ill-treatment or abuse in the US.305 

Some stun weapon manufacturers and suppliers offer training as a means to ensure safety, but 
such training is not available to all those able to acquire electro-shock weapons. The human rights 
content of training courses appears to be weak or non-existent. One US course manual claims that 
"should  an  officer  misuse  or  abuse  someone  with  less-than-lethal  electronic  weaponry,  the 
consequence or error could, at the very worst, be a minor non-permanent injury." The evidence in this 
report shows how misleading such statements are. US law enforcement officers who have received 
training in the use of stun guns, report using them variously on assailants for 1 to 2 seconds on the 
legs, but also on the torso for 3 to 5 seconds. The Amnesty International report quotes a 1992 report 

xl 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that  stated  "Less  aggressive  officers  may  experience  negative  results  [the  stun  gun  not  inflicting 
incapacitation]...due to the fact that you must physically make contact and hold that contact for up to six 
or eight seconds."306   One design feature in a modern stun gun is an automatic switch-off after 15 
seconds of use, which is reactivated after 5 seconds. It would appear, therefore, that prolonged or 
repeated  application  of  a  stun  belt,  gun  or  baton  constituting  severe  ill-treatment  or  torture  is  not 
prevented by their technological design and remains an ever-present danger. The  characteristic lack of 
physical signs of injuries also ensures that ill-treatment, abuse and torture with stun weapons will, in all 
likelihood, remain under-reported and this now includes child targets. 307  

Human rights organisations continue to document increasing numbers of cases where torture and 
ill-treatment are committed with electro-shock weapons. Meanwhile, many European Union member 
states  continue  to  allow  their  companies    to  manufacture,  supply  and  export  such  electro-shock 
weapons.  Some  of  these  exports  are  to  countries  where  torture  and  ill-treatment  have  been 
documented.  Appendix 1 provides details of companies in Belgium, France and Germany who have 
manufactured, supplied or distributed electro-shock weapons between 1990 and the present.  Some of 
these  companies  continue  to  trade.  Further  more,  the  EC  has  actually  given    CE  quality  control 
markings for such weapons and foreign manufacturers such as those from Taiwan boast as an official 
seal of approval in promoting  their overseas sales (Taiwan bans such weapons for home use).  This 
practice should be terminated. (Figure 10 shows an example of Taiwanese electro-shock batons with 
CE markings). 

6. AN ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES & THEIR EFFECTS 

6.1 History. The emergence of a second generation of (cid:4)non lethal(cid:1) weapons from the United States in 
the early 1990's resulted from military strategists eager to embrace the oxymoronic doctrine of non-
lethal warfare. The doctrine(cid:1)s promoters were primarily futurologists such as Alvin and Heidi Toffler,308 
naive Quaker science fiction writers Chris & Janet Morris,309 and a former deputy director of the CIA 
Ray  Cline,  and  his  US  Global  Strategy  Council  in  Washington.    They  found  willing  ears  not  only 
amongst the former chiefs of staff of the US Army and the Strategic Air Command but also the US 
National Nuclear Laboratories at Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Oakridge. 

The 1990 seminal work of the Morris(cid:1)s, (cid:4)Non-Lethality :A Global Challenge(cid:1)  310defined the new 
ideology as (cid:4)a revolutionary new strategy of deterring and containing aggression with non-lethal and 
highly constrained force that provides utility across the continuum of conflicts(cid:1).  The disingenuous non-
lethal ideology was further championed by Col. John Alexander who co-authored a book with Janet 
Morris, (cid:4)The Warriors Edge.311 Alexander spearheaded the (cid:2)special technologies(cid:3) group of the Los 
Alamos National Laboratory and co-ordinated their early efforts on (cid:4)non-lethal(cid:1) weapons.  Ironically, 
Alexander made his name in the rather more lethal Phoenix assassination programs in the Vietnam 
War (and later became a proponent of psychic warfare).312 

Statements  from  advocates  of  the  doctrine  present  it  as  a  humane  alternative  to  more  lethal 
warfare and a logical response to the changes in the global security environment. For example (cid:2)As 
major conventional conflict becomes rare, (cid:4)less-than-lethal-war(cid:1) violence, instigated by those immune to 
world opinion and economic costs associated with making war, has become common(cid:3). Such stances 
have been used to justify the so called (cid:4)revolution in military affairs(cid:1).313  Others are more cynical about 
such claims for the moral high ground, viewing these new initiatives as an (cid:2)institutional rice bowls(cid:3) 
response with scientists and the military looking for new weapons projects to justify their careers and 
massive expenditures, once the end of the Cold War made many of the old (cid:2)containment(cid:3) stances 
redundant.314  The  Morris(cid:1)s  came  up  with  a  new  philosophy,  what  they  called  (cid:4)the  containment  of 
barbarism(cid:1) aimed at controlling disruptive behaviour, rather than any particular ideology.  

In May 1993, the US Attorney General Janet Reno appeared before Congress to describe the FBI 
role the standoff with the Branch Davidian cult at Waco. She expressed the wish that there had been a 
(cid:4)magic non-lethal bullet(cid:1) that could have saved the lives of the children who were incinerated in the fire 
at the compound.315 Later in October that year, the US military were stinging with the  

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xlii 

 
 
 
Fig 10.  Example of Taiwenese manufactured  
Electro-shock weapons with European CE markings. 

xliii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xliv 

 
 
 
humiliation they had suffered in Somalia at the hands of unruly crowds and a ragtag militia during 
operation (cid:1)Restore Hope.(cid:2) Despite deploying much superior firepower on the streets of Mogadishu, 18 
US soldiers were slaughtered and filmed being slaughtered. In the ensuing battle 300 Somali citizens, 
both civilians and guerrillas were also dead - a highly embarrassing debacle which did not restore 
hope.  

It was thought that weapons which might be able to target guerillas and civilians together might just 
do the trick. In 1995, the Pentagon and the US Justice Department signed a secret memorandum of 
understanding authorising the Pentagon to receive almost $50 million for additional (cid:1)black box(cid:2) or 
secret research programme funding for (cid:1)less-lethal weapon(cid:2) research.316 There was now a mutual 
desire to find (cid:1) a magic bullet(cid:2) that would neutralise the (cid:1)CNN Factor(cid:2). Whilst the full range of many of 
these highly secretive programmes may never be known, some of the projects have been reported as 
being  associated  with  particular  research  laboratories.  Eg.  Laser  research    (ARPA,  ARDEC,  Los 
Alamos,  Army Communication Electronic Command); Optical munitions (ARDEC/Los Alamos and 
Phillips Laboratories); Acoustics (SARA, ARDEC, Los Alamos); Electromagnetic pulse(ARDEC, Los 
Alamos, Harry Diamond Laboratory, Eglin Air Force Base); Foam and Slickums (Sandia); Grenade 
launched foam (ARDEC, Army Research Laboratory), rubber bullets (ARDEC/ARL).317 

Critics both inside and outside the US government saw many dangers in such unaccountable (cid:1)black 
programme  funding(cid:2).  It  was reported that, (cid:3)One of the immediate consequences of the excessive 
secrecy is a wasteful duplication of effort. Justice Department officials who surveyed some of the black 
budget programmes for possible law enforcement applications found the same technologies being 
developed in as many as six independent programmes.....The waste results from a lack of independent 
oversight  of  non-lethal  programmes,  which  like  other  highly  classified  (cid:1)special  access(cid:2)  or  (cid:1)black(cid:2) 
programmes in defence and intelligence - operate beyond the reach of the checks and balances that 
US citizens take for granted.(cid:4)318   By 1999, the Pentagon benefited even further from this post cold-war 
doctrine,  with  a  gold  plated  spending  increase  of  $110  billion  over  six  years  to  boost  "military 
readiness". According to William Hartung, senior research fellow at the US World Policy Institute at The 
New School, the total US military budget of $260 billion plus, only makes sense in terms of politics and 
economics, rather than any real threat to American security since it is "already twice as large as the 
combined budgets of every conceivable U.S adversary, including major powers like China and Russia 
and regional (cid:1)rogue states(cid:2) such as Iraq, North Korea and Libya(cid:4).319 For Hartung, the weapon makers 
are shaping US foreign and military policy. He might have also added by default, NATO & UN (cid:1)peace 
keeping(cid:2)  strategies.  By  1998,  the  US  had  an  integrated  product  team:  consisting  of  the  Marines, 
Airforce, Special Operations Command, Army, Navy, Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and 
Departments of Transportation, Justice and Energy.320  

In October 1999, NATO announced a new policy on (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) weapons and their place in allied 
arsenals. Officials said that the policy(cid:2)s purpose (cid:3)was two fold, namely to clarify the legal ambiguities 
surrounding the use of non-lethal weapons and to broaden the range of combat options for military 
commanders, especially for purposes of peacekeeping and peace enforcement(cid:4).321 The NATO doctrine 
confirms that:- 

(cid:1)(cid:2) (cid:3)The  availability  of  Non-Lethal  Weapons  shall  in  no  way  limit  a  commander(cid:2)s  or  individual(cid:2)s 
inherent right and obligation to use all necessary means and to take all appropriate action in self 
defence.(cid:4) In other words,  

xlv 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(cid:1)(cid:2) (cid:1)Neither the existence, the presence nor the potential effect of Non-lethal Weapons shall constitute 
an obligation to use Non-Lethal Weapons or impose a higher standard for, or additional restriction 
on, the use of lethal force. In all cases NATO forces shall retain the option for immediate use of 
lethal weapons consistent with applicable national and international law and approved Rules of 
Engagement.(cid:2)  

(cid:1)(cid:2) (cid:1)Non-Lethal  Weapons  shall  not  be  required  to  have  zero  probability  of  causing  fatalities  or 
permanent  injuries.  However,  while  complete  avoidance  of  these  effects  is  not  guaranteed  or 
expected, Non-Lethal Weapons should significantly reduce such effects when compared with the 
employment of conventional lethal weapons under the same circumstances.(cid:2)  

(cid:1)(cid:2) (cid:1)Non-Lethal Weapons may be used in conjunction with lethal weapon systems to enhance the 

latter(cid:3)s effectiveness and efficiency across the full spectrum of military operations.(cid:2)322 

6.2 Design, Role & Function of 2nd Generation (cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)Less-Lethal(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2) Weapons According to the new NATO 
doctrine, (cid:4)non-lethal(cid:3) weapons should enhance the capability of NATO forces to achieve objectives 
such as, to (cid:1)(i) accomplish military missions and tasks in situations and conditions where the use of 
lethal force, although not prohibited, may not be necessary or desired; (ii) discourage, delay, prevent or 
respond to hostile activities; (iii) limit or control escalation; (iv) improve force protection; (v) repel or 
temporarily incapacitate personnel;(vi) disable equipment or facilities; (vii) Help decrease the post-
conflict costs of reconstruction.(cid:2)323   

Current doctrine says it is unrealistic to (cid:1)assume away(cid:2) civilians and non combatants, taking the 
view that the US must be able to execute its missions in spite of and/or operating in the midst of 
civilians. Therefore the US Army (cid:4)Non-Lethal Warfare Requirements(cid:3) assume  a (cid:4)dirty battlefield(cid:3) which 
means  (cid:4)civilians  and  noncombatants  will  be  mixed(cid:3)  and  therefore  targeted  together.  In  such 
circumstances, seven (cid:4)non-lethal common tasks(cid:3) were identified at a 1996 conference on Non-lethal 
weapons (hosted by the American Defense Preparedness Society), namely (i) incapacitate /stop an 
individual  (in  a  room,  in  a  crowd,  fleeing);  (ii)  distract  individual  (in a room, in a crowd); (iii) seize 
individual (in a crowd, singly/stationary, moving); (iv) stop a vehicle (approaching, retreating); (v) block 
an area (to vehicles, to personnel); (vi) control crowds  (Stop approach, Encourage dispersal) and (vii) 
disarm/neutralize equipment.324  In 1996, the non-lethal tools identified by the Army for these missions 
included anti-traction; acoustics; entanglements/nets; malodorous munitions; barriers; foams; (cid:4)non 
lethal(cid:3) mines; directed energy systems; isotropic radiators and radio frequency weapons. Three years 
later the chairman of that conference (the former head of Los Alamos(cid:3) Disabling Weapons Program, 
Col.  John  B  Alexander),  identified  potential  target  categories  for  these  (cid:4)non-lethal  weapons(cid:3)  as: 
combatants, criminals, hostages, hostages(willing), non combatants, rioters, refugees and disaster 
victims.325 

A dubious Pandoras Box of new crowd control/crowd punishment weapons has emerged, designed 
to be media-friendly and appear, rather than be, safe. If these weapons, when deliberately targeted at 
innocent civilians, can actually maim and kill we are not talking about humane, bloodless (cid:4)operations 
other than war.(cid:3)  Despite the epithet (cid:4)non-lethal(cid:3), what we have at work here is an innovative multi-
million dollar public relations exercise, on a mission of winning friends and influencing people. As Steve 
Metz of the Strategic Studies Institute at the US Army War College in Pennsylvania puts it, (cid:4)There is 
always a marine with a rifle standing behind the one with a glue gun(cid:3).326 

6.3 Varieties of 2nd. Generation (cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)Less-Lethal(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2) Weapons. There is now a wide literature on what we 
have called 2nd generation Crowd Control weapons,327 and indeed a wide variety of technologies either 
being marketed as a result of contracts let or at the prototype or testing stages, (Samples of which are 
covered in Appendix 6). With the new NATO (cid:4)non-lethal(cid:3) doctrine, some of these technologies have 
moved from tactical to potentially strategic roles in any new programme of military intervention. It is 
worth  briefly  describing  some  of  these  developments  and  the  problems  their  presentation  has 
encountered by reference to a series of Non Lethal Weapons (NLW) conferences organised by the 

xlvi 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jane(cid:3)s Group, where much of the new doctrines and associated technologies have been show cased 
since 1997. It is predominantly US based but increasingly, EU Member States have been co-operating 
with such work , creating various bridgeheads into European crowd control perspectives. (It is worth 
stressing that much of the public side of this work is presentational and several of these programmes 
have been running for several years under different budget headings, whilst the remainder, perhaps the 
most  powerful  developments,    remain  shrouded  in  secrecy).  A  good  example  of  how  such  old 
programmes have been rejuvenated as new programmes is the case of calmative and other chemical 
crowd control weapons. (Figures 11 -1 4 provide examples of 2nd Generation (cid:4)Non Lethal(cid:3) weapons). 

xlvii 

 
 
 
Some Examples of 2nd Generation (cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)(cid:1)Non Lethal(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2)(cid:2) Weapons. 

         Fig.11. Blinding Laser Weapon  

                                                Fig. 12. Flight stabilised capture net . 

xlviii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig13. US Military doctrine to target civilians and (cid:1)insurgents(cid:2) together.                                  Fig 14. Bounding (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) landmine. 

xlix 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.3.1 Calmatives The human brain has thousands of so called receptor sites. A receptor has been 
defined by Dr. Mathew Meselson as a (cid:1)molecule on a cell which when a certain other kind of molecule 
called a ligand binds to it, causes something to happen.(cid:2) For example (cid:1)There are receptors in our brain 
called opioid receptors. The body manufacturers molecules called enkephalins and endorphins, which 
bind with these receptors; if the proper molecule binds to some of these receptors it alleviates pain, or 
brings on sleep, or slows down breathing or affects various emotions(cid:2).328  As discussed in 6.4 (below) 
the Human Genome project will map these receptor sites, and eventually those which evoke sleep, 
obedience,  submission,  sexual  display  etc.  The  US  military  have  undertaken  research  on  these 
receptor  sites  for  many  years.  (cid:1)Of  the  few  that  have  been  identified,  some  can  cause  temporary 
blindness; can make you think you are smelling something that is not there; can cause submissiveness 
or extreme anxiety(cid:2).329  

Meselson informs us that a few synthetic chemicals bind very specifically to opioid receptors and 
induce sleep. From these have been developed chemical crowd control weapons many of which are 
based on analgesics which induce sleep, called calmatives. One of this group of  chemicals is the 
fentanyl family of morphine like analgesics, which started to be examined in CBW labs around 1963, 
after which they were introduced into surgical practice as injectable anaesthetics.330 Certain derivatives 
of fentanyl e.g. carfentanyl are extremely toxic, more so than nerve agents like VX with ten micrograms 
per kilogram body weight being able to induce paralysis. However, one defect is  potential fatalities 
since these opioids can cause respiratory collapse. A second family referred to in the open literature 
are  the  bis-quaternary  pyridium  compounds  which  were  evaluated  alongside  the  fentanyls  and 
cogeners in 1984. Other candidate analgesics for disabling weapons include (some only given code 
names)  EA  3382[a  dart  gun  paralysant  for  clandestine  ops];  the  benzomorphans  oripavine  and 
thebaine; TL 2636 and its iso-amyl cogener M-140; etophine(used in the chemical restraint of large 
animals);  the  phenothiazine  family  (such  as EA 5202); butyrophenone tranquillisers(such as CAR 
302,089, the 3-methyl homologue of spirodol) and the anticholinergic glycollates of which there are 
several  hundred.  Some  of  these  produce  mental  confusion,  elevated  blood  presure,  vomiting, 
prostation and coma and their effects can last for just a short duration(e.g. EA 3834 and CAR 302,668), 
others last hours or even days (e.g.EA 3167). In the mid seventies, work was undertaken to spread 
these  agents  via  a  solution  in  the  sensory  irritant  methoxycycloheptatriene,  possibly  with  the  skin 
transferral agent DMSO. The US Chemical Corp issued a technical memorandum proposing several of 
these  agents  as  candidates  for  law  enforcement  and  riot  control.331  In  1991,  this  incapacitating 
chemical  program  was  transferred  to  a  new  budget  head  -  the  (cid:1)Advanced  Riot  Control  Agent 
Technology(cid:2) or ARCAT.332 

It should be remembered that the US for the purposes of the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC) has a different set of definitions on what is permissible and what is excluded for riot control 
under the general purpose criterion of the convention. Under Executive order 11850 of April 1974, four 
examples are given where the US can use riot control agents, namely; (a) (cid:1)in riot control situations in 
areas under direct and distinct US military control, to control rioting prisoners of war; (b) in situations in 
which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided; 
(c) in rescue missions in remote isolated areas, of downed aircrews and passengers and escaping 
prisoners and (d) in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from 
civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations(cid:2).333  

It does not take much imagination, given the failure of the CWC to define domestic riot control and 
law enforcement, that in operations other than war, such as peacekeeping missions, the US might feel 
it was legitimate to deploy new agents and dissemination systems. By 1991 the US Army said they now 
had  a  device  which  (cid:1)could  deliver  a  potent  riot  control  compound.(cid:2)  They  advised  (cid:1)A  class  of 
compounds has been selected and viable analogues are under evaluation for acceptability in meeting 
initial  generic  requirements(cid:2).334  It  is  likely  that  these  agents  are  part  of  the  fentanyl  family.335  In 
operational circumstances, it is very difficult to control levels of individual intake and one person(cid:3)s 
sleeping draft would be another(cid:3)s lethal dose. Used in conjunction with lethal weapons or where a 
crowd was fleeing, additional fatalities could occur from either falling or crush injuries or simply being a 

l 

 
 
 
 
 
sitting target for a nervous recruit expecting the worst. The war in the former Yugoslavia has shown 
how men engaged in ethnic conflicts use mass rape as a weapon and immobilising chemicals could 
easily form an adjunct to such policies but one which few commanders will ever admit.  

li 

 
 
 
By 1994 this work was well on its way to completion and  President Clinton was able to say, (cid:1)I 
will..direct the Office of the Secretary of Defense to accelerate efforts to field non-chemical, non-lethal 
alternatives to Riot Control Agents for use in situations where combatants and non-combatants are 
intermingled(cid:2).336 By 1998 other paralysing tunable weapons for layered defence and less-lethal area 
denial munitions were selected for funding - including overhead chemical agent dispensers and rocket 
delivered micro-enscapsulated malodourous substances.337 Future (cid:3)(cid:4)non-lethal(cid:4) weapons  identified by 
the US Marines for 2000 onwards include pulsed energy systems, microwave systems, advanced 
delivery robototics and unmanned vehicles carrying less-lethal weapons etc.338 A few examples of what 
has emerged already are discussed below. Some attempt has been made to say which technologies 
are now available, which are on the horizon or at prototype stages and which lie some years off but for 
which preparatory research programmes are already in place. 

6.3.2 Upgrades of Existing Crowd Control Technologies Much of what has been promoted for (cid:3)non-
lethal(cid:4) munitions has been around in various guises for some time. In 1995, the US Joint Non-Lethal 
Weapons working Group had tested various (cid:3)off the shelf(cid:4) candidates including blunt impact devices, 
chemical  irritants,  entanglements  and  aqueous  foam  barriers.  Fiscal  Year  (FY)  1995  Non  Lethal 
accomplishments  were  identified  by  Charles  Thornton,  Division  Chief  of  the  Dismounted  Battle 
Laboratory, TDADOC as blunt impact (12 gauge muzzle launched 37/40mm); chemical irritants such 
(such as OC & CS and what he calls RCA(cid:4)s) Disorientating Tech(cid:4)s Set beam and Maxi-beam(these are 
dazzling  light  torches)  entanglements;  barriers  -  aqueous  foam;  40mm  sponge  grenades,  soft 
munitions and ballistic entanglements. BY FY 1996, technologies listed still included blunt impact, 
entanglements,  slippery  barriers  and  sticky 
land  mines 
(CALTROPS/Volcano),  distraction  devices  and  acoustic  weapons.339    Also  in  1996,  the  US  Army 
Research Laboratory was developing a (cid:3)Variable Velocity Rifle System(cid:4) which allows the operator to 
select between lethal and non-lethal on a shot by shot basis using so called dual purpose (cid:3)bruiser 
ammunition(cid:4). (This device works by a venting system which keeps padding around the sabot style 
ammunition during low velocity firings which is released at higher more lethal speeds).340  At the same 
time, the Federal Bureau of prisons was looking at off the shelf candidates for prison riot control such 
as chemicals, OC, smoke, flash-bang grenades, electronic stun belts and some future applications 
such as anaesthetic darts/pellets.341 

foam  but  also  alternatives 

to 

6.3.3 Entanglements - popularly known as (cid:3)stick(cid:4)em and slick(cid:4)em. By 1997,  after several TV and 
magazine articles on less-lethal weapons, the image of the sticky foamed target of a glue gun had 
become almost the symbol of the 2nd. Generation of less-lethal weapons. Net guns used for personal 
capture are now in operational use. For example police in Western Australia recently ordered them. In 
1997342  Alliant  Tech,  better  known  for  making  mines,  made an industry perspective on non-lethal 
weapon systems which looked at spider net entanglements, foams to block an area and super slippery 
substances which make roads and pathways impassable.343 However, at the same conference, Hilda 
Libby no longer talked of sticky foam as a (cid:3)stick em(cid:4) - it was seen more as an area denial munition. 
Why? Because despite the massive Public Relations exercise promoting its (cid:3)benign use(cid:4) to paralyse 
targets, it took hours to decontaminate a subject from the foam (using baby oil) and there is a real risk 
of suffocation if the foam covers the mouth and nose. Little is being said about such failures. Likewise a 
dart  weapon  for  prisons  has  also  apparently  been  quietly  dropped  after  fears  about  lethal effects 
emerged.344 

6.3.4 Directed Energy Weapons - These weapons have created the most heated debate. Some 
variants  such  as  isotropic  radiators  have  come  on  to  the  market  as  omni-directional  (cid:3)laser  bright(cid:4) 
rounds, where precision targeting is impossible. They are being promoted as cheap dazzle devices 
against people and optics but little has emerged in the way of technical data. Other more directional 
lasers have been used as dazzle devices for example the USAF Saber 203 laser dazzle system, 
prototypes of which were used by the US Marines in Somalia.345 Blinding laser weapons are banned by 
the blinding laser convention,346 nevertheless, even after this treaty, their use is still being promoted for 
law  enforcement.347  A  recent  development  has  been  using  a  UV  laser  which  can  ionize  the  air 
sufficiently for it to conduct an electric charge. This enables an electric shock to be delivered over some 

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distance to create muscle paralysis or tetanization. 348 A fully working prototype is still some way off but 
the  principle  has  been  successfully  tested    using  a  Lumonics  Hyper-X  400  excimer  laser  at  the 
University of California at San Diego.349  

Other Directed Energy Weapons are being explored. For example in 1997, Edward Scannel of the 
US Army Laboratory identified a Vortex Ring Gun which is a combustion Ring Gun creating vortices for 
impulse or chemical delivery and a range of high powered acoustic technology.350 The literature talks of 
acoustic bullets, beams and blastwave projectors. Comments on acoustic weapons have suggested 
they can be tunable radiating a directed energy beam of 90-120 decibels to provide anything from 
extreme levels of annoyance and distraction through to 140-150 decibels for (cid:1)strong physical bodily 
trauma  and  damage  to  tissues(cid:2)  to  shockwave  levels  of  more  than  170  decibels  (cid:1)producing 
instantaneous  blastwave  like  trauma(cid:4)  which  could  be  lethal.351  The  current  leader  in  acoustic 
technology in the US is a small company in Huntington Beach,  California called Scientific Applications 
and Research Associates which is reported to have made vortices which are capable of providing an 
area denial function.352  

However, despite the claims of powerful infra-sound weapons capable of making people sick and 
causing involuntary defecation, a presentation by Jurgen Altman of the University of Dortmund at the 
1999 Jane(cid:4)s conference, (cid:3)Fielding Weapons for the New Millennium said such claims were based on 
Physics not as we know it. In a more detailed technical study Altman provides a tightly argued case for 
doubting the technical workability of such weapons over longer distances. At shorter distances with 
explosive driven strong sound blast waves there would be a case for including such weapons within the 
SIrUS criteria of banning weapons which target a particular aspect of human anatomy.353  

The most controversial (cid:3)non-lethal(cid:4) crowd control and anti-materiel technology proposed by the US 
are so called Radio Frequency or Directed Energy Weapons that can allegedly manipulate human 
behaviour in a variety of unusual ways. Some microwave systems have been proposed which can raise 
body temperature to between 105 to 107 degrees F, to provide a disabling effect in a manner based on 
the microwave cooker principle. However, the greatest concern is with systems which can directly 
interact with the human nervous system. There are many reports on so called psychotronic weapons 
which are beyond the brief of this study but one comment can be made.354 The research undertaken to-
date both in the US and in Russia can be divided into two related areas: (i) individual mind control and 
(ii) crowd control. That the US has undertaken a variety of (cid:3)mind control programmes in the past such 
as MkULTRA and MkDELTA is a matter of public record and those using electromagnetic radiation 
such  as  PANDORA  have  been  the  focus  of  researchers  in  para-politics  for  many  years.355  More 
recently, authors such as Begich and Roderick have alleged significant breakthroughs in the ability of 
military high frequency electromagnetic technologies to manipulate human behaviour.356  

What is admitted by the military authorities in the US is that research programmes using so called 
directed energy weapons for anti-personnel and anti-material purposes are proceeding into prototype 
stages357. The military utility of these weapons is that they provide a tunable or rheostat ability a (cid:1)need(cid:2) 
that is emerging as part of the new US military intervention doctrine of so called (cid:3)layered defence.(cid:4) This 
means in practice an (cid:1)onion style(cid:2) of risk where anyone coming into contact with the outer shell may be 
sickened, paralysed. Entering subsequent levels may lead to being  physically harmed,  disabled or 
permanently maimed whilst the core of the zone is protected by lethal technology, contact with which  is 
fatal. 

6.3.5 Area Denial Munitions - are victim initiated technologies which have in the past been used at 
borders and along the perimeters of control zones to prevent entry or exit. At the 1997 Jane(cid:4)s NLW 
conference, the systems manager for the US non-lethal material programe, Hilda Libby, advocated a 
range  of  such  technologies  to  (cid:3)insert into existing weapons platforms(cid:4) including many area denial 
munitions.358 The US has said that it will not sign the Landmines Treaty until 2006 when there are non-
lethal alternatives.   

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Therefore it does not come as a surprise that the search for suitable alternatives covered by Libby 
included (cid:3)non-lethal(cid:4) anti-personnel land mines based on the bounding APERS Mine (volcano M16A2) 
but with entanglement payload and including potential immobilization enhancers  - adhesive net and 
electric sting net; cannister-launched area denial systems.359  Allegedly (cid:3)non-lethal(cid:4) versions of the 
Claymore mine containing plastic rather than steel balls have been also been showcased. However, 
little hard data has been presented on fragment kinetic energies to judge such assertions by the criteria 
outlined in Section 4 and in Table 2 (below). Given the number of such mines which will need to be 
replaced along borders such as that dividing North and South Korea, there is tremendous commercial 
incentive to compete for these contracts. A recent addition has been by the electric stun weapon 
manufacturer Tasertron, who recently announced two devices - a Taser Area denial device (TADD) 
and a (cid:3)Volcano Launched Taser Munition(cid:4), for border control and perimeter protection. Triggering the 
TADD device leads to electric shock darts firing in a multi-directional pattern whereas the Volcan(cid:4)s 
darts go in one direction only.360 

Other second generation area denial technologies which are already available are malodorous 
stench chemicals (which can be used to contaminate an area deemed to be off limits, the chemicals 
can be chosen to be offensive to particular cultural or ethnic groups and sensibilities)361 and aqueous 
foam barriers (which are essentially a biodegradeable form of suds which can be piled as high as four 
feet).362 

6.4 Designer Bio-Weapons For Selective Mass Control The rapid change in biotechnology including 
genetic  engineering  is  already  revolutionizing  medicine  and  agriculture.  However  relatively  little 
attention  has  been  paid  to  its  potential  malign  use  as  surgically  targetable  future  technologies  of 
political control. This possibility of a malign breakthrough was recognised in the early Nineties when 
important advances in the Human Genome Project (involving the mapping of some 3 billion pairs of 
human DNA) and the human diversity project (which looked at the genetic basis for racial differences), 
were  already  taking  place.363    Whilst the idea of genetic weapons is not new364, it was previously 
thought such targeting was impossible because humans are so similar genetically.365 

 However the Genome Diversity Project which stores genetic material from 500 populations around 
the world has found significant differences in blood group proteins. These differences are now thought 
to be sufficiently stable and large to be targeted either by using genetically modified organisms or 
toxins which select a particular genetic marker.  Given the heterogeneous nature of many populations 
including those of the US, only certain political areas and borders could be targeted without the risk of 
so called friendly fire. The biotechnology revolution will bring enormous benefits to our understanding 
and our ability to intervene in life processes.  Many commercial activities will be transformed by such 
research such as tailor-making drugs more exactly for human receptor sites known to be linked to 
particular metabolic pathways. One indicator of the awesome rate of change in this area is the meteoric 
rise in the number of patent requests filed at the US Patent and Trademark Office for nucleic acid 
sequences: 4,000 in 1991 and 500,000 in 1996.366  Multinational drug companies are currently doing a 
complete survey of each of the constituent nucleotides for each human genome group. A major driving 
force is thwarting cancer: some genes force cell growth, some genes inhibit cell growth. The Holy Grail 
of this research is to find a biochemical tool which can enter cancer cells, correct cell growth then stop. 
However, the mirror image of this research is that it will yield knowledge on how to go the other way. As 
the data on human receptor sites accumulates, the risk of breakthroughs in malign targeting of suitable 
micro-organisms at either cell membrane level, or via viral vectors, grows correspondingly.367 

The development of such genetic based weapons is currently banned under the 1972 Biological & 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the 1925 Geneva Protocols and the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
Alas, unlike the CWC, there are currently no verification procedures for the BTWC, it is a gentleman(cid:4)s 
agreement368. The emergence of pepper-gas as a weapon for crowd control is a case in point - as a 
plant toxin it is covered by the BTWC but has simply slipped through the net in terms of internal security 
operations. Other natural and synthetic toxins used for such purposes may be even more hazardous, 
particularly if they are re-engineered. Already the properties of saxitoxin, banned under the CWC and 

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the bio-regulator  endthelia (which is a very powerful constrictor of blood vessels and can produce 
aneurysms) have been noted.  The potential for malign applications emerging for semi-lethal crowd 
control from this research should not be dismissed. Arguably there should be a set of new norms 
regarding  the  use  of  such  momentous  knowledge  of  life  processes  for    human  manipulation  and 
control.369 

The issue is too complex to be adequately covered by this study but the potential significance of 
developments  in  biotechnology  leading  to  a  third  generation  of  instruments  to  manipulate  human 
behaviour deserves a specialist study in its own right. If such a study could be completed in time for the 
BTWC 2001 review conference, it could  help produce a greater scientific knowledge of these issues 
and gain further support for strengthening the convention. 

6.5 International Humanitarian Agencies have been very circumspect about the alleged non-lethality 
of these technologies. Dominique Loye of the ICRC has emphasized that:- (cid:1)there is an urgent need to 
study carefully the potential physical and psychological effects of new technologies such as infra-
sound, electromagnetic waves or even sticky foam on humans. We would hope, for example, that it is 
not  the  aim  of  the  weapons  research  community  to  introduce  into  police  and  military  arsenals 
technologies which may be non-lethal but which will have permanent or non-treatable effects. Yet even 
the temporary effects may need specialised medical treatment which is not available in many countries 
and which is very often not available on the battlefield. We also hope that it is not the intention of the 
promoters of (cid:3)non-lethal(cid:4) weapons to increase the lethality of warfare. Yet these weapons could do just 
that if used in conjunction with lethal force, which is how we understand they are to be deployed.(cid:2)370  

His  colleague,  surgeon  Robin  Coupland  has  pointed  out  that  under  article  35  of  the  Geneva 
protocols, 150 countries have already agreed to ban (cid:1)weapons, projectiles and material and methods 
of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.(cid:2) Since the protocol was 
signed in 1977 little effort has been made to work out what this means in practice. Coupland asks if is 
right that weapons manufacturers and the military should decide the answer? E.g. if sticking foam is 
used in a conflict situation, people could suffocate or be left for dead.371 The extent to which these new 
technologies  can  undermine  international  treaties  and  human  rights  law  is  a  crucial  issue.  The 
manufacturers  and  proponents  of  these technologies are acutely aware of this dimension but the 
commercial pressure on them to (cid:3)push the envelope(cid:4) are intense. ICRC with its SIrUS project has 
adopted a new approach based on the actual weapons design which invites abusability. For example, 
all weapons which are currently banned by international law, such as poison gas, exploding bullets, 
blinding  laser  weapons  and  landmines,  were  designed  to  inflict  a  specific  injury  and  to  do  so 
consistently.  According  to  ICRC  it  is  time  to  put  a  ban  on  any  (cid:3)non-lethal(cid:4)  weapon  that  causes 
superficial  injury  or  unnecessary  suffering  by  specifically  singling  out  anatomical,  biochemical  or 
physiological targets.372 Australia is the first country to commit itself to taking SirUS criteria into account 
when reviewing its weapons policies.373 

Other  critics  say  that  the  notion  of  (cid:3)soft-kill(cid:4)  is  a  fallacy.  The  Nobel  prize  winning  scientific 
organization  Pugwash, has come to the conclusion that the term (cid:3)non-lethal(cid:4) should be abandoned, not 
only because it covers a wide variety of different weapons but also because it can be dangerously 
misleading. (cid:1)In combat situations, (cid:3)sub-lethal(cid:4) weapons are likely to be used in co-ordination with other 
weapons and could increase overall lethality. Weapons purportedly developed for conventional military 
or peacekeeping use are also likely to be used in civil wars or for oppression by brutal governments. 
Weapons developed for police use may encourage the militarisation of police forces or be used for 
torture. If a generic term is needed, (cid:3)less-lethal or pre-lethal might be preferable(cid:2). 374 

The reality can indeed be  far from  non-lethal. A current and future domain of this weaponry is 
during internal security operations, where it provides authoritarian regimes with new tools for crushing 
dissent. Already variants of (cid:3)less-lethal(cid:4) paralysing and incapacitating electroshock weapons have 
found a role in torture.375 The new  weapons potentially offer the torturing states a spine chilling arsenal 
of repressive instruments.  Whilst the genie of advanced crowd control weapons may not go back into 

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the bottle, there is still time for the European Union to develop consistent and appropriate structures of 
accountability.  Pugwash  considered  that  (cid:1)each  of  the  emerging  less-lethal  weapons  technologies 
required  urgent  examination  and  that  their  development  or  adoption  should  be  subject  to  public 
review(cid:2).376  The process should be transparent,  adaptable and open to public and political scrutiny. 
Any class of technology shown to be excessively injurious, cruel, inhumane or indiscriminate, should be 
either prohibited or subject to stringent and democratic controls. 

7. AN APPRAISAL OF LESS DAMAGING  ALTERNATIVES. 

7.1 Crowd Control Technologies and Social Contexts. From the arguments presented above, it is 
clear that the innovation, deployment and overall accountability regarding the use of crowd control 
weapons in Europe is inconsistent and subject to differing levels of both regulation and control. There 
are  tremendous  commercial pressures coming  from crowd control weapon manufacturers urging 
government(cid:4)s to buy newer, more advanced forms of crowd control technology. Nowhere is this more 
apparent than in the United States, where the (cid:3)wild west(cid:4) gun culture yields 30,000 murders each year 
and  over  100,000  people  injured  by  gunshot  wounds.377  Much  of  this  American  crowd  control 
technology overlaps with new US military (cid:3)non lethal(cid:4) technologies and consequentially developments 
within NATO. Thus the new NATO doctrine about using so called (cid:3)non-lethal(cid:4) warfare now means 
civilians and combatants are intentionally targeted with the same weaponry. Some of these are claimed 
to be less damaging but how can we know? 

It  is  obvious  that  America  has  peculiar  problems  associated  with  the  prevalence  of  firearms 
amongst the citizenry under rights guaranteed by their constitution. Although US police have been 
shown to be more than capable of misusing riot weapons when used against crowds such as the WTO 
demonstrations held in Seattle in November 1999, it is undeniable that US police officers do have to 
deal with armed hostage and barricade situations on a daily basis.  In those situations, the use of (cid:3)less-
than lethal(cid:4) weapons may be an entirely appropriate alternative to the use of lethal firearms.378  

However, it is questionable whether European police forces would, or should, want to import the 
(cid:1)gangster cop(cid:2) mentality that has accompanied some of the tactics evolved in the US to deal with this 
level of violent behaviour. What are the alternatives? In many respects, the United States is oddly 
insular  and  inward  looking.  It  is  hard  to  think  of  a  European  Member  State  where  such  a  large 
proportion of the population does not possess a passport, which is reportedly the situation in America. 
Outside  of  the  present    Austrian  government379  most  Europeans  would  find  it  inconceivable  that 
constitutional rights could protect racist and xenophobic propaganda as freedoms of speech, as they 
are in the US under the 1st Amendment. Racist policing can become systemic without appropriate 
accountability. A serious lack of police accountability has allowed certain officers from  forces such as 
the Los Angeles Police Department to shoot innocent citizens, plant evidence, engage in bank robbery, 
rape, practice interrogation methods that have been categorised as torture and award each other 
celebratory plaques for certain kinds of killings.380 

Thankfully, this is not civilisation as  we know it - yet. There are good reasons for drawing back from 
the notion that Corporate America should programme European policing methods for crowd control, 
which it will if the status quo regarding the acquisition and deployment of crowd control  weapons  is 
allowed  to continue in the current under-questioned, under-managed, under-licensed, under-regulated 
and under-accountable manner. This is not to suggest the issue of crowd control weapons is without 
complexity. What this study does assert is that the dangers of such weaponry being used to undermine 
(cid:1)due process(cid:2) are so high, given the second generation of products now entering service in the USA, 
that a certain degree of circumspections is required.  

7.2 The Need for Social Impact Assessments.  Before the advent of Rachel Carson(cid:4)s classic book 
(cid:3)Silent Spring(cid:4),381  the tremendous impact that industrial and pesticide pollutants were having on the 
environment and our food chain were simply not realized. One early response of that awareness of the 
unforseen social impacts of science and technology was the US Congress setting up the forerunner to 

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STOA, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in Washington, to create an early warning system 
to alert decision makers about the potential hazards of technological innovation. Nowadays, the early 
warning system for such concerns about the environment has been institutionalised and we are all 
familiar with the process of Environmental Impact Assessments, which is now seen as a normal part of 
the planning landscape.  

Could not something similar be set up to ensure that decisions regarding new police technologies 
including  crowd  control  weapons  are  fully  informed  by  the  full  range  of  likely  social  and  political 
impacts?  Such technologies  can have profound implications for civil liberties and human rights.  If 
they were subject to a compulsory (cid:3)Social Impact Assessment(cid:4) or audit of the  human and civil rights 
consequences, particularly problematic innovations would not proceed without the legal and regulatory 
framework  being  fully  clarified.    Experience  has  shown  that  vested  interests  soon  surround  the 
implementation of any new technology. Once introduced it is very difficult to reverse an implementation 
decision and its associated cultures.  

Decisions about specific crowd control technologies are often viewed as operational matters and 
simply left to the police or the military.  Questions about appropriateness are taken by user groups and 
often in secrecy without any public debate. A better policy route would be to thoroughly explore the 
impacts of all policing technologies before implementation. A testing set of criteria should be developed 
to objectively judge and assess the impact, ongoing requirement (including  deployment and training 
procedures) and any potential need to withdraw or redesign the technology should untoward impacts 
emerge.  Special consideration should be paid to the dangers of (cid:1)technological creep(cid:2) and (cid:1)decision 
drift(cid:2) whereby a system that would never have been given the go-ahead if introduced in one move, is 
deployed by a series of incremental technological changes and gradual reorientation of training and 
targeting procedures. Such social impact assessments would be able to objectively pronounce on the 
health, safety and legal liability issues associated with particular crowd control weapons before they 
were introduced and ensure a consistent approach. The most efficient alternative to the deployment of 
crowd control weapons are social and economic policies which effectively create areas of freedom, 
security and justice.  The deployment of crowd control weapons is usually an admission that such 
policies have not been implemented or have failed.  In such instances, purely technical means do not 
effect a long term solution and can prove dysfunctional.  

7.3 Alternative Crowd Management Methodologies.  Any alternatives to crowd control technologies 
must be discussed in the context of their role in creating areas of freedom, justice and security and 
must  be  democratically accountable. There may indeed be appropriate (cid:3)non lethal(cid:4) alternatives to 
currently used crowd control weapons but any proposed pragmatic options should be independently 
tested against preset health and safety criteria for both the public and the officers charged with using 
them. There are many potential pitfalls of implementing (cid:1)easy technical fixes(cid:2) based upon centralised 
control  systems,  secrecy  and  a  lack  of  accountability.  It  is  easy  to  substitute  more  repressive 
technologies for social justice as  events recorded in Indonesia, Kenya and most recently Zimbabwe 
testify. (See Section 8).  It is also  easy to reject counter-intuitive alternatives because they seem too 
radical.  A  good  example  is  crowd  control  outside  nightclubs which was always thought to require 
muscle bound (cid:3)bouncers(cid:4) who could tackle any trouble that was presented at the doors by punters who 
might  be  less  than  sober.  However,  the  macho  culture  of  night  club  bouncers  was  based  on  the 
assumption that the threat of violence was the only way to maintain order and overly violent doormen 
caused many of the violent episodes they were there to prevent. Changing the image, training and 
including  more  women  amongst  night  club  door  staff,  has  recently  led  to  less  violence,  partially 
because the women appear to have more sophisticated verbal skills and can diffuse potential violence 
by negotiation rather than coercion. A prescient observation in this regard was given by Her Majesty(cid:4)s 
Inspectorate of Constabulary in the UK (cid:1)Some officers forget that the best weapons they(cid:4)ve got to deal 
with potential violence are their brains and the ability to talk(cid:2).382  

Could a similar approach be successfully adopted for public order policing? Again it seems counter-
intuitive but we might be guided by the notion that if it has already happened then it is possible.  South 
Korea, the most recent case, also seems the least likely. In the past, the South Korean Police have 

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used CS gas to literally fumigate anti-government demonstrations on a scale in a different league to 
even that used by the Police at the anti-WTO demonstrations in Seattle last year, but on a routine basis 
week in, week out. Yet according to the LA Times, last year the South Korean police substituted their 
Darth  Vader  body  armour  and  chemical  fogging  tactics  with  a  move  towards  putting  unarmed 
policewomen to the front lines during demonstrations to calm protestors. The results were impressive 
and instead of the 220,000 canisters of teargas used in 1997, in 1999 none were used. The only 
casualty was the Seoul based tear gas company Dae-A Chemical Industry which closed down last 
April.  It is perhaps significant that because women face much steeper odds getting accepted into the 
police force in Seoul (only 1 in 200 women are accepted onto the force, whereas 1 in10 males applying 
are hired), police women tend to much better educated than their male counterparts. All are graduates 
of 4-year colleges, whereas only 80% of the men hold Bachelors degrees.383 The lessons here are 
quite important, since the Korean Police Authorities have recognised that police-crowd confrontations 
are a process not a single event. More peaceful policing tactics can create more peaceful outcomes. 
The positive benefits are more than just less tear gas on the streets of Seoul. Now that fewer riot police 
are required, riot officers are being redeployed to traffic control and crime prevention. The European 
Parliament might like to learn more from the Seoul Police themselves by organising an official visit for 
relevant Members and Officers to meet with their European counterparts. 

7.4 CCTV Surveillance and Algorithmic Systems. One apparently seductive alternative option is the 
notion of substituting CCTV systems for public order riot squads. However, once a public order incident 
develops, security force commanders prefer the deployment of a (cid:3)real-time(cid:4) dispersal response.  In that 
sense, any passive alternative is not useful in dealing with the immediate consequences, although 
CCTV networks could provide evidence after the event, of those involved in any incidents.  What tends 
to happen in practice is that it is not a case of either crowd control weapons or CCTV but both and 
more.  This  is  certainly  the  case  in  the  UK  where  police  and  military  officers  have  access  to  both 
alternatives.  For example, (cid:1)Heli Tele(cid:2) helicopter mounted CCTV is frequently used to target (cid:1)snatch 
squads(cid:2) onto alleged (cid:3)ring-leaders(cid:4).  In situations such as Indonesia (where European companies have 
sold  both  airborne  surveillance systems, crowd marking & dispersal systems, as well as powerful 
command, control & information computer systems) such targeting may have fatal consequences.  

Nevertheless, there are public order situations where CCTV might have both a deterrent effect and 
a positive role in identifying both hooligans and members of the police and security services who may 
have exceeded their remit. However even in the United Kingdom, which is the most heavily surveilled 
country in the EU, the ubiquitous presence of CCTV cameras does not dissuaded football hooligans 
from threatening and anti-social behaviour.  Indeed, the most comprehensive recent survey of the utility 
of CCTV surveillance systems  in preventing crime (undertaken for the Scottish Office by Professor 
Jason Ditton of the Scottish Centre for Criminology) found that they did not.  Ditton said that (cid:1)the 
cameras  had  not  lived  up  to  their  early  promise(cid:2).  After  four  years  of  monitoring  the  monitors, the 
professor called for (cid:1)an independent watchdog to oversee the use of the technology(cid:2).384  

Members of the Committee will recall that a previous STOA document (PE 166.499) noted the 
emergence of (cid:3)face-recognition(cid:4) cameras but thought that deployment of such systems was five years 
away.  Yet the (cid:3)Mandrake(cid:4) face-recognition system has already been deployed since November 1998 in 
Newham, London and has created the basis of a universal identity recognition network. Such systems 
work by scanning the geometry of faces in a crowd and recognising if they are held in a database of 
individuals of interest. They are not totally reliable generating (cid:3)reliable hits(cid:4) in a claimed 80% of cases 
which in the best case means a 1 in 5 chance of a false identification.385  

The  Newham  system  is  being  extended  and  if  that  process  continues,  the  logic  is  a  total 
surveillance  society  where  everyone(cid:4)s  movements  are  tracked  and  eventually  their  speech  and 
friendship networks as well. Few political systems, even in Europe, have enjoyed absolute certainty of 
long term stability within a democratic framework and there is no guarantee that such stability will 
continue. Any mass surveillance system is potentially much more than an anti-riot network and it is on 
balance probably wise to resist a universal extension of such schemes and keep them limited and 
local.386 

lviii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
However, at enclosed public sports events, such as sports stadiums where public disorder by even 
a quite small minority can have significant  public safety implications, there is a case to explore such 
systems. That case is particularly telling if a club has suffered crowd violence in the past and because 
identification and access are  controlled at turnstiles, the system could have several payoffs including 
more rapid entry for season ticket holders, the automatic exclusion of banned individuals and the real 
time tracking of those caught up in disorder including the police. However, a current failure rate, of at 
least 20%, means that these are not fool proof systems and there should be appropriate procedures for 
dealing with misidentification and to ensure that any material gathered is subject to the terms of extant 
data protection legislation. If Members are minded to explore this option, it may be worth looking at 
piloting  schemes  in  a  few  appropriate  sports  stadia  first  to  gauge  how  well  they  actually  perform 
compared to a similar set of sports stadia which could act as a control. Such an experiment should be 
independently audited taking into account the views of both the police and the fans, before any longer 
term deployment is approved. 

8. EXPORT OF CROWD CONTROL WEAPONS & HUMAN RIGHTS. 

For illustrative purposes we identified the role played by  crowd control weapons in facilitating 
human  rights  violations  in  33 countries (See Appendix 5). Whilst this figure is certainly an under-
representation as hard data quantifying the overall situation is simply not available. It is, nevertheless 
absolutely clear that the export of crowd control technologies raises serious concerns when transferred 
to countries with poor human rights records.  Substantial evidence also exists from the testimony of 
human rights victims compiled by NGO(cid:4)s such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the 
Medical Foundation for the Treatment and Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture and the international 
media, that crowd control technologies are used at the same time as more lethal weapons to create 
gross  human  rights  violations.  The  Technical  Annex  to  this  report  provides  a  comparative  table 
(Appendix 6) indicating the countries which deploy crowd control weapons where there is documented 
evidence of injuries, fatalities and their role in effecting lethal force.  

8.1  Transfers  (Export)  of  Crowd  Control  Technologies.  Research  for  this  report  found 
manufacturers or suppliers of crowd control weapons based in at least 10 of the 15 EU countries. 
These include: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom. (See Appendix 1).  Of these, at least 6 EU countries  (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
and UK) have exported crowd control weapons to a number of countries where human rights violations 
have been committed with such technologies. (E.g. Bahrain, Egypt, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jordan, 
Kenya, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Zambia and Zimbabwe). However, effective parliamentary and 
public scrutiny of the trade and its impacts on human rights violations are made very difficult by the lack 
of comprehensive, timely, accurate and dis-aggregated data on transfers of such weapons at either the 
international, EU and national levels.  For example, the voluntary UN Register of Conventional Arms 
transfers, introduced in 1992, does not require States to provide details for most categories of  crowd 
control weapon transfers.387  The U.N Register provides no details of kinetic or chemical irritant weapon 
transfers. The Chemical Weapon Convention, (which allows  the manufacture, transfer and deployment 
of chemical irritants for law enforcement purposes) has a requirement for States to report transfers of 
such chemical irritants to the CWC Inspectorate, based in the Hague, Netherlands. Currently such data 
is not publicly available. Given that  all states are obliged not to proliferate chemical weapons under the 
terms of the treaty it is arguable that this data should now be in the public domain. 

The introduction of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, in June 1998, was 
welcomed as a first step by many human rights, arms control and development NGOs as well as by 
parliamentarians.  The Code states that export licenses will not be issued if the exports may be used 
for internal repression, or if they may provoke or prolong armed conflicts. Given that crowd control 
weapons are primarily used for (cid:3)internal security(cid:4) purposes there are major concerns that countries with 

lix 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
poor records of human rights violations will use such weapons for (cid:1)internal repression(cid:2).  However, a 
common criticism was the EU Code(cid:4)s lack of transparency and the consequential lack of parliamentary 
and public scrutiny of arms transfers.  The 15 EU countries have agreed to compile an annual report on 
defence exports and on the Code's implementation, but not to make it public, or release it through their 
parliaments.   The EU Code was also criticised for the lack of controls on the brokering and licenced 
production of weapons and munitions. 

Unfortunately, another weakness of the EU Code of Conduct relates to the (cid:1)common control lists(cid:2).  
This list identifies the types of weapons that EU States agree to control via the EU Code.  It would 
appear that France does not classify certain crowd control weapons, namely tear gas, as (cid:1)military 
equipment(cid:2)  but  has  a  7th  Category  weapon  classification  that  is  reported  to  be  exempt  from  the 
requirements for either export licences or firearms ownership licences.388 Therefore if, as occurred in 
1997/8, the United Kingdom rejected export licence applications for tear gas and other riot control 
equipment to Kenya because of human rights concerns, a French company, or UK citizen brokering a 
deal  through  a  French  company,  could  export  the  tear  gas  without  breaching  the  EU  Code  of 
Conduct.389 Other omissions in export controls on crowd control technologies exist in other European 
Union countries. For example, the Irish Government informed Amnesty International that  licences are 
not  required  for  exports  of  Pepper  Spray  or  CR  from  Eire.  This  loophole  raises  similar  concerns 
regarding transhipment of such weapons to (cid:3)repressive regimes(cid:4).390 

Whilst many EU member states do provide, or have recently started to provide Annual Reports on 
arms transfers to their national parliaments, many of these reports actually provide little in the way of 
useful data.391  For example, the recent report from the French Government simply provides data in 
three broad categories, namely: Land, Naval and Air based.392 This contrasts with Annual Reports from 
Italy393 and the United Kingdom394 that provide more specific details.  However, it has been argued by 
human rights organisations that even these more detailed reports prevent effective parliamentary and 
public scrutiny.  For example, the UK Department of Trade & Industry indicated that tear gas transfers 
could  be  recorded  on  the  Export  Control  Organisations  computer  databases  under  12  different 
category codes, namely: ML7, ML2, ML3, ML4, ML6, ML9, ML10, PL5001, PL5018, PL5021, PL5030 or 
1A905 and not only under ML7 as previously stated by the DTi.395  This type of aggregated data makes 
scrutiny very difficult.396 

The detailed, dis-aggregated transfer data is available from some countries.  For example, the table 
(see endnote 397) provides details of a transfer of tear gas via the USA to the Guatemala police from the 
Spanish firm, Falken SA. It should be achievable, within the EU wide Harmonized Customs system to 
provide  data  that  allows  effective  parliamentary  and  public  scrutiny  of  the  trade  in  crowd  control 
weapons.398  Steps now need to be taken to make this practical possibility a political reality.  The 
transfer of crowd control weapons are often promoted by private companies who often also transfer 
militarised tactics overseas, without adequate regard for the human rights situation or accountability of 
military, security and police forces in the countries where these technologies will be deployed. The 
European  Parliament  is  urged  to  consider  options  which  might  be  adopted  to  ensure  that  such 
transfers do not facilitate human rights violations. 

The following case studies provide further detail of the human rights problems associated with such 

transfers and the need for a common approach across all EU member states. 

8.2 Kenya - tear gas, plastic bullets and water cannon. In the run up to Kenya(cid:4)s elections on 29 
December 1997, human rights NGOs raised concerns that the government(cid:4)s intimidation of opponents 
and violent disruption of political rallies threatened to undermine the polls.399 At least nine people were 
killed and hundreds injured when pro-democracy rallies were violently disrupted by security forces.  The 
Kenyan student leader, Janai Robert Orina described how (cid:1)Tear gas is a day-to-day experience for 
us... There are times when the air around the city of Nairobi reeks of it(cid:2).400 

On July 8th 1997, it was reported that Kenyan paramilitary police stormed the All Saints Anglican 
Cathedral,  Nairobi,  attacking pro-reform advocates who were sheltering inside. Reports state that 

lx 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
police  threw  tear  gas  canisters  inside  the  cathedral  and  then  moved  in  wielding  truncheons  and 
describe how (cid:1)an elderly opposition MP and several dozen individuals bled profusely as other victims 
groaned with pain among the pews.(cid:2)401  The police use of tear gas in the All Saints Cathedral was 
confirmed by other sources.402  Following this incident, Amnesty International received the physical 
remains of tear gas canisters and plastic baton round canisters that had been used in Kenya. These 
canisters were identified as having been manufactured in the United Kingdom.403  The use of tear gas 
within confined spaces or when people cannot physically leave an area could be seen as a form of 
punishment rather than dispersal.  When tear gas has been used in these type of circumstances a 
number of severe injuries and death have been attributed to it.404 405  It also appears that when the 
Kenyan police and security units have deployed tear gas, it is not used instead of physical beatings with 
batons,  sticks  or  canes  or  as  an  alternative  to  lethal  force  but  rather  as  an  additional  form  of 
punishment. Following campaigning by human rights organisations, the British government announced 
in March 1998 that since election on May 1st, 1997,  it had rejected (cid:5)1.5 million worth of  applications to 
export certain types of riot control equipment, including batons and tear gas, to the Kenyan police.406 

Unfortunately, during 1998 human rights organisations continued to receive reports of human rights 
violations by the Kenyan security forces and remained concerned over the abuse of security equipment 
such  as  tear  gas  and  plastic  bullets  in  Kenya.    Reports  emerged  of  the  violent  suppression  of  a 
nationwide teachers strike in October 1998.  The 6th October 1998 edition of the Daily Nation  reports 
how police and members of the GSU (General Security Unit) attacked teachers with tear gas, whips 
and rungus (clubs).  According to the report at least ten teachers in Thika district were injured and 
required treatment by the Kenyan Red Cross Society after being tear gassed by police.407  It was 
reported in January 1999 that Kenyan riot police had used rubber bullets, teargas, baton charges and 
water  cannon  against  students    trying  to  plant  trees  in  protest  against  deforestation.  The  report 
described the water cannon as spraying (cid:1)acidic water(cid:2) which probably denotes the use of chemical 
irritants in the water jet.408  

On 10 June 1999, Amnesty International researchers witnessed around 2,000 peaceful protestors, 
led by human rights and church groups, demonstrate for peaceful democratic change in Kenya.  One 
hundred yards from the Parliament building the head of the demonstration was stopped by a wall of 
police armed with riot shields and batons. The peaceful protestors sat on the ground and started to 
sing Christian songs.  After less than 10 minutes police on horseback emerged and rode into the crowd 
of protestors, followed by police on foot who beat the peaceful crowd with sticks.  The crowd reacted 
angrily, and some threw stones at the police.  The police responded by firing tear gas into the crowd 
and the church grounds where some of the protestors had retreated to.409  Over 100 canisters were 
fired in one hour. The police later moved in with water-cannon which fired a mixture of water and tear 
gas, reportedly an irritant and a dye. 

From the witness testimony and the physical remains of canisters, Amnesty International was able 
to identify that the manufacturer of the tear gas was a French-based company, Nobel Securite (formerly 
SNPE).410  Further press reports suggested that the water cannon had been shipped to Kenya from 
either South Africa, Israel or France.411   So even though the United Kingdom had refused export 
licences for tear gas and other riot control equipment to Kenya at least one French company stepped in 
to fill the vacuum. 

8.3 Indonesia.  Over the last 20 years the international media and human rights organisations have 
documented numerous incidents where the Indonesian security forces have deployed both crowd 
control weapons and lethal force, often with severe consequences for peaceful protestors.  However, 
with the exception of water cannon, what is striking is the lack of hard data on specific transfers of such 
crowd control weapons.   

The Indonesian security forces have deployed chemical irritants (CS), plastic baton rounds and 
water cannon that spray a mixture of water, chemical irritant and marker dye.412 Both German and UK 
water cannon were identified as being deployed on the streets of Bandung in July 1996.413 The German 

lxi 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
water cannon were identified as Mercedes Benz vehicles but is unknown who actually constructed and 
supplied the vehicles. The UK water cannons were manufactured by Glover Webb (a subsidiary of 
GKN Defence) and supplied by Procurement Services International. Having permitted the export of 3 
Tactica water cannon in 1994 and another 6 in 1995, the United Kingdom agreed an export licence in 
December 1996 for a further 7 water cannon and 303 Internal Security vehicles in complete disregard 
of numerous reports of the use of such vehicles in undermining human rights.414 

However, despite quite prolific use of crowd control weapons such as tear gas and plastic bullets 
there is little hard data on which countries are providing the transfers of such weapons and munitions. 
Past transfers of riot control weapons to Indonesia have included Mecar bullet-trap rifle grenades415 
and small amounts of tear gas from the UK.416 One possibility is that indigenous companies have 
established local production of such weapons and munitions through licenced production agreements.  
For  example  PT  Pindad  manufactures  a  range  of  small  arms  and  ammunition  under  licenced 
production agreements from European companies including FN Herstal, Browning (Belgium)417 and 
Beretta (Italy).418  It was reported in 1995 that PT Pindad could supply a range of pyrotechnics including 
(cid:1)Grenades, anti-riot, tear gas CN, hand launched(cid:2).419 Such licenced production agreements (where a 
European based company permits a third-country manufacturer to produce products under (cid:3)licence(cid:4)) 
raise grave concerns that European Union embargoes and human rights based export criteria will be 
undermined. 

8.4 Zambia.  On 30 July 1997 events at Freedom House, the UNIP headquarters in Lusaka,  indicated 
the political nature of policing opposition political parties in Zambia. A coalition of opposition political 
parties had planned a march through downtown Lusaka to protest a Supreme Court ruling against them 
in connection with a petition contesting President Chiluba(cid:4)s reelection victory in 1996. A heavy police 
presence broke up the march with tear gas, and a large number of demonstrators -- many women with 
small children -- came into the UNIP building to seek refuge.  

An estimated 100 police officers gathered at the entrance of the building with riot batons, at about  
9:45am  that  day.  The  police  siege  would  last  until  10:00  pm  that  night.  To  force  people  from  the 
building into the street outside, where they would be beaten, police officers used teargas inside the 
building. Several witnesses confirm that police gave no warning before stepping inside and began 
shooting tear-gas from a gun launcher down the internal corridors of the building. Rabbison Chongo, a 
UNIP official, said: (cid:1)I(cid:2)ve never seen so much tear gas. They broke doors of Freedom House and they 
fired tear gas into the building. So much tear gas, you couldn(cid:2)t see down the hall five feet in front of 
you. So much that you can(cid:2)t get air in the lungs, you can(cid:2)t breath(cid:3).420 Another person in the building that 
day, Melania Chipungu, said she began to suffocate because of the tear gas.(cid:2)421 Apparently the police 
prevented  the  Zambian  Red  Cross  from  providing  medical  assistance  to  those  affected  by  police 
beatings and tear gas on this422 and other occasions423. 

SECTION C.  TECHNICAL ANNEX 

The technical and analytical material used to prepare this report has been collated into a series of 8 
appendices to which this report refers.  It is recommended that both documents are read together.  

lxii 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1. THE MAIN CHEMICAL IRRITANT RIOT CONTROL GASES 

Stability / Solubility 

Effects 

Relative Power 

Powder. Insoluble but 
stable in water, ideal for 
use in water cannon. 
Soluble in organic solvent 

Burning sensation in the eyes. Heavy flow 
of tears. Stinging of moist skin. Blisters at 
high concentrations. Salivation, nausea 
and headaches. 

Melting 
Point / 
C 

59 

Chemical Name and 
Formula 

Short 
Name 

Form 

1-Chloroacetophenone 

CN 
Mace 

2-Chlorobenzylidene 
malonitrile 

CS 
Tear Gas 

Dibenz -1,4 -oxazepine 

CR 
Fire gas 

White 
Solid 
Odour of 
apple 
blossom 

White 
Solid 
Pungent 
odour of 
pepper 

Pale 
Yellow 
Solid 

94 

Powder. Insoluble and 
unstable in water, soluble 
in apolar and organic 
solvents. Used in water 
cannon   

72 

Soluble in water. 

Oleoresin Capsicum 

OC 
Pepper 

Colourless 

65 

Stable in water, soluble in 
organic solvent. 

Nonivamid 

PAVA 

N/A 

Stable in water, soluble in 
organic solvent. 

Diphenylaminearsine 

DM 
Adamsite 

Yellow-
Green 
odourless 

N/A 

Partially soluble in water, 
relatively insoluble in 
organic solvents. 

lxiii 

Strong lachrymation with involuntary 
closing of the eyes. Burning sensation on 
moist skin, 2nd degree burns. Coughing 
and vomiting at higher concentrations. 

Very intense skin pain particularly around 
moist areas. Involuntary closing of eyes 
resulting in temporary blindness which 
may cause panic or hysteria. 

Uncontrollable coughing and gasping for 
breath. Eyes close immediately. Loss of 
body motor control. Intense burning 
sensation. Leads to immediate 
incapacitation 

Burning ache and stinging of skin, 
redness depending on concentration of 
PAVA, violent pain and blepharospasm in 
eye, uncontrollable coughing and 
gasping, no immunity with repeated 
doses. 

Burning in throat, pain in chest, 
uncontrollable coughing and sneezing, 
vomiting, more prolonged systemic effects 
i

l d h

d h

l d

t

i

ICt50 
(mg.min/m3) 

20 

3.6 

1 

5 

30 

0.7 

22-150 nausea 
370 
vomiting 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 1. THE MAIN CHEMICAL IRRITANT RIOT CONTROL GASES 

Chemical Name and 
Formula 

Short 
Name 

Form 

Melting 
Point / 
C 

Stability / Solubility 

Effects 

Relative Power 

ICt50 
(mg.min/m3) 

include headaches, mental depression, 
chills, abdominal cramps, vomiting, 
diarrhea lasting several hours 

TABLE 2: COMPARATIVE EFFECTS OF VARIOUS LESS LETHAL KINETIC IMPACT MUNITIONS 

Munition 

Manufacturer 

Country 

Projectile weight / g 

Range / m 

Impact Energy/ Joules 

Plastic Bullet 

Royal Ordnance 

UK 

(cid:1)Cross Cartridge(cid:2) 

Heckler and Koch 

Germany 

Flash Ball 

Jelly Baton 

Verney Carron  

France 

Crown Aircartridge 

Netherlands 

Flexible Baton 

MK Ballistic Systems 

Bean Bag 

MK Ballistics 

(cid:1)Cease and Desist(cid:2) 

Milstor Corporation 

Rubber baton slug 

Fiocchi 

USA 

USA 

USA 

USA 

Slingshot Bullet Machine 

TFM 

South Africa 

MR 35 Punch 

Manurhin 

Spherical Ball 55mm 

Rubber Bullet 

SNPE 

SNPE 

Kraken 59mm 

Policske Strojirny 

France 

France 

France 

Poland 

lxiv 

135 

179 

28 

N/A 

40 

40 

N/A 

4.5 

107 

21 

1355 

46 

56 

25-60 

36462 

12 

N/A 

N/A 

36462 

150-210424 

above 200 at muzzle425 

200 at 7m426 

265427 

163428 

120429 

Less than 18 

130 at 10m430 

15-40 

175 max 

Up to 10 

120 at muzzle, 77 at 10m431 

205 at muzzle432 

150-200433 

more than 30 

630 at muzzle, 150 at 30m434 

10 - 30 

50 

240 at muzzle, 45 at 30m435 

227 at 30m436 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 2: COMPARATIVE EFFECTS OF VARIOUS LESS LETHAL KINETIC IMPACT MUNITIONS 

Munition 

Manufacturer 

Country 

Projectile weight / g 

Range / m 

Impact Energy/ Joules 

Arwen AR-1  

Royal Ordnance 

UK 

79.4 

20-100 

220 at muzzle, 70 at 30m437 

Impact energy: 
- below 20.3 Joules (15 foot lbs) is described as safe or low hazard, provided the projectile is large enough not to damage the eyes;  
-  between 40.7 - 122 Joules (30 and 90 foot pounds) is described as a dangerous area for impact energy  
- above 122 Joules (90 foot pounds) is described as being in the severe damage region  
(From: Egner, D.O. et al (1973) (cid:1)A multi disciplinary technique for the evaluation of less lethal weapons Vol 1'. US Department of Justice. 

Impact energies in the table are given at the range (in metres) for that projectile, unless otherwise stated. 

lxv 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES & REFERENCES 

1. See (cid:1)Action plan of the Council and the Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, security and 
justice(cid:2) (text adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 3 December 1998) Official Journal of the European Communities C19, vol 42, 23 January 1999. 

2.A new beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland -The report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland. September 1999,  
http://www.belfast.org.uk/report/ 

3. Statement by the UK Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs (1997). (cid:1)Action being taken to ban the export of electro-shock 
weapons(cid:2). 28th July. 

4.European Parliament, Committee On Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, 14 January 1999 - PE227.710/fin. 

5.Given that the EU recently gave recognition that certain classes of crowd control equipment can be used for human rights violation (when setting 
export restrictions to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) it would be a useful starting point if this typology of weapons and ammunition were 
considered and agreed as a base line when excluding crowd control weapons from export to human rights violating regimes. (Council Regulation (EC) 
No 926/98 of 27 April 1998 concerning reduction of certain economic relations with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Official Journal L130,01, 05/1998 (Doc. 
398R0926) The community legislation in force  is comprehensive and restricts exports of equipment which might be used for internal repression including anti-
riot shields, water cannon, acoustic devices for riot control, electric-shock belts designed for restraining human beings, vehicles designed to be electrified to repel 
boarders, portable teargas and pepper-gas sprays, electric shock shields, batons, tasers etc).  

6.This report (PE 166.499) is available free from the European Parliament or via http://jya.com/stoa-atpc.htm 

7.See Ackroyd et. al (1980) for a historical discussion of the different types of riot weapons used in European foreign colonies and why. 

8. Lamb, Christopher (1995) (cid:1)Non-Lethal Weapons Policy: Department of Defence Directive(cid:2) 1st January. p.1. 

9. A comprehensive bibliography is presented in Bunker, R.J. (ed.) (1998) (cid:1)Non-Lethal Weapons: Terms and References(cid:2). INSS Occasional paper 15. USAF 

lxvi 

 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
Institute For National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado. (Available via http://www.infowar.com/resource/res_100997a.html-ssi). 

10. See Wright, S (1999) (cid:1)The Hypocrisy of (cid:1)Non-Lethal(cid:2) weapons(cid:2). Le Monde Diplomatique. December. Lewer, N. & Schofield, S. (1997) (cid:1)Non Lethal weapons - 
a Fatal Attraction(cid:2). Zed Press, London. Dando, M (1996) (cid:1)A new form of warfare: the rise of non-lethal weapons(cid:2).  Brasseys, London. 

11. Defense News October 1999 

12. The Technical Annex contains 8 Appendices which provide a detailed technical treatment of the current state of the art. Appendix 1 has used open source 
literature derived from military, security and police exhibitions, to identify the key manufacturers, suppliers and distributors of crowd control weapons worldwide. 

13. See (cid:1)Action Plan of the Council & Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam on an area of freedom, 
security and justice(cid:2). (Text adopted by the Justice and Home Affairs Council, 3 December 1998) Official Journal of the European Communities, 
C19, Vol 42, Notice No. 1999/C19/0123. January 1999. 

14. Archer, Denis, H.R. (Ed)(1978) (cid:1)Jane(cid:2)s Infantry Weapons 1978'. Jane(cid:2)s Publication Group, UK. 

15.Dewar, Michael (1979) (cid:1)Internal Security Weapons and Equipment of The World(cid:2). Ian Allan Ltd, London, UK. 

16. Manufactured or distributed by companies such as Armament Systems and Procedures, Inc (USA), Civil Defence Supply Ltd (UK), ICL 
Technical Plastics (UK), Le Protecteur (France) and Dipl Ing. Walfass (Germany). 

17. Manufactured or distributed by companies such as Bonowi (Germany), ISPRA (Israel), DEFEX (Spain), Federal Laboratories & Mace Security International 
(USA),  

18. Manufactured or distributed by companies such as  Verney Carron (France), Flashball; SAE Alsetex (France); Pipenbrock Pyrotechnic (Germany); Heckler & 
Koch (Germany), Rubber Impact Cartridge; Simad Stacchini (Italy) Baton round; Crown Aircartridge (mnetherlands), Jellybaton; Swartklip (South Africa), Pains 
Wessex and Haley & Weller (UK),  and the US Army Ring Airfoil Civil Disturbance Control system. 

19. Manufactured or distributed by companies such as Manhurin (France), MR35 Punch; Royal Ordnance (UK), Arwen  which can fire a range of 
37/38mm munitions including smoke, irritant CS gas and variable range plastic baton rounds and Mechem (South Africa)  MGL 40mm Multiple 
Grenade Launcher. 

20. Manufactured or distributed by companies such as GKN Defence (UK), Mercedes Benz (Germany), CSI Princhim, Lohr and Soframe (France), 

lxvii 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Avnon and Beit Alfa (Israel), Custom Armoring Corp (USA). 

21. Manufactured or distributed by companies such as Ruggierie (France) blinding grenade, Nico Pyrotechnik (Germany) Flash-Stun and 
Distraction Grenades, Royal Ordnance (UK) hand assault sound grenade. 

22. Manufactured or distributed by companies such as SAE Alsetex (France); Piepenbrock Pyrotechnic (Germany); NORINCO, (China) 

23.Manufactured or distributed by companies such as Haley & Weller (UK), Nobel Securite (France), ISPRA, (Israel) and Defense Technology Corp 
(USA). 

24. Manufactured or distributed by companies such as Le Protecteur (France), SAE Alsetex (France), IDC Chemie (Germany), Piepenbrock 
Pyrotechnik (Germany), Falken SA (Spain), Mace Security International (USA), Zarc International (USA), Bsafe Industries(cid:2) Devastator, (USA). 

25. Manufactured or distributed by companies such as SAE Alsetex (France), ISPRA (Israel), Manroy (UK), Manpack Mist Sprayer and Defense 
Technology Corp (USA) . 

26. Manufactured or distributed by companies such as AKAH (France), Eclats Antivol (France), SAE Alsetex (France), Dipl Ing H Wallfass (Germany), ISPRA 
(Israel), NitSpy (Spain), Teh Huang Plastic Co Ltd (Taiwan), Nova Products (USA), Tasertron (USA). 

27. Non-lethal Weapons for Law Enforcement: Research Needs and Priorities.  A Report to the National Science Foundation, Security Planning Corporation, First 
Printing, March1972.   

28.  For a more technical explanation of such performance calculation see; US Department of Justice. (cid:3)Multi-disciplinary technique for the 
evaluation of less-lethal weapons, Volume 1'. July 1973.   

29.Office of the Director of Defence Research and Engineering (1959) (cid:3)Report of the Task Group on Biological and Chemical Weapons 
Development of the Defense Science Board(cid:4). DSB 225/3. 18th Feb. vol.2, p26. 

30. Ibid, Vol 1, pp 1-2. Such work was continued. (See section 6) 

31. A provision made under the Verification Annexe V1.2. Organisation For the Prohibition Of Chemical Weapons, Convention on The Prohibition of the 

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Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and their Destruction. August 1994, p.122. 

32. For a discussion of the background to this information which emerged from South Africa(cid:2)s Truth and Reconciliation Commission which revealed that a host of 
some 500 products was being produced as secret poisons against Anti-Apartheid activists, see Lovell, J. (1998) (cid:1)S.African Panel told of a secret murder factory(cid:2). 
Reuters. June 9. 

33. Sanford, J.P. (1976) (cid:3)Medical Aspects of Riot Control (harrassing) agents(cid:4). Ann. Rev. Med. 27, pp. 412-419. 

34. The most comprehensive record of this research is provided by Robinson,J.P. (1994) (cid:3)Disabling Chemical Weapons: some technical and 
historical aspects(cid:4). Working paper of the Pugwash Study Group on Implementation of CBW Conventions. Second Workshop. Den 
Haag/Noordwijk, Netherlands. 27-29th May.  

35. Indian Border Security Force Tear Smoke Unit (TSU), Tekanpur, Gwalior, India. 

36. Chemical Warfare laboratories researched the analogues of this irritant (such as VAN) for many years as an aid to understanding the 
neurophysiology of pain. Reviewed in (cid:3)Substances Producing Pain & Itch(cid:4). Arnold 1964. Letter to Steve Wright from R.M. Watson (the then 
Director of the UK Chemical Defence Establishment at Porton Down),  dated 22nd. July 1975. 

37.IDC of Switzerland packages CN and CS into special 18 litre canisters as well as special drums of 30 to 200 litres and with base solutions which 
can be individually dyed. IDC brochure (cid:3)Irritant agent base solutions CS and CN for spraying with water launcher cannons(cid:4). Displayed at Milipol 
Exhibition, France, 1993. 

38. Police and Security News 5-6/99. 

39. (cid:3)Less lethal munitions are they really safe and effective(cid:4), http://www.cactive.com/cato/NIJ.html 

40. Barzilay, D. (1973) (cid:3)The British Army in Ulster(cid:4). Vol 1. Century Books, Belfast. 

41. See for example (cid:3)Jane(cid:4)s Security & Counter-Insurgency Equipment 1993/94'.Jane(cid:2)s Publication Group, UK. 

42. See for example Technical specification for the (cid:3)Slingshot(cid:4) rubber bullet weapon manufactured by TFM Olifantsfontein Pty (South Africa).  

lxix 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
Company Brochure, April 1996. 

43. Los Angeles Times 31/5/94 gives details that foam rubber rounds have also been developed. 

44.The Kraken weapon which fires commercial ten manufactured by Policske strojirny a.s. Policka, Poland. Company brochure. 1998 

45. For example Nobel Securite , France, large 55mm rubber balls. 

46. See B(cid:2)Tselem (1998) (cid:1)Death Foretold - the firing of rubber bullets to disperse demonstrators in the Occupied Territories(cid:2). P25. 

47. See for example Applegate, R. (1969) (cid:3)Riot Control - Materiel and Techniques(cid:4). Stackpole Books, Harrisburg, USA.  BSSRS (1985) 
(cid:3)TechnoCop - New Police technologies(cid:4).  Free Association Books, London. 

48.See for example Israel Security Catalogue, 1990, Sibat, Israel Ministry of Defence, Avnon Trade Ltd, Israel, company brochure. 

49. International Defense Review (1994) (cid:3)Wanted: a watch on non-lethal weapons(cid:4). 1 April, vol 027, No. 004, p1. 

50. Independent Evaluation Report of TASER and AIR TASER conducted energy weapons. 10th September 1999.  
Http://www.airtaser.com/Laur/Report.html 

51.This feature is widely being used by a large number of U.S. correctional agencies as a means of subject control and crowd control(cid:3) (Independent Evaluation 
Report of TASER and AIR TASER conducted energy weapons. 10.9.99 Http://www.airtaser.com/Laur/Report.html 

52.Robinson, MN; Brooks CG; Renshaw, GD (1991) (cid:3)Electric Shock Devices and their effects on the Human Body(cid:4), Medicine, Science, Law. Vol 
30, no.4, p285-300. 

53. Ordog,G.J; Wasserberger, M.D; Schlater,T; Balasubramanium,S (1987) (cid:3)Electronic Gun (Taser) Injuries(cid:4), Annals of Emergency Medicine, Vol 
16, 1 Janaury, p103-108 

54. Roy, O.Z; Podgorski,A.S (1989) (cid:3)Tests on a shocking device - the stun gun(cid:4), Medical & Biological Engineering & Computing, Vol 27, p445-
448. 

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55. For example the Cochrane Steel Products (Pty) Ltd of South Africa, system as deployed in Taipei, Taiwan. 

56. An effort has also been made to provide a comprehensive survey of such practices and legislation via the questionnaires circulated by 
Amnesty International as part of this study. An analysis of the responses is presented in Appendix 2. 

57. Adopted and proclaimed by the UN. General Assembly, 10 December 1948. 

58. Adopted by the UN General Assembly, 16 December 1966. Entered into force 3rd January 1976 

59. Article 33 of the Vienna Declaration states that governments have a duty to train their law enforcement officers in human rights. 

60. See (cid:3)A new beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland - The report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland(cid:4). September 
1999. http://www.belfast.org.uk/report. 

61. European Parliament, Committee On Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy. 14th January 1999 - PE227.710/fin. 

62. International Committee of the Red Cross (cid:3)The SIrUS Project and Reviewing the Legality of New Weapons(cid:4) is available from 
http://www.icrc.org 

63. For a useful discussion of this point see Jacobsson, Dr Marie (of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs) (1999) (cid:3)International law 
perspectives on non-lethal weapons(cid:4). A paper presented to (cid:3)Fielding non-lethal weapons in the new Millennium(cid:4). Jane(cid:4)s NLW (cid:4)99 Conference. 1-2 
November, London. 

64.The proposed changes to the SIrUS project include (i) a provision that the primary effect should not be to target a specific part of the human 
anatomy, physiology or biochemistry and (ii) The injuries of the survivors should be treatable in a non-specialist facility. Coupland, R. (1996) 
Medicine & Global Survival 1996.3.A1,p.6. 

65. A fuller discussion of this research is contained in Coupland, Robin. M. (ed) (1997) 'The SIRUS Project - Towards a determination 
of which weapons cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering(cid:4). International Committee of the Red Cross. Geneva. 

66. Chemical Weapon Convention 1993. Article II, paras 2 & 7. 

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67. In the SIPRI Yearbook 1998, page 467 Jean Pascal Zanders has explained that ...(cid:4)under the general purpose criterion of the CWC, certain 
purposes for which the objects for which objects may be employed are prohibited but not the objects themselves. Article II of the CWC thus defines 
CW as any toxic chemical or its precursors intended for purposes other than those not prohibited by the CWC as well as munitions, devices or 
equipment specially designed to be used with them. 

68. Experts advise caution on this point, since whilst riot control agents are permitted under article 1, para5 and Article II, paras 1,2,7 and 9(d) of 
the CWC, there are still limits. SIPRI has provided an example of a 1997 NATO exercise undertaken near Riga in Latvia under the Partnership For 
Peace exercise where a World War I lacrimator and asphyxiating agent , chloropicrin was used to simulate chemical contamination. The exercise 
was halted when officials realized that this agent was listed in Schedule 3 of the CWC and according to Article II, para7, could not be considered 
as a riot control agent. 

69. Dinmore, G. (1997) (cid:3)US unit repels Serb mob with tear gas(cid:4). Financial Times. 2nd September ,p1. 

70. Thus there are several gray zones where the use of chemical weapons for controlling crowds falls between warfare and domestic riot control. 
The key question here is the extent to which the chemical agents used, the nature of the disseminating devices and the actual quantities used, are 
consistent with the legal purposes not prohibited by the convention. Artillery shells and other indiscriminate mass dissemination devices can not 
properly be considered instruments of domestic riot control. In those instances where the CWC prohibits chemical irritants and disseminating 
devices, possessor states must both declare and destroy them in order to meet their obligations under the convention.  

71. According to SIPRI Chemical Weapons expert Jean Pascal Zanders, the matter is further complicated by positions taken by 
individual countries in terms of their reservations in ratifying the CWC. Zanders, J.P., Hart, J. (1998) (cid:3)Chemical and biological weapon 
developments and arms control(cid:4). SIPRI Yearbook 1998. p467. 

For example the (cid:3)US senate ratified the CWC on the understanding that the convention would not restrict its use of riot control 
agents, including use against combatants in the following cases: (a) the conduct of peacetime military operations within an area of 
continuing armed conflict where the United States is not a party to the conflict (e.g. Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia); (b) consensual 
peacekeeping operations when the use of force is authorized by the receiving state, including operations pursuant to Chapter VI of 
the UN Charter. The US Senate accepted the definition of a riot control agent in Article II of the CWC but stated explicitly that the 
(cid:3)President shall take no measure and prescribe no rule or regulation, which would alter or eliminate Executive Order 11850.(cid:4) - as 
used by President Bush in the Gulf war to justify use of riot control agents in search and rescue operations. 

72. A copy of the ethical policy on the Human Genome project and recent discussion is available in Rothman, H (2000) (cid:3)Disseminating the 

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principles of the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights(cid:4).  In (cid:3)New Genetics and Society(cid:4), v19, n1. Taylor & Francis. 

73. Presented by the Omega Foundation to a STOA scoping meeting, held at the European Parliament, Brussels, 5 August 1999. 

74. Coupland, Robin. (Ed) (1997) (cid:3)The SIrUS Project - towards a determinations of which weapons cause superfluous injury or unnecessary 
suffering(cid:4). ICRC, Geneva. 

75. OPCW, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and On their 
Destruction, (Corrected Version) 8 August 1994, the Hague, Netherlands. 

76.(cid:1)As with other foreign chemicals which man(sic) may be exposed, no matter how detailed, extensive and carefully effected are the pre-clinical 
toxicity investigations and observations in controlled human exposures, there can be no complete guarantee from such studies that there is 
absolute safety in use for a given chemical.(cid:3) Ballantyne, B. (1997) (cid:1)Riot Control Agents - Biomedical and Health Aspects of the Use of Chemicals in 
Civil Disturbances(cid:2). Medical Annual. pp.7-41. 

77.(cid:3)Politician and scientist alike must accept the inescapable conclusion that any substance capable of producing an intolerable irritation at low 
concentrations must also produce a concomitantly high toxicity. In other words, the existence of ideal riot agents of sufficient safety not to impair 
the health of rioters or accidentally exposed innocents is merely notional.(cid:3) Jones, R. (1973) (cid:1)Return To Riot Control(cid:2). New Scientist. May 31, 
pp.546-547. 

78. Ballantyne, B., Swanson, D.W. (1978) (cid:3)The comparative acute mammalian toxicity of 1-chloroacetophenone(CN) and 2-chlorobenzylidene 
malononitrile (CS)(cid:4). Arch Toxicol. 40, pp.75-95. 

79. Sidell, F.R. (1997) (cid:3)Riot Control Agents, in (cid:3)Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare(cid:4). Chapter 12.  Borden Institute, Walter Reed 
Army medical Center, pp.308-325. 

80. Kibler, A.L. (1933) (cid:3)The After-Effects of Chloroacetophenone(cid:4). Edgewood Arsenal, Md Medical Research laboratories. Technical Report 133, 
quoted in Sidell, 1997 op.cit. 

81. Holland, P., White R.G. (1972) (cid:3)The cutaneous reactions produced by o-chloro-benzylidene malonitrile and 1-chloroacetophenone when applied 
directly to the skin of human subjects(cid:4). British Journal of Dermatology. 86. pp 150-154. 

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82. Chung, C.W., Giles, A.L. (1972) (cid:3)Sensitization of guinea pigs to alpha-chloroacetophenone (CN) and ortho-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile 
(CS), tear gas chemicals(cid:4). Journal of Immunology. 109. pp 284-293. 

83. Pennys, N.S., Israel, R.M., Indgin, S.M. (1969) (cid:3)Contact dermatitis due to 1-chloroacetophenone and chemical mace(cid:4). New England Journal of 
Medicine. 281. pp.413-415. See also Penney, N.S. (1971) (cid:3)Contact dermatitis due to chloroacetophenone(cid:4). Fed Proc. 30. pp96-99. 

84. Oksala, A. and Salminen, L. (1975) (cid:3)Eye Injuries Caused By Tear Gas Hand Weapons(cid:4). Acta Opthalmologica. Vol 53. pp 908-913. 

85. Levine, R.A., Stahl, C.J. (1968) (cid:3)Eye injury caused by tear gas weapons(cid:4). Amer.J. Opthalmol. 65. pp 497-508. 

86. Rengstorff, R.H. (1969) (cid:3) Tear gas and riot control agents: A review of eye effects(cid:4). Optom Week. 60. pp 25-28. 

87. Chapman, A.J., White, C. (1978) (cid:3)Death resulting from Lachrymatory agents(cid:4). J.Forensic Sci. 23. pp 527-530. 

88. Stein, A.A., Kirwan, W.E. (1964) (cid:3)Chloroacetophenone (teargas poisoning): A clinico-pathologic report(cid:4). J. Forensic Sci. 9. pp 374-382. 

89. Not surprisingly, much of the critical comment has come from commercial promoters of alternative products e.g. Bleetman, A., Peet, A. (1999) 
(cid:3)Incapacitant devices: an evaluation of Oleoresin Capsicum spray(cid:4). Unpublished report to Alarmgrip UK, 11 August. 

90. United Kingdom (1960) patent specification 967 660. 

91. One of the most relevant and perceptive toxicological analyses of this aspect is provided by Hu, H., Fine, J., Epstein, P., Kelsey, K., Reynolds, 
P. and Walker, B. (1989) (cid:3)Tear Gas - Harrassing Agent or Toxic |Chemical Weapon(cid:4). JAMA. August 4. pp 660-663. 

92. Ballantyne, B., Callaway, S. (1972) (cid:3)Inhalation toxicology and pathology of animals exposed to o-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS)(cid:4). Med. 
Sci and the Law. 12. pp 43-65.  

93. Hu, H., Christiani, D. (1992) (cid:3)Reactive airways dysfunction after exposure to teargas(cid:4). Lancet. 339. 1535. 

94. See Ballantyne, B., Swanston, D.W. (1978) (cid:3)The comparative acute mammalian toxicity of 1-chloroacetophenone(CN) and 2-chlorobenzylidene 
malononitrile (CS)(cid:4). Arch. Toxicol. 40. pp 75-95. Also Gaskins, J.R., Hehir, R.M., MaCaulley, D.R., Ligon, E.W. (1972) (cid:3)Lacrimating Agents (CS 

lxxiv 

 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
and CN) in rats and rabbits(cid:4). Arch. Env. Health. 24.  pp 449-454. 

95. Sidell, F.R. (1997) (cid:3)Riot Control Agents(cid:4)  in (cid:3)Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare(cid:4), Chapter 12. Borden Institute, Walter Reed 
Army Mdical Center. pp 308-325. 

96. Schindel, H.J. (1993) (cid:3)Assessment of health effects of CS gas(cid:4). Gesundddheitwesen, Germany. 55. pp 372-5. 

97. See Himsworth, H. (1971) (cid:3)Report of the Inquiry into the Medical and Toxicological Aspects of CS (orthochlorobenzylidene Malonitrile, II 
Enquiry into Toxicological Aspects of CS and its Use for Civil purposes(cid:4). HMSO, England. Also Save the Children (1989) (cid:3)Report on the status of 
Palestinian Children: Uprising in the Occupied territories 9 Dec 1987-9 East Jerusalem, Israel(cid:4). And Krapf, R., Thalmann, H. (1981) (cid:3)Akute 
Exposition durch CS-Rauchgas und linische Beobachtungen(cid:4). Schweiz Med Wochenschr. 11. 2056-2060 cited in Hu et. al. 1989, op.cit  

98. See New Scientist, 5 February 1976, (cid:3)Teargas in high doses is lethal(cid:4) p.267. See also (cid:3)The Himsworth Committee Report(cid:4). HMSO, Cmnd 4775, 
1971. 

99.Quoted from Nairn, A. (1988) (cid:3)Tears of Rage(cid:4). Multinational Monitor. Vol 9. no4, April. 

100. Zekri, A.M.B., King, W.W.K., Yeung, R. and Taylor, W.R.J. (1995) (cid:3)Acute mass burns caused by o-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS) tear 
gas(cid:4). Burns. Vol. 21. No.8. pp 586-589. 

101. Hu, H., Fine, J., Epstein, P., Kelsey, K., Reynolds, P. and Walker, B. (1989) (cid:3)Tear Gas - Harrassing Agent or Toxic |Chemical Weapon(cid:4). 
JAMA. August 4. pp 660-663. 

102. Schmid, E., Bauchinger, M. (1991) (cid:3)Analysis of the aneuploidy inducing capacity of 2-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS) and metabolites 
in V79 Chinese hamster cells(cid:4). Mutagesis. 6. pp 303-5. 

103. Beswick, F.W., Holland, P., Kemp, K.H. (1972) (cid:3)Acute effects of exposure to ortho-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile and the development of 
tolerance(cid:4). Br. J. Ind. Med. 29. pp 298-306. 

104. Klapper, J.A., McColloch, M.A., Merkey, R.P. (1971) (cid:3)The Relationship of Personality to Tolerance of an Irritant Compound(cid:4). Edgewood 
Arsenal Medical Research Laboratories, USA. Technical Report 4577. 

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105. McNamara, B.P., Rennie, R.A., Rozmiarek, H., Ford, D.F., Owens, E.J. (1973) (cid:3)CS: A study of Carcinogenicity(cid:4). Edgewood Arsenal National 
Technical Information Service, USA. Publication FB TR-73027. 

106. Personal communication from the UK Home Office, Police Scientific Development Branch to independent UK researcher, dated 29th March 
2000.  

107. Ballantyne, B. (1977) (cid:3)Riot Control Agents(cid:4). In Scott, R.B., Frazer, J. (eds) (1977) Medical Annual. Wright & Sons, Bristol UK. 

108. Ballantyne, B., Gall, D., Robson, D.C. (1976) (cid:3)Effects of Drenching With Dilute Solutions of o-Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile (CS) and 
Chlorobenz(b.f)-1.4-oxazepine (CR)(cid:4). Med. Sci. Law. Vol.16 No.3, pp.159-170. 

109. Ballantyne B., (1977), op.cit 

110. Upshall, D.G. (1973) (cid:3)The effects of dibenz(b,f)-1:4 oxazepine (CR) upon rat and rabbit embryonic development(cid:4). Toxicol. Appl. Pharmacol. 
24. pp 45-59. 

111. Himsworth H., (1971) op.cit. 

112. See STOA report, PE 166.499 available at http://jya.com/stoa-atpc.htm , for a fuller discussion. 

113. Los Angeles Times, June 18, 1995. 

114. Salem, H., Olajos, N.J., Miller, L.M., Thomson, S.A. (1993) (cid:3)Capsaicin Toxicology review(cid:4). US Army Erdec, Life Sciences department. 

115. Edwards, S.M., Granfield, J., Jamie, O. (1997) (cid:3)Evaluation of Pepper Spray(cid:4). National Institute of Justice. US Dept of Justice. 

116. See Busker, R.W., van Helden, H.P. (1998) (cid:3)Toxicologic evaluation of pepperspray as a possible weapon for the Dutch police force:risk 
assessment and efficacy(cid:4). Am. J. Forensic Med. Pathol. 19 (4). pp 309-16. 

117. Lakartidningen (1993), nr7 s.588-589 cited in Winfridsson, A. (1999) (cid:3)Pepparspray och targasspray till valdshotade kvinnor(cid:4). Institute of 
Criminologies, Stockholm University in explaining why OC was rejected in favour of CS for licensed protection sprays for women at risk of male 

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violence. 

118. Stopford, W. Dr (1996) (cid:3)Statement concerning patho-physiology of Capsicum and risks associated with Oleo-Resin capsicum exposure(cid:4). 
Division of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, Duke University Medical Center, Durham, North Carolina. July. 

119. See GB Application No. WO1998GB0001511, Priority No. GB1997000106363 Pelargonic Acid Vanillyamide containing tear gas. 

120. UK House of Commons Written Answer from Mr. Boateng to Mr. Flyn. Hansard. 9 June 1999, col. 335. 

121. Police Review (1998) (cid:4)Contract Awarded to research water-based CS spray alternative(cid:4). 19th December. 

122. SIPRI (1975) (cid:4)Delayed Toxic Effects of Chemical Warfare Agents(cid:4). Stockholm, Sweden, pp 15-17. 

123. Physicians For Human Rights, (1987) (cid:3)The Use of Tear Gas in the Republic of Korea: A report by Health professionals(cid:4). 
http://www.phrusa.org/research/chemkorea.html 

124. Minkahyup Human Rights Group for prisoners of conscience (1996) (cid:3)Human Rights Situation in Korea:An Urgent Report(cid:4). September. 

125. Ibid. In 1987, the US Physicians For Human Rights following their own field research asserted (cid:1)There is considerable evidence 
that these essential studies cannot be undertaken in South Korea today. The government has not allowed research by responsible 
medical investigators of this problem and has refused to identify for health professionals the chemical compounds it is using, thereby 
blocking essential medical studies and proper treatment.(cid:2)  

126. For a discussion, see Allen, T.J. (2000) (cid:3)Chemical Cops - Tear gas and pepper spray can be deadly(cid:4). In These Times. US. April 3. 

127. From Zarc International (1993) (cid:3)Cap Stun Weapons - Aerosol product Line, Law Enforcement and Military, Technical Information(cid:4). p.44. 

128. Liberty in conjunction with Channel 4 Dispatches (1996) (cid:3)The truth of CS(cid:4). November. ISBN 1 85144 182 4. 

129. Evans, R., Wright, S. (1999) (cid:3)British police face a CS gas attack(cid:4). Guardian. July 8th. 

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130. For example one study using a narcoleptic drug Diazem to decrease anxiety in less intelligent people showed it had a marked effect on 
increasing their tolerance. See Klapper, J.A., McColloch, M.A., Merkey, R.P. (1971) (cid:1)The Effect of Diazem on Tolerance of a Mucous Membrane  
Irritant(cid:2). Edgewood Arsenal Medical Research Laboratories, USA. Technical Report 4581. 

131. Police Complaints Authority (UK) (2000) (cid:3)CS Spray: Increasing Public Safety(cid:4). March, p29. 

132. Ibid. 

133. Mueller, F. (1991) (cid:3)Chemical Aerosol Report(cid:4). Cincinnati Police Division, USA. 

134. Police Review Commission (USA) Study (1997) (cid:3)The Effectiveness of OC. Pepper Spray - An Analysis of Berkeley Police Reports(cid:4). 

135. San Francisco Chronicle (1997) (cid:1)ACLU Criticizes Novato Police Policy on Pepper Spray(cid:2). October 22nd. 

136. For a useful discussion see Parneix-Spaake et al (1993) (cid:3)Severe cutaneous reactions to self-defence sprays(cid:4). Arch. Dermatol. Vol 129. p913. 

137. Sidell, F.R. (1997) (cid:3)Riot Control Agents(cid:4) in (cid:3)Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare(cid:4), Chapter 12.  Borden Institute, Walter Reed 
Army Medical Center. pp 308-325. 

138. Rice, P., Dyson, E.H. and Upshall, D.G. (1996) (cid:3)A review of the Toxicology of Methyl Isobutyl Ketone and Methylene Chloride(cid:4).  Chemical 
and Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down, UK. July. (Restricted). 

139. For a discussion, see Wright, S., & Evans, R. (1999) (cid:3)British Police face a CS gas attack(cid:4). Guardian (S2 Science). July 8th. 

140. Ironically, in the US, the Occupational Safety & Health Administration has called for a substantial reduction in the exposure to Methylene 
Chloride because of its risk to health including cancer, cardiovascular disease and material impairment of the central nervous system. OSHA (1997) 
(cid:3)Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride(cid:4). 62. 1494-1619. 1st October. 

141. Rice,P., Jones, D.W., Stanton, D. (1997) (cid:3)A literature review of solvents suitable for the police CS spray device(cid:4). Defence Evaluation and 
Research Agency, UK. (DERA/CBD/HA/CR/1997/230). November. (Restricted). 

142. (cid:3)There are no data available on the metabolism, kinetics, acute toxicity or skin irritancy of CS when administered in MIBK as solvent(cid:4). UK 

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Department of Health. Committee on Toxicity, Mutagenicity, Carcinogenicity of Chemicals in Food, Consumer Products and the Environment 
(1999) (cid:3)Statement on 2-Chlorobenzylidene Malononitrile (CS) and CS Spray(cid:4). September. 

143. Zekri, A.M.B., King, W.W.K., Yeung, R. and Taylor, W.R.J. (1995) (cid:3)Acute mass burns caused by o-chlorobenzylidene malononitrile (CS) tear 
gas(cid:4). Burns. Vol. 21. No.8. pp 586-589. 

144. Sidell F. (1997) op.cit. 

145. McGregor, Glen. (2000) (cid:3)Ottawa Cops Pepper Spray Lawsuit(cid:4). The Ottawa Citizen. 19th February. 

146. Hansard, 21 January 1977, col 330. 

147.  For a more technical explanation of such performance calculation see US Department of Justice (1973) (cid:1)Multi-disciplinary technique for the evaluation of 
less-lethal weapons(cid:2). Volume 1. July.  U.S. military weapons research laboratories have used this approach to produce the empirical data used in this current study 
as a benchmark.  These researchers note that such performance characteristics generally fall into two categories namely:- (i) those that determine the effect on the 
target if the target is hit (muzzle velocity, projectile weight and drag), and (ii) those that determine if the target is hit (accuracy and reliability).  Similarly with 
chemical devices where the performance characteristics fall into the same two categories. However, the distinction between a (cid:4)hit(cid:3) and a (cid:4)no-hit(cid:3) is not as precise 
for chemical devices as compared with kinetic energy devices. 

148. Egner, D.O. et al (1973) (cid:1)A multi disciplinary technique for the evaluation of less lethal weapons Vol 1'. US Department of Justice. 

149. Hansard 28 March 2000. (cid:4)The government have accepted recommendation 69 of the report of the Independent Commission on Policing (in Northern 
Ireland), that a research programme to find a less potentially lethal alternative to plastic baton rounds should be established. The issue is at present being actively 
considered and a decision on the way forward is expected in the near future.(cid:3) 
Examples of secrecy include suppression of reports from the UK(cid:2)s Ordnance Board - the body that certifies weapons that can be used by the UK security forces; 
the UK Police Scientific Development Branch who have produced several reports on (cid:4)Police Baton Round Equipment for the Police(cid:3) (Police Scientific 
Development Branch Annual Report 92/93) and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) who produce the (cid:4)Public Order Tactical Options Manual(cid:3) for 
UK Police forces and have a central role in decisions on what equipment is used, for example their (cid:4)ACPO Replacement Baton Gun Project Team(cid:3) which led to 
the decision the deploy the Heckler and Koch weapon in the UK (Police Scientific Development Branch Annual Report 92/3) and also the review of plastic baton 
rounds which led to new guidelines being introduced in 1999. 
Although the UK government has published the name of the manufacturer of the weapon used in the UK (Her Majesty(cid:2)s Inspector of Constabulary Annual Report 
1996/7, HMSO, UK.)  it refuses, on national security grounds, to name the ammunition supplier or to publish tenders for training equipment (Minutes of the 
Select Committee on Administration http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmpubadm/821/821mem17.htm) 

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The Police Authority of Northern Ireland undertook a review on the (cid:4)Control and Use of Plastic Baton Rounds(cid:3) in 1998 which took place in private and was not 
published in full (Police Authority of Northern Ireland letter to the Committee on the Administration of Justice, Belfast dated 3 June 1998). 

150. Rosenhead, J. (1976) (cid:1)A new look at less lethal weapons(cid:2). New Scientist. 16th December. 

151. Steadman, N. (1989) (cid:1)Modern Riot Guns(cid:2) in (cid:1)Internal Security and Counter Insurgency Supplement(cid:2) to Jane(cid:2)s International Defence Review. Ocotber.  (cid:4)The 
safe envelope for baton firing may often be as narrow as 30m, which may explain the occasional miscalculation.(cid:3) 

152. Steadman, N. (1990) (cid:2)Close range baton gun from Verney Carron(cid:2). National Security July/August. p35. (cid:4)Despite the US safety figures it has been reported 
that the UK MoD has specified a level of 220 Joules for the baton gun and that the problem with the conventional riot gun however is that achieving the desired 
220 joules at mid range (40-50m) means that it might easily kill within 20m. At this range for example, most standard 37/38mm ammunition will neatly punch a 
hole through plywood 11mm thick.(cid:3) 

153. Verney Carron, France. (cid:1)Flashball(cid:2) company brochure. 

154. MK Ballistics, USA (cid:1)Flexible Baton(cid:2) company brochure. 

155. For example the Royal Ordnance (UK) Arwen weapon. Company brochure. Or the Heckler and Koch (Germany/UK) riot gun. Police Authority of Northern 
Ireland Annual Report 1997-8 

156. Steadman, N. (1989) (cid:1)Modern Riot Guns(cid:2) in (cid:1)Internal Security and Counter Insurgency Supplement(cid:2) to Jane(cid:2)s International Defence Review. October. 

157. National Security (1988) (cid:1)Wallop improves riot control weapons(cid:2). September. 

158. Police and Security Equipment 1998-99. Jane(cid:2)s Publications Group, UK. 

159. Manurhin Equipement, France, (1994) Company brochure for the MR 35 Punch rubber ballgun. 

160. MK Ballistic Systems, USA (1999). Company information on RB-37-FS impact projectile gives an accuracy of 6-8 inches at 25 yards. 

161. Venter, A. (1998) (cid:1)Vital vehicle in times of unrest(cid:2). International Police Review November/December. Figure for the Slingshot rubber bullet machine at 70m.  

162. Goodwin, B. (1991) (cid:1)MoD admits dangerous defects in riot guns(cid:2). The Engineer 10th October. (cid:4)It has been reported that the baton can land 3m either side of 
the target over a 60m range.(cid:3) 

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163. Jane(cid:2)s Infantry Weapons 87/88, p471. Jane(cid:2)s Publications group, UK. Detail of the Condor SA(cid:2)s AM-404 multiple baton cartridge states  (cid:4)this round (multi 
baton) is recommended only for use against groups, since the dispersion of the three projectiles inhibits accuracy. 

164. B(cid:2)Tselem (1998) (cid:1)Death Foretold - Firing of rubber bullets to disperse demonstrators in the Occupied Territories(cid:2). Israel 

165. Jane(cid:2)s Police and Security Equipment 1998-99, p344. Jane(cid:2)s Publications Group, UK. 

166. Goodwin, B. (1992) (cid:1)MoD orders emergency changes to plastic bullets(cid:2). The Engineer 16th July. 

167. Schyma, C., Schyma, P. (1997) (cid:1)Possibilities for injuries caused by rubber bullets from the self defense weapon MR 35 Punch(cid:2). Arch. Krimipol. Sep-Oct. 
200(3-4). 87-94.  (cid:4)The propellant used in the French MR 35 Punch, manufactured by Manurhin causes important variations in the projectiles velocity from 120 to 
140m/s. The resulting energies were about 150 to 200 Joules. The report then discusses the wound ballistics and concludes that they contradict the (cid:1)non-lethal(cid:2) 
character of the MR 35.(cid:3) 

168. Hansard 19 June 1997. Dr Reid (Ministry of Defence) answer to Brian Sedgemoor. Bullets were found to be travelling at a significantly higher muzzle 
velocity than that in the specification and at least 45,000 were withdrawn from service. 

169. Committee on the Administration of Justice (1998) (cid:1) Plastic bullets - A Briefing Paper(cid:2). 1998. 

170. For details of the RPL Mk II riot projectile launcher see http:/ozarkmtns.com/less-lethal/riot.htm 3/8/98. 

171. Guidelines have been widely criticised as allowing and encouraging misuse of these weapons. See for example Committee on the Administration of Justice 
(1996) (cid:1)The Misrule of Law(cid:2) and Bell, D. (1999) (cid:1)The use of rubber and plastic bullets in Northern Ireland(cid:2). M.A. Thesis. University of Ulster, Magee College. 
See also B(cid:2)Tselem (1998) (cid:1)Death Foretold - Firing of rubber bullets to disperse demonstrators in the Occupied Territories(cid:2). Israel, p26. (cid:4)The Israeli Defence Force 
is reportedly under orders to fire rubber bullets only from a distance of greater than 40m, and plastic bullets from a distance greater than 70m. However, the 
numerous deaths and injuries resulting during confrontations between the IDF and Palestinians is evidence of one or more of the following - failure to follow 
distance of fire orders in a stressful situation, the inadequacy of the reported (cid:4)safe(cid:3) distances of fire, or a willful decision to inflict extra-judicial punishment. 
Furthermore, it is obvious that instructions to aim only at the lower extremities, shoot only at rioters or stone throwers, and do not shoot at women or children are 
not adequate to prevent unnecessary injury or death.(cid:3) 

172. Air Taser Inc, USA.(1997) Press Release from Modern Non-Lethal system introduced to the United Kingdom. May. 

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173. Statewatch Bulletin (1996). Brian Douglas was the first person to die after being struck on the neck by a long handled baton. July/August, vol 6 no 4. 

174. Police Complaints Authority (UK) (1998) (cid:1)Striking a balance: the police use of the new batons(cid:2). Crown. ISBN 0-9553157-1-1. 

175. Robb, J.D.A. and Mathews, J.G.W. (1971) (cid:1) The injuries and management of riot casualties admitted to the Belfast hospital wards August to October 1969'. 
British Journal of Surgery. Vol 58. No.6. June. 

176. Guardian 30/12/98 New Police batons may cause lasting injuries. The police have been told not to use their new, longer, US style batons to hit suspects on 
the kneecaps or shins because of the danger that the blows will result in long-term injuries, including fractures. The warning from the Police Complaints Authority 
follows an inquiry into more than 450 official complaints about the new batons that have replaced the traditional truncheon. 

177. Statewatch Bulletin January 1999, vol 9 no 1. 

178. Statewatch Bulletin, January 2000, Vol 10 No 1. (cid:1)UK: Northumbria police constabulary withdraws extendable batons(cid:2),  (cid:4)because we did not see the 
operational necessity to use them outweighed the research which was available nationally saying such weapons were responsible for a higher proportion of injuries 
and damage to people than other kinds of batons.(cid:3) 

179. Detroit Sunday Journal (1997) (cid:1)Vance video shows guards in assault drills(cid:2). (cid:4)One technique, involving short wrist snaps that deliver powerful blows, is meant 
to deceive judges and others who must try to decide if a victim of such a clubbing was hit hard, according to drill leaders present. One said the technique must be 
used (cid:4)if there(cid:2)s a video camera out there(cid:3)(cid:4).July 27-August 2. 

180. Http://www.ebm-online.com/batton/spinex.htm 20/3/2000. The SpineX - a new Dutch produced curved baton. 

181. Home Office Police Research Group, UK. (1993) (cid:1)Assessing the Expandable Side Handled Baton(cid:2). Police Research Series Paper 11. (cid:4)The Expandable Side 
Handled Baton (ESHB) was, however drawn much more frequently than the truncheon, reflecting officers(cid:2) greater confidence in the ESHB than in the truncheon. 
This greater preparedness to draw the ESHB, together with a greater readiness to intervene in more violent incidents, meant more minor injuries to those members 
of the public involved in reported disturbances were caused by the ESHB than by the truncheon.(cid:3) 

182. Guardian 1st October 1985. 

183. Amnesty International (1999) (cid:1)Urgent Action Bulletin Malaysia(cid:2). September. Eight people are reported to have received hospital treatment, either as a result 
of injuries sustained, or for the after effects of chemicals used by water cannon to disperse demonstrators. Helmi bin Muhammed is reported to have received 

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serious injuries to his head, back, eyes and neck. 

184. Lippelt, H. (1982) (cid:1)Auswirkungen des Wasserwerfer-Eisatzes, bei der Gorleben-Demonstration am 4./5 September 1982'. Dokumentation der Fraktion Die 
Grunen im niedersachsen Landtag. 

185. Stern (Germany) 20/6/84 reported a case of severe rib cage bruising with lung embolism and thrombosis, temporary blindness in one eye leading to 
permanent eye damage and broken bones. 

186. Northam, G. (1988) (cid:1)Shooting in the Dark(cid:2). Faber and Faber, p116. 

187.  Beit Alfa Trailer Co. Israel, company brochures. 

188. BSSRS. (1985) (cid:1)TechnoCop, New Police Technologies(cid:2). Free Association Books. p70. 

189. Duke-Elder, S., MacFaul, P. A. (1972) (cid:1) Mechanical Injuries(cid:2). System of Ophthamology. London. Kimpton. 14. Part 1. 

190. Acheson, J. F., Chignell, A. H, and Wong, D. (1987) (cid:1) Eye injuries caused by directed jets of water from a fire hose(cid:2). British Medical Journal. Vol 294. 21st 
February. The report concluded that (cid:4)the damage inflicted by a blow to the eye depends on the kinetic energy of the blow; ocular damage is due to the direct 
impact disrupting the anterior segment and the contra coup effect disrupting the retina. The energy on impact of solid objects such as a cricket ball or fist is 
dissipated over the cranial vault and facial skeleton as the blow strikes the orbital margin. This anatomical arrangement does not protect against atmospheric and 
immersion blast injuries or injuries due to high velocity jets of fluid; thus directed water jets can cause serious eye injuries. 

191. Berson, D., Landau, D. (1985) (cid:1)High pressure water jets as a cause of severe bilateral intraocular injuries(cid:2). American Journal of Ophthalmology. 120 (4). 
p542-3. 

192. Ranta, A. and Salminen, L. (1983) (cid:1)Orbital laceration caused by a blast of water: report of 2 cases(cid:2). British Journal of Ophthalmology. 67. 840-841. 

193. Chemical Defence Establishment, Porton Down, United Kingdom. (1978) (cid:1)Assessment of damage to the anterior segment of the pig(cid:2)s eye due to the Special 
Water Dispenser (SWD)(cid:2). Technical Note No. 366. September. 

194. Chemical Defence Establishment, Porton Down, United Kingdom. (1979) (cid:1)The Special Water Dispenser an assessment of the likelihood of damage to the 
fundus of the eye (R)(cid:2). Technical Note No. 378. February.  This testing was targeted on pigs eyes with an impact energy of 120 joules and an impact time of 0.1 
seconds. 

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195. Eg the Armortek water cannon operates at 175 psi, http://armortek.com/prod04.htm, the riot control water cannon from Bulldog Direct Protective Systems 
Inc operates at 250 psi http://www.bulldogdirect.com/armored-wc.html, and the Ifex 3012 water gun operates at a pressure of 360 psi, IFEX 3000  brochure, 
PMC Supplies, UK. 

196. BSSRS (1985) (cid:1)TechnoCop - New Police Technologies(cid:2). Free Association Books, UK. 

197. Rocke, L. (1983) (cid:1)Injuries caused by plastic bullets compared with those caused by rubber bullets(cid:2). The Lancet. 23rd April. 

198. Police and Security News May 1998, p39. 

199. Ibid. Historical data collected from the National Tactical Officers Association in the USA. 

200. Reich, K. (1994) (cid:1)L.A police deploy (cid:4)Less lethal(cid:3) weapons(cid:2). Los Angeles Times 31st  May. 

201. Bell, D. (1999) (cid:1) The Use of rubber and plastic bullets in Northern Ireland(cid:2). M.A. Thesis.  University of Ulster, Magee College, Ireland. 

202. Bell, D. (1999) Ibid. 

203. Shaw, J. (1972) (cid:1)Pulmonary contusion in children due to rubber bullet injuries(cid:2). British Medical Journal. 4. 764-766. 

204. Millar, R., Rutherford, W. H., Johnstone, S. and Malhotra, V.J. (1975) (cid:1) Injuries caused by rubber bullets: a report on 90 patients(cid:2). British Journal of Surgery. 
Vol. 62. 480-486. 

205. Ritchie, A. J., Gibbons, J.R.P. (1990) (cid:1)Life threatening injuries to the chest caused by plastic bullets(cid:2). British Medical Journal. Vol 301. 1027. 

206. Rocke, L. (1983) (cid:1)Injuries caused by plastic bullets compared with those caused by rubber bullets(cid:2). The Lancet. 23rd April. 

207. Redgrave, P.(1982) (cid:1)Plastic Bullets: The medical facts(cid:2). World Medicine. 5th February, p52-54.  

208. Irish News, 11 march 1998. 

209. McMenamin, E. (1999) (cid:1)Submissions / general observations of Eamann McMenamin, Solicitor of Madden and Finucane, 88 Castle street, Belfast Re; the use 
of plastic bullets during the (cid:1)Drumcree(cid:2) disturbances of July 1996 and July 1997, Submission to the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland(cid:2). 
July 1999. (cid:4)No contemporaneous records are kept as and when the individual plastic bullet rounds are fired and it is respectfully believed these statements are just 

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a concoction for the purposes of giving lip service to the statutory obligations. 
Her Majesty(cid:2)s Inspector of Constabulary inspected the RUC(cid:2)s use of plastic bullets and reported in his annual report in 1996 that record keeping was inadequate. 
In his report the following year he declares himself (cid:4)quite at a loss to understand why (a better reporting system) was not actioned before this years marching 
season, when so much useful information could have been acquired(cid:4). Her Majesty(cid:2)s Inspector of Constabulary, UK, Annual Reports 1996 and 1997 

210. New Statesman (1984). (cid:4)Many of the injured refused medical treatment for fear of being arrested(cid:3). 17th August. p4. 

211. Hiss, J., Hellman, F.N. and Kahana, T. (1997) (cid:1)Rubber and plastic ammunition lethal Injuries: the Israeli Experience(cid:2). Med.Sci.Law.  Vol 37. No 2. p139. 

212. Yellin, A., Golan, M., Klein, E., Avigad, I., Rosenman, J., Lieberman, Y. (1992) (cid:1)Penetrating thoracic wounds caused by plastic bullets(cid:2). Journal of 
Cardiovascular Surgery. 103. 381-385. 

213. Jaouni, Z.M., O(cid:2)Shea, J.G. (1997) (cid:1)Surgical management of ophthalmic trauma due to the Palestinian Intifada(cid:2). Eye. 11. 392-397. 

214. Missliwetz, J., Wieser, I. and Denk, W. (1991) (cid:1)Medical and technical aspects of weapon effects(cid:2).  Beitr. Gerichtl. Med. 49..361-6. The report compared the 
plastic ROTA training ammunition to standard 5.56mm ammunition. It stated that the ammunition has the advantage of being less dangerous over long distances 
(500m ) but concluded that at short range the ammunition has a (cid:4)reasonable capacity of incapacitation. 

215. B(cid:2)Tselem (1998) (cid:1)Death Foretold - Firing of (cid:4)rubber(cid:3) bullets to disperse demonstrations in the Occupied Territories(cid:2). Israel. 

216. Cohen, M.A. (1985) (cid:1)Plastic Bullet Injuries to the Face and Jaws(cid:2). South African Medical Journal. 68. 849-852. 

217. South (1988) (cid:1)The science of Suppression(cid:2). November, p71. 

218. Missliwetz, J. and Lindermann, A. (1991) (cid:1)Gunshot Wounds Caused by Fiocchi Anticrime Cartridges (Plastic Bullets)(cid:2). American Journal of Forensic 
Medicine and Pathology. 12(3). 209-212. 

219. Chute, D.J. and Smialek, J.E. (1998) (cid:1)Injury patterns in a plastic (AR-1) baton fatality(cid:2). American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology. 19(3). 226-
229. 

220. Daily Telegraph 18th May 1997 (cid:1)Police could test (cid:1)spiderman(cid:2) gun(cid:2). 

221. Law Enforcement News XXIII November 30th 1997, No.478. 

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222. http://www.zarc.com/english/news/bluelinedef_tecbeankill.html 8/3/2000 

223. Sehgal, A., Challoner, K.R. (1997). Journal of Emergency Medicine. Nov-Dec. 15(6). 789-91. 

224. Steele, J., McBride, S., Kelly, J., Dearden, C., Rocke, L. (1999) (cid:1)Plastic bullet injuries in Northern Ireland: experiences during a week of civil disturbance(cid:2). 
Journal of Trauma, Injury, Infection and Critical Care. Vol 46. No 4. pp711-714. 

225. Home Office News Release, UK, 27th July 1999. 

226. This report called on governments to (cid:1)Establish a rigorous independent inquiry into the use of stun belts and all other types and variants of 
electro-shock weapons, to assess their medical and other effects in terms of international human rights standards regulating the treatment of 
prisoners and use of force; the inquiry should examine all cases of death or injury in custody resulting from the use of such instruments, and the 
results of the inquiry should be published without delay(cid:2). Amnesty International (1997) (cid:1) Arming the Torturers - Electro-shock torture and the spread of Stun 
Technology(cid:2). ACT 40/01/97. March. 

227. T(cid:2)Prina Technology, USA (1994) (cid:1) Stun Guns - An independent report(cid:2). p17. 

228. (cid:4)The Air Taser functions by using electrical waves to disorient the human nervous system, it(cid:2)s like radar jamming.  So rather than using blunt force like a gun 
we(cid:2)re hoping to cause enough injury to bring him down, or a pain like a pepper spray where you(cid:2)re hoping to cause enough pain that they get distracted.  Here 
we(cid:2)re actually causing a temporary paralysis, ..  so it(cid:2)s a very non-violent way in terms of stopping somebody we just want them to stop what they(cid:2)re doing, we 
don(cid:2)t want to hurt them in anyway....(cid:3) Rick Smith Air Taser Inc.  Equinox - Non-Lethal weapons. Channel Four. RDF Television. 22nd September 1996. 

229. In 1996 the President of Stun Tech Inc, Dennis Kaufman stated that (cid:4)Stun Tech products, such as stun guns and belts have been tested on pigs and humans 
since 1973. There has never been a single documented case of a hand-held stun gun causing death in the United States(cid:3). Inter Press Service 18th June 1996. 

230. Rick Smith from Air Taser stated in 1996 that (cid:4)We(cid:2)ve got over twenty thousand field firings that have, that where the Taser has been used and there(cid:2)s not one 
incidence where the Taser has played a marked role in the death of an individual.(cid:3) Equinox - Non-Lethal weapons. Channel Four. RDF Television. 22nd September 
1996. 

231. Air Taser also claim that a University of Southern California Medical Center showed that (cid:4)the Taser leaves 0% long-term injuries(cid:3).  However, Air Taser 
recognise, in the warning notes that accompany their product,  that the temporary paralysis could be fatal under specific circumstances.  For example, if someone 
was tasered in a swimming pool. (cid:1)Warning. Read this before using(cid:2).  Air Taser Inc, 1994. 

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232.One Chinese manufacturer warns against the use of their devices for greater than three seconds to avoid the risk of injury or death. Their 
company brochure states (cid:4)Precaution - Do not shock on the head or in the heart in performing their missions.  In order to avoid injuries or deaths, 
do not act over three seconds on the recipients(cid:3) State-Run No. 764 Factory - Public Security Business Division brochure July 1996. 

233. Outdoor Life (1988) (cid:3)A shocking cure for Snakebites(cid:4). July, v182, n1, p45-47. 

234. These studies  evaluated dapsone and electric shock therapy found that (cid:1)Guardian stun gun treatment results did not differ significantly from those of the 
control group for any of the four wound areas. . Barrett,S.M., Romine-Jenkins, M., Fisher, D.E. (1994) (cid:1)Dapsone or Electric Shock Therapy of Brown Recluse 
Spider Envenomation?(cid:2). Annals of Emergency Medicine. July. v24. n1. p21-25. 

235. Communication from Dr T. Bernstein, University of Eisconsin-Madison to Mr NP Zylich, Consumer Product Safety Commission, February 12, 1976. 

236. He [Harry Landis] had a history of heart problems, and there does not appear to be conclusive evidence that stun belts are in fact safe for those who such 
medical histories. Although one health study has been undertaken on stun belts by Robert Stratbucker of the University of Nebraska that claimed the felts were 
safe, the study was only done on anesthetized pigs. Hinman, L.M. (2000) (cid:1)Stunning Morality: The moral dimensions of Stun Belts(cid:2). 
www.ethics.acusd.edu/stunning%20Morality%20Text.htm. 

237. Texas state correction authorities stopped using stun guns reportedly on medical grounds, but continued to allow prison guards to use electro-shock riot 
shields when removing prisoners from cells.  On 1 December 1995, Texas correctional worker Harry Landis was reported to have collapsed and died after 
enduring two 45,000 volt shocks while training with a riot shield. Amnesty International (1996) (cid:1)United States of America - Use of Electro-Shock Stun Belts(cid:2). 
AMR 51/45/96, 12 June . 

238. The Texas Department of Criminal Justice, which had used the shields to subdue prisoners since September 1995, immediately suspended their use. 
Meanwhile, John McDermit, president of Nova Products, Inc., the maker of the shield, denied that it had killed Landis. (cid:4)We(cid:2)re very sorry this happened,(cid:3) 
McDermit said. (cid:4)But there certainly was no connection between his training and his death.(cid:3)  Cusac, Anne-Marie. (1996) (cid:1)Stunning Technology(cid:2). The Progressive. 
July. 

239. O(cid:4)Brien, D. (1991) (cid:3)Electronic weaponry - a question of safety(cid:4). Annuals of Emergency Medicine. May. v20. n5, p583-87. 

240. Duff, L.T. (1976) (cid:3)TASER TF-1, CP-76-5 (Memo)(cid:4). Washington DC, US Consumer Product Safety Commission February 10. Cited in 
O(cid:4)Brien, D (1991) op cit. 

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241. O(cid:4)Brien, D. (1991). Op. cit. 

242. Nova Technologies Inc: The Nova XR-5000. Las Vegas, Nevada, NOVA, 1984. Cited in O(cid:4)Brien, D (1991) Annals of Emergency Medicine, 
20 May 1991, v5, p583-7 

243. Unpublished communication from M Katz, General Counsel, US Consumer Product Safety Commission, January 24, 1984. Cited in O(cid:4)Brien, 
D. (1991) Annals of Emergency Medicine. 20th May. v5. p583-7. 

244. Stratbucker, Robert. A. (1985) (cid:3)Safety Technical Evaluation of Model XR-5000 electronic stun gun(cid:4). University of Nebraska Medical Center-
Omaha. 15 January . 

245. Stratbucker,R.A., Marsh,M.G. (1993) (cid:3)The relative immunity of the skin and cardiovascular system to the direct effects of high voltage - high 
frequency component electrical pulses(cid:4). IEEE BioMedical Engineering Conference. 

246.  Roy,O.Z., Podgorski,A.S. (1989) (cid:3)Tests on a shocking device - the stun gun(cid:4). Med. & Bio. Eng. & Comp. 27. 445-448. 

247. Robinson,M.N., Brooks, C.G., Renshaw, G.D.  (1990) (cid:3)Electric Shock devices and their Effects on the Human Body(cid:4). Medical Science and 
Law. v30. n4. 

248. Guardian 10th July 1998, p3 (cid:3)Judge shocks noisy prisoner into silence(cid:4),. (cid:1)Nine deaths in Los Angeles jails have been linked to taser gun use, 
and in 1986 the city paid a $300,000 ((cid:5)190,000) settlement to a youth burnt by stun guns to force him to confess to a robbery(cid:2) 

249. Police Review 16th September 1988, p1927. (cid:1)Two Los Angeles men have died after being shot by police stun guns.  They were overcome by 
the electric darts as police arrested them in separate incidents on suspicion of drug abuse.  Police use Taser guns to disable violent suspects 
temporarily. An investigation has been ordered(cid:2) 

250. Los Angeles Times, March 12, 1993. (cid:1)Questions raised in death of man shot by Taser(cid:2). The death of Los Angeles barber Michael James Bryant, who died 
after being chased by police and, refusing to get out of a swimming pool, was shot with an electric stun gun, has raised serious questions about the incident.  An 
autopsy on March 10, 1993 did not determine the cause of Bryant's death.  

251. Chicago Defender July 1st 1995. Section PG, Col 6:1. (cid:1)Woman guilty in stun gun death(cid:2). On June 28, 1995, Francine Knox was convicted in the death of her 
nephew, Brandon Jordan, an infant who died after being shocked with a stun gun.  The Peoria Illinois woman could face up to 20 years in prison when she is 

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sentenced for the death. 

252. San Francisco Chronicle. June 19th 1992, Section A, 23:1. (cid:1)Lawsuit Seeks $6 million in Deuel Prisoner's Death(cid:2). Guards trying to subdue a prisoner at Deuel 
Vocational Institution in Tracy CA in 1991 shocked the man to death with an electronic stun gun, according to a lawsuit filed in federal court Jun 18, 1992.  The 
man, Donnie Ray Ward, was mentally ill. 

253. Burdett-Smith, P. (1997) (cid:3)Stun Gun Injury(cid:4). Journal of Accident & Emergency Medicine. November. v14. n6. p402-4. 

254. Other reports of injuries have emerged where illegal stun guns have been used by muggers to immobilise their targets enabling them to inflict 
physical injuries to the prone victim. See for example (cid:3)Hunt for brutal stun gun robbers(cid:4), Manchester Evening News 13/5/2000, p1. 

255. Mehl, L.E. (1992) (cid:3)Electrical Injury from Tasering and Miscarriage(cid:4). Acta. Obstet. Gynaecol. Scand, Summer. February, v71, n2, p118-123. (cid:1)A 
case report is presented of a woman who was (cid:1)Tasered(cid:2) by law enforcement personnel while 12 weeks pregnant.  The Taser is an electronic 
immobilization and defense weapon that has been commercially available since 1974.  The TASER was developed as an alternative to the .38 
special handgun.  The patient was hit with TASER probes in the abdomen and the leg. She began to spontaneously miscarry 7 days later and 
received a dilation and curretage procedure 14 days later for incomplete abortion...As use of the TASER becomes more common, obstetrical 
clinicians may encounter complications from the TASER more often.(cid:2) 

256. New York Times, November 25th 1994. (cid:3)A Baby(cid:4)s Stun-gun death(cid:4). 

257. Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Background, Circumstances and Actions resulting in the death and injury of Rail Commuters 
at Tembisa Station on 31 July 1996. August 1996. 

258. Translation of letter to Dr Harold Hillman, May 10, 1995. 

259. For example, a medical article in 1993 reported (cid:1)...Eleven cases of sudden death of men restrained in a prone position by police officers are reported. Nine 
of the men were hogtied, one was tied to a hospital gurney, and one was manually held prone. All subjects were in an excited delirious state when restrained. 
Three were psychotic, whereas the others were acutely delirious from drugs (six from cocaine, one from methamphetamine, and one from LSD). Two were 
shocked with stun guns shortly before death.  The literature is reviewed and mechanisms of death are discussed(cid:2)  O(cid:2)halloran, R.L., Lewman, L.V. (1993) 
(cid:1)Restraint Asphyxiation in excited delirium(cid:2). American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology. 14(4). 289-295. 

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260. The isopropyl alcohol used in Cap-Stun is flammable. There is a court case       
pending concerning the use of Cap-Stun. Rick Wimberly, from Cap-Stun Weapon      
Systems, supplied the following information:"On August 10, 1990, NYPD officers responded to a call about an emotionally disturbed boy armed 
with a hammer and two knives who had locked himself in his bathroom. The officers opened the bathroom door and sprayed the subject with a 
crowd control unit sold by Luckey Police Products, the former owners of Cap-Stun. When the subject did not respond to a verbal command, the 
officers shot him with an electronic taser. A spark started a fire. The boy suffered first and second degree burns. There are two different accounts 
on how the fire started. Either the Taser ignited the boy after he was sprayed or the taser ignited the shower curtain and wallpaper, and burned the 
boy".  Cincinnati Police Division Chemical Aerosol Report 1992. 

261. Report of the Joint Committee of Inquiry into the Background, Circumstances and actions resulting in the death and injury of rail commuters at Tembisa 
Station on 31 July 1996.  

262. Op. cit. p18 

263. A 1997 study by Prof. Peter Kraska and Victor Kappeler at Eastern Kentucky University(cid:2)s School of Police Studies in the USA, reports that this process 
accelerated in the 1980's when 90 per cent of the police departments surveyed in cities over 50,000 had paramilitary units, as did 70 percent of departments 
surveyed in communities with populations under 50,000. See Kraska, P. and Kappeler, V. (1997) (cid:1)Militarizing American Police: The Rise and Normalization of 
Paramilitary Units(cid:2). Social Problems. 44. p.24. 

264. Weber, D.C. (1999) (cid:3)Warrior Cops - The Ominous Growth of  Paramilitarism in American Police Departments(cid:4). Briefing Report No.50, The 
Cato Institute, August 26th. 

265. Hard evidence of such civilian casualties killed by police (cid:3)friendly fire(cid:4), particularly in US black ghetto areas, is already documented. See for 
example Cassidy, P. (1997) (cid:3)Operation Ghetto Storm - The Rise in Paramilitary Policing(cid:4). Covert Action Quarterly. No. 62. Fall 1997. pp 20-25. 

266. For an excellent discussion of this phenomena, see Kraska, P. and Kappeler, V. (1997) Op. cit. 

267. See U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Department of Defense (1997) (cid:3)Joint Technology Program: Second Anniversary Report(cid:4). Washington, 
US Department of Justice, February. pp.1-18. 

268. Also of note are the changing contexts in which such weapons can be authorised - for example, controlling protestors hundreds of kilometres 
away from the site of any demonstration or static assembly. Thus, the recent EU proposals already agreed make the deployment of such public order 

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tactics weapons and options legal at the discretion of senior police officer, acting at the bequest of a fellow European colleague wishing to dissuade 
European nationals travelling outside their country of residence.  

269. See for example, Hersh, S.M. (1969) (cid:3)Your friendly neighbourhood MACE(cid:4). New York Review of Books. 27th March. pp 41-44.  Page, J.A. 
(1969) (cid:3)Mace for the masses(cid:4), Commonweal. 90(5). 141-3. 18th April.  (cid:3)Public Sale of protective Chemical Sprays(cid:4), Hearings before the consumer 
subcommittee of the US Senate committee on Commerce,21 May 1969. 

270. Amnesty International, International Secretariat (2000) (cid:3)USA - Ruling limiting Police use of Pepper Spray (cid:6) A Positive step(cid:4). AI Index AMR 
51/72/2000. News Service 92. 17th May. 

271. Amnesty International Press release (1997) (cid:3)AI-USA:Police Use of pepper Spray Is Tantamount To Torture(cid:4). Nov 7th. 

272. Amnesty International News Service (2000).(cid:4)Austria - Incidents of police brutality continue(cid:4). (cid:1)Supported by eyewitness reports and medical 
evidence, detainees have reported being repeatedly kicked, punched, kneed, beaten with truncheons and sprayed with pepper after restraint. The 
victims are mostly non-white foreign or Austrian nationals and in many cases police are alleged to have used racist language.(cid:2)  AI Index: EUR 
13/07/00. 24th March. 

273. US GAC, (1989) (cid:3)Israel: Use of US Manufactured Tear Gas in the Occupied Territories. Report to the Honourable Ronald V. dellums(cid:4). House 
of representatives. April. 

274. A point recognised by NATO spokesman General Guiseppe Marani who announced reports of Yugoslav forces in Kosovo using 
tear gas to drive civilians from their homes in Pristina.  He stated: "Tear gas shouldn't be used in combat.  It can be  used for police 
work.  You can use it to pull someone out of a house and arrest him.  It shouldn't be used to pull someone out of a house and shoot 
him." Reuters 20th Apr 1999, (cid:3)NATO says it hit Serb `Frog' surface missile site(cid:4). 

275. Examples of baton abuse are reported in virtually every country worldwide. Most of this abuse is unsystematic, but in some cases more systematic abuse has 
been reported, "among the more primitive weapons deployed are hard fibre glass batons and iron batons covered with plastic; these have replaced the wooden 
stick. They have been used to smash demonstrators cheekbones, forcing their eyes from their sockets. Dr John Hiddlestone, a UN health official, says he has seen 
so many of these wounds inflicted with 'such a degree of accuracy' that h believes troops must have had training for this particular blow." South (1988) (cid:1)The 
science of suppression(cid:2). November. 

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276. Numerous reports from Northern Ireland detail the doctoring of projectiles with such objects as razor blades, nails, torch batteries, glass slivers, bottle tops 
and coins. See Information on Ireland (1982) (cid:1)They Shoot Children - the use of rubber and plastic bullets in the North of Ireland(cid:2). Russell Press, UK.  Also United 
Campaign Against Plastic Bullets (1996) (cid:1)A report on the misuse of the baton round in the North of Ireland, submission to the Mitchell Commission on 
Decommissioning(cid:2). January 18th 1996. (cid:4)The death of 11 year old Francis Rowntree in 1972 was caused by a rubber bullet that had a battery inserted into it(cid:3). 
Because plastic bullets are harder, they are more difficult, but not impossible,  to tamper with. See also Rauch, J., Storey, D. (1998) (cid:1)The policing of public 
gatherings in South Africa 1960-1994'. The Truth Commission Research Unit, South Africa. May. (cid:4)It is well known within police circles that SAP members 
would alter ammunition in order to inflict more damage on their victims. The best known example of this was the practice of placing batteries inside rubber 
stoppers, thus raising the likelihood of lethal consequences if they hit the victim on the head(cid:3). 

277. The RUC maintains that the bullets are only used against rioters in situations of serious public disorder, in accord with the rules of minimum use of force. 
However, many of those killed by plastic bullets have been proven not to have been rioting, according to the Committee on the Administration of Justice "in six 
cases a judge or inquest found that those killed were innocent victims. In two further cases involving children aged 10 and 11, no finding of rioting was made by 
the inquests. In one case two juries could not agree whether a victim had been petrol bombing troops from a kitchen window. In only four cases inquest juries 
judged those killed to have been rioting" see Committee on the Administration of Justice (1990) (cid:1)Plastic Bullets and the Law(cid:2).  CAJ Pamphlet no.15. March.  See 
also Committee on the Administration of Justice (1996) (cid:1)The Misrule of Law, A report on the policing of events during the summer of 1996 in Northern Ireland(cid:2). 
October which details numerous instances of plastic bullets fired when no rioting was taking place. Similarly in Israel there are numerous reports of rubber and 
plastic ammunition fired when no rioting is taking place, or fired into the backs of people fleeing the firing; see B(cid:2)Tselem (1998) (cid:1)Death Foretold, Firing of rubber 
bullets to disperse demonstrators in the Occupied Territories(cid:2). December. 

278. Millar et al report a series of 19 patients where impact was below 25m despite the guidelines stating 30m as minimum see  Millar, R., Rutherford, W., 
Johnstone, S., Malhotra, V. (1975) (cid:1)Injuries caused by rubber bullets: a report on 90 patients(cid:2). British Journal of Surgery. Vol 62. 480-486. 
Metress and Metress report that "an examination of the three rubber bullet and 13 plastic bullet deaths in Northern Ireland indicates that most were fired at from a 
distance of less than 20 yards in contrast to the rules for firing, see Metress, E.  and Metress, S. (1987) (cid:1) The Anatomy of plastic bullet damage and crowd control(cid:2). 
International Journal of Health Services. Vol 17. No2.   Many examples of plastic bullets fired at short or even point blank range are detailed in Committee on the 
Administration of Justice (1996) (cid:1)The Misrule of Law, A report on the policing of events during the summer of 1996 in Northern Ireland(cid:2). October . Reports on 
demonstrations that took place in Seattle, USA in 1999 detail the firing of kinetic impact weapons at short range see for example Wilson, K. and Porterfield, E. 
(1999) (cid:1)Brutal police behaviour was recorded on video(cid:2). Seattle Post Intelligencer. 9th December.  

279. Medical evidence suggests that vulnerable areas of the body are targeted. All the deaths that have occurred in Northern Ireland have been by shots to the 
chest or head - see United Campaign Against Plastic Bullets (1996) (cid:1)A report on the misuse of the baton round in the North of Ireland, submission to the Mitchell 
Commission on Decommissioning(cid:2). January 18th. Millar et al reported that over 70% of injuries were to the chest, neck or head area see Millar, R., Rutherford, W., 
Johnstone, S., Malhotra, V. (1975) (cid:1)Injuries caused by rubber bullets: a report on 90 patients(cid:2). British Journal of Surgery. Vol 62. 480-486. Rocke found that over 
50% of the injuries examined were to the chest, neck or head area, see Rocke, L. (1983) (cid:1)Injuries caused by plastic bullet compare to those caused by rubber 

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bullets(cid:2). The Lancet. 23 April, p920.  The Committee on the Administration of Justice detail  scores of injuries to the upper body in contravention of the 
guidelines, see Committee on the Administration of Justice (1990) (cid:1)Plastic bullets and the law(cid:2). CAJ Pamphlet No 15. 
Similar results have been reported from South Africa for example see Cohen, M. (1985) (cid:1) Plastic bullet injuries of the face and jaws(cid:2). South African Medical 
Journal. Vol 68. 
In Israel Hiss et al reported deaths caused by impacts to 17 victims, 13 of whom suffered wounds to the head, neck or chest, see Hiss, Y., Hellman, F., Tzipi, K. 
(1997) (cid:1)Rubber and plastic ammunition lethal injuries: the Israeli experience(cid:2). Med Sci Law. Vol 37. No 2. 
The most recent medical paper on plastic bullets highlights impacts on the vulnerable areas of the body in nearly 40% of cases and recommends that no shot 
should impact above waist level, see Steele, J., McBride, S., Kelly, J., Deraden, C., Rocke, L. (1999) (cid:1)Plastic bullet injuries in Northern Ireland: experiences 
during a week of civil disturbances(cid:2). Journal of Trauma, Infection and Critical Care. vol 46. no 4. 711-714. 

280. The deaths of at least two of the victims in Northern Ireland occurred when plastic bullets were fired from a moving vehicle; see  United Campaign Against 
Plastic Bullets (1996) (cid:1)A report on the misuse of the baton round in the North of Ireland, submission to the Mitchell Commission on Decommissioning(cid:2). January 
18th. 

281. There are many reports of plastic bullets being fired at people coming out of pubs, clubs, restaurants, walking down the street, going shopping, shot through 
windows, into rooms, inside public halls etc, see Committee on the Administration of Justice (1990) (cid:1)Plastic bullets and the law(cid:2). CAJ Pamphlet No 15. Also 
Redgrave, P. (1982) (cid:1)Plastic bullets: the medical facts(cid:2). World Medicine. February. Also Committee on the Administration of Justice (1996), (cid:1)The misrule of law, a 
report on the policing of events during the summer of 1996 in Northern Ireland(cid:2) Ocotber. 

282. Many reports detail kinetic energy weapons pointed at children or innocent bystanders, or peaceful protestors sitting on the ground, see New Statesman 17th 
August 1984, p4 and Committee on the Administration of Justice (1996), (cid:1)The misrule of law, a report on the policing of events during the summer of 1996 in 
Northern Ireland(cid:2). Ocotber 

283. Although justified as a crowd control weapon, their use has been reported against peaceful environmental protestors for example in Spain in 1996 against 
Greenpeace, see El Periodico, Barcelona, 2nd December 1996. 

284. It has frequently been asserted by human rights groups in Northern Ireland that despite serious disorder from both protestant and catholic communities, 
rubber and plastic bullets have been disproportionately and indiscriminately against the catholic community. Of the 14 deaths from plastic bullets 13 have been 
catholic. During the summer of 1996 in Northern Ireland far more plastic bullets were fired in catholic areas than protestant areas despite a similar level of 
disturbances; see Human Rights Watch (1997), (cid:1)To serve without favor - policing, human rights and accountability in Northern Ireland(cid:2) and Committee on the 
Administration of Justice (1996), (cid:1)The misrule of law, a report on the policing of events during the summer of 1996 in Northern Ireland(cid:2). October. 

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285. For example, (cid:1)using tear gas, pepper spray and rubber bullets, the police forced the 200 ex-combatants out of the building. Sixty four bullets 
hit a single demonstrator, fifty year old army veteran Francisco Loza, who remains seriously injured(cid:2), El Salvador Watch, January 1996, No. 45. 

286. Bullets fired from a normal gun have specific identifying marks cause by the internal imperfections of the barrel - hence bullets can be matched back to the 
gun that fired them and potentially the firer. Rubber and plastic ammunition used in Northern Ireland and the Occupied territories cannot be traced in this way. 

287. In Northern Ireland despite 17 deaths and hundreds of injuries no single officer has ever been convicted of wrongdoing. In the only case that was heard under 
criminal law the officer was acquitted despite him breaking the guidelines on two counts, namely firing at the chest and below 20 yards range. 

288. Details of investigation into 49 of the 58 Palestinians killed by (cid:4)rubber(cid:3) bullets found that action was only taken against 3 officers, 1 was acquitted, 1 had a 
(cid:4)note on his file(cid:3) and 1 was sentenced to twenty one months in prison for shooting and killing Ali Abu Awad from a distance of one metre whilst he lay on his 
back; see B(cid:2)Tselem (1998) (cid:1)Death Foretold, Firing of rubber bullets to disperse demonstrators in the Occupied Territories(cid:2). December. 

289.The system of payments has been criticised because it prevents full examination and public disclosure of the facts of a case. Many cases are settles secretly 
out of court, with no admission of liability, see Bell, D. (1999) (cid:1)The use of rubber and plastic bullets in Northern Ireland(cid:2). M.A. Thesis. University of Ulster, 
Magee College. 

290. Helen Bamber, Director of the Medical Foundation for the Treatment & Rehabilitation of Torture Victims, London quoted in (cid:1)The Torture Trail(cid:2), 
Channel 4 Dispatches programme, broadcast 11/1/1995. 

291. He stated that (cid:4)electro-shock weapons are promoted as legitimate tools for law enforcement when in fact they are weapons of terror used to 
torture men, women and children.  If companies knowingly trade electro-shock weapons with governments that torture,  they are complicit in the 
abuse. Corporations cannot not disguise these weapons as reasonable police equipment for crime control when the design is intended to inflict 
severe pain suffering on human beings.(cid:2) William F. Schulz, Executive Director, Amnesty International USA. AIUSA Press Release. March 3, 1997. 
(cid:1)Arming the Torturers: Electro-Shock Torture and the Spread of Stun Technology(cid:2).  

292.  For example, Armond Start, professor at the National Center for Correctional Health Care Studies has referred to stun weapons as (cid:4)one of 
those toys that enterprising manufacturers have developed that sound real good, but their potential for abuse is so great.(cid:3) Unfortunately, in the 
hands of a torturer, even a "toy" can produce cruel, even fatal, results.   (cid:1)Weapons of Torture(cid:2) - A Time investigation turns up evidence of loose 
controls and US companies(cid:2) shipping stun guns to countries that practice torture.  Time Magazine, 6 April 1998, p52-53. 

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293. Time Magazine 6 April 1998, p52-53. (cid:3)Weapons of Torture(cid:4) - A Time investigation turns up evidence of loose controls and US companies(cid:4) 
shipping stun guns to countries that practice torture.  

294. Amnesty International (1997) (cid:3)Arming the Torturers - Electro-shock torture and the spread of Stun Technology(cid:4). ACT 40/01/97. March. 
Appendix 1, p25. 

295. The report included the following findings (cid:1)From various sources the delegation received allegations according to which people detained by 
the Bureau of Security in Vienna during February and March 1994 had received electric shocks inflicted with batons equipped to administer an 
electric discharge.  The delegation of the CPT did not meet any detainees who claimed to have personally received electric shocks. However, 
several detainees met separately by different members of the delegation alleged having been threatened with electric shocks during interrogation 
at the Bureau of Security in Vienna.  These detainees all described a similar instrument which was a portable device the size of an electric razor 
one extremity of which had two electrodes, a device which reportedly a police official  carried in a personal bag.(cid:2) ECPT. Council of Europe(cid:2)s 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture, October, 1996. 

296. Agence France-Presse. March 14th , 1996 (cid:1)About 70 injured in clashes over priest accused of homosexuality(cid:2). (cid:4)The government called for calm on Thursday 
after about 70 people were injured in clashes with riot police who used tear gas to disperse supporters of a Greek Orthodox priest accused of homosexuality.   
Police also used electric batons to fight back 3,000 supporters of the  cleric, as they tried to break down police barriers around the Archbishopric in Nicosia. 
Students of a nearby secondary school also threw bottles and stones into the building's courtyard.  A police spokesman told AFP that 58 demonstrators and 10 
police officers were taken to hospital, mostly suffering from breathing difficulties caused by the tear gas, which hung over the capital much of the day.  Three 
demonstrators and two police officers were hospitalized for further treatment. One demonstrator was in serious condition after being struck by a electric baton, 
according to state radio.(cid:3) 

297. United Nations Commission on Human Rights. Report of the Special Rapporteur. 24 December 1997. E/CN.4/1998/38. 

298. Reuter-News-Service  6th September 1990. (cid:1)Bulgarian Police to get Anti-Riot Equipment(cid:2). Bulgaria' s police, criticised for not preventing the  recent  
storming  and arson of Socialist Party headquarters, are being completely  refitted as a riot force, the official BTA news agency reported on Thursday.  New  
equipment  will  include  water and air cannon, electric shock batons, blank  cartridges, rubber, plastic and stun bullets, dogs, horses, armoured personnel  carriers 
 and  "non-lethal  chemical  weapons",  a decree by the council of ministers said. The  decree  said  the  new  weapons could be used only when physical force 
failed  to  quell public disorder endangering property and civil rights and freedoms. (It is not known which country supplied the electro-shock batons). 

299. Amnesty International (1998) News Release (cid:3)Standing up for the Victims?  1998 United Nations Commission on Human Rights(cid:4).  AI News 
release IOR 41/04/98. 12th March. 

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300. Human Rights Watch (1997) (cid:3)Turkey: Torture and Mistreatment in Pre-Trial detention by Anti-Terror police(cid:3). 19th March.(cid:4)Torture, especially 
by anti-terror police units, continues to be practiced widely in police detention in Turkey. Torture by the anti-terror unit is neither spontaneous nor 
rogue. This unit has methodically incorporated torture and abuse into its daily operations, utilizing special equipment, including special straps to 
bind detainees, high pressure hoses, racks for suspending suspects by their arms, and instruments to apply electric shock(cid:3). 

301. Amnesty International (1999) (cid:1)Urgent Action (UA 287/99)  Fear of torture/ill-treatment(cid:2)   AI Index: AMR 51/179/99. 3 November. Other New 
Mexico inmates transferred to Wallens Ridge in September have made similar allegations of torture or ill-treatment. For example, Perry Connor 
has alleged that he was subjected to electro-shocks on his testicles from a stun gun, and Joseph Saavedra, Raymond Tahod and Julian Fuentes 
have alleged that they were beaten and/or shocked with stun guns. At least one of them has said that the electro-shocks caused him 
uncontrollable defecation. The New Mexico Corrections Department has conducted a initial investigation into the allegations, but has not made its 
findings public(cid:3). 

302. St Louis Post-Dispatch (1997) (cid:1)Graphic Tape Shows Attacks on Inmates Scenes Depict Kicking, Stun Gun Prods and Dog Bites(cid:2). August 17th. 
A 1:1. (cid:4)In a dramatic show of force, Texas deputies curse, kick, drag and zap with an electronic stun gun Missouri prisoners who had been calmly 
relaxing in their bunks minutes before. Missouri prisoners housed in rented cells as part of a lease agreement with Texas have made claims of 
abuse for months. But their stories were routinely rejected as overblown by the Texas Jail Standards Commission and the Missouri Department of 
Corrections. Now the FBI is investigating for possible assault charges and civil rights violations.  The Missouri Corrections Department is yanking 
its 415 male prisoners out of the jail in Brazoria County, Texas, beginning this week.   And on Friday, Missouri abruptly cancelled its $6 million 
annual contract with that rural county, south of Houston(cid:3).  

303. Boston Globe. August 19th 1997. (cid:1)Advocate wants inmates returned NBC report prompts worry about Texas jails(cid:2). A videotape that shows Texas prison 
guards beating and kicking inmates from Missouri at a county jail where they are housed has prompted one former lawmaker to question the safety of 
Massachusetts prisoners sent to Texas. The tape, made by prison officials as a training tool and aired on NBC last night, shows the guards conducting a raid after 
one of them smelled marijuana.  Dressed in riot gear, the guards are shown forcing inmates to crawl as they are prodded by stun guns, chased and bitten by attack 
dogs, and sprayed with tear gas. Missouri officials were so upset by the incident that they pulled their 415 prisoners out of the Texas jail and brought them back to 
Missouri.  They also cancelled their $6 million contract with the private company that manages the jail where the episode happened, in Brazoria County, just south 
of Houston. 

304. In affidavits taken by FIAC lawyers in Miami, some detainees said they were shackled and three said they were jolted with a device that gives 
electric shocks. Cuban detainee Rolando Alberto Vera Leon said guards shackled him spread-eagled to a concrete bed, face down; zapped him 
with a 50,000-volt riot shield; and left him there for 17 hours. At least eight detainees saw other INS detainees jolted with the "shock shield" or stun 
guns. Others said they were beaten; cursed with anti-immigrant comments and racial epithets; and arbitrarily placed in solitary confinement for 

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weeks at a time. Jackson County Jail administrator John Sullivan said he was investigating the complaints, but insisted there was no pattern of 
racism or abuse in the 300-bed jail, which has housed thousands of INS detainees since 1992. Reuters 7/31/98; Boston Globe 8/2/98 

305. For example, that of Scott Norberg, an inmate at Madison Street Jail in Arizona, USA who reportedly died in prison on 1 June 1996 as a result 
of asphyxia, when detention officers who had intervened because of his alleged disruptive behaviour tried to overcome his resistance. The autopsy 
report was said to indicate that he had numerous contusions and lacerations to his head, face, neck and limbs as well as burn marks resulting from 
the use of a stun gun on various parts of his body. From(cid:1)Question of the Human Rights of all persons subjected to any form of detention or 
imprisonment, in particular: torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment(cid:2).   Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Nigel 
S. Rodley, submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 1997/38. Addendum.  24 December 1997.  E/CN.4/1998/38/Add.1 

306. Amnesty International (1997) (cid:3)Arming the Torturers - Electro-shock torture and the spread of Stun Technology(cid:4). ACT 40/01/97. March. 

307. Frechette,A., Rimsza, M.E. (1992) (cid:1)Stun Gun Injury: A new presentation of the Battered Child Syndrome(cid:2). Pediatrics. May. Vol 89. No 5. p898-
901. Which identified how medical and social workers were under-recognising the effects of child abuse using stun guns.  The authors highlighted 
 that  (cid:1)the signs of such abuse are often subtle, and that they may currently be under-recognized. The skin lesions that are often seen are 
hypopigmented circular macules, measuring approx 0.5cm in diameter. They may be raised slightly and erythematous if inflicted recently.  Most 
characteristic of stun gun assault is pairing of lesions approx 5cm apart(cid:1).  The authors were of the opinion that (cid:1)...Unfortunately, as well suited as 
they may be for self-protection, they are also very well suited for a form of assault on children which may be difficult to detect.  Abusers have ready 
access to these devices and, because they are extolled as safe, may appear to provide an attractive method of gaining control over children or 
inflicting severe punishment. There have been some highly publicised cases involving interrogation and torture of adults with stun guns, but we can 
find no reports of stun gun abuse in children. Given the subtlety of physical findings resulting from a stun gun assault, these cases may be under-
recognized currently.(cid:2) and the authors concluded that: (cid:1)It is our hope that a better understanding of stun guns and the patterns of injury they may 
produce will result in an increased awareness of this type of abuse(cid:2). 

308. For an extended discussion of the background see for example Toffler A., & Toffler H., (1994) (cid:3)War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of 
the 21st. Century,(cid:4) Little Brown & Co., London. 

309.Morris J., And Morris C., (1990) (cid:3)Non-Lethality: A global strategy,(cid:4) Morris & Morris, West Hyannisport, MA. 

310.Ibid. 

311.Alexander J.B., Groller, R., & Morris, J., (1990), (cid:3)The Warriors Edge(cid:4), USA. 

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312. Aftergood, S. (1994)(cid:3)The Soft-kill fallacy(cid:4), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September-October pp.40-45 

313.Lovelace D.C & Metz S.,(1998) (cid:3)Non-lethality and American Landpower: Strategic context and operational concepts, Strategic Studies 
Institute, US Army War College, June 15th.  

314. Ballantyne R., (1998) (cid:3)The Technology of Political Control(cid:4), Covert Action Quarterly, Spring, pp.17-23 

315. Paradoxically in 1999 allegations emerged that contrary to earlier denials, the FBI had used incendiary (cid:3)non-lethal(cid:4) CS grenades 
at Waco, which are now believed to have started the fire. Although the FBI have now admitted to lying about the use of incendiary CS 
cartridges they deny a causal link to the fire. A further investigation was launched in 1999. See Guardian, Aug 27th.  1999 p.13 

316.Hough W., (1995) (cid:3)High Tech Civilian Control Studied, Secret Pentagon-DoJ (cid:3)Memo of Understanding(cid:4), The Spotlight, July 31. 

317.See Lewer, N. & Schofield, S.(1997) (cid:3)Non-Lethal Weapons - A Fatal Attraction(cid:4), Zed Books. 

318.Aftergood S.,(1994) op. cit. 

319. William D Hartung,(1999) 'Stuffing the Pentagon with $$ is Wrong(cid:2), Newsday, January 11. 

320. For a detailed discussion of the U.S. NLW Management structure, see Col. Mazarra,(1998) (cid:3)Non-Lethal Weapons development & Doctrine - A 
View To The Future(cid:4), presented to Janes NLW (cid:3)98,  Conference, London 1-2 December. 

321. Hill L., (1999) (cid:3)NATO to adopt policy on non-lethal weapons(cid:4), Defence News, Oct 18. 

322. NATO (1999) NATO Press Statement, (cid:3)NATO Policy on non-lethal weapons(cid:4), dated 13 October (See URL: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p991013e.htm). 

323. Ibid. 

324. Thornton C., (1996) U.S. (cid:3)Army Non-Lethal Warfare Requirements(cid:4) Proceedings, Non-lethal Defense II, The American Defense Preparedness 
Association, March 6-7. 

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325. Alexander JB., (1999) (cid:3)Future War - Non-lethal Weapons in Twenty First Century Warfare,(cid:4) St Martin(cid:4)s Press, New York.p224. 

326.New Scientist, 18 October 1997, p27. 

327. See for example, Bunker, R.J. (ed.) (1998) (cid:3)Non-Lethal Weapons:Terms and References(cid:4). INSS Occasional paper 15. USAF Institute For 
National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado. Available via http://www.infowar.com/resource/res_100997a.html-ssi 

328. Mathew Meselson (1992) (cid:3)Banning Non-Lethal Chemical Incapacitants in the Chemical Weapons Convention(cid:4), Committee For National 
Security, Washington, February 20 

329.Meselson, 1992, op. cit. 

330.Much  of the scientific background to the chemicals described in this section is derived from Robinson, JPR, (1994) (cid:3)Disabling chemicals: 
some technical and historical aspects(cid:4), a paper presented to the second workshop of the Pugwash study group on Implementation of the CBW 
conventions, Den Haag, 27-29 May. 

331. Witten B., (1968) (cid:3)Non-lethal agents in crime and riot control(cid:4) Edgewood Arsenal Technical memorandum, EATM 133-1, July, AD392476 
(via FOIA) 

332.Dept of the Army (1991) (cid:3)Supporting data FY 1992/1993 biennial budget estimate, Descriptive Summaries of the Research Development Test 
and Evaluation Army Appropriation(cid:4), submitted to Congress February, AD A234275. 

333.US Executive Order 11850 of April 1974 quoted in Meselson (1992) op.cit  note 21. 

334.This Acquisition Strategy (AS) was approved in February 1991, the Acquisition Plan was approved in May 1991. (USA Department of the 
Army(1992), (cid:3)NBC Modernization Plan(cid:4) January).  

335. Evidence for this conclusion comes from US Defense department FY 93 Small Business Innovation Research program for proposals including 
(cid:3)less-than-lethal(cid:4) Immobilizing Chemicals(cid:4). The objective is given as (cid:1)To suggest acquire, evaluate and develop chemical immobilizing materials for 
applications to various missions such as rescue, embassy protection, anti-terrorism, barricade situations, domestic disturbances and other law 
enforcement scenarios.(cid:2) The programme suggested that the fentanyls were candidates but that the duration of action too long and safety ratios too 

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low.(cid:2) New (cid:1)candidate immobilizers(cid:2) should have (cid:1) improved safety ratios and shorter duration of action.(cid:2) ASA Newsletter(1993) No.38, 14 
October, page 14. 

336.President Clinton (1994) Letter to the Senate transmitting the Chemical Weapons Convention for ratification, June 23rd 

337.See presentation of J Busic (1998)(cid:3)Technology Investment:exploring New Non Lethal Weapons concepts(cid:4), to Janes Non-Lethal Weapons - 
Development & Doctrine conference, 1-2 December. 

338. See Presentation of Colonel Mazarra, United States Marine Co., (cid:3)A View To the Future(cid:4),Janes Non-Lethal Weapons - Development & 
Doctrine conference, 1-2 December 1998. 

339.Thornton C., (1996) (cid:3)US Army Non-Lethal Warfare Requirements(cid:4), Non-Lethal Defence II Conference Proceedings, ADPA, March 6-7. 

340.Janes International Defense Review (1996) (cid:3) Modified M16 for lethal/non-lethal attack(cid:4), No.9, September, p 20. 

341.Mahon J., (1996) (cid:3)Correctional Applications of less-lethal Force, Office of Security Technology, Federal Bureau of Prisons, presentation to 
Non-Lethal defence II Conference Proceedings, ADPA, March 6-7. 

342.Flint J., (2000) (cid:3)It worked for Spiderman, now WA police seek a net result(cid:4), The Age, Australia 17th.  February(cid:4). 

343.Alliant Technical Systems  (1997) (cid:3)An Industry perspective on Non-Lethal Weapons(cid:4) Presentation to Janes Conference NLW, 1997, 20-21 
November, London 

344. According to David Boyd at the National Institute of Justice research programme on Non-Lethal Weapons. 

345. Gourley, S., (1996) (cid:3)Soft Options(cid:4) Janes defence Weekly, London 17th. July. 

346. For a discussion, see Doswald-Beck, L.. (1996) (cid:3)New Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons(cid:4). International Review of the Red Cross, M-J 96 
36(312)pp.272-299. 

347. See for example Alexander J.B et. Al.(Eds.) (1997): SPIE Proceedings, (cid:3)Security Systems And Non-Lethal technologies For Law Enforcement, 
Boston, MA (http://www.spie.org/web/abstracts/2900/2934.html 

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348. See Patent No 5675103, Non-lethal tetanizing laser, filed 17 July 1997.. The UK Defence Ministry(cid:4)s Defence Evaluation Research Agency as 
looked at this (cid:3)freezer ray already. See (cid:3) Raygun freezes Victims Without causing Injuries(cid:4), Sunday Times 9 May 1999 

349.See Technology News (1999) UV Lasers Stop people in Their Tracks, January. Also Max Glaskin (1999) (cid:3)Ray gun freezes victims without 
causing injury(cid:4), Sunday Times May 9 

350. Scannel EP, (1997), (cid:3) - ARL Non-lethal Weapon Concepts(cid:4), Janes Conference, (cid:3)The Future of Non-Lethal Weapons(cid:4), 20-21 Nov.  

351. Bill Arkin quoted in the Guardian 9 December 1997. 

352. For a discussion, see Alexander JB., (1999) op.cit 

353. See Altman J., (1999) (cid:3)Acoustic Weapons - A Prospective Assessment: Sources, Propagation, and Effects of Strong Sound, Cornell University 
Peace Studies program, Occasional papers, May. 

354. E.g. a provocative study on alleged psychotronics has emerged from the Czech republic. See Babacek, M., (1998) (cid:3)Psychoelectronic Threat to 
democracy - the Secret Arms Race (Russian federation and the USA Built Radar Systems that Could Enable Them to Control Minds of Whole 
Populations. (Http://www.mk.net/~mcf/babdoc.htm) 

355. For an interesting discussion, see Victorian A., (1998) (cid:3)The military use of electromagnetic microwave and mind control technology, Lobster 
No, 34 Hull, Winter edition, pp 2-7 (See also back issues of this  exceptional publication: http://www.knowledge.co.uk/xxx/lobster/) 

356.See Begich N., & Roderick J., (2000) (cid:3)Earth Rising? The Revolution: Toward a Thousad Years Of Peace, Earthpulse Institute, USA. 

357. See reports from US military laboratories presented to Janes Non-Lethal Weapons conferences in 1997, 1998 and 1999. 

358. See Outlines: http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/NLD3/libb.pdf 

359. Not surprisingly, some of these are made by manufactures of the now outlawed anti-personnel land mines such as Alliant Tech, who developed 
a fishook mine in 1996 as part of such a cannister launched area denial system which shoots out a thin wire with fishooks. Marketing manager Tom 
Bierman says that (cid:3)Its intended to snag, its not going to kill you(cid:4). Not unless that is those who share your predicament panic.    

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360. See Business Wire (1999) (cid:3)Battlefields of the future - Tasertron(cid:4)s Mine and Munition patents Issued Now,(cid:4) Oct. 14, p.196. 

361.Malodourous substances were chosen for US funding under the FY 1997 selection round - (cid:3)Investigating effect of odourous compounds on 
people of various cultures and geographical locations. See presentation of J Busic (cid:3)Technology Investment:exploring New Non Lethal Weapons 
concepts, Janes Non-Lethal Weapons - Development & Doctrine conference, December 1998. 

362.For a presentation of these weapons and their tactical utility see RDF(1996), (cid:3)Non-Lethal Weapon broadcast by CH. 4's Equinox series, 22nd. 
September and subsequently repeated on the US Discovery Channel. 

363. By academics and former military scientists writing for SIPRI.  For a clear discussion of these developments see, Barfal, T., 
Lundin S.J., and Rybeck B., (1993) (cid:3)Benefits and threats of developments in biotechnology and genetic engineering,(cid:4)Appendix 
7A.,SIPRI Year Book, World Armament and Disarmament, Stockholm, Sweden.  

364. See for example,  Larson CA., (1970) (cid:3)Ethnic Weapons,(cid:4) Military Review, Nov. 3-11. 

365. For an extended scientific discussion of the basis of such genetic breakthroughs and their feasibility, see the BMA(cid:4)s (1999) (cid:3)Biotechnology, 
Weapons and Humanity(cid:4), Harwood Academic Publishers, Ch.4, pp53-68 

366. Enriques J., (1998) (cid:3)Genomics and the world(cid:4)s economy.(cid:4) Science, vol 28, 14 August, pp.925-26. 

367. For a recent comprehensive and clear discussion of the prospects of genetic warfare and the breakthroughs in bio-technology upon which it can 
be based, see Dando M., (1998) (cid:3)Benefits and Threats of developments in biotechnology and genetic engineering,(cid:4) Appendix 13A, SIPRI Year 
Book, World Armament and Disarmament, Stockholm, Sweden.  

368.The 5th. Review conference of the BTWC will take place in 2001. Detailed accounts and summaries of the negotiations are available at the joint 
SIPRI/Bradford Department of Peace Studies Internet site at URL http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 

369. However some of these concerns have been addressed by the Principles of the Universal Declaration of the Human Genome and Human 
Rights. They have been more specifically covered by the resolution on legal aspects of military activities passed at the meeting of the EP(cid:4)s Foreign 
Affairs, Security and defence Policy which called for an international convention and global ban on all research and development , whether civilian 
or military , which seeks to apply knowledge of the chemical, electrical, sound vibration or other functioning of the human brain to the development 

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of weapons which might   enable any form of manipulation of human beings, including a ban on any actual or possible deployment of such systems.  

370. Non-Lethal Weapons and International Humanitarian Law, Proceedings of Jane(cid:4)s Non-Lethal Weapons Conference 1-2 
December 1998. 

371. Edwards, R.(1999) Humane Killing, New Scientist, 4 December, pp. 14-15 

372. ICRC(1997) The SIrUSProject, Geneva. Also http://www.icrc.org  (English) 

373. For a discussion see Edwards. R.,(1999) (cid:3)Humane Killing(cid:4), New Scientist, 4 December, pp.14-15. 

374. Pugwash Newsletter (1997) November, p.276 

375.Amnesty International (1997) (cid:3)Arming the Torturers: Electroshock Torture and the Spread of Stun Technology, London: International 
Secretariat. 

376. Pugwash(1997) see note 38. 

377. Reuters 20th March 2000 (cid:3)Glock Mulls Joining US Handgun Settlement(cid:4). In the US,12 children under the age of 19 are killed by guns every day 
- by adults, each other or by accident which is more than all the other industrialised countries combined. Every two years, more Americans are 
killed by guns than died in the entire Vietnam War see, MacIntyre, B.(2000) (cid:3)Shooting From the Lip Over Right To Bear Arms(cid:4). Times, London 
25th March. 

378. For a useful discussion of such dilemmas for US police officers see, Major Steve James(cid:2) collection of articles on less-lethal force options and impact 
projectiles. Available from City of Springfield Police Department, 321 E. Chestnut Expressway, Springfield, Missouri 655802, USA Fax  (417) 864 1827 
(HRT4ME@dialnet.net) 

379. Amnesty International (2000) (cid:3)Austria before the UN Committee against Torture: allegations of police ill-treatment(cid:4). AI Index: EUR 
13/001/00. 24th. March. The report accused the Austrian police of seriously flouting human rights and abusing their powers in their treatment of 
black detainees. Based on the findings of the UN Committee Against Torture, the report provides detailed eyewitness accounts and medical reports 
of detainees being kicked, punched beaten with truncheons and sprayed with pepper. See also Guardian 25th March 2000. 

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380. These crimes have emerged during an ongoing investigation into police practices in Los Angeles.  See for example  Reuters 6th May 2000 (cid:3)U.S. 
Reportedly May Sue to Force LAPD Reforms(cid:4). 

381. Carson, R. (1963) (cid:3)Silent Spring(cid:4). Hamish Hamilton. 

382. Hansard, 12th May 2000 c1186. 

383. Reitman, V. (2000) (cid:3)Seoul Adopts Chemical-Free Policy on Protests(cid:4). Los Angeles Times. Sunday March 5th. Section A page A-4. 

384. BBC Wednesday, August 11, 1999. (cid:3)UK. Government maintains CCTV vision(cid:4). Published at 06:06 GMT 07:06. 

385. PA News. 6th October 1998 (cid:3) Spy on the Street can identify criminals in seconds(cid:4). Liberty questioned claims that the system had an 80% 
success rate. Its campaigns manager Liz Parratt warned: "The accuracy of facial mapping is very limited. You only need to look at a handful of 
photos of celebrities to see how very different the same people can look in different photos.      "The claim that those who have nothing to hide have 
nothing to fear is rubbish. What the police call an 80% success rate is what we would call a one in five chance of a mistake. Even if it worked, it 
would need to be very carefully regulated to protect people's privacy." 

386. For a detailed discussion of the longer term social implications of the development of (cid:3)intelligent(cid:4) or algorithmic surveillance see Norris,C. and 
Armstrong, G. (1999) (cid:3)The maximum surveillance society - the rise of CCTV(cid:4).  Berg. Sussex. 

387. The exception would be water cannon, if States decided to categorise them within the Armoured Vehicle category. 

388. See for example. Manurhin MR35 Punch company brochure that states: In France the MR35 Punch is a weapon classified in the 7th Category: 
free purchase, possession and transport in the conditions accepted by law.  (Company Brochure, June 1994). 

389. In France an export licence is not required to export tear gas as this material is not 
included in the French governments arms control list.  In other words, it is not military 
equipment and so it is not subject to arms export controls.  Foreign buyers simply need to contact the French manufacturer, agree a price and that's 
it. Personal communication with the authors from Saferworld 3rd April 2000. 

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390. Irish Government response to Amnesty International (cid:3)Less-than-lethal(cid:4) survey questionnaire. 9th February 2000. 

391. See for example, Eire, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, UK. 

392. Given that chemical irritants can be deployed by individual personnel, from vehicles, helicopters and by Naval launched munitions it is 
difficult to identify where any such transfers would be recorded. 

393. See for example the details provided for a transfer by Simad SpA of 12 Cartuccia Lacrimogena cal 40mm M40STA/SR at a value of 300 Dm.  
Sulle Operazioni Autorizzate E Svolte Per Il Controllo Dell(cid:3)Esportazione, Importazione E Transito Dei Materiali di Armamento Nonche 
Dell(cid:4)Eportazione E Del Transito Del Prodotti ad Alta Technologia.  Communicata alla Presidenza il 31 Marzo 1999. 

394. See for example listing for of export licence granted for CS Grenades to Tanzania [No further details] Strategic Export Controls Annual 
Report, October 1999. [1998 data], p89. 

395. Export Controls.  
Mr. Letwin: To ask the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry if (a) tear gas and (b) plastic bullets are covered by the export control regime. 

Dr. Howells: These goods, and others, are controlled under entries in Part III of Schedule I of the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994 as amended: tear gas 
under entry ML7; and plastic bullets under entries ML3 or PL5021.  However, a variety of devices may contain tear gas. Such devices are controlled under several 
other entries: for instance, portable anti-riot devices for administering an incapacitating substance under PL5001; grenades under ML4 or PL5030; ammunition 
under ML3 or PL5021; gas projectors or generators under ML2 or PL5018; under entries ML6, ML9, or ML10, gas projecting equipment for controlled ground 
vehicles, combatant vessels or aircraft, respectively, that are specially designed or modified for military use; and portable devices designed for self-protection by 
the administration of an incapacitating substance under entry 1A905 of the Dual-Use and Related Goods (Export Control) Regulation 1996, as amended.    It 
should be noted that other goods are also controlled under each of these entries.  (Hansard. 19 April 1999 : Column: 456) 

396. See for example, Amnesty International (1999) (cid:3)Submission to the Joint Inquiry into the Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls(cid:4). May. 
London. 

397. Trade Intelligence CDROM 1997. Typical record from Trade Intelligence information source  

TRADE Intelligence Bill of Lading Number:SEAU9687966807 Port of Embarkation: 
Port of Arrival: 

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US Clearing Dest: 
Foreign Port Dest: 
Carrier: 
Country of Origin: 
Algeciras, Spain (ES) (EURO) 
Miami, Florida 
Miami, Florida 
Santo Tomas, Guatemala (GT) (SAMR) 
SEAU - Sea-Land Service Inc. (Maersk Califonia: 718W (EURO) 
Shipment 
Arrival Date: 12-Oct-97 
Container?:   Y 
TEU Count:   1 

Weight: 5790 KG   
Measure: 15CM 
Shipper 
Falken Sociedad Anomina  
c/ Juan Jose Martinez Seco 12 
28021 Madrid, Espana 
Tel: 91-7981418 

Consignee 
Ministerio de la Gobernacion 
7A, Calle 10-54, Zona 1, 
Guatemala, Guatemala, CA 
Notify Parties 
Ministerio de la Gobernacion 

7A, Calle 10-54, Zona 1, 
Guatemala, Guatemala, CA 

Commodity Information 
Cntr: GSTU333765 
Cellulosic Chemical Pulps 
HS Code: 470692 
Cntr: GSTU33765 
Pieces: 14 
Chemical pulps equipo especial para control de masas para la direction general de la policia nacional civil L/C No. 
Puerto Nacional Santo Tomas de Castillo, Izabal, Guatemala CA. Marks and Numbers Cntr: 
No marks 

398. The 9 digit EU Harmonized Custom codes would allow data to be provided for all EU member states.  Whilst some codes cover a broad 
category of products in some cases it appears that manufacturers have extended the 9 digit code to produce more accurate data.  For example, SNPE 

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provides the following code for its E2 Irritant grenade. 9306 90 10 2001B.  It would be useful if this level of data was made publicly available. 

399. See for example photograph of Kenyan police using teargas on pro-democracy demonstrators at Uhuru park, Nairobi in May 1997. In Amnesty 
International (1997) (cid:3)Kenya - The quest for Justice(cid:4). AI index: AFR 32/25/97. First published September 1997. 

400. Amnesty International (1998) (cid:3)Equipping Kenyan Repression(cid:4). AI UK Journal. January/February. p14-15. 

401. Anglican Communion News Service (1997) (cid:3)Kenya: Police storm cathedral(cid:4). 11th July. 

402. Independent, 8th July 1997 (cid:4)Kenyan protestors die in clashes(cid:4). and Times, 8th July 1997, p14. (cid:3)Seven die as Police smash Kenyan protests(cid:4). 

403. The tear gas canister was manufactured by Pains Wessex, Salisbury, UK. Designated Standard Hand CS Irritants Mk IV.  The plastic baton 
round was identified as being manufactured by Haley & Weller, Draycott, Derbyshire, UK. Designated 38mm Baton Round H371 long range 
version, which has a propellant giving a range of 90 to 130 metres.  Both companies are subsidiaries of Chemring Plc, Portsmouth, UK. 

404. Lockman, Zachary. And Beinin, J. (Eds) (1989) (cid:3)Intifada - The Palestinian Uprising against Israeli Occupation(cid:4). MERIP Publication. p324. 
Lists 66 Palestinians killed by tear gas. 

405. Nairn, A. (1998) (cid:1)Tear of Rage(cid:2). Multinational Monitor. April. p15-17.     
"..Tear gas is often described as relatively harmless. In a March [1988] interview with New York radio station WBAI-Pacifica, Federal Laboratories President Dr 
Dennis Constantine said the gas "is not lethal. It is considered as being an irritant and there are no permanent serious effects because of its use.  Anything can be 
lethal if used improperly..."   
The Federal Laboratories "Riot Control" manual describes the dangers differently... The manual includes formulas for calculating the 'median lethal dosage' of CS 
and CN, expressed as the number of minutes it would take to 'kill 50 percent of an exposed group of persons.' In the example quoted at the beginning of the article, 
a Federal Laboratories No.230 Flite-Rite projectile containing 25 grams of CN gas can be expected to kill half the inhabitants of an eight-foot by eight-foot by 
seven-foot room in seven minutes. They would be expected to live 18 minutes if the CS gas were used instead."  

406. Hansard 25th March 1998, Col 160.  
Mr. Kidney: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what assessment he has made of the compliance with his Department's ethical 
foreign policy of the sale of military, security and police equipment to Kenya. [35969]  

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Mr. Fatchett: In accordance with the revised criteria for licensing arms exports, we do not issue arms export licences for Kenya where there is a clearly identifiable 
risk that the proposed export might be used for internal repression.  

During 1997 we rejected licence applications (together worth over (cid:5)1.5 million) to export certain types of riot control equipment, including baton rounds and tear 
gas, to the Kenyan police. Furthermore, we removed Kenya from the coverage of several Open Individual Export Licences for the supply of body armour, firearms 
and ammunition.  

407. The Nation 6th October 1998. 

408. Agence France Presse 30th January 1999 (cid:1)Kenya. Dozens injured as Kenyan police tackle eco-protestors(cid:2). 

409. Agence France Presse 10th June 1999 (cid:1)Kenyan police and demonstrators clash over constitution(cid:2).  

410.  Amnesty International, International Secretariat (1999) (cid:3)Tear Tracks: The trail from Europe to Kenya(cid:4) in (cid:3)The Terror Trade Times(cid:4). October. 
p10. 

411. The East African. 2nd October, 1997 (cid:1)Kenya makes $4.4m Order for Anti-Riot  Vehicles(cid:2). 

412. This combination of chemical irritant and marker dye has often led to observers and victims mis-reporting the weapons deployed. For example, 
(cid:4)This time the paramilitary police drove British-made armoured water cannon onto the campus and sprayed the students with an ammonia solution. The water 
cannon were part of batch of nine exported to Indonesia in 1995. Dozens of students suffered skin burns.  Independent, 27 March 1997 (cid:1)British arms help Jakarta's 
war against its own citizens(cid:2).  

413. TAPOL (1997) (cid:1)Statement on the Judicial Review Initiative(cid:2).25th  March 1997.(cid:3)There was also overwhelming evidence that British and German water 
cannon had been out on the streets on 27 July 1996 and that water cannon were used to spray demonstrators with coloured liquid, possibly CS gas(cid:3). 

414. Amnesty International News Release (1997) (cid:1)Indonesia and East Timor. Arms and security transfers undermine human rights(cid:2). AI Index ASA 21/39/97. 3rd 
June. Riot control vehicles supplied from the UK to Indonesia during 1994-5 were fitted with powerful water cannons designed to use both tear gas as well as pink 
dye. Both types of chemicals have been reportedly used by Indonesian security forces on street protestors.                                                                                         
 It is known that such dye has been used to mark street protestors in Jakarta. On 23 May 1997, a photograph and report of a riot control vehicle using pink dye was 
published by a UK newspaper. The UK Government has stated that it is opposed to the use of such dye by the Indonesia authorities and agreed on 12 February 

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1997 to investigate reports of the misuse of the water cannon. Nevertheless, it has been reported to Amnesty International that further transfers of such water 
cannon to Indonesia from the UK are being considered.    
Amnesty International believes that as long as arbitrary arrests and ill-treatment                  by the security forces are common in Indonesia, and until the UK 
Government has reported the results of its investigation into the misuse of water cannon to Parliament and can offer reasonable assurances that such transfers will 
not be misused again, such transfers should be stopped. 

415. Ezell, E. (1988) (cid:3)Small Arms Today(cid:4). Boston, Stackpole Books. p205. 

416. A report dating from 1990 that Schermuly had supplied a small amount of CS gas.   Defence Manufacturers Association (1990) (cid:1)Police & Security 
Requirements for Equipment and Services in the ASEAN region(cid:2). August. p238. 

417. SS1-V1, SS1-V2 and SS1-V3 assault rifles. Jane(cid:4)s Infantry Weapons 1997/98, p153. 

418. Defence Manufacturers Associationm (1990) (cid:1)Police & Security Requirements for Equipment and Services in the ASEAN Region(cid:2). August. p238. 

419. Jane(cid:2)s International Defence Directory 1995. Jane(cid:2)s Publications Group, UK. PT Pindad was listed as supplying: small arms ammunition, spares for licenced 
weapons, mortar bombs, hand grenades, explosive devices, pyrotechnics, and Grenades, anti-riot, tear gas CN, hand launched.  

420. Interview on 7 November 1997 with Rabbison Chongo, of Zambia(cid:1)s United National Independence Party (UNIP) in London 

421. After being beaten by police, then detained in a police van, she said she watched the police officers going inside the building to shoot tear gas rounds, then 
closing the main glass door of the lobby to contain it (cid:4)The smoke in this office was terrible. I tried to wash my face. I wanted to go upstairs to the first floor. I 
couldn(cid:3)t see in front of me, about five feet in front, I couldn(cid:3)t see because it was like chili in my eyes. I was following the wall to go out and up the stairs. Then 
someone was pulling me out. A hand was pulling me out. It was the police. They started beating me. Three police men, they hit me with batons. Wooden batons, a 
club with a handle on the side. They tore my skirt and threw me in a van. What I saw when I looked out: guns., The police were going in with guns. They opened 
the door [to Freedom House] and would shoot teargas, then they closed the door again. (Interview with Mrs Melania Chipungu, 8 April 1998). 

422.UNIP official Basil Kabwe recalled (cid:1)We sent out telephone messages to red cross. Mrs Melian Sebente Akuffo managed to get through to the Red Cross. But 
the police shot tear gas canisters at the ambulance, it was clearly marked with a red cross, and it turned around and drove away again.(cid:2)  (Interview with Basil 
Kabwe in Lusaka, 8 April 1998) 

423.For example, on 27 July 1998, Melian Sebente Akuffo was at another UNIP office elsewhere in Lusaka. After phoning Freedom House, she was asked 

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telephone the police. She remembered her conversation with the police officers: (cid:4)The policeman who I spoke with said: (cid:1)We(cid:2)ll tear gas them until they die and 
those who come out of the building we will break their necks.(cid:2) I asked: (cid:1)Are you a policeman for the [ruling party] MMD or for the republic?(cid:3) and he banged 
down the receiver.(cid:3) Melian Sebente Akuffo then called the Zambia Red Cross, and agreed to meet them outside Freedom House, and accompany them into the 
building. (cid:4)I went with the Red Cross to give water to people suffocating. Police said we couldn(cid:2)t give water to people. The policeman in charge said if the Red 
Cross didn(cid:2)t move, he would shoot out their tyres. He shot tear gas into the vehicle.(cid:3) 

424. Hansard 21st  January 1977 

425. Jane(cid:2)s Police and Security Equipment 1998-99, p345. Jane(cid:2)s Publications Group, UK. 

426. Verney Carron (France) company brochure. 

427. Jane(cid:2)s Police and Security equipment 1998-99, p148. Jane(cid:2)s Publications Group, UK. 

428.  MK Ballistic Systems (USA) company brochure. 

429. MK Ballistic Systems (USA) company brochure. 

430. Milstor Corporation (USA) company brochure. 

431. Fiocchi (Italy) company brochure. 

432. TFM Pty, South Africa, company brochure. 

433. MR 35 Punch - see Arch. Kriminol. 1997 Sep-Oct. 200(3-4):87-94. Variation in energy due to variation in propellant charge. 

434. Nobel Securite (formerly SNPE) France company brochure. 

435. Nobel Securite (formerly SNPE) France, company brochure. For the 46g rubber bullet the energy level given is for the upper range limit, at 10m impact 
energy  would be higher. 

436. Policske Strojirny, Poland company brochure. 

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437.. Chute, Dennis. J. and Smialek, John. E. (1998) (cid:1) Arwen:  Injury Patterns in a Plastic (AR-1) Baton Fatality(cid:2). The American Journal of Forensic Medicine 
and Pathology. 19(3). 226-229. 

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