Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on 'Poland on the road to accession'
Date: 1999-12-09
Institutions: European Economic and Social Committee, Provisional data
Subjects: Poland, accession to the European Union, cooperation policy, exchange of information, public awareness campaign

C 51/74

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

23.2.2000

Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on ‘Poland on the road to accession’

(2000/C 51/17)

On 25 February 1999 the Economic and Social Committee, acting under Rule 23(3) of its Rules of
Procedure, decided to draw up an opinion on ‘Poland on the road to accession’.

The Section for External Relations, which was responsible for preparing the Committee’s work on the
subject, adopted its opinion on 24 November 1999. The rapporteur was Mr Ribbe.

At its 368th plenary session (meeting of 9 December 1999), the Economic and Social Committee adopted
the following opinion by 103 votes in favour, 14 against and five abstentions.

1.

Introduction

Since Poland set out on the road to democracy and a market
economy, the ESC has supported the country’s association
with the EU under the Europe Agreement and has been a firm
advocate of Polish accession.

The Association Agreement with Poland
signed on
16 December 1991 came into force on 1 February 1994. The
country submitted its application for EU membership on
5 April 1994. A year later the Council of Ministers decided to
consult the European Commission, which then went on to
draw up an opinion on the basis of the criteria laid down at
the Copenhagen summit of June 1993. This opinion was
presented on 15 July 1997.

Following the decisions of the Luxembourg European Council
of December 1997, accession negotiations with Poland were
officially started on 30 March 1998. The Commission was
instructed to report regularly on the progress each accession
country was making with its reforms.

The latest report was submitted on 13 October 1999. Its
findings have been taken into account in this opinion.

2. Purpose of the own-initiative opinion

2.1.
The Committee recognizes and welcomes the great
efforts made both by the Polish government and the EU
Commission, especially the DG responsible for enlargement,
in the accession process. A great deal of the groundwork
for successful completion of accession negotiations and the
adoption of the acquis communautaire by Poland has been
done on both sides. The progress made so far inspires the ESC
with confidence. The programmes decided upon under Agenda
2000 will also help to intensify the accession process.

Nevertheless, there are still some outstanding problems which
have not yet been sufficiently discussed and which the ESC
became aware of, inter alia, during its visit to Poland in June
1999. The ESC would like to re-examine these in this opinion.

The ESC’s sometimes critical assessments and recommen-
dations are to be seen as a contribution towards making
accession proceedings more effective.

The present document does not intend to give an
2.2.
overview of the current state of negotiations with Poland. That
information can be found in various publications produced by
the Commission.

2.3.
The purpose of the ESC’s own-initiative opinion is
therefore to give as objective as possible a picture of the
current situation in Poland with regard to the accession process
and to highlight problems which are emerging, or may emerge,
during the integration process and which the ESC feels have
not yet been given sufficient attention. The main focus will be
an analysis of the current state of civil society organisations, a
description of their present role, and recommendations for
improvements, including through additional EU initiatives.

2.4.
The opinion is based on the firm belief that a task as
great and important as the integration of the central and
eastern European countries
into the EU can only be
accomplished successfully if an in-depth and structured dia-
logue can be held with as many representative partners from
civil society organisations as possible.

3. General introduction

3.1.
Poland’s economic development is at present very
uneven. For years, the whole country has been experiencing a
continuous economic upturn. Growth rates averaging 5 to 7 %
are now typical of the remarkable dynamism which set in after
the economically difficult years at the start of the economic
and social transition in the early 90s. Budgetary and currency
stability have continued to be a strong draw for foreign
investors. Even among SMEs the trend has been ever upward.
The main economic activity has been concentrated first and

23.2.2000

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 51/75

foremost in the traditional urban centres. Warsaw, for example,
is experiencing an extraordinary economic boom, providing
the focus for 40 % of all foreign investment. There is almost
full employment on the capital’s labour market and skilled
workers are in short supply, too. The situation is similar in
Poznan, Szczecin, Gdansk, Lodz, Lower and Upper Silesia,
Cracow and other cities.

3.5.
At the beginning of 1999, four large-scale and funda-
mental reform projects were implemented in Poland after
being passed in parliament. They are:

— administrative and structural reform, reducing the number
of voivodships (provinces) from 49 to 16 and introducing
poviats (districts);

3.2.
The situation in most rural regions is quite the reverse,
with an unemployment rate far above the national average, as
for example in parts of northern Masuria (the town and
surroundings of Goldap with a constant rate of 30 %) and
Pomerania. One of the reasons for this is the break-up of the
vast collective or state farms where thousands of workers are
now left with no livelihood (1). For years the cohesion of
the rural population has been beset by serious social and
psychological problems. There is also high unemployment in
the rural regions of the south east and east, where numerous
small farms now do nothing more than eke out a meagre
existence.

There is thus a perceptible trend within Poland for regional
disparities to polarise, creating considerable potential for social
tension. This potential must not be underestimated in the
run-up to the impending referendum on EU membership.

The growth in stark regional differences between town
3.3.
and country is being accelerated by the striking disparity in
education. While in cities almost 10 % of the population hold
a higher educational qualification and 34,1 % have completed
secondary school and college, the corresponding figures in
rural areas are only 1,9 % and 15,4 % respectively. In rural
areas, the number of people leaving school without any
qualifications is 10,8 % and the number who have only
completed primary school 43,8 %, while in cities the corre-
sponding figures are only 3,8 % and 27,6 % respectively. This
serious disparity in education will have a lasting detrimental
effect on the economic development of rural areas. Admittedly,
the educational reform now being implemented is intended to
address this situation, but
the
unsatisfactory state of affairs will change, and certainly not in
the short term, especially as the funds needed for the edu-
cational reform would appear to be unavailable at present.

there is little chance that

3.4.
As one of the key objectives of EU policy is to reduce
regional disparities, the EU accession partnership programmes
for Poland should make this a priority even during the
accession phase, supporting the efforts of the Polish authorities
in a flexible yet focused manner. It seems not unlikely that the
referendum on Poland’s membership will be very strongly
influenced by problems in rural areas and agriculture and may
well be decided by this issue.

— reform of the pension system;

— health reform;

— educational reform.

3.6.
The administrative reform has not only contributed to
giving the regions and localities more responsibilities of their
own,
it was also imperative for the implementation of
many of the obligations resulting from the adoption of the
Community acquis. The ESC feels, however, that a considerable
effort is still required, not only to build up the relevant
administrative bodies, but also to train staff to an appropriate
level. As yet there is also no smoothly functioning division of
responsibilities in practice between the centre (voivods) and
elected regional authorities (sejmiks) and their leaders (mar-
shals), who are supposed to represent regional interests. The
partially unresolved question of regional funding is particularly
emotive.

3.7.
Poland has set itself the target of meeting all the
requirements for accession by 31 December 2002. The ESC
endorses this clearly ambitious goal while nevertheless noting
that a great deal of work is still required to achieve it at all
levels and in all sectors, since it will involve not only accepting
and transposing the acquis communautaire,
into national
law, but also implementing it. The details given in the
above-mentioned Commission report of 13 October 1999
regarding the ground to be made up in certain areas, e.g.
environmental protection, are a source of considerable concern
to the Committee.

It

is not merely a question of

3.8.
It should be strongly emphasised that accession is
much more a large-scale social process than an administrative
one.
transposing and
implementing the acquis; a new social model is to be estab-
lished. The ESC would stress that, if the integration process is
to succeed, it is important that Poland and its citizens (as well
as its administrative structures) merge into the EU in a
harmonious and organic manner. Civil society organisations
have a very important role to play in this as catalysts. Accession
is a desirable and sensible option for all parties concerned but
it must not be forced through before all are ready, even though
the ESC recognises and supports in principle the Polish desire
for accession as soon as possible.

(1) Some 20 % of agricultural land was formerly worked by state
concerns or large cooperatives, especially in western and northern
Poland. The remaining 80 % was worked by private concerns
which in most cases were very small.

3.9.
The Polish government continually emphasises that
Poland’s integration into EU has been the overriding objective
in the country’s recent history. This being so, the dramatic fall
in support for EU membership within the Polish population

C 51/76

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

23.2.2000

must be a cause for the greatest concern (1). Efforts to counter
this trend must be stepped up by means of a carefully planned
information campaign and, above all, concrete policies; the
EU’s support policy should also be strategically geared to
achieving this (see below).

3.10.
convinced that:

This means that both sets of negotiators must be

The reasons for this may be manifold, and are certainly
well-founded historically. Effective dialogue is an ongoing
democratic process which did not exist in the traditional
political system in central and eastern European countries.
Government, employers and workers, as well as the other
partners in society, have yet to define and identify their role, a
process which will undoubtedly take time. The government
clearly faces difficulties because civil society organisations are
so poorly organised, but these must not be used as an excuse.

— integration makes sense,

— personnel and financial resources deployed during the
accession phase and subsequent membership represent the
best possible investment in Europe’s future, and

— the sometimes radical restructuring facing certain sectors

(farming, heavy industry etc.) is necessary.

Fragmentation of the various groups representing
3.14.
civil society is indeed a serious problem which the government
cannot solve single-handedly. For this reason, support for
effective structures in civil society should also be seen as a
priority from the EU’s point of view and large-scale assistance
provided e.g. through the Phare programme or, if necessary,
through new programmes under the Phare umbrella (e.g. the
twinning programme, which should no longer be restricted to
the administrative sector).

It is essential to convince all concerned that even those who
apparently stand to lose out will ultimately gain from a process
which ensures peace and a secure future, as well as contributing
to overall environmentally and socially sustainable develop-
ment (as defined by the 1992 Rio conference).

4. Specific comments

3.11.
Nevertheless, the fears of those perceived as more
vulnerable, as the potential losers, must be taken very seriously,
perhaps much more seriously than has been the case to date,
even though these fears may stem from insufficient knowledge
of the EU or the consequences of accession. The Polish
government and the EU with their programmes and initiatives
must offer some kind of concrete prospects to counteract
waning confidence in the merits of membership.

It is imperative to step up structured dialogue with
3.12.
civil society organisations. The ESC sees considerable ground
to be made up in this area. Awareness of the true consequences
of accession is extremely limited in many sectors. As a result,
the debate within society is often based on speculation and
conjecture. This leads to uncertainty among the population, a
tendency to resist integration or to political lethargy, which is
dangerous in the long term. This danger should be counteract-
ed with a targeted, open and ongoing policy of information,
untrammelled by propaganda of any sort, in which civil society
organisations should be closely involved. The ESC offers the
Commission and the Polish government its support in this
endeavour. For instance, appropriate initiatives could be
launched via the Joint Consultative Committee.

3.13.
The Polish government may be fully convinced of the
overall usefulness of substantially enhancing this dialogue, or
of the need to do so, but it seems to the Committee that the
development of this dialogue is proceeding much too slowly.

(1) According to the latest surveys, only 55 % of the population are
now in favour of membership, compared with 83 % in 1997.

4.1. Social partners/civil society organisations

4.1.1.
Social and environmental standards, social dialogue
and dialogue between and with civil society organisations have
been part of Europe’s economic, social and political culture
for decades. They are important for the functioning of the
market economy, and indeed, of democratic, civil society. They
are also in part a component of the acquis communautaire.
There is no substitute for effective social partnership and
dialogue between and with civil society organisations. No
government or parliament can single-handedly tackle the
business which is negotiated between social partners and
with civil society organisations in functioning democratic
economies.

4.1.2.
Such a culture cannot simply be transferred like a
regulation or a directive to countries and societies which,
because of their political past, have (so far) not been able or
allowed to develop it.

4.1.3.
There is no question that, in a country like Poland
where political change was largely instigated by sections of
civil society (the church and trade unions), political leaders are
more than most aware of the particular importance of this
dialogue. It is questionable whether this awareness is shared
by all, e.g. the new class of employers. Many of the new
aspiring entrepreneurs may not always be fully aware of their
social responsibilities and obligations to society.

23.2.2000

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 51/77

4.1.4.
In the ESC’s view, developing civil society organis-
ations in the accession countries is one of the key tasks and
one which, although scarcely achievable through legislation
under the acquis communautaire, is nevertheless crucial to the
success of the integration process. Yet this task cannot be
accomplished by governments alone. That is why an intensive
transfer of know-how is required, which the EU Commission
should also have a strong interest in promoting.

As the ESC sees it, the situation with regard to the social
partners in Poland is currently as follows:

4.1.6.4.
The employers are on the whole much less organ-
ised, presenting a very varied picture. In the public sector the
state is often torn between its role as an employer and its role
as a reformer. In the private sector, most employers shy away
from integrating into regional or national structures. They are
no match for the apparently all powerful unions and have no
interest in agreements beyond works level. Most collective
wage agreements continue to be concluded at works level.
However, with the clearly emerging decline in union power,
there has been a significant increase in the number of broken
agreements.

4.1.5. With its constitution and various individual laws, the
Polish government has created the legal conditions for social
dialogue. The ESC very much welcomes this. Working con-
ditions and labour relations in Poland are thus governed by
comprehensive labour legislation. Unions and employers can
therefore organise their relations in a variety of ways as in
the West. Nevertheless, the ESC has observed that various
difficulties still exist in practice. These are outlined below.

Since 1997, when political

4.1.7.
forces with links to
Solidarnosc came to power, the influence of Solidarnosc on
the government has increased and most actual or potential
disputes have been settled by decree rather than through
negotiation between the social partners. For this reason
employers have no interest in ‘submitting’ to the seemingly
powerful unions. This means that many employers do not see
the need for an organisation of their own, preferring instead
to deal direct with the workers at company level, with or
without sectoral unions.

4.1.6.
In 1994 a Tripartite Commission was formally
set up in Poland supplemented by corresponding tripartite
industry-specific working groups. But the Tripartite Com-
mission has long been unable to fulfil its role. This is because
the partners involved are not on an equal footing:

Trade unions in Poland are divided and polarised
4.1.6.1.
along party political lines. In particular, the two major trade
union confederations, NSZZ ‘S’ (Solidarnosc) and OPZZ, are
very closely associated with party politics. The NSZZ ‘S’ has
close links with the ruling coalition of the AWS (Solidarity
Electoral Action) and UW (Freedom Union) parties and
accounts for the majority of the ruling parties’ Sejm members
(MPs), as well as many members of the government and high
officials. Similarly, the OPZZ is the political partner of the
opposition SLD (Democratic Left Alliance), albeit not so
inextricably linked.

Apart from the large umbrella organisations there
4.1.6.2.
is a large number of other trade unions, some of which operate
only at works or sectoral level and are only able to influence
nationwide processes in exceptional cases.

4.1.6.3.
Trade union influence and level of organisation are
still considerable in those state companies which still exist
(heavy industry, railways etc.), but in newly formed private
companies the unions hold little sway. While the restructuring
of state concerns is a frequent source of conflict between
government and unions (see 4.2 Heavy industry/mining), not
least because the unions see their influence being eroded,
union influence in negotiations between private companies
and their employees is the exception rather than the rule; such
cases are almost always resolved through works agreements.

4.1.8.
At the same time there has been a marked decrease
in the number of organised trade unionists in the private
sector, a trend which is likely to spread to other sectors of the
economy still to be privatised. With the tendency being for
established unions to have only the appearance of strength,
this may lead to the still fragile system of social partnership in
Poland becoming totally marginalised. This may be to the
detriment of the workers, which could in turn result in social
unrest, because the necessary catalysts are not operative or are
not in place.

4.1.9.
It is important to note in this context that the
political parties and the relevant unions have begun to review
their interdependence and to define their true roles.

In establishing the SLD as a new, nationwide
4.1.9.1.
left-wing party, the Left has made it clear that ‘its’ union, the
OPZZ, is not automatically affiliated, but that membership can
only be on an individual, rather than a block, basis. Trade
unionists are free to join, but the union will no longer be able
to play a significant role in the new party as an umbrella
organisation.

The trend can also be observed in the right-wing
4.1.9.2.
AWS alliance, albeit not as consistently. Solidarnosc is simply
too powerful at present to be systematically excluded from the
political process on the right. But even here it seems to be only
a question of time before Solidarnosc is forced to limit itself to
trade union activities. The question remains whether it will
still have enough members by then to fulfil its role.

C 51/78

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

23.2.2000

4.1.10.
The crux of these developments is that the system
of social partnership in Poland is still in its infancy and the
practical implementation of the legal framework now in place
is still not functioning properly. The ESC will keep a keen eye
on progress in this area.

4.1.11.
Other civil society groups and organisations are
also facing problems. The level of organisation is in some cases
extremely poor. There is a widespread aversion towards
centralised structures, which is entirely understandable given
the experience of the past. But since political decisions are
obviously made at the centre, these groups and organisations
would be well advised to set up organisational structures of
their own on a par with existing political bodies with real
decision-making powers in order to be able to participate
effectively in the dialogue involving all sections of society.

4.1.12.
The problem is somewhat compounded by a lack
of awareness among the population on certain issues. Despite
the highly commendable commitment of consumer protection
organisations, questions of consumer protection have not
received very much attention so far. This, coupled with the
low level of organisation already described and lack of
resources, highlights the serious need for improvement in the
role of, for example, consumer and environmental protection
agencies.

Nevertheless, there have been some quite positive
4.1.13.
developments which should be taken further. For example,
regional chambers are given a major role in the dialogue.
Polish law provides for regional chambers, such as chambers
of agriculture. Following democratic elections, these chambers
the
of agriculture are in place and ready to act
voivodships. With their statute and representative compo-
sition, they can help to create organisational structures for
skilled labour in the sector and take on the role of a major
interlocutor with regional and national authorities. It goes
without saying that such chambers are no substitute for the
work of e.g. autonomous farmers’ organisations.

in all

4.2. Heavy industry, mining and the future of industry

This section is intended to highlight the problems Poland is
experiencing with the necessary structural changes and the
role of government and the social partners in this process.

4.2.1.
The state of heavy industry in Poland is a source of
major concern both for the Polish authorities and the EU. It
has so far proved impossible to carry out
the planned
industry. It seems that structural
privatisation of the steel
reform in the steel sector, which will probably entail job losses,
is being held up by the all too numerous vested interests
within the steel business.

4.2.2.
The situation in the mining sector is critical. There is
as much potential for social upheaval, in this sector as in
agriculture.

4.2.2.1.
Before the re-establishment of democracy in
Poland, mining was the most privileged sector of the whole
economy. Miners were the highest paid workers. They also
enjoyed an exceptionally large number of social privileges. At
the same time mining was the classic example of the irration-
ality of the system.

4.2.2.2.
The policy of cheap energy and constantly rising
production with no regard for the production or resultant
costs rendered any kind of rational accounting impossible,
with devastating consequences for the whole economy. Coal
mines were permanently running at a loss. Their revenue
depended solely on the level of state subsidies, and not on real
prices and costs. This mentality largely persists today among
mine workers and managers.

4.2.2.3.
In the last 20 years the officially fixed price of coal
represented between 40 % and 90 % of the actual production
cost. This ratio formed the basis for determining state subsidies,
which even included a state-guaranteed ‘profit’ for individual
mines.

4.1.14.
It is a matter of importance to the Committee to
address the role of women in Polish society. According to the
European Commission (1), the small proportion of women
involved in political decision-making (2) is not the only evi-
dence that equal rights are still far from being a reality. In fact,
the trend is towards rather traditional, conservative family
values, resulting in major difficulties for women who wish to
run their lives independently on their own terms.

4.2.2.4.
After the transition in 1989, the above-mentioned
discrepancies were reduced, but the coal industry continues to
operate at a heavy loss. The main reason for the plight of
coal-mining is the dogged refusal to do away with the outdated
structures of the former planned economy, i.e. the refusal to
give up the special status accorded to the workforce which can
no longer be justified.

(1) See the European Commission’s Annual Report 1998 on equal

opportunities

(2) Women make up only 12,7 % of the national parliament.

4.2.2.5.
The state-run monopolistic structure of the sector
also plays a decisive role in perpetuating coal and electricity
prices which are not determined by market criteria. The
strong coal-mining lobby ensures that the boards of mining
companies, pit managers, distribution companies and powerful

23.2.2000

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 51/79

trade unions present a united front despite their various
and sometimes divergent interests. The rules of the market
economy seem not to apply for these groups. Pit losses are
growing, but miners’ incomes and, in particular, the bonuses
received by mining company directors continue to rise.

Every Polish government since the transition has
4.2.2.6.
tried to tackle the mining problem. A Fifth Reform Programme
was submitted in 1999. As it stands, it seems to make a
successful contribution towards significantly reducing the
number of mine workers and increasing productivity, which is
unfortunately of limited benefit in the light of the current low
level of coal production prices worldwide.

secondly there was condemnation of the all too powerful links
between the NSZZ ‘S’ members in the government and the
same trade unions representing workers.

4.2.2.10.
The unresolved question in Poland is not whether
the mining sector should be brought into line with the changed
economic conditions, but how this process is to be funded
against a background of unrealistic demands and ultimatums.
The Polish taxpayer will not be able to sustain the necessary
expenditure much longer. In this context, it would be useful to
examine the precedent set by the European Coal and Steel
Community, which came up with specific economic and social
provisions to deal with such problems as reconversion and
retraining.

The social plan included in the reform programme
4.2.2.7.
(in force since June 1998) provides for the following as a
means of cushioning the necessary redundancies:

4.3. Agriculture and rural development

— the pensioning off of miners with 20 years of service at

the coalface on 75 % of their current salary;

— a severance package for miners who have worked less than
20 years at the coalface and wish to take voluntary
retirement totalling 24 monthly salaries, i.e. around PLN
50 000 per worker;

— two years of benefit payments and 65 % of salary with an

offer of further training;

— grants for employers in other industries who take on

redundant miners.

4.2.2.8.
The success of the social plan is gratifying because
it has enabled the government to reduce the number of mine
workers from 243 000 in 1997 to 207 000 by the end of
1998. The problem is that the government was not expecting
such a high take-up for the early retirement with severance
package option and there are insufficient funds available.

4.2.2.9.
The trade unions, under the umbrella of the NSZZ
‘S’ (Independent and Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarnosc)
are uncompromising in their demands for financial compen-
sation for the abandonment of coal mining. The OPZZ union
(All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions) and a number of splinter
groups are, on the other hand, vigorously opposing any move
towards pit closures or cutbacks. The unions are not willing to
yield any ground to the government in these difficult times.
On the contrary: after a hunger strike in the mines lasting
several weeks, which was organised by the NSZZ ‘S’ (Solidar-
nosc) union at the end of 1998, they managed to force the
government not only to reaffirm its commitment, but also to
provide assurances that the payments given for early retirement
would be inflation-linked. This deal came in for strong public
criticism, firstly because it meant that other groups of socially
disadvantaged workers were unable to push through their own
claims in the long term as the government’s financial reserves
were being spent almost exclusively on the miners, and

The economic disparities between urban centres and rural
areas are becoming ever greater. At the same time it is clear
that ‘city-dwellers’ are not aware of the problems in agriculture
and rural areas, do not understand them or simply ignore
them, a phenomenon which is certainly not unique to Poland.

4.3.1.
Two major problems are highlighted in all analyses
of Polish agriculture: the large proportion of the population
employed in agriculture (1) and the small size of the farms. The
future of the overwhelming majority of today’s farms (the
European Parliament talks of 1 to 1,5 million of approx. 2
million farms) is seen as a social and not as an agricultural
issue. The reason given is that some of the farms do not
produce for the market, but cater for their own needs or
engage in private marketing in one way or another.

4.3.2.
There is no doubt that this form of agriculture based
on extremely small farm units (2) will have to undergo radical
structural change. It must be ensured, however, that such
change is carried out in as socially sustainable and environmen-
tally sound a manner as possible. Crucial to this are training
programmes to upgrade skills within the agricultural pro-
duction process, as well as to provide people with alternative
skills of use outside the agricultural sector.

Polish farms may be classified in three categories.
4.3.3.
The first of these are farms which, with an injection of capital,
will be perfectly able to become economically viable units. The
second are farms which will continue to exist as secondary
operations. The farms in the third category will probably be
given up within a generation, particularly because, in many
cases, those who might have taken them over have already
sought another occupation.

(1) Some 25 % of all jobs in Poland are in the farming sector, around
half of these in full-time farming or as the main occupation and
the remainder in farming as a secondary occupation, or on farms
which produce for self-consumption and are not therefore a part
of the official market system.

(2) The average size of Polish farms is approx. 7,5 ha. 95 % of all

dairy farmers have five cows or less.

C 51/80

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

23.2.2000

4.3.4.
Clear development strategies should be drawn up as
a matter of urgency for all three categories, taking account of
regional differences in farming structure and the differing
potential for job creation within and outside agriculture, where
the serious disparity in education between town and country
is once again a major factor. But such strategies are so far
lacking. It is open to question whether this is the reason why
there is virtually no dialogue between the government and
farming organisations.

Even the rural development plan recently submitted
4.3.5.
by the Polish government contains relatively few references to
concrete initiatives, and has also given rise to disputes. Just as
it is correct to recognise in economic terms that a farm of e.g.
four hectares with three cows cannot survive for long, so too
is it wrong to call on a farm owner to give up farming without
offering any alternative prospective source of income or social
protection.

4.3.6.
Also lacking are wide-ranging studies on the potential
environmental impact of the structural changes necessitated
by economic considerations and consequently, strategies to
achieve in Poland what the EU is currently working on, i.e. the
integration of environmental protection into agriculture (1).
One can expect to see a twofold trend: extensively farmed
marginal land will be abandoned, while better-quality land will
be farmed more intensively. There needs to be a detailed
analysis of the impact of the ecological changes this will bring.

4.3.7.
Unlike the production sector, major restructuring
has already taken place, or begun or is currently being
introduced in the processing and marketing sectors. Western
companies are heavily involved, which has facilitated the
financing of the overall process. However, this is creating a
relatively centralised system with few market stakeholders
which is not necessarily compatible with the needs of regional
economies. Such a system also magnifies the obvious market-
ing difficulties faced by poorly organised small and medium-
sized farms.

4.3.8.
Rural development would benefit considerably if the
EU and the Polish government devoted more attention to
creating small and medium-sized structures in the processing
and marketing sectors too (e.g. small butchery businesses (with
affiliated abattoirs), bakeries and smaller and medium-sized
dairies). The cooperative structures which still exist e.g. in the
dairy sector should be used as a basis for this. The EU should
make sure that
these kinds of structures receive special
consideration not only for Phare funding, but especially
through the Sapard programme.

4.3.9.
dence-building effect on regional populations.

Bottom-up projects of this sort also have a confi-

4.3.10. Ministry representatives and members of farming
organisations have repeatedly referred to the problems arising
from the difficulties Poland faces in accessing the EU farm
market and from the combined effort of the EU’s export
refunds policy and the reduction of Polish import duties (2). As
less Polish produce is sold on the Russian and Asian markets
because of their economic crises, the marketing difficulties
faced by the Polish farming sector, which are compounded by
the CAP, are particularly serious. The current negotiations
concerning mutual concessions for both agricultural and
processed agricultural products should address this point.

The merging Commission negotiating position,
4.3.11.
which does not provide for compensation payments to Poland
for agriculture, is likely to be a source of considerable conflict.
The ESC is in favour of gradually integrating the agriculture of
the CEEC into the existing system of EU compensation
payments after accession, especially in areas where price levels
in the accession countries are already on a par with those in
the EU. The price differences which do still exist, as well as
factors such as differing production costs, should be taken into
account when determining the duration of the necessary
transition arrangements.

4.3.12.
The ESC would like to stress that when the future
course of Polish agriculture is considered, particular attention
should also be focused on those farms which in future will
only be run as a secondary occupation. As long as it is not
possible to create enough alternative jobs outside agriculture,
farms should not be evaluated in purely economic terms; there
should also be some recognition of their capacity to relieve the
social burden.

4.3.13.
The major structural problems facing agriculture in
Poland cannot be overcome in a few years, however great the
effort made. Nor is it safe to assume that the predominantly
small-scale farms with extremely low productivity will be able
to cope to some extent with the massive competitive pressure
of the internal market within the foreseeable future. More time
will be needed for agriculture in Poland to make the necessary
structural changes and to boost
its competitiveness. The
ESC is therefore in favour of transition periods which take
appropriate account of these requirements.

(1) There are comparatively few ecological problems in agricultural
areas of Poland because of the relatively low capital resources and
extremely limited use of inputs. The major problems which do
exist are wind and water erosion.

(2) The pork imported from Denmark and the wheat and potato
starch which used to be exported from the EU to Poland are
quoted as examples.

23.2.2000

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 51/81

4.4. Transport

The evolution of transport in Poland is marked by
4.4.1.
massive increases in the number of private cars and a rapid
decline in public passenger and goods transport. This is equally
true in urban centres, regionally and nationwide. The Polish
road network cannot cope with this trend, being unsuitable
for either the volume of traffic or the weight of vehicles (axle
load over 10t).

The changes in the modal split and the resulting
4.4.2.
deterioration in public transport services are having grave
social and environmental consequences. On the one hand, it
means reduced mobility for all those who do not have access
to a vehicle of their own and, on the other, there is clear
evidence of the detrimental effects of increased traffic on the
environment (air pollution, noise etc.). This is particularly true
in cities, where in many cases transport is on the brink of
collapse.

4.4.3.
For many years Poland had neither the time nor the
money to adapt its road infrastructure to the rapid increase in
traffic. Cars can be acquired quickly (by private individuals)
(especially with public
while infrastructure development
funding) takes time. According to EU financial projections of
the investment needed for transport projects of European
significance (1) in Poland, Poland would have to spend around
1,5 % of its GDP on this alone. The current proportion of GDP
spent on investment in the entire (!) transport sector is only
0,7 %. Since existing transport infrastructure outside these
transport axes is also in need of renewal (2),
the Polish
extremely limited financial
government — which has
resources (3) — is clearly caught
in a dilemma between
large-scale investment (e.g.
in TINA projects) and urgently
needed investment in maintenance and expansion outside the
European transport axes, which is also vital for economic
development, as well as having to decide between a road or a
rail-oriented policy. There has even been some difficulty raising
the necessary co-financing for projects to be built with Western
assistance.

4.4.4.
Both the Polish rail network and urban public
transport structures were (and largely still are) relatively well
developed, although services are about to be cut back on a
massive scale (4). Networks are out-dated technically and are
often inadequately managed. Particularly in urban transport,
where buses and trains have always been the mainstay, various
kinds of restructuring are taking place. The central government
has absolved itself completely of any responsibility for urban
public transport. Financial assistance to boost efficiency is not
provided by the state, so resource-starved local authorities are
left to deal with the problem themselves. In addition, their
transport operators are expected to absorb the cost of social

(1) See TINA report.
(2) See EBRD study on the development of the road system in Poland.
(3) Investment in road building has shrunk by 3/4 compared to the

mid ’80s.

(4) 8 000 km of the Polish State Railways’ 23 000 km network is to

be closed down.

policy measures decided upon by central government for
which it provides no financial compensation (e.g.
fare
reductions for schoolchildren, students, the disabled, pen-
sioners etc.).

Considerable discussion has arisen over the planned
4.4.5.
development of the Oder into a waterway ‘of European
dimensions’. While critics point to excess capacity on the
railways and reject the investment needed on transport policy
and environmental grounds, those in favour claim amongst
other things that a waterway of this kind is ‘in the interests of
Europe.’ The Commission should give the Polish government
its views on this project as soon as possible, along with some
indication of whether EU funding would be available, and if
so, how much.

4.4.6.
The evolution of transport as seen in Poland is not
compatible with the EU’s calls for a socially and environmen-
transport policy. So far there is
tally sound ‘sustainable’
no sign of a strategy for the coordinated and integrated
development of
transport. Most
the different modes of
decision-makers are unfamiliar with the ideas contained, for
in the EU White Paper on citizens’ networks,
example,
even though it is particularly important that these also be
implemented in the accession countries.

Every possible opportunity and instrument should
4.4.7.
be used in bilateral
talks and through the available EU
programmes to avoid repeating the sort of transport policy
failures which are now a source of regret in many Member
States. At the same time, the positive solutions set out by the
EU in the Eltis programme among others should be transposed
to the accession countries such as Poland. The ESC would
therefore urge the Commission not to limit Phare and the ISPA
support chiefly to trans-European transport projects, but also
to set up model initiatives in the field of urban transport
projects, rural transport initiatives and projects to benefit
cyclists and pedestrians. One criticism of the TENs is that they
exclude urban transport problems and concentrate solely on
links between centres. This needs to be changed.

4.5. Environmental protection

Poland has already made considerable progress in
4.5.1.
the environmental sector in recent years. This has been
achieved through a combination of stringent environmental
regulations and innovative forms of financing for environmen-
tal investment. The polluter-pays principle, much discussed in
the West, is a reality in Poland. The money it brings in goes
into the ‘environment funds’ held at national, voivodship,
district and local
level. Another important environmental
financing instrument recognised by the OECD as exemplary is
the Polish EcoFund (debt-for-environment swaps) set up in
1991. The proportion of environmental investment in Poland
coming from abroad is around 5 %.

C 51/82

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

23.2.2000

4.5.2.
The transposition of the Community acquis on the
environment into national law and the establishment of a
functional environmental administration which it necessitates
are tasks currently facing Poland. Much work is still
to
be done, especially with regard to setting up an effective
environmental administration (including monitoring systems).
The Polish authorities should lose no time in stepping up
their efforts in response to the observations made in the
Commission report of 13 October 1999 that there is still
considerable ground to be made up in this area and that very
little progress has been achieved of late. The ESC is of the
view that the legal and administrative conditions relating to
adoption of the Community acquis must be fulfilled in their
entirety.

4.5.3.
Another problem is the feasibility of transposition
and technical implementation of Community environmental
law. Despite good progress, numerous efforts and relatively
high levels of environmental investment(1), Poland is still a
long way from being able to meet EU environmental standards
across the board. The situation is compounded by the fact that
some environmental successes, e.g. cleaner air in cities (the
move from coal to gas as domestic fuel) are being cancelled
out by new forms of pollution (e.g. by the increase in car
traffic).

4.5.4.
There is often a shortage of technical infrastructure
such as filtering and water treatment plants etc. The investment
needed is estimated at well over USD 30 to 40 billion, and it is
reasonable to assume that a much longer time span will be
needed for implementation of Community environmental law
than previously expected. For example, Poland is unlikely to
be able to implement the municipal waste water directive on
time. Some credence should be given to the argument that this
might afford Poland some degree of competitive advantage
because businesses will not have to pay for certain environ-
mental precautions (initially). However, it is equally true that
the EU Member States themselves are being dilatory about
implementing many of the environmental protection pro-
visions (2).

4.5.5.
As far as environmental policy investment is con-
cerned, transition periods are a sine qua non. A choice of clear,
verifiable and if necessary enforceable courses of action should
be agreed upon with Poland and the financial transfer which
takes effect upon accession (e.g. from the Structural Funds)
should be conditional on compliance with this environmental
agreement.

4.5.6.
The ESC welcomes the Commission’s initiatives to
support environmental measures under both the PHARE (3)
and ISPA (4) programmes (from 2000). Nevertheless, some
strategic consideration should be given to the kind of projects

(1) Almost 2 % of GDP goes on environmental investment.
(2) The European Court of Auditors has noted that a large number of
the 40 000 water treatment plants in Europe require modernis-
ation or conversion and that another 40 000 plants need to be
built. These will also not be completed before the ‘deadline’.

(3) Approx. EUR 170 million since introduction.
(4) ISPA = Instrument

for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession,

Regulation (EC) No 1267/99, OJ L 161/1999.

to be invested in. There are two possible strategies (which in
brief are: either participation in large-scale investment or
setting up small and medium-sized projects single-handedly.
Since there is a shortage in Poland of new,
innovative
small-scale projects which create jobs, it may be worth shifting
the focus of EU support to concentrate on the latter approach.
The other advantage of the EU’s own prototype projects is that
they are more effective in drawing public attention to the
positive impact of EU assistance, which will lead to greater
support for EU membership.

The ESC would emphasise that any measures should
4.5.7.
take account of the need to preserve any remaining potential
for nature conservation, reiterating its criticism that
the
accession countries are treated differently with regard to
participation in the LIFE projects than EU Member States and
third countries (5).

4.6. EU assistance

4.6.1.
EU programmes: Phare, ISPA and Sapard (6)
starting in 2000).

Accession assistance is given to Poland under three
(the last two

4.6.2.
This assistance is very important to the accession
countries and is very well received. But compared with the
total investment required and the Community funds which
these countries stand to receive after accession, the EUR 3
billion currently available each year is a relatively small
amount, and how it is to be used requires careful and strategic
planning. The accession countries are also still having some
trouble absorbing the available funds in an appropriate way.

This makes it even more important that assistance
4.6.3.
should have the widest possible effect, promoting initiatives to
serve as models or initiating measures which will show the EU
in a positive light among wide sections of the public.

4.6.4.
Probably the most successful action of this kind was
the aid given to the 1997 flood victims under the Phare
programme. In the same way, the Commission should place
greater emphasis on smaller bottom-up projects, implementing
them in conjunction with the Polish authorities. In particular,
the fact that ISPA funding is concentrated on urban centres,
which have far greater financial capabilities than smaller towns
or rural areas, needs to be reviewed.

4.6.5.
The ESC is very well aware that such small-scale
projects are much more difficult for the Commission to
manage, requiring as they do more administration, coordi-
nation and monitoring and thus tying up more staff. Staff
numbers are insufficient in many cases; e.g. the Regional Policy

(5) See ESC opinion on LIFE III (OJ C 209, 22.7.1999).
(6) Sapard = Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural
Development, Regulation (EC) No 1268/99, OJ L 162/1999.

23.2.2000

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 51/83

DG will probably run into major problems unless a large
number of qualified staff are assigned to the ISPA programme
(at a cost of EUR one billion per year). An assessment should
also be made of the extent to which the running of support
programmes can be placed even more in Polish hands,
reducing the role of EU services to checking that the relevant
projects are being conducted correctly.

5. Specific comments and recommendations

5.1.
The ESC is extremely concerned to note the rapidly
dwindling support among the Polish population for EU
membership. It sees this as a signal that communication with
the general public has been inadequate, a fact which must be
taken seriously. A range of measures are urgently needed to
counteract this, including the development and implemen-
tation of an information strategy with civil society organis-
ations. The new Joint Consultative Committee could be used
for this purpose.

As far as the ESC is concerned, the development of
5.2.
political dialogue with civil society organisations is fundamen-
tal. As there are serious deficiencies in this area, it is proposed
either that a special programme be set up, or that,
for
example, the twinning programme within Phare be extended
to appropriate initiatives involving NGOs and other civil
society groupings.

5.3.
The ESC would recommend that the Council and the
Commission address the following points in negotiations with
the Polish government, examining the relevant implementation
options:

— how to raise awareness among the social partners and civil
society organisations of the need for them to organize
themselves more effectively, by creating umbrella associ-
ations, for example. There is an urgent need for these
organisations to improve coordination of their operations
and to further develop their ability to conduct
their
dialogue with political authorities in a more structured
form;

Brussels, 9 December 1999.

— the urgent need for appropriate development strategies
which are socially and environmentally acceptable to
be formulated for the key sectors (e.g. heavy industry,
agriculture, railway reform), and to be discussed and
implemented in a structured dialogue with the groups
concerned which is co-funded by the EU;

— the urgent need to step up the flow of information to and
dialogue with civil society organisations (employers, trade
unions, trade, industry, agricultural groups, consumers,
environmentalists) concerning preparations for EU entry
and the implications of membership;

— how to develop an education campaign specifically for
economically disadvantaged areas providing both training
within agriculture and vocational skills for jobs outside
agriculture, which are urgently needed to cater for the
structural change in agriculture and to stop the economic
gulf between town and country widening still further;

— how to rectify current transport trends in Poland, which
are not compatible with the EU’s aspirations towards a
socially and environmentally sustainable transport policy,
through the medium of a dialogue involving all sectors of
society;

— how to meet the needs of smaller towns and rural areas in

the regional distribution of ISPA funds;

— how to improve the operating environment for SMEs as
the processing and marketing sectors are developed and
how to develop cooperative structures further;

— how to solve the question of the division of responsibilities
between the various levels of decision-making and adminis-
tration, including funding, which is still unclear in certain
cases;

— how existing contacts between Polish and EU interest

groups can be enhanced and new ones established.

The President

of the Economic and Social Committee

Beatrice RANGONI MACHIAVELLI

C 51/84

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

23.2.2000

APPENDIX

to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee

The following amendments, which obtained more than one quarter of the votes cast, were rejected during the
discussions.

Point 4.1.6.1 and 4.1.6.2

Delete and replace with the following:

‘(New 4.1.6.1) The Polish trade union landscape is characterised by the existence of two large confederations, NZZ
Solidarnosc and OPZZ, whose sectoral and regional components generally enjoy a large degree of autonomy. In
addition to these quite loose structures, there are many other trade union groupings and autonomous unions, in
some cases operating only within a particular company.

(New 4.1.6.2) The complex relationships between the large confederations and the political world, Solidarnosc with
the AWS and OPZZ with SLD, make purely social dialogue difficult at times by politicising certain issues.’

Reason

This wording gives a better representation of the socio-political context, avoiding cut-and-dried statements which are
oversimplified.

Result of the vote

For: 41, against: 53, abstentions: 9.

Point 4.1.7

Delete the first part of the point up to ‘has increased and ...’, so the point begins ‘Most actual or potential disputes ...’.

Reason

The description of the relationship between Solidarnosc and the government is simplistic to the point of inaccuracy.

Result of the vote

For: 39, against: 62, abstentions: 8.

Point 4.1.9.1 and 4.1.9.2

Delete.

Reason

4.1.9 is sufficient on its own.

Result of the vote

For: 41, against: 62, abstentions: 9.