Council Regulation (EC) No 2597/1999 of 6 December 1999 imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of polyethylene terephthalate (PET) film originating in India and collecting definitively the provisional, duty imposed
Date: 1999-12-06
Institutions: Council of the European Union
Subjects: India, import, monetary compensatory amount, originating product, plastics, thin sheet

10. 12. 1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 316/1

I

(Acts whose publication is obligatory)

COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 2597/1999

of 6 December 1999

imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of polyethylene terephthalate (PET) film
originating in India and collecting definitively the provisional, duty imposed

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 of 6
October 1997 on protection against subsidised imports from
countries not members of the European Community (1) (herein-
after referred to as the ‘Basic Regulation’) and in particular
Article 15 thereof,

After consulting the Advisory Committee,

Whereas:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1. PROCEDURE

By Commission Regulation No 1810/1999 (2) (herein-
after referred to as ‘the provisional duty Regulation’), a
provisional countervailing duty was imposed on imports
of polyethylene terephthalate (‘PET’)
film into the
Community originating in India falling within CN codes
3920 62 19 and 3920 62 90.

Subsequent to the imposition of the provisional counter-
vailing duty, the Indian cooperating exporting producers
Ester Industries Ltd, Flex Industries Ltd, Garware Poly-
ester Ltd, India Polyfilms Ltd/Jindal Polyester Ltd (related
companies), MTZ Polyesters Ltd, Polyplex Corporation
Ltd (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Indian exporting
producers’),
(hereinafter
referred to as the ‘GOI’), the complainant Community
producers (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Community
industry’)
and two users of PET film submitted
comments in writing.

the Government of

India

In accordance with the provisions of Article 11(5) of the
basic Regulation, all the above parties except for one
user requested and were granted hearings.

One user, which did not make itself known at an earlier
stage, reacted further to the imposition of the provi-
sional measures.

(1) OJ L 288, 21.10.1997, p. 1.
(2) OJ L 219, 19.8.1999, p. 14.

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

The Commission continued to seek and verify all infor-
mation it deemed necessary for the definitive findings.

The oral and written comments submitted after the
imposition of provisional measures and after the above
disclosures were considered and, where deemed appro-
priate, taken into account in the definitive findings.

2. PRODUCT UNDER CONSIDERATION

Recital 7 of the provisional duty Regulation described
the product under consideration to be polyethylene
terephthalate (PET) film.

Recital 8 of
the provisional duty Regulation stated
further that the product can be split into a variety of
segments typically identified within the industry as
magnetic, packaging, electrical, imaging and other indus-
trial segments and that for the purposes of the invest-
igation, the products were grouped in types according to
market segment, thickness, coating properties, surface
treatment, mechanical properties and clarity/opacity.

the

imposition of provisional measures

After
the
Commission received a request by the Community
industry to consider not only the types classifiable
within CN codes 3920 62 19 and 3920 62 90 as set out
in the provisional duty Regulation but also those classifi-
able within CN codes 3920 62 11 and 3920 62 13 as
PET film. The Indian exporting producers opposed the
inclusion of the two additional codes claiming that the
PET film classifiable within them is not interchangeable
with the PET film falling within the other two codes, i.e.
3920 62 19 and 3920 62 90. They pointed out
that
only these latter codes were included in the complaint of
the Community industry and that the two former ones
had not been specifically included in the complaint on
the grounds that the products categorised within these
codes were not
interchangeable with those classified
within CN codes 3920 62 19 and 3920 62 90.

L 316/2

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

10. 12. 1999

(10) On the basis of the information collected in the course
of the investigation, the Commission decided not to
include CN codes 3920 62 11 and 3920 62 13 within
the scope of the investigation as no information has
been submitted which would suggest
the claim
made by the Community industry in the complaint in
terms of lack of interchangeability is not correct.

that

3. SUBSIDIES

3.1.

GENERAL SUBMISSIONS

(11)

(12)

3.1.1. Addition of

interest

in the calculation of

benefits obtained

The exporting producers requested withdrawal of the
interest element that had been added in order to calcu-
late the total amount of benefit obtained under the
various schemes. It was claimed that the addition of
interest was unwarranted, beyond the terms of
the
Agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures
(ASCM) and prohibited under Article VI paragraph 3
GATT 1994. The Calculation Guidelines of the Commis-
sion would be null and void in this respect.

The legal basis for the addition of interest to the face
value of the subsidy is Article 5 in conjunction with
Article 6 of the basic Regulation. Article 5 states that the
amount of countervailable subsidies shall be calculated
in terms of the benefit conferred on the recipient which
is found to exist during the investigation period for
subsidisation. Article 6, which reproduces Article 14 of
the ASCM, establishes rules for calculation of the benefit
for certain types of subsidies. For all categories of subsi-
dies mentioned in Article 6,
i.e. provision of equity,
loan guarantees and goods and services or
loans,
purchase of goods, the benchmark for determining the
benefit is the equivalent cost of funds on the commercial
market. Therefore, by applying the rationale contained
in Article 6 as a general rule to all categories of subsi-
dies, in order to encompass the full benefit, the costs of
borrowing the funds at commercial
rates must be
included.

(13) When expressed as a face value during the investigation
period, all subsidies are effectively equivalent to a grant.
Since non-repayable grants are not available commer-
cially, the recipient,
in the absence of such a grant,
would have had to raise the equivalent amount from

commercial sources and repay it with interest over a
period of time. It is this element of the benefit which is
covered by adding interest
to the nominal subsidy
amount.

(14)

This approach is
specifically provided for by the
sentence ‘The face value of the amount of the subsidy
has to be transformed into the value prevailing during
the investigation period through the application of the
normal commercial
in the Commission's
interest rate’
guidelines for the calculation of the amount of subsidy
in countervailing duty investigations (calculation guide-
lines) (1) and is the Community's standing practice which
has been followed in a number of previous cases.

the amount of

(15) Article VI3 GATT 1994, which is reproduced in Article
19(4) of the ASCM, only states that duties must not be
levied in excess of
the subsidy. The
amount of the subsidy is calculated in terms of benefit
found to exist in the investigation period (Article 14
ASCM). Since the company also benefited from the fact
that it did not have to source the funds on the financial
market, the amount of benefit must also include an
interest element. Consequently, since the amount of
benefit (including interest) corresponds to the amount of
the subsidy and the countervailing duty is calculated in
terms of the subsidy margin found, Article VI(3) GATT
1994 is filly respected by the addition of interest.

(16)

the claim to exclude the interest
For these reasons,
element in the calculation of the benefits obtained under
the various schemes is rejected.

3.1.2 Specificity of the various schemes

(17)

since Article 27(2) of

The exporting producers submitted that the presump-
tion in Article 2(3) of the ASCM rendering subsidies
contingent upon export performance specific will not
ipso facto apply,
the ASCM
provides that the prohibition of subsidies contingent
upon export performance shall not apply to developing
countries. India is one of the countries listed in Annex
VII to the ASCM, and therefore the export subsidies
granted by the GOI would not be prohibited. As a
consequence, the Commission would be under an obli-
gation to demonstrate on the basis of positive evidence
that the schemes in question are specific.

(18) Article 3(4)(a) of the basic Regulation clearly states that
subsidies, including those illustrated in Annex I, shall be
in law or in fact,
deemed to be specific if they are,
contingent on export performance. This condition has
been individually examined for each of
the subsidy
schemes subject to this proceeding.

(1) OJ C 394, 17.12.1998, p. 7.

(19)

(20)

(21)

(22)

10. 12. 1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 316/3

3.2.

INDIVIDUAL SCHEMES

3.2.1. Passbook scheme (PBS)

the finished product. Therefore,

there is no
export
requirement that the imported inputs being substituted
must be equal in quantity to, and have the same quality
and characteristics as the home market inputs.

The GOI and the exporting producers raised arguments
regarding this scheme, which is described in recitals 12
to 19 of the provisional duty Regulation. These argu-
ments need not be addressed, given that the benefits
obtained under this were not included in the amounts of
duty provisionally established for the reasons given in
recital 24 of the provisional duty Regulation. Conse-
quently, no measures will be imposed on benefits under
this scheme and,
therefore, no definitive finding is
required.

3.2.2. Duty entitlement passbook (DEPB) scheme —

pre-export basis

(24) A company which can obtain its inputs at a lower value
or which sources some of the inputs on the domestic
market, would be able to import duty-free inputs that
could be used for domestic production or sale since the
actual imported quantities will have no relation to those
set in the SION. There was no evidence found of an
effective system or procedure in place to confirm either
which duty-free inputs are actually consumed in the
production process of the exported finished product or
in what quantities. Furthermore, it has been found that
the offset that may take place when goods are exported
is not carried out on the basis of actual quantities of
duty free imported inputs used in the processing of the
exported products, but rather on the basis of standard
value assumptions concerning inputs of the exported
product.

The GOI and the exporting producers raised arguments
regarding this scheme, which was described in recitals
26 to 30 of the provisional duty Regulation.

(25)

In particular, it was claimed that the DEPB pre-export
scheme is a permitted remission/drawback scheme
within the provisions of the basic Regulation, and, as
is non-countervailable. It was also claimed that,
such,
should the scheme be found to be countervailable, only
actual excess remissions should be used as a basis for the
calculation of the benefit, and the Commission should
have examined whether there was in fact an excess
drawback of import charges on inputs consumed in the
production process.

The DEPB on pre-export basis is not a remission/draw-
back or substitution scheme within the provisions of the
Basic Regulation, despite the existence of the ‘actual user
condition’. It is fundamentally a value, and not quantity
based scheme. The DEPB rate, which gives rise to import
duty exemption, is not calculated in relation to specific
physical quantities of inputs actually consumed or to be
consumed in the production process. Concretely, inputs
are determined on the basis of Standard Input/output
Norms (SION) which set notional costings based on
what are considered to be the values of inputs that have
to be imported to manufacture a particular product.
Once the DEPB rate has been set for a particular finished
product, inputs can be imported duty free under a DEPB
licence. There is no mechanism in place
pre-export
from
which would prevent an exporting producer
shifting the ratios of his inputs actually imported, since
he is only required to remain within the overall credit
ceiling granted.

(23)

In addition, there is no obligation to actually import all
different inputs for which credit has been granted. The
only limits to the quantity of any particular input that
may be imported under the scheme is the value of the
licence granted and the corresponding commitment to

is determined that

the government of

Even if the DEPB pre-export basis were to be considered
a duty draw-back system, as alleged, Annex II(II)(5) and
Annex III(II)(3) to the basic Regulation provide that,
where it
the
exporting country does not have a verification system in
place, a further examination by the exporting country
based on actual inputs involved, or actual transactions,
respectively, will normally need to be carried out in the
context of determining whether an excess payment
occurred. Since, as explained above, no such verification
system of actual quantities of imported inputs exists, the
GOI was required to undertake an examination. The GOI
did not carry out such an examination. Therefore, the
Commission did not examine whether there was in fact
an excess drawback of
import charges on inputs
consumed in the production of the exported product.

(26)

In any event, the excess remission of import duties is the
basis for calculating the amount of the benefit only in
the case of bona fide drawback and substitution draw-
back schemes. Since it has been established that the
DEPB pre-export scheme is not a drawback or substitu-
tion drawback scheme within the meaning of Annex I(i)
and Annexes II and III to the basic Regulation, the
benefit is the total remission of import duties, not any
supposed excess remission.

(27) As the DEPB pre-export scheme involves government
revenue that is otherwise due being forgone, the scheme
is considered to confer a subsidy under Article 2(1)(a)(ii)
of the basic Regulation. Since benefit under the scheme
cannot be obtained without an export commitment, the
scheme is contingent in law upon export performance
within the meaning of Article 3(4)(a) of the basic Regu-
lation, and is therefore specific.

L 316/4

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

10. 12. 1999

Calculation of the subsidy amount

(35)

This claim has to be rejected for the same reasons as
stated in recital 26.

(28)

The benefit to the exporting producers has been calcu-
lated as explained in recital 23 of the provisional duty
Regulation, taking additionally into account application
fees which have been claimed by the exporting produ-
cers. These additional amounts had, however, no influ-
ence on the provisionally calculated subsidy margins.

(29)

Two companies benefited from this scheme during the
investigation period and obtained subsidies of 1,31 %
and 6,84 %.

(30)

(31)

(32)

(33)

(34)

3.2.3. DEPB scheme — post-export basis

The GOI and the exporting producers raised arguments
regarding this scheme, which was described in recitals
37 to 39 of the provisional duty Regulation.

In particular, it was claimed that the DEPB Scheme on
post-export basis would be a permissible substitution
drawback scheme since DEPB post-exports credits would
be granted only in accordance with notified SION.
Under paragraph (I) of Annex I to the basic Regulation,
a drawback scheme may permit the use of a quantity of
home market inputs equal to, and having the same
quality and characteristics as the imported inputs. It was
also claimed that the Excise Authorities would be in a
position to verify which imported inputs are incor-
porated into the exported product. Accordingly,
the
DEPB Scheme on post-export basis would be a permis-
sible substitution drawback scheme under Annex II to
the basic Regulation.

It should be recalled that, contrary to the DEPB scheme
on pre-export basis, no ‘actual user condition’ exists. The
credits on the DEPB scheme on post-export basis are
calculated as a percentage of
the value of exported
finished products. Credits thus obtained can be used to
offset customs duties normally due on imports of any
goods (excluding those on the negative list of imports).
There is no restriction to goods for use in the produc-
tion of the exported product. Imported goods may be
sold on the domestic market or used in any other way.
Moreover, licences, and thus credits, are freely transfer-
able.

Consequently, it can be concluded that the DEPB scheme
on post-export basis is not a drawback or substitution
drawback scheme within the meaning of Annex I(i) and
Annexes II and III of the basic Regulation.

The GOI also claimed that the scheme constitutes an
export subsidy only to the extent that it provides a
drawback of import charges in excess of those actually
leviable in imported inputs that are used in export
production, and that
the Commission has failed to
discharge its obligation of determining the extent of this
excess.

Calculation of the subsidy amount

(36)

The GOI submitted that, in the case of licences being
sold, the Commission would be required to determine
the actual value of the benefit derived by the exporting
producers through these sales transactions, and not on
the basis of the amount of credit granted in the licence.

(37) As already explained in recital 43 of the provisional duty
Regulation,
this claim cannot be granted since the
benefit granted by the GOI to the exporting producer in
terms of revenue foregone is properly reflected in the
value of the licence. Selling a licence at a price different
(i.e. higher or lower) than its value represents a purely
commercial transaction which does not alter the amount
of benefit originally received from the scheme.

(38)

The benefit to the exporting producers has been calcu-
lated as explained in recitals 41 to 44 of the provisional
duty Regulation. In this respect, it should be noted that a
number of claims were made by four exporting produ-
cers and accepted by the Commission. Subsequently,
additional costs necessarily incurred to obtain the licence
have been taken into account. Also, corrections have
been made to the amounts of credit granted. These
corrections result
the subsidy
margins.

in minor changes of

(39)

Four companies benefited from this scheme during the
investigation period and obtained subsidies of between
2,34 % and 17,68 %.

(40)

(41)

3.2.4. Export promotion capital

goods

(EPCG)

scheme

the objective of

The GOI submitted that
the EPCG
scheme, which was described in recitals 46 to 50 in the
provisional duty Regulation, would be to permit the
technological upgrading of plant and equipment by
enterprises across the economy while also preserving
India's scarce foreign exchange resources. It was claimed
that the EPCG benefit is not contingent upon export
performance because EPCG licences are available regard-
less of previous export performance. Moreover, an EPCG
licence-holder can always purchase domestic rather than
imported capital goods.

In regard to this claim, it should be noted that to avail
itself of the EPCG scheme, a company must make a
commitment to export a certain value of goods within a
certain time period. This scheme is therefore contingent
in law upon export performance since no benefit can be
obtained without a commitment to export goods. As
such, it is deemed to be specific under the provisions of
Article 3(4)(a) of the basic Regulation and, therefore,
countervailable.

10. 12. 1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 316/5

(42)

(43)

The exporting producers claimed that, under the EPCG
Scheme, the Government revenue is not forgone, but
only postponed. If an importer of capital goods fails to
fulfil his export obligation by the end of the period that
the scheme provides, any differential duty will be
collected with interest. Thus, the question whether an
importer had enjoyed any duty remission at all and
whether the government revenue is forgone and, thereby
a benefit is conferred, will arise only at the end of the
given period for fulfilment of
the export obligation
under this scheme. It would therefore be premature to
consider the import of capital goods under the scheme
during the period of investigation.

In regard to this claim,
it is considered that, when a
company applies for this scheme and thereby gives a
commitment to export goods, it must be presumed that
the export obligation will be met and final exemption
from the payment of the import duties will be obtained.
Indeed, there must be an expectation on the part of the
companies that they will finally not have to pay duties.
To assume otherwise would render the scheme meaning-
less.

(44) Moreover,

the investigation has positively established
that the GOI in fact grants extensions of the period of
export obligation to companies that are unable to meet
their export obligation within the period initially estab-
lished.

(45)

it

For these reasons,
is considered that government
revenue is forgone at the time of importation of capital
goods and the importing company receives a benefit in
the form of the total amount of unpaid duties.

Calculation of the subsidy amount

(46)

The benefit to the exporting producers has been calcu-
lated as explained in recital 53 of the provisional duty
it should be noted that a
Regulation. In this respect,
number of claims were made by all exporting producers,
which were in part accepted by the Commission. Most
notably, costs necessarily incurred in order to qualify
for, or to obtain the subsidy and for which substantiated
evidence was provided were taken into account. Those
costs were notably linked to application fees and bank
guarantees. The application fee is a one time operation
whereas the bank guarantees can be a one time opera-
tion covering a period of several years for the bank
guarantee or can be composed of several yearly instal-
ments to be paid throughout the period of the validity
of the bank guarantee.

(47)

It should be noted that, one of these companies, MTZ
Polyesters Ltd, claimed that the method applied in the
provisional duty Regulation is not appropriate in its
specific case, since it had been in a totally different
situation during the investigation period than the other

companies involved in the investigation. Most notably, it
was claimed that, owing to unforeseen events, among
which was a natural disaster, commercial production
started only in October 1998. This led to very low
domestic and export
sales during the investigation
period and consequently to a high subsidy margin. The
company therefore proposed and requested to use a
different calculation methodology.

(48)

It should be noted that no such claim had been
submitted to the Commission during the investigation
until the disclosure of provisional findings. However,
with its request, the company submitted detailed and
substantiated evidence concerning the start of commer-
cial production and the effect that such late start had on
its operations.

specific

and exceptional

the application of

(49) After careful scrutiny of this submission, the Commis-
sion concluded that the request to adopt different calcu-
lation methodologies as proposed by the company was
not justified. However, the Commission considered that,
circumstances
given the
affecting this company,
the same
denominator (i.e. actual exports) to this company as that
applied to the companies which were in a normal
commercial production situation led to results of such a
disproportionate nature that they did not adequately
reflect the benefit obtained by this company from the
countervailable subsidy under this scheme. Accordingly,
the Commission, while maintaining the same calculation
methodology, made an adaptation of the production and
export sales figures of this company, based on verified
data from companies in a normal commercial produc-
tion situation in order to allocate the benefit conferred
by the subsidy during the investigation period.

(50)

In summary, six companies have availed themselves of
this scheme during the investigation period and obtained
subsidies of between 1,42 % and 8,75 %.

3.3.

EXPORT PROMOTION ZONES/EXPORT ORIENTED
UNITS (EPZ/EOU)

(51)

The GOI submitted that it does not forgo any revenue
under this scheme, which was described in recitals 55 to
58 of the provisional duty Regulation, because customs
duties on capital goods are only suspended during the
period of bonding. This means that, on imports of
the
capital goods
importer is not required to pay customs duty. However,
when the capital goods are sold, or de-bonded,
the
customs duty becomes payable, at a rate proportionate
to the depreciated value of the capital goods at the time
of sale or de-bonding.

for use within EPZ/EOU units,

L 316/6

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

10. 12. 1999

(52)

(53)

(54)

(55)

This claim is similar to the one made by the exporting
producers concerning the EPCG scheme,
i.e. revenue
would not be forgone, but merely postponed. However,
to presume that capital goods would be imported duty
free and then resold on the domestic market, duty paid,
In any event,
would render the scheme meaningless.
even if capital goods were to be resold at a given
moment in the future, revenue would be forgone in an
amount proportional to the accrued depreciation. If and
when such capital goods are sold is a merely commercial
decision taken by the company.

it

For these reasons,
is considered that government
revenue is forgone at the time of importation of capital
goods and the importing company receives a benefit in
the form of the total amount of unpaid duties.

The exporting producer made a similar claim, and addi-
tionally presented arguments relating to the imports of
for exported products. Since the EPZ/EOU
inputs
scheme was used exclusively for the import of capital
goods,
arguments need not be
addressed.

additional

these

This subsidy is contingent in law on export performance
within the meaning of Article 3(4)(a) of the basic Regu-
lation, since it cannot be obtained without the company
accepting an exporting obligation, and therefore deemed
to be specific.

Calculation of the subsidy amount

(56)

The benefit of the exporting producer has been calcu-
lated as explained in recitals 63 to 65 of the provisional
duty Regulation. One company received benefits under
this scheme at a rate of 0,7 %.

3.3.1. Income tax exemption scheme

(57) As already established in the provisional duty Regula-
tion, no exporting producer made use of this scheme.
Consequently, no measures were imposed and no defin-
itive finding is required in the context of the invest-
igation.

3.4.

REGIONAL SCHEMES

3.4.1. Sales tax

(58)

(59)

the benefit
The exporting producers submitted that
bestowed under the sales tax exemptions of the States of
Gujarat and Maharashtra and the trade tax incentive
scheme of the state of Uttar Pradesh is conferred to the
purchaser of the goods, and not the seller.

Sales or trade tax in these states is a tax levied on sales
of goods, and added to the sales prices on the invoice.
The seller thereby acts as a tax collector. The sales/trade
tax system differs from VAT systems in that sales/trade
tax paid cannot be offset against sales/trade tax collected.

(60)

(61)

(62)

It has been claimed that the sales or trade tax exemp-
tions have been used by the companies exclusively for
sales transactions, and not for any substantial purchases
of goods.

The Commission, doting the verification visit, has found
no evidence to the contrary. It was also established that
all major suppliers of inputs for the exporting producers
are located outside the States concerned. Therefore, sales
tax was payable on purchases of goods by the exporting
producers.

It can therefore be concluded that the sales tax exemp-
tions granted by the States of Gujarat and Maharashtra
and the trade tax incentive scheme granted by the State
of Uttar Pradesh conferred no benefit upon the
exporting producer.

(63) No measures will be imposed and, therefore, no defin-
itive findings on these schemes are required. Finally, it
should be noted that these findings do not prejudice
findings concerning the usage of
these schemes for
purchase transactions.

(64)

(65)

3.4.2. Regional schemes — Electricity duty exemp-

tion

The GOI and one exporting producer, MTZ Polyesters
Ltd, submitted that this scheme, which was described in
recitals 80 and 81 of the provisional duty Regulation,
would not be specific, since it would be available to all
new enterprises in Gujarat, regardless of where they are
located.

The Commission analysed the evidence submitted in
order to substantiate this claim. After a careful exam-
ination,
it can be concluded that, even though some
unclear wording in the relevant legislation appears to
have been used, notably in the context of defining
‘service undertakings’ and setting differential duty rates,
this scheme is indeed available to all new industrial
undertakings within the state on an equal basis and
during a period of five years.

(66) Article 3(2)(b) of the basic Regulation stipulates that
where the granting authority, or the legislation pursuant
to which the granting authority operates, establishes
objective criteria or conditions governing the eligibility
for, and the amount of, a subsidy, specificity shall not
exist provided that eligibility is automatic and such
criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to. Such
objective criteria and conditions should,
inter alia, be
horizontal in application and not favour certain enter-
prises over others.

(67)

In the light of the submissions received and evidence
it is considered that the
verified in this investigation,
scheme meets the criteria of Article 3(2)(b) of the basic
Regulation, in so far as it is horizontal in application,
since it is available to enterprises in the whole state, and
based on objective criteria, namely the creation of new
industrial undertakings.

10. 12. 1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 316/7

(68)

It is therefore concluded that this scheme is not specific
and therefore not countervailable.

3.4.3. Regional schemes — Octroi refund

(69)

Concerning the octroi refund, which was described in
recitals 88 to 89 of the provisional duty Regulation, the
GOI submitted that the octroi is an indirect tax levied by
local authorities in India on goods that enter the terri-
torial units of a town or a district. It was argued that the
‘Guidelines on consumption of inputs in the production
process’ in Annex II of the ASCM would permit indirect
tax-rebate schemes of prior stage cumulative indirect
taxes levied on imports that are consumed in the
production of exported products. Therefore, this scheme
would not be countervailable.

or by any other party in relation to the fulfilment of the
requirements contained in Article 4(3) of the basic Regu-
lation. Certain evidence, which was limited to data stem-
ming from 1981/1982, was submitted considerably
beyond the deadline.
the
Commission is neither under an obligation nor in a
position to establish that the criteria required for a deter-
mination under Article 4(3) of the basic Regulation,
including, inter alia, those relating to the measurement of
economic development based on statistical evidence, are
met in the case of this scheme.

circumstances,

In these

(76) Under these circumstances, the Commission is under an
obligation to confirm the findings as outlined in recital
93 of the provisional duty Regulation. It is therefore
definitively concluded that this scheme is countervail-
able.

(70)

This argument has to be dismissed, since the octroi
refund scheme has no link whatsoever with export
production.

Calculation of the subsidy amount

(71) No substantiated claims regarding specificity of

this
scheme have been submitted. It is therefore confirmed
that this scheme is specific in accordance with Article
3(2)(a) and (c) of the basic Regulation since it is expli-
citly limited to certain enterprises, which are located in
designated areas, within the jurisdiction of the granting
authority.

(77)

The benefit to the exporting producer has been calcu-
lated as explained in recital 94 of the provisional duty
Regulation. However, the company provided evidence
that it was not entitled to a refund of the full amount of
tax, which consequently led to a lower subsidy margin.

(78) One company benefited from this scheme during the
investigation period and obtained subsidies of 1,08 %.

(72) One

exporting producer, Garware

Ltd,
submitted that it had obtained no benefit under this
scheme during the investigation period (IP) since the
State Authorities of Maharashtra had not yet actually
fulfilled its repayment obligation.

Polyester

(73)

This argument has to be rejected, since the benefit
obtained is the accrued claim against the State of Mahar-
ashtra, to which the company is legally entitled.

(74)

The GOI, supported by the exporting producers, reit-
erated a general green-light claim and submitted that the
Commission, especially in the case of developing coun-
tries, would be under an obligation to establish that
backward regions are not eligible under Article 4(3) of
the basic Regulation,
than making a deter-
rather
mination based on facts available.

3.4.4. Capital incentive

(79)

The GOI and the exporting producers raised arguments
regarding this scheme, which is described in recitals 96
and 97 of the provisional Regulation. These arguments
need not be addressed, given that the benefits obtained
under this were not included in the amounts of duty
provisionally established for the reasons given in recital
24 of the provisional duty Regulation. Consequently, no
measures will be imposed on benefits under this scheme
and, therefore, no definitive finding is required.

(75)

In this respect, it should be noted that, in so far as this
scheme is concerned, which was used only by one
company located in the area of Aurangabat within the
State of Maharashtra, no evidence was submitted within
the deadlines applicable to this proceeding by the GOI

(80)

The amount of countervailable subsidies in accordance
with the provisions of the Basic Regulation, expressed ad
valorem, for each investigated exporter is as follows.

Amount of countervailable subsidies

L 316/8

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

10. 12. 1999

S
B
P

B
P
E
D

S
G
C
P
E

U
O
E
/
Z
P
E

State schemes

t
r
o
p
x
e
-
e
r
P

t
r
o
p
x
e
-
t
s
o
P

x
a
t
-
s
e
l
a
S

e
v
i
t
n
e
c
n

i

l
a
t
i
p
a
C

d
n
u
f
e
r

i

o
r
t
c
O

d
n
u
f
e
r

y
t
i
c
i
r
t
c
e
l
E

Ester Industries Ltd

Flex Industries Ltd

6,84

2,34

2,87

10,44

2,13

Garware Polyester Ltd

1,31

1,48

1,08

India Polyfilms Ltd & Jindal Poly-
ester Ltd

4,82

1,52

0,70

MTZ Polyester Ltd

8,75

Polyplex Corporation Ltd

17,68

1,42

(in %)

L
A
T
O
T

12,0

12,5

3,8

7,0

8,7

19,1

4. INJURY

(83)

Therefore, the findings set out in recitals 105 and 106 of
the provisional duty Regulation are hereby confumed.

4.2.

COMMUNITY CONSUMPTION,
AND MARKET SHARE

IMPORT VOLUMES

(81)

(82)

4.1.

DEFINITION OF THE COMMUNITY INDUSTRY

(84)

Recital 106 of the provisional duty Regulation states
that four complainant producers fulfil the requirements
the basic Regulation, since they
of Article 10(8) of
account
total Community
production of the product concerned and are therefore
deemed to constitute the Community industry within
the meaning of Article 9(1) of the said Regulation.

for more than 80 % of

The conclusions reached by the Commission at
the
provisional stage, notably the existence of significant
increases of
the product
concemed, and a substantial increase of their share of
the Community market were confirmed.

Indian exports of

total

(85)

Therefore, the findings set out in recitals 107 to 110 of
the provisional duty Regulation are hereby confirmed.

The Indian exporting producers have alleged that the
proceeding should never have been initiated, as the
complaint did not include sufficient evidence to prove
that the requirements of Article 10(8) were fulfilled.
They claimed that the fact that the captive production of
PET film was left out in the complaint means that the
Commission could not estimate the total production of
PET film in the Community on the basis of
the
complaint. This allegation was considered unfounded as
the captively produced PET film never entered the open
Community market as PET film but as a downstream
further processed product. In any event, the level of
non-captive production of the complainant producers
was substantially sufficient for standing to be estab-
lished.

4.3.

PRICES OF SUBSIDISED IMPORTS

(86)

The Indian exporting producers have alleged that the
price comparison of
the provisional duty Regulation
leads to unfair results for them, as it does not take into
account the difference in price between commodity and
special types of PET film. They have claimed that the
Indian exports consist mainly of commodity-type PET
film whereas an important part of PET film produced by
the Community industry is of special type. This argu-
ment had to be rejected as the aspects of commodity
and special type of PET film were taken into account in
the product grouping used for the price comparison.

10. 12. 1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 316/9

(87)

The Indian exporting producers have claimed further
that the exclusion of certain parts of the structure of the
product grouping as defined in the questionnaire has
caused higher undercutting margins for them. They
objected to the simplification of
the product-type
grouping after the disclosure of the provisional findings,
claiming that the simplification led to incorrect compar-
ison for PET film types of different quality. They claimed
further that the Indian product tends to be of higher
shrinkage in terms of
thermal properties, narrower
width and more hazy as compared to the Community
product and therefore the Indian product is of lower
quality and less expensive.

(88) On the basis of the information received in the invest-
igation, at the provisional stage the Commission had
decided to simplify the grouping in types of different
PET film as compared to what was foreseen by the
questionnaires sent to the parties concerned. Therefore,
the width, the thermal properties and the distinction
between hazy and clear film were not considered. In this
respect it has to be noted that, as in all investigations, in
particular given the stage of the information collection,
the product type grouping set out in the questionnaire
in this case was indicative and open to modification. The
present investigation has shown that a product grouping
differentiation by PET film width would have multiplied
the number of product types to be compared signifi-
cantly without a clear impact on price comparison.
Furthermore, the inclusion of thermal properties and the
distinction between hazy and clear film was not possible
as for haziness it fumed out that no clear definition
exists for this characteristic and for thermal properties
the definition given in the questionnaires was not
consistently followed by the parties concerned. This led
to a situation in which both the Community producers
and the Indian exporting producers had used different
and incomparable definitions for them.

(89)

The above allegation of the Indian producing companies
has been disregarded, not only because the simplification
of the product grouping was inevitable to guarantee a
manageable undercutting exercise with representative
comparisons of the product groupings declared by both
parties concerned (actually around 400 Community
industry product grouping codes were compared with
about 160 PCN codes of the Indian exporting produ-
cers), but also as the undercutting determination already
in a simplified form reflects sufficiently the differences in
terms of physical characteristics between the types
produced by the Indian exporting producers and by the
Community industry.

(90) All the Indian exporting producers also requested a level
of trade adjustment. They argued that whereas they sell a
major proportion of their PET film to importers in the
Community, the Community industry is mainly selling
they
directly to converters of PET film. Therefore,

claimed that the comparison for the purposes of under-
cutting should be made between the importers' resale
prices to converters and the prices offered by the
Community industry. They submitted that the margin an
importer receives from its sales to converters is about
trade
25 %, which represents the requested level of
adjustment,

(91)

In this respect it has to be noted that in the question-
naire the Commission defined the levels of trade as
being (1) distributors, (2) converters, (3) original equip-
ment manufacturers, (4) end users and (5) others. The
Indian exporting producers have declared in their ques-
tionnaire replies that a major proportion of their sales of
PET film in Europe is sold to group number five, i.e.
‘others’, without any further clarification. After
the
disclosure on provisional findings the Indian exporting
producers have confirmed that their sales to importers
declared under ‘others’ should be considered as sales to
distributors. However, the investigation has shown that
some of
these distributors are also converting the
product, indicating that the clarifications submitted by
the Indian exporting producers concerning the level of
trade are inaccurate. Furthermore, the investigation did
not confirm the 25 % price difference between the two
levels of trade. In fact as far as the Community industry's
sales are concerned, the average selling price to distribu-
tors is higher than the price charged to the converters.
In the circumstances of the Indian exporting producers,
this would mean that any adjustment to be made would
actually increase the price undercutting rates determined.
The fact that prices to distributors are higher than those
to converters in the case of the Community industry is
explained by the fact that the converters buy larger
quantities and therefore receive a quantity discount. In
the case of the Indian exporting producers five compa-
nies out of six sold at higher prices to converters than to
distributors as
submitted by them. However, one
company sold at clearly higher prices to distributors and
the price difference between the two levels of trade for
the rest of the companies was far below 25 %.

(92)

The investigation has also shown that the two major
levels of trade are not clearly separated owing to the fact
that some major companies act both as a distributor and
as a converter. It was noted further that there is no clear
price difference between the two levels as the quantity
ordered seems to be a more important price factor than
the level of trade. Finally, and contrary to the allegation
the
forward by the Indian exporting producers,
put
investigation has shown that the Community industry
also sells the product under consideration to distributors
as well as to converters. Therefore it was concluded that
there are no grounds to grant
the Indian exporting
producers an adjustment for a level of trade.

L 316/10

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

10. 12. 1999

(93) One of

that

the Indian exporting producers, MTZ, also
requested an adjustment for a quality difference. They
submitted that they had included off-grade film in their
transaction listing used for undercutting calculations and
that the off-grade film types should be granted an adjust-
ment by way of an increase of their sales price by
100 %. In this respect it should be noted that the ques-
tionnaire reply of MTZ states
the company
produces three qualities of film: A- grade, B-grade and
off-grade. However, in the transaction listing no refer-
ence to different grades was made. After the disclosure
of
the provisional measures, MTZ provided further
information on how to identify the off-grade products in
the transaction listing. Having received this information,
the Commission compared the prices between the
alleged off grade product types with the rest of the
product
there is no price
difference between the two groups of types. Therefore
the request of MTZ for a quality adjustment could not
be accepted.

types and concluded that

(94)

Finally, the Indian exporting producers claimed that the
Commission should have offset any negative margin of
price undercutting by positive ones in their undercutting
calculations. Since this was not done, they stated that a
higher injury elimination margin had been determined.
It should be noted that, in the methodology described in
recitals 112 to 114 of the provisional duty Regulation
for the calculation of the price undercutting margins, the
weighted average net sales prices of
the subsidised
imports were compared on a model-by-model basis with
the weighted average net sales price of the Community
industry on the Community market. Therefore,
this
amount by which the
methodology allowed the
exporting producers' price in an export
transaction
exceeded that of the Community industry's weighted
average price to be taken into account on a per model
basis. The argument was therefore rejected.

(95)

It follows from the above that the provisional finding set
out in recital 114 of the provisional duty Regulation of
undercutting ranging between 28,2 % and 50,5 % are
confirmed.

4.4.

SITUATION OF THE COMMUNITY INDUSTRY

(96)

responses of

the complainants,

The GOI claimed in general terms that based on the
non-confidential
the
Community industry is not suffering any injury at all. In
this respect as stated in recitals 115 to 125 of the
provisional duty Regulation, the investigation has shown
that the overall trends for the Community industry are
negative, notably in relation to market share and prices
as well as profitability, giving a clear indication of
material injury. This trend is sufficiently confirmed in
the non-confidential
the Community
industry.

responses of

(97)

The Indian exporting producers have alleged that the
choice of 1995 as a starting year for data collected for
the investigation has distorted the analysis in favour of a
finding of injury to the Community industry. They have
submitted that, since 1995 was an exceptionally good

year owing to very high demand, it is only natural that
the injury indicators show a negative trend after that.
The Indian exporting producers claim that fixing year
1993 as a starting year would have given a fairer view as
to the evolution of the injury factors. However, the
purpose of the investigation is to evaluate the effect of
the countervailable imports on the economic situation
of the Community industry during the IP. In order to
trends are established for a
make such an analysis;
number of
information
indicators on the basis of
relating to a number of years (usually three) preceding
the IP. The purpose of this analysis is therefore not to
compare the starting year with the IP but rather to assess
the annual developments within the entire period
considered. In any event it should be noted that at the
time the decision on the period considered was taken
there was no information available of the possibility that
the injury indicators would have shown a different
pattern had an earlier starting year been chosen. Finally,
it should be noted that choosing an earlier starting year
would not have been favourable to Indian exporting
companies as there was a strong increase in their market
share in the time was leading to the IP.

(98)

the findings stated in recitals 115 to 125 of the provi-
sional duty regulation are confirmed.

4.5.

CONCLUSION ON INJURY

(99)

Based on the above considerations, it is confirmed that
the Community industry has suffered material
injury
within the meaning of Article 8(1) of the basic Regula-
tion.

5. CAUSATION

5.1.

EFFECT OF THE SUBSIDISED IMPORTS

(100) The Indian exporting producers and GOI claimed that
there was no obvious correlation between the Indian
subsidised exports and the injury suffered by the
Community industry. They claimed that there has been
globally a negative price development
for PET film
caused by a worldwide surplus of the product coupled
with a decrease in the price of the key raw materials.
The Indian exporting producers claimed further that PET
film prices in the Community have just followed the
global negative price trend and the fact that the average
price of the Community producers declined in 1996
when the market share of the Indian exporting produ-
cers decreased should prove the claim. However,
it
should be recalled that India is one of the major contri-
butors to the worldwide surplus on the PET film market
and that according to Eurostat figures India cut its prices
on the European market as early as 1996 while the
other major exporting countries the USA,
Japan and
South Korea increased their prices. The fact that they

10. 12. 1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 316/11

lost market share in 1996 does not mean that they were
not causing injury to the Community industry through
increased price pressure resulting in a 3 % decrease in
the average price of the Community industry. Finally, it
should be recalled that the injury analysis is made on the
basis of the IP and that the previous years are mainly
used for setting the trend.

the arguments put

Thus,
exporting producers and GOI must be rejected.

forward by the

Indian

5.2.

EFFECT OF OTHER FACTORS

5.2.2. Fluctuation in the price of raw materials

(106) The Indian exporting producers have argued that on the
basis of the non-confidential questionnaire replies of the
Community industry, one can conclude that the average
decline in the raw material prices during the period
considered has been more like one third than 17 % as
stated in the provisional duty Regulation. This, they
claim, is confirmed by the publicly available information
on raw material price developments. They repeated their
previous argument that a one-third decrease in the price
of raw materials permits the Community industry to
reduce its prices without a corresponding decrease in
profitability and that the imports from India therefore
did not trigger the price reductions of the Community
industry.

(101) The findings made as set out in recitals 134 to 144 of
the provisional duty Regulation are hereby confirmed
with the following additions

(107)

5.2.1. Imports from other third countries

(102) The Indian exporting producers and GOI maintained
their argument about the discriminatory aspect of inves-
tigating only imports originating in India while the
import volumes from South Korea have increased and
the Korean average prices have declined during the
period considered. The Indian exporting producers
claimed that the increase in the import volumes from
South Korea is likely to be even higher than officially
reported by Eurostat as the importers of Korean PET
film are likely to carryout the customs clearance occa-
sionally under CN code 3920 69 00 (other polyesters)
just as they have done for the PET film of Indian origin.

(103) The Commission maintains the arguments presented in
the provisional duty Regulation, namely that the abso-
lute and relative increase in South Korea's market share
has been smaller than that of India and that the prices of
South Korean PET film have systematically stayed at a
higher level than the Indian prices. Furthermore, the
Korean exporting producers reduced their prices only
one year later than the Indians. As for the imports under
the CN code for other polyesters the Commission has
not received any evidence implying that Korean PET film
could have been cleared through customs with that
code.

(104) Finally, and most importantly, it should be noted that
the Commission has seen no reason to initiate an invest-
igation against South Korea as no evidence of unfair
trade in the form of dumping or subsidised exports
being practised by the Korean exporting producers has
been brought to their attention.

(105) Based on the above,

the situation with respect

to
imports originating in India and South Korea are
different, a situation of discrimination cannot have
occurred.

replies

It should be noted that the Commission, on the basis of
confidential questionnaire
investigated price
development of all PET film raw materials as stated in
recital 140 of the provisional duty Regulation arriving at
it is true that the
the decrease of 17 %. Furthermore,
non-confidential questionnaire replies of the Community
industry concentrated on the price development of
dimethyl terephthalate (DMT) or terephthalic acid (PTA).
As the price of these raw materials decreased more than
the prices of other raw materials, a decrease of 17 % in
total cost of raw material
is consistent with a higher
decrease in the costs of DMT and PTA. Therefore the
conclusions of recital 140 of the provisional duty Regu-
lation are consistent with the replies to the questionnaire
received from the Community industry and are therefore
confirmed.

5.2.3. General difficulties in the polyester sector

(108) The Indian exporting producers submitted that

the
decreasing prices of biaxially orientated polypropylene
(BOPP) film would have a direct effect on PET film prices
in the packaging sector as the products are interchange-
able from a PET film user's perspective. Therefore, they
claimed that the prices would have in any case have
decreased with or without the increased imports of PET
film into the Community.

(109) The Commission had to reject

this argument as no
evidence to support the claim has been brought forward.

5.3.

CONCLUSION ON CAUSATION

(110)

In view of the above, the conclusion of recital 145 of
the provisional duty Regulation is confirmed.

L 316/12

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

10. 12. 1999

6. COMMUNITY INTEREST

the Indian exporting producers from the Community
market. The duties will only remedy the effect of an
illegal,

injurious subsidisation.

6.1.

PRELIMINARY REMARK

(111) No new facts or arguments were submitted by any party
with regard to the interest of the Community industry,
other Community producers or importers of PET film.

6.3.

CONCLUSION ON COMMUNITY INTEREST

(114)

In examining the various interests involved and all the
above aspects, the Commission can confirm that there
are no compelling reasons not to take action against the
imports in question.

The findings of
the provisional duty Regulation are
therefore confirmed, notably the conclusions that the
impact of measures on those groups would either be
beneficial (Community industry and non-captive other
Community producers), neutral (captive producers) or at
most negative to a limited extend (importers).

7. DEFINITIVE DUTY

(115) On the basis of the conclusions on subsidisation, injury,
causal
link and Community interest, the Commission
considers it necessary to adopt definitive countervailing
measures.

6.2.

INTEREST OF USERS OF THE PRODUCT CONCERNED

7.1.

INJURY ELIMINATION LEVEL

(112) As mentioned in recital 2, the Commission received
comments from two users of the product under consid-
eration after the disclosure of the finding having led to
provisional measures. In the submissions of the users it
was claimed that contrary to the provisional findings,
PET film is an important raw material cost factor for
them and that production of downstream products
based on PET film accounts for an important proportion
of their total production. They claimed further that the
price increases of the Community industry would make
it difficult for them to compete on the downstream
market against
imports from South Korea, People's
Republic of China and the USA. It was claimed further
that there have been occasions when the Community
industry has refused to deliver certain quantities of PET
film indicating the existence of a lack of capacity. The
Community industry was also alleged to have refused to
develop a non-standard film for the specific needs of one
of the users where an Indian producer has agreed to do
so. Therefore, they claim that it is in the interest of the
users to maintain an alternative source of PET film
originating in India.

(113) The Commission maintains the arguments and conclu-
sions presented in recital 153 of the provisional duty
Regulation as far as the overall share of PET film out of
the total production costs of users overall and the
proportion overall of PET film based downstream of the
users' total production are concerned. As the analysis
concerned reflects an overall analysis, there can be indi-
vidual cases in which PET film may be a crucial raw
material for a user. This, however, does not alter the
average overall results of the investigation. Furthermore,
the investigation has shown that even for certain users
for whom PET film is an important cost factor, the
imports of PET film originating in India had a minor
share in their total purchases of PET film. Furthermore,
the worries of the users concerning the disappearance of
an alternative source of
imports in case of capacity
shortage or a need to develop a new film type are
unfounded as the countervailing duties will not exclude

(116) The Community industry suggested that a higher
minimum profit margin than 6 % (set by the Commis-
sion in recital 156 of the provisional duty Regulation)
was necessary. However, it is not important to define a
conclusive percentage in this case as, even on the lower
figure used by the Commission, the injury margin is
greater than the subsidy margin. The Indian exporting
producers made requests for adjustments for level of
trade and suggested a correction in the calculation
method of the underselling margins required to deter-
mine the injury elimination level.
In addition, MTZ
requested an adjustment for quality differences. As set
out in recitals 92 and 93, these requests had to be
denied.

7.2.

FORM AND LEVEL OF DUTY

(117) Changes from the provisional determination of

the
amount of countervailable subsidies have been made
where appropriate. The rate of definitive countervailing
duty is accordingly lower than the level of provisional
duty for all of the cooperating Indian exporting produ-
cers.

(118)

In accordance with Article 15(1) of the basic Regulation,
the countervailing duty rate should correspond to the
subsidy margin, unless the injury margin is lower. The
following rates of duty therefore apply for the cooper-
ating producers:

Ester Industries Ltd

Flex Industries Ltd

Garware Polyester Ltd

India Polyfilms Ltd

Jindal Polyester Ltd

MTZ Polyesters Ltd

Polyplex Corporation Ltd

12,0 %

12,5 %

3,8 %

7,0 %

7,0 %

8,7 %

19,1 %.

10. 12. 1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 316/13

(119) Given the high level of cooperation, which covered
more than 80 % of imports into the Community of the
product concerned originating in India, it was consid-
ered appropriate to establish the duty rate for non-coop-
erating companies at the same rate as the highest rate
that has been established for the cooperating companies,
i.e. 19,1 %. This level will ensure that no bonus is
granted for non cooperation and that duty evasion will
be minimised.

(120) Recitals 159 and 160 of the provisional duty Regulation

are confirmed.

8. COLLECTION OF THE PROVISIONAL DUTY

(121)

In view of the magnitude of the countervailable subsi-
dies found for the exporting producers and in light of
the seriousness of the injury caused to the Community
industry,
it is considered necessary that the amounts
secured by way of provisional countervailing duty under
Regulation (EC) No 1810/1999 be definitively collected
to the extent of the amount of definitive duties imposed.

9. PROPOSALS FOR UNDERTAKINGS

(122) Finally, it should be noted that the Commission services
also received proposals for price undertakings from five
Indian exporting companies. The Commission services
investigated the said proposals and concluded that they
cannot be sufficiently monitored or managed due to the

Produced by

Ester Industries Ltd

75-76, Amrit Nagar, Behind N.D.S.E. Part-1,
New Delhi — 110 003, India

Flex Industries Ltd
A-1, Sector-60,
Noida — 201 301 (U.P.), India

Garware Polyester Ltd

50-A Swami Nityanand Marg, Vile Parle (East),
Mumbai — 400 057, India

India Polyfilms Ltd

112, Indra Prakash Building
21, Barakhamba Road,
New Delhi — 110 001, India

Jindal Polyester Ltd

115-117, Indra Prakash Building
21, Barakhamba Road,
New Delhi — 110 001, India

MTZ Polyesters Ltd
Sarnath Centre,
Upvan Area, Upper Govind Nagar, Malad (E),
Mumbai — 400 097, India

complexity of the product: about 160 minimum prices
would be required to cover all Indian product groupings
and there were no guarantees that the suggested organ-
isation for monitoring the undertakings,
the Export
Inspection Agency of India, has the mandate or the
technical means to carry out such a detailed control.
Therefore, the Commission services had to reject the
received proposals for undertakings,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

ex 3920 62 19

1.
A definitive countervailing duty is hereby imposed on
imports of polyethylene terephthalate (PET) film falling within CN
3920 62 19*10,
(TARIC
codes
3920 62 19*15, 3920 62 19*25, 3920 62 19*30, 3920 62 19*35,
3920 62 19*40, 3920 62 19*45, 3920 62 19*50, 3920 62 19*55,
3920 62 19*60, 3920 62 19*65, 3920 62 19*70, 3920 62 19*75,
3920 62 19*80, 3920 62 19*81, 3920 62 19*85, 3920 62 19*87,
3920 62 19*89, 3920 62 19*91) and ex 3920 62 90 (TARIC
codes 3920 62 90*30, 3920 62 90*91), originating in India.

codes

The rate of duty applicable to the net free-at-Community-

2.
frontier price, before duty, shall be as follows:

Rate of duty
(%)

TARIC additional code

12,0 %

A026

12,5 %

A027

3,8 %

A028

7,0 %

A029

7,0 %

A030

8,7 %

A031

L 316/14

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

10. 12. 1999

Produced by

Polyplex Corporation Ltd
2 Ring Road, Kilokri,
Opposite Maharani Bagh,
New Delhi — 110 014, India

Rate of duty
(%)

TARIC additional code

19,1 %

A032

All other Indian companies

19,1 %

A999

3.

Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.

The amount secured by way of provisional countervailing duty pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1810/1999
shall be definitively collected at the duty rate definitively imposed.

Amounts secured in excess of the definitive rate of countervailing duty shall be released.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following its publication in the Official Journal of the
European Communities.

Article 3

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 6 December 1999.

For the Council

The President

T. HALONEN