WRITTEN QUESTION E-1789/99 by Lucio Manisco (GUE/NGL) to the Commission. Mr Kinnock's undertaking.
Date: 1999-10-11
Institutions: European Parliament, Provisional data
Subjects: European Anti-fraud Office, European Commission, European official, disciplinary proceedings, fraud against the EU

18.7.2000

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

C 203 E/47

3. What is done to check the accuracy of the CVs of long- and medium-term experts (experience,
qualifications, etc.) that are attached to tenders submitted in response to invitations to tender for TACIS
projects?

4. What would happen if, in the case of the MTP tender, it was found, after the contract had been
signed or during project implementation, that the successful candidate had supplied incorrect details with
his tender or was not fulfilling the undertakings he had given? What precautions are taken, or are built in,
at the contract-signing stage to limit the material and political damage that could be done in such a case
(MTP tender, contract value € 12,8 million)?

Answer given by Mr Patten on behalf of the Commission

(2 December 1999)

Under current TACIS rules the tendering procedures differ according to the sum involved in the

1.
project.

Programmes involving sums in excess of € 10 million are publicised via what is known as the (cid:145)open tender(cid:146)
procedure. A description of the project is published in the Official journal and on the internet so as to
reach as large an audience as possible. A preliminary list of suitable tenderers is very carefully selected by a
committee of at least three people who work to published criteria. Generally, the jury taking the final
decision includes two in-house and two external members as well as representatives of the beneficiary
country. Extremely thorough and detailed checks are carried out at every stage of a tender (written tender,
interview, financial offer) to ensure that the offer provides what is called for in the tender. The contract is
awarded to the tender with the best combination of quality and value for money.

2.
There are monitoring offices in each of the New Independent States. Projects and the services
provided by firms that have been awarded contracts are subject to continuous joint monitoring by the staff
of the respective delegations and task managers in Brussels.

3.
The first check on any curriculum vitae submitted takes place during a preliminary interview. Where
long-term experts with an important role in a project do not attend this interview, their credentials are
checked by staff from the delegations and the task managers. This is particularly important in the case of
projects mainly involving expertise, transfer of know-how or training.

If, between the conclusion of a contract and the start of work,

4.
it transpired that the company
concerned had provided incorrect information or had not fulfilled its undertakings, the first step would be
to investigate the immediate circumstances. If suspicions were confirmed and action was required, the
cancellation clauses in the contract could be applied. Should it come to this, a new tender would be
published and the contract awarded to another company to ensure that the project could go ahead and to
limit damages. If cancellation resulted in financial damage, the Commission would pursue claims for
damages.

(2000/C 203 E/057)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1789/99

by Lucio Manisco (GUE/NGL) to the Commission

(11 October 1999)

Subject: Mr Kinnock(cid:146)s undertaking

Replying to written question No 26 with a view to his hearing before the Committee on Budgetary
Control, Commissioner Kinnock confirmed that, in connection with the Bertholot affair, the Anti-Fraud
Office (OLAF) is conducting an inquiry (cid:145)into the questions raised in the report of the Committee of
Independent Experts(cid:146). On 30 August 1999 (cid:129) following several articles in the European press indicating
that the reports, supplied by DG XII and submitted by Mrs Cresson to Parliament in order to justify
Mr Bertholot(cid:146)s salary and activities, had apparently been produced in 1998 and given dates earlier than the
real dates (cid:129) a Commission spokesperson confirmed that OLAF is conducting an inquiry into the contracts
obtained by Mr Bertholot between 1995 and 1997 (cf. AFP 301508 AOU 99).

C 203 E/48

Official Journal of the European Communities

EN

18.7.2000

Further on in his reply to written question no. 26 with a view to his hearing before the Committee on
Budgetary Control, Mr Kinnock pointed out that, should he be appointed, he would propose that (cid:145)persons
who are the subject of OLAF investigations are removed from their posts if the necessary minimum of
evidence has been established and if there is an evident risk that inaction could endanger the investigation(cid:146).

Having regard to the indisputable facts identified by the independent experts in their report with regard to
this (cid:145)clear-cut case of favouritism(cid:146)
(cf. point 8.1.35 of the report), and given that the administrative
authorities responsible within DG XII are still in place in that directorate-general, does Commissioner
Kinnock envisage immediately suspending the senior officials concerned from their posts if they were to be
the subject of the inquiry currently being conducted by OLAF?

Answer given by Mr Kinnock on behalf of the Commission

(25 November 1999)

The Commission confirms that OLAF is conducting an internal enquiry into the Berthelot case.

The Commission further confirms its intention to consider the removal of any persons who are the subject
of OLAF investigations from their posts and, in such cases, various options exist:

Where the necessary evidence has been gathered and failure to remove the persons in question from their
posts would endanger the OLAF investigation, it would be possible to suspend the persons in question
from their posts by opening disciplinary proceedings prior to receipt of OLAF(cid:146)s final report. In some cases,
however, the main source of necessary evidence will obviously be OLAF reports, and the measures taken
(cid:129) including disciplinary proceedings (cid:129) will, therefore, largely depend upon the content of such reports.

The Commission would inform the Honourable Member that the suspension of an official is a time limited
measure which can last up to four months and include the withholding of up to 50 % of the official(cid:146)s
salary under Article 88 of the Staff Regulations. Under the Staff Regulations, that action can only be taken
by the competent appointing authority if an allegation of serious misconduct is made against the official.

Finally, the Commission would point out that the definitive removal of an official from his or her post,
that is the ending of his or her relation of employment with the Commission, can only take place after
disciplinary proceedings have come to an end.

The Commission assures the Honourable Member that if any OLAF reports contain allegations of serious
misconduct against officials, all necessary measures will be taken without delay.

(2000/C 203 E/058)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-1790/99

by Marit Paulsen (ELDR) to the Commission

(11 October 1999)

Subject: Malaria vaccine

Developing countries are in great need of a malaria vaccine. However, the pharmaceutical companies are
not very interested, because they would not make enough money from selling their medicines to
developing countries.

Could the Commission, as part of its development policy, present a proposal aimed at getting EU Member
States to commission pharmaceutical companies to develop a malaria vaccine and to undertake to pay a
certain price per dose of vaccine? Such a proposal could result in a vaccine being developed.

Answer given by Mr Nielson on behalf of the Commission

(30 November 1999)

The Commission agrees with the analysis presented by the Honourable Member, but is not necessarily
convinced the solution proposed is possible or even effective. The Commission includes below some
potential elements for a more feasible strategy.