1999/676/EC: Commission Decision of 20 July 1999 concerning presumed aid allegedly granted by France to Sécuripost [notified under document number C(1999) 2537] (Text with EEA relevance) (Only the French text is authentic)
Date: 1999-07-20
Institutions: European Commission
Subjects: France, State aid, capital transfer, control of State aid, postal service, road transport

23.10.1999

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

L 274/37

COMMISSION DECISION

of 20 July 1999

concerning presumed aid allegedly granted by France to Sécuripost

[notified under document number C(1999) 2537]

(Only the French text is authentic)

(Text with EEA relevance)

(1999/676/EC)

THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community, and in particular the first subparagraph of
Article 88(2) thereof,

Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic
Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof,

Having called on interested parties to submit their comments
pursuant to the provisions cited above,

Whereas:

(1)

(2)

(3)

I.

Facts and procedure

The judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
28 September 1995 in Case T-95/94 (1) annulled the
Commission decision of 31 December 1993, by which
it had declared that various measures affecting the
French post office’s subsidiary Sécuripost, a firm
operating on the market for the secure transportation
of moneys, and about which a complaint had been
lodged by the Chambre syndicale nationale des entre-
prises de transport de fonds et de valeurs (Sytraval) and
by Brink’s France SARL (Brink’s) did not constitute
state aid within the meaning of Article 87 (formerly
Article 92) of the Treaty. The Commission brought an
appeal against this judgment but this was dismissed in
its entirety by the Court of Justice on 2 April 1998 in
Case C 367/95P (2). The Court acknowledged that the
pleas put forward by the Commission in support of its
appeal were partly founded. However, it also held that
the contested decision was marred by deficiencies in
the reasons given which were in themselves sufficient
to justify its annulment.

It should be noted that the original complainants
(Sytraval and Brink’s) did not take part in the appeal.

The file which is the subject of the present decision
concerns the measures taken by the French State, either
directly or through the post office, to assist Sécuripost
prior to its transfer to the private sector, authorised by
the French Government in 1993. On account of an

inadequate statement of reasons on a number of
points, the Court of First Instance judgment annulled
the Commission decision of 31 December 1993 find-
ing that no state aid was involved. Consequently, the
Commission
under
Article 88(2) (formerly Article 93(2)) of the Treaty in
respect of the measures concerned by those points, so
as to examine them in the light of Articles 87 and
88 of the Treaty and to decide whether they were
compatible with the common market.

procedure

initiated

the

(4)

(5)

(6)

The decision initiating the procedure was published on
22 October 1996 in the Official Journal of the European
Communities (3), giving notice to the other Member
States and interested parties to submit their comments
on the measures concerned to the Commission within
one month of the date of publication.

In that decision, the Commission called on the French
authorities to provide, inter alia, all the data on the
aspects highlighted by the Court of First Instance and
to send any other information and observations they
considered relevant in the light of the Sytraval judg-
ment in order that the Commission could assess the
measures in question pursuant to Articles 87 and 88
of the Treaty.

The French authorities were informed of the Com-
mission decision to initiate the procedure by letter of
26 June 1996. By letter of 12 September 1996, they
sent the Commission a note providing a range of
information on the points raised by it when it initiated
the procedure. Additional information was provided, at
the Commission’s request, in a number of subsequent
letters. The last of these letters reached the Commission
on 28 October 1998.

(7)

The complainants did not intervene during the pro-
cedure and did not submit any comments. No other
interested party or Member State besides France sub-
mitted comments.

(1) [1995] ECR II-2651.
(2) [1998] ECR I-1719.

(3) OJ C 311, 22.10.1996, p. 12.

(9)

(10)

(11)

L 274/38

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Official Journal of the European Communities

23.10.1999

II. The measures concerned

(13)

(8)

The points in the Commission decision of 31 Decem-
ber 1993 which were raised by the Court of First
Instance related to the following measures.

It reproached the Commission for not having examined
whether or not the rates charged disclose the existence
of state aid. Its judgment calls for a comparison of the
rates charged by SNAG and the rates charged by
private garages for similar services. The Court of Justice
confirmed the CFI’s analysis, considering that
the
Commission had committed a manifest error af assess-
ment.

(a) Secondment of officials to Sécuripost

The Court of First Instance held that the fact that the
officials seconded to Sécuripost by the post office may
at any time be reassigned to the department originally
employing them if staff reductions prove necessary in
the undertaking to which they are seconded, without
that undertaking having to pay in such circumstances
any compensation for redundancy whatsoever, consti-
tutes an objection to which the Commission did
not respond, resulting in an inadequate statement of
reasons.

(b) Absence of contributions by Sécuripost to unemployment

insurance funds

The Court of First Instance concluded that, on this
point, the reasons given in the contested decision were
inadequate in so far as the Commission acknowledges
that ‘no contributions need to be made to unemploy-
ment insurance funds in respect of the employment of
officials on secondment, since their employment is
guaranteed by their status as officials’. Since it did
not explain why this difference between the system
applicable to Sécuripost and that applicable to its
competitors did not constitute aid, the Commission’s
statement of reasons was inadequate.

(14)

(15)

(e) Loan of FRF 15 million granted to Sécuripost for the

financial year 1989

The Court of First Instance considered inadequately
reasoned the Commission’s statement that the loan was
granted within the framework of a global agreement
between the companies in the Sofipost group and that
the interest rate applied was half a percentage point
higher than the bank base rate.

The Court of First Instance explained that ‘the fact that
the transaction was of a commercial nature is not in
itself sufficient to show that it does not amount to
state aid within the meaning of Article 92 of the Treaty,
since such a transaction may none the less be effected
at a rate which gives Sécuripost a special advantage by
comparison with its competitors’.

(16)

The Commission should therefore have examined
whether the rate applied was in line with the market
rate and, since it did not do so, the Court of Justice
considered that it had committed a manifest error of
assessment.

(c) Placing of premises at Sécuripost’s disposal

The Court of First Instance held that ‘Sécuripost’s
premises are made available to it within the framework
of the special system of precarious occupancy, and
that,
in its decision, the Commission provided no
details regarding either the rents actually charged to
Sécuripost, or those which Sécuripost’s competitors
have to pay for comparable premises’. The Commission
did not therefore compare the rents actually charged
to Sécuripost and those payable by its competitors for
Justice
comparable premises, which the Court of
considered to be a manifest error of assessment.

(17)

(d) Maintenance of Sécuripost vehicles by SNAG

(12)

The Court of First Instance held that the fact that
SNAG (the post office’s workshop and garage service)
uses an invoicing system similar to that used by private
garages was insufficient to rule out the presence of
state aid under the Treaty.

(f) Rates charged by Sécuripost to the post office

The Court of First Instance reproached the Commission
because it had ‘merely compared the prices charged
with the provision of services to the post office and to
Casino, (...) the comparison was based solely on the
information relating to 1993, and (...) no attempt was
made to justify or clarify it.... Furthermore, there was a
steady fall in the rates charged by Sécuripost to the
post office between 1987 and 1993, in accordance, in
particular, with the framework agreement between the
post office and Sécuripost of 30 September 1987,
thus further magnifying the differences cited by the
applicants’. In addition, ‘In the absence of any details
regarding the rates charged by Sécuripost to the post
office and to other customers in 1987, 1988, 1989,
1990, 1991 and 1992, the Court considers that it does
not have at
the requisite information
enabling it to review the validity of the contested
decision...’. The Court of Justice confirmed this analysis,
considering that the Commission had committed a
manifest error of assessment on this point.

its disposal

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Official Journal of the European Communities

L 274/39

(18)

(19)

(20)

(21)

III. The information provided by the French

authorities

(a) Secondment of officials to Sécuripost

first of all,

that
The French authorities maintain,
recruitment of officials gave rise to an overall additional
cost, between 1988 and 1991, of some (...) compared
with what would have been the situation if Sécuripost
had taken on employees on private-law contracts only.
This was because of the much higher salaries paid to
the seconded officials than would have been paid to
staff employed on contracts subject to private law (for
example, in 1990 the average monthly salary exclusive
of social security contributions paid to an official
working for Sécuripost as a transporter of moneys was
(...) as opposed to (...) paid to a Sécuripost transporter
of moneys employed under a private-law contract).

As regards the cost of reassigning to their original
department officials seconded by the post office to
Sécuripost, the French authorities explained that such
reassignment gave rise to payment by Sécuripost to
the officials concerned of a reintegration indemnity
following the breaking of the secondment contract.
This indemnity was intended to compensate for the
difference between the salary paid to the reassigned
official during the period between the date of his actual
reassignment and the date originally set for the end of
the secondment, on the one hand, and the remuner-
ation he would have been paid if he had remained on
secondment at Sécuripost until that original date, on
the other. Officials seconded from the post office to
Sécuripost (secondment was due to last five years) were
paid higher salaries during their secondment and the
termination of
their employment with Sécuripost
therefore gave rise to compensation for the early
cessation of these more favourable conditions.

The indemnity paid, on the basis of an agreement
negotiated with the unions as part of the redundancy
programme, was between (...) and (...) per reassigned
official, depending on the date of reassignment. On
average, it amounted to (...) per reassigned official.

instead of parting with the officials
If Sécuripost,
reassigned to the post office, had laid off private-sector
employees, it would have had to make redundancy
payments. The French authorities calculated the theor-
etical redundancy payment which Sécuripost would
have had to make. The calculation was based on the
law applicable to Sécuripost in this respect, i.e. the
rules laid down in the collective agreement for the
transport sector and the redundancy programme
drawn up by Sécuripost. On the basis of the average
salary of an official employed by Sécuripost and the
rules deriving from the collective agreement,
the
redundancy payment for an employee on a private-law
contract would have been (...). Sécuripost paid a total
of (...) to the 235 officials reassigned before 30 June
1991, whereas the total amount in redundancy com-
pensation which would have had to be paid to

employees subject to private law but on the same
salaries as the officials would have run to (...) × 235 or
around (...). The cost to Sécuripost of compensating
the officials for their reassignment was therefore higher
than the cost it would have incurred if it had made
redundancy payments to employees subject to private
law.

(22)

Furthermore, the French authorities point out that the
redundancy payments which Sécuripost would have
had to make to employees on private-law contracts
were calculated on the basis of the salaries of the
seconded officials and that the amounts would have
been significantly lower if they had used a lower salary,
in line with salaries actually paid to private-sector
employees, given the reality of the labour market.

(23)

(b) Absence of contributions to unemployment insurance

funds

The French authorities confirmed that Sécuripost did
not have to pay into unemployment insurance funds
for the seconded officials since their employment was
guaranteed by their status as officials. However, they
pointed out that seconded officials are generally subject
to social security contributions at higher rates than
those applicable to private-sector employees, with the
disparity in the rates of employer’s contributions in
respect of officials and in respect of private-sector
employees growing from 1,31 % in 1988 to 7,47 % in
1992. In particular, the rate for contributions to the
civil servant’s superannuation fund, which correspond
to retirement contributions for employees, is consider-
ably higher than the rate applied to private-sector
employees.

(24)

The French authorities calculated that the extra cost of
employers’ contributions linked to the employment of
officials between 1988 and 1991 totalled (...).

(c) Placing of premises at Sécuripost’s disposal

(25)

(26)

The French authorities gave various explanations
regarding the circumstances in which Sécuripost was
able to rent all or part of its premises from the post
office between 1988 and 1992.

First of all, Sécuripost’s renting of premises from the
post office was a temporary solution and it soon
looked for other premises as alternatives to those it
was renting from the post office. Of the premises
Sécuripost rented for its use, the proportion rented
from the post office accounted for 93 % of total rented
surface area in 1988, but this had fallen to only 7 % in
1992. The French authorities explained that Sécuripost
rapidly gave up the premises rented from the post office
because they did not, generally speaking, correspond to
its particular business requirements.

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Official Journal of the European Communities

23.10.1999

(27)

(28)

(29)

(30)

The French authorities note in particular that the
average surface area of premises rented by Sécuripost
from the post office was small (62 m2 in 1988), while
the premises which Sécuripost subsequently rented on
the private market had a significantly larger surface
area (324 m2 on average in 1992). They also note that
the premises were generally dilapidated and unsuitable
for the use to which Sécuripost wished to put them.
The French authorities gave several specific examples
where Sécuripost had rented premises from the post
office which were clearly unsuitable for its needs,
whether owing to their size, location or fittings.

that

The French authorities also pointed out
the
premises rented by Sécuripost from the post office
were public property and had therefore been rented
out in accordance with the specific rules governing
public property. In particular this meant that Sécuri-
post was authorised to occupy the premises on a
precarious and revocable basis only. The rent for
occupying public property is set by the Ministry for
Economics and Finance and is calculated using a fixed
rate, determined by comparison with the rental value
of comparable private property, and a variable rate,
determined according to the specific advantage which
the occupant gains by occupying the property.

As regards the premises rented by Sécuripost from the
post office, the rental charge took the form of a
rent set by agreement between the post office and
Sécuripost. Since the file dates back such a long way,
the French authorities were not able to find all the
rental contracts drawn up between the post office and
Sécuripost over the period under consideration. None
the less, they were able to provide clarification of the
rents charged for 43 premises throughout France.

Using this sample, the French authorities sought to
compare the rents Sécuripost paid to the post office
with those which it would have had to pay for
comparable property on the private market. The
comparaison was based on the Cote annuelle des valeurs
vénales immobilières au 1er janvier 1988 (4) (annual rating
of monetary values of property at 1 January 1988):
this publication gives a band of rental values for new
and old, renovated and non-renovated property for
each French town. It also applies a weighting to assess
the rental value of certain types of property (garage,
car parks, etc.). The French authorities deducted 25 %
from the rental value calculated using the Callon rating
for the property that Sécuripost rented from the post
office. They explained that a deduction of this size was
common practice on the property market in the case
of precarious occupancy contracts. According to the
information provided by the French authorities, when
the value of the property rented by Sécuripost is
calculated using the Callon property rating and after
reducing the rate by 25 % to take account of the
precarious nature of the occupancy agreements, the
market price of the 43 premises used in the sample is,

(4) Editions Callon, 1988.

on the whole, close to the rent paid by Sécuripost.

(31)

(d) Maintenance of Sécuripost vehicles by SNAG

The French authorities confirmed that the invoices
issued by SNAG for the repair and maintenance of
Sécuripost’s heavy goods vehicles were based on
the rates charged by the dealer network of Renault
Véhicules Industriels (RVI), both as regards the hourly
rate and the time invoiced. As for the rates, the French
authorities compared the reference rates for charging
for labour in respect of the repair and maintenance of
heavy goods vehicles used in 25 large garages in France
(e.g. in Paris, Bordeaux and Orléans). The reference
rates are used throughout the heavy goods vehicle
maintenance and repair sector in France, including in
the private sector. The data provided by the French
authorities show that, for the period 1988 to 1992,
the average rates that SNAG charged Sécuripost were
not significantly different from the rates that RVI
charged its own customers.

(e) Loan of FRF 15 million granted to Sécuripost for the

financial year 1989

(32)

The French authorities explained that Sofipost, a
post office holding company, granted a loan of FRF
15 million to Sécuripost. It was a short-term loan
granted for the period from 21 December 1989 to
23 October 1990. The interest rate applied was:

(33)

— 0,55 percentage point above the three-month

PIBOR (5) or 11,36 %, in 1989,

— 0,60 percentage point above the three-month

PIBOR, or 10,96 %, in 1990.

This rate is highter than the cost of borrowing outside
the group borne by Sofipost (i.e. the refinancing rate
granted to Sofipost by the banks, which means that
Sofipost made a profit by lending on these terms to its
subsidiary) and highter than the average intra-group
lending rates used by some of
the major French
commercial and industrial groups. The French auth-
orities explained that the special auditors’ reports of
various French groups for the year 1989 show that
intra-group loans are common practice. These reports
also reveal wide disparities in the rates used within
different groups (e.g. 5 % for Eurocom as opposed to
15,34 % for BSN). In some groups, loans are granted
interest-free or the rate is dependent on the perform-
ance of the subsidiary receiving the loan. The rate

(5) The PIBOR (Paris Inter-Bank Offered Rate) is the money market
rate, i.e. the annual rate at which banks are prepared to lend to
one another for a period of three months. It is calculated on a
daily basis by the French Banking Association as the arithmetic
mean of the rates reported by 14 representative institutions on
the Paris market.

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Official Journal of the European Communities

L 274/41

granted to Sécuripost is therefore at the top end of the
range of the intra-group lending rates recorded in
1989.

(34)

(35)

(36)

(f) Rates charged by Sécuripost to the post office

The French authorities confirmed that Casino was the
only Sécuripost customer which could be compared
with the post office in that both served a wide
geographical area extending across France, and sub-
mitted a detailed comparison of the rates charged to
the post office and to Casino. The comparison referred
to 1993, because the Casino contract had been won in
June 1992 as a result of a competitive bid.

The French authorities also explained that, as opposed
to what was stated by the Court of First Instance, the
rates charged to the post office did not fall steadily but
that, on the contrary, the rates charged in 1993, which
had been in force since 1 January 1992, were higher
than the previous rates, applicable since May 1989.
Consequently, using the 1993 rates as a basis for
comparison could not help but accentuate any differ-
ence between the rates charged by Sécuripost to the
post office and the market rates applicable during the
period 1989 to 1993.

Before rising in 1989, the rates charged by Sécuripost
to the post office had fallen between 1987 and 1989.
However, the French authorities pointed out that prior
to 1989 Sécuripost had no private customers, and that
it was only from 1990 onwards that Sécuripost
recorded any significant
turnover with its private
customers. They also provided the Commission with
the delivery rates charged by Sécuripost to major
customers other than the post office (and Casino)
between 1990 and 1992. These customers were classi-
fied by geographical area (urban, suburban, rural) so as
to enable a comparison to be made with the rates
charged for the post office.

(37)

The pricing systems used for the post office and
Casino are not identical. For the post office, Sécuripost
introduced a pricing system with rates differentiated
according to geographical area (urban, suburban, rural).
However, the contract with Casino was based on a
standard national rate which in 1993 was FRF 163 per
delivery.

This gives a rate of FRF 180,61 per delivery, compared
with the standard national rate of FRF 163 offered by
Sécuripost to Casino. If we imagine the rates charged
by Sécuripost to the post office being applied to
Casino, this would increase the charge per delivery by
FRF 17,61.

However, the French authorities consider that this
difference of FRF 17,61 (or about 11 % of the rate
charged to Casino) is largely justified by the extra
costs arising from the specific constraints imposed on
Sécuripost by the post office.

There are four technical constraints affecting a contract
for the transportation of moneys: journey time (depen-
dent on the distance of the collection/delivery site from
the central depot and on traffic density), security
constraints (number and status of personnel, type
of van), operating constraints (e.g. closing time of
collection/delivery sites, need to pass by the Banque de
France) and other constraints (e.g. national coverage).

The French authorities analysed and compared the
contracts which Sécuripost had with the post office
and with Casino in the light of the above constraints.

As regards journey time, the French authorities ex-
plained that the average distance between sites was
9,91 km for deliveries made on behalf of the post
office and 5,08 km for those made on behalf of Casino.
Taking account of the standard time spent at each site
and of the average speed at which vans travel in urban,
suburban and rural environments, the number of sites
visited per hour is 3,4 for the post office, as compared
with 4,9 for Casino.

As regards security constraints, the post office imposed
some which were not imposed under the contracts
with Casino. The main requirements were: three secur-
ity guards to accompany the consignment (6) specific
procedures for gaining access to post office premises,
and approach and radio procedures. However, the
French authorities were not in a position to quantify
the effect of these constraints.

(39)

(40)

(41)

(42)

(43)

(44)

As regards operating constraints,
the post office
imposed a complex route, and waiting times at post
offices could be long and were not necessarily always
charged for. On the other hand, a standard contract
such as that concluded with Casino stipulated an

(38)

In order to make a useful comparison between the
rates charged to the two customers, the rates for the
post office were applied to Casino’s delivery structure.

(6) The French authorities explained that a Decree of 13 July 1979
required the presence of three security guards for any transpor-
tation of moneys exceeding FRF 20 000. In its internal rules, the
post office adopted a lower threshold: FRF 50 000 and then FRF
100 000.

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automatic charge if the waiting time exceeded 10
minutes. In this connection, it should be remembered
that unavailable periods added up to 130 minutes for
the post office and 30 minutes for Casino. Thus, in a
standard eight-hour day, a van on a post-office route
has only five hours 50 minutes in which to complete
invoiceable journeys, while a van on a standard route
such as in the case of Casino will have seven hours
30 minutes.

(45) Other constraints were the obligation to provide a
service throughout France and the long payment
periods, whereas private customers observed usual
market practice. These constraints were not quantified
by the French authorities.

(46)

It follows that, taking account only of the constraints
on journey time and operation, the number of deliver-
ies per day which could be carried out on average by
Sécuripost for the post office was (5 h 50 × 3,40), or
19,8 while for Casino it was (7h 30 × 4,9), or 36,75.
The number of deliveries which could be made per day
for Casino was thus 85 % higher than that for the post
office. Furthermore, the average amount charged by
Sécuripost for a delivery on behalf of the post office,
weighted for the geographical distribution of post
establishments, was FRF 264, as opposed to the
standard national rate of FRF 163 charged to Casino.
By multiplying the number of deliveries per day by the
rate charged per delivery, we can calculate the daily
income generated by a van working on a post office
route as (FRF 264 × 19,8), or FRF 5 227, while a van
on a Casino route will bring in an average income of
(FRF 163 × 36,75), or FRF 5 990. Consequently,
Sécuripost did not overcharge for its services to the
post office relative to a comparable customer such as
Casino, given the specific constraints imposed by the
post office for transporting moneys on its behalf, even
though only some of those constraints have been taken
into account.

IV. Assessment

(47)

(48)

The Commission examined the information and data
provided by the French authorities. It also conducted
its own investigations into certain points. On this basis,
the measures concerned do not
it considers that
constitute state aid within the meaning of Article 87 of
the Treaty.

the Commission considers

that
In particular,
employing seconded officials did not confer any advan-
tage on Sécuripost. The reassignment to the post office
of seconded officials did not confer any advantage on
Sécuripost because the amount paid in compensation
to the officials when they were reassigned earlier than
planned was slightly higher than what would have
been paid in compensation if these employees had been
recruited by the company as private-sector employees,
even without taking account of the fact that employees
subject to private law would have earned lower salaries
than the officials, these salaries forming the basis

(49)

(50)

(51)

for calculating redundancy payments. Moreover, the
comparative study of employers’ social security contri-
butions for private-sector employees and for officials
which the French Government carried out shows that,
far from constituting state aid, employing officials
entailed extra expense for Sécuripost.

The information provided on the rents paid by Sécuri-
post for the 43 premises throughout France shows that
the rents were generally similar to and, on average,
higher than the market rate, taking account of the
deduction for the precarious nature of the occupancy
contracts drawn up between the post office and
Sécuripost. The sample of 43 premises used by the
French authorities represents a total surface area of
3 170 m2 ; or 35 % (in terms of surface area) of all the
premises rented by Sécuripost from the post office in
1988. From the sample we see that the average rent
charged for the premises rented by Sécuripost from the
post office was (...) in 1988(7). If we calculate the
market value of this sample, and taking account of the
deduction applicable on the basis of the precarious
nature of the occupancy contracts signed by Sécuripost
and the post office, we obtain a market value of (...) in
1988, which is lower than the average rent paid by
Sécuripost for the same sample.

The Commission arranged for an expert report to be
carried out in order to ascertain whether the deduction
applied was really justified: the conclusions of this
report show first of all that, since the premises rented
by the post office to Sécuripost were public property,
they had to be rented on a precarious basis. The report
also concludes that, while the precarious nature of a
rental contract does not necessarily or automatically
justify a deduction by comparison with the market
value, the usual practice is to apply reduced rents to
precarious private lettings.

Consequently, the French authorities correctly showed
that the rents paid by Sécuripost to the post office for
43 of the premises rented were in line with the market
value for the rented property. Given that this sample
of 43 premises is evenly spread throughout France and
represents a significant share of all premises rented
between 1988 and 1992 by Sécuripost from the post
the French
office,
authorities have given sufficient justification to show
that the rents paid by Sécuripost to the post office
were in line with the market values of the rented
property and therefore that no state aid is involved.

the Commission considers that

(7) This year was taken as the reference year: as explained above,
Sécuripost quickly found alternative premises to those rented
from the post office after 1988.

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Official Journal of the European Communities

L 274/43

(52)

(53)

(54)

As regards vehicle maintenance, the Commission con-
siders that the comparison with RVI rates is appropri-
ate. The RVI network is a benchmark on the market in
terms of the network size and market share (8). The
Commission made a statistical comparison of the rates
charged by SNAG for vehicle maintenance and the
rates charged by RVI. Overall, the rates are generally
very similar throughout France: on average, at national
level, the gap between the rates never exceeded 4 %
over the reference period. On average, between 1988
and 1993, two of the reference rates used were very
slightly lower for SNAG than for RVI, although the
difference was not greater than 1,5 % and the third rate
used was slightly higher for SNAG than for RVI
(difference of 1,65 %). These differences in the rates are
practically insignificant and lower than the statistical
spread observed; the Commission therefore considers
that SNAG invoiced Sécuripost for vehicle maintenance
at the market rate and therefore that no state aid was
involved.

The Commission considers that the terms of the FRF
15 million loan are in line with the terms on which
commercial relations between a parent and its subsidi-
ary within a private group are normally conducted.
The rate is higher than both the PIBOR and the cost of
borrowing outside the group by Sofipost. Sécuripost
therefore paid a mark-up to this financial holding
company of the post office. In addition, the rate used
is towards the top of the band of rates for intra-group
loans established on the basis of the annual auditors’
reports for 1989. Sofipost’s behaviour can therefore
be compared with that of a private holding company
acting in accordance with market conditions.

As regards prices charged, the Commission considers
that the comparison with Casino is the only one which
is wholly relevant. Before 1992 Sécuripost did not
have any other customers comparable to the post
office in terms of the geographical spread of deliveries.
In addition, the application of the 1993 prices was
cautious since they had been increased by comparison
with the preceding period (1989 to 1992). Using the
1993 prices as a basis for comparison was bound,
therefore, to accentuate any difference between the
rates Sécuripost charged the post office and the market
rates between 1990 and 1993. The Commission
considers that the statistical comparison carried out by
the French authorities, which takes into account only
some of the constraints, shows that the rates Sécuripost
charged its parent company between 1990 and 1993
were not excessive but were comparable to the rates
charged to other customers, bearing in mind the
constraints mentioned above. The constraints imposed
by the post office and the corresponding charges give
a daily income per van lower than that earned with
Casino. An analysis of the rates Sécuripost charged
customers other than Casino between 1990 and 1992
the prices the post office was
also confirm that

(55)

charged were not excessive: applied to an equivalent
geographical structure, the charges for the post office
were, taking the average for the period 1990 to 1992,
only 0,4 % higher than the charges for these other
customers. Sécuripost therefore received no state aid
in connection with the invoicing of deliveries for the
post office between May 1990 and 1993.

During the years 1987 to 1989 Sécuripost did not
register any significant turnover from business with
customers other than the post office, and the French
authorities were not able to provide data for compari-
son between the market rates and the rates used by
Sécuripost in its business with the post office. None
the less, using the charges reported by the French
authorities for customers other than the post office for
the period 1990 to 1992 the Commission extrapolated
the market rates for 1987 to 1989: this gives, for a
geographical spread of deliveries equivalent to that of
the post office, an estimated market rate of around FRF
248 per delivery. This estimated rate cannot be directly
compared to the rate Sécuripost charged the post office
because it is extrapolated from rates applied between
1990 and 1992 to customers spread over a smaller
geographical area than that covered by the post office.
Moreover, since this estimated rate was extrapolated to
the period 1987 to 1989 from rates which Sécuripost
charged customers other than the post office between
1990 and 1992, it is not appropriate to analyse the
annual differences between the extrapolated rate and
the rate applied to the post office: only an analysis of
the average difference observed over the period 1987
to 1992 between the rate (extrapolated or real) applied
by Sécuripost to customers other than the post office
and the rates applied to the post office can produce a
valid conclusion. That difference was around 5 %.
Given the specific constraints imposed for deliveries
on behalf of the post office, this difference is not
excessive: the Commission therefore considers that the
level of the rates Sécuripost charged the post office
between 1987 and 1989 did not constitute state aid,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The measures taken in respect of Sécuripost and covered in
the Commision decision to initiate the procedure (9) namely
the secondment of post office officials to Sécuripost, the

(8) 1992 statistics compiled by the French vehicle manufacturers
union, the DAFSA study of April 1994 and the June 1996 edition
of Transport Magazine.

(9) OJ C 311, 22.10.1996, p. 12.

L 274/44

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

23.10.1999

absence of contributions by Sécuripost to unemployment
insurance funds, the placing of post office premises at Sécuri-
post’s disposal, the maintenance of Sécuripost vehicles by the
Service National des Ateliers et Garages des PTT (SNAG), the
granting of a loan of FRF 15 million by Sofipost (a post office
holding company)
for 1989 and the rates
charged by Sécuripost to the post office, do not constitute
state aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) of the Treaty.

to Sécuripost

Article 2

This Decision is addressed to the French Republic.

Done at Brussels, 20 July 1999.

For the Commission
Monika WULF-MATHIES

Member of the Commission