Resolution informing the Commission of the reasons why the discharge cannot at present be given in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Communities for the 1997 financial year
Date: 1999-05-04
Institutions: Committee on Budgetary Control, European Parliament
Subjects: Community budget, Middle East

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23.
Notes that, as its Committee of Inquiry into the Community Transit System was not informed by the
Commission of the real scale of its problems with the computerisation of the transit system, it made an
incorrect analysis of the reasons for the delay in the introduction of the system;

Personal responsibility of Commissioners

24.
Considers that examples discovered during the discharge procedure have revealed a real concern
that irregularities are committed without individual Commissioners perceiving the need to take personal
responsibility for such actions;

Weaknesses in the Commission’s structure

Believes that the discharge procedure has illustrated in many cases a lack of flexibility in personnel
25.
management  with  unacceptable  abuses  arising  from  this.  Urgent  action  is  required  to  modernise  the
structures in preparation for an incoming Commission on 1 January 2000.

(b)  A4-0201/99

Resolution informing the Commission of the reasons why the discharge cannot at present be given in
respect  of  the  implementation  of  the  general  budget  of  the  European  Communities  for  the  1997
financial year

The European Parliament,

−  having regard to the revenue and expenditure accounts and the financial statement of the European
Communities for the 1997 financial year (SEC(98)0519 − C4-0350/98, SEC(98)0520 − C4-0351/98,
SEC(98)0522 − C4-0352/98),

−  having regard to the report of the Court of Auditors for the 1997 financial year (1) and to the special

reports relating thereto,

−  having regard to the Council recommendation of 15 March 1999 (C4-0156/99),

−  having regard to Article 276 of the Treaty establishing the European Community,

−  having regard to Article 89 of the Financial Regulation, and in particular paragraphs 1 and 4 thereof,

−  having regard to Rule 86 of its Rules of Procedure,

−  having regard to the initial report of the Committee of Independent Experts on the allegations of fraud,

mismanagement and nepotism in the European Commission,

−  having  regard  to  the  attached  Working  Document  of  the  Committee  on  Budgetary  Control  on  the
implementation of the general budget of the European Community for the 1997 financial year,

−  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control and the opinions of the Committee
on  Research,  Technological  Development  and  Energy,  the  Committee  on  Employment  and  Social
Affairs,  the  Committee  on  External  Economic  Relations,  the  Committee  on  Regional  Policy,
the Committee  on  Transport  and  Tourism,  the  Committee  on  the  Environment,  Public  Health  and
Consumer Protection, the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education and the Media, the Committee on
Development and Cooperation, the Committee on Civil Liberties and Internal Affairs, the Committee
on Fisheries and the Committee on Women’s Rights (A4-0201/99),

A.  whereas, pursuant to Article 276 of the EC Treaty, the European Parliament gives discharge to the

Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget,

B.  whereas the President and Members of the Commission have resigned from office,

(1)  OJ C 349, 17.11.1998.

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1.

Decides to postpone discharge;

2.
Notes that the Committee of Independent Experts will submit by September 1999 a second, final
report (resolution of 23 March 1999 on the resignation of the Commission and the appointment of a new
Commission (1))  giving  a  far-reaching  overview  of  the  culture,  practices  and  procedures  of  the
Commission;

3.
Notes that discharge cannot be granted to an outgoing Commission which has no authority to enter
into any commitments towards the European Parliament in respect of future policy; believes that discharge
should be granted to the new Commission in response to the reform undertakings it gives, pursuant to
Article 89(4) of the Financial Regulation, between now and 15 October 1999;

Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the above-mentioned working document of the

4.
Committee on Budgetary Control to the Commission, the Council and the Court of Auditors.

(1)  Minutes of that sitting, Part II, Item 2.

ANNEX

WORKING DOCUMENT

postponement of the discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the
general budget of the European Union for the financial year 1997

A.  whereas the discharge procedure for the 1996 financial year has revealed serious shortcomings in the

ability of the Community’s Executive properly to implement the Union’s policies,

B.  whereas these doubts were confirmed by the report of the Committee of Independent Experts, which
pointed out that the institutions of the European Union still need to acquire a culture of responsibility
and the resources necessary for the practical implementation of responsibilities,

C.  believing that the serious criticisms expressed by the independent experts and the discharge authority
about financial management need to be converted into a call for practical measures with a view to
relaunching Union action during this crucial stage prior to enlargement and the launching of Agenda
2000,

D.  whereas  the  European  Parliament,  in  its  capacity  as  discharge  authority,  is  the  only  elected  body
empowered  to  exercise  supervision  of  the  proper  and  efficient  implementation  of  the  budget,  but
whereas account has to be taken of the assessments of the committee of independent experts,

E.  whereas the Council has, for several years, in its recommendations for discharge, performed its task in

a way which does not suggest an in-depth evaluation of implementation of the budget,

F. 

recalling that on 14 January 1999 the European Parliament had already called for specific measures on
the following matters: the setting up of a new independent anti-fraud agency; publication of the full
text of the Declaration of Interests by all Commissioners; forwarding to Parliament of the three codes
of  conduct  concerning  the  work  of  the  Commissioners  and  their  offices,  officials  and  relations
between them; establishment of a formal agreement on confidential procedures; reform of the Staff
Regulations, notably with regard to disciplinary action,

G.  noting that the discharge constitutes a political act expressing confidence in the Executive in respect
of  the  proper  and  effective  management  of  the  Union’s  financial  policies;  and  that  this  act  is
indissolubly linked with the decision of the European Parliament to close the accounts of the financial
year in question, such closure constituting discharge,

H.  recalling that the action of the Member States’ administrations has an impact on the implementation of
most  of  the  budgetary  policies  and  that  the  discharge  procedure  must  take  account  of  this  factor,
without  however  diminishing  the  institutional  responsibility  of  the  Commission  to  implement  the
budget,

I. 

recalling that the Commission is obliged to ensure that the discharge authority is provided with all the
information required under Article 276 of the Treaty,

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J.  whereas the crisis surrounding the 1996 discharge procedure resulted above all from two factors:

− 

the inadequacy of the Commission’s political, financial and administrative management in the
many tasks it performs both internally and externally,

−  embezzlement on the part of some staff members, to which the response of the Commissioners

has too often been lax and ineffectual,

K.  whereas the Commission’s policy has been characterised by, on the one hand, excessive centralisation
of tasks and, on the other, excessive decentralisation of powers towards external bodies such as the
Technical Assistance Offices, which are not subject to appropriate scrutiny,

L.  noting  that  the  committee  of  independent  experts  identified  a  link  between  the  Commission’s
management failures and deficiencies in the establishment plan, which it felt constituted a violation of
the integrity of the European public service,

M.  whereas, therefore, the Commission’s staff policy culture must be adapted to the increased managerial
responsibilities  which  the  Commission  already  exercises  and  which  are  assuming  growing
importance in the Union context, particularly in the run-up to enlargement,

N.  noting that the Commission, having acknowledged the existence of this challenge, has put in hand a

huge reform programme in respect of in-house and external staff,

O.  emphasising that the Commission bears ultimate responsibility, at Community level, for the action of
the  national  administrations  which  are  jointly  responsible  for  the  implementation  of  the  national
policies managed on a partnership basis; noting that the Commission, acting in conjunction with the
financial representatives of the Member States in the context of the SEM 2000 programme, has been
developing measures since 1996/97 to consolidate and strengthen the partnership with the national
administrations,

P.  noting  that,  since  a  large  proportion  of  Community  funds  is  managed  by  the  Member  States,
a substantial percentage of the management shortcomings are linked to malfunctioning in the national
administrations  and  that  the  Council  must  therefore  acknowledge  its  responsibility  to  improve
cooperation between Community and national administrations and involve the latter more closely in
the discharge procedure, as provided moreover in the new version of Article 274 of the EC Treaty,

Q.  whereas, therefore, cooperation between national and Community partners must constitute the central
plank of much wider integration, on a subsidiary basis, of the Community and national levels and
whereas external supervision of the Community and national audit bodies is a major component of
this overall framework,

R.  noting that the GNP resource is assuming growing importance in the own resources system; noting
that a precise calculation is currently hampered by tax evasion and the existence, to some extent, of an
underground  economy  throughout  the  Community;  noting  that  the  Commission  has  embarked  on
technical  measures  to  ensure  that  national  accounts  are  exhaustive  but  taking  the  view  that  this
problem is also a political one,

S.  believing that assistance to the Palestinian people through programmes and projects implemented by
the European Commission has played and will continue to play a crucial economic and political role
in the Middle East despite deteriorating economic and social conditions,

T.  whereas, finally, there is a need to identify the priorities required to serve as the basis for the dialogue

between the discharge authority and the new Commission,

I.  GENERAL REMARKS

Discharge procedure

1.
Considers it essential that there should be a reform of the rules on the discharge procedure; requests
the Commission to propose that this be implemented as part of the revision of the Financial Regulation,
while Parliament will carry out a revision of its Rules of Procedure;

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2. Will open negotiations with the Council, the Commission, the Court of Auditors and the Member
States in the context of the SEM 2000 programme, with a view to ensuring that the discharge procedure
includes a dialogue with the national administrations; considers that to this end any agreement reached,
which should be finalised as part of the revision of the Financial Regulation, should include:

−  bringing  forward  the  starting  date  of  the  discharge  procedure  and,  as  a  consequence,  that  of  the
submission  of  the  Court  of  Auditors’  annual  report,  in  particular  with  a  view  to  shortening  the
contradictory procedure;

− 

the  possibility  for  representatives  of  the  national  administrations  to  be  heard  by  the  discharge
authority at its request or on their own initiative;

−  notification of the measures which national administrations have adopted in the light of the discharge

decision;

Information for the discharge authority

3.
Considers that the right of information accorded to it by Article 276(2) of the EC Treaty in respect of
discharge requires the Commission to submit to it, in their entirety, all documents it considers necessary
for the exercise of this responsibility;

Instructs its Committee on the Rules of Procedure, the Verification of Credentials and Immunities to

4.
table a proposed amendment to the Rules of Procedure seeking to:

−  emphasise  the  specific  nature  of  Parliament’s  right  to  information  in  the  context  of  the  discharge

procedure;

−  provide for confidential procedural arrangements appropriate to the different types of document and

information;

− 

restrict the exercise of these rights to the objectives of budgetary control;

Staff policy

Calls on the Commission to target the reform of staff policy, which must be clearly defined, at the

5.
following objectives:

(a)  reduce vacant posts to a maximum of 2% of the posts in the establishment plan;

(b)  progressively devolve on the national authorities and the applicant countries the tasks of supervisory
administration, while entrusting supervision to decentralised bodies in their territories and ensure an
adequate sharing of controls by the Community and national bodies;

(c)  establish  staffing  needs  (in  quantitative  and  practical  terms)  in  relation  to  the  Union’s  political
priorities, on the basis of the report requested from the Commission by Parliament in the context of the
budgetary priorities for 2000;

(d)  continue with the modernisation policy (MAP 2000 programme), possibly on the basis of the impetus
which a critical assessment by the Court of Auditors might give to the development of the programme;

(e)  open up competitions to the maximum number of participants on a geographical basis, in particular by
making them neutral in terms of the cultural and occupational differences which exist between one
Member  State  and  another;  prevent  dysfunctions  by  wider  use  of  computer  technologies  and/or
decentralisation;

(f)  codify the tasks of the seconded national experts in relation to their skills;

(g)  settle  cases  of  incompatibility  in  the  field  of  recruitment  and  performance  of  budgetary  and
administrative tasks, while at the same time providing for incompatibilities for Commissioners and
their private offices;

(h)  restrict the number of members of private offices, codify their tasks and boost the plurinational factor;

6.
Takes the view that the serious management and supervisory problems resulting from the ever wider
use of Technical Assistance Offices (TAOs) require an urgent and appropriate response and calls on the
Commission to implement the following measures without delay:

(a)  introduce systematic monitoring of compliance by TAOs with Community provisions on budgetary

and administrative matters and with the application of national law;

(b)  provide for incompatibility rules for the TAOs;

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(c)  rule  out  the  use  of  TAOs  for  any  European  public  service  task  (in  particular,  any  discretionary
disbursement  of  public  European  funds,  including  preparatory  activities)  and  strictly  define  the
relevant scenarios;

(d)  define  by  way  of  regulation  all  the  provisions  governing  the  statuses  of  staff,  Commissioners  and

TAOs;

Calls on the Court of Auditors to deliver an opinion as soon as possible with alternative approaches

7.
to performing the duties which have hitherto been entrusted to the TAOs;

8.
Regrets, however, that the Commission’s reaction was lacking in a number of key respects: wants the
new Commission to take up these points again in a constructive way and in a spirit of cooperation with the
European Parliament;

Conclusions  of  the  independent  experts  and  revision  of  the  Financial  Regulation  and  of  the  Staff
Regulations

9.
Notes that the conclusions drawn by the independent experts in their first report, points made on
numerous  occasions  in  the  past  by  the  Committee  on  Budgetary  Control,  highlighted  gaps  in  the
supervisory, investigatory and disciplinary systems within the Commission; believes that initial reforms
could  already  be  contemplated  as  part  of  the  revision  of  the  Financial  Regulation,  pursuant  to  the
recommendations adopted by the European Parliament in its resolution of 11 March 1999 on the need to
modify and reform the European Union’s own resources system (1):

(a)  the  administrative  and  budgetary  procedure  leading  up  to  the  commitment  and  implementation  of
expenditure  should  be  made  more  fluid,  by  eliminating  the  red  tape  which  hampers  the  decision-
making process, in return for a greater burden of responsibility for authorising officers;

(b)  the  Financial  Controller’s  approval,  which  was  given  too  frequently  to  irregular  operations,  must
presuppose not only that the act is regular in formal terms, but that the underlying operation is also
legitimate;

(c)  the separation of the powers of a priori supervision (the Financial Controller’s approval) and auditing
powers will be necessary to prevent the same body from carrying out tasks of a divergent, and often
incompatible, nature;

(d)  administrative inquiries, which are too frequent and rarely lead to disciplinary inquiries, should be
limited by precisely defining the cases in which they should apply, the relevant time-limits and the use
made of the results;

Commission reform

10.
Takes  the  view  that  the  Commission  must  introduce  more  comprehensive  institutional  reforms
enabling it better to adapt its management and supervisory culture to the new challenges with which it is
faced and consequently to improve its relations with the European public and external organisations;

Stresses  the  need  for  a  public  register  of  incoming  documents  and  a  uniform  and  adequate

11.
procedure for archives to avoid problems with ‘lost files’ and increase transparency;

12.

Accordingly calls on the new Commission to put in hand the following reforms:

(a)  to reduce and rationalise portfolios, by defining a limited number of real responsibilities, and to adapt

its structures and directorates-general accordingly;

(b)  the strengthen the coordinating role of the President and the Secretary-General of the Commission in

accordance with the Amsterdam Treaty;

(c)  to strengthen the Commission’s institutional and management structures in order to ensure that tasks

are not decentralised at the expense of cohesion.

Community policies managed on a partnership basis

Notes that the launching of the SEM 2000 programme has made it possible to find solutions of
13.
principle for several problems arising from the implementation of the policies managed in partnership
with the administrations of Member States, for example, concerning the eligibility of structural operations
and financial adjustments in that area; expects, however, that this theoretical result will be reflected in a
practical improvement in implementation and that such progress, already noted in the DAS for 1997 in the
EAGGF,  will  also  be  true  of  the  structural  actions;  will  verify  the  implementing  procedures  for  the
financial adjustments as part of the discharge;

(1)  Minutes of that sitting, Part II, Item 2.

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14.
Regrets that the proposals on the reform of the Structural Funds essentially leave the definition of
eligibility to national provisions and calls on the Commission to establish a hard core of provisions with a
view to enhancing homogeneous application in the Member States;

15.
Notes that a large number of cooperation problems are still entirely or partly unsolved, in areas such
as  the  integrated  supervision  of  EAGGF  operations  and  the  capacity  of  paying  agencies,  customs
cooperation, Community transit, fraud prevention and adaptation of applicant countries to Community
standards in terms of management and supervision;

Urges Member States to devote more resources to the control of areas of expenditure for which they

16.
are responsible and to implement in full Article 280 of the Treaty;

Encourages the Commission to continue its work and assures it of its critical support; to this end,
17.
urges the Commission to involve Parliament formally in an observer capacity in the work of SEM 2000 in
respect of partnership management;

Cooperation between audit bodies

18.
Issues an appeal to the European Court of Auditors and to the national audit bodies to step up their
mutual  cooperation  in  order  gradually  to  establish  systematic  partnership  on  the  basis  of  shared
programmes  and  comparable  auditing  methods  with  the  aim  of  agreeing  on  a  common  approach  to
supervising the management of the Community budget;

II.  1997 DISCHARGE

Own resources system

Supports the Commission’s efforts to ensure that national accounts are exhaustive, by taking full

19.
account of tax evasion and the underground economy;

20.
Believes that these efforts must be reflected in institutional and political responsibility and that the
Executive, which is the guarantor of the proper implementation of the budget, must take institutional and
political responsibility therefor;

21.
Calls on the Commission therefore to arrange for the technical establishment of the exhaustiveness
of  the  national  accounts  to  be  followed  by  a  declaration,  made  on  its  own  political  responsibility,
guaranteeing that those accounts are exhaustive and that the Executive stands surety for any dispute which
might arise in this regard;

22.
Expresses surprise at the fact that the Council, while understanding the analysis by the Court and
the Commission on the desirability of replacing the old European system of integrated economic accounts
by the new one proposed in 1995, has failed to draw the logical conclusions and is intending to maintain
the status quo, without providing any explanation;

23.
Calls  on  the  Commission  in  its  entirety  to  do  everything  in  its  power  to  ensure  that  the  new
computerised transit information system (NCTIS) becomes operational as soon as possible; regrets the
inexcusable delays which have already occurred; expects the Commission to inform Parliament of the
reasons, if there are any further delays, and of the action taken by it;

24.
Notes that the problem resulting from the importation of New Zealand dairy products has not yet
reached its conclusion, but emphasises that a practical solution must be found to put an end to a situation
which may well inflame international relations and obstruct the operation of the market; therefore calls on
the Commission:

(a)  to support the efforts of the United Kingdom Government aimed at recovering the sums owed to the

Community budget;

(b)  to assess the seriousness of the matter, and of the negligence, in respect of the four alleged cases of

irregularities;

(c)  to  ascertain,  on  the  basis  of  these  criteria,  which  of  the  above  cases  unquestionably  necessitate  a

penalty within the meaning of the Customs Code, and in particular Article 239 thereof;

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(d)  to take account of the opinions of specialised international organisations, such as the World Trade

Organisation, without prejudging the possibility of an appeal against their decisions;

(e)  to ensure that the New Zealand Government assumes a monitoring role in the IMA-issuing system in
order  to  avoid  the  conflict  of  interest  arising  from  the  fact  that  the  New  Zealand  Dairy  Board  is
currently both beneficiary and monitor of the arrangement;

(f)  to enact binding control rules for imports under reduced-rate customs quotas and, at the same time, to

revise the IMA1 customs certificate procedures which are currently in force;

(g)  to support the legitimate interests of all Community importers by enabling them, in accordance with
the rules of free world trade, to import products at a reduced rate under the same conditions as those
granted to exporters from countries benefiting from customs preferences;

EAGGF−Guarantee Section

25.
Notes  that  the  Commission  has  complied,  in  respect  of  the  BSE  problem,  with  most  of  the
recommendations formulated by the European Parliament’s temporary committee of inquiry, but requests
it, as part of the clearance of accounts, to recover in full the amounts paid out in contravention of the
Regulations in force, to report to Parliament explicitly on the state of recovery, and to continue its work on
setting up a comprehensive system for the identification and registration of bovine animals;

26.

Calls on the Commission once again:

(a)  to speed up implementation of an integrated system for the financial and budgetary management of

the EAGGF−Guidance Section;

(b)  to ensure that risk analysis is applied to all customs inspections for the arrangements which affect the

Community budget, including both exports and imports;

(c)  to speed up development of the new transit system;

(d)  to  improve  coordination  between  physical  and  a  posteriori  checks,  as  provided  for  by  Council
Regulation No 4045/89, and to step up laboratory analyses of agricultural products benefiting from
export refunds;

Notes that as regards the clearance of accounts for the EAGGF−Guarantee Section, for the years

27.
1993 and 1994, the case concerning Fle´chard and the state of recovery need further clarification;

28.
Notes, in agreement with the Council, that the Court of Auditors’ observations on durum wheat
refer to the text of the existing rules and have no implications in terms of implementation or irregularities
and that, consequently, there is no need to draw conclusions from them as part of the discharge procedure;
notes that it would nevertheless be appropriate for the legislative and budgetary authorities to give thought
to changes to make legislation more equitable;

Structural policies

29.
Notes  that  the  Court  of  Auditors,  reviewing  implementation  of  the  Structural  Funds,  expresses
several  criticisms,  supported  by  the  Council,  most  of  which  relate  to  the  need  for  better  coordination
between  the  legislation,  estimates  and  implementation  of  the  Structural  Funds;  emphasises  in  this
connection that:

(a)  the  budgetary  authority  will  need  to  budgetise  in  a  realistic  manner  the  amounts  in  the  financial
perspective  and  ensure  that  sufficient  payment  appropriations  are  entered  to  meet  actual  commit-
ments;

(b)  the  Commission  must  do  its  utmost  to  ensure  that  the  Member  States  keep  it  informed  of
implementation  operations  up  to  and  including  final  beneficiaries  (including  the  setting-up  of
databases);

(c)  the  legislative  authority  and  the  Commission  will  have  to  define  more  precisely  the  concept  of
additionality  and  the  detailed  arrangements  for  application  and  penalties  in  the  event  of  non-
compliance;

(d)  the Commission and the responsible authorities in the Member States must act at every level (entry of
appropriations,  implementation,  better  use  of  monitoring  committees)  in  order  to  narrow  the  gap
between legislation and implementation of structural measures;

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(e)  revision of the Financial Regulation and reform of the Structural Funds should be such as to give legal
commitments,  accounting  commitments  and  payments  a  status  accurately  reflecting  the  actual
implementation of actions financed;

Expects  to  receive  specific  proposals  on  this  matter  from  the  Commission  and  the  SEM  2000

30.
authorities which it will deal with during its work on Agenda 2000;

Internal policies

31.
Regrets that a grey area has emerged in the management of internal policies and observes that the
most striking examples in 1997 are to be found in the management of a scientific visitor and the Leonardo
programme;

32.
Deplores the Commission’s failure, despite several demands, to inform the European Parliament
about  the  management  problems  affecting  the  Leonardo  programme,  thus  letting  Parliament  vote  on
Leonardo II on a false basis;

Notes that the Commission has adopted certain of the measures recommended during the debate

33.
with the budgetary control authority, namely:

− 

− 

− 

revision of the status of visitors, which will in future preclude any distortions in recruitment;

termination  of  the  contract  with  the  TAO  Agenor  in  respect  of  management  of  the  Leonardo
programme;

takeover of the management of the programme by the Commission, which must happen without delay
and be accompanied by measures designed to ensure proper continuation of the programme;

Calls on the Commission to act without delay to recover in full the money paid to the scientific

34.
visitor for his contracts with DG XII and the JRC;

35.
Takes  the  view  that  the  irregularities  and  favouritism  which  characterised  the  Commission’s
management  are  symptomatic  of  responsibilities  situated  both  at  political  level  and  at  the  level  of  the
administration and supervisory authorities;

36.
Points  out  that  the  Commission  has  faced  up  to  its  institutional  responsibilities;  emphasises
however that the latter are also attributable to the imperfections of the system, which must be rectified by
measures relating to in-house and external staff;

External policy areas

(a)  Palestine

37.
Is  concerned  that  the  Commission,  although  hampered  by  extraneous  factors,  has  on  occasion
failed  to  deliver  and  monitor  its  programmes  effectively  and  notes  that  its  actions  have  often  been
characterised by a lack of coordination, leading, inter alia, to erratic patterns of disbursement;

Regrets that the Commission has embarked upon ambitious projects, such as the European Gaza
38.
Hospital,  with  insufficient  attention  to  their  feasibility  and  sustainability;  resulting  in  an  image  not
commensurate with the economic contribution of the European Union;

Calls  on  the  Commission,  within  the  context  of  its  strategic  priorities,  to  build  upon  people-

39.
to-people projects proven to be simple, visible and effective;

40.
Insists  that  the  European  Commission  improve  its  programme  preparation,  implementation  and
evaluation by significantly strengthening coordination with the Palestinian Ministry of Planning and other
responsible authorities and by establishing a management information system to prevent major problems
and delays;

(b)  South Africa

41.
Is concerned that the positive work undertaken by the Commission’s delegation in South Africa,
under difficult circumstances, to implement Community development aid is undermined by the slowness
and inflexibility of procedures imposed by the Commission in Brussels and is disturbed by the subsequent
tarnishing of the image of the European Union;

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42.
Notes  that  problems  have  been  repeatedly  raised  in  a  number  of  audit  reports  submitted  by  the
Court of Auditors, including the concentration of management powers in Brussels, lack of suitable staff in
the delegation and a general failure to manage and follow up projects in a timely and effective fashion;

Believes  that  the  delegation  in  South  Africa  should  be  recognised  as  a  key  office  and  deserves

43.
special attention from the Commission;

(c)  PHARE and TACIS

44.
Believes  that  the  situation  exposed  by  the  Commission’s  financial  controller  concerning  the
procedures for the award of PHARE and TACIS contracts is detrimental to the Union’s image in recipient
countries; calls on the Commission:

(a)  to fully comply with the Financial Regulation and therefore to award contracts by private treaty only

in exceptional cases;

(b)  to bring in the ACPC for all contracts involving administrative support costs;

(c)  to propose better arrangements in the context of revision of the Financial Regulation to make sure that
there  is  also  as  much  competition  as  possible  when  contracts  are  awarded  to  non-profit-making
institutions or associations;

(d)  to ensure genuine price competition between tenderers;

(e)  to provide reasons for the inclusion or exclusion of each firm on the list of those which may be invited

to submit tenders in the restricted procedure;

(f)  to  ensure  that  the  files  relating  to  the  award  of  contracts  are  complete  so  that  the  procedures

themselves may be reconstructed;

Calls on the Court of Auditors to carry out an audit of the procedures for the awarding of contracts

45.
and of the contents of the PHARE and TACIS files;

(d)  Management of external aid

46.
Notes that the joint RELEX service has not tackled the most important problem facing beneficiaries
of the PHARE and TACIS programmes concerning the long payment periods for participation in projects;
calls on the service to submit forthwith a proposal to modify the internal procedures in order to ensure
prompt payment of beneficiaries by the Commission;

Believes  it  is  essential  to  give  the  RELEX  service  a  genuine  added  value,  and  calls  on  the

47.
Commission:

(a)  to make available, as soon as possible, posts to meet the nominal staffing level of this service;

(b)  to give the services responsible for external relations enough staff to perform their strategic task of

setting guidelines;

(c)  to provide a precise breakdown of tasks performed by the external relations services and RELEX;

(d)  to speed up the programme of simplifying and harmonising procedures and typical contracts which

should be reduced to the bare minimum;

(e)  to write off, in agreement with the partner countries, all dormant commitments which can no longer be

completed satisfactorily;

(f)  to strive, in agreement with the legislative and budgetary authority, towards a genuine concentration

of priority actions;

(g)  to end its current policy of demanding bank guarantees from NGOs;

48.
Calls  on  the  new  Commission  to  make  the  management  of  pre-accession  aid  more  efficient  by
bringing under the same service implementation of the funds concerning enlargement, as provided for in
Parliament’s resolution of 14 January 1999 (PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD programmes);

C 279/128

EN

Official Journal of the European Communities

1.10.1999

Tuesday 4 May 1999

49.
Notes that, although the Commission has now forwarded to Parliament the internal audit reports on
Leonardo, it has not forwarded the eleven audit reports on the handling of certain contracts under ECHO
which the Committee on Budgetary Control requested in October 1998;

(e)  MED

Is concerned that there is still a considerable gap between commitments and actual payments for
50.
external aid to developing countries and third countries in the Mediterranean region and that there is no
sign of this trend reversing, despite the fact that the budgetary priorities have been set out in SEM 2000;
is concerned that the gap between theory and practice in respect of external aid is undermining the EU’s
credibility in this area;

(f)  Nuclear safety

51.
Believes that the delays and shortcomings in the Commission’s activities in the field of nuclear
safety  underline  the  inflexibility  and  inadequacy  of  the  Commission’s  resources  compared  with  the
importance of the task;

52.
Calls on the Institutions to ensure that there is in future a match between the resources and tasks
entrusted to the Commission, and calls on the Commission no longer to accept any responsibilities without
having the appropriate expertise and resources;

EAC

53.
Deeply regrets the fact that after 16 years the Commission has still not implemented Regulation
3245/81 on the European Association for Cooperation, despite the fact that this regulation is explicitly
mentioned in the remarks in the budget; calls for maximum transparency in winding up the Association,
subject to Belgian national legislation and close scrutiny by the Court of Auditors and the Commission’s
financial controller;

Fraud − OLAF

54. Welcomes the progress made in establishing OLAF and expects

− 

the Council to finalise the outcome of the negotiations before the end of May;

− 

the  Commission  to  confer  on  OLAF  all  the  powers  which  were  conferred  on  UCLAF  and
responsibility  for  all  matters  concerning  unlawful  activities,  regardless  of  whether  any  financial
damage is involved;

Repeats its call for a complete list to be submitted of instances of presumed fraud, corruption or

55.
other illegal acts committed by Commission officials;

EIF

56.
Recalling that the issue of transparent public audit and control of the EIF has been a long-festering
question which has been raised successively in each discharge decision since the creation of the Fund on
14 June 1994, urges the Commission to seize the initiative and ensure rapid agreement between all parties
to grant the Court of Auditors full access to the EIF, thereby enabling it to report to Parliament on the
strengths and weaknesses of EIF management of Community and own equity funds;

Decentralised agencies

57.
Regrets that the new statutes for the second-generation agencies which have been agreed by the
Commission  and  Parliament  are  being  blocked  by  the  Council,  thereby  preventing  Parliament  from
exercising its proper control and discharge powers.