Resolution on the decision-making process in the Council in an enlarged Europe
Date: 1999-02-11
Institutions: Committee on Constitutional Affairs, European Parliament
Subjects: Coreper, European Council, common foreign and security policy, decision-making, enlargement of the Union, petrochemicals, qualified majority













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51999IP0049

Resolution on the decision-making process in the Council in an enlarged Europe  


Official Journal C 150 , 28/05/1999 P. 0353 





A4-0049/99Resolution on the decision-making process in the Council in an enlarged EuropeThe European Parliament,- having regard to Rule 148 of the Rules of Procedure,- having regard to the report of its Committee on Institutional Affairs (A4-0049/99),A. whereas the European Parliament has a duty to carry out a critical analysis, accompanied by proposals, of the functioning of the major Union institutions, an analysis and proposals which take account of all the legal and statutory provisions, the formal or informal decision-making procedures and the administrative or political practices which, over and above the provisions of the Treaties, govern an institution and determine its effectiveness,B. having regard to the central role played by the European Council and the Council of Ministers in the Union decision-making system and the increasing paralysis of that system,C. whereas, in view of the extension of the Union's Monetary and political powers and of the run-up to the forthcoming enlargement, and prior to any further accession, there is a vital need to conduct an overall review of the role of the Council within the European Union and to carry out, by means of both Treaty amendments and major political and administrative changes:- a thoroughgoing reorganisation of the structure of and the roles entrusted to the various political and administrative bodies which participate in the Council's work - European Council, Council of Ministers, Coreper and the specialist committees - with a view to guaranteeing the coherence and consistency of that work;- the rationalisation and consolidation of procedures with a view to giving the Council and its work a suitable degree of effectiveness and transparency and reducing the weight of bureaucracy,D. whereas progress towards greater democratisation entails the implementation of principles which can be recognised by European citizens: the principle of majority voting, the political accountability of the authorities, scrutiny by parliamentary institutions, transparency of decision-making procedures,E. regarding as desirable progress towards a simple general model for the Union based on its dual nature as a union between Member States and a union between peoples in which the Commission will develop into a genuine European executive, with the European Parliament representing the people and the Council representing the Member States with a view to promoting a Union capable of acting as an integrated, united and coherent body, thereby increasing its international influence,F. whereas, during the preparations for a revision of the Treaties, democratic dialogue among the institutions is required, in accordance with Parliament's resolution of 19 November 1997 on the Amsterdam Treaty (CONF 4007/97 - C4-0538/97) ((OJ C 371, 8.12.1997, p. 99.)),I. THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL1. Calls, for the sake of transparency and rationalisation, for a revision of Article 202 (ex 145) EC, which determines the powers of the Council of Ministers of the European Union, so as to draw a clearer distinction between the three main aspects of its role:- the legislative and budgetary role it carries out jointly with Parliament on the basis of Commission proposals;- the governmental role, within which a clear distinction should be drawn between decision-making power, which rests with the Council, and the tasks of initiative and implementation, which should essentially fall within the competence of the Commission and, to some extent, the Member States;- the role of coordinating the position of national governments in areas of their responsibility;2. Expresses concern, in this connection, at the current trend which seeks to make the Council, in certain areas of responsibility, particularly those under the second pillar, an institution which, in addition to decision-making, carries out the tasks of proposing and implementing legislation to which it is ill suited, a trend which undermines the logical division of roles between the Commission and the Council;II. STRUCTURESThe European Council3. Emphasises the vital, irreplaceable role of laying down general guidelines and providing political impetus for the European Union which the European Council of Heads of State or Government plays and must continue to play;4. Takes the view that, in order to avoid the risk of drift and if it is to exercise more effectively its role of providing impetus and guidelines in an ever larger European Union, the European Council must lay down for itself clear operating rules with the aim, in particular, of:- avoiding over frequent meetings which might deprive its conclusions of the authority they gain from being exceptional, formal statements and limiting the number of informal meetings which do not lead to the adoption of conclusions;- ensuring that each European Council meeting is of sufficient duration so as to allow time for in-depth exchanges of views among the members of the European Council and encourage them to conclude substantive agreements;- maintaining, despite the increase in the number of participants following the enlargements, the interactive nature of exchanges of views among the members of the European Council by making frequent use of meetings of the European Council restricted to the Heads of State or Government and the President of the Commission, an approach which requires the amendment of Article 4 (ex D) of the EU Treaty, and by banning tours de table;- ensuring that the European Council is supplied with high-quality analyses, studies and proposals, primarily by the Commission, which calls for suitable preparation of European Council meetings based on a high level of cooperation between the Presidency, the General Affairs Council and the Commission;- banning, in the preparation of European Council meetings, any move to bypass the General Affairs Council by means of discussions involving a network of special advisers ('topnet'), the establishment of which could only serve to disrupt the normal interplay between the institutions;- in a move away from current practice, excluding from the conclusions adopted by the European Council all matters which have not been discussed by that body and which would inevitably water down the political message sent by the European Council to the peoples and institutions of the Union;5. Points out that, where they exercise decision-making power conferred on them by the Treaty, the Heads of State or Government should systematically meet not as the European Council but as the Council meeting at the level of the Heads of State or Government, which implies:- in terms of structures, that the President of the Commission should not be a member and that the ministers assisting the Heads of State or Government should be members of the specialist Council of Ministers competent to deal with the matters on the agenda;- in terms of procedures, that the Council meeting at this level should lay down for itself rules based on those employed by the Council, particularly as regards agendas, formal arrangements for the submission of the proposals discussed and decision-making;The Council6. Notes, in that connection, both the fact that the General Affairs Council is increasingly out of step with the work of the other councils of minsters and the highly adverse impact of this state of affairs, since one of this Council's main tasks is to ensure the unity of action and the overall consistency of the work of the Council of Ministers;7. Maintains that restoring the cohesiveness of the Council of Ministers will entail both the rehabilitation and the revamping of the General Affairs Council (GAC):a) rehabilitation calls for a clear restatement and strengthening of the powers of the GAC, which implies, in particular, that it should be incumbent on the GAC, rather than on the Presidency, but on a proposal from the latter and after consultation of the Commission, to take decisions concerning:- the drafting of the Council's programme of work;- the calendar of meetings of the specialist councils, which should make it possible to bring an end to the situation whereby all those councils almost automatically meet once every six months, the only practical way of reducing the needlessly high number of specialist councils;- the allocation of work between itself and the various specialist councils, thereby giving it control over its own area of responsibility and enabling it to retain an overview of horizontal matters;- the preparation of European Council meetings;b) the revamping implies a change in the make-up of the Council:- the GAC should comprise the government figures most closely involved, under the authority of their head of government, in the coordination of national policies, rather than, as a matter of principle, the foreign ministers;- the GAC should therefore be completely separate, as regards its meetings and also its make-up, from the Council of Foreign Ministers;- the distinction drawn between the two councils should make it easier for ministers to be present throughout GAC meetings;8. Points out that the effectiveness of the General Affairs Council and, more generally, the cohesiveness of the Council can primarily be increased by making the requisite improvements to interministerial coordination in the Member State governments;9. Would be in favour, in the context of the Council's legislative activity and where necessary, of the possibility of convening formal Councils of Ministers responsible for matters relating to women's rights;The Presidency10. Notes, that the conditions under which future presidencies will be carried out, in particular the longer rotation cycle, the accession to the Presidency of states with small populations and the greater disparities among the states taking on the role, will have a bearing on the nature of the responsibilities borne by the Presidency;11. Predicts, therefore, that the Presidency will be forced to concentrate on its conciliation tasks and hand over the tasks of leadership of the Union and the conduct of foreign policy to the President of the Commission and the High Representative for the CFSP, a trend which will require the appointment to these two posts of eminent persons with a clear political profile;12. Takes the view that the changes ordinarily suggested for the Presidency - longer presidencies, sharing of responsibilities among several Member States, ending of the strict rota system - in fact present more drawbacks than the retention of the status quo, but that it would be wise not to entrust the Presidency of the Union to a state which has been a member for less than three years;13. Takes the view, however, that the number of ministers chairing specialist councils should be substantially reduced, with the same minister chairing several councils, so as to facilitate coordination within the Presidency and reduce the risks of inconsistency among the various councils;High Representative for the CFSP14. Reiterates its criticisms of the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty establishing, within the Council rather than the Commission, the post of High Representative for the CFSP; the placing of that post runs counter to:- the optimum division of responsibilities between the Council and the Commission;- the consistency vital to international action by the Union which affects the three pillars simultaneously;The committees15. Regards it as essential that Coreper be given the means to carry out to the full its role of providing administrative coordination for the Council's work;16. Takes the view that the slow-down in legislative activity in the Council over the last few years, combined with more manageable agendas, should enable Coreper itself to take on some of the administrative tasks conferred by the Treaties on the major specialist committees without it being necessary to establish a Coreper III which might undermine the body's internal cohesiveness;17. Takes the view, in this connection, that there is an imbalance in the division of tasks between Coreper I and Coreper II and that Coreper II should have its responsibilities substantially increased in the areas of international action and judicial and police affairs given that these various aspects of the Union's activities are covered by pillars which are separate but inextricably linked;18. Deplores the fact that certain specialist committees, particularly the Political Committee, have taken to submitting their proposals to the Council without first putting them to Coreper, a breach of Article 207 (ex 151) of the EC Treaty, even though compliance with that provision is vital to the coherent functioning of the institution;19. Acknowledges that, owing to the specific nature of the matters they deal with, the drawbacks involved are too great for the Special Committee on Agriculture and the Monetary Committee to be disbanded and for their role to be taken over directly by Coreper;20. Argues, however, that the same cannot be said of the Political Committee or the K.4 Committee, which, since they lack both the Community-based philosophy required to provide the Council with genuinely joint proposals and the political authority to conclude proper intergovernmental agreements, should have their responsibilities taken over by Coreper II; notes, further, that this reorganisation would have the advantage not only of restoring the authority of Coreper II, but also of fostering greater consistency between the actions taken under the second and third pillars, actions which are more and more closely linked;21. Expresses concern at the proposal to establish, within the first pillar, a body symmetrical with the K.4 Committee competent to deal with matters which the Amsterdam Treaty has transferred from the third to the first pillar, since the establishment of such a body would serve to reverse in part the Communitisation of the policies transferred and introduce inappropriate working methods into the first pillar;III. PROCEDURESProposal of legislation22. Urges, in respect of all decisions submitted to the Council or the European Council, that the Treaty should explicitly provide for a power of initiative which cannot be enjoyed by the Council itself and which should, except in cases where it is shared with the Member States, rest with the Commission;23. Emphasises, in particular, that the exercise of the power of appointment to the most senior posts in the European Union - e.g. the President of the Commission or the European Central Bank - makes it essential, in order to avoid any repetition of past mistakes, that the conditions governing the submission and admissibility of applications, their consideration on the basis of hearings of the candidates and decision-making by a qualified majority are clearly laid down;24. Deplores the weak, restricted nature of the initiatives taken in the sphere of the CFSP since the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty;25. Fears that the planning and early warning unit will be reduced to a simple juxtaposition of national officials, on the basis of one per Member State, which would then operate as an additional Council working party;26. Expresses the hope that the High Representative for the CFSP will be quickly appointed and is able to contribute to the revival of international action by the Union, which presupposes:- that the High Representative should be a politician, rather than an administrator;- that he should establish himself as the leader of what would be a genuine planning and early warning unit consistent with the objective laid down in the Treaty, i.e. a proper joint administration;- that he should establish fruitful cooperation with the Commission based on trust, with a view to being integrated into that body;- that until he has been integrated into the Commission he should give an account of his work to Parliament;Extension of qualified majority voting27. Deplores the fact that the Amsterdam Treaty created or retained many instances in which the Council, the European Council or the Member State governments must act unanimously and emphasises that, in a European Union which should shortly have more than 20 Member States, unanimity is an arrangement fundamentally inappropriate to effective decision-making and serves to hamper the sound general functioning of the Union when the decision concerned is horizontal in nature, for example appointments, and, indirectly, to render meaningless a Community power laid down by the Treaty when the decision is sectoral in nature;28. Condemns, further, the Council's propensity to circumvent, in the context of its internal rules or unilateral decisions, the majority rules laid down by the Treaty or by means of interinstitutional agreements; condemns, in particular:- the undermining, in the Council's internal rules, of the provisions of the interinstitutional agreement on the revision of the financial perspective;- the tendency not to submit a Commission proposal to the Council before it has been the subject of unanimous agreement among the members of the competent Council working party, regardless of how long this takes;29. Urges, therefore, that the future Treaty should, subject to the points made below, lay down a general principle of qualified majority voting applicable to all Council decisions, regardless of their nature, with the exception of the revision or accession decisions provided for in Articles 48 and 49 (ex Articles N and O) of the Treaty on European Union and the constitutional decisions provided for in Articles 190, 269 and 308 (ex 138, 201 and 235) of the EC Treaty;30. Takes the view, however, that the European Council of Heads of State or Government must be able to retain, when exercising its role as a provider of political guidelines and impetus as laid down in Article 4 (ex D) EU, specific operating arrangements in so far as it merely adopts conclusions on a proposal from the Presidency and does not strictly speaking take decisions;31. Maintains, a contrario, that the Heads of State or Government should employ the qualified majority rule in use in the Council of Ministers, as they did at the Milan European Council, as soon as their deliberations take the form of a meeting of the Council at the level of the Heads of State or Government or the European Council takes a decision for which explicit provision is made in the Treaty: appointments, decisions concerning EMU, the convening of an Intergovernmental Conference, and joint 'strategies' in the sphere of the CFSP;32. Since the so-called positive abstention procedure represents only a limited advance, leaving open the possibility for any Member State to oppose the adoption of a strategy, an action or a joint position, takes the view, in the sphere of the CFSP, that consideration should be given to the extent to which unanimity could be replaced by qualified majority voting, that provision to be accompanied by a clause specifying the possible non-involvement of the Member States making up the minority, so as to guarantee that no Member State could be compelled to commit its armed forces, and with any expenditure generated still being met from the Community budget;33. Proposes, however, that the own resources ceiling should be determined by means of a more simple procedure;Weighting of votes34. Takes the view that the Treaty could ultimately replace the current weighting system with a double majority system;35. In the meantime, reiterates its commitment to a system for the weighting of votes which combines arrangements to take account of the population differences among the Member States with the relative over-representation of the Member States with small and medium-sized populations;36. Takes the view that any change in the number of votes allocated to Member States must serve not to overturn but rather maintain the current balances;37. Regrets the fact that the Amsterdam Treaty contains no provisions on the adjustment of the weighting of votes and that the protocol on the reform of the institutions annexed to the Treaty proposes only vague or unsuitable solutions;38. Expresses surprise, in this connection, at the interest apparently being generated by the idea of introducing, with no change to the current weighting system, a provision which would prevent the constitution in the Council of a majority comprising Member States representing only a minority of the Community population, given that the very idea of such a majority is not only politically unrealistic, but quite simply arithmetically impossible in a European Union with fewer than 32 Member States;39. Advocates, in connection with future accession treaties, a minor adjustment of the weighting system solely intended to:a) avoid too much levelling-out in the number of votes allocated to the Member States with medium-sized, small or very small populations;b) maintain the current balances;40. Takes the view that the Member States must focus on reaching agreement on a method for the objective assessment of the balances to be maintained and proposes, in that connection, the establishment of a fixed ratio linking two changing percentages: the percentage of votes in the Council held by the most populous Member States and the percentage of the total population of the European Union accounted for by those same Member States; the allocation of additional points to Member States with too few votes by comparison with their population would be determined by the fall in the ratio and would serve merely to restore it to its previous level;Transparency41. Reiterates that, if the democratic requirement stipulating that the work of the Council must be transparent is to be met, the vote in connection with every substantive legislative, budgetary or implementing decision reached by the Council must take place in public, along with the accompanying deliberations and explanations of vote, with the exception of decisions in the sphere of the CFSP if the publication thereof would run counter to their effective implementation;42. Calls on the Council to revise its internal Rules of Procedure accordingly with a view to abolishing the exceptions to the principle of publication set out in Rule 7(5);Implementation43. Reiterates its view that it should not be incumbent on the Council and its committees, but rather on the Commission, on the one hand, and the Member States, on the other, to implement legislative and budgetary decisions; draws attention, in this connection, to the terms of its resolution of 16 September 1998 on commitology ((OJ C 313, 12.10.1998, p. 101.)) and emphasises in particular the need for symmetry between the rights of Parliament and the Council as regards the scrutiny of measures taken to implement legislative acts;44. Urges the Member States to establish an effective hierarchy for the implementation of CFSP decisions, which will require:- the redistribution and unification within the Commission of responsibility for international action;- a greater role for the planning and early warning unit in the coordination of measures to implement CFSP decisions and the development of synergy between it and the Commission's international services;- consolidation of the political role of the High Representative, who should eventually become a member of the Commission;45. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and the applicant countries.